# Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity

## Collected Essays, 1959–2012, by Abraham J. Malherbe

EDITED BY

*Carl. R. Holladay, John T. Fitzgerald, Gregory E. Sterling, James W. Thompson*

SUPPLEMENTS TO NOVUM TESTAMENTUM 150

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Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity

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Volume 1

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This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Dedicated to those remarkable students
with whom it was my privilege to work
at Abilene Christian College
and Yale University

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3. "Heracles" originally appeared in German under the title "Herakles," *RAC* 14 (1988), 559–583.
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11. "Athenagoras on the Location of God," *Theologische Zeitschrift* 26 (1970): 46–52.
12. "Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers," in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann; 2 vols.; Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 1:214–225.
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20. Review of Helmut Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament* (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982); reviewed in *Religious Studies Review* 10 (1984): 112–116.
21. "On the Writing of Commentaries," *Restoration Quarterly* 53 (2011): 129–140.

The editors wish to acknowledge with gratitude the permission given by publishers and editors mentioned in the above list to publish the essays in this collection.

# EDITORS' FOREWORD

At the Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting, which met in New Orleans in November 2009, John Fitzgerald and Carl Holladay met with Abe and Phyllis Malherbe to discuss the disposition of Abe's archives and the possibility of publishing his collected essays. Initially he was reluctant to pursue either topic since he was preoccupied with his own research and writing. Nor did he want us to take time away from our own work to assist him in pulling together his scholarly essays. We assured him that we had graduate students who could help us scan copies of his published essays, convert those pdf files into editable Word .doc files, and then edit and update those articles so that they could be useful for the wider community of scholars who shared Abe's scholarly interests and who could benefit from having easier access to his articles.

A few weeks later, after reflecting on our proposal and discussing it with Phyllis, Abe consented. Meanwhile, James Thompson and Greg Sterling agreed to share the editorial responsibilities, which meant that we could divide the labor four ways. Over the course of several conference calls, the five of us worked out the editorial protocols that we would follow. Among other things, we decided to update the bibliography whenever feasible and, of course, to standardize the bibliographical citations, using the *Society of Biblical Literature Handbook of Style* as our primary stylebook. We decided to regard each article as a self-contained essay, as though it stood in a scholarly journal. In each essay, full bibliographical citation would be given with the initial mention of a scholarly article or book, and abbreviated accordingly in the remainder of the essay. We would try, if possible, to supply full publication information, including the name of the series in which the item occurred. We would also use the standard abbreviations for journals and series throughout the collection but provide a comprehensive list of abbreviations in the front matter.

In keeping with the high scholarly standards of Abe's published articles, we also decided to display Greek quotations using Greek fonts rather than using English transliteration. Since different formats of displaying Greek and Latin quotations were used in the original published articles, this meant that much of the Greek had to be re-entered manually and checked for accuracy. Since many of the articles were originally written for non-specialists, Abe often used the English titles of primary sources.

But we decided to use the Latin titles of the primary sources when feasible and convert all of the abbreviated titles to conform to the *SBL Handbook of Style*.

The decision to update the scholarship extended beyond bibliography. In Abe's early work on Athenagoras, which was the focus of his dissertation research at Harvard, he used the accepted scholarly title *Supplicatio pro Christianis*. In the past few decades, however, patristics scholars have adopted the title *Legatio pro Christianis*, and we have changed those references accordingly. This also meant using a more up-to-date text. Whereas Abe had used Johannes Geffcken's edition, citing page and line number, we decided to use William Schoedel's Oxford edition, citing chapter and section numbers. Another modification relates to the shift in scholarly consensus relating to the ancient Middle Platonist Albinus. Earlier scholarship attributed two works to Albinus: a *Handbook of Platonism* (*Epitome doctrinae platonicae* or *Didaskalikos*) and an *Introduction to Plato* (*Introductio in Platonem*, also known as *Prologus* or *Eisagōge*). Influenced by the work of John Whittaker, classical scholars now attribute the former work to Alcinous, while retaining the attribution of the latter work to Albinus.[1] In the patristic essays, and elsewhere in the collection, we have introduced this distinction, with explanatory annotations at each point to orient the reader.[2]

The essays are arranged according to the three main areas of Abe's scholarly work: New Testament, Hellenistic philosophy, and patristics. A fourth section includes some of his more occasional pieces, ranging from theological lectures to scholarly book reviews. Not every published essay appears in this collection. Through consultation with Abe, the editors selected essays from his early period, many of which were published in *Restoration Quarterly*, a journal that he co-founded in the 1950s. We selected essays that represented the best of his scholarship from that period, along with those that became widely influential, such as "The Task and Method of Exegesis."

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[1] John Whittaker and Pierre Louis, *Enseignement des doctrines de Platon* (Collection des universités de France; Paris: Belles lettres, 1990); also see John Dillon, *Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

[2] This distinction is now reflected in the fourth edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*. See "Alcinous (2)," *OCD*[4], 53, and "Albinus (1)," *OCD*[4], 49. Accordingly, we use the following abbreviations for these respective works: Alcinous, *Didask.*, and Albinus, *Intr.* It should be noted that the SBL *Handbook of Style* reflects the older consensus and attributes both works to Albinus.

In some cases, Abe was initially reluctant to publish some of the essays. He worried that the essay "Toward Understanding the Apologists" was too general and would be of limited value, but on further reflection he changed his mind. Working back through the essays also prompted further reflection, for example, on his essay "Conversion to Paul's Gospel," written for a festschrift honoring his long-time friend Everett Ferguson. "That was a bad title," he recalled. "Conversion is to God, not the message," he observed. He also wondered whether it would be worth the effort to resurrect the essay on Heracles, which he wrote in English and which was translated into German for publication in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*. But once it was done, through the monumental efforts of Drew Denton, an Emory doctoral student in historical studies, he was pleased with the result and glad that we decided to include it.

The essays cover a fifty-year span. Within each section, the essays are arranged chronologically for the most part. Since some of the essays were revised and re-published in other venues, we opted for the earlier publication date. This arrangement enables the reader to see how Abe's scholarly interests developed within particular areas over time. While working on the essay "Athenagoras on Christian Ethics," he commented that in the first few pages of this essay one could see how his research interests began to shift from what he called "high flown Platonism" to "the more common man's philosophy, Cynicism."

One of the most challenging essays was "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," which has an unusual history. One of the chief difficulties was its delayed publication. Invited to do this essay for *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, he submitted the manuscript to de Gruyter in 1972, and it appeared twenty years later, in 1992! He had numerous exchanges with the editors, who asked him to submit revisions and updates. This accounts for the odd footnote numeration in the original published essay. Meanwhile, a pirated copy of the manuscript somehow became available, and it began to be cited by other scholars as "forthcoming." And as Greg Sterling noted—with only slight exaggeration—in one of his memorial tributes to Abe, this article was perhaps the most frequently cited "forthcoming article" in the history of NT scholarship! When the article finally appeared, Abe appended a letter to the offprint that he sent his friends and colleagues, explaining (and apologizing) for the delay. We convinced Abe to include this letter in the opening footnote to this essay.

Given the redactional history of "Hellenistic Moralists" and its extended gestation period, it provides a unique window into two decades of Abe's

scholarly development. Throughout this period, his doctoral students were working on many of the ideas that he introduced in the essay. As they would complete their dissertations and publish their work, he would send this updated information to the publisher. Consequently, the article chronicles the work of his Yale doctoral students, as well as Abe's pursuit of his own scholarly agenda. This was also a critically important article in Abe's tenure decision at Yale in the early 70s. It enabled his colleagues to see the ground-breaking work he was doing in relating the New Testament to Hellenistic culture, in particular Hellenistic philosophy. And it was laying the groundwork for his later work on the Thessalonian letters.

To Amanda Davis Bledsoe goes the credit for getting "Hellenistic Moralists" into its final form. She worked on this essay for several months, not only standardizing the bibliographical citations but also checking the primary references. She also played a major role in editing a large percentage of the other essays in the volume. In Abe's comments, he wrote, "I am in awe at the amount of labor that Amanda has expended on it." After working through the essays, Abe also gave this impression: "Over the twenty-plus years that I worked on this article, my style changed. In the beginning, I write tightly, in the style of a German reference work. Towards the end, I am more freewheeling, especially as I deliver myself of opinions and judgments." He also commented that it would be a wonderful article to use in a NT doctoral seminar introducing students to the Graeco-Roman world. Spending a week on each of the sub-topics, assessing the current state of scholarship while students worked through the primary texts, he suggested, would be an enriching experience.

By now, it should be clear to the reader how the editorial process of this collection unfolded. Each of the four editors took responsibility for roughly a quarter of the essays. They and their graduate assistants were responsible for converting the pdf files into editable files. Along with the editing also came the fresh entry of Greek quotations and bibliographical updating as needed. Rather than having Abe relate to four different editors, the decision was made early on to send the edited essays to Atlanta, where the Emory team would check and refine them. Once an essay had reached final form, it would be sent as hard copy to Abe, with a specific list of questions or items to verify. After reading the essay, Abe would send it back to Atlanta, where his suggestions and revisions would be included in the final "canonical form."

Before his death on September 28, 2012, Abe had signed off on all but three of the essays. As he read the essays, he would occasionally supply additional bibliography. But, as he noted, he resisted the temptation to keep adding bibliography. He also worked with us in supplying headings

and sub-headings, as well as in other matters of formatting. The essays, as they appear, are formatted according to his wishes.

Throughout the whole editorial process, Abe was well aware of how much effort the graduate assistants had expended toward this project. Two of them have already been mentioned—Drew Denton and Amanda Davis Bledsoe, who, along with other Emory students Chris Holmes, Dan Shoemake, and Devin White, assumed heavy responsibility in getting the essays into a form suitable for Abe's final review. Early on, Bo Adams lent his considerable technological skills to the project, taking special pains to equip Abe's New Haven computer with what he needed to process electronic files—all to no avail! In the end, we decided that the old-fashioned way of sending and receiving paper manuscripts still worked best. But Abe remained especially appreciative of all the hard work Bo contributed to the project. Emory students Chris Holmes, along with Michael Suh, Jonathan Potter, Justin Walker, and Dan Shoemake, lent valuable assisting in preparing the indexes. A special word of thanks goes to Wesley Dingman at Abilene Christian University, who compiled the Greek word index and, in the process, discovered numerous errors in the Greek. Stephen and Kathryn Long at the University of Notre Dame also lent valuable assistance in compiling the Latin word index, working on other parts of the index, and general editing.

At Abilene Christian University Joel Brown lent valuable technological and editorial assistance to James and Carolyn Thompson, as did Aaron Sanders for Greg Sterling at the University of Notre Dame. A special word of gratitude is due Carolyn Thompson for her editorial assistance at many levels. Since several of the later essays were published in *Restoration Quarterly*, Carolyn played a valuable role in preparing them for their initial publication, but also for their subsequent inclusion in this collection.

A final work of thanks to Phyllis for her support of this project. An integral part of Abe's scholarly life, Phyllis played a vital role in the editing and production of the original essays. In their republished form, these essays are a tribute to her devotion, efficiency, and industry.

We had hoped to present this collection of essays to Abe and Phyllis at the Society of Biblical Literature Annual Meeting in Baltimore in November 2013. Our deep regret is that these essays will be published posthumously.[3] But because of Abe's active involvement in—and

[3] For memorial tributes, see Carl R. Holladay, "Memorial Service for Abraham J. Malherbe," *ResQ* 55 (2013): 7–13; Cilliers Breytenbach and Johan C. Thom, "Abraham J. Malherbe (1930–2012)," *NovT* 55 (2013): 100–101; Jan G. van der Watt, "Abraham (Abe) Johannes Malherbe (1930–2012)—teoloog en mens / theologian and human," *Hervormde Teologiese*

thorough endorsement of—the project from its inception and virtually to the end, we also have a deep satisfaction that the essays are as he wanted them to be.

Carl R. Holladay
John T. Fitzgerald
Gregory E. Sterling
James W. Thompson

*Studies* 68:1 (2012), Article #1346, 9 pages, http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v68i1.1346. Also see John T. Fitzgerald, "Abraham J. Malherbe as a New Testament Scholar: An Analysis and Appreciation, Part I, The Early Years," *ResQ* 46 (2004): 163–200; "Part II,The Later Years," forthcoming, 2014.

# ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations follow *The SBL Handbook of Style for Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Early Christian Studies* (ed. Patrick H. Alexander, John F. Kutsko, James D. Ernest, Shirley A. Decker-Lucke, and David L. Petersen; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999) and, for additional journals and series, Siegfried M. Schwertner, *IATG²: Internationales Abkürzungsverzeichnis für Theologie und Grenzgebiete / International Glossary of Abbreviations for Theology and Related Subjects* (2d ed.; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1992).

| | |
|---|---|
| AAAbo | Acta Academiae Aboensis |
| AASF | Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae |
| *AAST* | *Atti dell' Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino* |
| AB | Anchor Bible |
| *ABD* | *Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Edited by D.N. Freedman. 6 vols. New York, 1992. |
| *ABR* | *Australian Biblical Review* |
| ACW | Ancient Christian Writers. 1946– |
| ADAW.PH | Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin. Philosophisch-historische Klasse |
| *Aeg* | *Aegyptus* |
| AF | Archäologische Forschungen |
| AGSU | Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Spätjudentums und Urchristentums |
| AGWG | Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen |
| AJEC | Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity |
| *AJP* | *American Journal of Philology* |
| AKG | Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte |
| AMA | Athenäums Monografien Altertumswissenschaft |
| AM.T | Athenäums Monografien Theologie |
| AnBib | Analecta biblica |
| *AncSoc* | *Ancient Society* |
| AnGr | Analecta Gregoriana |
| *ANRW* | *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung*. Edited by H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972– |

| | |
|---|---|
| ANTC | Abingdon New Testament Commentaries |
| APAW.PH | Abhandlungen der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin. Philosophisch-historische Klasse |
| APF | Acta Philosophica Fennica |
| *AR* | *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* |
| ASGW | Abhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften |
| ASNU | Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis |
| ATDan | Acta theologica Danica |
| ATSLC | Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere La Colombaria |
| *AuA* | *Antike und Abendland* |
| AUC | Acta Universitatis Carolinae |
| AUL | Acta Universitatis Lundensis |
| AUU | Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis |
| BA | Beiträge zur Altertumskunde |
| BAG | Bauer, W., W.F. Arndt, and F.W. Gingrich. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. Chicago, 1957. |
| BAGD | Bauer, W., W.F. Arndt, F.W. Gingrich, and F.W. Danker. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. 2d ed. Chicago, 1979. |
| BAKG | Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte |
| *BAR* | *Biblical Archaeology Review* |
| BAW | Bibliothek der alten Welt |
| BBB | Bonner biblische Beiträge |
| BCF | Biblioteca di cultura filosofica |
| *BCLAB* | *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques de l'Académie Royale de Belgique* |
| BDAG | Danker, F.W., W. Bauer, W.F. Arndt, and F.W. Gingrich. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. 3d ed. Chicago, 2000. |
| BDF | Blass, F., A. Debrunner, and R.W. Funk. *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*. Chicago, 1961. |
| BEFAR | Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome |
| BETL | Bibliotheca ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium |
| BEvT | Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie |
| BFCT | Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie |
| BGBE | Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Exegese |

BGPhMA Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters
BGU *Aegyptische Urkunden aus den Königlichen Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin, Griechische Urkunden*. 15 vols. Berlin, 1895–1983.
BHEgl Bibliothèque de l'histoire de l'église
BHP Bibliothèque d'histoire de la philosophie
BHT Beiträge zur historischen Theologie
*Bib* *Biblica*
*BibInt* *Biblical Interpretation*
*BibLeb* *Bibel und Leben*
BibS(N) Biblische Studien (Neukirchen, 1951–)
BICS Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London
*BJRL* *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester*
BK Berliner Klassikertexte
BKAW Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften
BKP Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie
BNTC Black's New Testament Commentaries
BP Biblioteca patristica
BSGRT Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana
BStS Biblioteca di studi superiori
BT.HD Bibliothèque de théologie. Histoire des doctrines chrétiennes avant Nicée
BTN Bibliotheca theologica Norvegica
BT(N) Bibliothèque théologique. Neuchâtel.
BU Biblische Untersuchungen
*ByzZ* *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*
*BZ* *Biblische Zeitschrift*
BZNW Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche
CAGBQS Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina. Quellen und Studien
*CBQ* *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
CBQMS Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CCS Cambridge Classical Studies
CCSL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
CCTC Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries
CEA Collection d'études anciennes

| | |
|---|---|
| CGC | Collection Les Grandes civilisations |
| CGLC | Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics |
| *CIL* | *Corpus inscriptionum latinarum* |
| *CJ* | *Classical Journal* |
| CL | The Cloister Library |
| *ClB* | *Classical Bulletin* |
| *CM* | *Classica et Mediaevalia* |
| CMOM | Collection de la Maison de l'Orient Méditerannéen Ancien |
| CNT | Commentaire du Nouveau Testament |
| CollLat | Collection Latomus |
| *Colloq* | *Colloquium* |
| ColPhil | Collection Philosophica |
| ConBNT | Coniectanea neotestamentica or Coniectanea biblica: New Testament Series |
| *CP* | *Classical Philology* |
| *CQ* | *Classical Quarterly* |
| CSCP | Cornell Studies in Classical Philology |
| CSCT | Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition |
| CSEL | Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum |
| CSVU | Collectio scriptorum veterum Upsaliensis |
| CTL | Crown Theological Library |
| CWS | Classics of Western Spirituality |
| DAWB | Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin |
| *DCB* | *Dictionary of Christian Biography*. 4 vols. Edited by William Smith and Henry Wace. London: J. Murray, 1877–1887. |
| DEA | Das Erbe der Alten |
| DEOC | Documents pour servir à l'étude des origines chrétiennes |
| *DLZ* | *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* |
| DPH | Dissertationes Philologicae Halenses |
| EB | Echter Bibel |
| *EBib* | *Études bibliques* |
| ECC | Eerdmans Critical Commentary |
| ECTSPA | Elenchos: Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico |
| EHS | Europäische Hochschulschriften |
| EKKNT | Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament |
| *EMZ* | *Evangelische Missionszeitschrift* |
| EnAC | Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, Genève, Fondation Hardt |
| EPRO | Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'empire romain |
| *ETL* | *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* |

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|---|---|
| ETS | Erfurter theologische Studien |
| EvFo | Evangelisches Forum |
| *EvT* | *Evangelische Theologie* |
| *ExpTim* | *Expository Times* |
| FB | Forschung zur Bibel |
| FChLDG | Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte |
| FF | Foundations and Facets |
| *FGH* | *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Edited by F. Jacoby. Leiden, 1954–1964. |
| FGNK | Forschungen zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons und der altchristlichen Literatur |
| FHG | Fragmenta historicum graecorum. Paris, 1841–1870. |
| FKDG | Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte |
| FKGG | Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte |
| FRLANT | Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments |
| *FVS* | *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und Deutsch.* Edited by Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz. 3 vols. 6th ed. Berlin: Weidmann, 1951–1952. |
| GCS | Die griechische christliche Schriftsteller der ersten [drei] Jahrhunderte |
| *GM* | *Giornale di metafisica* |
| *Gn* | *Gnomon* |
| GNC | Good News Commentary |
| *Gnom. Byz.* | C. Wachsmuth, "*Gnomologium Byzantinum* ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου Ἰσοκράτους Ἐπικτήτου e variis codicum exemplis restitutum." Pages 162–207 in *Studien zu den griechischen Florilegien.* Berlin: Weidmann, 1882. Repr., Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1971. |
| *Gnom. Vat.* | Leo Sternbach, *Gnomologium Vaticanum e Codice Vaticano Graeco 743*. Originally published in *Wiener Studien*, 1887–1889. Repr., Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963. |
| *GR* | *Greece and Rome* |
| *GRBS* | *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* |
| *Greg* | *Gregorianum* |
| GTA | Göttinger theologische Arbeiten |
| GUR | Greifswalder Universitäts-Reden |
| *Gym.* | *Gymnasium. Zeitschrift für Kultur der Antike und humanistischen Bildung* |
| HABES | Heidelberger althistorische Beiträge und epigraphische Studien |

HAW Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft
HB Humanistische Bibliothek
HBS Herders biblische Studien
HCS Hellenistic Culture and Society
*HDB* Hastings, James. *Dictionary of the Bible*. 5 vols. New York, 1898–1904.
*Hen* *Henoch*
Hercher *Epistolographi Graeci*. Edited by Rudolf Hercher. SGB 47. Paris: A.F. Didot, 1873; repr., Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1965.
*Herm* *Hermanthena*
*Hermes* *Hermes: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie*
HermesE *Hermes* Einzelschriften
HistRhet A History of Rhetoric
HNT Handbuch zum Neuen Testament
HNTC Harper's New Testament Commentaries
*HR* *History of Religions*
*HSCP* *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
HThSt Hamburger theologische Studien
HTKNT Herders theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
*HTR* *Harvard Theological Review*
HTS Harvard Theological Studies
*HUCA* *Hebrew Union College Annual*
HumC.G Humanitas Christiana. Griechische Reihe
HUT Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie
Hyp. Hypomnemata. Untersuchungen zur Antike und zu ihrem Nachleben
*HZ* *Historische Zeitschrift*
ICC International Critical Commentary
*IDBSup* *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible: Supplementary Volume*. Edited by K. Crim. Nashville, 1976.
*IG* *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Editio minor. Berlin, 1924–
*ILS* *Inscriptiones Latinae selectae*. Edited by Hermann Dessau. 3 vols. in 5. Berlin: Weidmann, 1892–1916.
*Int* *Interpretation*
*JAAR* *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*
JAC Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum
*JBL* *Journal of Biblical Literature*
*JBR* *Journal of Bible and Religion*
*JCPh* *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*
*JEH* *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
*JETS* *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*

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|---|---|
| *JHS* | *Journal of Hellenic Studies* |
| *JR* | *Journal of Religion* |
| *JRAS* | *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* |
| *JRelS* | *Journal of Religious Studies* |
| *JRH* | *Journal of Religious History* |
| *JSJ* | *Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Periods* |
| JSNTSup | Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series |
| *JSOT* | *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* |
| *JTC* | *Journal for Theology and the Church* |
| *JTS* | *Journal of Theological Studies* |
| KBANT | Kommentare und Beiträge zum Alten und Neuen Testament |
| KEK | Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Meyer-Kommentar) |
| KI | Kritische Information |
| *KlPauly* | *Der kleine Pauly* |
| KlT | Kleine Texte |
| KPS | Klassisch-philologische Studien |
| KTA | Kröners Taschenausgabe |
| LAB | Living Age Books |
| *LAW* | *Lexikon der alten Welt* |
| LCL | Loeb Classical Library |
| LEC | Library of Early Christianity |
| LGE | Lyricorum graecorum quae exstant |
| *Light* | *Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays, 1959–2012, by Abraham J. Malherbe*. 2 vols.; NovTSup 150.1–2; Leiden: Brill, 2014 |
| *LR* | *Lutherische Rundschau* |
| LSCP | Leipziger Studien für classischen Philologie |
| LSJ | Liddell, H.G., R. Scott, H.S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th ed. with revised supplement. Oxford, 1996. |
| LWC | Living Word Commentary |
| LXX | Septuagint |
| MAC | Monumenti di antichità cristiana |
| MBTh | Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie |
| *MH* | *Museum helveticum* |
| MM | Moulton, James H., and George Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament: Illustrated from the Papyri and Other Non-literary Sources*. London, 1930. Reprint, Peabody, Mass., 1997. |
| MMT | Makers of Modern Theology |

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|---|---|
| MR | Mythes et religions |
| MS | Millennium Studies |
| MThS | Münchener theologische Studien |
| MThSt | Marburger theologische Studien |
| MUS | Münchener Universitätsschriften |
| MWF(L) | Missionswissenschaftliche Forschungen. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Missionswissenschaft. Leipzig. |
| *NAWG* | *Nachrichten (von) der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* |
| NCB | New Century Bible |
| NClB | New Clarendon Bible |
| NCTD | Nouvelle collection de textes et documents |
| *NedTT* | *Nederlands theologisch tijdschrift* |
| *NeueZST* | *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* |
| *NewDocs* | *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity*. Edited by G.H.R. Horsley and S. Llewelyn. North Ryde, N.S.W., 1981– |
| NICNT | New International Commentary on the New Testament |
| NIGTC | New International Greek Testament Commentary |
| NIV | New International Version |
| *NJahrb* | *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum (1898–1925); Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung (1925–1936)* |
| *NovT* | *Novum Testamentum* |
| NovTSup | Supplements to *Novum Testamentum* |
| NRSV | New Revised Standard Version |
| NS | New Series |
| NT | New Testament |
| NTAbh | Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen |
| NTC | The New Testament in Context |
| NTD | Das Neue Testament Deutsch |
| NTF | Neutestamentliche Forschungen |
| NTL | New Testament Library |
| *NTS* | *New Testament Studies* |
| *NTT* | *Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift* |
| NTTS | New Testament Tools and Studies |
| OBO | Orbis biblicus et orientalis |
| ÖBS | Österreichische biblische Studien |
| OBT | Overtures to Biblical Theology |
| *OCD*³ | *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth. 3d ed. Oxford, 1996. |

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| *OCD*⁴ | *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Edited by Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, and Esther Eidinow. 4th ed. Oxford, 2012. |
| OCPM | Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs |
| OECT | Oxford Early Christian Texts. Edited by H. Chadwick. Oxford, 1970– |
| *OGIS* | *Orientis graeci inscriptiones selectae*. Edited by W. Dittenberger. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1903–1905. |
| OrChrAn | Orientalia christiana analecta |
| OT | Old Testament |
| Par. | Paradosis |
| *ParPass* | *Parola del passato. Rivista di studi classici* |
| PatMS | Patristic Monograph Series |
| PatSor | Patristica Sorbonensia |
| PE | Pastoral Epistles |
| PFKP | Problemata: Forschungen zur klassischen Philologie |
| PFLUT | Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università di Torino |
| PG | Patrologia graeca [= Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca]. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 162 vols. Paris, 1857–1886. |
| PH | Philologisch-historische Klasse |
| PhAnt | Philosophia Antiqua |
| *Phil* | *Philologus* |
| *PhM* | *Philosophische Monatshefte* |
| *Phron* | *Phronesis* |
| *PhWS* | *Philologische Wochenschrift* |
| PL | Patrologia latina [= Patrologiae cursus completus: Series latina]. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 217 vols. Paris, 1844–1864. |
| PMAAR | Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome |
| PMTKA | Palingenesia. Monographien und Texte zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft |
| PTMS | Princeton Theological Monograph Series |
| PU | Philologische Untersuchungen |
| PVTG | Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti Graece |
| PW | Pauly, A.F. *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. New edition G. Wissowa. 49 vols. |
| PWSup | Supplement to PW |
| QD | Quaestiones disputatae |
| QSGP | Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie |
| *RAC* | *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*. Edited by Theodor Klauser et al. Stuttgart, 1950– |

*RB* — *Revue biblique*
*RCSF* — *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia*
*RE* — *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*
*REAug* — *Revue des études augustiniennes*
*REG* — *Revue des études grecques*
*REL* — *Revue des études latines*
*RelSRev* — *Religious Studies Review*
*ResQ* — *Restoration Quarterly*
REV — Revised English Version
*RevPhil* — *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes*
*RGG*[2] — *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft*. Edited by Hermann Gunkel et al. 5 vols. 2d rev. ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 1927–1931.
*RGG*[3] — *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Edited by K. Galling. 7 vols. 3d ed. Tübingen, 1957–1965.
RGRW — Religions in the Graeco-Roman World
*RhMus* — *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*
*RHPR* — *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*
*RHR* — *Revue de l'histoire des religions*
RhSt — Rhetorische Studien
*RivAC* — *Rivista di archeologia cristiana*
*RMM* — *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*
RNT — Regensburger Neues Testament
*RQ* — *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte*
*RSIt* — *Rivista storica italiana*
*RSR* — *Recherches de science religieuse*
RST — Regensburger Studien zur Theologie
RSV — Revised Standard Version
RTHP — Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philologie
RV — Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher für die deutsche christliche Gegenwart
RVV — Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten
SAM — Studies in Ancient Medicine
SANT — Studien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
SASW — Studien des apologetischen Seminars in Wernigerode
SAW — Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft
SBA — Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft
SBB — Stuttgarter biblische Beiträge
*SBFLA* — *Studii biblici Franciscani liber annuus*
SBL — Society of Biblical Literature

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| SBLBMI | Society of Biblical Literature The Bible and Its Modern Interpreters |
| SBLDS | Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series |
| *SBLHS* | *The SBL Handbook of Style for Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Early Christian Studies.* Edited by Patrick Alexander, John F. Kutsko, James D. Ernest, Shirley A. Decker-Lucke, and for the Society of Biblical Literature David L. Petersen. Peabody, Mass. Hendrickson, 1999. |
| SBLMS | Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series |
| SBLSBS | Society of Biblical Literature Sources for Biblical Study |
| *SBLSP* | *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers* |
| SBLTT | Society of Biblical Literature Texts and Translations |
| SBLWGRW | SBL Writings from the Greco-Roman World |
| SBM | Stuttgarter biblische Monographien |
| SBS | Stuttgarter Bibelstudien |
| SBT | Studies in Biblical Theology |
| SC | Source chrétiennes. Paris, 1943– |
| *ScEccl* | *Sciences ecclésiastiques* |
| SCHNT | Studia ad corpus hellenisticum Novi Testamenti |
| *SCP* | *Studies in Classical Philology* |
| *SE* | *Studia evangelica I, II, III* (= TU 73 [1959], 87 [1964], 88 [1964], etc.) |
| *SecCent* | *Second Century* |
| SeL | Storia e letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi |
| SFB | Series Facultatis Theologicae (Analecta Gregoriana) |
| SFLPL | Symbolae Facultatis Litterarum et Philosophiae Lovaniensis |
| SGB | Scriptorum graecorum bibliotheca |
| SGC | Scrittori greci commentati |
| SGKA | Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums |
| SGPS | Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza |
| SGU | Studia Graeca Upsaliensia |
| SHAW | Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften |
| SHC | Studies in Hellenistic Civilization |
| SHCANE | Studies in the History and Culture of the Ancient Near East |
| SHCT | Studies in the History of Christian Thought |
| SHG | Subsidia hagiographica |
| *SIFC* | *Studi italiani di filologia classica* |
| SJLA | Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity |
| SKP | Studien zur klassischen Philosophie |

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|---|---|
| *SMSR* | *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni* |
| SNTSMS | Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series |
| SNTSU | Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt |
| SNTW | Studies of the New Testament and Its World |
| *SO* | *Symbolae Osloenses* |
| SP | Sacra pagina |
| SPAW | Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften |
| *Spec* | *Speculum* |
| Spengel | Spengel, Leonhard, ed. *Rhetores graeci*. 3 vols. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1853–1856 |
| SSKPG | Spudasmata: Studien zur klassischen Philologie und ihren Grenzgebieten |
| *ST* | *Studia theologica* |
| StANT | Studium zum Alten und Neuen Testament |
| STAT | Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian toimituksia. Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae |
| StBL | Studies in Biblical Literature |
| StHell | Studia Hellenistica |
| *StMor* | *Studia Moralia* |
| STP | Studi e testi di papirologia |
| StPatr | Studia patristica |
| StPB | Studia post-biblica |
| StPP | Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde |
| STR | Studia. Travaux de recherche |
| Str-B | Strack, H.L., and P. Billerbeck. *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*. 6 vols. Munich, 1922–1961. |
| *StRo* | *Studi Romani* |
| StudNeot | Studia neotestamentica |
| SUNT | Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments |
| *SVF* | *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*. Edited by Hans F.A. von Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1903–1924; repr., Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964. |
| SVTP | Studia in Veteris Testamenti pseudepigraphica |
| *TAM* | *Tituli Asiae Minoris*, Vol. II: *Tituli Lyciae linguis Graeca et Latina conscripti*. Edited by E. Kalinka. 3 fascicles. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1920–1944 |
| *TAPA* | *Transactions of the American Philological Association* |
| TAPhS | Transactions of the American Philosophical Society |
| TB | Theologische Bücherei: Neudrucke und Berichte aus dem 20. Jahrhundert |

TBAW — Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft
TCH — Transformation of the Classical Heritage
*TDNT* — *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. Translated by G.W. Bromiley. 10 vols. Grand Rapids, 1964–1976.
TDSA — Testi e documenti per lo studio dell'antichità
*TF* — *Theologische Forschung*
*TGF* — *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*. Edited by A. Nauck. 2d ed. Leipzig, 1889
ThH — Théologie historique
THKNT — Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament
ThSt — Theologische Studien
*ThViat* — *Theologia viatorum*
*ThZ* — *Theologische Zeitschrift*
TKTG — Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte
*TLZ* — *Theologische Literaturzeitung*
TNTC — Tyndale New Testament Commentaries
*TP* — *Theologie und Philosophie*
*TRE* — *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*. Edited by G. Krause and G. Müller. Berlin, 1977–
*TRu* — *Theologische Rundschau*
TS — Texts and Studies
TU — Texte und Untersuchungen
TUGAL — Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
*TWNT* — *Theologische Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*. Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. Stuttgart, 1932–1979.
*TynBul* — *Tyndale Bulletin*
*TZ* — *Theologische Zeitschrift*
UISLL — University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature
UMP — University of Manchester Publications
UNT — Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
UWSLL — University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature
*VC* — *Vigiliae christianae*
VZAGAAW — Veröffentlichungen des Zentralinstituts für Alte Geschichte und Archäologie der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR
WBC — Word Biblical Commentary
WBPKG — Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Programm des Köllnischen Gymnasiums
*WD* — *Wort und Dienst*

WdF Wege der Forschung
WGRW Writings from the Greco-Roman World
W-H Wachsmuth and Hense. *Ioannis Stobaei Anthologium*. Edited by Curt Wachsmuth and Otto Hense. 5 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1884–1912; repr., 1958.
WKGLS Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern
WMANT Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament
*WSt* *Wiener Studien*
WTS Wijsgerige teksten en studies
WuB Wissenschaft und Bildung
WUNT Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
YCS Yale Classical Studies
ZBNT Zürcher Bibelkommentare Neues Testament
*ZKG* *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*
ZMKA Zetemata. Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft
*ZNW* *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche*
*ZPE* *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*
*ZST* *Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie*
*ZTK* *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*
*ZWT* *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*

# NOTES TO READERS

*Original venue of presentation or publication.* An asterisked entry before the first footnote in each essay provides information about the original venue in which an essay was presented or published. Several of the original essays were republished in slightly modified form in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989). In these cases, the editors, in consultation with the author, typically followed the 1989 version of the essay.

*Original page numbers.* Pagination in the original publication is indicated by numbers in the outside margin. Since the full page numbers for the essay are given in the asterisked note, the first page number is not indicated, except when it was needed for the sake of clarity.

*Abbreviations.* As noted in the Abbreviation List, the editors used the *SBL Handbook of Style* as the primary reference for abbreviations of journals and series, and Schwertner's de Gruyter *International Glossary* as the secondary source. When neither of these provided abbreviations, the editors formulated their own. For other matters of editorial style, when *SBLHS* did not address an issue, the editors used *The Chicago Manual of Style* (16th ed.; Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2010).

*Cross-references.* In keeping with the author's wishes, the editors have employed a system of cross references in the footnotes to refer to the author's articles. These cross references, which are enclosed in square brackets, are usually employed only for the first citation of one of the author's articles in each essay.

*Bibliographical citations.* In each article, full bibliographical citation is given the first time an item is introduced; subsequently it is referred to by the author's name and abbreviated title. This enables readers to use each essay as a self-contained unit, rather than having to search for the full bibliographical citation somewhere else in the collection. The major exception is when readers will need to go outside the essay to consult the abbreviation list.

*Citation of ancient primary texts.* Latin abbreviations for ancient primary texts are based on *SBLHS*. The full Latin title of a primary source, along with its English translation, is given in the relevant index. When *SBLHS* does not supply a title for a primary source, the editors typically consulted the abbreviation list in Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, or

comparable reference works. In the case of rather esoteric ancient sources not normally found in the standard reference works, the editors consulted with the author, who suggested appropriate titles and abbreviations.

*Updating.* For the most part, the editors sought to replicate the original essay in both content and style. When it seemed appropriate, they updated the bibliographical information and typically sought to include full publication information, including the edition and series. When changes in scholarly opinion required the use of an updated edition or different nomenclature for certain ancient authors, the editors, in consultation with the author, made these changes. Most of these changes pertain to the essays on Athenagoras and the more recent scholarly view of replacing *Supplicatio pro Christianis* with the title *Legatio pro Christianis*, and distinguishing between Albinus and Alcinous (see the Editors' Foreword for full discussion).

*Bibliographical Citations and WorldCat.* The editors typically checked the bibliographical entries against the information provided in WorldCat and other electronic data bases. They encountered the usual problems of conflicting bibliographical information found in different WorldCat entries. In many cases the editors checked the original source to confirm the citation. They regularly consulted with the author when the bibliographical information in the original article conflicted with what was reported in WorldCat. When it was impossible or impractical to consult the original source, the editors reported the information conservatively, tending to report only what they could confidently confirm.

# INTRODUCTION

When I was approached by the editors of this collection of essays with the proposal that a collection of some of my articles be made, I demurred on the grounds that it would require too much of their and my time. I was right, but they were persuasive, and for that I am now deeply grateful. They are all at the top of their game, and that they were prepared to take time out from their own important work for this project has moved me deeply. Under the remarkable leadership of Carl Holladay we have all been kept busy as manuscripts flowed to Atlanta, where he and his minions put the final touches on them as they finished the transformation of the essays into the final form in which they appear here.

The articles come from a period of more than fifty years, beginning with some less technical pieces written for the needs of a conservative constituency. They are included for their biographical interest and because they may still be of value to some readers. The collection as a whole mainly reflects my interest in the interface between early Christianity and ancient philosophy, and in recent decades, particularly that between Paul and his heirs and their cultural environment. Coming from so long a period, it is clear to me that some of them would have benefited from advances that have since been made by the publication of new editions of texts and by new research, but I will stand with what I offered for examination. On the whole, the articles in this collection reflect my work on larger projects in which I was engaged at the time.

In the 1960s, my interest was in the Platonism of the Christian Apologists, particularly that of Athenagoras, to whom my doctoral dissertation ("The *Supplicatio pro Christianis* of Athenagoras and Middle Platonism," Th.D. diss., Harvard University, 1963) was devoted.

This was a period when, in the absence of comprehensive treatments of Middle Platonism such as John Dillon's *The Middle Platonists* (1977) and of Hellenistic philosophy in general by A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (2 vols., 1987), or the convenient collection of sources by Gabriele Giannantoni, *Socraticorum Reliquiae* (4 vols., 1985), we were driven to the texts themselves, frequently uncollected and fragmentary in nature. Refinement and change were to come later. We learned, for example, that the writer we knew as Albinus was actually a certain Alcinous, and a change in fashion led to referring to Athenagoras's work as

his *Legatio* rather than the once customary *Supplicatio*. Attentive readers will note other such instances.

During a year's leave at Harvard in 1967–1968, my interest shifted from Middle Platonism in two directions. Reading Hercher's *Epistolographi Graeci* made me aware of ancient epistolary theory, and certain letters with a Cynic slant made me resolve to learn more about those enemies of all humbug who had caught the imagination if not always admiration of their contemporaries in the early Empire. New Testament scholars had recognized the importance of the Cynics for studying such things as Paul's diatribal style and his competitors when preaching in the marketplace. I spent some time becoming familiar with the sources for Cynicism, especially some pseudonymous letters theretofore neglected by *neotestamentici* that showed Cynic influence, resulting ultimately in a study edition by myself and my students (*The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* [1977]). A colleague quipped that Abe was reading the junk mail of antiquity.

My focus widened as I worked my way into non-Cynic moral philosophers. My primary interest was to situate Paul in his Graeco-Roman environment, and an investigation of ancient letter writing and of the popular philosophers appeared to me to hold promise for such an enterprise. I had already encountered these philosophers in my graduate studies and especially when I worked on Athenagoras's ethics, but from now on they would loom large in my work as I read more intensively than I had done such authors as Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Seneca, Maximus of Tyre, Plutarch, Lucian of Samosata and rummaged around in Wachsmuth and Hense's edition of Stobaeus's *Anthologium*, newly reprinted in 1974. To make them more easily accessible, I published a selection of texts in translation from them, organized like a book I was working on but had to abandon (*Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* [1986]). My interest in epistolography came to fruition in a collection and translation of ancient theorists in "Ancient Epistolary Theorists," *Ohio Journal of Religious Studies* 5 (1977): 3–77, which was reprinted under the same title as volume 19 in the SBL Sources for Biblical Studies in 1988.

I am sometimes asked about the method I followed in the enterprise that has occupied me for decades. Upon rereading these articles, I have been impressed by how little I have said about my procedure. It is only in the last couple of decades in public lectures and private correspondence that I have explicitly commented on how I see matters. But from the beginning, intuition has led me to a certain approach. In the first place, I have sought to respect the integrity of both sets of sources, Christian and non-Christian alike. This conviction that the motto *ad fontes!* is

all-important explains my concern to make the Graeco-Roman material more easily available. The way I wrote my articles also reveals this concern, not only arguing particular points, but by doing so pedagogically. It appeared to me manifestly wrong to use the non-Christian material as a quarry to be mined in order to adorn some portrayal or other of something Christian. Perhaps, but only perhaps, one could go about the task in that way if one were interested in the history of ideas, which I was not. My interest has been to understand texts in their concrete circumstances so far as possible, and that has required attention to social history and old-fashioned exegesis.

My academic formation took place at a time when what I was interested in what was referred to as "backgrounds" to the New Testament. We had all used C.K. Barrett's *The New Testament Backgrounds: Selected Documents* (1957), and Everett Ferguson's magisterial *Backgrounds of Early Christianity* in successive editions (1987, 1993, 2003) was coming to dominate the field. Ambitious Introductions to the New Testament dutifully began with a section on background that summarized some information about political, religious and philosophical history. Helmut Koester, for example, devoted an entire first volume of his impressive *Introduction to the New Testament* to such information, titling it *History, Culture and Religion of the Hellenistic Age* (1982).

Such learned volumes were immensely useful for providing basic information about the ancient world, but in the end proved inadequate in making the New Testament integral to the world of which Christianity was part. In practice, it was too easy to let "background" become the equivalent of "backdrop," as to a stage, at most providing a setting for the action that takes place in front, on the stage, without actually being part of the action.

It is more accurate, and satisfying, to think in terms of the context or, better, the environment in which Christianity came into existence, for then one is open to considering formative influences, although one would still have to give thought to what is meant by formation. It is also possible, however, to allow the notion of environment to convey a perception of a static state in which things are said to share an environment because they exist in proximity to each other.

It is more realistic, and satisfying, to think in terms of the ecology of ancient Christianity and its world. I have not worked this out systematically, having only made the suggestion in a couple of public lectures and in private correspondence and referred to it explicitly in some of my later articles. It is very easy for me to get beyond my depth when using such

scientific terms, but I use ecology with the first meaning proposed by the *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, as a concern "with the interrelationship of organisms and their environments." Colleagues in anthropology and environmental science assure me that I am using the term correctly in what I propose.

This is what I have in mind. The two elements brought into relationship with each other must each be viewed in terms of their own environment, not statically. We are aware that what Paul says and what is said about him are to be read in light of complex and changing circumstances; for example, what Paul says in 1 Thessalonians and Galatians is not the same, nor is what is said about him in Galatians the same as in 2 Corinthians. The same thing is true on the other side, for our present interest, the popular philosophers of the early Empire and their philosophy. While one may conveniently if not overly precisely refer to a philosophical Koine that existed, that is not to imply that we are dealing with a homogeneous phenomenon; indeed, homogeneity was not characteristic even within most philosophical schools. The point is, then, that we are dealing with an environment in which there is movement as particular elements, with their own integrity, are stimulated or react as they come in contact with similar or different elements that are responding to the same stimuli, or that they evolve within their context as they respond with an awareness of the larger environment.

The title of one of my books is *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (1989), which well represents my interests. The "and" in the title is not to be taken as the weasel word it frequently is in academic titles, used to slap together blocks of data that may or may not have anything to do with each other. The supposition behind the connective in the title is that Paul and the philosophers inhabited the same space to such a degree that one can conceive of a relationship between them. Using my ecological model, that means that, if I study Paul and Musonius Rufus on a particular subject, I will study each in the conviction that I will know each more fully as I learn more of his history and environment. I will also learn that their environments are not hermetically sealed, but that as they occupied the same physical and cultural space, they also shared space in the intellectual world.

That perception broadens my perspective beyond the myopic concentration that frequently views the relationship as one of derivation or influence. Instead, it encourages reading ancient texts with a peripheral vision that takes in the environment by which a range of phenomena are all nourished while retaining their individuality. An immediate consequence

is that a wide range of material comes under consideration, including non-philosophical witnesses to the matter at hand, such as proverbs, fables, and other forms of popular morality. The environment then becomes richer and less abstract.

An obvious shortcoming in my work is that I did not treat Hellenistic Judaism to the extent that I should have done. It is not because I do not consider it important, but because I discovered a long time ago that I could not control that material with any confidence. To attempt to do so would have required more time than I could bestow on the task. I had only one life to live, and I would rather concentrate on what I thought I could do responsibly. The Hellenistic Jewish materials are extraordinarily important, not because they represent a filter through which everything Hellenistic in Paul came, as is sometimes claimed. Those writers were Hellenistic Jews, as was Paul, and were subject to the same or similar stimuli that he was, and they are therefore significant examples of the kind of assimilation that Paul experienced, and Paul shared some of their suppositions. Paul did use some of their traditions, as he does Wisdom of Solomon in Rom 1–2,[1] but there are extended discussions in Paul that reveal his self-understanding of his apostleship for which there are no parallels in Judaism, but where he uses Stoic and Cynic traditions.[2] He does so probably because some of his converts had introduced the subject in those terms, and he answers in a manner that demonstrates his familiarity with them and does so with sophistication. It seems to me that Paul is at his most philosophical when responding to claims made in philosophical terms by some in his churches.[3]

In the interest of being less abstract, let me point to two texts from the Pauline literature to illustrate what I am suggesting might be done, both of which discuss αὐτάρκεια, self-sufficiency, a popular ancient virtue.

In Phil 4:11, Paul claims to have been αὐτάρκης in all things.[4] Commentators regularly relate this to the Stoic notion of self-sufficiency. Some consider the statement virtually Stoic and then interpret the context accordingly, while others give a nod to Stoicism but refer to a wider, non-technical use of the term. Self-sufficiency was widely regarded as a virtue. The Stoic sage was thought to be αὐτάρκης as he renounced claims made

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[1] See "The Apologetic Theology of the *Preaching of Peter*" as an example. [*Light*, 2:867–882]

[2] See "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War." [*Light*, 1:135–166]

[3] See "Determinism and Free Will in Paul: The Argument of 1 Corinthians 8 and 9." [*Light*, 1:289–311]

[4] See "Paul's Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11)" for detailed discussion. [*Light*, 1:325–338]

on him from without and within; he remained free from all necessities, totally focused on those things under his control. Stoics had derived the notion of self-sufficiency from the Cynics and intellectualized it.

Cynics had a simpler view, holding that nothing that was derived from a source outside of a person could have any value. But they differed among themselves. A rigorous Cynic such as Demetrius rejected all wealth, even that which could be put to good use, while milder Cynics thought of self-sufficiency as being satisfied with what was available to one, an attitude also represented in popular proverbs. Epicurus also had a moderate, but more nuanced, view of self-sufficiency, holding that one should be satisfied with the minimum, content with little if one did not have much.

We notice, then, that αὐτάρκεια was widely used by persons of different intellectual persuasions, most frequently without the intellectual or psychological baggage of the Stoics or even without reference to them. It seems to me more realistic to place Paul in such an environment, where his is one among a wide-ranging number of options, rather than to tie him to Stoicism, one such option, and then to determine how he transformed it. People who held to self-sufficiency as a virtue did not do so because they had derived it from someone else, although they might have engaged them in discussing the subject. Rather, they made a generally acknowledged virtue fit their own self-understanding or intellectual commitments and applied it to their own circumstances. I suggest that we grant Paul the same freedom as he appropriates the generally accepted virtue in his own particular circumstance. Precisely how he does so is to be determined exegetically, which will place it in its historical circumstance, but that need not detain us here, for our interest is primarily methodological.

We also need to widen our focus to include more than self-sufficiency in isolation. Αὐτάρκεια was not so conceived by either Paul or his contemporaries. Of interest to us here is that self-sufficiency was part of the consideration of the prime ancient social virtue of friendship, and there lay a problem. One common definition of friendship was that friends have all things in common, that they share all things and demonstrate their friendship in the giving and receiving of gifts. How, then, could one be self-sufficient in such a friendly relationship? The conundrum was discussed at great length.

The letter to the Philippians is replete with the language from commonplace treatments of friendship, and this provides the context for Paul's claim that he was αὐτάρκης in all things. Philippians 4:10–18, the so-called "thankless thanks" with which Paul ends the letter in response to the Philippians' gift, contains such language: the sharing of burdens; the language

of accountancy, giving and receiving, to describe the exchange of benefits; and the appropriate time to respond to a gift. In using such common coin, Paul is at pains to claim that he did not consider their gifts in a utilitarian manner because he was in need. No, he was self-sufficient in circumstances (need, plenty, fed, hungry, etc.) that suggest a view of self-sufficiency approximating that of mild Cynics or the non-philosophical wisdom that one plays the cards one is dealt. There is no Stoic introspection.

That is not to say, however, that Paul's use of the clichés of friendship means that he is content to remain on the level of social relationship or that he does not engage in introspection. The section opens with thanks to the Lord (v. 10) and closes with a doxology (v. 20); he attributes his ability to be self-sufficient to the divine empowerment (vv. 11, 13), and considers what he had received as a sacrificial gift acceptable to God (v. 18), and is convinced that God will supply the Philippians' every need (v. 19).

I suggest, then, that the notion of αὐτάρκεια not be viewed in isolation or in light of a Stoic view, but that the range be extended to include various options proposed in the moral discourse of the day. That places Paul in his ecological environment, where he is one among other moralists. As they conceived of the virtue in terms of their own commitments, so does Paul make sense of it within his theological framework. Since we are dealing with a text, we also need to extend our examination of its literary context and nature, which in this case leads to the treatment of social relations, which adds an element that takes us still further from the introspection of one philosophy.

Another place where αὐτάρκεια appears is in 1 Tim 6:6–8, "But there is great profit when it is accompanied by self-sufficiency (ἡ εὐσέβεια μετὰ αὐταρκείας). You see, we brought nothing into the world, and we can't carry anything out of it. But if we have food and clothing, we will be content with that (τούτοις ἀρκεσθησόμεθα)."[5] Some scholars have thought that there is nothing in this passage that a Cynic or Stoic could not have said and that the author speaks of the virtue in much the same way that they did. That may be true of the Cynics, but not of the Stoics. There is none of the philosophical reflection here that one would have expected of a Stoically tinged use of the word.

The author rather operates on the level of what is common coin, even though he does so elsewhere with greater sophistication than he is

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[5] See "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth, 1 Timothy 6:3–19, Part I" for detailed discussion. [*Light*, 1:507–534]

credited with. In this passage, he is satisfied to work on the level of cliché, explaining αὐτάρκεια with "You see, we brought nothing into the world, and we can't carry anything out of it." This cliché is proverbial, and the same sentiment is expressed in Jewish, Greek, and Latin texts. There is none of the theologizing modern interpreters force onto it. The statement belongs to a vast landscape of moral discourse, and the author thinks that αὐτάρκεια is so evident a virtue that it can qualify εὐσέβεια without elaboration.

How little interest the author has in theological or other reflection here appears clearly from a comparison with 1 Tim 4:7–8, where a quotidian good, σωματικὴ γυμνασία, is contrasted with γυμνασία πρὸς εὐσέβειαν. In 1 Tim 6:6, the reverse is the case: the everyday virtue qualifies εὐσέβεια.

It is obvious that my suggestion of an ecological approach is still inchoate. I hope that this admission, as indeed the collection of these articles, will stimulate further discussion.

Abraham J. Malherbe
July 24, 2012



VOLUME 1

# PART ONE

# NEOTESTAMENTICA

CHAPTER ONE

# THE CORINTHIAN CONTRIBUTION*

How important the contribution for the saints in Jerusalem was to Paul is clear from the space it occupies in his Corinthian correspondence and from the fact that it was central to him in his third missionary endeavor. A complete discussion of this subject is not possible in the present article.[1] The main aspect of the contribution that will concern us will be the significance that it had for Paul. It is clear from Paul's writings that he did not consider the contribution a mere practical matter, although it did involve practical concerns. The significance of the contribution will be illustrated by pointing to the historical context in which it was conceived and initiated and by investigating Paul's reasons for collecting it. The significance that it has for Paul is especially evident from the terminology that Paul uses for it, from his description of how it is to proceed from Christians, and from the results that it would produce.

## Origin

The origin of the contribution is probably to be seen in the account given in Gal 2:1–10, where it is stated that James and Cephas and John gave to Paul and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship (δεξιὰς . . . κοινωνίας).[2] Κοινωνία does not here have only a practical sense of cooperation, that is, having a division in the work, but it is used in the sense of a joint enterprise.[3]

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* Originally published in *ResQ* 3 (1959): 221–233.

[1] Besides a thorough exegesis of 1 Cor 16, and 2 Cor 8–9, other subjects that need to be studied include: (1) a thorough discussion of other sections of Paul's writings that deal with a contribution, e.g., Rom 15, Phil 2, 4; (2) a detailed study of Titus's place in the gathering of the Corinthian collection, and (3) a placing in proper perspective of Paul's use of sacrificial imagery in connection with the contribution as it compares with his use of such imagery elsewhere.

[2] See Wilbur M. Franklin, "Die Kollekte des Paulus" (Diss., Heidelberg, 1938), 12, who, however, thinks that Gal 2 refers to the Jerusalem visit of Acts 15. The probability is much greater that the visit of Acts 11:29–30 is what Paul refers to. For the latter view, see Bill Decker, "The Early Dating of Galatians," *ResQ* 2 (1958): 132–138.

[3] See Heinrich Seesemann, *Der Begriff Koinonia im Neuen Testament* (Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1933), 86–87.

This agreement between Paul and the Jerusalem apostles, which was programmatic for Paul in his later work, is divided into two parts, (1) "that we go to the Gentiles, and they to the circumcision," (2) "that we remember the poor."[4] It should be noted that this agreement is reached when Paul 222 is concerned lest he run in vain (Gal 2:2). The agreement, | then, part of which is the remembering of the poor, is the solution to the problem of possible disunity that Paul had foreseen.[5] There is a recognition by both Paul and the Jerusalem apostles that such an activity would create a bond of solidarity.

From the very moment, then, that Paul's mission was recognized by the Jerusalem church, he was concerned with the contribution for the poor. That his concern for the contribution was not a late interest is clear from the fact that a contribution is mentioned in his first letter (Gal 2:10), without his having to elaborate on it. From his reference to the Galatian contribution in 1 Cor 16:1, it can be assumed that it was given without much ado. Besides Galatia, contributions are also mentioned for the other two areas of Paul's Gentile mission, namely, Macedonia (Rom 15:26; 1 Cor 16:1–2) and Achaia (1 Cor 16:2–4).

## Plan of the Collection

In the first mention of the Corinthian contribution in his letters, Paul sets forth the plan that was to be followed in its collection (1 Cor 16:1–4). Although the Corinthians apparently already knew about the contribution,[6] he mentions four things relative to its preparation.

(1) The contribution was to be stored up on every first day of the week. From his tone it seems that he is referring to a regular practice of meeting

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[4] Both parts of the agreement are introduced by ἵνα, "in order." Since there is no verb, both parts of the agreement must be thought of as being dependent upon δεξιὰς ἔδωκαν, "they gave the right hand." The second clause is then "not a request added to the agreement, but a part of the agreement itself" (Ernest DeWitt Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* [ICC 35; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1952], 99).

[5] Paul must have seen clearly that a misunderstanding and disapproval of his work by the leading apostles in Jerusalem could seriously damage its success and the unity of the church as a whole. It would be the best policy to come to an agreement with the leaders in the most conservative church. In the light of the repeated accusations made against him, it seems that Paul tried to avoid an anticipated problem. Cf. Acts 15:1–5; 21:27ff.; Gal 2:12ff.

[6] The way in which Paul begins the discussion of this subject, "Now concerning . . .," recalls 1 Cor 7:1; 8:1; 12:1, where he discusses subjects with which the Corinthians were familiar.

on the first day of the week.[7] It had apparently not been the practice to store up collections at regular times.[8] Paul is here instituting the practice for the sake of order. He anticipated at least a whole year during which the collection was to be taken up,[9] and expected the regularity of the weekly contribution to preclude any last-minute confusion.

(2) Everyone was to take part in the weekly storing up. Every | individual was to do it by himself (παρ᾽ ἑαυτῷ). There is no evidence that churches had treasuries as early as this or that money was collected during the worship service.[10] 223

(3) Representatives of the Corinthians would be sent by Paul to Jerusalem when he came.[11]

(4) If, however, the amount contributed was sufficiently large, Paul himself would go and they would accompany him.[12]

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[7] Cf. Acts 20:7 for Christian worship on the first day of the week.

[8] The practice reflected in Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 67, was not yet in use in the NT.

[9] See Wilfred L. Knox, *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), 294 n. 26: "St. Paul is writing before Pentecost and apparently about Easter, while he hopes to come to Corinth and possibly to spend the winter there. This would allow at least a whole year for the collection, although he hopes that much of it will be finished by the time he arrives." Jean Héring, *La seconde épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1958), 19, thinks that in reality one and a half or two years elapsed between 1 Cor 16 and 2 Cor 8.

[10] Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (ICC 33; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911), 387; Hans Lietzmann, *An die Korinther I–II* (HNT 9; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1931), 89; Frederik W. Grosheide, *Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 398; Richard C.H. Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Paul's First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians* (Columbus, Ohio: Wartburg, 1946), 759–760. See, however, Bo Reicke, *Glaube und Leben der Urgemeinde* (Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1957), 57–58, who thinks that "fellowship" (κοινωνία) in Acts 2:42 refers to the collection and distribution of the goods held in common. Seesemann, *Koinonia im Neuen Testament*, 87–90, is more convincing with his suggestion that κοινωνία here refers to the spiritual concord of the first congregation.

[11] Note that, although it is the Corinthian contribution, Paul is fully in charge of the arrangements.

[12] That this is the meaning of ἄξιον ᾖ, is generally recognized. See Ernest-Bernard Allo, *Première épître aux Corinthiens* (2d ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956), 457; Lietzmann, *An die Korinther I–II*, 89; Lenski, *The Interpretation of St. Paul's First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians*, 759–760. It would not be fitting for an apostle to go to Jerusalem with a paltry sum, and it would certainly not help Paul in attaining the aims he had in mind with the contribution. This statement would also be an encouragement to a congregation which was not too liberal; cf. 1 Cor 9:11; 2 Cor 11:8; 12:13. No Corinthian delegates are mentioned in Acts 20:7, which may mean that the contribution was sent independently.

## The Proposed Recipients

The gospels show that from the beginning many poor people attached themselves to Jesus and his disciples.[13] Luke sketches a picture (Acts 4:34) of the Jerusalem church in which there is no need, probably because of its communism. Some years later, however, the church received material aid (Acts 11:29–30) and is described by Paul as having poverty in it (Gal 2:10; Rom 15:26). The change in fortune was the result of a number of factors. Luke indicates that the first contribution by the Antioch church to Judaea was occasioned by a famine (Acts 11:27–30).[14] The persecutions to which the church was subject must certainly also have played a part.[15] Furthermore, the practice of having all their possessions in common, which was an admirable temporary solution, could not be expected to be successful indefinitely. It is very improbable that there can be any prolonged common consumption where there is no common production.

224 | The indigence of the Jerusalem church, however, should not be emphasized to the point where it is assumed that their penury was unique in comparison with the churches who sent contributions to them. From 1 Cor 16:1 it may be assumed that all the Jerusalem Christians were in need, but Rom 15:26 shows that only some of them were poor. On the other hand, Paul describes the very churches which he holds up as an example of liberality to the Corinthians as being in extreme poverty. Not only was Macedonia as an area poor,[16] but the church there, that is, in Philippi, Beroea and Thessalonica, was subject to frequent persecutions (cf. Acts 16, 17; 1 Thess 2:14). Paul's description of the beginning and early activity of the Thessalonian church is illuminating for the picture that he is sketching in 2 Cor 8:1–4 to encourage liberality. In 1 Thess 1:6–7, he says that the Thessalonians received the word in much affliction with joy (ἐν θλίψει

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[13] See Ernst Lohmeyer, *Soziale Fragen im Urchristentum* (WuB 172; Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1921), 80.

[14] Note that Luke frequently connects events of great importance, or well-known ones, with the history of the Empire. Cf. Luke 1:5; 2:1–2; 3:1–2; Acts 12:1, 19; 18:2. This famine was thus of importance.

[15] Cf. Acts 8:1ff.; 9:1ff.; 12:2ff.; 2 Cor 11:24–26; Gal 1:13; 1 Cor 15:9; 1 Thess 2:14, 15; Phil 3:6.

[16] See Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (ICC 34; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1915), 233, "The Romans had been very hard on these Macedonians; they had taken possession of the gold and silver mines which were rich sources of revenue, and had taxed the right of smelting copper and iron; they had also reserved to themselves the importation of salt and the felling of timber for building ships. The Macedonians said that their nation was like a lacerated and disjointed animal (Livy xlv.30)."

πολλῇ μετὰ χαρᾶς), and that they became examples to all the believers in Macedonia and Achaia. The churches that he holds up as an example for the Corinthians in 2 Cor 8:1–4 are described as follows, "for in a severe test of affliction, their abundance of joy (ἐν πολλῇ δοκιμῇ θλίψεως ἡ περισσεία τῆς χαρᾶς αὐτῶν) and their abject poverty overflowed in liberality." The contribution, then, came from churches which were very much like the recipients in that they were persecuted and that they were poor. Very evidently, then, the contribution is not for Paul an administrative concern for the relief of poverty in Jerusalem, but is placed in a quite different context. This brings us to the next consideration, namely his reasons and purposes for the collection.

## Reasons for the Collection

It is true that the contribution was ostensibly for the poor in Jerusalem (cf. Gal 2:10; Rom 15:17; Acts 24:17). But this was not in itself the great significance that it had for Paul. If he were primarily concerned with the material needs of the saints in Jerusalem, he would certainly not have been as leisurely in his collection of the contribution as he was. He had higher goals that he wanted to attain, and the contribution was mainly a method through which he could attain them.

For Paul it is quite reasonable that beneficiaries of spiritual blessings should reciprocate with material blessings.[17] The Gentiles | are actually in debt to the Jews because they share in their spiritual blessings, and they can be expected to respond with material gifts (Rom 15:26–27). The contribution, which shows this sense of reciprocity, can be used in a case of tension to create some solidarity (Gal 2:1–10). From the recipients' point of view, the contribution should have a conciliating effect (2 Cor 8:19), although Paul was not sure it would be successful in this (Rom 15:31). It would prove that Paul and his converts were not iconoclastic, but that they respected the Jerusalem church. From the contributors' point of view, the contribution was to be an expression of their spirituality and was to be classed with faith, utterance, knowledge, and earnestness (2 Cor 8:7) and was a proof of their love (2 Cor 8:24). Paul thus sees in the contribution an

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[17] For the same principle on an individual level in Paul, see 1 Cor 9:11; Gal 6:6; 1 Tim 5:17–18. Although admittedly a moot point, the correct interpretation of 2 Cor 8:13ff. is probably to be regarded as being similar to Rom 15:26–27.

opportunity for the expression of the noblest Christian sentiments upon which the solidarity was to be built (cf. Gal 5:13–15; Phil 1:1–11).[18]

A few historical considerations as to the background against which the contribution was collected will further illustrate Paul's reasons and method. The essential unity of the Jews in the Dispersion is very noteworthy, considering the fact that they were so greatly separated by geography and language. Probably the most important thing that contributed to this unity was their attachment to the temple.[19] From at least the first century BC, it was the custom to tax all Jews over twenty a half shekel.[20] Periodically, delegates were entrusted with this tax, and in company with delegates from other cities they would journey to Jerusalem.[21] These bearers were called the equivalent of the Greek ἀπόστολοι.[22] The bearers went to Jerusalem *en masse*, among other reasons, for the sake of safety. The dangers of transferring money were especially great between Greece and Jerusalem and more so in Asia. Josephus (*A.J.* 14.110–113) recounts that Mithridates carried off 8,000 talents which the Jews had deposited at Cos for several years, which amount | was the temple contribution. Cicero (*Flac.* 28) also describes how Flaccus in 62–61 BC confiscated the whole amount that had been collected in Asia for the temple. Because of the danger, the Jews chose favorite meeting places for the delegates. In Asia it was Ephesus, whence they could travel by sea to Palestine, which was a quicker and safer route than the overland journey.[23] Ephesus as a meeting place was protected under the Empire by a special imperial edict.[24] The Jews were at great pains in this province to do everything in order because of their past experience and because the transfer of funds to Palestine was not popular with the Romans.[25]

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[18] Although Paul's primary purpose might have been to create a bond between the Gentile and Jerusalem churches, one should not forget that Paul is concerned with the Corinthian church, which itself was in danger of fragmentation. The two chapters devoted to the subject indicate the importance, not only for relations with Jerusalem, but also for the condition of the church in Corinth. A common concern, such as the contribution, would unite them.

[19] Wilhelm Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im späthellenistischen Zeitalter* (HNT 21; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1926), 70ff.; Emil Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (4 vols.; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1901–1911), 2:314ff.

[20] See Str-B 1:760ff., on Matt 17:24ff.

[21] Cf. Josephus, *A.J.* 18.310–313; Philo, *Spec.* 1.77–78; *Legat.* 312.

[22] Str-B 3:316, on Rom 15:26. In Jewish apocryphal writings, freewill gifts were called ἀποστολαί (1 Esd 9:51, 54; 1 Macc 2:18; 3:2). Those who bore the gifts were also called ἀπόστολοι.

[23] Knox, *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, 298–299.

[24] Josephus, *A.J.* 16.167–168, 172–173.

[25] Cicero, *Flac.* 28.

At this time, Christians were still regarded as Jews by both Romans and Jews. To the Romans they appeared to be people who could create disorder (Acts 16:20ff.; 18:14ff.), while the Jews regarded them as the sect of the Nazarenes (Acts 24:5, cf. 14; 28:22). It would not be regarded as out of the ordinary for Christians to take up a contribution to be sent to Jerusalem. It is also instructive that Paul spent a great part of the third missionary journey in Ephesus and that it was during this period that he was making the final arrangements for the collection. This was in perfect harmony with Jewish custom. Paul also wanted to arrive in Jerusalem by Passover, like the Jewish temple delegates did. He was accompanied by delegates from small groups of worshippers which must have appeared to Jews and Gentiles alike as heretical synagogues. As far as the organization of the contribution was concerned, it was thus in harmony with the Jewish practice. Just as he made use of his Roman citizenship in his mission, so Paul here takes advantage of the Jewish heritage of Christianity.

What is more important for our discussion right here is the impression that this organization of and emphasis on the contribution must have had on the Christians in the Gentile churches. For the Jewish converts in the Dispersion, the contribution would be very similar to the temple tax and would probably have the same effect of maintaining a unity with Jerusalem. The same would also be true to some extent of the converts from among the Jewish proselytes. From their association with the synagogue they would be familiar with the practice and its effects. As for the Gentile converts, they would naturally assimilate to some extent this understanding. Coming into close contact with this tradition, they would not think it strange to have such ties with the first Christian congregation, many of whose members had seen the Lord during his life, who were witnesses to his death, and some who were actually witnesses to his resurrection. Just as the temple was the visible manifestation of the truth of the Law to the Jews, so the Christians in Jerusalem were the visible guarantee of the truth of the resurrection | (cf. Acts 13:31; 1 Cor 15:3–11). The historical probability 227 is thus great that for the Dispersion churches as a whole the contribution for the saints in Jerusalem had the same effect that the contribution for the temple had for the Dispersion Jews. It is definite that such a unity is what Paul wanted to attain through the contribution.

## The Significance of the Contribution Itself

There is a marked difference between 1 Cor 16:1–4 and 2 Cor 8–9 in Paul's approach to the contribution. In the first letter, he is concerned with the

administrative aspects. As he had directed (διέταξα) the churches in Galatia, so they were also to do (ποιήσατε).[26] Everyone was to lay aside (τιθέτω). It has been observed above that Paul is fully in charge of the matter in 1 Corinthians.[27] He has determined how the contribution was to be taken up and he commands the Corinthians to do it. To the Corinthians this might have seemed too high-handed, especially since they challenged his authority. Thus in 2 Corinthians Paul never uses the imperative in his discussion of the collection and emphasizes that he is not speaking by way of command (οὐ κατ᾿ ἐπιταγήν) but to prove their love (2 Cor 8:8). In the contribution, they would really be glorifying God by obedience of their confession (ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὁμολογίας, 2 Cor 9:13). After having been primarily concerned with administrative details, Paul turns to the significance of the contribution in 2 Corinthians.[28] His change of the treatment of the subject and the significance are illustrated by the different terminology that he uses in the two epistles.

Paul's word for the collection in 1 Cor 16:1, 2 is λογεία. The word was used primarily of religious contributions but also occurs in secular contexts. The papyrological evidence of Egypt naturally being bigger than that of the rest of the Mediterranean world, most of the occurrences refer to the Egyptian religious scene of the Hellenistic period.[29] More recent evidence from Asia Minor from the first century AD has indicated, however, that the picture reflected is the same.[30] The word λογεία was originally used of a freewill contribution to a temple or for some religious purpose. It 228 gradually | came to have the sense of an obligatory levy, however.[31] A good example, contemporaneous with 1 Corinthians, is afforded by P.Oxy. 239 (AD 66), "I swear that I have levied no contributions (λογείαν) whatever in

[26] Although διατάσσειν can mean merely "to arrange," it carries with it preeminently the sense of authoritative disposition. See BAG, s.v. διατάσσω for references. The sense behind the word is especially evident in the cognates, διαταγή, διάταγμα, and διάταξις. In 1 Cor 16:1–2, the imperative becomes explicit in the accompanying imperatives ποιήσατε and τιθέτω.

[27] See n. 11 above.

[28] Nevertheless, Paul, a very practical man, continued in a practical manner to arrange for the collection. It is in this respect that the *liaison* activity of Titus needs to be studied.

[29] See Walter Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Ägypten* (2 vols.; Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1905–1908), passim.

[30] Adolf Deissmann, *Light From the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World* (trans. Lionel R.M. Strachan; 4th ed.; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1927; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965), 104–107.

[31] Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Ägypten*, 359.

the above village."[32] Regardless of how Paul meant the word to be understood, it would be natural for the unfriendly recipients of his letter to associate the negative meaning with it. When relations with them became strained, Paul used other words to describe the true significance.[33]

The same may also be true of Paul's use of θησαυρίζειν, "to store up." The cognate θησαυρός, referring either to the treasury itself or to the contribution placed in the treasury, is more frequently found in contemporary sources.[34] It was used of temple deposits, and it is possible that Paul's use of it might have been understood as being analogous to this.[35] The Tebtunis Papyrus 6, 27 (140–139 BC) is interesting for the use of θησαυρός. In reply to complaints by some priests that they had been defrauded, the local government officials are informed "to see that the revenues of the priests are not disturbed. No one but the appointed agents of the priests are to collect any of the saved revenues, and force is to be applied to those who fail to pay the proper dues."[36] We cannot, of course, make too close a connection between the situation reflected in this particular papyrus and Paul's letter, but it is probable that the same general situation existed as far as the disrespect of the temple collection and the application of force in its contribution was concerned. No levied tax is ever popular, and the word used for it would naturally come to have unpleasant nuances. In using the word in the manner that he did and in the context that he did, Paul might conceivably have added to the negative response that he received from the Corinthians.

Leaving the mechanics of the contribution, Paul turns to what should be the proper Christian motivation, and he illustrates this with a very significant use of terminology. "Grace" (χάρις) is the keyword with which he

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[32] MM, 377.

[33] Thus Seesemann, *Koinonia im Neuen Testament*, 28 n. 2; Hans Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (KEK 6; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), 274; Lietzmann, *An die Korinther I–II*, on 2 Cor 8:6. The question is asked why Paul does not use λογεία in Rom 15:26, if it indeed was his original word for the contribution. Seesemann thinks that perhaps the reason was because Paul was actually in Corinth when he wrote Romans, and that he omitted it out of deference to his hosts' feelings. It is more probable, however, that κοινωνία, which is used in Rom 15:26, expresses exactly what he wanted to say.

[34] θησαυρίζειν, for instance, does not appear at all in the indices of Otto, whereas the references to θησαυρός are numerous.

[35] See Robert Eisler, *Iesous Basileus ou basileusas: Die messianische Unabhängigkeitsbewegung vom Auftreten Johannes des Täufers bis zum Untergang Jakobs des Gerechten nach der neuerschlossenen "Eroberung von Jerusalem" des Flavius Josephus und den christlichen Quellen* (2 vols.; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1929–1930), 2:491.

[36] See Bernard P. Grenfell, Arthur S. Hunt, and J. Gilbart Smyly, eds., *The Tebtunis Papyri* (4 vols.; London/New York: Henry Frowde/Oxford University, 1902–1933), 1:58ff.

229 opens the whole discussion and to which he | returns time and again. Almost the complete unfolding of the concept in Christianity is to be seen in 2 Cor 8. Χάρις is (1) the divine favor and its objective proof for all men, v. 9; (2) it is the personal possession by Christian individuals of gracious power, 8:1; 9:8, 14; (3) it is a Christian work of love, the working out of the received grace in one's relationship with the brethren, 8:4, 6, 7, 19.[37] Paul's use of χάρις in our context is illuminated by the use of the word in Acts and in Paul's other letters. In Acts[38] a new use of χάρις appears and does so in contexts which deal with the extension of the gospel to the Gentiles.[39] Although this introduction of χάρις into Christianity was not due to Paul,[40] it cannot be doubted that this special use was connected with his missionary efforts. He uses it frequently with regard to himself as the proclaimer of the universal gospel,[41] and with regard to the Gentile recipients of his gospel.[42] "A review of these passages makes it impossible to doubt that St. Paul's use of χάρις is dominated by the thought of the admission of the Gentiles to the privileges which had been peculiar to Israel."[43] Paul's approach in 2 Cor 8–9 is thus essentially the same as that expressed in Rom 15:26ff. Instead of openly asking the Corinthians to reciprocate materially, Paul appeals to their spirituality. Since they have received the grace of God, they should in turn be gracious.

A corollary to χάρις is κοινωνία, "fellowship" (2 Cor 8:4),[44] and it is to this ideal that Paul exhorts the Corinthians (2 Cor 9:13). Κοινωνία is not just a practical term for Paul but has a high religious content.[45] The appearance with χάρις in 2 Cor 8:4 precludes the possibility that Paul intends κοινωνία to have the meaning of "gift" here. "Κοινωνία must have had for him the

[37] Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 243.

[38] Cf. Acts 13:43; 14:3, 26; 15:11, 40; 18:27; 20:24, 32.

[39] See J. Armitage Robinson, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians: A Revised Text and Translation with Exposition and Notes* (London: Macmillan, 1907), 244ff.

[40] Béda Rigaux, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres aux Thessaloniciens* (*EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956), 352, however, says that χάρις in the NT is a Pauline term.

[41] Cf. 1 Cor 3:10; Gal 1:15–16; 2:21; Rom 1:5.

[42] Cf. 1 Cor 1:4 (cf. v. 9); 6:1; Eph 2:5–9; Col 1:6.

[43] Robinson, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians*, 226.

[44] The RSV translation, "begging us earnestly for the favour of taking part" for μετὰ πολλῆς παρακλήσεως δεόμενοι ἡμῶν τὴν χάριν καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν unfortunately loses the richness of the statement.

[45] This appears clearly from the terms with which κοινωνία appears. Cf. 1 Cor 1:9; 10:16; 2 Cor 8:4; 13:13; Phil 1:5; 2:1; Phlm 6. Seesemann, *Koinonia im Neuen Testament*, 99, perhaps pushes too far in this direction when he says that Paul never uses the term with a profane meaning, and then explains 2 Cor 6:14 as being of non-Pauline origin.

deepest, most inward religious sense."[46] The best translation would be "deepest participation." More difficult to decide is the exact meaning | 230 that κοινωνία has in 2 Cor 9:13,[47] that is, whether it means (1) the gift itself, i.e., the concrete proof of their communion, as in Rom 15:26,[48] or (2) the solidarity between the two parties. Because of the last words in the verse, καὶ εἰς πάντας ("and to all"), the second possibility is the more likely. He is not exhorting them to make only a contribution to Jerusalem, but he wants a solidarity between the Corinthians and the whole church which can come only if there is the correct spiritual basis. When there is this deep sense of communion, then this particular contribution will be forthcoming.

Finally, the liturgical language that Paul uses of contributions points to a deeper understanding. He encourages the Corinthians to complete (ἐπιτελεῖν), what they had begun (2 Cor 8:6, 11). Ἐπιτελεῖν was used especially of the fulfillment of religious rites (cf. Phil 1:6; Heb 9:6).[49] Paul is thus drawing a picture of an offering in the sacral sense of the word. This is brought out still further by his use of λειτουργία ("priestly service") in 2 Cor 9:12. This liturgical language for a contribution is found in other passages in Paul, especially in those which deal with contributions toward his support. Paul describes himself as a λειτουργός ("priest") to the Gentiles in the gospel's priestly service, ἱερουργοῦντα (Rom 15:16). Epaphroditus, who brought him support from Philippi, is also a λειτουργός to his need (Phil 2:25), and the contribution proved to be a fragrant offering, ὀσμὴ εὐωδίας, and an acceptable sacrifice, θυσία δεκτή (Phil 4:18).[50]

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[46] Seesemann, *Koinonia im Neuen Testament*, 68.

[47] The rendering of the RSV, "by the generosity of your contribution" for ἁπλότητι τῆς κοινωνίας is especially unfortunate, since it both obliterates the insight that ἁπλότης gives to the contribution (see *infra*), and decides not too wisely on "contribution" as a translation for κοινωνία.

[48] Cf. with Rom 15:26, κοινωνίαν τινὰ ποιήσασθαι εἰς τοὺς πτωχούς; Phil 4:15, ἐκοινώνησεν εἰς λόγον δόσεως καὶ λήμψεως.

[49] William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (ICC 32; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1908), 413, on ἐπιτελέσας in Rom 15:28, "Coupled with λειτουργῆσαι above, (it) suggests that St. Paul looks upon these contributions of the Gentile communities as a solemn religious offering and part of their εὐχαριστία for the benefits received."

[50] Hermann Strathmann, "λειτουργός," *TDNT* 4 (1967): 229–231, minimizes the "sacral-cultic" element in Paul's use of λειτουργός. He thinks that the use of this stem should be looked upon as if it represents the original etymology; Paul and Epaphroditus are working on behalf of the people. This is certainly possible, as the inscriptions and Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* 38.41.7, for instance, indicate. When Strathmann insists, however (p. 234), that the liturgical element is absent from Phil 2:30, he is definitely wrong. The occurrence of θυσία,

The liturgical language in Rom 15 culminates in verses 27 and 28, where Paul
231 is encouraging a Gentile | contribution for Jerusalem. Here λειτουργῆσαι is the counterpart to κοινωνεῖν, and the former is to be ἐπιτελεῖσθαι. Against this sacrificial-liturgical background then, in which Paul sees himself as being poured out as a sacrifice in the Gentile ministry (Phil 2:17), a ministry in which he acts as priest and for which offerings are made, he encourages the Corinthians to render a similar spiritual service. It is no mere practical matter, but divine service which ends in the glorification of God (2 Cor 9:12–13).

## How It Was To Proceed

It has been pointed out that Paul emphasizes that he is not commanding them to give (2 Cor 8:8), but that the contribution will really be a test of their obedience to their confession (2 Cor 9:13). Rather, having given themselves first to Christ, by God's will they will follow Paul's suggestions (2 Cor 8:5). The Macedonians had given themselves to Christ and then overflowed with joy, ἡ περισσεία τῆς χαρᾶς ... ἐπερίσσευσεν (2 Cor 8:2). The cognate verb, περισσεύειν, "to overflow, to abound in," occurs in our context with words which indicate that Paul had a higher meaning in mind than only liberality. As they abound "in faith, in speech, in knowledge, in utmost eagerness and ... in love (πίστει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ πάσῃ σπουδῇ καὶ ... ἀγάπῃ), they were also to abound "in this generous undertaking" (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χάριτι, 2 Cor 8:7). They are encouraged to give freely, for God would overflow with graciousness toward them (πᾶσαν χάριν περισσεῦσαι εἰς ὑμᾶς, 2 Cor 9:8). Such a gift would overflow in many thanksgivings to God (περισσεύουσα διὰ πολλῶν εὐχαριστιῶν τῷ θεῷ, 2 Cor 9:12). The connotation in our context is not so much abundance as the primary aspect, but abundant giving as the result of a spontaneous welling up of joy and a sense of God's grace.[51]

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λειτουργία, and σπένδομαι in v. 17, and λειτουργός in v. 25 could hardly leave a doubt that Paul is using sacrificial language.

For Paul's mission, cf. also 2 Cor 2:14–17. A detailed study of Rom 15:14–33, with special reference to the sacrificial and liturgical elements in Paul's language, as it refers to his ministry and to the contribution, will make clear the intimate connection that there existed between them for him.

[51] The vexed question whether περίσσευμα is to be taken literally in 2 Cor 8:14, again raises its head. The consistent use of it in these chapters in the sense of a spiritual overflowing suggests that the true meaning of this verse is to be looked for in this direction.

A very similar approach is found in Paul's use of the term ἁπλότης in connection with the contribution.[52] The word has the basic meaning of simplicity in the sense of singleness in attitude, and from this are derived the meanings "sincerity, frankness, generosity, liberality." In 2 Cor 8:2, Paul says that the joy of the Macedonians had overflowed in a wealth of sincere goodwill.[53] Edlund, in discussing 2 Cor 9:11, 13, where ἁπλότης occurs | (translated as "generosity" in the RSV), notes that Paul is here dealing with the motives for giving, and that he sharpens the OT thinking on the subject.[54] He had pointed out that the Septuagint uses ἐν ἁπλότητι καρδίας for the manner of giving in 1 Chr 29:17.[55] He now quotes Pedersen[56] for the sense that the contribution had among the Jews: 232

> We know the basis of the value and power of the gift. It is not something material, but part of the psychic entirety of the man. *Gifts are therefore always spiritual gifts.* Like good words and good deeds they carry something from the soul of the one into the heart of the other; they not only bring tidings of good will, they bring good will itself, because they belong to the intensity of the soul. The gift is not an expression of sentiment; it is a necessary result of a real relation between men, and itself creates or strengthens a relation of this kind.[57]

Pedersen may be overstressing this aspect of solidarity, of which he is so fond, but his description happens to fit Paul's description of 2 Cor 9:11–13 extremely well.

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[52] Conny A.E. Edlund, *Das Auge der Einfalt: Eine Untersuchung zu Matth. 6,22–23 und Luk. 11,34–35* (ASNU 19; Lund: Gleerups/Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1952), 83, suggests that ἀφελότης καρδίας in Acts 2:46 has the same meaning as ἁπλότης. In his discussion of this passage, Bo Reicke, *Diakonie, Festfreude und Zelos in Verbindung mit der altchristlichen Agapenfeier* (Uppsala: Lundequist/Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1951), 167–168, emphasizes the proper disposition of the hearts of the Christians in their joyful fellowship. In this parallel passage, then, the picture is sketched of a real Christian communion, which is the result of joyful goodwill.

[53] Again, the RSV translation is unfortunate. Paul is describing the Macedonians as having a deep concern which is expressed in liberality. See Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 243; Edlund, *Das Auge der Einfalt*, 90.

[54] Edlund, *Das Auge der Einfalt*, 91ff.

[55] Edlund, *Das Auge der Einfalt*, 54–55.

[56] Johannes Pedersen, *Israel, Its Life and Culture* (4 vols. in 2; London: Oxford University Press, 1926–1940), 1:296.

[57] It should be noted that Robert H. Charles, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1908), 105, goes out from *T. Iss.* 3:8, where ἐν ἁπλότητι καρδίας occurs and translates 2 Cor 8:2; 9:11, 13 as "liberality." For the development of the usage in the intertestamental period, and especially in *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, see Edlund, *Das Auge der Einfalt*, 62ff.

In a more direct manner, Paul makes clear that there must be a readiness to give (2 Cor 8:11–12), that they should sow bountifully (2 Cor 9:6), and that they should give without reluctance or compulsion, everyone giving as he had chosen (2 Cor 9:7). Joy and preparedness are to characterize their giving, for God loves a cheerful giver (2 Cor 9:7).

## The Results of the Contribution

The results that will be forthcoming are not practical results, but show the spiritual quality of the contribution. The givers will increase the harvest of their righteousness (2 Cor 9:10). They will actually be doing it for the glory of God (2 Cor 9:13) and the glory of the Lord (2 Cor 8:19), and the gifts will result in thanksgivings to God (2 Cor 9:11–12).[58] Just as the progression in 2 Cor 9:11–13 is grace-thanksgiving-glory, so also it is where Paul speaks of 233 his ministry (2 Cor 4:15). Therefore, what he said of the | contribution which enabled him in his ministry to attain the great end, he could also very well have said of this contribution: It is "not that I seek the gift; but I seek the fruit which increases to your credit" (Phil 4:17). Only a true spiritual gift will bring about such spiritual blessings, and the gift therefore becomes not a proof of their obedience to an administrative aspect of Christianity, but a proof of their love (2 Cor 8:8) and a proof of their glorifying God (2 Cor 9:13).

[58] The concept of δόξα θεοῦ ("glory of God") should receive closer attention than can be devoted to it here. Δόξα is used in a concrete sense outside of Judaism and Christianity. See Gillis P. Wetter, *Charis: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ältesten Christentums* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1913), esp. 130–132, 152–153. George H. Boobyer, "'Thanksgiving' and 'The Glory of God' in Paul" (Diss., Heidelberg, 1929), 12ff., points out that the concrete sense is also found in Paul, e.g., 2 Cor 3:7, 18 (cf. 1 Cor 15:41), and suggests that we should keep this in mind when we study 2 Cor 8–9.

CHAPTER TWO

# THE TASK AND METHOD OF EXEGESIS*

Exegesis is the basic discipline, not only of NT studies, but of theology. As to form, theology must always be the exegesis of Scripture.[1] Exegesis must govern theology. Theology must not be allowed to rule exegesis, for then this discipline loses its character and becomes eisegesis. The history of the interpretation of the NT shows that the relationship between exegesis and theology has not always been discerned clearly. It is the purpose of this collection of articles to contribute to the interpretation of the NT both from the standpoint of method and from the standpoint of the history of the interpretation of the NT.[2] The present article finds its place in this collection by virtue of its attempt to contribute to obtaining a clearer perspective of the task of exegesis, and through advancing considerations for a methodology for the exegesis of the NT.

## The Task of Exegesis

The task of the exegete is, first and foremost, a historical one. "Exegesis is thought of as the procedure for establishing the original meaning of a literary text by the use of philological and historical tools."[3] The exegete is thus a historian and not a theologian.[4] The difficulty enters when we realize that everyone has certain theological presuppositions. The exegete's task is

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* Originally published in *ResQ* 5 (1961): 169–178. This article served as an introduction to the issue of the journal that was devoted to exegesis and interpretation of Scripture.

[1] See Rudolf Bultmann, "Die Frage der 'dialektischen' Theologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Erik Peterson," *Zwischen den Zeiten* 4 (1926): 40–59, esp. 59; repr., Jürgen Moltmann, ed., *Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie* (2 vols.; TB 17; Munich: C. Kaiser, 1962), 2:72–92. English translation: "The Question of a Dialectic Theology: A Discussion with Erik Peterson," in *The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology* (ed. James M. Robinson; trans. Keith R. Crim and Louis De Grazia; Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968), 257–274.

[2] Other articles in this issue of *Restoration Quarterly* are referred to in subsequent notes. See nn. 8, 21, 24, and 33 below.

[3] James Luther Mays, "Exegesis as a Theological Discipline" (Inaugural address delivered at Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va., April 20, 1960; CD sound recording; Richmond, Va.: Union Presbyterian Seminary).

[4] See William A. Irwin, "A Still Small Voice Said, 'What Are You Doing Here?'" *JBL* 78 (1959): 1–12.

to read the text and explain it—a task which is as difficult to describe as it is difficult to perform. Exegesis has a part in the problems which flow forth from any writing which is separated from us by centuries and is transmitted to us in another language. But the NT is different from any other writing which is so transmitted to us. It is different since, although directed to the people of the first century, it is also directed to people of all time.[5]

It is precisely because of this understanding of Scripture that the method, and so the results of exegesis, sometimes suffer. The writers of the Bible were not mere chroniclers. The events they recorded had the 170 meaning of revelation for them, and that was the | reason they recorded them.[6] To understand the intent and the meaning of the biblical writers, therefore, we should have empathy with them, and this means that when we read them we go outside the area of impersonal analysis of literary documents. The area of hermeneutics is thus a necessary corollary to the area of exegesis. It should be recognized that the division of biblical interpretation in which exegesis and hermeneutics fall into different treatments, as in the present collection, is really an artificial one.[7] This division is adopted purely for the sake of convenience. This article should be read in conjunction with the one by Don H. McGaughey.[8]

Hermeneutics means, literally, the discipline of interpretation. No one comes to the NT without any preconceptions "as though he were the blank report paper on which the objective measurable data from a controlled experiment is to be recorded."[9] The task of hermeneutics is to make a synthesis of the results of exegesis, and to make it relevant to the reader. Making it relevant involves a personal element with all its presup-

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[5] Evert P. Groenewald, "Die Eksegese van die Nuwe Testament" (Inaugural address, University of Pretoria, 1938; Publications of the University of Pretoria 4.13), 1–18, esp. 4; see Edwin Cyril Blackman, "The Task of Exegesis," in *The Background of the New Testament and Its Eschatology* (ed. William D. Davies and David Daube; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 3–26, esp. 4.

[6] See G. Ernest Wright, *God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital* (SBT 8; Chicago: A.R. Allenson, 1952), 66–67; Thomas W. Manson, "The Failure of Liberalism to Interpret the Bible as the Word of God," in *The Interpretation of the Bible* (ed. Clifford W. Dugmore; London: SPCK, 1944), 92–107, esp. 94; Robert M. Grant, *The Bible in the Church: A Short History of Interpretation* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), 132; Robert L.P. Milburn, *Early Christian Interpretations of History* (New York: Harper, 1954), 4.

[7] See James Muilenberg, "Preface to Hermeneutics," *JBL* 77 (1958): 18–26; John Coert Rylaarsdam, "The Problem of Faith and History in Biblical Interpretation," *JBL* 77 (1958): 26–32; and Krister Stendahl, "Implications of Form-Criticism and Tradition-Criticism for Biblical Interpretation," *JBL* 77 (1958): 33–38, for a recent discussion of the historical method and the present day situation.

[8] Don H. McGaughey, "The Problem of Biblical Hermeneutics," *ResQ* 5 (1961): 251–256.

[9] Mays, "Exegesis as a Theological Discipline," 23.

positions, and this means that we interpret the material. The question to decide is not whether interpretation exists in a proper application of exegesis or not. What is to be decided is whether a particular interpretation is valid or not.

The admission that presuppositions are present does not mean that we are therefore adrift in a sea of subjectivity. "Presupposition" has become a scare word because "scientific" exegesis, in its opposition to "theological" exegesis, charged that the latter allowed its practice to be dominated by dogmatic propositions. In reaction to this charge it was and is denied that any presuppositions exist in exegesis.[10] A more legitimate response would have been that presuppositions do indeed exist, but that the validity, and not the existence, of these presuppositions is the real issue in the interpretation of the NT. This fact has come to be recognized in the battle between Barth and Bultmann over the nature of hermeneutics. Both agree that presuppositions are a part of hermeneutics.[11]

The issues which are important for us in our present concern are clearly accented in the method of exegesis followed by the history of religions school, the so-called *religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, which | arose in Germany at the end of the nineteenth, and the beginning of the twentieth century, and which still exerts great influence on NT scholarship. These fathers of the historical-critical method involved themselves in the error of assuming that by the rejection of orthodox-dogmatic presuppositions they had opened the way to an appropriate exegesis. Actually, in place of these orthodox-dogmatic presuppositions, there appeared the new "dogmatic" premises of a theology determined by the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Idealism.[12] In attacking the theological exegetical method, the weapon of the historical critic was, of course, history.[13] The emphasis was on the fact that the biblical text was a part of history, and that it had a history of its own. It was therefore to be placed in the relative and conditioned context of history. The text was thus to be studied in the same manner that any other ancient text is studied scientifically.

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[10] Mays, "Exegesis as a Theological Discipline," 23.

[11] See Rudolf Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (4 vols.; Tübingen: Mohr, 1952–1960), 1:128ff.; Bultmann, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?" in *Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann* (trans. Schubert M. Ogden; New York: Meridian Books, 1960), 289–296; Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (5 vols. in 14; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936–1977), 1.2:815ff.

[12] Mays, "Exegesis as a Theological Discipline," 8; see Hans-Joachim Kraus, *Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart* (Neukirchen: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1956), 171.

[13] Muilenberg, "Preface to Hermeneutics," 19.

> What is actually questionable in this approach is its concept of history itself. While it derived its awareness of the necessity of the category 'historical' from Scripture itself, it acquired its definition of what history is from outside Scripture—and was born schizophrenic. It is not enough in interpretation merely to ask the historical question because the material belongs to history. One must also fashion a notion of history appropriate to the material so that in asking the question real interpretation is possible. This historical criticism up to our time has never successfully done.[14]

The result has been that the process of exegesis ends in a fragmentation of the text in which literary fragments, historical documents, and phenomenological and linguistic elements clutter the view to such a degree that the text and its message are obscured, and true interpretation is impossible. These are the fruits of a wrong presupposition.

Since the category "historical" is inherent in Scripture itself, and since it has to be admitted that we do have presuppositions, a valid interpretation would be one in which the two are congruent. Such a method is one which proceeds from a Christological base. This presupposition is that in Christ a new meaning of history is revealed—revealed in the first century, but with a validity for all time. This presupposition was also that of the writers of the NT. There is 172 | therefore no tension between our view of history and that of the NT itself, and we can approach it as an object in history which not only can be interpreted today, but must be interpreted because it gives meaning to our own historical existence.

But what does this understanding mean to us in our concern with exegetical method? Does it deny the value of the historical-critical method? Does it mean that what has been described as a valid presupposition will force dogmatic propositions into the text and so rule exegesis? To both of the last two questions the answer should be an emphatic "no." The NT, which is the explication of the Christological message, which is our presupposition, is nevertheless a phenomenon in history, which not only gives meaning to history but partakes of it. The Christ of faith is the same as the Christ of history.[15] Therefore, if the biblical revelation is to

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[14] Mays, "Exegesis as a Theological Discipline," 8; see C.K. Barrett, "Yesterday, Today and Forever: The New Testament Problem" (Inaugural address, University of Durham, May 12, 1959), 4: The NT student "is thus confronted not only with the problem of historicity, which is on the whole an academic one, but also with the problem of history. History is not a matter of the past only, but an organic process in which past and present are inseparably related, and the way in which the NT history is presented compels the student of it to ask questions about God's purpose, and his own place, in history."

[15] See Blackman, "Task of Exegesis," 16ff.

be understood correctly, it must be subjected to the method of historical criticism. "Historical and philological exegesis should define and describe the human and accidental *setting* within which the biblical revelation has had to show itself at a given point of history."[16] Seen in this way, the Christological presupposition creates the framework within which the text is to be studied, but its emphasis is to be on the hermeneutical aspects of interpretation, as hermeneutics is conceived of in this volume. Christ is in a very real way the spiritual sense of interpretation. "This provides us with both a canon of interpretation and a principle of unity."[17]

The great contributions of historical criticism need thus not be surrendered. Indeed, they cannot be surrendered. If the presupposition underlying historical criticism is a valid one, this method of exegesis makes for a more articulated theology, for it helps to understand the NT in its context.[18]

## The Method of Exegesis

We shall now list some considerations that must be present in the | exegesis of a NT text. The great danger in outlining a procedure to be followed in exegesis is that the impression can be left that the text is a synthetic composite of elements of text, language, context, background, etc., which can be peeled off like the layers of an onion. The text, however, is not a mere juxtaposition of elements without any mutual penetration. It is much rather a syncretistic blend of different elements in which mutual penetration has brought about a new entity. Any analysis of a text should 173

[16] Oscar Cullmann, "The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism," *The Student World* 42 (1949): 117–133, esp. 127; repr. in Cullmann, *The Early Church: Studies in Early Christian History and Theology* (ed. A.J.B. Higgins; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956), 3–16.

[17] Blackman, "Task of Exegesis," 22.

[18] This evaluation of historical criticism does not imply that all the judgments of its advocates can be accepted uncritically. Because of its insistence that the NT is to be understood as a collection of writings of one religion among others, it tends to interpret it in terms of the other religions which existed in the period of its origin. This attitude has the effect of seeing influence upon the NT by these other religions to a disproportionate degree. The uniqueness of the NT is thus slighted. This approach is also ultimately responsible for wrong judgments in connection with the dating and relevance of historical material. Minor methodological points also suffer. This should not have the effect on the exegete of discarding this basic approach, however, but should cause him to apply a sounder and more responsible historical method. "The excesses of rationalism are not cured by flight into irrationalism, but only by a truer use of reason" (Blackman, "Task of Exegesis," 10).

therefore be conscious of two aspects of any one element: (1) the peculiar meaning that it has as an isolated entity, i.e., the meaning that it will contribute to the whole, and (2) the conditioning that it undergoes as part of the whole to which it contributes. The interpenetration which takes place in the second of these aspects cautions us against the danger of oversimplification which is attendant on the outlining of any simple exegetical procedure.

Therefore, although the order in which the following elements of exegesis is presented seems a reasonable one, it will be found that it is unlikely that one will remain in one area of investigation without infringing on another. There are also cogent reasons why the order can be changed.

Two further preliminary remarks need to be made. First, in this article it will not be possible to discuss all the tools to be used in exegesis. The reader is strongly urged to acquire the very excellent book by Frederick W. Danker, *Multipurpose Tools for Bible Study*,[19] which gives a thorough description and evaluation of the tools, and illustrates how to use them. This book will be of great value to the expert as well as to the non-expert.

Secondly, it is self-evident that the reader of the NT who does not have a working knowledge of Greek is at an appreciable disadvantage. This discussion will emphasize a method which presupposes such a knowledge, although suggestions will be made for those who do not have the gift of tongues. The latter are encouraged to acquire at least a rudimentary knowledge of Greek to the extent that they can use an interlinear Greek and English NT with discretion and can make use of critical commentaries and lexicons. Such a knowledge can be acquired with the aid of a book like D.F. Hudson, *Teach Yourself New Testament Greek*.[20] Perhaps it should be pointed out that the student of Greek soon learns that modesty with regard to his ability as a Greek scholar increases in proportion to the number of years devoted to the study of the language.

### *Text*

The problem of text is treated in greater detail in the article by Frank Pack in *ResQ* 5.[21] Any exegesis has to begin with a study of the textual

[19] Frederick W. Danker, *Multipurpose Tools for Bible Study* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1960; rev. and expanded ed.; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).

[20] D.F. Hudson, *Teach Yourself New Testament Greek* (New York: Association Press, 1960).

[21] Frank Pack, "The Contributions of Textual Criticism to the Interpretation of the New Testament," *ResQ* 5 (1961): 179–192.

variants, and a textual base has to be arrived at through application of the accepted canons of textual criticism. This means, of course, that an edition of the Greek NT must be used | which contains a critical apparatus that shows the variants. Of this type of text, most readily available are those of The British and Foreign Bible Society and the Nestle text.[22] A new edition of Nestle, in which the apparatus will be altogether reworked and expanded, will be available in the near future.[23] Although the physical make-up of the former is perhaps to be preferred, the Nestle-Aland text has more complete marginal notes which are of great value to the exegete. The chapter entitled "The Nestle Text" in Professor Danker's book can be read with great profit by all who wish to draw from the tremendous riches of this little volume.

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Although the person who uses only an English translation will not be able to go into the intricacies of textual study, he can be aware of the more important variants by using the American Standard or the Revised Standard Version. In the margins and the footnotes of these versions some variants are indicated. If a variant reading is indicated in a particular passage, the strength of its attestation can be checked to some degree by comparing a number of modern speech versions. If they do not all have the same preferred reading, the matter will certainly bear looking into further. A good commentary will discuss the problem, and indicate what issues are involved. This is by no means a fool-proof method of determining the importance of variant readings. If a variant is important enough to be indicated in a translation, it is important enough to be investigated.

### *Language*

After the text has been established, the exegete can begin the process of translation. Translation involves more than the substitution of English words for their roughly equivalent Greek counterparts. It involves the elements of language study (philology, grammar, etc.), but also that of context and background. The study of the language of the text is thus only the first step in the process of translation. For a more detailed study of the problem of language, the reader is referred to the article by

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[22] George D. Kilpatrick, ed., *Hē Kainē Diathēkē* (2d ed.; London: The British and Foreign Bible Society, 1958); Kurt Aland, ed., *Novum Testamentum Graece* (24th ed.; Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1960).

[23] Nestle-Aland, *Novum Testamentum Graece* (ed. Eberhard and Erwin Nestle, later Kurt Aland, Barbard Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce M. Metzger; 27th ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2004; 28th ed., ed. Holger Strutwolf, 2012).

JW Roberts.[24] Here only a few suggestions are made in the interests of outlining exegetical procedure.

1. The first task in language study is to determine the possible meanings of every significant word in the text under consideration. The standard Greek lexicons should be consulted, but the serious reader should go further than this. The different possible meanings that the lexicon indicates are not to be regarded as being basically different from each other. The differences rather represent the vantage points from which the lexicographer viewed the basic conception contained in the word. By consulting all the references given on a particular word, the reader will begin to see the reason the lexicographer made his divisions. Only when he sees the reason for this division will he be on the way to really understanding the meaning of the word. | 175
2. A concordance is indispensable in philological study. A particular word should first be studied as to its use by the author of the text under consideration. A concordance is required for this. A glance at a concordance will sometimes show that a word has a habit of appearing in a particular author in the company with the same other words. Sometimes a pattern of usage or a complex is discernible which immediately casts light on the meaning for a particular passage.
3. From the investigation of passages by the same author, proceed to the other places where it occurs in the NT. Then go to the Septuagint, keeping in mind that it was the Bible for most of the NT writers. Then go to the places in the early Christian literature where the word occurs to see how it was understood, then to the Jewish writers extant in Greek, and finally, to pagan Greek.
4. The most significant words can be studied in works like Kittel and Friedrich, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*,[25] from which some articles have been translated and printed under the title *Bible Key Words*.[26] Old, but still useful, is Hermann Cremer's *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*.[27] For non-Greek readers, Alan Richardson, ed., *A Theological Word Book of the Bible*; Jean-Jacques von

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[24] JW Roberts, "The Language Background of the New Testament," *ResQ* 5 (1961): 193–204.

[25] Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, eds., *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (11 vols.; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1933–1979).

[26] John R. Coates, ed., *Bible Key Words* (New York: Harper, 1951–1965).

[27] August Hermann Cremer, *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek* (trans. D.W. Simon and William Urwick; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1872; 4th English ed., 1895).

Allmen, *Vocabulary of the Bible*; and especially W.E. Vine, *An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words with Their Precise Meanings for English Readers*, are excellent helps.[28]

5. After the possible and probable meanings of the words have been ascertained, the text should be studied from a grammatical and syntactical point of view. By all means the indices of scripture references in the standard NT Greek grammars should be consulted to see if the passage under study is discussed in the grammar. The best NT grammar for reference use is Blass-Debrunner, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*.[29] An English translation of this work by Robert Funk has just been published.[30]

*Context*

The context of the passage will help to create the perspective in which the text is to be seen. The following considerations are important for determining the situation in which the text has meaning.

1. Larger Context. Here all the introductory matters are to be considered, such as authorship, date, destination, purpose, etc. These questions are discussed in the standard introductions to the NT. Among the most useful are those of McNeile, Moffatt, and Zahn.[31]
2. Immediate Context. Determine what place the text under consideration occupies in the argument of the whole writing. How does it fit in the immediate context in which it appears?
3. Parallel Passages. How does the same author, and how do other writers in the NT, treat the same problem in other places? | 176

[28] Alan Richardson, ed., *A Theological Word Book of the Bible* (New York: Macmillan, 1951); Jean-Jacques von Allmen, *Vocabulary of the Bible* (trans. P.J. Allcock et al.; London: Lutterworth, 1959); William Edwy Vine, *An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words with Their Precise Meanings for English Readers* (4 vols. in 1; Old Tappan, N.J.: Fleming H. Revel, 1966).

[29] Friedrich Blass and Albert Debrunner, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (9th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954).

[30] Friedrich Blass and Albert Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (trans. and rev. Robert W. Funk; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

[31] Alan H. McNeile, *An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament* (2d ed.; rev. C.S.C. Williams; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); James Moffatt, *An Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* (3d ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1949); Theodor Zahn, *Introduction to the New Testament* (trans. John Moore Trout; 3 vols. in 1; 2d ed.; New York: Scribner's, 1917).

a. By looking up the important words involved in a concordance or topical Bible, the parallel passages can be located.
b. The references in the outside margin of the Nestle text which are marked with an exclamation mark (!) are especially helpful. This means that at the reference after which it appears, the references will be indicated where the subject is discussed. For example, in the outer margin at 1 Cor 16:1, where the contribution is discussed, there is the following: Acts 11:29! When one turns to Acts 11:29, he finds in the outside margin references where the contribution is discussed. Of course, this sometimes involves the judgment of the editor, but it is a helpful device.
c. When studying the Synoptic Gospels, a synopsis like that of Albert Huck and Hans Lietzmann, *Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien* for the Greek text, or *Gospel Parallels*, which gives the RSV translation,[32] should be used. Check the context of the same event or discourse in the other gospels to see how it was used.

### *Background*

Background study is really a part of the attempt to determine the context in which the text appears and to translate the language which would be meaningful in this context. The background against which the NT was written was both Jewish and pagan. The articles by Jack P. Lewis and Roy B. Ward discuss the study of these backgrounds.[33] Background study is always difficult because the material is extremely complex. It is therefore not surprising that it is in this area of the exegetical discipline that the temptation is greatest to make generalizations. In studying the background for any possible relevance, the following questions will help to form an approach to the material:

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[32] Albert Huck and Hans Lietzmann, *Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien* (10th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1950); Burton Hamilton Throckmorton, *Gospel Parallels: A Synopsis of the First Three Gospels with Alternative Readings from the Manuscripts and Noncanonical Parallels* (3d ed.; Nashville: Nelson, 1979). See now Kurt Aland, *Synopsis Quattuor Evangeliorum* (15th ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2001); Burton Hamilton Throckmorton, *Gospel Parallels: A Comparison of the Synoptic Gospels* (Nashville: Nelson, 1992), which is based on the NRSV.

[33] Jack P. Lewis, "The Jewish Background of the New Testament," *ResQ* 5 (1961): 209–215; Roy Bowen Ward, "The Pagan Background of the New Testament," *ResQ* 5 (1961): 216–229.

1. Is any particular material that comes into the discussion really possibly relevant to the text in question so far as its date and provenience are concerned?
2. Is the background material more relevant to the writer of the text, or to his readers?
3. How intense is the relevance of background material: Was it strong enough to be termed influence, or merely conveniently common enough to be termed points of contact?
4. Is the relevance of the background material being judged by historical probability, or by subjective judgment?

*Foreground*

Still a further part of the effort to obtain historical perspective is to check the Christian foreground.

1. The treatment a particular passage received in the early church is instructive both for the possible understanding of the passage by the original recipients, and also for background elements which are many times contained in the Fathers. The places where a | particular passage 177 is used in the early church can easily be located by checking the index of Scripture passages in Volume IX of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*.[34] Special attention should be paid to the early commentators like Origen and Hippolytus. For a little later period, but very excellent on the Pauline epistles, see Theodore of Mopsuestia.
2. The use of significant Greek words in the Christian foreground can be studied with the help of Edgar J. Goodspeed's *Index Patristicus* and *Index Apologeticus*.[35] For later authors, some volumes in the *Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der erste drei Jahrhunderten* series contain selected indices. The new *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, edited by G.W.H. Lampe, will be of great value in this type of study.[36]
3. English words can be located through the index volume of the Ante-Nicene series.

[34] Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds., *Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325* (10 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951–1953).
[35] Edgar J. Goodspeed, *Index Patristicus* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1907); Goodspeed, *Index Apologeticus* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1912).
[36] G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).

4. Some nineteenth-century English commentaries, like those of Brooke Foss Westcott, Joseph B. Lightfoot in the Macmillan series, and the series by Charles J. Ellicott on the Greek text, usually refer to patristic passages and can be used with profit.[37]

*Exegetical Studies*

Detailed exegetical studies by modern scholars devoted to the passage under study, or to problems connected with it, should be used. Such articles appear in scholarly journals and books where they might be lost if it were not for some excellent tools which make us aware of their existence. These reference works survey all the literature which appears in the biblical field and record what significant work has been done on any passage, word, concept or problem of NT studies. The following are the most important of these survey journals.

1. *New Testament Abstracts*, a Catholic publication, gives summaries of the most important articles which appear in scholarly NT journals. All the summaries are in English, although the survey covers all the important international journals.
2. *Internationale Zeitschriftenschau für Bibelwissenschaft und Grenzgebiete* is more comprehensive and also covers the related fields. The summaries are all in German.
3. *Biblica* is published by the Pontifical Institute in Rome and covers the whole Bible. It is the most comprehensive, and contains surveys of the most important articles in all the important modern languages and in Latin.

*Commentaries*

Commentaries, like the exegetical studies, will probably be consulted earlier in the process of exegesis. The aspirant exegete, however, should

[37] Brooke Foss Westcott, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians* (repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950); Westcott, *The Epistles of St. John* (repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952); Westcott, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952); Westcott, *The Gospel According to St. John* (repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954); Joseph B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (10th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1890); Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Colossians and to Philemon* (9th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1890); Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Philippians* (8th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1888); Charles J. Ellicott, *St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians: With A Critical and Grammatical Commentary* (London: Longmans, Green, 1887); Ellicott, *The Pastoral Epistles of St. Paul: With A Critical and Grammatical Commentary and a Revised Translation* (London: Longmans, Green, 1883).

place his emphasis on the study of the primary material rather than on these secondary helps. Commentaries and shorter studies, however, do point out the problems in any text and are | helpful by referring to relevant background material. The following types of commentaries can be used to good effect. 178

1. Critical commentaries like the *International Critical Commentary* series and the new German Meyer series are excellent for details in exegesis. The *Cambridge Greek Testament* series is also worthy of more honors than is usually bestowed upon it. Its value lies in its practice of usually listing various possibilities of solving a problem with dispassionate fairness and leaving the decision up to the reader. Such commentaries as these should be used before a synthesis is made.
2. Commentaries should also be used which emphasize the continuity of the book in which exegesis is done. It is necessary to get the sweep and direction of the author's thought. The Moffatt series and the new Harpers series of commentaries fall into this category. The *New International Commentary* series should probably also be included here, although individual volumes have different emphases. The *Interpreter's Bible* is a popular series which is of little value for serious exegesis. Its main value lies in the excellent General Articles in Volumes I, VII and XII of the series.

### *Synthesis and Paraphrase*

After research has been done in all these areas, a synthesis should be made which contains all the relevant elements that have been discerned. Blowing life into these dry bones is accomplished by returning to the text and paraphrasing it on the basis of the analysis of the different elements. This discipline will unite disparate elements, and will show a new dimension in the text itself.

Here the task of exegesis ends, and that of hermeneutics takes over to place the text and its message in the total context of theology and its relevance to present-day man.

CHAPTER THREE

# THE BEASTS AT EPHESUS*

Paul's statement in 1 Cor 15:32 that he had fought with beasts at Ephesus has long been a notorious *crux interpretum*. Ἐθηριομάχησα can be understood in either a literal or figurative sense.[1] If taken literally, the expression is usually thought to refer to a struggle with wild animals in the arena at Ephesus.[2] When understood figuratively, the expression is most frequently understood to refer to Paul's battle with his opponents at Ephesus.[3]

There are problems in connection with both interpretations, as the extensive literature dealing with the verse shows. One of the objections to taking ἐθηριομάχησα figuratively is that, if Paul is here referring to his struggle with opponents of his ministry, he is using a very unusual expression for what was to him a very usual experience. Despite the fact that the figurative use elsewhere is not unknown, such a use of the verb without any further qualification sounds unusual.[4] Nevertheless, the figurative understanding has generally prevailed because of the problems a literal

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* Originally published in *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 79–89.

[1] See the summary of the issues involved by Robert E. Osborne, "Paul and the Wild Beasts," *JBL* 85 (1966): 225–228. For the literal understanding, see Wilhelm Michaelis, *Die Datierung des Philipperbriefes* (NTF 8; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1933), 44ff.; for the figurative meaning, see Josef Schmid, *Zeit und Ort der paulinischen Gefangenschaftsbriefe: Mit einem Anhang über die Datierung der Pastoralbriefe* (Freiburg: Herder, 1931), 38ff.

[2] For literal fighting with beasts, see Diodorus Siculus 3.43.7; Josephus, *B.J.* 7.38. If εἰ . . . ἐθηριομάχησα is taken as a contrary to fact condition (e.g., by Michaelis, *Die Datierung des Philipperbriefes*, 44ff.), Paul is referring only to the possibility of his fighting with beasts. Such a reading might suggest that he was imprisoned in Ephesus and that he was in danger of being thrown to the beasts. See George S. Duncan, *St. Paul's Ephesian Ministry: A Reconstruction with Special Reference to the Ephesian Origin of the Imprisonment Epistles* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), 126ff.

[3] The passages most frequently referred to for the figurative meaning are Ign. *Rom.* 5.1; Appian, *Bell. civ.* 2.61; Philo, *Mos.* 1.43–44. Schmid (*Zeit und Ort*, 59 n. 5) adds P.Ryl. 15, 7; Vettius Valens, *Anthol.* 2.40 (in Wilhelm Kroll, *Vettii Valentis anthologiarum libri* [Berlin: Weidmann, 1908] p. 129 line 33 and p. 130 line 21), and Plutarch, *An virt. doc.* 439.

[4] Thus Schmid, *Zeit und Ort*, 41; see Johannes Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), 365; Cayton R. Bowen, "I Fought with Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 42 (1923): 59–68, esp. 66–67, "When Paul uses the term without explanation, I submit that these simple words could not have been understood otherwise than literally by the readers at Corinth. . . . It is true that ancient authors sometimes compare wild men with wild beasts, but there is no evidence (outside the words we are considering) that

interpretation would raise for Paul's standing as a Roman citizen. Roman citizens might in serious cases be so condemned, but then lost their citizenship. Paul's later appeal to Caesar (Acts 25:11) | would indicate that he was still a citizen at that time and that he had therefore not been thrown to the beasts.

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The purpose of this article is to determine whether the idea of fighting with beasts in a figurative sense is indeed as unusual as has been maintained. Whereas earlier discussions have centered mostly on the implications of Roman law for the interpretation of the passage and on the historical circumstances of Paul's work in Ephesus, this study will examine literary evidence that has not been brought into the discussion.

## Diatribe Style

Commentators on 1 Cor 15:29–34 have noted in passing that some characteristics of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe are found in this passage. Closer examination of this section in which ἐθηριομάχησα appears reveals that the language and style of the diatribe are concentrated here to an unusually high degree.

1. The style is simple, like that of the diatribe.[5] The sentences are short and simply constructed. They are similar in construction, are of substantially equal length, and are paratactic in nature with almost no connectives. They are frequently in the form of rhetorical questions and sometimes make use of transitional formulae such as ἐπεὶ τί (v. 29) and τί καὶ ἡμεῖς (v. 30) which are common in the diatribe.[6]
2. Imperatives are used as in the diatribe. The hortatory subjunctive (v. 32) is used with the force of the ironic imperative so much loved in the diatribe.[7] Serious imperatives (μὴ πλανᾶσθε, v. 33; ἐκνήψατε, v. 34) of verbs common in the diatribe are placed at the end of the unit where they would be found in the diatribe.[8]

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θηριομαχεῖν without explanation was ever used as such a figure.... The verb had really no other use than the specific reference to the combats in the arena."

[5] See Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (FRLANT 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910; repr., 1984), 17ff.

[6] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.16.11; 1.16.3; 1.18.11; Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 55.

[7] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.26.12.

[8] See Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 32–33. For μὴ πλανᾶσθε, see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.6.23.

3. Related to the imperatives are the exclamations which heighten the explosive character of the diatribe. τί μοι τὸ ὄφελος; (v. 32) has such force.[9] So does νή, the particle of strong affirmation which occurs only here in the NT, but is frequent in the diatribe.[10]
4. The hardships expressed by κινδυνεύομεν (v. 30), ἀποθνῄσκω (v. 31) and ἐθηριομάχησα (v. 32) represent the so-called *peristasis* catalogue of the diatribe, the lists of hardships faced by the wise man.[11]
| 5. The diatribe abounds with quotations, especially from Homer, Euripides, Menander, and Philemon.[12] Frequently quotations appear at the end of a section as the one from Menander in v. 33 does. The quotation from Menander's *Thais* has the proverbial character which was a feature of many quotations in the diatribe. This is the only quotation from pagans in an undisputed letter of Paul. In his reticence to quote from them Paul is markedly different from Philo, who delights in such quotations.[13] The quotation here should therefore be regarded as significant. It need not suggest that Paul had any extensive knowledge of Greek literature. Menander's writings were highly regarded in Paul's day,[14] and were frequently suggested as excellent reading for the aspiring rhetorician.[15] It is likely that Paul's contact with Greek literature took place on this level. 73
6. The whole discussion is conducted as an *argumentum ad hominem*, as is frequent in the diatribe. This is seen in the use of the ironic imperative, but is expressed most clearly in the concluding statement of the section (v. 34): πρὸς ἐντροπὴν ὑμῖν λαλῶ.[16]

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[9] See Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 33, 86–87.

[10] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr*. 2.20.29; Adolf F. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament* (RVV 10; Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1911; repr., 1964), 143.

[11] Epictetus, *Diatr*. 1.24.1, αἱ περιστάσεις εἰσὶν αἱ τοὺς ἄνδρας δεικνύουσαι. See Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 19–20, 71–72. For dying daily, see Seneca, *Ep*. 24.20; Athenaeus, *Deipn*. 12.552B; Philo, *Flacc*. 175. Κινδυνεύειν and ἀποθνῄσκειν are used together in Epictetus, *Diatr*. 2.19.24.

[12] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 43ff. On the use of the poets in moralistic teaching in general, see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 231ff.

[13] See Karl L. Schmidt, "Der Apostel Paulus und die antike Welt," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* 4 (1924/1925): 45ff.; repr. in *Das Paulusbild in der neueren deutschen Forschung* (ed. Karl H. Rengstorff; WdF 24; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964), 223.

[14] Cf. Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 712D; *Comp. Arist. Men. compend.* 854AB. For early Christian knowledge of Menander, see Robert M. Grant, "Early Christianity and Greek Comic Poetry," *CP* 60 (1965): 157ff.

[15] See Quintilian, *Inst.* 10.1.69–70; Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 18.6–7; Ausonius, *Ep*. 22, *ad Nep*.

[16] Robert M. Grant ("Hellenistic Elements in I Corinthians," in *Early Christian Origins: Studies in Honor of Harold R. Willoughby* [ed. Allen Wikgren; Chicago: Quadrangle Books,

It has long been established that Paul uses the style of the diatribe in his letters. Whether his adoption of this style was by direct appropriation from pagan examples or whether it was mediated to him by the Hellenistic synagogue need not detain us here.[17] What is important for our purpose is that the immediate context in which θηριομαχεῖν occurs has obvious, even unusual (for Paul), contacts with the diatribe which represents the moralistic preaching of the Roman Empire.[18] It is appropriate, then, to examine the moralistic literature of this period for any light it may shed on the meaning of θηριομαχεῖν. | 74

## The Passions as Beasts

At least as early as Plato, human passions and the pleasures of the flesh are described as beasts which fight against man.[19] That these warring passions should be subdued by the wise man became part of the teaching in philosophical schools and gymnasia in pre-Christian times.[20] But it was the Cynics and Stoics who first developed a complete picture of the struggle of the sage.[21] The terminology of the arena became part of the language of the diatribe and other moralistic writings.[22] Especially in the Cynic heroes Heracles and Diogenes was the ideal struggle seen to have taken place.

Heracles was the most important of the Cynic patrons.[23] His hardiness had caught the imagination of the Hellenistic period, and he came to

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1961], 61) suggests that the word "shameful" in 1 Corinthians reflects conventional moral judgments. He does not refer to 1 Cor 6:5 or 15:32.

[17] See nn. 64ff. below.

[18] For the diatribe and moralistic preaching in the empire, see Paul Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judentum und Christentum* (4th ed.; HNT 2; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), 75–96, 253ff.

[19] Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 9.588C–590A; *Phaed.* 81E–82B; Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 7.1.1–3.1145a15–34; 7.5.1–6.1148b15–1149a15.

[20] Cf. Polemo's conversion in the schoolroom of Xenocrates, Diogenes Laertius 4.16; Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 173ff. For the place of philosophy in Hellenistic education, see Henri I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* (6th ed.; Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965), 308ff. = Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (trans. George Lamb; 3d ed.; New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 206–216.

[21] See now Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), esp. 16–37. The author does not relate his findings to 1 Cor 15:32; cf. 76 n. 1.

[22] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.18.22–23; Seneca, *Ep.* 80.2–3.

[23] See Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D.* (London: Methuen, 1937; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967; 2d ed., London: British Classical Press, 1998), 13; Jacob Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1879), 22ff.

exemplify the man who is in control of himself and is truly independent. As fighter of beasts he had been called θηροκτόνος,[24] and of greater interest to us, he was also called θηριομάχος.[25] The moralists of the first and second centuries AD still refer to his labors,[26] but Heracles was now seen as the savior of men, not merely because he had defended men against the wild beasts, but because in his example he continued to show them how to conquer themselves and also to be victorious over the tyrants who oppress them.[27] These Hellenistic descriptions of Heracles, and also of Diogenes, provide the background for understanding Paul's statement in 1 Cor 15:32ff.

| Heracles the glutton was a familiar figure in the fourth century BC,[28] 75 and it is clear that this unflattering tradition continued.[29] Yet a favorable portrayal of Heracles was known by the time of Antisthenes who is considered by Diogenes Laertius (1.15; 6.13) to have been the founder of the Cynic sect.[30] Dio Chrysostom tells us that Heracles purified himself of the ἡδοναί, which are the beasts, and that this is what is meant by his taming the earth.[31] The Cynic has Heracles as his model and is himself a soldier fighting against pleasures, thus seeking to purify his own life.[32]

Diogenes also fought with these beasts and was compared to Heracles.[33] For Diogenes the struggle against pleasures was fiercer and greater than that against other hardships.[34] Pleasure's onslaught is subtle, "it deceives

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[24] Tegea, *IG* V,2 91.

[25] Lucian, *Lex.* 19.

[26] E.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.6.32; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 63.6. Pfitzner (*Paul and the Agon Motif*, 29) overstates the case when he says, "They strove to remove the popular opinions held concerning Hercules and his great feats by asserting that those men erred who thought that he had fought against beasts, for the beasts were allegorized as the vices of men the hero sought to extirpate in his global wanderings."

[27] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.84. For the idealization of Heracles in Greek literature of the Roman age, see Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 50–73.

[28] Cf. Euripides, *Alc.* 788ff.; Aristophanes, *Av.* 1574ff. On the early Heracles as a glutton, see Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (12 vols.; London: Oxford/H. Milford, 1935–1961), 6:466–467.

[29] Cf. Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.512E.

[30] Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 13.

[31] *Or.* 5.22–23. See Ernst Weber, *De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum sectatore* (LSCP 10.2; Leipzig: J.B. Hirschfeld, 1887), 253ff.; Louis François, *Essai sur Dion Chrysostome. Philosophe et moraliste cynique et stoicien* (Paris: Delagrave, 1921), 165ff.

[32] Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8.

[33] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.26ff.

[34] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.20. Behind this lies an ancient tradition, according to Karl Hahn, *De Dionis Chrysostomi orationibus, quae inscribuntur Diogenes* (*VI, VIII, IX, X*) (Hamburg: J.G. Steinhaeusser, 1896), 41ff. Cf. also *Or.* 9.12, τὸ πάντων ἀμαχώτατον θηρίον.

and casts a spell with baneful drugs, just as Homer says Circe drugged the comrades of Odysseus, and some forthwith became swine, some wolves, and some other kinds of beasts."[35] Pleasure drives the victim into a sort of sty and pens him up; henceforth the victim goes on living as a pig or wolf.[36]

The Cynic's struggle was not conceived of as only an inward one. Men who live shameful lives, especially those who dishonor philosophy by their lives, are shameless beasts (ἀναίσχυντα θηρία), and Heracles was supposed to have been sent to exterminate them.[37] In this vein Lucian under the alias of Παρρησία announces, before he engages the philosophers, that he is about to enter battle with no ordinary beasts.[38] They act like dogs which bite and devour one another.[39] Although Lucian did | not hold any philosophical school in high esteem,[40] it is nevertheless clear that for him Heracles is especially concerned with the Epicureans who speak for Hedone, who makes men live a bestial life.[41]

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Plutarch represents the widespread antipathy of the period to the Epicureans. In his polemical writings against them he uses the language we have been considering. In his *Adversus Colotem*, Colotes, perhaps smarting under the charge that his sect lived like wild beasts,[42] states that it was a lack of proper laws that would result in leading the life of savage beasts. Plutarch counters that life would become savage, unsocial, and bestial not just because of the absence of laws, but because of the Epicurean phi-

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[35] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.21. For this allegorization of *Od.* 10.236, see further Plutarch, *Conj. praec.* 139A. It may also be behind Lucian, *Bis acc.* 21. See also Hahn, *De Dionis Chrysostomi*, for other occurrences.

[36] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.24ff.

[37] Lucian, *Fug.* 20, 23; cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.6.32. The Cynics were themselves compared with animals, but this comparison is most frequently considered an apt one because of their viciousness and harshness; see Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 37ff.

[38] Lucian, *Pisc.* 17.

[39] Lucian, *Pisc.* 36; cf. *Vit. auct.* 10.

[40] See Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (2 vols.; HAW 7.2; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1920–1924; repr., 1959–1961), 2:712ff. Also see Marcel Caster, *Lucien et le pensée religieuse de son temps* (CEA; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1937; repr., New York: Garland, 1987), 9–122.

[41] E.g., Lucian, *Bis acc.* 20; *Fug.* 19.

[42] For the Epicurean assertion that the first impulse of all living animals is toward pleasure, see *Frg.* 398 in Hermann Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1887). Usener (p. lxx) sees the (Ps.)-Plutarchean *Brut. an.* (*Gryllus*) as directed against Epicureans who lived like animals. For later discussion and modification of this view, see A. Philippson, "Polystratos' Schrift über die grundlose Verachtung der Volksmeinung," *NJahrb* 23 (1909): 506ff.

losophy, particularly its "doctrines inciting men to pleasure." For Plutarch, "this is the life of brutes, because brute beasts know nothing better nor more honest than pleasure."[43]

In Hellenistic literature the libertinistic life popularly, if unjustly, associated with the philosophy of Epicurus is frequently summarized as ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν.[44] In Plutarch's anti-Epicurean writings this becomes a formula for the sensual life.[45] This description of the profligate life seems to have entered the Greek world as a description of Sardanapalus, the most well-known figure of oriental antiquity among the Greeks.[46] According to a tradition well-known in Hellenistic times, the wealthy seventh-century Assyrian was the founder of Tarsus,[47] and his grave was supposed to have been in Anchiale, fourteen miles from the city.[48] On the grave was an inscription reading ἔσθιε, πῖνε, παῖζε.[49] Chrysippus | adds that a fuller statement by Sardanapalus appeared on the tomb, part of which read "... knowing full well that thou art but mortal, indulge thy desire, find joy in thy feasts. Dead, thou shalt have no delight ..."[50] According to the Epicureans, of course, there is no afterlife and man's moral life should therefore be lived totally within the perspective of the present life.[51] By NT times Sardanapalus had become the stock figure used by Cynics for the kind of man who has been led astray by pleasure.[52] Consequently it is not

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43 Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1108D; 1124E–1125C; cf. *Suav. viv.* 1089C.

44 See the references in Johann J. Wettstein, ed., *Novum Testamentum Graecum* (2 vols.; Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1962; orig. pub. Amsterdam: Dommer, 1751–1752), 2:169. For Latin authors, see Horace, *Carm.* 1.4; 2.3; 4.7; Seneca, *Controv.* 14; Petronius, *Satyr.* 34.

45 E.g., Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* 1098C; 1100D; *Adv. Col.* 1125D.

46 See Ernst Maass, *Orpheus: Untersuchungen zur griechischen, römischen, altchristlichen Jenseitsdichtung und Religion* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1895), 209ff.; F.H. Weissbach, "Sardanapal," PW (1920): 2436–2475. Cf. the vast collection of references in John E.B. Mayor's note on Juvenal 10.362, *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Macmillan, 1872; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1966), 2:178–179.

47 See Weissbach, "Sardanapal," 2466ff.; Hans Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im augusteischen Zeitalter: Mit Berücksichtigung der paulinischen Schriften* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913).

48 See William M. Ramsay, *The Cities of St. Paul: Their Influence on His Life and Thought* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1907), 132ff.

49 This form of the inscription is given, among others, by Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.530B; Strabo, *Geogr.* 14.5.9. Instead of παῖζε, some of the authors in the tradition have ὄχευε or ἀφροδισίαζε. See the discussion in Weissbach, "Sardanapal," 2443ff.

50 *Apud* Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 8.336AB.

51 Cf. *Frgs.* 336ff., 396ff. (Usener).

52 Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 155; Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 181ff.

uncommon to find Heracles contrasted to Sardanapalus, the Epicurean *par excellence*.[53]

Our investigation thus seems to lead to the conclusion that Paul's use of θηριομαχεῖν ultimately comes from language used by the moralists of his day to describe the wise man's struggle against hedonism. His quotation from Isa 22:13, φάγωμεν καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν, in this context would be reminiscent of the slogan attributed to the Epicureans and reflects the contemporary anti-Epicurean bias. The suspicion that Paul does have in mind some kind of Epicureanism has been expressed by some commentators,[54] but, so far as I can ascertain, it has never been developed. It is not our purpose here to determine the view of the resurrection either held by the Corinthians or ascribed to them by Paul.[55] At this point we are only concerned to determine the meaning of the language he uses.

After the quotation from Menander[56] in v. 33, Paul concludes this part of his argument and again uses terms found in anti-Epicurean polemic: ἐκνήψατε δικαίως. The view that pleasure is like a drug[57] or like wine[58] was not applied only to Epicureans, but it could obviously be pressed into service against them in a special way. Epicurus answers the accusation that the end of his philosophy is sensuality by asserting that pleasure as he conceives of it is sober reasoning. In his letter to Menoeceus a number of calumnies against him are answered.[59] People, he says, attribute these views to him either because they are ignorant,[60] | prejudiced, or wish to misrepresent him. Pleasure is νήφων λογισμός which investigates every choice and avoidance.[61] The greatest good is φρόνησις, which is more precious

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[53] E.g., Cleomedes, *Cael.* 2.1, 91–92; Juvenal, *Sat.* 10.360ff.; Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1065C. For the contrast between Diogenes and Sardanapalus, see Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* 1.9; 32.9.

[54] E.g., Wettstein, *Novum Testamentum Graecum*, who calls the quotation from Isa 22:13 an *Epicureorum vox.* Also, Ernest-Bernard Allo, *Saint Paul, Première épître aux Corinthiens* (2d ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956), 417.

[55] For a summary of the discussion, see John C. Hurd, *The Origin of I Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1965), 195ff.

[56] Menander himself had been a fellow student of Epicurus at Athens.

[57] See nn. 35 and 36.

[58] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Orr.* 30, 36, and 39.

[59] Diogenes Laertius 10.131–132.

[60] This may itself be a slap at the accusation that Epicurus was ignorant and an enemy of all learning. See André-Jean Festugière, *Epicurus and His Gods* (trans. C.W. Chilton; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956; orig. pub. *Épicure et ses dieux* [MR 19; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1946]), 33ff.

[61] Cf. Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1123F, "If men not sodden with drink or under the influence of drugs and out of their minds, but sober (νήφοντες), and in perfect health, writing books on truth and norms and standards of judgment."

even than philosophy, for all other virtues spring from it. It teaches that a life of pleasure must be a life lived φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως.[62] The idea of justice is an important element in Epicurus's thinking, and its appearance with νήφων λογισμός is not accidental.[63] If this background can be posited, ἐκνήψατε δικαίως may come from an ironic demand made of Epicureans that they sober up in a just manner.

## Hellenistic Judaism

Paul need not have been directly dependent on such anti-Epicurean discussions for the language he uses. Nevertheless, it is not immediately obvious why he could not have derived this particular style of expression from the philosophers in the marketplace, whose common property it was.[64] Even a familiarity on his part with the contrast between Heracles and Sardanapalus is not impossible. In one of his addresses to Tarsus, Dio Chrysostom calls Heracles the founder of the city and refers to the Tarsians' custom of constructing a funeral pyre in Heracles's honor.[65] If Paul did not actually grow up in Tarsus,[66] he did spend a number of years there during which he could have learned the traditions associated with the city (Gal 1:21–22; cf. Acts 9:30ff.). Without wishing to press it too far, we may note that in an earlier discussion of immorality in 1 Cor 10:7 Paul, again using an OT passage, describes immorality as φαγεῖν, πεῖν, and παίζειν, a striking parallel to the inscription said to have been on Sardanapalus's grave.

It is also possible that Paul was dependent on Hellenistic Judaism, not only for the use of the diatribe,[67] but also for the manner of his discussion in 1 Cor 15:32–34. Philo describes the pleasures as serpents: | "They are like the serpents in the wilderness" (Num 21:6).[68] Again, the serpent of Eve is 79

62 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 10.140.

63 Note its recurrence in the Κυρίαι Δόξαι: Diogenes Laertius 10.140, 144, 150ff., and the polemic in Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1124D–1125A.

64 The hesitancy of Pfitzner (*Paul and the Agon Motif*, 3ff.) to take this possibility seriously is not well founded.

65 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.47.

66 So Willem C. van Unnik, *Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth* (trans. George Ogg; London: Epworth, 1962), who has not met with complete approval; see Nigel Turner, *Grammatical Insights Into the New Testament* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1966), 83–85.

67 For the "agon motif" in Hellenistic Judaism, see Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif*, 38ff.; for the influence of the diatribe on the Hellenistic synagogue preaching, see Hartwig Thyen, *Der Stil der jüdisch-hellenistischen Homilie* (FRLANT NS 47; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955).

68 Philo, *Leg.* 2.77 (cf. 72ff., 74, 81, 84, 87–88). Cf. Paul's treatment of the same event (Num 21:6) in 1 Cor 10:9.

the symbol of pleasure that attacks the reasoning faculty (λογισμός) in us, and its enjoyment leads to the ruin of understanding.[69] The Epicurean element is also present in Wis 2:6, ἀπολαύσωμεν τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθῶν, which also is reminiscent of Isa 22:13. Although the people whom the author of Wisdom had in mind may not have been Epicureans,[70] it is likely that they had been influenced by a superficial knowledge of Greek (namely, Epicurean) thought. The views attributed to them may reflect OT passages, but these allusions are of such a nature that they could express the ideas of pleasure-loving Greeks.[71] The habit of calling a philosophical or religious opponent an Epicurean, or of describing him in Epicurean terms, is not unknown in pagan, Jewish, or Christian literature.[72] Paul's appropriation of his language is in this tradition.

## Conclusion

Regardless of the avenue by which Paul was introduced to this mode of expression, he appropriated it in no artificial way. It became part of his own style. The question still has to be raised, however, as to what Paul refers to when he says εἰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐθηριομάχησα ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, τί μοι τὸ ὄφελος; Fighting with beasts in a figurative sense was, as we have seen, not an uncommon description of the sage's struggle. Such a figurative understanding of θηριομαχεῖν in this context appears to be the correct one. The Cynic hero was said to fight with beasts when he subdued his own passions as well as his hedonistic opponents. Paul describes his self-control with an athletic metaphor in 1 Cor 9:24–27.[73] It may be part of his intention to include the idea of self-control in 1 Cor 15:32 as well. However, ἐν Ἐφέσῳ leaves the impression that Paul has a more particular circumstance in mind which was known to his readers.

In 1 Cor 16:8–9 he states his intention to remain in Ephesus because a door had been opened for him, and that he has many adversaries. It is | not possible to determine with absolute certainty who these adversaries

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[69] Philo, *Agr.* 108; cf. § 97 with *Leg.* 2.72ff.

[70] That they were Epicureans is argued by A. Dupont-Sommer, "Les 'impies' du Livre de la Sagesse sont-il des Epicuriens?" *RHR* 111 (1935): 90–109. For a contrary view, see J. Fichtner, "Die Stellung der Sapientia Salomonis in der Literatur- und Geistesgeschichte ihrer Zeit," *ZNW* 36 (1937): 113–132.

[71] Thus Paul Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1912), 40ff.

[72] See Richard P. Jungkuntz, "Fathers, Heretics and Epicureans," *JEH* 17 (1966): 3–10.

[73] The γάρ in 10:1 relates this figure closely to 10:1–13. That it is simply a loose conjunctive (so, e.g., Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif*, 83) is not convincing.

were,[74] but they may very well have been the beasts with whom he had fought.[75] In 1 Cor 15 Paul is arguing against men who denied the future resurrection of the body in favor of a present one in the spirit.[76] For them eschatology had been radically realized.[77] They were already experiencing the blessings of the eschaton (cf. 1 Cor 4:8ff.). Their morality was not governed by any futuristic hope. In the face of this, Paul insists that the Christian's moral life must be lived with a view towards the resurrection of the body (cf. 1 Cor 6:12–14). In Ephesus he had opposed evil men, for association with them corrupts (cf. 1 Cor 5:6ff.). If there were no resurrection of the body, his struggle at Ephesus had been in vain. It would have been κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, a struggle on a merely human level, without a hope of resurrection.[78] The Corinthians, familiar with Paul's experiences, would readily see the application to their own situation.

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[74] See Schmid, *Zeit und Ort*, 38ff. If Rom 16 was indeed written to Ephesus (Wilhelm Michaelis, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* [3d ed.; Bern: Berchtold Haller, 1961], 160ff.), Paul's warning in Rom 16:17–20 may provide a clue to the character of these men. For a description of them as Jewish-Christian Gnostics, see Walter Schmithals, "Die Irrlehrer von Rom 16:17–20," *ST* 13 (1959): 51–69 (= *Paulus und die Gnostiker: Untersuchungen zu den kleinen Paulusbriefen* [*TF* 35; Hamburg-Bergstedt: Reich, 1965], 159–173).

[75] The description of heretics as beasts is not unusual; cf. Phil 3:2; Acts 20:29; Titus 2:12; Ign. *Eph.* 7.1; *Smyrn.* 4.1.

[76] See Ernst Haenchen, "Gnosis. II. Gnosis und NT," in *RGG*[3] 2:1653; Hans von Soden, "Sakrament und Ethik bei Paulus," in von Soden, *Urchristentum und Geschichte. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Vorträge* (2 vols.; Tübingen: Mohr, 1951–1956), 1:259ff. (= *Das Paulusbild in der neueren deutschen Forschung*, 361ff.); Julius Schniewind, "Die Leugner der Auferstehung in Korinth," in *Nachgelassene Reden und Aufsätze* (ed. Ernst Kähler; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1952), 110–139. Evald Lövestam ("Über die neutestamentliche Aufforderung zur Nüchternheit," *ST* 12 [1958]: 80–102, esp. 83–84) suggests that ἐκνήψατε and ἀγνωσία betray the gnostic character of the heretics, but that Paul uses the terms here in his own way.

[77] For a discussion of this kind of eschatological outlook and its influence on morality, see William L. Lane, "1 Tim 4:1–3. An Early Instance of Over-Realized Eschatology," *NTS* 11 (1964): 164–167.

[78] For this understanding of κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, see BAG, s.v. ἄνθρωπος 1.b; Jean Héring, *La première épître de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (CNT 7; Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1949), *ad loc.*; Schmid, *Zeit und Ort*, 43 n. 2. A similar use of κατὰ ἄνθρωπον is found in 1 Cor 3:3–4, where the Corinthians' conduct is said to show that they live as mere men, rather than as men governed by the Spirit. See Kümmel's note on 3:4, in Hans Lietzmann and Werner G. Kümmel, *An die Korinther I–II* (4th ed.; HNT 9; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1949).

CHAPTER FOUR

# "GENTLE AS A NURSE": THE CYNIC BACKGROUND TO 1 THESSALONIANS 2*

Paul's description of his Thessalonian ministry in 1 Thess 2 has in recent years been variously interpreted. The discussion has revolved in part around the question whether vv. 1–12 are to be understood as an apology directed to a concrete situation in Thessalonica in the face of which Paul had to defend himself, or whether the language that seems to support such a view can be understood in another way. A major statement in favor of the latter option had been made by von Dobschütz, who claimed that the "apology" reflects the mood of Paul at the time of writing rather than a strained relationship with the Thessalonians.[1] Martin Dibelius represented a somewhat similar view, but saw this as a favorite theme of Paul that he could have introduced without his having been forced to do so by circumstances in Thessalonica. Dibelius pointed out that it was necessary for Paul to distinguish himself from other preachers of his day without actually having been accused of being a charlatan. To illustrate his point he brought into the discussion descriptions of wandering Cynics.[2] More recently, Günther Bornkamm has lent his support to Dibelius.[3] A.-M. Denis does not specifically address himself to the problem, yet sees the main thrust of vv. 1–6 to be Paul's presentation of himself as the messianic prophet to the Gentiles.[4]

The most exhaustive recent treatment is that of Walter Schmithals, who argues forcefully that Paul is defending himself against specific charges that had been made against him.[5] Schmithals | emphasizes that Paul's 204

* Originally published in *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 35–48.

[1] Ernst von Dobschütz, *Die Thessalonicher-briefe* (KEK 10; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1909), 106–107.

[2] Martin Dibelius, *An die Thessalonicher I, II, An die Philipper* (3d ed.; HNT 11; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1937), 7–11.

[3] Günther Bornkamm, "Glaube und Vernunft bei Paulus," in Bornkamm, *Studien zu Antike und Urchristentum* (BEvT 28; Munich: Kaiser, 1963), 130 n. 22.

[4] Albert-Marie Denis, "L'Apôtre Paul, 'prophète messianique' des Gentils. Étude thématique de I Thess 2:1–6," *ETL* 33 (1957): 245–318.

[5] Walther Schmithals, "Die historische Situation der Thessalonicherbriefe," in Schmithals, *Paulus und die Gnostiker: Untersuchungen zu den kleinen Paulusbriefen* (*TF* 35; Hamburg-Bergstedt: Reich, 1965), 89–157.

language in 1 Thess 2 is in many respects similar to that of his Corinthian correspondence, and he claims that the same kind of Jewish Christian Gnostics are responsible for Paul's apologies in both groups of letters. He admits that there are parallels in 1 Thess 2 to the descriptions of the Cynics cited by Dibelius, and accepts the necessity of genuine preachers having to distinguish themselves from the charlatans. However, he points out that there are no close verbal parallels to Paul in the material cited by Dibelius. More important to him, though, is that the form of Paul's description of his work in Thessalonica is of such a nature that it demands being viewed as an apology.[6] Schmithals is not explicit at this point, but what seems to make him think that Paul protests too much is Paul's antithetic statements that could be understood as denials of accusations: τὴν εἴσοδον . . . οὐ κενή (v. 1) . . . ἀλλὰ . . . ἐν πολλῷ ἀγῶνι (v. 2), οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀκαθαρσίας οὐδὲ ἐν δόλῳ, ἀλλά . . . (vv. 3–4), οὐχ ὡς ἀνθρώποις ἀρέσκοντες ἀλλὰ θεῷ . . . (v. 4), οὔτε . . . ἐν λόγῳ κολακείας . . . οὔτε ἐν προφάσει πλεονεξίας . . . οὔτε ζητοῦντες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δόξαν οὔτε . . . δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει εἶναι . . . ἀλλὰ ἐγενήθημεν ἤπιοι (vv. 5–7).[7]

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion by examining in greater depth the Cynic background posited by Dibelius. Attention will be directed to the diversity that existed among wandering preachers and among the Cynics themselves, and to the self-descriptions of serious-minded Cynic philosophers in this context.

## Types of Philosophers

Given the situation described by such writers as Lucian of Samosata,[8] it is to be expected that the transient public speakers were viewed with suspicion.[9] It is understandable that the genuine philosophic missionary would want to distinguish himself from other types without his having explicitly been accused of acting like a | particular type. A good illustration of how a 205

[6] Schmithals, "Die historische Situation der Thessalonicherbriefe," 111.

[7] See also Willi Marxsen, "Auslegung von 1 Thess 4, 13–18," *ZTK* 66 (1969): 24, who in a preliminary statement on the problem holds that one can speak of an apology in 1 Thess 2:1–12, but of the Gospel, not of the apostle. He does, however, leave the matter open, and does not accept Schmithals's hypothesis.

[8] See Rudolf W.O. Helm, "Lucian und die Philosophenschulen," *NJarhrb* 9 (1902): 351–369.

[9] See Ludwig Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von August bis zum Ausgang der Antonine* (4 vols.; 8th ed.; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1910), 4:301ff. for the reactions of different classes of people to philosophers.

wandering philosophic teacher of the better type described himself and his work is provided by Dio Chrysostom, the orator-turned-Cynic philosopher (AD 40–ca. 120). Although Dio is in some ways atypical of the Cynics, his descriptions of these preachers are some of the most systematic available to us, and serve to illuminate our problem. In the *proemia* to four of his discourses, namely the Olympic Oration (*Or.* 12), the oration to Alexandria (*Or.* 32), the first oration to Tarsus (*Or.* 33), and the oration to Celaenae (*Or.* 35), he speaks of his relationship to his audience in a manner of interest to us. These speeches come from a period in Dio’s life after he had lived in exile and taught as a wandering Cynic.[10] Dio had been invited to deliver these addresses, and there is no question of his having to defend himself here against specific charges that he was a charlatan.[11] Nevertheless, he is aware of the suspicion of the crowd,[12] and he sets out to make clear what kind of preacher he in fact is. In doing so he distinguishes himself on the one hand from the sophists and rhetoricians, and on the other hand from the so-called Cynics. In examining his description of the ideal philosopher we shall concentrate on *Oration* 32,[13] adducing material from his other discourses as well as from other Cynic sources to fill out the picture. Although passing reference is occasionally made to this discourse in discussions of 1 Thess 2, it has never been examined in detail in this connection.

*Resident Philosophers*

The first type of philosopher Dio describes (*Or.* 32.8) are the resident philosophers who “do not appear in public at all, and prefer not to run the risk, possibly because they despair of being able to improve the masses.” He seems to have in mind men like Seneca and Cornutus, who were either members of large private households which they served as philosophic chaplains, or who were to be found at court.[14] These men, according to Dio,

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10 For a useful discussion of Dio’s life and words, see Winfried Elliger, *Dion Chrysostomos: Sämtliche Reden* (Zurich/Stuttgart: Artemis, 1967), VII–XLIV. For an independent dating of *Or.* 32, see L. Lemarchand, *Dion de Pruse. Les oeuvres d’avant l’exil* (Paris: J. de Gigord, 1926), 86–110.

11 On these discourses, see Hans F.A. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898; repr. as 2d ed., 2004), 438–439, 460ff.; Elliger, *Dion Chrysostomos*, XVI.

12 Cf. *Or.* 12.1, 8–9, 15; 13.11; 34.1–3; 35.2, 5, 6.

13 Wilhelm Weber, “Eine Gerichtsverhandlung vor Kaiser Traian,” *Hermes* 50 (1915): 47–92, esp. 78–79, dates *Or.* 32 ca. A.D. 108–112.

14 For the type, see von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, 445ff.; Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 335–336, 338–339; Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo*

206 wish to maintain | their dignity, and are useless (ἀνωφελεῖς). They are like make-believe athletes who refuse to enter the stadium where they would enter the contest of life.[15] The description of a Cynic's battles with hardships, human passions and men who are enslaved to them as an ἀγών is well-known.[16] Another type of resident philosopher is the one who "exercises his voice in what we call lecture-halls, having secured as hearers men who are his allies and can easily be managed by him" (*Or.* 32.8).[17] Evidently he has in mind philosophers like Musonius, Epictetus, and Demonax.[18]

### *Wandering Charlatans*

The next type Dio mentions are the so-called Cynics who were to be found in great numbers in the city.[19] These are the hucksters Lucian satirizes so mercilessly. Dio describes them as a bastard and ignoble race of men. They have no knowledge whatsoever, he says, but adds with tongue in cheek, "they must make a living ... posting themselves at street corners, in alleyways, and at temple gates, they pass around the hat and deceive (ἀπατῶσιν) lads and sailors and crowds of that sort by stringing together puns (σκώμματα) and philosophical commonplaces (σπερμολογίαν συνείροντες) and ribald jokes of the marketplace."[20] From other descriptions of this type it appears that they deceived (πλανᾶν, ἀπατᾶν) men by flattery (κολακεύειν, θωπεύειν) rather than speaking with the boldness and frankness

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 178–179, 296; Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian, 1956), 289–333; Jan N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (NovTSup 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 15ff.

[15] Cf. *Or.* 32.20–24. On ὠφέλεια as motivation of the Cynics, see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Colophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 33–34, 36, 39.

[16] See Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), esp. 16–37; Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 74ff. [*Light*, 1:41–51]

[17] Nigrinus called the lecture-halls ἐργαστήρια and καπηλεῖα. Cf. Lucian, *Nigr.* 25.

[18] For this type, see von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, 446ff.; Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 339.

[19] For the great number of Cynics abroad, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 72.4; Lucian, *Bis acc.* 6; *Fug.* 3ff.; Philo, *Plant.* 151.

[20] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.9. For Cynics in the streets and marketplaces, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.34–35; Julian, *Or.* 7.224Af.; Lucian, *Peregr.* 3; Origen, *Cels.* 3.50. For συνείρειν, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.5; for σκώπτειν, *Or.* 9.7; 32.22, 30; 33.10. For σπερμολογία, see Acts 17:18; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 65B; Philostratus, *Vit. soph.* 1.524 (cf. Philo's description of the sophists as λογοθῆραι, *Mos.* 2.212). On pleasing the crowd, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.7; 35.8; 66.26.

of the true philosopher.[21] The result, Dio says, is that | they achieve no good at all, but accustom thoughtless people to deride philosophers in general.[22] Such derision was most commonly expressed in the charges that the Cynics were out for their own glory (δόξα), sensual gratification (ἡδονή) and money (χρήματα), the very things against which serious Cynics pitted themselves in their ἀγών.[23] 207

## *Orator-Philosophers*

Dio then turns to excoriate a type of Cynic that was difficult to distinguish from rhetoricians (*Or.* 32.10).[24] To their hearers they made epideictic speeches or chanted verses of their own composition. Epideictic speech is described by ancient handbooks on rhetoric as being intended "not for the sake of contest (ἀγών), but of demonstration."[25] Sophists who delivered such speeches felt no real involvement in the occasion on which they were delivered. Consequently, since they lacked substance and did not result in anything positive, they were described as vain or empty (*vanus*, *vacuus*, *inanis*, or κενός).[26] Dio accuses the orator-philosophers of preaching for their own gain and glory. They have no desire to benefit their listeners; in fact, they corrupt them. It is like a physician who, instead of curing his patients, entertains them.[27] | 208

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[21] Ἀπάτη is the more common of the two terms among the Cynics, but they can also be used interchangeably (cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.33, 35). For πλάνη, see also Wilhelm Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos* (StPP 6; Leipzig: E. Avenarius, 1906), 36; Euripides, *Rhadam. Frg.* 659 (566 Nauck), and Hippocrates's description of certain philosophers as ἐξαπάται, *Vict.* 24.8 (6.496 Littré). On deceit and flattery, cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 48.10, and Otto Ribbeck, *Kolax. Eine ethologische Studie* (Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 9.1; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1833).

[22] For the reproach they brought on philosophy, see Lucian, *Fug.* 21; *Pisc.* 34; Julian, *Or.* 7.225Af. On achieving no good because of a softened message, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.10, 15.

[23] On the joining of φιλόδοξος, φιλήδονος, and φιλοχρήματος, see Gerhard, *Phoinix von Colophon*, 58ff., 87–88.

[24] Among them were the κιθαρῳδοὶ Κυνικοί, a breed Dio considered a peculiarly Alexandrian phenomenon (cf. *Or.* 32.62, 68). On his assessment of the rhetoricians, see *Or.* 2.18; 4.35ff.; 12.10; 33.1–6, 23; 35.1, 9–10. For this type, see Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 345ff.

[25] Ps.-Aristotle, *Rhet. Alex.* 35.1440b13. See George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (History of Rhetoric 1; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 152ff., 167. For ἀγών as a philosophical argument, see Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 7.324; 11.19; Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 80B.

[26] Cf. Quintillian, *Inst.* 12.10, 17, 73; Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* 1090A; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 31.30; Seneca, *Ep.* 114.16.

[27] For the Cynic as a physician of sick souls, see also Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.17; 33.6ff., 44. See Karl Holl, "Die schriftstellerische Form des griechischen Heiligenlebens," *NJahrb* 19 (1912): 406–427, esp. 418.

### *Harsh Cynics*

Dio knows of yet another type of Cynic who demands more of our attention. This type does speak with παρρησία, that boldness of the philosopher who has found true personal freedom, and who on the basis of this freedom strives to lay bare the shortcomings of his audience as the first step in improving them (*Or.* 32.11).[28] The fault with men of the type Dio has in mind is that they display their boldness sparingly,[29] "not in such a way as to fill your ears with it, nor for any length of time. No, they merely utter a phrase or two, and then, after railing (λοιδορήσαντες) at you rather than teaching you, they make a hurried exit, anxious lest before they have finished you may raise an outcry and send them packing" (*Or.* 32.11). This type of speaker thus confused λοιδορία with παρρησία. In Imperial times reviling, berating Cynics were such a common sight that the legendary figure Timon the misanthrope was remembered as a Cynic.[30] Whether or how a philosopher's outspokenness should be tempered became an important topic of discussion.[31]

The Cynic, the morally free man, conceived it his right and duty to speak with παρρησία and to act as an example.[32] He did so because of his φιλανθρωπία, his desire to do good to men.[33] As humane a person as Dio was convinced that it was necessary for the serious philosopher to be harsh when the occasion demanded it.[34] He himself spoke with παρρησία, but adapted his message to his hearers' | needs,[35] and remained with them. Dio contrasts the genuine philosopher with the low-class Cynic:

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[28] On παρρησία, see Heinrich Schlier, "παρρησία," *TWNT* 5:869–884; esp. Erik Peterson, "Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von παρρησία," in *Reinhold Seeberg Festschfrift* (ed. Wilhelm Koepp; 2 vols.; Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1929), 1:283–297; Giuseppe Scarpat, *Parrhesia: Storia del termine e delle sue traduzione in Latino* (Brescia: Paideia, 1964).

[29] Note that in *Or.* 33.6ff. Dio also moves from the example of the physician to discuss a limitation in παρρησία. Cf. also Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.23.30–38, who regards protreptic as the proper style of the philosopher in his lecture room, the ἰατρεῖον, rather than, for example, epideictic.

[30] See Franz Bertram, *Die Timonlegende: Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Misanthropentypus in der antiken Literatur* (Greifswald: J. Abel, 1906), 33 n. 1, 38, 40ff. For the harshness of the Cynics, see especially Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 67ff., 165ff., and "Zur Legende vom Kyniker Diogenes," *AR* 15 (1912): 388–408.

[31] E.g., Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 65F–74E.

[32] See Jacob Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1879), 101–102; Lucian, *Demon.* 3; Philo, *Her.* 14; *Spec.* 1.321.

[33] See Julius Kaerst, *Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters* (2 vols.; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1901–1909), 2:118ff. Cf. Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 14.4 (174, 15–16 Hobein), καὶ γὰρ ἰατρῶν ὁ φιλάνθρωπος λυπηρότατος.

[34] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.19ff., 27, 33; 33.7, 11ff.

[35] Cf. Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 1: ὅτι πρὸς πᾶσαν ὑπόθεσιν ἁρμόσεται ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγος.

> But as for himself, the man of whom I speak will strive to preserve his individuality in seemly fashion and with steadfastness, never deserting his post of duty, but always honoring and promoting virtue and sobriety and trying to lead all men thereto, partly by persuading and exhorting (πείθων καὶ παρακαλῶν), partly by abusing and reproaching (λοιδορούμενος καὶ ὀνειδίζων), in the hope that he may thereby rescue somebody from folly and low desires and intemperance and soft living, taking him aside privately individually and also admonishing (νουθετῶν) them in groups every time he finds opportunity "with gentle words at times, at others harsh."[36]

Even when his listeners scorn him, "he is not vexed; on the contrary, he is kinder to each one than even a father or brothers or friends."[37] His concern is especially shown in the individual attention he gives.

The charlatans were also sometimes harsh, but for different reasons. They made up for the lack of content of their speeches by railing at the crowd, in this way hoping to secure its admiration.[38] They made a profession of abusiveness, considering shamelessness to be freedom, the incurring of hatred outspokenness, and avarice benevolence.[39] Naturally, they caused the ὕβρις of the crowd before too long and took their departure before they were attacked.[40] Their frankness was a cover for their cowardice and benefited no one.

Of special interest is the harshness of some Cynics that resulted from a pessimistic view of mankind. While all serious philosophers were conscious of the shortcomings of the masses,[41] few were as uncharitable as these men were.[42] They saw no hope of improving | man except by the 210

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36 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38. The concluding quotation is from Homer, *Il.* 12.267.

37 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.42.

38 Cf. Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 10–11; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.22.28ff.; 3.22.50–51; 4.8.34.

39 Cf. Aelius Aristides, *Pro quatuoviris* (vol. 2, p. 401 Dindorf). On this much discussed passage, see Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker*, 38, 100ff.; Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 306ff.; and esp. Eduard Norden, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, (*JCPh* Supplementband 19.2; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1892), 367–462, esp. 404ff., and André Boulanger, *Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d'Asie au II^e^ siècle de notre ère* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1923), 249ff.

40 For the threat of the mob, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.20, 24, 29, 74; 34.6; *Gnom. Vat.* 352; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 45.

41 Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.20ff., 24–25, 27–28; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.18.3, 7, 9ff.; 28.10–11; Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 333Bff.; Julian, *Or.* 6.188D, 196D, 197B.

42 Their low view of mankind appears most clearly in some of the Cynic letters, e.g., Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 2 (280 Hercher); *Ep.* 4 (281 Hercher); *Ep.* 5 (282 Hercher); Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 27 (241 Hercher); *Ep.* 28 (241–243 Hercher); Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 17.28, 43 (301, 303 Hercher). On these letters, see Rudolf W.O. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1906; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), 90–91; Paul Wendland, "Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895), 38–39; Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 67–68, 156ff., 165ff., 170ff.

most abusive scolding. It was especially these men who were accused of misanthropy. Melancholy Heraclitus provided a perfect figure to whom letters from Imperial times representing this view of mankind could be ascribed. In Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 7, he is represented as defending himself against the charge of misanthropy, for which the residents of Ephesus want to banish him from the city.[43] In response, he denies that he hates men; it is only their evil that he hates. That is what had robbed him of the divine gift of laughter. Even within the city he is not really a part of them, for he refuses to share in their wickedness. Would that he could laugh, but, surrounded by enemies, and with the flagrant vices of mankind on every hand, he wonders how anyone could laugh. He will retain his dour visage even if it should mean his exile.

### *Gentle Philosophers*

As can be expected, a reaction set in against the stress on the harshness of Cynic preaching.[44] It was now emphasized that at least as early as Crates Cynics had been known for their understanding of human nature and even for their gentleness at times.[45] The stress on the gentleness of Musonius,[46] Dio,[47] and Demonax[48] should be seen against this background. What is of particular interest to us is the way in which the different kinds of preaching were described.

A widespread gnomic statement clarified the difference between admonition and reviling: πλεῖστον διαφέρει τὸ νουθετεῖν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤπιόν τε καὶ φίλον, τὸ δὲ σκληρόν τε καὶ ὑβριστικόν· καὶ τὸ μὲν διορθοῖ τοὺς 211 ἁμαρτάνοντας τὸ δὲ μόνον ἐλέγχει.[49] Without denying | the need for harshness

[43] Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 7 (283–285 Hercher). See Jacob Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe: Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religionsgeschichtlichen Literatur* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1869).

[44] See Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 39ff.

[45] See Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.* 632E; Julian, *Or.* 6.201B, Crates ἐπετίμα δὲ οὐ μετὰ πικρίας, ἀλλὰ μετὰ χάριτος. See Ernst Weber, *De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum sectatore* (LSCP 10; Leipzig: J.B. Hirschfeld, 1887), 211; Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 170–171; Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 127ff.

[46] See Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: "The Roman Socrates"* (YCS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 29.

[47] See Philostratus, *Vit. soph.* 1.487; Weber, *De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum sectatore*, 220–221.

[48] See K. Funk, "Untersuchungen über die Lucianische Vita Demonactis," *Phil* Supplementband 10 (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1905–1907), 559–674, esp. 595–596.

[49] E.g., *Gnom. Byz.* 59 (C. Wachsmuth, "*Gnomologium Byzantinum* ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου Ἰσοκράτους Ἐπικτήτου e variis codicum exemplis restitutum," *Studien zu den griechischen*

when the occasion demands it, the value of admonition (νουθεσία) was now affirmed.[50] The word ἤπιος is widely used as a synonym for φιλάνθρωπος, the quality that the philosopher must have before he can speak with παρρησία,[51] and it is used in the descriptions of the philosopher's speech. Thus an ancient characterization of Epictetus says that he was τὴν μὲν ὄψιν σεμνός, τὴν δὲ ὁμιλίαν ἤπιος, τὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥμερος.[52]

It is not surprising that in ancient times the subject of gentleness should call to mind the figure of the nurse crooning over her wards. In addition to their physical attributes, the main qualification given in Hellenistic discussions of nurses is that they were not to be irascible.[53] That men remembered their nurses in this way is illustrated by the large number of tomb inscriptions which describe nurses affectionately as being kind.[54] It became customary to contrast the harshness of a certain kind of παρρησία with gentle speech such as that of a nurse who knows her charges.

Maximus of Tyre illustrates one such use. Especially in a discourse in which he argues that the philosopher's speech must be adapted to every subject, does he show a sympathetic view of man. The mass of men, the common herd, is to him naturally mild, but is difficult to persuade only because it has been fed with depraved nutriment. What it requires is a musical shepherd who does not punish its disobedience with whip and spur.[55] Elsewhere he elaborates on the contrasts he has in mind here. What is naturally adapted | to mankind is "a certain musical and milder 212

*Florilegien* [Berlin: Weidmann, 1882; Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1971], 162–207, esp. 176); cf. also nos. 258–259.

50 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.86; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.26–27. For the contrast between λοιδορία (παρρησία) and νουθεσία, see Plutarch, *Inim. util.* 89B; *Superst.* 168C; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38. See Weber, *De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum sectatore*, 208.

51 E.g., Philo, *Sacr.* 27; Hecataeus, *apud* Josephus, *C. Ap.* 1.186. See Ceslas Spicq, "La philanthropie hellénistique, vertu divine et royale (à propos de Tit. III, 4)," *ST* 12 (1958): 169–191, and Spicq, "Bénignité, mansuétude, douceur, clémence," *RB* 54 (1947): 321–329, esp. 332.

52 Moschion 3 (Heinrich Schenkl, "Die epiktetischen Fragmente: Eine Untersuchung zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der griechischen Florilegien," *Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-historischen Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Wien: F. Tempsky, 1888], 443–546, esp. 517).

53 E.g., Soranus, *Gyn.* 32 (263–264 Rose); Oribasius 3 (122, 3 Bussemaker-Daremberg); Favorinus, *apud* Aulus Gellius, *Noct. att.* 12.1.21; Ps.-Pythagoras, *Ep.* 12 (608 Hercher). On the subject, see Wilhelm Braams, *Zur Geschichte des Ammenwesens im klassischen Altertum* (*Jenaer medizin-historische Beiträge* 5; Jena: G. Fischer, 1913), 1–31, esp. 8ff.; Wilhelm Schick, *Favorin περὶ παίδων τροφῆς und die antike Erziehungslehre* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1912); Egon Eichgrün, *Kallimachos und Apollonios Rhodios* (Berlin: E. Reuter, 1961), 185ff. Claude Moussy, *Recherches sur "Trepho" et les verbes Grecs signifiant "nourrir"* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1969) has been unavailable to me in this study.

54 See G. Herzog-Hauser, "Nutrix," PW 17 (1937): 1495.

55 Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 1 (5, 17ff. Hobein).

philosophy which might popularly allure and manage it, in the same manner as nurses charm through fabulous narrations the children committed to their care."[56] Maximus then states that he much prefers this treatment of the masses to the παρρησία of the philosophers. The word philosopher, he says, is hard or oppressive (βαρύ) to the multitude. The philosophers would do well to follow the example of the ancient philosophers who clothed their philosophy in fables, just as physicians mix bitter medicines with sweet nutriment.[57]

Pseudo-Diogenes represents a completely different view of man and therefore of the way in which a philosopher should approach him. He sees gentleness as the method of the flatterer, or as showing ignorance of man's true condition.[58] His *Epistle* 29 appears to be a response to those Cynics who held that the philosopher should be gentle as a father or nurse: Those who associate with the masses do not understand with what vehemence the disease of evil has laid hold of them. They have been gravely corrupted. It is now necessary to perform cautery and surgery and to use strong drugs on them. "But instead of submitting to such care, like children you have summoned to your sides mammies and nurses who say to you, 'Take the cup, my pet. Show that you love me by pouring a little of the medicine and drinking it.'"[59]

Dio Chrysostom uses the figure of the nurse in an ambivalent manner. In *Oration* 4.73ff. he describes a conversation between Alexander the Great and Diogenes. Diogenes is aware that Alexander despises him for the way in which he had been taking the king to task. In order to set him at ease, Diogenes then tells Alexander a fable "just as nurses, after giving the children a whipping, tell them a story to comfort and please them." The purpose | of the myth is to show that the passions are irrational and brutish.[60] The nurse is thus used with approval as an example of

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[56] Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 4 (43, 17ff. Hobein). See also Julian, *Or.* 7.204A. Julian, who holds that the Cynic's παρρησία should not be without a civilized mildness, rejects the use of myths, which nurses use. He may have used Dio Chrysostom as a source. See Johann Rudolf Asmus, *Julian und Dion Chrysostomos* (Tauberbischofsheim: J. Lang, 1895), although the similarities between them could be due to the use of common sources.

[57] Cf. Diogenes, *Frg.* 10 Mullach; Themistius, *Or.* 5.63B; 24.302B; *Virt.* 18. See, however, Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 25 (303, 11ff. Hobein): A skilled physician may mix brief pleasure with the pain of the remedy, yet to impart pleasure is not the function of Asclepius but of cooks.

[58] E.g., Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28 (241–243 Hercher). See Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker*, 36, 96–98; Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie," 386ff., 395ff.

[59] Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 29.4, 5 (244 Hercher).

[60] The myth is recounted in Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 5; cf. § 16.

understanding human nature. In *Oration* 33, however, a nurse is used to symbolize something of which he disapproves. In the *proemium* to this oration, Dio distinguishes himself from the flatterers who praise their hearers. He promises that he will speak with παρρησία, but cautions that he will not touch on all their ailments.[61] He will be the genuine physician who will help them, and he may subject them to abuse. In this he promises to follow the example of Socrates who censured and rebuked his listeners, unlike the comic poets who “flattered the assembled multitude as one flatters a master, tempering their mild snapping with a laugh, just as nurses, whenever it is necessary for their charges to drink something rather unpleasant, themselves smear the cup with honey before they hold it out to the children.”[62] What is common to both uses is that the figure of the nurse is used in connection with the amelioration of the philosopher’s imperiousness.[63]

Plutarch insists that παρρησία, like any other medicine, must be applied properly. Men need friends to speak to them frankly in times of good fortune. But in times of misfortune there is no need for a friend’s παρρησία or for harsh words (λόγων βάρος ἐχόντων) or stinging reproof (δηγμόν).[64] It is intolerable for a sick man to be reminded of the causes of his illness. The very circumstances in which the unfortunate find themselves leave no room for παρρησία, but require gentleness and help. “When children fall down, the nurses do not rush up to berate them, but they take them up, wash them, | and straighten their clothes and, after all this is done, then rebuke them and punish them.”[65] 214

[61] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.7, 44. On the limitation of a subject, see Epictetus. *Diatr.* 1.29, 30ff., 64; Musonius, *Frg.* 1 (5, 3ff. Hense). That this is a rhetorical cliché is argued by Klaus Thraede, “Untersuchungen zum Ursprung und zur Geschichte der christlichen Poesie (I),” JAC 4 (1961): 108–127.

[62] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.10. On the comic poets’ ineffective παρρησία see Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 68C.

[63] Epictetus mostly uses the figure of the nurse in a pejorative manner when he speaks of those who do not wish to advance in their philosophic understanding. Cf., e.g., *Diatr.* 2.16.25, 28, 39, 44.

[64] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 68ff. Plutarch uses βάρος in this kind of context almost as a synonym for δηγμός (cf. 59C, 72A). For βαρύς used of the misanthropist, see Euripides, *Heracl.* 2ff. (cf. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 31). For the biting character of Cynic speech, see Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 259ff. πᾶν τὸ εἶδος τοῦ Κυνικοῦ λόγου σαίνοντι ἅμα ἔοικε τῷ καὶ δάκνοντι, and cf. Diogenes, *Frg.* 35 (Mullach); Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 468A, ὕλαγμα τὴν τοῦ Κυνικοῦ βλασφημίαν (contrast 468C, ἤπιος).

[65] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 69BC.

## The Ideal Philosopher

We return to Dio's description of the Cynics. His criticisms of the various Cynics can be summarized as follows: Some did not really become involved in the ἀγών of life, either because they lacked the courage, or because their empty speeches were not designed to involve them in the situations to which they spoke. The common market-place preachers are accused of error (ἀπάτη, πλάνη), flattery (κολακεία), and preaching for reputation (δόξα) and money (χρήματα), and to satisfy their sensual appetites (ἡδονή). A special complaint is that the transients were sometimes brutally harsh rather than seeking to benefit their hearers. This harshness (βάρος), we learn elsewhere, is justified by an insistence on the philosopher's παρρησία that would allow no gentleness (ἠπιότης) under the circumstances.

After thus describing the different Cynics, Dio characterizes the ideal Cynic in negative and antithetic formulations designed to distinguish him from them (*Or.* 32.11–12):

> But to find a man who with purity and without guile speaks with a philosopher's boldness (καθαρῶς καὶ ἀδόλως παρρησιαζόμενον), not for the sake of glory (μήτε δόξης χάριν), nor making false pretensions for the sake of gain (μήτ' ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ), but (ἀλλ') who stands ready out of goodwill and concern for his fellow man, if need be, to submit to ridicule and the uproar of the mob—to find such a man is not easy, but rather the good fortune of a very lucky city, so great is the dearth of noble, independent souls, and such the abundance of flatterers (κολάκων), charlatans and sophists. In my own case I feel that I have chosen that role, not of my own volition, but by (οὐκ ἀπ' . . . ἀλλ' ὑπό) the will of some deity. For when divine providence is at work for men, the gods provide, not only good counsellors who need no urging, but also words that are appropriate and profitable to the listener.

Dio's insistence on the philosopher's boldness, and his statements of the philosopher's qualifications in negatives and antitheses, namely that he should speak without guile, not for the sake of glory or gain, but as one who has a concern for men, and in opposition to flatterers, charlatans, and sophists, is meaningful against the background he has sketched. It is natural for him to express himself in this manner even though a personal attack had not been made on | him. Some of his other qualifications, however, deserve further attention. 215

He states that the philosopher must speak καθαρῶς καὶ ἀδόλως. Καθαρῶς may mean "clearly," "plainly," and thus merely refer to clarity of

expression.[66] It is probable, however, that it has greater significance. Elsewhere, Dio says that the Cynic must purify his mind by reason, trying to free it from the slavery to lusts and opinions. This purification is his fight for his own freedom which is the basis of his παρρησία.[67] Epictetus also, in distinguishing the ideal Cynic from the charlatan, emphasizes that the Cynic must begin by purifying his own mind. It is the Cynic's conscience, his knowledge of his own purity, and that he is a friend and servant of the gods, that allows him to speak with παρρησία.[68] Thus when Dio describes the true Cynic as καθαρῶς παρρησιαζόμενος he is referring to the Cynic's speaking with purity of mind, thus requiring that the frankness of such a man be based on true freedom, and he probably does so with the charlatans in mind who claimed to speak as philosophers, but who had not purified themselves.[69]

Again, Dio's emphasis on his divine commission is noteworthy.[70] The way in which the statement is formulated (οὐκ . . . ἀλλ') suggests that this qualification of the true Cynic is also given with the hucksters in mind. Epictetus also, when he describes the divine call of the Cynic, does so by contrasting the crude charlatan with the man who had been sent by God.[71] That the Cynic could endure the ὕβρις of the crowd proves his divine call.[72] It is possible, on the | other hand, that, rather than those masquerading under the Cynic cloak, Dio and Epictetus wanted to distinguish themselves from Cynics like Oenomaus of Gadara, who did away with the reverence of the gods.[73] 216

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[66] See Johann C.G. Ernesti, *Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae*, 163–164, s.v. καθαρός.

[67] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.40. Stated in a different manner, it is the Cynic's giving heed to the injunction γνῶθι σαυτόν. See Plutarch's quotation of the Delphic command at the beginning of his tractate on παρρησία, *Adul. amic.* 65F; cf. *Virt. prof.* 81CD. This view is especially characteristic of Julian (cf. *Or.* 6.188A). True Cynic παρρησία is the verbal expression of inner ἐλευθερία, and is nothing other than ἐλευθεροστομεῖν. See Otto Hense, "Bion bei Philon," *RhMus* 47 (1892): 219–240, esp. 231. That this is also Dio's understanding of the true philosopher is clear from *Or.* 4.57–58, 67, 80. See Weber, *De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum sectatore*, 141–153.

[68] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.19, 93ff.

[69] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.36ff., where the philosopher's παρρησία is described in antithesis to flatterers; cf. also *Or.* 51.4.

[70] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13; 32.21; 34.4–5.

[71] E.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.2, 9ff., 50ff., 53ff. For the same contrasting formulation in Dio Chrysostom, see *Or.* 34.4; 45.1. See Holl, "Die schriftstellerische Form des griechischen Heiligenlebens," 420 n. 3.

[72] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.24.1–10; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 9.9; 12.9; 32.21–22.

[73] Julian, *Or.* 7.209Af.; 6.199A. Cf. also Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 19 (211 Hercher); Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 7 (237 Hercher). On the difference in Cynic attitudes toward the gods, see Rudolf Hirzel,

## Paul and the Cynics

Paul's description of his Thessalonian ministry in 1 Thess 2 is strikingly similar to the picture sketched by Dio, both in what is said and in the way in which it is formulated:

Dio says that some Cynics fear the ὕβρις of the crowd and will not become involved in the ἀγών of life. The speech of some of them can be described as κενός. The true philosopher, on the contrary, faces the crowd with παρρησία because God gives him the courage. Paul says that although he had suffered and experienced violence (ὑβρισθέντες) in Philippi, his sojourn in Thessalonica was not empty (κενή), but he spoke boldly in God (ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα ἐν τῷ θεῷ) in a great struggle (ἐν πολλῷ ἀγῶνι) (vv. 1, 2).

Dio says the charlatans deceive (ἀπατῶσιν) their hearers and lead them in error (πλάνη). Paul says he did not preach out of error (οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης) (v. 3).

Dio says the ideal philosopher must speak with purity of mind (καθαρῶς) and without guile (ἀδόλως). Paul says he was not motivated by uncleanness (οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀκαθαρσίας), nor did he speak with guile (οὐδὲ ἐν δόλῳ) (v. 3).

Dio says that the true philosopher will not preach for the sake of glory (μήτε δόξης χάριν), nor for personal gain (μήτ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρίῳ), nor as a flatterer (κολάκων). Paul claims that he did not use a cloak for greed (οὔτε ἐν προφάσει πλεονεξίας), nor did he seek glory from men (οὔτε ζητοῦντες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δόξαν), or flatter them (οὔτε ... ἐν λόγῳ κολακείας) (vv. 5, 6).

Dio claims that he was divinely directed to speak. So does Paul (v. 4).

Dio emphasizes that the philosopher, in spite of personal danger, seeks to benefit his hearers by adapting his message to their situation, and being kinder to them individually than even a father. | 217 He represents the view that the philosopher should not consistently be harsh (βαρύς), but should on occasion be gentle (ἤπιος) as a nurse. Paul says that he was prepared to lay down his life for his converts (v. 8), that, like a father with his children, he worked with each one individually (ἕνα ἕκαστον ὑμῶν, v. 10), and that, although as an apostle of Christ he could have been demanding of them, he was gentle as a nurse (δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει ... ἀλλὰ ἐγενήθημεν ἤπιοι ἐν μέσῳ ὑμῶν, ὡς ἐὰν τροφὸς θάλπῃ τὰ ἑαυτῆς τέκνα, vv. 6–7).[74]

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*Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch* (2 vols.; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1895), 2:191 n. 3, and Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 80–81. The useful study by Helmut Rahn, "Die Frömmigkeit der Kyniker," *Paideuma* 7 (1960): 280–292, does not do justice to this diversity.

[74] Pedro Gutierrez, *La paternité spirituelle selon Saint Paul* (*EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1968), 87–117, does not seriously consider the possibility of the Cynic background of this passage. For the same παρρησία-φιλία *topos* elsewhere in Paul, see Phlm 8–9.

## Conclusion

The similarities between Paul and Dio, and between Paul and Cynicism in general, can be extended, but these suffice to show that there are verbal and formal parallels between Paul and Dio that must be taken into account in any consideration of 1 Thess 2. One is not obliged to suppose that Dio was responding to specific statements that had been made about him personally. In view of the different types of Cynics who were about, it had become desirable, when describing oneself as a philosopher, to do so in negative and antithetic terms. This is the context within which Paul describes his activity in Thessalonica. We cannot determine from his description that he is making a personal apology.

Two final cautions are in order. In the first place, to point out these striking similarities of language does not obviate the need to give serious attention to the exegetical problems in 1 Thess 2 and elsewhere where the same subject is discussed. In the second place, to point out that Paul had the same practical concerns as Dio, and that he used the same language in dealing with them, does not imply that he understood these words to mean the same thing they did in Dio. As we have seen, the Cynics differed among themselves as to what they meant by the same language. The further step must be taken of coming to a clearer perception of the self-understanding(s) of the Cynics before investigating Paul's thinking on his ministry against the background. This study has attempted to demonstrate that such an effort will be fruitful.

CHAPTER FIVE

# THE INHOSPITALITY OF DIOTREPHES*

Despite the fact that our knowledge of Diotrephes is confined to what is said of him in 3 John 9–10, he has been regarded as of great importance because he provides us with a glimpse into the development of early Christianity at the end of the first century. The attempts to place him in his proper context have resulted in quite diverse interpretations of what is said about him.[1]

A traditional interpretation, represented by Theodor Zahn, held that Diotrephes was an autocratic bishop who had the power of excommunication (v. 10, ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκβάλλει).[2] What Diotrephes is accused of, according to this interpretation, is not that he does not have the authority to excommunicate, but that he employs it in an imperious and ruinous manner.

Adolf Harnack saw the chief importance of 3 John in the information it affords us with regard to the development of church organization in Asia Minor.[3] On the one hand is the Elder who exercises great influence over the churches in the region, using his traveling emissaries as a means of control over them. On the other is Diotrephes, who, with the majority of his church, rejects the authority of the Elder by refusing to receive his emissaries. This Harnack regards as evidence of the consolidation of individual churches and the rejection of the old provincial mission organization. Diotrephes, according to this interpretation, is the first monarchical bishop whose name we know.

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[1] See Ernst Haenchen, "Neuere Literatur zu den Johannesbriefen," *TRu* NS 26 (1960): 268–291.

[2] Theodor Zahn, *Introduction to the New Testament* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1909; repr., 1953), 3:375ff.

[3] Adolf Harnack, "Über den dritten Johannesbrief," TU 15.3 (1897): 3–27.

More recently the tendency has been to find theological motives for Diotrephes's actions. Walter Bauer placed Diotrephes in the struggle between "orthodoxy" and "heresy," making him a representative of the latter.[4] On this understanding, Diotrephes takes the same action against the emissaries of the Elder that the latter in 2 John 10–11 had prescribed against docetists. Ernst Käsemann is also convinced that the issue between the Elder and Diotrephes was not merely personal or a matter of church organization, but in fact theological.[5] However, he stands Bauer's theory on its head: Diotrephes was theologically traditional, the Elder innovative. This is proven for him by the fact that the Elder does not accuse Diotrephes of heresy, which one would have expected him to do had Diotrephes been heretical. He further suggests that Diotrephes had excommunicated the Elder, and that his authority was therefore recognized by Diotrephes's church and by the Elder, who had formerly been a member of it.

In the absence of unambiguous information that can serve as a control, the temptation is always to fit Diotrephes into a preconceived scheme, and none of these interpretations successfully resists it. Given the paucity of information about Diotrephes, the most that can be claimed for any of these theories by their proponents is that they may be probable. Acknowledging that we are limited to probabilities, I suggest that we attempt to understand Diotrephes in light of the main subject of 3 John, which is the extension of hospitality to fellow Christians. That is the point at issue, and by examining what is said of Diotrephes from the perspective of the practice in the New Testament, we may hope to attain some clarity on his actions.

## Patterns of Early Christian Hospitality

The practice of private hospitality was widely recognized as a virtue in antiquity, but may have declined as such in the pagan world of the first century AD.[6] The mobility which characterized the period brought with it

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[4] Walter Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 93–94.

[5] Ernst Käsemann, "Ketzer und Zeuge: Zum johanneischen Verfasserproblem," *ZTK* 48 (1951): 292–311 (= Käsemann, *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen* 1 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965], 168–187); and Käsemann, *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen* 2 (1965$^2$), 133 n. 1.

[6] See Gustav Stählin, "ξένος," *TDNT* 5 (1967): 1–36; Helga Rusche, *Gastfreundschaft in der Verkündigung des Neuen Testaments und ihr Verhältnis zur Mission* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1957), and especially J.B. Mathews, "Hospitality and the New Testament Church:

a system of inns that sought to meet the needs and desires of travelers. The inns, however, did not enjoy a good reputation among the upper classes, being considered as centers of all sorts of nefarious activities and offering poor services.[7] Whenever possible, therefore, discriminating travelers availed themselves of the hospitality of business associates and other acquaintances.[8]

The early church reflects the mobility of Roman society as well as the practice of private hospitality. The book of Acts presents Paul as establishing churches on the main trade routes of the Empire and having, among his first associates and converts, people who were, like himself, transients. Paul's own letters further impress one with the mobility of his coworkers.[9] It is understandable that, in view of conditions in the inns, Christian travelers would prefer to avail themselves of the hospitality of their brethren. The book of Acts shows a social interest in hospitality. This practice is also presupposed in Paul's letters as he plans his own as well as his coworkers' travels, and it appears frequently in paraenesis.[10] A virtually technical vocabulary developed to describe the hospitable reception (compounds of λαμβάνω and δέχομαι) and sending on (προπέμπω) of those individuals who were spreading the faith.[11]

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An Historical and Exegetical Study" (Th.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1965). Mathews's view (180ff.) of the decline should be modified in light of such experiences as Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 7) enjoyed among the poor peasants on Euboea. See also Donald W. Riddle, "Early Christian Hospitality: A Factor in the Gospel Transmission," *JBL* 57 (1938): 141–154.

[7] The most useful study of travel conditions for our purpose is still that of William M. Ramsay, "Roads and Travel (in the New Testament)," *HDB* 5 (1904): 375–402. For conditions in the inns, see Tönnes Kleberg, *Hôtels, restaurants et cabarets dans l'antiquité romaine. Études historiques et philologiques* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1957), and Theodore Crane, "*Caveat Viator:* Roman Country Inns," *ClB* 46 (1969): 6ff.

[8] See Horace, *Sat.* 1.5, for a colorful account of a journey from Rome to Brundisium.

[9] For the trade routes, see Ramsay, "Roads and Travel." Of Paul's associates, Aquila and Prisca are at various times placed in Pontus, Rome, Corinth, and Ephesus (Acts 18:1–3, 18–19). Lydia is associated with Thyatira and Philippi (Acts 16:14). For his coworkers, see E. Earle Ellis "Paul and His Co-Workers," *NTS* 17 (1971): 437–452. Harry Y. Gamble, *The Textual History of the Letter to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), has convincingly argued that Rom 16 was part of Paul's original letter to Rome. The number of people Paul greets in that chapter, whom he had known in the eastern Mediterranean but find themselves in Rome at the time of writing, illustrates most impressively the mobility of the church.

[10] For hospitality in Acts, see, e.g., Acts 21:4, 7, 16–17, and Henry J. Cadbury, "Lexical Notes on Luke-Acts," *JBL* 45 (1926): 305–322, and Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts* (London: SPCK, 1958; repr., Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999), 251ff. See Rom 15:28–29; 16:1–2; 1 Cor 16:10–11; Phil 2:29; Phlm 22 for hospitality in travel plans, and Rom 12:13; Heb 13:2; 1 Pet 4:9 for it in paraenesis.

[11] See Mathews, "Hospitality and the New Testament Church," 166–174. Λαμβάνω and its cognates are used in this sense especially in the Johannine literature: λαμβάνω (2 John 10),

In addition to the material support of travelers, Christian hospitality was further manifested in the phenomenon of the house church. In its earliest period the churches had no buildings especially designed for their religious services and seem to have met primarily in hospitable homes.[12] The book of Acts represents Paul as converting entire households and using them as bases for his missionary activity, and Paul's letters reveal that his churches continued to meet in the homes of some of their members.[13] The arrangement had its positive side, the implications of which have not as yet sufficiently been investigated. But it was also beset with problems, which are of more immediate interest to us.[14]

Among the problems is the role of the Christian patron in whose house the church would meet. To have had house churches implies that there were Christians of sufficient means to provide large enough quarters for the church's meetings. We know from Paul's letters of at least two such hosts who extended hospitality both to a local group of Christians and to traveling Christians, in this case, Paul himself (Rom 16:23; Phlm 2, 22). From the events in Thessalonica (Acts 17:5–9) we know that such patrons

ὑπολαμβάνω (3 John 8; cf. Josephus, *C. Ap.* 1.247); προσλαμβάνω (Acts 28:2; Phlm 17). Δέχομαι and its cognates are also used in this sense: δέχομαι (Mark 6:11 par.; Col 4:10; cf. *Did.* 11.1–2); ἀποδέχομαι (Acts 18:27; 21:17); προσδέχομαι (Rom 16:2; Phil 2:29); ἀναδέχομαι (Acts 28:7); ὑποδέχομαι (Acts 17:7; cf. Ign. *Smyrn.* 10.1; Herm., *Sim.* 8.10.3; 9.27.2); ἐπιδέχομαι (3 John 10). Προπέμπω is used in the NT only of sending a departing traveler on his way. It could mean accompanying him for a short distance (Acts 20:38; 21:5) or simply sending him on a mission (Acts 15:3), but more generally it means to equip him with all things necessary for the journey (Titus 3:13; cf. Rom 15:24; 1 Cor 16:6, 11; 2 Cor 1:16; 3 John 6; Pol. *Phil.* 1.1) and is thus almost synonymous with ἐφοδιάζω (cf. Josephus, *B.J.* 2.103; *A.J.* 20.50). For the practice, see also Acts 28:10. See Zahn, *Introduction*, 54 n. 4; Mathews, "Hospitality and the New Testament Church," 230–231.

[12] See Floyd V. Filson, "The Significance of the Early House Churches," *JBL* 58 (1939): 105–112; Oscar Cullmann, *Early Christian Worship* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), 9–10; Edwin A. Judge, *The Social Pattern of Christian Groups in the First Century* (London: Tyndale, 1960); V. Richard Krautheimer, *Early Christian and Byzantine Architecture* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), 1ff.; Leonhard Goppelt, *Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Times* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 88, 204–205. Michael Green, *Evangelism in the Early Church* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 81, 207–223, 326, provides a useful collection of evidence although his interpretation is not always satisfactory.

[13] Cf. Acts 18:1–8; 17:6–7; 16:15, 31–34; Rom 16:3–23.; 1 Cor 1:14–16; 16:19; Col 4:15; Phlm 2, etc.

[14] For the implications of the house church, see Filson, "Significance of the Early House Churches," and Judge, *Social Pattern.* For how an understanding of the social structure of a house church can illuminate our understanding of 1 Corinthians, see Gerd Theissen, "Soziale Schichtung in der korinthischen Gemeinde: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des hellenistischen Urchristentums," *ZNW* 65 (1974): 232–272, and Theissen, "Soziale Integration und sakramentales Handeln," *NovT* 16 (1974): 179–206. One of the major problems was that if whole households could be converted, they could also be led astray, a concern of the Pastoral Epistles (cf. Titus 1:11; 2 Tim 3:6).

assumed legal responsibility for the groups meeting in their houses.[15] Exactly what status in the congregations that were meeting in their houses this service conferred on them is not totally clear. An answer to that question involves one's understanding of the meaning of προΐστημι in its various contexts in the NT, a matter that cannot be gone into in detail here. It would appear certain that in the Pauline letters the term does not denote an office. In Rom 12:8 and 1 Thess 5:12 it means to give aid. Phoebe is described in Rom 16:2 as προστάτις, that is, a legal representative of the church, very much like Jason was in Thessalonica.[16] The description most likely implies that she hosted a church in her house as he did. Given Paul's view of the lack of authority of women in the church (1 Cor 14:33–37), his description of Phoebe as προστάτις πολλῶν . . . καὶ ἐμοῦ αὐτοῦ makes it clear that he does not view a patron(ess) of the church as having authority by virtue of his or her care for the church.

The Pastoral Epistles may, on the surface, seem to provide more information.[17] They are concerned with heresy, especially as it was making inroads into Christian households (2 Tim 3:16; Titus 1:11). It is striking how frequently οἶκος and its cognates appear in the letters.[18] The church order which the letters advance is designed to strengthen the church in its battle with heresy.[19] The church is described as οἶκος θεοῦ (1 Tim 3:15; cf. 2 Tim 2:20) in which the bishop serves ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμος (Titus 1:7). The qualifications for the various functionaries in the church, whether the bishops, deacons or widows, always involve their behavior in or the circumstances of their own households (1 Tim 3:4–5, 12; 5:4). Deacons are required to be τέκνων καλῶς προϊστάμενοι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων οἴκων (1 Tim 3:12), where the meaning must be to take care of their households.[20] A similar requirement is made of the bishops, and its purpose is clearly stated:

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15 Λαβόντες τὸ ἱκανόν (Acts 17:9) is the equivalent of *satis accipere*, which in Roman criminal and civil law is the posting of a bond that could be forfeited if the offence were repeated. See Kirsopp Lake and Henry J. Cadbury, *The Beginnings of Christianity: Part I: The Acts of the Apostles: Volume IV English Translation and Commentary* (ed. F.J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake; 5 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1920–1933), 4:206; Adrian N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 95–96.

16 See William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans* (ICC 32; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1908), 417–418, and Bo Reicke, *Diakonie, Festfreude und Zelos in Verbindung mit der altchristlichen Agapenfeier* (UppsaIa: Lundequist/Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1951), 244 n. 8, on Phoebe as προστάτις of the church in Cenchreae.

17 See Bo Reicke, προΐστημι, *TDNT* 6 (1968): 700–703.

18 1 Tim 3:4–5, 12, 15; 5:4, 8, 13–14; 2 Tim 2:20; Titus 1:7, 11.

19 Note 1 Tim 3:14–16 and Titus 1:10–16, following the lists of qualifications.

20 Reicke, *TDNT* 6 (1968): 702: Although the *patria potestas* is assumed, attention is rather drawn to the care of the deacon's family.

εἰ δέ τις τοῦ ἰδίου οἴκου προστῆναι οὐκ οἶδεν, πῶς ἐκκλησίας θεοῦ ἐπιμελήσεται; (1 Tim 3:5). The meaning of προστῆναι may here shade into that of "to manage," but, as ἐπιμελήσεται would indicate, the element of care is still present.[21]

It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the social circumstances of the churches addressed in the Pastoral Epistles. It is tempting, in view of the requirement that the bishop be hospitable (1 Tim 3:2; Titus 1:8; cf. Hermas, *Sim.* 9.27.2), of the description of the church as the household of God, and of the stress on the household, to assume that bishops had churches in their homes and there exercised rule over them. But there is nothing in the Pastorals to compel such an idea. If we are to assume that such a host would be financially well off and generous, 1 Tim 5:17–18 might be read as contrary evidence, for there the elder is the recipient of material reward, not the provider for the church.[22] Be that as it may, the Pastorals do not provide evidence that the bishops derived authority from providing hospitality to the church.[23] What authority they may have had they derived elsewhere. Furthermore, the actions to be taken against the heretics, unlike that commended in 2 John 10, are not explicitly described in terms of the refusal of hospitality to them either by the church or the bishop. Rather, the author's overriding concern is that they be avoided and, when they are confronted, the contact with them be limited to one or two encounters.[24] One may expect that hospitality would have been refused them, as in 2 John 10, but that raises the question where μία καὶ δευτέρα νουθεσία could be expected to take place (Titus 3:10). We must conclude, then, that the evidence of the Pastoral Epistles is unclear so far as the house church and its patron are concerned.

The information on the number of house churches within one locality and their relationship to each other is scanty.[25] But we do have some information that permits us a glimpse, if no more, of the situation in dif-

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[21] The move from household to broader responsibilities is a Hellenistic paraenetic commonplace (see Helge Almqvist, *Plutarch und das Neue Testament: Ein Beitrag zum Corpus Helenisticum Novi Testamenti* [Uppsala: Appelbergs, 1946], 125), but that should not by itself be taken to mean that it has no immediate relevance to the situation addressed.

[22] I assume, on the basis of Titus 1:5–9, that the ἐπίσκοποι and πρεσβύτεροι are synonymous.

[23] From Titus 3:12–14 it appears that it is the responsibility of all Christians to speed travelers on their way (προπέμπω), not of the bishops only.

[24] Cf. 1 Tim 4:7; 6:11; 2 Tim 2:14, 16, 23; 3:6; Titus 1:11, 13; 3:9–10.

[25] See Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2d ed.; 2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister

ferent parts of the Empire. It is generally thought that Paul in Rom 16 is aware of at least three house churches in the community to which he writes (vv. 5, 14–15),[26] and Col 4:15 may indicate that there was more than one church in Laodicea.[27] Paul's admonition that 1 Thessalonians be read πᾶσιν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς (5:27; cf. Col 4:16) may indicate a plurality of groups in Thessalonica. In that case, and on the acceptance of the early dating of 1 Thessalonians, we would have evidence that a number of separate groups had developed soon after the church's establishment. We do not know much about the relationship between such groups except that the letters addressed to them are aware of their separate existence yet consider them united in such a way that one letter to each locality suffices for all the groups.[28] One may further suppose that by the time Acts and the Pastorals were written, there would have been more than one house church in any locality, yet they describe presbyters and bishops with respect to cities, not individual groups.[29] It would appear, then, that although there may have been a number of Christian groups in any particular locality, they were not isolated from each other, but thought of themselves as together constituting the church in that location.[30]

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Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 1:442ff., 2:84ff. He does not, however, examine NT material in detail.

[26] E.g., Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, 421; Judge, *Social Pattern*, 36.

[27] Thus Ernst Lohmeyer, *Die Briefe an die Philipper, an die Kolosser und an Philemon* (11th ed.; KEK 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), 169–170; Werner G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* (14th rev. ed.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1965), 238, referring to Col 4:15, 17, and Phlm 2, claims that two house churches in Colossae are mentioned. I take this to mean that he thinks Nympha also lived in Colossae. The majority opinion places her in Laodicea.

[28] This is clearly the case with Rom 16. The letter ἐκ Λαοδικείας (Col 4:16) was probably a letter addressed to Laodicea, ἐκ indicating that the letter was to be brought from Laodicea to Colossae. See Eduard Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 174 n. 47. Were Colossians genuine, we would have two letters written to the same locality, but even then the personal circumstances attending the writing of Philemon, viz., the return of Onesimus to his master, would explain the necessity of two letters. Adolf Harnack, "Das Problem des zweiten Thessalonicherbriefes," SPAW (1910), 560–578, correctly, I think, surmised the existence of at least two different groups in Thessalonica, but his theory that 1 and 2 Thessalonians were written to those different groups has rightly been rejected, most recently by Ernest Best, *A Commentary on the First and Second Epistle to the Thessalonians* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972), 38–42.

[29] Acts 20:17. The phrase κατ' ἐκκλησίαν in 14:23, in light of the mention of the cities evangelized in vv. 21–22, should be taken in the same way; cf. also Titus 1:5.

[30] See N. Afanassieff, "L'assemblée eucharistique unique dans l'église ancienne," *Kleronomia* 6 (1974): 1–36, for the argument that there was only one eucharistic gathering despite the existence of a number of groups. His argument that κατ' οἶκον ἐκκλησία should not be translated house church, but "église locale qui se réunit dans une maison" is not convincing.

The Christian practice of hospitality was open to abuses, as not only they but also pagans were aware.[31] As one way to regulate the practice to some degree, at least, letters of recommendation were written to introduce traveling missionaries to the churches along their way. The custom of writing such letters was widespread in the first century. A recent study of familiar letters of recommendation by Chan-Hie Kim has enabled us to come to a better understanding of their form and content.[32] Many passages in the New Testament refer to the practice of writing such letters, and on the basis of form and content Kim identifies certain portions of Paul's letters as being related to the commendation and introduction.[33] The only non-Pauline passages of commendation that he finds in the New Testament are 3 John 12 and Heb 13:17. His analysis of the epistolary type shows that Paul's commendations follow, *mutatis mutandis*, the pattern of other letters of the same type. We are concerned with the elements in the letters rather than with the form of the letters. There are some features of the letter of recommendation that are of interest to us.

The person recommended is frequently identified as being an intimate of the writer. "By identifying himself with the recommended, the writer intends the recommendation to be taken as if he himself were being commended. The sender hopes that the recipient will treat the person whom he has recommended just like himself."[34] Statements such as that in P.Oslo 55, ὑποδεξάμενος ὡς ἂν ἐμέ, are common.[35] The recipient is, then, on occasion asked to do what is requested for the sake of the writer.[36] The requests are made for general assistance, expressed in forms of συνεργέω and λαμβάνω,[37] but quite frequently the request is more specific, for example, to extend hospitality to the recommended person who is the

[31] 2 John 10 and *Did*. 11–12 show the dangers inherent in the practice. For a view of how Christian hospitality could be abused, see Lucian, *Peregr.* 11ff.

[32] Chan-Hie Kim, *The Familiar Letter of Recommendation* (SBLDS 4; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1972), 119ff.

[33] Acts 9:2; 18:27; 22:5; 1 Cor 16:3 refer to the practice. See Rom 16:1–2 (possibly 3–16); 1 Cor 16:15–18; Phil 2:29–30; 4:2–3; 1 Thess 5:12–13a; Phlm (particularly vv. 8–17).

[34] Kim, *Familiar Letter*, 51.

[35] Kim, *Familiar Letter*, 50ff., 51 n. 33, draws attention to P.Oxy. 32, *peto domine ut eum ante oculos habeas tamquam me*; Cicero, *Fam.* 13.62, *cura ut habeas quo meo*, and to P.Oxy. 1663 and P.Ryl. 691. See also Phlm 17, προσλαβοῦ αὐτὸν ὡς ἐμέ.

[36] See C.W. Keyes, "The Greek Letter of Introduction," *AJP* 56 (1935): 41; P.Oxy. 787, εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν καταλογὴν ποιήσεις αὐτῶι; Ps.-Plato, *Ep.* 15 (p. 532 Hercher) ἡμῶν ἕνεκα. Cicero, *Fam.* 13.78, *mea causa*; 13.31, *honoris mei causa.* See Kim, *Familiar Letter*, 80–81, for more references, and cf. Rom 16:2 προστάτις . . . ἐμοῦ αὐτοῦ, and Phil 2:30.

[37] Συνεργέω*:* PSI 376, 969. Note how frequently συνεργός appears in the context of Pauline recommendations: Rom 16:3, 9; Phil 4:3; Phlm 24; cf. 1 Cor 16:16. For ἀντιλαμβάνω, see PSI 520; P.Col.Zen. 112.

bearer of the letter. Such requests are expressed by compounds of δέχομαι and other explicit statements on hospitality.[38] One reason given for fulfilling the request is that the commended person may testify (μαρτυρέω) to the writer of the good reception he had received.[39]

## The Situation in 3 John

It is against this background, I suggest, that 3 John should be viewed. It is a real letter, addressed to a situation which the author plans to correct.[40] It follows one that he had earlier written to the same church (v. 9). That letter appears to have been a letter of recommendation written on behalf of traveling brethren (vv. 5–8, 10).[41] Such a letter would have contained the main elements common to letters of recommendation as enumerated above. The travelers had met with a mixed response from the people to whom the letter had been addressed.

Gaius had received them, and is now commended by the Elder in a manner that calls to mind the main elements of his earlier letter (vv. 5–8): ἐμαρτύρησάν σου τῇ ἀγάπῃ ... προπέμψας ... ὑπολαμβάνειν ... συνεργοί. Diotrephes, however, had rejected the letter and its bearers (vv. 9, 10). This raises the question of the relationship between Gaius and Diotrephes. The letter had been addressed to the church, and it is to be assumed that Gaius knew about the letter.[42] There is no indication that Gaius held an official position in the church, although he does seem to have been an influential man with a circle of φίλοι (v. 15).[43] We can thus identify two groups, Gaius and his friends, and Diotrephes and those over whom he exercises some

[38] Ὑποδέχομαι: P.Oslo 55; P.Princ. 105; προσδέχομαι: P.Mil.Vogliano 76; P.Oslo 51, and Rom 16:2; Phil 2:29.

[39] P.Oslo 55; P.Flor. 173; P.Oxy. 1064; 1424.

[40] C.H. Dodd, *The Johannine Epistles* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1946), lxiii; Haenchen, "Neuere Literatur," 281–282. See the excellent article by Robert W. Funk, "The Form and Structure of II and III John," *JBL* 86 (1967): 424–430.

[41] Thus Dodd, *Johannine Epistles*, 161–162; Joseph Chaine, *Les épîtres catholiques* (2d ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1939); Haenchen, "Neuere Literatur," 283; Rudolf Schnackenburg, *Die Johannesbriefe* (Freiburg: Herder, 1970), 326; and Rudolf Bultmann, *The Johannine Epistles* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), 100. This is not a reference to 2 John as has been argued by Zahn, *Introduction*, 3:375ff. The circumstances envisioned in the two are different.

[42] There is no reason to suppose that Diotrephes had suppressed the letter, as is frequently assumed. Schnackenburg, *Johannesbriefe*, 326, is probably correct: the Elder mentions the letter only to point up the arrogance of Diotrephes.

[43] For the Johannine sense of φίλος, see G. Stählin, "φιλέω, κτλ," *TDNT* 9 (1974): 166. Zahn, *Introduction*, 3:375, represents the generally held opinion that there is no hint that Gaius occupies an official position in the church. Ἐργάζομαι in the commendation of Gaius in v. 5, ὃ ἐὰν ἐργάσῃ, does not describe an official or semi-official activity, but rather the

control. The relationship between the two groups is not spelled out, but it is unlikely that Gaius and his friends were part of the group dominated by Diotrephes.[44] There is no hint of a confrontation between Gaius and Diotrephes or of tension between them. Gaius has some knowledge of Diotrephes's group, but he was not a member of it, and not one of those whom Diotrephes ejected from the church because they wished to receive the traveling brethren (v. 10).[45] It is more reasonable to assume that there were at least two Christian groups in the immediate area, one associated with Gaius, the other with Diotrephes.[46] This would be in keeping with earlier evidence that a number of separate groups would soon be formed in one locality and would eliminate the difficulties involved in placing Gaius in Diotrephes's group.

If the Elder had followed what appears to have been earlier practice and had addressed his former letter to all the house congregations which together constituted the church in the immediate region, it would explain Gaius's knowledge of its content without his having been a member of Diotrephes's church. But why, then, does he now write to Gaius without including the other groups? He may be doing so to encourage Gaius, but more to the point is that 3 John is itself a letter of recommendation, probably on behalf of Demetrius (vv. 11, 12). The Elder is certain that Demetrius will meet with a good reception from Gaius as the earlier travelers had. Third John is, then, at once a commendation of Gaius for his earlier hospitality and a recommendation of Demetrius.[47] It should further be noted that, although it is a personal letter, v. 15 would indicate that it has a wider reference than Gaius alone.[48]

Diotrephes's actions become clearer when his relationship with the Elder on the one hand and with his congregation on the other is observed. Despite the efforts to prove otherwise, there is nothing in 3 John to suggest that the issue between the Elder and himself was a doctrinal one.

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voluntary charitable service for someone as it does in Matt 26:10; Gal 6:10; Col 3:23. See Schnackenburg, *Johannesbriefe*, 323 n. 5.

[44] Contra Schnackenburg, *Johannesbriefe*, 323, 328; Bultmann, *Johannine Epistles*, 95, 103; Marinus de Jonge, *De Brieven van Johannes* (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1968), 256.

[45] Thus Dodd, *Johannine Epistles*, 161; Hans Windisch, *Die katholischen Briefe* (HNT 4.2; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1951), 140.

[46] See Schnackenburg, *Johannesbriefe*, 301; Maurice Goguel, *The Primitive Church* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), 139.

[47] See Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Lesefrüchte," *Hermes* 33 (1898): 529ff.; Zahn, *Introduction*, 3:374; Schnackenburg, *Johannesbriefe*, 330.

[48] Cf. also Philemon, which is more than a purely personal letter. See Lohse, *Colossians and Philemon*, 187.

The frequency with which ἀλήθεια occurs (vv. 1, 3, 4, 8, 12) does reflect the Elder's concern with pure doctrine,[49] but it is not an issue between the Elder and Diotrephes. Rather, it is the Elder's means of strengthening his recommendation of Demetrius to Gaius, that they might become συνεργοὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ (v. 8: cf. 12). What is at issue is Diotrephes's refusal to receive the letter of recommendation that had been written: ἀλλ' ὁ φιλοπρωτεύων αὐτῶν Διοτρέφης οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται ἡμᾶς (v. 9). The Elder seems to think that Diotrephes had seen in the letter a threat to his own pre-eminence in the church and that he had therefore rejected the letter as well as its bearers.

There is no reason to understand ἐπιδέχομαι in v. 9 as meaning "to recognize someone's authority," and in v. 10 as "to receive someone as guest."[50] In letters of recommendation such as the letter referred to in v. 9 had been, the request on behalf of the persons recommended was that they be received for the sake of the author. The reception of such letters and their bearers was proof of the good will of the recipients, as 1 Maccabees and Josephus illustrate. The author of 1 Maccabees, writing of the friendship between the Jews and the Romans and Spartans, gives an account of the correspondence that passed between the various parties and the treatment of their emissaries. Of the Roman treatment of Jewish emissaries it is said (12:4): καὶ ἔδωκαν ἐπιστολὰς αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτοὺς κατὰ τόπον, ὅπως προπέμπωσιν αὐτοὺς εἰς γῆν Ιουδα μετ' εἰρήνης. The author indicates that the Jews had reciprocated. In a letter from Jonathan the high priest to the Spartans, he has Jonathan remind them of the way Onias the high priest on a previous occasion had received a messenger from Arius the Spartan king (12:8), καὶ ἐπιδέξατο ὁ Ονιας τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀπεσταλμένον ἐνδόξως καὶ ἔλαβεν τὰς ἐπιστολάς, ἐν αἷς διεσαφεῖτο περὶ συμμαχίας καὶ φιλίας. Josephus's version of the incident, identifying the messenger as Demoteles, reads, τήν τε ἐπιστολὴν ἐδεξάμεθα προθύμως καὶ τῷ Δημοτέλει καὶ τῷ Ἀρείῳ εὐνοϊκῶς διετέθημεν (*A.J.* 13.167). The reception of the letter and its bearer proved the good will of the recipient toward the writer.

It is such an understanding of ἐπιδέχομαι that is present in vv. 9 and 10. Diotrephes had shown his ill will toward the Elder by refusing his letter

[49] This is stressed by Zahn, *Introduction*; Käsemann, "Ketzer und Zeuge," and James L. Houlden, *The Johannine Epistles* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 8ff.

[50] Thus, BAG, s.v. ἐπιδέχομαι. Johannes E. Huther, *Kritisch-exegetisches Handbuch über die drei Briefe des Apostel Johannes* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1868), 294, and de Jonge, *De Brieven van Johannes*, 263, correctly insist on the same meaning in both verses.

and his emissaries.[51] In addition, he slandered the Elder and, adding insult to injury, imposed his will on the brethren who would act contrary to his wishes. We must be content with the fact that we do not know what Diotrephes's reasons were for his conduct. We are limited to the Elder's view of the matter, and he sees in it a purely personal issue.

Of Diotrephes's actions with respect to his church, the Elder says οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐπιδέχεται τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τοὺς βουλομένους κωλύει καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκβάλλει (v. 10). As we have seen, Diotrephes's action has been described as excommunication, an action which was in his power as monarchical bishop.[52] Nothing is said in the text, however, of any office that he may have occupied. That he was a monarchical bishop is often concluded from the description of him as ὁ φιλοπρωτεύων αὐτῶν (v. 9) and the statement ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκβάλλει (v. 10). But φιλοπρωτεύω can mean either to be ambitious to become πρῶτος or to love being πρῶτος,[53] and by itself does therefore not indicate whether he was a bishop or only arrogated to himself the powers of a bishop. Whether, in fact, we have to do with monarchical authority at all depends on whether ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκβάλλει does refer to excommunication. That ἐκβάλλω is a technical term for banning someone from the synagogue or the church is often affirmed with an appeal to John 9:34–35 for support.[54] But neither in that passage nor here does it clearly describe official action.[55] Yet ἐκβάλλει is not to be taken as a rhetorical overstatement merely implying that Diotrephes was threatening to throw people out of the church.[56] Diotrephes does forbid

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[51] It is probably significant that 3 John, which is itself a letter of recommendation, does not request that hospitality be extended to the traveling brethren for the sake of the Elder. Instead, Diotrephes is threatened with (v. 10), and Gaius promised (vv. 13ff.), a personal visit. It is noteworthy that even in recommending the brethren to Gaius, he offers theological rather than personal reasons for doing so.

[52] Thus Harnack, "Über den dritten Johannesbrief," followed by Käsemann, "Ketzer und Zeuge"; Günther Bornkamm, "πρέσβυς," *TDNT* 6 (1967): 670–671; and Bultmann, *Johannine Epistles*, 101 n. 12.

[53] See BAGD, s.v. φιλοπρωτεύω. The positions taken by commentators on its meaning here are informed by their understanding of the situation and cannot be based simply on the meaning of the term.

[54] Thus Käsemann, "Ketzer und Zeuge," and Bultmann, *Johannine Epistles*.

[55] De Jonge, *De Brieven van Johannes*, 264; Schnackenburg, *Johannesbriefe*, 329; and Wilhelm Michaelis, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (Bern: Haller, 1961), 299, correctly view this as not an official action.

[56] Such an explanation, advanced, for example, by Haenchen, "Neuer Literatur," 283–284, would eliminate the problem that Gaius, had he been a member of Diotrephes's church, would have had to be excommunicated, but we have no indication of such an action in the letter. On that understanding he would be running a serious risk when

members of the church to receive the emissaries and he does eject them from the church when they persist. He is obviously in a position to do so, but it is not necessary to make him a monarchical bishop to explain his actions. Nor is it necessary to suppose that he asked the church for coercive measures against those of their number who acted against his wishes.[57] The picture that we get is of one man exercising his power, not of someone lobbying in order to impose his will.

The situation reflected is one in which power rather than ecclesiastical authority is exercised. The subject with which 3 John deals is hospitality, and the Elder accuses Diotrephes of refusing hospitality to strangers. It seems reasonable that ἐκβάλλω should be understood as the opposite of (ὑπο)λαμβάνω and ἐπιδέχομαι, that is, that Diotrephes refused to extend hospitality any longer to those Christians who would oppose him in the matter. Ἐκβάλλει suggests that they had been beneficiaries of his hospitality as members of the church, the assembly that met in his house.[58] On such an understanding, ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκβάλλει would have the same effect as the command given in 2 John 10, μὴ λαμβάνετε αὐτὸν εἰς οἰκίαν, the exclusion from the assembly meeting in a home, except that the latter is directed against the travelers, while in the former the action is extended to those who are already members of the local assembly. We have found no evidence that to have a church meet in one's home bestowed any authority on the host. There is no indication that Gaius had any authority by virtue of his hospitality, and there is no need to assume it for Diotrephes. He may not have had ecclesiastical authority, but he did have the power to exclude from the assembly in his house those who opposed him. Whereas in *Didache* 11 we learn of traveling Christians abusing hospitality, in 3 John we see an individual who was extending it, using it for his own purpose.

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he receives the brethren, and that would be the Elder's reason for praising him so much. Schnackenburg, *Johannesbriefe*, 328, also considering Gaius to have been one of those who wished to receive the brethren, claims that Gaius's hospitality is proof that Diotrephes did not actually have jurisdictional authority. However, the letter does not contain any evidence of a clash between Diotrephes and Gaius, and it is more reasonable to assume that Gaius was not subject to Diotrephes's actions.

[57] Suggested by Dodd, *Johannine Epistles*, 162–163; Goguel, *Primitive Church*, 243–244.

[58] This was already suggested as a possibility by Karl Braune, *The Epistles General of John* in Johann P. Lange, *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures: Critical, Doctrinal and Homiletical* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1869), 24:198.

## Conclusion

This essay does not in a narrow sense deal with the two themes to which this volume[59] is devoted. Yet the breadth of interest of Nils Dahl assures me that it is nevertheless appropriate. That it deals with a man such as Diotrephes will only serve to point up the contrast between him and my συνεργὸς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ and friend, in whom there is no vestige of φιλοπρωτεία. *Ad multos annos!*

[59] *God's Christ and His People: Studies in Honour of Nils Alstrup Dahl* (see entry above before n. 1).

CHAPTER SIX

# SOCIAL LEVEL AND LITERARY CULTURE OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY*

Attempts to establish the social level of early Christians invariably rest to a considerable degree on Paul's description of his converts in Corinth (1 Cor 1:26): "For consider your call, brethren; not many of you were wise according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth." Recent studies have stressed that this passage reveals that the Corinthian church counted among its members at least an influential minority of well-to-do persons, as well as a large number of people from the lower classes.

Regarding the passage, E.A. Judge argues that these words at face value "merely imply that the group did not contain many intellectuals, politicians, or persons of gentle birth. But this would suggest that the group did at least draw upon this minority to some extent."[1] They represented the owner and patron class that sponsored Christianity and had dependents who were also converts. "But the dependent members of the city households were by no means the most debased section of | society. If lacking freedom, they still enjoyed security, and a moderate prosperity. The peasantry and persons in slavery on the land were the most underprivileged classes. Christianity left them largely untouched."[2] It was the domination of a socially pretentious section of the population that was responsible for many of the church's problems.

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Wilhelm Wuellner has recently come to similar conclusions through a different approach. After subjecting 1 Cor 1:26–28 to critical analysis of grammar and form, he suspects that "inferences drawn from archaeological sources notwithstanding, the Corinthian Christians came by and large from fairly well-to-do bourgeois circles with a fair percentage also from

* Originally published as ch. 2 in *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 29–59; published in German as "Soziale Ebene und literarische Bildung," in *Zur Soziologie des Urchristentums* (ed. Wayne Meeks; trans. G. Memmert; TB 62; Munich: Kaiser, 1979), 194–221.

[1] Edwin A. Judge, *The Social Pattern of Christian Groups in the First Century* (London: Tyndale, 1960), 59. Gerd Theissen ("Soziale Schichtung in der korinthischen Gemeinde: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des hellenistischen Urchristentums," *ZNW* 65 [1974]: 232–272) follows up Judge's assessment, with some modifications.

[2] Judge, *Social Pattern*, 60.

upper class people as well as the very poor. But to use 1 Cor 1:26–28 as the most important text in the whole NT for allegations of Christianity's proletarian origins is indefensible and no longer tenable simply and chiefly on grammatical grounds."[3]

Somewhat less significant are those attempts to describe the social constitution of early Christianity on the basis of the Acts of the Apostles and other late writings of the NT, which have a recognized tendency to describe Christianity as "middle class."[4] Heinz Kreissig seeks to correct what he considers to be an erroneous view of the social status of Christians | in the first century.[5] Basing his study largely on Acts, the Pastoral Epistles, and the Shepherd of Hermas (I), he finds that Christianity did not grow so much among the proletariat or manual workers or small farmers as it did in urban circles of well-situated artisans and tradespeople. He admits that some Christians were poor or were slaves but cautions us that conversions of people from the upper ranks were not the exception. Kreissig does not mean that there were no revolutionary elements in early Christianity—it would still have to be determined to what social strata such "progressives" belonged.

31

## An Emerging New Consensus: Moving Beyond Deissmann

It appears from the recent concern of scholars with the social level of early Christians that a new consensus may be emerging. This consensus, if it is not premature to speak of one, is quite different from the one represented by Adolf Deissmann, which has held sway since the beginning of the

[3] Wilhelm Wuellner, "The Sociological Implications of 1 Corinthians 1:26–28 Reconsidered," *SE VI* (TU 112; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), 666–672.

[4] For Luke's pride in the high social standing of Paul's converts, see Henry J. Cadbury, *The Book of Acts in History* (New York: Harper, 1955), 43; Eckhard Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller* (SUNT 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 22ff., 26, 30. On Luke's interest in women from the upper classes, see Martin Hengel, "Maria Magdalena und die Frauen als Zeugen," in *Abraham unser Vater: Juden und Christen im Gespräch über die Bibel: Festschrift für Otto Michel zum 60. Geburtstag* (ed. Otto Betz, Martin Hengel, and Peter Schmidt; AGSU 5; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963), 243–256. Note also his interest in the "God-fearers" or "worshipers of God," who were generally of higher social status than proselytes. See Peter Stuhlmacher, *Das paulinische Evangelium: I: Vorgeschichte* (FRLANT 95; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 99 n. 5, 261; Henneke Gülzow, *Christentum und Sklaverei in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (Bonn: Habelt, 1969), 13–14.

[5] Heinz Kreissig, "Zur sozialen Zusammensetzung der frühchristlichen Gemeinden im ersten Jahrhundert u. Z.," *Eirene* 6 (1967): 91–100.

century.[6] The more recent scholarship has shown that the social status of early Christians may be higher than Deissmann had supposed. We have noted Karl Kautsky's opinion that in its beginnings Christianity was a movement among various unpropertied classes. Even those who opposed his Marxist interpretation agreed with his reading of the evidence.[7] In a review of Kautsky's book on the origins of Christianity, Deissmann did not | criticize him for his evaluation of the evidence but for his failure to appreciate the movement and the literature from below. 32

Kautsky is accused of judging the Christian sources "not from the level of his own fundamental conception, but from that of a sated Berlin rationalism which looks down genteelly and unhistorically" upon the gospels and misses the character of Paul's letters. Kautsky had argued against the conception of Christianity as the creation of Jesus on the basis of the fact that Roman historians of the early Empire scarcely mention Jesus. In a statement that reflects his own romantic view of things, Deissmann answers: "This non-mention is the direct result of the specifically non-literary nature of Primitive Christianity—a movement among the weary and heavy-laden, men without power and position, 'babes' as Jesus himself calls them, the poor, the base, the foolish, as St. Paul with a prophet's sympathy describes them. Kautsky himself knows the passage."[8]

Deissmann clearly believes in a correlation between social class and literary culture. His great work, *Light from the Ancient East*, which has influenced NT scholarship's understanding of the character of NT language and literature, is based on that presupposition. Deissmann was one of the most successful in convincing the scholarly community that the newly found papyri were important for understanding the NT. Complaining that most of the extant literature of antiquity represents the cultivated upper class, which almost always had been identified with the whole ancient

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6 For the old view, see the survey of opinions in Kreissig, "Zur sozialen Zusammensetzung," 91–96. This view is still held by John C. Gager, *Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1975), 96ff., 106ff. A major exception was Rudolf Schumacher, *Die soziale Lage der Christen im apostolischen Zeitalter* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1924). See also K. Schreiner, "Zur biblischen Legitimation des Adels: Auslegungsgeschichte zu 1. Kor. 1, 26–29," *ZKG* 85 (1975): 317–357.

7 Other scholars also agreed about the social level of the earliest Christians but denied that they had any proletarian consciousness. See Martin Dibelius, *Urchristentum und Kultur* (Heidelberg: Winters Universitätsverlag, 1928), 20–21, and the earlier literature cited by Schumacher, *Die soziale Lage der Christen.*

8 Adolf Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World* (trans. Lionel R.M. Strachan; 4th ed.; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1927; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965), 466.

world of the imperial age, he welcomed the discovery of the papyri. These scraps from the rubbish heaps of antiquity opened our eyes to the common people, those classes from which "we have to think of the apostle Paul and the early | Christians gathering recruits."[9] Deissmann believes that these nonliterary documents are valuable for three reasons: 1) They guide us toward an accurate philological estimate of the NT and primitive Christianity; 2) they direct us to a correct literary appreciation of the NT; and 3) they provide us with information on social and religious history, "helping us to understand both the contact and the contrast between Primitive Christianity and the ancient world."[10]

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New Testament language and literature formed part of Deissmann's understanding of the social character of early Christianity. Modifications have been made to Deissmann's assessment of the language and literature of the NT, but their implications for the social status of early Christianity have not been recognized. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to observe what research since Deissmann has taught us about the linguistic and literary character of the NT. In examining the level of literary culture of the NT, I do not wish to imply that the social level of early Christianity can be established solely on the basis of linguistic or literary data, which only complement other kinds of evidence at our disposal. Nor do I wish to suggest that all NT writers represent the same literary finesse. Deissmann, in basing his case primarily on the Gospels and Paul, utilized only those authors and those features in their works that generally represent most of the NT. He was fully aware that Luke and the author of Hebrews were purposely edging toward producing literary works for higher circles.

Paul is of special interest and warrants a brief digression before we turn to linguistic and literary considerations. His letters are the earliest NT writings and were | addressed to actual situations in his mission churches. They are, therefore, valuable sources for learning about the churches. They also provide evidence about the man who wrote them, raising the issue of Paul's education.

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The church fathers, measuring Paul by the criteria of classicism, were embarrassed by his rudeness of style. That, however, has not deterred his admirers in every generation from producing volumes on his erudition.[11] In justifying their attempts to portray his familiarity with Greek philosophy,

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[9] Deissmann, *Light*, 9.

[10] Deissmann, *Light*, 10.

[11] See Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1909; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958), 2:491ff.; Edwin A. Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," JAC 15 (1972): 29ff.

these admirers frequently had recourse to the fact that he was born in Tarsus, one of the three major university cities of antiquity. Tarsus was known for the unusual involvement of its local populace in the academic enterprise. As a youth, they argued, Paul received a good Greek education that enabled him in later years to communicate with the philosophers in Athens. However, a detailed study of Acts 22:3 in light of similar contemporary descriptions of individuals' educational careers has convinced W.C. van Unnik[12] that this passage should be punctuated as follows: "I am a Jew, born at Tarsus in Cilicia, but brought up in this city, educated at the feet of Gamaliel according to the strict manner of the law of our fathers, being zealous for God as you all are this day." According to this reading, Paul would already have spent his early youth in Jerusalem before he entered Gamaliel's school around the age of fifteen. His earliest formation could then be regarded as Jewish, taking place in an Aramaic-speaking community and determining his thought throughout his life. But to base either conclusion on the statement in Acts 22:3 is precarious. An earlier youth in Tarsus would not have guaranteed a thorough Greek education, nor would an early youth in Jerusalem have | precluded one. 35 The Hellenization of Palestine was more thorough than has been thought, even to the extent that disciples of the rabbis were educated in Greek philosophy and rhetoric. It is of biographical interest to know where Paul received his education, but it is not of decisive importance in order to determine what his educational level was in the period of his greatest missionary activity, some twenty years after his conversion. By then he had spent two decades in a Greek environment—ample time for him to have assimilated the Greek culture that is reflected in his letters. His letters provide that primary information about the questions with which we are concerned, and it is to them and the other documents in the NT that we must turn.

## Language and Style as Indicators of Social Level

Deissmann's major contribution was in the field of lexicography.[13] Reacting against the view that the NT was written in a language of its own, a "Holy Spirit Greek," he compared NT vocabulary with the newly discovered papyri

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[12] Willem C. van Unnik, *Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth* (trans. George Ogg; London: Epworth, 1962).

[13] For a history of NT lexicography, see Gerhard Friedrich, "Pre-History of the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament," *TDNT* 10 (1976): 613–661.

and concluded that "for the most part, the pages of our sacred Book are so many records of popular Greek, in its various grades; taken as a whole the NT is a Book of the people."[14] Deissmann's immediate followers carried his work into the field of grammar, with the assurance "that the papyri have finally destroyed the figment of a NT Greek which is in any material respect different from that spoken by ordinary people in daily life throughout the Roman world."[15] The presence of Semitic elements in the NT writings 36 posed problems for this theory, but these | elements were explained as literal translations of the OT and Aramaic sources that did not constitute sufficient reason for isolating the language of the NT.

Recent writers have not been satisfied with that explanation, for the features under discussion occur "in parts of the New Testament where the possibility of Semitic sources is more than remote." Instead, the distinctive features have been attributed to the familiarity of Christian writers with the Septuagint. It is further held by Nigel Turner, who has produced the most extensive recent work on the syntax of NT Greek, "that the language of the Old Testament translators and the New Testament writers was the same: a living dialect of Jewish Greek," a unique language with a character and unity of its own.[16] As such it should be classified as a distinct type of the common Greek. "It belongs neither to the popular papyrus texts nor to the cultured exponents of what is called the literary Koine. Biblical Greek is far removed from the uncultured dialect of the marketplace. Greek-speaking Jews had imbibed their linguistic tradition from religious experience, from the bilingual necessity which was forced upon them, and most of all from the study of the Greek Old Testament and from synagogue worship."[17] By no means do all linguists accept Turner's view that NT Greek is a special dialect,[18] but the Semitic element is generally admitted to be more significant than Deissmann and his immediate successors had thought.

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[14] Deissmann, *Light*, 143.

[15] James Hope Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek, 1: Prolegomena* (4 vols.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1906–1976), 1:18–19.

[16] Nigel Turner, "Second Thoughts: Papyrus Finds," *ExpTim* 76 (1964): 45. See also Turner, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Vol. 3: Syntax* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), and see Klaus Beyer, *Semitische Syntax im Neuen Testament* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962).

[17] Turner, "Second Thoughts," 46.

[18] See Edgar V. McKnight, "The New Testament and 'Biblical' Greek," *JBR* 34 (1966): 36–42.

The sociological implications of this shift in opinion must | still be determined. Three decades before the publication of Turner's book, A.D. Nock was also impressed by the differences between the language, especially the vocabulary, of the papyri and of Paul: 37

> Any man who knows his classical Greek authors and reads the New Testament and then looks into the papyri is astonished at the similarities which he finds. Any man who knows the papyri first and then turns to Paul is astonished at the differences. There has been much exaggeration of the Koine element in the New Testament.... Nothing could be less like the Pauline letters than the majority of the documents in Deissmann's *Light from the Ancient East*. Paul is not writing peasant Greek or soldier Greek; he is writing the Greek of a man who has the Septuagint in his blood.[19]

The Septuagint and the NT have vocabulary and usages that would have been strange to a Greek. Such usages, Nock points out, "are the product of an enclosed world living its own life, a ghetto culturally and linguistically if not geographically; they belong to a literature written entirely for the initiated, like the magic papyri with their technical use of such words as οὐσία, σύστασις, ἀγωγή. Philosophical works intended for wider circles had some peculiar turns of speech and words, προηγμένα, for instance, but they bore a meaning on the surface. Writings with a terminology which did not satisfy this requirement could not and did not court publicity outside the movement."[20] Thus, whereas Deissmann had seen the sociological value of NT Greek as placing Christianity on the social scale, Nock suggests that the value of the language lies in its reflection of the in-group mentality of the early Christians. It appears that the more NT Greek emerges as a | distinct type by virtue of its Semitic character, the more it reveals the mind-set of a minority group; and this perception is relevant to the current interest in early Christian communities. 38

Investigation of the sociological significance of this in-group Greek will have to deal with the fact that, although we cannot absolutely deny the possibility of pagan analogies, "apart from the magical papyri, which are working copies for use, we have no writings of men of esoteric piety addressed only to their spiritual brethren. It may be questioned whether many such existed.[21] This is, therefore, an instance in which the riches of

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[19] Arthur Darby Nock, "The Vocabulary of the New Testament," *JBL* 52 (1933): 138, most readily accessible in Zeph Stewart, ed., *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 1:341–347, esp. 346–347.

[20] Nock, "Vocabulary," 135, or Stewart, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, 1:344.

[21] Nock, "Vocabulary," 135, or Stewart, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, 1:344.

our Christian sources may enable us to cast light on other ancient cults. Nevertheless, examination of the phenomenon should take into consideration ancient[22] and modern[23] occurrences that may appear in some way analogous, as well as the insight offered by the social sciences.[24]

39 The style of NT Greek has also been perceived | by other scholars to be different from that of the man in the street. Albert Wifstrand argues that Hebrews, James, and 1 Peter have characteristics quite different from the vernacular.[25] Deissmann had recognized that these letters were more literary than those of Paul, but Wifstrand tries to evaluate their style more precisely. He states that the obvious differences between their style and the vernacular are the special words and religious terms in the NT. But he notes that even in comparison with the Hellenistic diatribe, with which many points of contact have been seen, the NT makes much greater use of metaphor and abstract nouns and is far more intimate. The language of these letters is not vulgar, but is the ordinary Koine written by people of some education. It shows the predilections of Hellenistic secretarial and scientific prose and also the use of the Semitic by the authors when they wished to write in a higher style. It therefore appears to be a language of the Hellenized synagogue, which is not, however, a special dialect. Its phonology, syntax, and accidence and formation of sentences show a preference for Semitic modes of expression.

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[22] The Hellenistic Pythagoreans' adoption of the Doric dialect, in addition to the linguistic phenomena mentioned by Nock, remains a tantalizing enigma that may deserve further attention. Holger Thesleff thinks that these "somewhat reactionary Academic and Peripatetic propaganda" pieces were aimed at a select public, which was expected to listen, and that they are clearly not esoteric, but "semi-exoteric." See Thesleff's "On the Problem of the Doric Pseudo-Pythagorica: An Alternative Theory of Date and Purpose," in *Pseudepigrapha*, in *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* (vol. 18 of the Fondation Hardt series; Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1971), 1:85–86, and his earlier work, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1961), 77ff. If they were "semi-exoteric," their archaistic Doric garb might be explained partially by their intention to show the debt of Plato and Aristotle to Pythagoras. But the Pythagoreans were not merely scoring a polemical point, for they sincerely believed that the debt was real. Therefore the adoption of Doric in these tractates also reflects on the Pythagoreans themselves.

[23] The Quaker plain speech may be a case in point. The use of *thee* and *thou*, "though it originated in the intention to treat all men as equals, has turned out in practice to establish a new distinction" (Henry J. Cadbury, *Friendly Heritage* [Norwalk, Conn.: Silvermine, 1972], 241). It is one of their customs that has become "a badge of peculiarity for a sect" (Hugh Barbour, *The Quakers in Puritan England* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964], 241).

[24] Suggestive is Wayne A. Meeks, "The Man from Heaven in Johannine Sectarianism," *JBL* 92 (1972): 46–72.

[25] Albert Wifstrand, "Stylistic Problems in the Epistles of James and Peter," *ST* 1 (1948): 170–182.

Wifstrand does not claim this preference for all the writings of the NT, but it is important that he perceives a combination of professional prose and the Semitized language of the synagogue. Also significant is his relation of the character of NT Greek to the Christian community:

> What is peculiar to the New Testament is that God is nearer and one's fellowmen are nearer than they are to the Jews and Greeks, the conception of community has quite another importance, the valuations are more intense, and for that reason the emotionally tinged adjectives too are more frequent (dear, precious, glorious, living, everlasting, imperishable, and so on) together with other stylistic | features which appear in almost all late Christian preaching, but often in so empty and humdrum a manner that there is reason to wish for a little less of New Testament expression and a little more of New Testament spirit.[26]

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Wifstrand's notion of professional prose was taken up by his student Lars Rydbeck.[27] Rydbeck does not deny the Semitic coloring in NT Greek, but he insists that one should always try to determine whether those elements also appear in professional prose of the period. He bases his understanding of that style on technical writings on philology (Didymus), pharmacology (Dioscurides), technology (Heron), mathematics (Nichomachus), and astronomy (Ptolemaeus). These writers, who were interested in communicating facts and had no belletristic aims, wrote a nonliterary, nonclassical prose. This was the standard language used by people when they wished to express themselves without any literary pretension. It was also the style taught in schools and learned by people whose home language was not Greek. But we cannot assume that it was the common *spoken* language.

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[26] Wifstrand, "Stylistic Problems," 182. Pagans took offense at the intimacy Christians felt among themselves and expressed in their language, for example, their description of themselves as brothers. See the reaction of pagan views in Tertullian, *Apol.* 39, and Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 9.2; 31.8, and on the latter, see Graeme W. Clarke, *The* Octavius *of Marcus Minucius Felix* (ACW 39; New York: Newman, 1974), nn. 116 and 528. See also Lucian, *Peregr.* 13, and Hans Dieter Betz, "Lukian von Samosata und das Christentum," *NovT* 3 (1959): 233–234. Betz's suggestion that Lucian is simply describing early Christians in terms of a common Hellenistic ideal does not sufficiently consider the polemical nature of the pagan concern with the description of Christians as brothers, or the special connotations of the term. The significant work of Christine Mohrmann and her students has demonstrated how Christian Greek and Latin, especially of the later period, transformed the meaning words originally had in pagan usage. See Gerard J.M. Bartelink, "Umdeutung heidnischer Termini im christlichen Sprachgebrauch," in *Die Alte Kirche* (ed. Heinzgünter Frohnes and Uwe W. Knorr; Munich: Kaiser, 1974; vol. 1 of *Kirchengeschichte als Missionsgeschichte* [2 vols.; ed. Heinzgünter Frohnes, Hans-Werner Gensichen, and Georg Kretschmar; Munich, Kaiser, 1974–1978]), 397–418, and the literature cited there.

[27] Lars Rydbeck, *Fachprosa, vermeintliche Volkssprache und Neues Testament* (AUU Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 5; Uppsala: Universitetet, 1967).

41 The vernacular that | Deissmann found in most of the papyri is actually found in only a small percentage of the total papyrus documents, and our knowledge of it is still very limited. The language of the NT, according to Rydbeck, is the written language of educated people, not that of the vulgar papyri. Although he does not draw any sociological conclusions, his findings agree with the presently emerging view of the higher social status of early Christians.[28]

## Classical Quotations and Allusions

Some scholars have thought that the quotations of and the allusions to classical Greek authors in the NT may be an indication of the literary culture of the writers who used them.[29] Several allusions of a proverbial nature do occur, which, on the surface, have parallels in classical literature:[30] "The love of money is the root of all evils" (1 Tim 6: 10); "Why do you seek the speck that is in your brother's eye but do not notice the log that is in your own eye?" (Matt 7:3); "Physician, heal yourself" (Luke 4:23); "Having eyes do you not see, and having ears do you not hear?" (Mark 8:18); and "The dog turns back to his own vomit, and the sow is washed in the 42 mire" | (2 Pet 2:22). Closer scrutiny reveals that, rather than being derived from Greek literature, these allusions come from widespread sapiential traditions. Furthermore, the background of some of them is the OT and Jewish writings. Since morals are expressed in terms of popular wisdom that knows few cultural boundaries, it is not surprising that the Greeks also expressed the same thoughts.[31]

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[28] Almost half of Rydbeck's references are to Luke and Acts of the Apostles, which are hardly representative of NT Greek.

[29] Deissmann does not deal with them because of his conviction that the NT is nonliterary. See Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, 2:498, on Paul. Evelyn B. Howell, "St. Paul and the Greek World," *GR*, 2d series, 11 (1964): 7–29. (A shorter version appears in *ExpTim* 71 [1960]: 328–332.) Howell argues that Paul was indebted to Plato; that he "quoted or echoed classical authors more freely than is usually allowed"; and that, in short, "he was a complete member of the Greek world, or rather that he could and did assume that character when it suited his purpose to do so" (8). Howell is corrected by H. R. Minn, "Classical Reminiscence in St. Paul," *Prudentia* 6 (1974): 93–98.

[30] See the excellent treatment of the subject by Robert Renehan, "Classical Greek Quotations in the New Testament," in *The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays* in *Honor of the Very Reverend Georges Vasilievich Florovsky* (ed. David Neiman and Margaret Schatkin; OrChrAn 195; Rome: Pontificium Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1973), 17–45, to which I am indebted for much of what follows.

[31] The Golden Rule is a good example. See Albrecht Dihle, *Die goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgärethik* (SAW 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962).

There is another group of statements that may indeed go back to classical authors, especially to the tragedian Euripides. "You might find yourself fighting against God" (Acts 5:39) and "It hurts to kick against the goads" (Acts 26:14) may have had their ultimate origin in the *Bacchae*. Other echoes from Euripides have also been advanced as evidence that Luke was familiar with that author.[32] But that is not a necessary conclusion. Long before the first century, verses from Euripides were systematically collected and later found in anthologies designed for use in schools.[33] Quotations of such verses without any attribution of authorship do not, therefore, verify a personal reading of the original author.

A few exact quotations from Greek authors, however, do appear in Paul or are attributed to him. Paul's caution that "bad company ruins good morals" (1 Cor 15:33) may have come from one of Menander's plays, as critical editions of the NT indicate; but it is likely that Menander himself had borrowed it from Euripides.[34] In any case, the quotation has a proverbial character that was a feature of many quotations appearing in the Hellenistic diatribe, the style here adopted by | Paul.[35] He shows no awareness of the author from whom it originally came. In Titus 1:12 the statement "Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons" is attributed ·by the author to "a prophet of their own." He may have had Epimenides, who was a Cretan, in mind. But this statement, too, had become proverbial by the first century AD and is insufficient evidence of a firsthand knowledge of the works of Epimenides (sixth century BC). Epimenides has also been suggested as the author of the first quotation attributed to Paul in Acts 17:28, "In him we live and move and have our being," to which a quotation from Aratus, "For we are indeed his offspring," is added. Whether these two quotations have been accurately ascribed has been discussed at great length. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that the thought expressed by the two quotations is that of a widely diffused Stoicism, and that the latter quotation from Aratus (fourth–third century BC) appears in a poem on astronomy that enjoyed great popularity in antiquity. Thus we are once more brought to a level on which handbooks, anthologies, and summaries were used.

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[32] For the most important bibliography, see Pieter W. van der Horst, "Drohung und Mord schnaubend (Acta ix.1)," *NovT* 12 (1970): 265 n. 2.

[33] See Bruno Snell, *Scenes from Greek Drama* (Sather Classical Lectures 34; Berkeley: University of California Press. 1964), 51 n. 4.

[34] See Frederick W. Danker, "Menander and the New Testament," *NTS* 10 (1964): 365–368; Haiim B. Rosén, "Motifs and *Topoi* from the New Comedy in the New Testament?" *AncSoc* 3 (1972): 245–257.

[35] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80. [*Light*, 1:41–51]

These classical allusions and quotations do, however, reflect a certain level of literary culture. The writings of Hellenistic authors, especially those of the moral philosophers, teem with quotations of this type. What the Hellenistic age lacked in originality it sought to make up by repeating and applying the wisdom of classical writers.[36] But those writers were not always read in their entirety. The schools had recourse to selections from classical works, which were frequently arranged according to moral topics.[37] The massive work of Stobaeus provides an excellent example of such collections. Rather than | read the works of classical philosophers firsthand, students generally learned their philosophy from handbooks that summarized or compared the doctrines of the different schools. Handbooks provided an introduction for most secondary-school students to subjects ranging from rhetoric to land surveying.[38]

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Rhetoricians nevertheless supplied reading lists for their students in which the works of Euripides and Menander are frequently recommended.[39] Quintilian provided lists for young students who were preparing for the bar (*Inst.* 10.1, 67–68), and Dio Chrysostom did the same for a mature individual who wished to take part in public life but had no time or inclination to subject himself to a more formal education (*Or.* 18.6–7). Recommending these authors proved useful for the man in public life rather than for developing literary appreciation. Of Euripides, Dio says, "He cleverly fills his plays with an abundance of characters and moving incidents, and strews them with maxims useful on all occasions, since he was not without acquaintance with philosophy." This practical interest was responsible for the collections of statements from the poets, which were used by most students. What was important was the wisdom contained in the poems, not their authorship, and they could be quoted without any attribution of authorship. Moral philosophers, who attempted to reform the masses, used these sayings because they believed the poets were the authorities of the masses and representatives of the common wisdom. By quoting proverbial statements from poets, a teacher could assume that they expressed "the thought and feeling of men generally, just what the many think about wealth and the other objects of their admiration, and

[36] On the moral aspect of the study of the poets, see Henri I. Marrou, A *History of Education in Antiquity* (trans. George Lamb; New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 234–235.

[37] See Henry Chadwick, "Florilegium," *RAC* 7 (1969): 1131–1160.

[38] See Ilona Opelt, "Epitome," *RAC* 5 (1962): 944–973.

[39] Papyrus finds also testify to the relative popularity of the two authors. See Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller*, 28–29.

what | they consider would be the greatest good derived from each of them" (Dio, *Or.* 7.98).[40] 45

The quotations and allusions in the NT all demonstrate this level of literary culture in which the practical rather than aesthetic interests dominated. In addition, they help us to establish the lowest educational level that can reasonably be assumed for the NT writers who use them, that is, the upper levels of secondary-school instruction.[41]

## Edwin Judge: Early Christians as a Scholastic Community

Allusions to the classics do more than point to the educational level of the NT writers; they may have implications for the scholastic aspect of early Christian communities. I here distinguish scholastic activity from the educational system I have described. The scholastic activity of which I speak presupposes an educational level that would have made "academic" activity possible. According to Edwin A. Judge we need not know only what relation Christians as a group had to the social structure of their own communities, "but what they existed for as a group, what activities they engaged in, and what their contemporaries would have made of them."[42] Although the churches could be classified in terms of their cultic or social welfare activities, Judge chooses to isolate them, especially the Pauline churches, as scholastic communities. He may be charged with overstating his case, but since he is one of the few professional social historians who has worked for decades in a field to which NT scholars have only recently returned, and since his views are not widely known in this | country, it 46 may be of value to introduce his thoughts in this context. His assessment of the social status of early Christians is markedly different from that of Deissmann.

Judge argues that the early churches "were founded and to some extent carried on under the auspices of professional preachers, which makes them parallel in some respects to the philosophical movements of the

[40] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 2.5.

[41] See Marrou, *History of Education in Antiquity*, 233–242.

[42] Edwin A. Judge, "The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," *JRH* 1 (1960–1961): 4–15, 125–137, esp. 8. See also Hans Conzelmann, "Paulus und die Weisheit," *NTS* 12 (1966): 231–244. Conzelmann hypothesized that Paul organized a school activity devoted to the study of "Wisdom."

day."[43] Because of its academic character, early Christianity is better known than are other religious movements. Indeed, he affirms, Christian literature is devoted almost entirely to this academic aspect of its affairs, so that we know far more about the churches' arguments over points of ethical and theological doctrine than we do about their religious practices. The missionary method of Paul serves to illustrate the phenomenon as Judge understands it.

He calls Paul a sophist, "without prejudice to the value or sincerity of his thought," in order to place him in his correct social class in terms of the impression his activities must have given to contemporary observers. The term *sophist*, for Judge's purposes, includes philosophers as well as the orators with whom the term is usually associated. All these men must have been more learned than their critics have shown. Judge surmises that Paul acquired the rhetorical art "by hard experience rather than by training. It was as his own profession, that of rabbi, failed him (when ejected from the synagogues), that he took up the new one."[44]

47 | Paul's Roman citizenship gave him status among the social elite of the Hellenistic states.[45] He moved in well-established circles where there was opportunity for vigorous discussion about behavior and ideas. This took place in privately organized meetings under the patronage of eminent persons, who also provided him with a retinue of assistants and an audience composed of their dependents. Judge identifies as many as forty persons who were supposed to have sponsored Paul's activities. They were all "persons of substance, members of a cultivated social elite."[46] Another class of approximately forty known persons constituted Paul's professional following. With Paul they traveled and did missionary work, remaining under his immediate control. These eighty people supplied the

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[43] Judge, "Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," 125. In his assessment Judge differs markedly from Gager, *Kingdom and Community*, 5, 106–107, who regards the early Christians as nonintellectual in contrast to the later Gnostics. Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," 23, also registers his dissatisfaction with the history of religions school for not appreciating Christianity's historical singularity.

[44] Judge, "Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," 127. Although Judge here considered it safe to "lump" Aelius Aristides and Dio Chrysostom with Epictetus, the Cynics, Apollonius of Tyana, and Peregrinus in the sophistic class to which Paul belonged (126), he later excludes the Cynics on the grounds that they "were far too conspicuous and vulgar to do anything but repel people from the well-established circles in which Paul moved" (Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," 32).

[45] But note Judge's later comment that "Roman citizenship may not have been so decisive a status factor in the Greek cities of the first century as has been supposed" ("St. Paul and Classical Society," 25–26).

[46] Judge, "Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," 130.

platform and retinue of Paul the sophist. "The importance of this for our picture of [the] social character of the Hellenistic churches is that it is only in this connection that we know of them, and that there is simply nobody else that we know of in any other connection of consequence in the churches."[47]

Judge's prosopography presents a stimulating case for regarding Paul in his social position as a sophist. He suggests some points that should receive further attention. Paul, unlike other touring preachers, "established a set of corporate societies independent of himself and yet linked to him by a constant traffic of delegations." Furthermore, Paul "is always anxious about the transmission of the *logos* and the acquisition | of *gnosis*. . . . The Christian faith, therefore, as Paul expands it, belongs with the doctrines of the philosophical schools rather than with the esoteric rituals of the mystery religions." This is shown especially by his concentration on ethics. The academic character of the Pauline communities emerged still more clearly when the interests of his rivals and peers were studied. Paul constantly attacks them on points of academic belief and moral practice, whereas "the religious activities of the Christian societies, the organization and the conduct of the cult are of only minor concern." Paul also denounces his opponents as sophists and dissociates himself from their method—actions that introduce the question of the exact function of rhetoric in Paul's ministry.[48] 48

This provocative outline shows that Paul's relationship with his churches seems to have no exact analogies elsewhere. But it is not clear that the churches were independent of him. If anything, Paul appears meddlesome, even if his churches do occasionally turn to him for advice. What is needed is a study of the role of the intermediaries between the two parties, as well as some inquiry into the sociological function of the letters, which are surrogates for Paul's presence.[49]

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[47] Judge, "Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," 134–135.

[48] Judge, "Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," 135–136.

[49] See the discussion of 1 Thessalonians in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Rockwell Lectures at Rice University; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977; 2d ed., enlarged, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 22–27. A closer examination of epistolary paraenesis will aid in clarifying the relationship between the letter writers and their readers. On Seneca, see Hildegard Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae Morales* (SSKPG 18; Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), pt. 2, and Winfried Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung* (DAWB, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft 37; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962), 69–70.

The contact between Paul and popular philosophy is most evident in the field of ethics.[50] For a proper perspective, however, we must have a more realistic understanding of both the unity and the diversity among philosophers of the day. We are accustomed to stressing the philosophical Koine, especially as | it touches on ethics, to the point that differences or contrary viewpoints blur, or disappear completely. This is regrettable, since it is precisely the differences that are significant for understanding some of the issues reflected in the NT. The discussion regarding Paul's custom of working to support himself is a case in point.[51] An appreciation of the diversity of practice and teaching among representatives of the same school should also guard us against rejecting philosophers whom we mistakenly identify with a type that cannot legitimately represent the whole school. For example, Judge's view of the Cynics as "far too conspicuous and vulgar to do anything but repel people from the well-established circles in which Paul moved"[52] reflects a view of the Cynics that is presented in many of Lucian's satires; but that view hardly comports with Lucian's view of Demonax, or with the writings of Dio Chrysostom, who, even during his Cynic period, could hardly have been accused of vulgarity.

Judge suggests that the concept of popular ethics may enable us to place Paul more securely in the society of his day. By popular ethics he does not mean "any systematic propagation of ideas to the public, such as the Cynics undertook, but the way in which a loose body of general principles for life develops amongst thoughtful people in a community."[53] Although the insights into popular ethics, gained especially by Albrecht Dihle,[54] are certainly valuable, we must have greater precision at this point if we are to move forward. If, by the Cynics' "systematic propagation of ideas," Judge refers to the types of paraenesis identified by form critics, and if he places a low value on them as important sources for our knowledge of the | relationship between Christians and their society, I must disagree with his assessment.[55] The stock-in-trade of the Greek moralists,

[50] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333. [*Light*, 2:675–749].

[51] See Malherbe, *Social Aspects*, 24–27.

[52] See n. 44 above.

[53] Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," 32–33.

[54] For a summary and appreciation of Dihle's work by Edwin A. Judge, see "'Antike und Christentum': Some Recent Work from Cologne," *Prudentia* 5 (1973): 1–7.

[55] Judge's criticism of NT scholarship for reducing paraenesis to a formal type ("St. Paul and Classical Society," 33) suggests that this is the case, but his caution that NT scholars need to give more attention to the problems of definition and evidence of the diatribe has real merit. Criticisms by early reviewers of Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen*

for example—the lists of vices and virtues, the moral commonplaces, the hortatory style—are all found in Paul and other NT writings and have been studied intensively.[56] But the stress has been on the origin and literary form of these devices rather than on their function. It is the function especially that should occupy us if we are to have a better understanding of Christian communities. An example of the type of approach that may produce rich dividends is provided by the *Haustafeln*, the lists of duties of members of a household.[57]

| Such lists were widely used in moral instruction in antiquity. Order in the household, which was viewed as a microcosm of society, was supposed to guarantee order in society as a whole. Instruction on how to behave toward the gods, the state, married partners, and to children assumed a recognizable form. Such lists appear in Hellenistic Jewish and Christian writings, and their implications regarding the inner life of the Christian communities have begun to receive scholarly attention.[58] But the lists have not been discussed in relation to the emerging picture of the house church. In addition to information that they may provide about the structure of such churches and the relationship between their various members, they should also be examined for evidence of the community's 51

*Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (FRLANT 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910; repr., 1984), seem to have escaped most NT scholars. For a summary of these criticisms, see my comments in "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," 267–333, esp. 314–320. Judge believes that further work should map out the difference between the pagan and Christian diatribes: "The so-called diatribe, whether in its drastic Bionic form or in the more temperate work of Musonius and Epictetus, deals in commonplaces, delivered as a literary creation against stock targets. It lacks altogether the engagement with actual people, circumstances, and disputed ideas that is characteristic of Paul." Further investigation will have to determine whether such a generalization holds for the pagan diatribes. Evidence suggests that there is a correlation between the style of the diatribes and the social setting in which they were delivered. The addresses of Maximus of Tyre to aristocratic circles in Rome are different from those of Epictetus to his students in a classroom, which again differ from those of Dio Chrysostom to the masses. We shall have to take more seriously the possibility that the discernible differences in form and style of what are known as diatribes are related to their sociological functions. On the diatribal factors in Paul's letter to Rome as reflecting a concrete situation, see Karl P. Donfried, "False Presuppositions in the Study of Romans," *CBQ* 36 (1974): 332–355.

[56] See the bibliographies in Wolfgang Schrage, *Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese: Ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Ethik* (Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1961); Ehrhard Kamlah, *Die Form der katalogischen Paränese im Neuen Testament* (WUNT 7; Tübingen: Mohr, 1964); James E. Crouch, *The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafel* (FRLANT 109; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972).

[57] See Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," 304–313, and, for more detail, David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26: Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981).

[58] Crouch, *Origin and Intention.*

relationship with the larger society. Such possibilities demand that more attention be given to the function of the lists, particularly to their use by minority groups.

An immediate background to the NT use of the lists is provided by Hellenistic Judaism. Conversion to Judaism created tension between proselytes and their pagan associates and relatives. Philo, in encouraging Jews to give special consideration to proselytes, describes them as having turned their kinsfolk into mortal enemies by rejecting the myths so highly honored by their ancestors. The proselytes had left their country, their relatives, and their friends for the sake of virtue and religion. Recognizing the social disruption caused by their conversion, Philo urges that proselytes be made to feel at home in the divine society to which they had been called.[59] Their new allegiance and the sense of belonging provided by membership in an exclusive minority group did not go unnoticed by pagan observers who were scandalized by conversion to | Judaism. Of proselytes Tacitus the Roman historian says, "The earliest lesson they receive is to despise the gods, to disown their country, and to regard their parents, children, and brothers as of little account."[60] In other words, when describing what he believes to be the social irresponsibility of converts to Judaism, Tacitus uses the same categories that outline proper social behavior in the *Haustafeln*. One could expect that in response to such polemic an apology might be developed that would address itself to the charges or that might even use the *Haustafel* apologetically. The latter indeed appears to have been the case.

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Both Philo and Josephus use expansions of the *Haustafel* form to counter the charges that Judaism was antisocial and to present it as the ideal society.[61] Such an apologetic use of the *Haustafel* can also be detected in 1 Peter. The community to which that letter was written was undergoing persecutions of an unofficial and social rather than legal character. The addressees are described as being spoken against (2:12), reviled (3:9), troubled (3:14), abused (4:4), and reproached (4:14). With full awareness of the tension between the Christians and their society, the author, using a *Haustafel*, exhorts them at length to continue in the Christian life. Actually, the *Haustafel* by this time had become a *Gemeindetafel*, a community list, in Christian use.

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[59] Philo, *Spec*. 1.52 and 4.178.

[60] Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.5.

[61] Philo, *Hypoth.*, preserved in Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 8.6 and 7.355C–361B; Josephus, *C. Ap.* 2.190ff.

It has been argued that 1 Peter was written to Christians who had previously been God-fearers, and that Hellenistic Jewish writings dealing with proselytes contribute to the clarification of the letter.[62] The function of the *Haustafel* is illuminated | by that insight. It is introduced with the command, "Maintain good conduct among the Gentiles, so that in case they speak against you as wrongdoers, they may see your good deeds and glorify God on the day of visitation" (2:12). The good conduct is then specified in a list of responsibilities toward governmental authorities (2:13ff.), of slaves to their masters (2:18ff.), of wives to their husbands (3:1ff.), of husbands to their wives (3:7), and of all Christians to each other (3:8–9). The apologetic and missionary functions, which were not separate from each other in Hellenistic Judaism, are combined in the introduction and in the detailed advice to slaves (2:15) and wives (3:1–2). While Christians are "aliens and exiles" in this world (2:11) and form a brotherhood (2:17; 5:9), they are, nevertheless, a responsible part of society and represent a quality of life that is intelligible enough to outsiders to function as missionary witness and defense. When perceived in this manner, the *Haustafel* is no longer simply a piece of standard Hellenistic moral exhortation that is Christianized here and there, as it is frequently thought to be; but it becomes an important piece of evidence for how the internal life of a Christian community, which had its own unique character, was seen as relating to a society that was suspicious of it. 53

To return to Judge's provocative outline, he suggests that the issues between Paul and his Christian rivals involved academic belief rather than religious practice. But it is not at all clear that the two were viewed as separate, either by Paul or his opponents, or that the debate was conducted as though they were separate.[63] However, Judge's bringing the philosophical movements of Paul's day into the discussion of how the early Christians' contemporaries perceived them has real merit, as my investigation of 1 Thessalonians has attempted to | show.[64] To Greeks, Judaism, with its emphasis on monotheism and morals, must have appeared to be a school of philosophy,[65] and Philo himself described the synagogue activity as 54

[62] Willem C. van Unnik, *De Verlossing I Petrus 1:18–19 en het Probleem van den eersten Petrusbrief, Mededeelingen der Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeeling Letterkunde*, NS 5. 1 (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1942).

[63] See Malherbe, *Social Aspects*, 12 n. 28.

[64] Malherbe, *Social Aspects*, 22–28.

[65] George Foot Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (3 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927), 1:284; Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford:

a devotion to philosophy.[66] It is to be expected, therefore, that scholars would attempt to relate first-century Christianity to contemporary philosophical schools.[67] Such efforts would be worthwhile if care were exercised not to make generalizations on the basis of work done on the subject almost a century ago.

Judge is also correct in drawing attention to the importance of rhetorical practice. It was an issue between Paul and some of his churches, especially the one in Corinth, where his opponents laid hold of it to demonstrate the insufficiency of Paul's apostleship.[68] An awareness of the importance attached to it does tell us something of the educational, theological, and social values of at least some members of that church. An awareness of ancient rhetorical theory and practice also brings important insights into Paul and his writings. There was a tendency among the church fathers and in German | classical scholarship around the turn of the century to take Paul's statement that he was "unskilled in speaking" (2 Cor 11:6) at face value and to compare him unfavorably with ancient rhetoricians.[69] To Deissmann, such a comparison was inappropriate, for Paul did not write artistic prose. He argued that one should keep in mind the contrast between artless, nonliterary prose, like Paul's, and artistic prose, which

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Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 78; Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 29ff.

[66] Philo, *Somn* 2.127 and *Contempl.* 26. Cf. also Josephus's description of the Jewish sects in terms of philosophical schools, *B.J.* 2.162–166; Josephus, *A.J.* 13.171–173, and 18.11–17. One should beware of making a contrast between intellectual, namely, philosophical discussion and religion as activities in which other organized communities would engage. For the cults and the schools, see Martin P. Nilsson, *Die hellenistische Schule* (Munich: Beck, 1955). For the spiritual exercises of the philosophical schools, see Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954).

[67] See Olof Linton, *Das Problem der Urkirche in den neueren Forschung* (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1932), 31ff.

[68] On the importance of rhetoric in 1 Corinthians, see Johannes Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* (trans. Frank Clarke; London: SCM, 1959), esp. 148ff., and on Paul's opponents in 2 Corinthians, see the influential interpretation by Dieter Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief: Studien zur religiösen Propaganda in der Spätantike* (WMANT 11; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964).

[69] See Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, 2:492ff.; Paul Wendland, *Die urchristlichen Literaturformen* (HNT 1.3; Tübingen: Mohr, 1912), 353ff. Both, however, recognized the originality of Paul's style but believed that it did not measure up to the standards of artistic prose. Unfortunately, neither took up the invitation of J. Weiss to experts in ancient rhetoric to relate his analysis of some aspects of Paul's style to rhetorical practice. See Johannes Weiss, "Beiträge zur paulinischen Rhetorik," in *Theologische Studien: Festschrift Bernhard Weiss* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897), 165–247.

followed the canons of rhetorical theory.[70] Paul was a man of the people, and his letters show none of the artificiality of the sophists.

Until recently, Paul's rhetoric had not been the object of extensive study.[71] Judge himself has now studied contemporary professional practice in light of Paul's disavowal of rhetorical finesse and has concluded that Paul could not have been trained in it. Paul was a reluctant and unwelcomed competitor in the field of professional sophistry. The problem of defining Paul's rhetoric still remains, but Judge thinks that he can already draw sociological conclusions from the fact that Paul did practice the art: "Because it was learned only at the tertiary stage of education it formed a peculiarly conspicuous social dividing line between those who belonged to the leisured circles for whom such education was possible and those who could only afford the common literacy necessary to earning one's living. It | is important to grasp the importance of this boundary, for Paul, whose calling set him in close relations with those who were established above it, made it his peculiar boast (surely rhetorical) that he fell below it in both respects. He could not speak, and he had to work."[72] 56

One may not agree entirely with Judge. For example, it is not certain that rhetoric was learned only in the third educational stage. In the Greco-Roman period, training in rhetoric had been annexed to some degree by teachers in the secondary schools.[73] Furthermore, if Paul could have acquired the art without having been formally schooled in it, as Judge argues, then perhaps rhetorical facility did not form a conspicuous social dividing line.[74] To stress that it did negates the fact that only a minority

[70] Deissmann, [*Light*, 3–4, 69–70]. See also his review of Weiss's and Norden's works in *TRu* 5 (1902): 65–66, where he expresses his uneasiness even about speaking of a Pauline "rhetoric," which suggests to him something too studied to be applied to Paul.

[71] See Norbert Schneider, *Die rhetorische Eigenart der paulinischen Antithese* (HUT 11; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1970), for a renewed, but heavy, theological interest.

[72] Edwin A. Judge, "Paul's Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice," *ABR* 16 (1968): 44.

[73] See Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, 233ff. Note also that Martin P. Nilsson, *Die hellenistische Schule*, modifies Marrou's assignment of subject matter studied in the three stages of the educational process still further. Many of the inscriptions that Marrou believes refer to the third phase, after the age of eighteen, Nilsson considers to belong to secondary education, or to youths fifteen to eighteen years old.

[74] The evidence advanced by Glen W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 21–22, which shows that sophists generally did not come from the low or middle classes, does not apply to Paul. Bowersock deals with the second century, and with a class of sophists whose concerns and social roles were totally different from those of Paul.

in the churches may have belonged to that class. And whether tradesmen and artisans can rightly be called "leisured" is surely to be questioned.

We should also be careful not to presume, on the basis of Paul's rhetoric, the level of rhetorical sophistication of the churches to which he wrote. We should at least consider the possibility that Paul's rhetorical or literary ability distinguished him from most of his converts.[75] At most, 57 rhetorical ability or | interest in the practice may be taken as part of the cumulative evidence showing that the Pauline churches included some educated people. What is more significant than its indication of social level is what it tells us of the educational, theological, and social values of some members of the Corinthian church, who expressed those values in their high appreciation of the art of persuasion.

The literary character of Paul's letters forms one aspect of the question of his literary and rhetorical culture. As we have noted, Deissmann believed that the newly discovered papyrus letters represented the literary culture of the common people and contributed by far the most important parallels to Paul's letters. His insistence that Paul's letters are "real letters" rather than "epistles," which were literary productions, is very well known. Deissmann's definition met with immediate criticism, but his understanding of Paul's letters has, in general, become the accepted one.[76] It may not be fair to say that epistolographic research has been somewhat stagnant since Deissmann,[77] but his concentration on the papyri has influenced form critical studies of letters until recently.[78]

Deissmann found Franz Overbeck's opinion, that Paul's letters could not properly be classed as literature, stimulating. Overbeck justified his claim

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[75] Wendland, *Die urchristlichen Literaturformen*, 353, suggests that this was the case, and Werner Straub, *Die Bildersprache des Apostels Paulus* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1937), 11–12, claims to find evidence that the uneducated recipients of Paul's letters had difficulty in understanding them.

[76] Deissmann, *Light*, 146ff. See John C. Hurd, *The Origin of I Corinthians* (New York: Seabury, 1965), 3–4.

[77] See Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," 33 n. 75.

[78] See Beda Rigaux, *The Letters of St. Paul: Modern Studies* (ed. and trans. Stephen Yonick; Chicago: Franciscan Herald, 1968; repr., 2001), ch. 6. See also John L. White, *The Form and Function of the Body of the Greek Letter* (SBLDS 2; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1972); White, *The Form and Structure of the Official Petition: A Study in Greek Epistolography* (SBLDS 5; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1972), and Chan-Hie Kim, *Form and Structure of the Familiar Greek Letter of Recommendation* (SBLDS 4; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1972). For a broader survey, see William G. Doty, *Letters in Primitive Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973). Occasionally nonpapyrus materials were brought into the discussion, as in Carl J. Bjerkelund, *Parakalô* (BTN 1; Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967); but generally, interest has been focused on the papyrus letters.

by arguing that Paul's written words were nothing other than an artless and casual surrogate for what Paul would have said had he been present with his | readers.[79] Eduard Norden partially agreed with Overbeck but 58 cautioned that the letter had gradually become an accepted literary form. He then demonstrated that, when not measured by the standards of classical rhetoric, Paul appears as a stylist of some consequence.[80] Norden is surely correct, but what is needed is not simply further investigation into Paul's style in light of the rhetorical theory and practice of his time, but an examination of his letters in light of the epistolary theory and practice of his time. Ancient writers had an interest in what constituted the proper subject matter and style of a letter, and Paul's letters will be illuminated by their prescriptions for letter writing as well as by the letters of men who were familiar with the theory. It is ironic that Overbeck's description of Paul's letters is almost exactly the definition of a letter given by the handbooks on letter writing.[81]

## Further Work on Epistolography

Work done recently by members of the Society of Biblical Literature's Seminar on the Form and Function of the Pauline Letters has reflected a desire to take into consideration epistolographic materials excluded or neglected by Deissmann and most of his followers. Sensitivity to the classifications of letters provided by ancient handbooks on letter writing, and utilization of "literary" letters, especially those of Cicero and Seneca, as well as the work of ancient rhetorical theorists, have contributed to a different perspective on Paul's letters.[82]

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[79] Deissmann, *Light*, 147, on Franz Overbeck, "Über die Anfänge der patristischen Literatur," *HZ* 12 (1882): 417–472, esp. 429. The same view is still reflected by Wolfgang Wiefel, "Die Wandlung der Formen in der frühchristlichen Literatur als soziologisches Problem," in VI^e conférence internationale d'études classiques des pays socialistes (*Academia Scientarum Bulgarica. Acta Antiqua Philippopolitana. Studia Historica et Philologica*) (Sofia: Serdicae, 1963), 319ff.

[80] Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, 2:492ff.

[81] For example. Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.*, prologue (Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* [SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988], 30–31); and Ps.-Proclus, *Peri Epistolimaiou Characteros*, p. 27, line 10, in the Weichert edition.

[82] For example, Abraham J. Malherbe, "I Thessalonians as a Paraenetic Letter" (paper delivered at the 1972 SBL Seminar on the Form and Function of the Pauline Letters), incorporated in Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," 267–333; Nils A. Dahl, "Paul's Letter to the Galatians: Epistolary Genre, Content, and Structure" (paper delivered at the 1973 SBL Seminar); and the following papers discussed at the 1974 SBL Seminar:

59 | The primary importance of this approach to the study of Paul's letters is not the contribution that it makes to our understanding of the social level of Paul and his churches. What it does demonstrate is that a wider range of possibilities is open to us in our attempts to understand Paul more fully. However, it is likely that additional investigation of Paul's style of letter writing will modify further Deissmann's view of the social level represented by Paul's letters. It may be significant, for example, that letters were written as an exercise in style early in the tertiary stage of the educational system.[83] If Paul's letters can be shown to reflect the stylistic conventions associated with instruction on that level,[84] we would have one more piece of evidence that shows that Deissmann aimed too low.

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Robin Scroggs, "Paul as Rhetorician: Two Homilies in Romans 1–11"; Wilhelm Wuellner, "Digression in I Corinthians: The Rhetoric of Argumentation in Paul"; and Hans Dieter Betz, "The Literary Composition and Function of Paul's Letter to the Galatians," the latter published in *NTS* 21 (1975): 353–379. See also Betz's study of 2 Cor 10–13, *Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition* (BHT 45; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1972).

[83] See the introduction to Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 1–11.

[84] Betz's studies (n. 82 above) presuppose a level of knowledge at least as high as that gained in the tertiary stage. Note also the references by Hans Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), 75, 82, 84, 211, 221, 230, 414, to the correspondences with instructions in the handbooks; he does not, however, discuss them in any depth.

CHAPTER SEVEN

# ΜΗ ΓΕΝΟΙΤΟ IN THE DIATRIBE AND PAUL*

Rudolf Bultmann's dissertation is still the best general description of diatribal style and remains the authority on the subject for most NT scholars.[1] Bultmann draws attention to the dialogical element in the diatribe in which a speaker or writer makes use of an imaginary interlocutor who asks questions or raises objections to the arguments or affirmations that are made.[2] These responses are frequently stupid and are then summarily rejected by the speaker or writer in a number of ways, for example by οὐδαμῶς ("by no means"),[3] οὐ πάντως ("not at all"),[4] οὐ μὰ Δία ("indeed not"),[5] or *minime* ("by no means").[6] The limited purpose of this paper is to examine the way in which μὴ γένοιτο ("by no means") is widely used in the diatribal literature, usually thought to be represented in Greek by the *Dissertations* of Epictetus, certain *Moralia* of Plutarch, various works of Philo, and by Bion, Teles, Musonius, Dio Chrysostom, Lucian, and Maximus of Tyre.[7] In fact, however, this particular rejection, as it appears as a response | in a dialogue without being part of a larger sentence, is unique to Epictetus and Paul.[8] 232

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* Originally published in *HTR* 73 (1980): 231–240; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 25–33.

[1] Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (FRLANT 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910; repr., 1984).

[2] For a more extensive treatment, see Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981).

[3] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 23.6; 26.6; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.6.13; 11.17, 22. The edition of Epictetus used is that of Heinrich Schenkl, *Epictetus: Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae* (*Editio maior*; Leipzig: Teubner, 1916). The translations are indebted to William A. Oldfather, *Epictetus: The Discourses as Reported by Arrian* (2 vols.; LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925).

[4] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.8.2.

[5] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 14.14; Maximus of Tyre 6.1d.

[6] Seneca, *Epp.* 36.4; 60.3.

[7] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 12 n. 1, 33 n. 4. See Stowers, *Diatribe*, 48–78, for a discussion of the sources for the diatribe.

[8] In Epictetus, it is used in this manner in *Diatr.* 1.1.13; 2.35; 5.10; 8.15; 9.32; 10.7; 11.23; 12.10; 19.7; 26.6; 28.19, 24; 29.9; 2.8.2, 26; 23.23; 3.1.42, 44; 7.4; 23.13, 25; 4.7.26; 8.26; 11.33, 36. In Paul it appears in Rom 3:4, 6, 31; 6:2, 15; 7:7, 13; 9:14; 11:1, 11; 1 Cor 6:15; Gal 2:17; 3:21. Galatians 6:14 and Luke 20:16 are not diatribal and will be left out of consideration. It does not appear in the representatives of the diatribe listed above.

Bultmann's interpretation of the diatribe is heavily dependent on Epictetus despite the latter's peculiar development of the style, and the generalization about the use of μὴ γένοιτο in the diatribe is made on the basis of Epictetus.[9] Bultmann is, furthermore, not as clear on the form of the rejection as one might wish.[10] There may therefore be merit in subjecting the way in which μὴ γένοιτο is used by Epictetus and Paul to closer examination, especially since Bultmann draws conclusions about Paul's manner of argumentation from Paul's rejection of his interlocutor's objections. Attention will be given to the context in which the rejection is used, with special interest in the position of μὴ γένοιτο in the argument, the introduction of the interlocutor's objection, the objection itself, the statement that follows μὴ γένοιτο, and the latter's relation to the succeeding argument.

## Μὴ Γένοιτο in Context

As to its position, μὴ γένοιτο in Epictetus frequently stands at the beginning of a new section of an argument (e.g., 1.10.7; 29.9), but much more frequently than in Paul does it appear at the end of either a section of an argument or an entire diatribe to strengthen the argument or a particular affirmation (e.g., 1.1.13; 2.35; 5.10; 8.15; 3.1.44). In Paul it generally begins a new stage in an argument (Rom 3:4, 6; 6:2, 15; 7:7, 13; 11:1, 11; 1 Cor 6:15), although it does appear once (Rom 3:31) at the end to strengthen an affirmation. For Paul it has primarily become a device by which he emphatically denies false conclusions that could be (or were?) drawn from his theology, the correction of which he then proceeds to set forth.

## The Introduction to the Objection

In a general description of the interlocutor in the pagan diatribe, Bultmann states that the words of the imaginary opponent as a rule are introduced by such short formulas as φησί ("he says") and ἀλλ' ἐροῦσιν ("but they will say"), although in lively | discourse there may be no introduction at all.[11] He points out that Paul also introduces objections with such statements as

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[9] Wilhelm Capelle (*Epiktet, Teles und Musonius* [BAW; Zurich: Artemis, 1948], 67–68) and Stowers, *Diatribe*, 53–58, 100–110, discuss Epictetus's peculiar form of the diatribe.
[10] See Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 11, on the pagan diatribe; 66–68, on Paul.
[11] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 10.

ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις ("but someone will say," 1 Cor 15:35), ἐρεῖς οὖν ("you will then say," Rom 9:19; 11:19), and the characteristic φησί (2 Cor 10:10), which show that Paul knew the diatribal mode of expression.[12] Mostly, however, the objection is interjected as a question without any introductory formula. Bultmann goes on to claim that Paul did not completely take over the dialogical mode. The fiction of the interlocutor does not have for him the same force it had for the Greeks; he therefore frequently does not formulate the objection in the direct words of the opponent, but in his own words, albeit in the sense of the opponent. For that, the renderings τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ("What then shall we say?") and ἀλλὰ λέγω ("but I say") are characteristic, a fact which shows that Paul utilizes the diatribe to develop and present his thought in the form of statement and counterstatement.

Bultmann's definition of the quotation formulas as introductory formulas is too narrow and does not allow for a more comprehensive comparison. The characteristic, short questions, which mark transitions in the argument and draw attention to what has been said, function as introductions to the objections raised by the interlocutor, and should be included in a comparison of Epictetus and Paul.[13]

In Epictetus the false conclusions rejected by μὴ γένοιτο are mostly introduced by the interjection τί οὖν; ("What then?" e.g., 1.2.35; 8.14; 12.10; 2.23.23; 3.1.44), and the independent questions ἐπεὶ τί δοκεῖς; ("Otherwise, what do you think?" 1.26.6), τί δοκεῖτε; ("What do you think?" 2.8.26; 4.8.26), and τί αὐτῷ λέγει; ("What does he say to him?" 3.1.42). Very frequently there is no introduction to the false conclusion (e.g., 1.5.10; 11.23); on other occasions οὖν ("therefore," e.g., 1.9.32; 19.7; 2.8.2) and τί ἐροῦμεν; ("What shall we say?" 3.7.2) are part of the sentences containing the objections.

Like Epictetus, Paul uses τί οὖν, but does so only once (Rom 6:15). Τί ἐροῦμεν; (Rom 3:5) and τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ("What then shall we say?" Rom 6:1; 7:7; 9:14) are not part of the objections themselves, while οὖν (Rom 3:31; 7:13; 1 Cor 6:15; Gal 3:21), | λέγω οὖν; ("Am I saying, then," Rom 11:1, 11) and ἆρα ("then," Gal 2:17) are part of the objections. Τί γάρ ("What, then?") is used once (Rom 3:3). 234

Bultmann's statements should thus be modified, at least with respect to the places where the objections call forth μὴ γένοιτο. There Epictetus does not introduce the interlocutor's words with a quotation formula but, like

[12] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 12. Φησί in 2 Cor 10:10 is not diatribal; it introduces an assessment of Paul by real opponents.

[13] See Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 13–14, on transitions.

Paul, uses other formulas that set up the objections. It is not obvious that in these cases the interlocutor in Epictetus has more force than it does in Paul and, as his use of τί ἐροῦμεν (3.7.2) indicates, he too can formulate the objection in his own words. Paul is very much like Epictetus, with the exception that he always has an introduction to the false conclusions. His introductions always contain causal particles or have causal force, thus connecting the false conclusion to what precedes. The impression thus gained, that Paul more securely fits the false conclusion into his argument, is only partly offset by the fact that when there are no introductions in Epictetus, the dialogical element is more pronounced than it is in Paul, and that it is designed to move the argument forward, whether it in fact succeeds in doing so or not.

## The Objection

Bultmann points out that in the pagan diatribe the objection is frequently simply a rhetorical form the speaker uses to give greater clarity and emphasis to his thought.[14] On such occasions the objection may not be worth discussing but may be the absurd consequence the hearer draws from the speaker's words. In such cases the objection is introduced by τί οὖν; and slapped down by μὴ γένοιτο. According to Bultmann, it is this diatribal use of the objection that is found in Paul.[15] The objections do not represent possible alternative views for Paul, but are absurdities. Sometimes objections expressing real opposing viewpoints do appear (e.g., Rom 11:19; 1 Cor 10:19?; 15:35), but almost always the imaginary opponent draws false consequences from Paul's viewpoint and, as in the diatribe, his objection is then forcefully rejected with μὴ γένοιτο.

With respect to those objections that are followed by μὴ γένοιτο, Bultmann is in general correct. However, while it is true that Paul in only two (Rom 3:3; Gal 3:21) of the thirteen passages | under review formulates the objection in the words of the opponent, the difference from Epictetus should not be overstated. The majority of the objections in Epictetus do, formally at least, represent the opponent's view, but, in addition to 3.7.2, he elsewhere presents the objection in the first person, e.g., 1.10.7, τί οὖν; ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι ἄπρακτόν ἐστι τὸ ζῷον; μὴ γένοιτο ("What then? Am I

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[14] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 10–11.
[15] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 67–68.

saying that he is an idle being? By no means!" Cf. 1.5.10). Furthermore, the objections in Epictetus and Paul are always in the form of rhetorical questions, which already points to their absurdity in both writers.

## Statements Following Μὴ Γένοιτο

Bultmann demonstrates that in the pagan diatribe the rejection of the objection could take place in different ways.[16] Frequently the retort is in the form of a counter-question. A calmer exposition could also follow, as it especially does in Seneca, Dio Chrysostom, and Plutarch, but frequently the lively tone continues and the opponent is overwhelmed by a series of questions or exclamations. The opponent may also ask further questions, so that a regular dialogue ensues. Bultmann notes that Paul seldom answers objections with counter-questions (Rom 9:19–24) and that only Rom 3:1ff. and 4:2 show the beginning of a dialogue.[17] Usually he slaps down the objection with μὴ γένοιτο, and then he shows the objector his error either in a coherent statement and establishes his own viewpoint (Rom 6:1ff.; 7:7, 13; 9:14; 1 Cor 15:35) or with a series of rhetorical questions or other rhetorical devices (Rom 9:19ff.; 1 Cor 10:19ff.; 2 Cor 12:16ff.).

The short suppression of the opposing viewpoint clearly shows for Bultmann what is characteristic of Paul's way of thinking. In the diatribe false consequences are also rejected with μὴ γένοιτο, but its predominance in Paul shows that here one has to do with something different. Paul reaches his propositions not by intellectual means but through experience and intuition. Thus in defending them he is not so much concerned to confirm them by intellectual considerations as he is to express the paradox of his propositions sharply and to guard against false ethical deductions. Nevertheless, he does use the form of the diatribe, and it is significant that most of the examples come from Romans and that all appear in didactic contexts. Bultmann sees, then, on the one | hand, far- 236 reaching formal agreements that to a considerable degree also include an agreement in movement of thought and, on the other hand, a distinction between the thought of Paul and the Greek preacher.

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[16] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 11.
[17] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 67–68.

### Introductions

Insufficient attention has been given to Bultmann's observation that a coherent statement follows μὴ γένοιτο in Paul, and more can be said about the form in which such statements occur. In all the places in Paul the rejection is supported by what immediately follows μὴ γένοιτο. These supporting statements are affirmations introduced by ἀλλά ("but," Rom 3:31; 7:7, 13; 11:11) and γάρ ("for," Rom 9:15; 11:1–3; Gal 2:18; 3:21) and by constructions characteristic of the diatribe: an imperative introduced by δέ (Rom 3:4), rhetorical questions introduced by πῶς ("how," Rom 3:6–7; 6:2–3), and οὐκ οἴδατε ("do you not know?" Rom 6:16; 1 Cor 6:16).[18] The supporting statements themselves contain quotations from or allusions to Scripture (Rom 3:4; 7:7; 9:15; 11:11; 1 Cor 6:16),[19] self-evident answers (Rom 3:6; 6:2, 16; Gal 2:18; 3:21), or contrary assertions (Rom 3:31; 7:13). On one occasion Paul refers to his own case in substantiation of his rejection, but then goes on to quote Scripture (Rom 11:1–2).

### Theme

With the exception of Rom 3:31, which ends a section of an argument, and perhaps Gal 2:18, it is characteristic of Paul that the support of μὴ γένοιτο thus introduced provides the theme of the discussion that follows. This can be demonstrated by simply noting the important terms in the supporting statements and the occurrence of the same terms and/or their cognates in the succeeding sentences: Rom 3:4, δικαιόω ("justify") and ἀδικία ("unrighteousness") and δικαιοσύνη ("righteousness") in v. 5; Rom 3:6, κρίνω ("judge"), and κρίνομαι ("I am judged," v. 7) and κρίμα ("judgment," v. 8); Rom 6:2, ἀποθνῄσκω ("die"), and θάνατος ("death") and ἀποθνῄσκω in vv. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10; Rom 6:16, δοῦλοι ("slaves") and ὑπακοή ("obedience"), and in vv. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22; Rom 7:7, διὰ νόμου ("through the law"), and διὰ ἐντολῆς ("through the 237 commandment") in vv. 8 and 11; Rom 7:13, | κατεργάζομαι ("work"), and in vv. 15, 17, 18, 20; Rom 9:15, ἐλεέω ("have mercy"), and in vv. 16 and 18; Rom 11:1; μὴ ἀπώσατο ("did not reject") and οὐκ ἀπώσατο ("did not reject") in v. 2 and the corresponding ὑπελείφθην ("am left") in v. 3; κατέλιπον ("have

[18] For imperatives, see Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 32–33; for πῶς, Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.77; 24.58; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 55.3; for οὐκ οἴδατε, Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 13.

[19] The 27th edition of Nestle-Aland, *Novum Testamentum Graece*, does not mark παραζηλῶσαι in Rom 11:11 as an allusion to Deut 32:21 as previous editions did, but the quotation of the OT passage in Rom 10:19 would argue that it should be so understood.

left," RSV: "have kept") in v. 4, and λεῖμμα ("remnant") in v. 5; Rom 11:11, παραζηλῶσαι ("make jealous"), also in v. 14; 1 Cor 6:16, ὁ κολλώμενος ("he who joins"), also in v. 18; Gal 3:22, συγκλείω ("consign"), also in v. 23 (RSV: "kept under restraint"). The suppression of the opposing viewpoint is thus not quite as short or abrupt as one might be led to believe by Bultmann, and we should do well to stress his observation that a coherent statement follows μὴ γένοιτο in Paul.

Bultmann's brief description of the diatribal use of μὴ γένοιτο leaves the impression that the exclamation marks the end of the matter under discussion.[20] A closer examination of Epictetus will clarify the matter and enable us to judge the correctness of the distinction Bultmann draws between Paul and "the Greek preacher."

Unlike Paul, Epictetus does not always provide some substantiation for his rejection of the objection raised. This is especially the case when the form of the dialogue is strictly adhered to (e.g., 1.1.13; 26.6; 2.8.2; 23.23). But when he does support his rejections, he is quite like Paul. The supporting statements are affirmations introduced by ἀλλά (1.28.24; 3.1.42, 44; 4.8.26–27) and γάρ (1.8.15; 12.10; cf. 4.8.26) but are also questions similarly introduced (ἀλλά, 1.10.7; γάρ, 2.8.26). He also uses the challenging questions and imperatives characteristic of the diatribe (1.29.9–10).[21] He is further similar to Paul in that his supporting statements may contain quotations of texts thought to have probative value (e.g., Homer *Il.* 1.526 in 2.8.26) or be answers that are self-evidently true (e.g., 1.29.9) or be straightforward contrary assertions (e.g., 1.9.32). He also refers to himself to support his argument (1.2.36), and on one occasion, having done so, goes on to quote Plato *Apol.* 17C as further confirmation (3.23.25).

Epictetus's support of his rejection may also provide the theme of the discussion that follows, but in this he is nowhere as | consistent as Paul. 238 One example of each type of supporting statement will illustrate his procedure in this regard.

In one instance, 2.8.26–7, Epictetus quotes *Iliad* 1.526 to substantiate his rejection. In the discussion that precedes, the question considered is whether the philosopher should affect a proud look (ὀφρῦς). The objection is then raised:

[20] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 11 n. 4, 33.
[21] Margarethe Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Vom Kynismus* (PhAnt 34; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 94.

> What do you think? (τί δοκεῖτε;) A proud look?
> By no means (μὴ γένοιτο)! For (γάρ) the Zeus at Olympia does not affect a proud look, does he? On the contrary (ἀλλά), his look is steady, as befits one who is about to say,
> No word of mine can be revoked or prove untrue (*Il.* 1.526).
> I will show you that I am of such character—faithful, reverent, noble, unperturbed.

Zeus provides the model for Epictetus, and to that extent the quotation determines the theme for what follows, the god-like demeanor of the philosopher.

Epictetus also advances what is self-evident to him to support his rejection of an objection. In 1.29.1–8, in discussing the Stoic's steadfastness, he claims that the Stoic should have no fear in the face of threat. Then, in 9–11 he records an objection:

> Do you philosophers, then (οὖν), teach us to despise kings?
> By no means (μὴ γένοιτο)! Which one of us teaches you to dispute their claim (ἀντιποιεῖσθαι) to the things over which they have authority (ἐξουσίαν)? Take my paltry body, take my property, take my reputation, take those who are about me. If I persuade any to lay claim (ἀντιποιεῖσθαι) to these things, let some man truly accuse me.
> Yes, but I wish to control your judgments also.
> And who has given you this authority (ἐξουσίαν)?

The rhetorical question following the rejection denies that Stoics dispute the claim of kings to those things over which they have authority. Laying claim (ἀντιποιεῖσθαι) and authority (ἐξουσία) constitute the theme of what follows. The sentence consisting of imperatives and the one following are self-evident to the Stoic and are Epictetus's support for his denial.

In 1.2 Epictetus refers to his own case to strengthen his rejection of an objection. The subject of the diatribe is the question of how the philosopher may preserve his own character. Toward the end of the diatribe reference is made to the greatness of | Socrates.[22] But, it is pointed out, not all men share his gifts. In 35–36 an objection is introduced and then rejected:

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> What then? (τί οὖν;) Since (ἐπειδή) I am without natural talent, shall I for that reason stop being diligent?
> By no means (μὴ γένοιτο)! Epictetus will not be superior to Socrates; but if only I am not worse, that is enough for me.

[22] See Klaus Döring (*Exemplum Socratis* [HermesE 42; Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979], 43–79) for Epictetus's use of Socrates as a model, and in the present connection, cf. *Diatr.* 3.23.25–26.

In the few lines that continue to the end of the diatribe the theme of realizing one's potential is continued.

## Conclusion

Some conclusions can now be drawn. Paul's use of μὴ γένοιτο does not have a counterpart in the pagan diatribe in general but does in Epictetus. It may therefore be the case that this way of rejecting an objection or false conclusion is more characteristic of the type of schoolroom instruction in which Epictetus engaged than street corner preaching.[23] Furthermore, this exclamation is part of a larger form that is found frequently in Epictetus and always in Paul. It would therefore appear that Paul had taken one way in which μὴ γένοιτο was put to use and used it exclusively in his argumentation. The larger form of which it is part does not mark the termination of an argument, but rather a transition. It performs this function more consistently in Paul than in Epictetus. With one exception it always appears in Paul at the beginning of an argument; in Epictetus it does so only sometimes. In Paul it is always made clear grammatically that the objection is a false conclusion to what he has said; Epictetus does so only on occasion. Paul and Epictetus both state the objection as a rhetorical question to show it to be absurd. Paul always provides a reason for his rejection of the false conclusion; Epictetus does so only sometimes. With one exception, the reason Paul advances introduces the theme for the argument that immediately follows; in Epictetus it does so only on occasion. The formal and functional agreements between Paul and Epictetus are thus more far-reaching than Bultmann demonstrated. Indeed, one may question, at least so far as the places where μὴ γένοιτο is used, whether the distinction he | maintains between "the Greek preacher" and Paul is valid. 240
It would not appear that there Paul felt less need to confirm his propositions intellectually than Epictetus did or that he was more indebted to experience and intuition than the teacher of Nicopolis.

[23] Stowers (*Diatribe*, esp. 75–78) argues for the schoolroom as the social setting of Epictetus's and other moral philosophers' diatribes.

CHAPTER EIGHT

# MEDICAL IMAGERY IN THE PASTORAL EPISTLES*

The author of the Pastoral Epistles made frequent use of the language of health and disease in polemic leveled at false teachers and their followers. The expressions "sound (healthy) teaching" (1 Tim 1:10; 2 Tim 4:3; Titus 1:9; 2:1), "sound words" (1 Tim 6:3; 2 Tim 1:13; Titus 2:8), and being "sound in the faith" (Titus 1:13; 2:2) appear in the New Testament only in the Pastorals and represent a major theme of the letters, viz., that orthodox teaching alone issues in a moral life. The entire complex of medical terminology in the letters, however, has not received extensive treatment. Commentators have occasionally discussed "sound teaching" et al. in brief excursuses, but they have not placed the use of these terms firmly in either their suspected philosophical context or in the argument of the letters themselves.

## Earlier Interpretations

The use of "sound teaching" et al. in the Pastorals presented further evidence to Martin Dibelius that Paul was not their author.[1] The singular use of these terms in the Pastorals, he insisted, could not be explained either as a new designation for the gospel by Paul in his old age or as new terms coined to fight the heresy at hand. The use of the term was as old as Homer and common in the philosophical literature of the author's time. But this terminology should be understood in the contemporary philosophical sense in which it designated rational speech and not in the original poetic sense according to which it would describe the power of the gospel to bring healing and life. While rationality was not a basic part of the structure of Paul's thinking, Dibelius detected "some shifts toward rationalism" in the Pastoral Epistles. The gospel, an established part of the church's teaching, is a rational criterion which can be applied.

* Originally published in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 121–136.

[1] Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 29–30.

Subsequent discussion has generally addressed the issues as identified by Dibelius. Some support has emerged for his claim that the terms were derived from the philosophers referring to the teaching of a rational moral life, but not to teaching whose goal is the health of the soul.[2]

20 | Wilhelm Michaelis, however, rejected Dibelius's position and insisted that the terms should not be understood in a philosophical sense but in the context of a polemic against heresy.[3] On this reading, the teaching is described as sound, not because it is rational or makes the readers or hearers spiritually healthy, but because it is free from the disease of heresy. Such usage was not intended in a philosophical sense.

A mediating position was presented by Ulrich Luck, who with Dibelius insisted that the terminology could be understood only against the Greek Hellenistic background, but for him that background is not specifically philosophical but represents the "average understanding." We thus have to do, not with a philosophical rationalism, but with "the logical relating of faith and teaching to rational existence in the world." Traditional teaching, in contrast to perverted doctrine, is concerned with "rational and proper life in the world, which as creation is characterized by order and reason."[4] It does not refer to teaching which seeks to make its hearers whole.

The way non-Christian material has been utilized to illuminate the use of the terminology in the Pastorals is unsatisfactory. Dibelius did little more than list some parallels, and Luck did not clearly relate his discussion of the Pastorals to what he considered to be their background. Michaelis and Jeremias did not treat the pagan material at all. Ceslas Spicq, while citing many parallels indicating that the terminology was not unusual in antiquity, did not present a unified picture that helps in understanding the language.[5] And Robert J. Karris, although he assiduously gathered parallels from ancient philosophers to support his thesis that the anti-heretical polemic of the Pastorals was indebted to the

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[2] E.g., Burton S. Easton, *The Pastoral Epistles* (New York: Scribner's, 1947), 234; J.N.D. Kelly, *A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (HNTC; New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 50.

[3] Wilhelm Michaelis, *Pastoralbriefe und Gefangenschaftsbriefe: Zur Echtheitsfrage der Pastoralbriefe* (NTF, Erste Reihe 6; Gütersloh; "Der Rufer" Evangelischer Verlag, 1930), 79–85. Norbert Brox, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (4th ed; RNT 7.2; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1969), 39–40, 107–108, mentions neither Dibelius nor Michaelis in this context, but represents the latter's view, as does Joachim Jeremias, *Die Briefe an Timotheus und Titus* (11th ed.; NTD 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 14–15.

[4] Ulrich Luck, "ὑγιής, ὑγιαίνω," *TDNT* 8 (1972): 312.

[5] Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épitres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 115–117.

philosophers' attacks on sophists, studiously avoided dealing with the terms describing health and disease.[6]

In order to make any advance in understanding the function of these terms in the Pastorals, all the terms describing health and disease will be considered. Inquiry will be made into the conceptual framework of the Pastorals in which the terminology may fit, and then, in light of these findings, non-Christian material will be investigated for any contribution it may make to understanding the Pastorals' imagery. It is methodologically proper to begin with the assumption that the Pastorals were addressing either an actual situation or one that would be readily recognizable to their readers. Since the language of health and disease was used in the polemic against false teachers, it is reasonable to assume that a particular type of opponent was in view and that it may be possible to sketch | a picture of the author's perception of this type. 21

## The Polemic of the Pastorals

In using the terminology of health and disease, the author of the Pastorals revealed an understanding of the nature of the church's teaching and also characterized those who opposed it or did not hold to it. On the positive side, the sound words are thought to form a pattern and to have been received from Paul (2 Tim 1:13). Such sound teaching cannot be censured (Titus 2:7). Instruction is given in it, and those who oppose it are reproved so that they might be sound in the faith (Titus 1:9, 13; cf. 2:2). It is not said that sound teaching makes its recipient sound; at most that is an inference that may be drawn from these latter statements.

### *The Heretics*

The author was much more explicit in using the terminology polemically to describe the heretics. In using the language of health and disease, the intention was not so much to describe the content of the heretics' teaching as their demeanor and its causes and results. The details about the heretics given in passages containing medical terminology are echoed and sometimes amplified in other polemical passages in the letters which

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[6] Robert J. Karris, "The Function and Sitz im Leben of the Paraenetic Elements in the Pastoral Epistles" (Th.D. diss., Harvard Divinity School, 1971) and a summary of the first part of the dissertation published as "The Background and Significance of the Polemic of the Pastoral Epistles," *JBL* 92 (1973): 549–564.

do not employ such terminology. These details are, therefore, not isolated bits of polemic, but form, in the author's perception, major features of the character as well as preaching method of those opposed. In its salient points, the exhortation of the author, frequently in explicitly antithetic form, urges the readers to the exact opposite mien and method, making it clear that the author was operating with a distinct type of person in mind who was to be shunned. The characterization of that type is vivid and polemical.

To begin with, the person who does not adhere to the sound teachings knows nothing (1 Tim 6:4). This theme of obtuseness runs throughout the letters. The heretics' mind and conscience are defiled (Titus 1:15), their conscience is seared or cauterized (1 Tim 4:2), they fall into many senseless lusts (1 Tim 6:9), their controversies are stupid and uninstructed (2 Tim 2:23; Titus 3:9). Those who listen to them and whom they capture are silly little women who are forever trying to learn but never come to a knowledge of the truth (2 Tim 3:7). In contrast to the heretics, the orthodox do have knowledge and understanding (1 Tim 1:7–8; 4:3). By applying their minds to what is written by the Apostle, they will receive understanding from the Lord (2 Tim 2:7; cf. 1 Tim 3:15). In other words, their knowledge is derived from tradition and Scripture (2 Tim 3:14ff.; cf. 2:2; Titus 1:9), and as the grace of God had appeared to instruct them (Titus 2:11–12), so the servant of God instructs his opponents with gentleness (2 Tim 2:25).

The intellectual condition of the heretics is so wretched that, in contrast to the soundness of orthodox teachings, it can be said that | 22 they are diseased (1 Tim 6:4).[7] Their minds are corrupt (διεφθαρμένων ... τὸν νοῦν, 1 Tim 6:5; cf. 2 Tim 3:8) and defiled (Titus 1:15), and the teaching they produce will eat its way in their hearers like gangrene (2 Tim 2:17). Their diseased condition is exhibited in their demeanor, in their preoccupation with controversies, verbal battles, and wranglings (1 Tim 6:4–5), which are unprofitable and useless (2 Tim 2: 14; Titus 3:9). Their harsh, bellicose, and

[7] Τετύφωται, μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, ἀλλὰ νοσῶν. The combination of τυφόω with words describing the cognitive element in man is common in the literature. Cf. Lucian, *Nigr.* 1, ἀνοήτός τε καὶ τετυφωμένος; Polybius 3.81.1, ἀγνοεῖ καὶ τετύφωται. Epictetus was aware that one's great power of argumentation and persuasive reasoning may be an excuse for τῦφος (*Diatr.* 1.8.6–7) and it is understandable why, as Julian (*Or.* 6.197D) says, true philosophers were called τετυφωμένοι. The word could also mean to be mentally ill, demented. See Demosthenes, *Or.* 9.20, where it is contrasted with being in one's right senses (ὑγιαίνειν). Plutarch (*Virt. prof.* 81F) cautions the young man that as he lays firmer hold on reason he will lay aside τῦφος, and he then goes on to expand a medical metaphor. In this light, it is quite likely that τετύφωται in 1 Tim 6:4 is intended to describe mental illness, and that μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος, ἀλλὰ νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεις is a further specification of the condition. Cf. Theophylact (PG 125:77), who, in commenting on the passage, thought that ignorance causes delusion, which he interpreted as a tumor of a diseased soul.

misanthropic bearing is reflected in other descriptions of them in the letters, especially by the antisocial vices listed in 2 Tim 3:2–4; they are proud, arrogant, abusive (cf. 1 Tim 6:4), disobedient to their parents (cf. Titus 1:16), ungrateful, inhuman, slanderers, fierce, haters of good, treacherous, reckless, swollen with conceit. Furthermore, they are insubordinate (Titus 1:10), given to strife (1 Tim 6:4; Titus 3:9), and factious (Titus 3:10).

### *The Orthodox*

The contrasting qualities and actions that should characterize the readers, given in the form of exhortations and in lists of qualifications of various functionaries, frequently in antithetic form, serve to further delineate the heretical type who is to be avoided. The readers should avoid useless verbal battles (2 Tim 2:14; Titus 3:2, 9; cf. 1 Tim 3:3, 23–24) and stupid and uninstructed controversies,[8] and should not be swollen with conceit (1 Tim 3:6), or be arrogant (1 Tim 6:17), quick-tempered, or violent (1 Tim 2:8; 3:3, Titus 1:7). They are to abuse and slander no one (1 Tim 3:11; Titus 2:3; 3:2), but are to be gentle to all (2 Tim 2:24; cf. 1 Tim 3:3; 6:11; Titus 3:2), especially in their instruction (2 Tim 2:25; Titus 3:2), showing all patience (2 Tim 4:2).

The terms describing the preaching and pastoral care of the orthodox distinguish them from their opponents: they are to preach (2 Tim 4:2) and speak what befits sound doctrine (Titus 2:1; cf. 15) and are to charge (1 Tim 1:3; 4:11; 5:7; 6:17), instruct (1 Tim 4:6, 11, 16; Titus 3:14; cf. 1 Tim 3:3, Titus 1:9), correct (Titus 1:5), and remind (2 Tim 2:14) others. They should be careful in chastising those within the community (1 Tim 5:1; cf. 19, 22), and should rather exhort (1 Tim 5:1; 6:2; 2 Tim 4:2; Titus 1:9; 2:6) and honor (1 Tim 5:3, 17) them. Only seldom are they commanded to engage in censure (2 Tim 4:20) and severe rebuke, harsh treatments reserved primarily for those who persist in sin (1 Tim 5:20; cf. 2 Tim 4:2; Titus 2:15) and for the heretics (Titus 1:9, 13) who must be silenced (Titus 1:11). The evangelists are to present themselves as examples in their speech and conduct, in love, faith, and purity (1 Tim 4:12), which requires that they constantly give attention to their own progress in the Christian virtues (e.g., 1 Tim 4:12–16; 5:22; 6:11–14; 2 Tim 2:1–8, 22; 3:10, 14; 4:5, 15).

All Christians should strive to live quiet and peaceable lives, godly | and respectful in every way (1 Tim 2:2). This demeanor is the exact opposite to that which characterized them once, when they themselves were foolish, 23

[8] For the theme of avoiding the heretics, see further 1 Tim 4:7; 6:11; 2 Tim 2:16.

disobedient, passing their days in malice and envy, hated by men and hating one another. All that was changed when the goodness and loving kindness of God the Savior appeared (Titus 3:3–4).

*Antisocial Behavior*

In addition to the diseased condition that they create in their hearers, the heretics through their harsh verbal battles produce the antisocial vices of envy, strife, slander, and base suspicions, which are summarized as the frictional wranglings of people corrupt in mind (1 Tim 6:4–5).[9] They subvert entire households (Titus 1:11; cf. 2 Tim 3:6). But all vice is contrary to sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:10).[10] They have in mind not the good of the people they preach to, but their own gain (1 Tim 6:5–10; cf. Titus 1:11). In contrast, the sound teaching has the life of the orthodox as an ordered community in view. The social responsibilities in which that community is instructed are tantamount to the sound teaching (1 Tim 6:1–3; Titus 2:1–10), and the behavior inculcated further has in view the approval of the Christian community by the larger society (Titus 2:5, 8, 10; cf. 1 Tim 3:7). High value is placed on the home and the instruction that goes on in it (e.g., 1 Tim 2:15; 3:4–5, 12; 4:3; 5:1–4, 14–16; 2 Tim 1:5, Titus 1:6), and when the church's leaders are to confront the heretics, it is to stop them from upsetting households (Titus 1 :9ff ). The teaching of the orthodox always has in mind the benefit of their hearers, never their own profit (e.g., 2 Tim 2:24–26; 1 Tim 1:20–21).

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[9] Διαπαρατριβαί ("frictional wranglings") clearly describes friction. See Polybius 2.36.5, ἐν ὑποψίαις ἦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ παρατριβαῖς, and cf. Athenaeus 14.626E and other references in LSJ, s.v. παρατριβή. Chrysostom (PG 62:392) proposes an alternative explanation: The heretics are like scab-covered sheep which infect the healthy sheep when they rub against them. He thus seems to think that παρατριβή is in some way related to παράτριμμα, which is used by medical writers of [infected?] abrasions. See LSJ, s.v. παράτριμμα for references. In view of the other medical terminology in the passage, the fact that διαφθείρω ("corrupt") is also used in a medical sense (see LSJ, s.v. διαφθείρω, φθείρω, and see below for the use by Dio Chrysostom and Ps.-Diogenes), and the analogous view in 2 Tim 2:17, the interpretation is not improbable, despite the caution of Dibelius-Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 82 n. 3.

[10] The unique formulation of 1 Tim 1:10, καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ ἀντίκειται, should not be overstressed. In function it is not different from such endings to vice lists as καὶ τὰ ὅμοια (Gal 5:21) and τὰ τοιαῦτα (Rom 1:32; 2:3), used to indicate that the list is not all inclusive. Cf. Gal 5:23, κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος. Karris's statement ("Function and Sitz im Leben," 64) that "no other catalogue of vices employed in Christian writers contains a reference to the 'sound teaching' " must not include the Pastorals (see 1 Tim 6:4–5; Titus 1:9–10, and cf. 2 Tim 4:3–4).

The heretics are received by people who do not endure sound teaching,[11] but who in keeping with their own irrational lusts accumulate teachers for themselves who will merely tickle their ears (κνηθόμενοι τὴν ἀκοήν, 2 Tim 4:3).[12] Among them are the silly little women who are incapable of grasping the knowledge of the truth (2 Tim 3:7). It is among such people that their teaching will eat its way like gangrene (2 Tim 2:17).

In sum, the author's use of the medical images is part of his overall perception of the heretics. The author describes them as intellectually inferior, having diseased minds which produce violent preaching and contaminate those who accept their teaching. They are antisocial and upset the social order by their preaching. They are motivated to preach by their hope of financial gain. Those who welcome them are likewise intellectually and morally inferior and are infected by them. Contrasted to the heretics are the orthodox who have knowledge and hold to sound teaching, who are generally mild in their own teaching, yet know to be severe when the occasion demands severity, who are socially responsible, who | give constant attention to their own moral progress, and always have the benefit of others at heart. 24

## The Moral Philosophers

When the historical and social setting of the Pastorals is considered, a certain group of teachers, well known in the early Empire, fits well the description noted above. Among the many kinds of philosophers who wandered about was a group, Cynics of a particular type, who were distinguished for the severity with which they delivered their message. They held a strange fascination for those who heard them, meeting with both acceptance and repulsion. Contemporary writers used the medical metaphor and images

[11] The conjecture by Price (recorded in the Nestle-Aland, 25th ed., apparatus), that ἀνθέξονται should be read for ἀνέξονται is attractive in light of Titus 1:9, but the latter reading is perfectly intelligible in the context. Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.15–16: Man's ears are dainty when reared on flattery and lies; they cannot endure (ἀνέξεσθε) demanding preaching.

[12] "Irrational lusts": The RSV rendering of ἐπιθυμίας by "likings" is too mild. The term in Greek philosophy described "the waywardness of man in conflict with his rationality." See Friedrich Büchsel, "θυμός κτλ," *TDNT* 3 (1965): 169, and see below. The element of irrationality is not absent in the Pastorals. Cf. 1 Tim 6:9, ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους; 2 Tim 3:6, of the women who learn without coming to knowledge of the truth; Titus 2:12, the divine παιδεία has as its goal the renunciation of worldly ἐπιθυμίαι*;* Titus 3:3, the ἀνόητοι were enslaved to their ἐπιθυμίαι.

of the Pastorals in discussing the teaching of philosophers in general, but the language was particularly used in connection with rigoristic Cynics and the questions they raised about the nature of the true philosopher's παρρησία, that frankness of speech used in attempting to cure people of their moral illness.

## *Moral Disease*

The description of human vices and passions as diseases was widespread, but was especially used by Stoics and Cynics. Stoics, as was their wont, engaged in minute subdivision and definition of the passions as diseases and identified the degrees to which the soul might be subject to them.[13] The soul, they held, might be in a state of war, with its passions and diseases prevailing over its healthy (rational) principles (τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας λόγους).[14] When passion in the soul rages savagely and produces itchings and ticklings which arise from lust and indulgence (κνησμοὺς καὶ γαργαλισμοὺς ἐξ ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας,[15] it is cured by drugs, and if some vice spreads (ἐπινεμομένη) like festering shingles, it is incised with professional skill with the instrument of sharp reason (λόγῳ τομεῖ τῷ κατ' ἐπιστήμην τέμνεται).[16] After reason has rid the soul of its disease, reason remains in the soul.[17] Such therapy cannot be brought about by eloquence or a specious παρρησία which is not genuine or beneficial (ὠφέλιμον), but merely tickles.[18] The person who is aware of moral illness should seek and welcome effective treatment. "Why do you tickle my ears?" asks Seneca, "Why do you entertain me? There is other business at hand; I am to be cauterized, operated upon, or put on a diet. That is why you were summoned to treat me!" (*Ep.* 75.6–7).

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[13] See Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.10–33, esp. 10, 23, 27, 33. Cf. Galen, *De locis affectis* I 3 (8 32 Kuhn; *SVF* 3:429); Diogenes Laertius 7.115 (*SVF* 3:422); Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.10 (2:93, 1–13 W-H; *SVF* 3:421). See Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 142ff.

[14] Philo, *Abr.* 223.

[15] Philo, *Det.* 110; cf. 2 Tim 4:3.

[16] Philo, *Det.* 110. The medical metaphor of the (rational) word as a scalpel is behind Heb 4:12. It is tempting to force 2 Tim 2:15, ἐργάτην ἀνεπαίσχυντον, ὀρθοτομοῦντα τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας, into a medical sense, for example, "a workman unashamed of the word of truth as it cuts straight (correctly)," especially since the medical metaphor is continued in v. 17, καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν ὡς γάγγραινα νομὴν ἕξει.

[17] Musonius, *Frg.* 36 (123–24 Hense); cf. *Ep. Pancrat.* 3–4 (137–138 Hense).

[18] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 51CD. The medical metaphor is not used in this immediate context, but is applied extensively elsewhere in the tractate where παρρησία is discussed. It is the basic conviction of all moral philosophers that the philosopher and his speech should be beneficial. See, e.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.3–4; 32.2, 5, 12–13, 33; 33.56; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 55CD, 68C; Lucian, *Demon.* 63, 66.

## *The Physician of the Soul*

Since philosophy was viewed as intended to cure vices and lead to virtue, it is natural that the philosopher was described as a physician of the soul whose teaching was the means by which the cure was effected.[19] The widespread use of such medical terminology and imagery is not surprising since philosophers (and sophists) were in fact closely related to physicians.[20] The description of the philosopher as a physician became most common among the Stoics and Cynics, although it was by no means confined to them.[21] The | Stoics Seneca,[22] Musonius,[23] and Epictetus[24] frequently made use of the comparison. As the quotation from Seneca reveals, Stoics expected that the philosopher-physician's treatment might need to be severe: not only drugs and diet, but the knife and cautery might need to be used. Epictetus held the same view.[25] 25

Dio Chrysostom permits the clearest insight into how a Stoic philosopher regarded his own exhortation as analogous to the work of a physician.[26] In *Oration* 77/78 Dio justified the philosopher's "fullest frankness" (πλείστη παρρησία). A soul is corrupt (διεφθαρμένη) because of the

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19 For references, see Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian, 1956), 292; Karl Holl, "Die schriftstellerische Form des griechischen Heiligenlebens," *NJahrb* 19 (1912), 418; Gustave Bardy, *La conversion au christianisme durant les premiers siècles* (Paris: Aubier, 1949), 75–76.

20 Cf. the title of one of the works of the physician Galen: *That the Best Physician Is Also a Philosopher*; and see Glen W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 19, 59–75, esp. 67–68.

21 Once they found their way into the diatribe, medical images were assured of wide usage. See André Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne: Libraire Payot, 1926), 304 (index), s.v. "*Medicin (comparaisons avec le –)*"; Barbara P. Wallach, A *History of the Diatribe from Its Origins up to the First Century B.C. and a Study of the Influence of the Genre upon Lucretius, III, 830–1094* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1975), 134ff. passim. For extensive non-Stoic and non-Cynic use of the image of the physician, see, for example, Philo of Larissa, the Skeptic teacher of Cicero, in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.2 (2:39, 19 – 42, 6 W-H), and Plutarch, who does, however, reflect Stoic ideas on the subject, in *Adul. amic.* 61ff., 73A–D, 74D, and see below in my text.

22 E.g., Seneca, *Epp.* 22.1; 27.1; 40.5; 50.4; 64.8; 72.5–6; 94.24; 95.29.

23 E.g., Musonius, *Frg.* 1 (1, 9–10 Hense), *Frg.* 3 (12, 15ff. Hense).

24 E.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.15.5; 3.21.20; 3.23.27–28, 30; 3.25.7–8; *Frg. 19*.

25 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.72–73.

26 Although *Or.* 77/78 may be from his Cynic period, it nevertheless shows a milder attitude than that of the type of Cynics with which we shall be concerned. The dating of *Or.* 32 to the middle years of Trajan's reign, thus after his Cynic period, proposed by Hans F.A. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898; repr. as 2d ed., 2004), 435–438, is generally accepted. See Christopher P. Jones, "The Date of Dio of Prusa's Alexandrian Oration," *Historia* 22 (1973): 302–309, for an attempt to place it in the reign of Vespasian, thus before Dio's Cynic period. In either case, the oration does not belong to his Cynic period, and in fact shows a definite anti-Cynic bias.

ignorance, depravity, insolence, jealousy, grief, and the countless other lusts (ἐπιθυμίαι) that beset it.[27] Such a condition requires surgery, and especially cautery (43). But the philosopher must first begin, and be as unsparing on himself as on others (45). The philosopher is not to be indiscriminate in severity but, as one who is sound (ὑγιής) in words and deeds, is to adapt his treatment to the condition of the hearers. By sometimes being severe and sometimes gentle, the philosopher hopes thus to rescue others from foolishness, lusts, intemperance, and soft living.[28] The aim is not to cause dissent, greed, strife, jealousies, and desire for base gain, but to remind others of sobriety and righteousness and to promote concord (38–39). The Stoic philosopher-physician is thus concerned with the virtue of individuals, yet takes special care to contrast antisocial vices with social virtues.

The social dimension of instruction in virtue was elaborated by Dio in *Oration* 32, where the medical metaphor was extended to apply to political officials. For the vices, Dio said, the gods have prepared one remedy and cure, namely, education and reason, and a person who employs this remedy throughout life arrives at last at a healthy and happy end (16).[29] The most depraved flee furthest from reason as the most inflamed sore shrinks from touch. Their treatment will need be the most drastic. The treatment of vice and its prevention is twofold. The one treatment may be likened to dieting and drugs and is applied by philosophers who, through persuasion and reason, calm and make the soul gentle, and who are the saviors of those who can be saved by confining and controlling vice before it reaches its final stage. The severity of their speech saves.

The other treatment may be likened to surgery and cautery and is practiced by rulers, laws, and magistrates, who remove what is abnormal and incurable. They are to be milder than the philosophers, for one should be sparing in meting out punishment, but not in imparting instruction (17–18). Dio appears to have had difficulty with his metaphors, inasmuch as cautery and surgery, | the more severe treatments, ought to belong to the philosophers, if they are the more severe, while dieting and drugs would be the method of the milder officials.[30] In any case, what is to be noted is that the metaphors are used of instruction in virtue within the

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[27] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.45; cf. 1 Tim 6:4 and n. 9 above.
[28] Cf. 2 Tim 2:23ff.
[29] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.6.
[30] For the ruler who practices surgery and cautery like a physician, see Plutarch, *Cat. Maj.* 16.5; Epictetus, *Frg.* 22.

social order and that there is a stress on the need for different degrees of severity corresponding to the differences in the moral condition of those instructed.[31]

### *The Human Condition*

While Dio asserted the need for painful frankness, he had a relatively optimistic view of the human condition which permitted him to adapt his preaching to the condition of his audience.[32] His comparatively rare pessimistic statements on the condition of the masses occur in speeches which show Cynic influence.[33] Stoics in general shared this relatively charitable view of human nature. Musonius, for example, held that humans have a natural disposition toward virtue,[34] and that the majority of wrongs are due to ignorance and misunderstanding which can be overcome by instruction.[35] Epictetus insisted that the philosopher should not be angry at those who err, but should pity them.[36] Such a humane view not only permitted but also required that the philosopher temper biting frankness with gentleness.

Some Cynics also viewed human nature in this way. Perhaps in reaction to Cynicism's reputation for harshness, there were those who emphasized that some of its heroes had been gentle in demeanor. Indeed, a milder strain of Cynics can be identified at least as early as Crates.[37] The major representative of this type under the Empire known to us was Demonax, who, according to Lucian, was kind, gentle, and cheerful, was everybody's friend, and avoided only those whose error placed them beyond the hope of cure.[38]

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[31] Dio frequently uses the images of surgery and cautery in connection with his own exhortation toward social harmony and constantly seeks to justify his own severity. Cf. *Or.* 33.44; 38.7; cf. 57.5. For his persistent use of the image, see Jakob Oesch, *Die Vergleiche bei Dio* (Diss., Zurich, 1916), 15ff.

[32] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.24–28. See *Or.* 13.13; 17.2–3 for his view that the crowd does not do what it knows to be best, and for its ignorance, *Or.* 13.27; 14.2.

[33] See Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 169. Dill, *Roman Society*, 369, generalizes on the basis of the orations which are influenced by Cynicism.

[34] See *Frg.* 2 (6ff. Hense), and see Anton C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (rev. ed.; WTS 8; Assen: van Gorcum, 1963), 18, 28ff.

[35] *Frg.* 10 (56, 3ff. Hense).

[36] E.g., *Diatr.* 1.18.3, 7ff. But some are impossible to persuade; cf. 2.15.13ff.

[37] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–17, esp. 210–11. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

[38] Lucian, *Demon.* 10.

*The Severe Cynics*

More important, however, is the larger company of Cynics, considered more typical of Cynicism in the popular mind, who were not sociable or gentle. Cynics of this type scoffed at the masses[39] and insisted that, since the masses were ignorant, they could not be friends of the philosopher.[40] The true Cynic was an avowed hater of mankind and withdrew from society.[41] While medical metaphors were used by all types of Cynics,[42] our particular interest is that group of stern Cynics.

These Cynics held that it was by virtue alone that the soul could be purified of its diseases and that it was the Cynic who was the physician who could bring about the cure.[43] The human condition was so corrupt that only the most painful treatment, the severest παρρησία, could avail. The letters ascribed to Diogenes illustrate the attitude and manner of preaching. *Epistle* 28 was a severe condemnation of Greek civilization directed at Sinope.[44] Diogenes called their laws the greatest delusion, and excoriated them for doing | nothing by sound reason (ὑγιῆ λόγῳ). By their ignorance and senselessness they had become a mockery, and Diogenes and nature hated them. Diogenes punished them in word, nature did so in deed. They legislated and educated, but to no avail. They were tickled by pleasure (ἐγαργαλίσθητε ὑπ' ἡδονῆς). If they continued to indulge themselves, Diogenes warned, the judges elected by the people, whom they called physicians (!), would treat them. They would cut and cauterize and prescribe drugs for the people, but would not be thanked for their ministrations. As for himself, Diogenes would associate only with those who knew his Cynic worth. He would be like Antisthenes, who spoke only

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[39] E.g., Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 17.26ff., 47ff. (301, 304 Hercher).

[40] E.g., Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 8 (616–617 Hercher).

[41] E.g., Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 24 (626 Hercher). On the misanthropy represented by these letters, see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 67–68, 156ff., 170ff.

[42] Antisthenes, already, is said by Diogenes Laertius (6.4, 6) to have compared a philosopher to a physician. To Diogenes is attributed the statement that he, like a physician, does not spend his time among those who are healthy, but among those who need therapy. See Stobaeus, *Flor.* 3.13.43 (3:462, 11–15 W-H), and cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.5. For further references, see Johann J. Wettstein, ed., *Novum Testamentum Graecum* (2 vols.; Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1962; orig. pub. Amsterdam: Dommer, 1751–1752), 1:358–359, on Matt 8:5. Demonax, according to Lucian (*Demon.* 7), thought that one should pattern oneself after physicians who heal diseases but are not angry at the patients.

[43] Cf. Ps.-Diogenes. *Epp.* 27 (241 Hercher); 49 (257–258 Hercher); Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep* 11.7 (293 Hercher).

[44] 241–243 Hercher. See Victor E. Emeljanow, *The Letters* of *Diogenes* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1974), 49, 71–72, 136–139; cf. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse,'" 212 n. 3.

with those who knew him, and avoided those who knew neither nature, reason, nor truth.

*Epistle* 29, addressed to Dionysius, tyrant of Sicily, likewise found justification for the Cynic's harshness and antisocial attitude in the putrid condition of society.[45] Diogenes threatened to send Dionysius a hard taskmaster (a Cynic) who would purge him. The tyrant needed someone with a whip, not someone who would flatter him. His disease (διαφθορά) was far gone, and required surgery, cautery, and medication for healing. Instead, Dionysius had brought in grandparents and wet nurses! The author seemed to be polemicizing against those philosophers who saw the need for occasional gentleness in preaching.

## Reaction to the Cynics

The antisocial Cynics did not, of course, withdraw from society, but lambasted it with unrelenting intensity. That they found audiences at all who would listen to them may be surprising, for the harsh treatment the mobs accorded philosophers in general was frequently recorded.[46] The fact, however, that the descriptions of mob-reaction frequently came from philosophers or professional teachers, persons never quite satisfied with the adulation they deserved, should warn of the hazard of overstressing the animosity with which they were regarded.[47] The moral philosophers obviously did meet certain needs or there would not have been as many of them as there were.[48] And, it was not only those of high moral purpose who were accorded a hearing. Lucian provided ample evidence that, although the wandering preachers did not always have motives and demeanor of the purest kind, they nevertheless had little difficulty in securing an audience. This was also, perhaps especially, true of both those Cynics who had a genuinely pessimistic view of humankind and adopted a correspondingly harsh style of preaching, and of those charlatans who effected such a Cynic style as a cover for their true designs.

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[45] 243–244 Hercher. Cf. Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 2, 7 (280, 283ff. Hercher). For the Cynic debate on whether the true Cynic can associate with rulers, see Ronald F. Hock, "Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic," *GRBS* 17 (1976): 41–53.

[46] For the reception of the philosophers, see Ludwig Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms* (8th ed.; Leipzig: Hirzel, 1910), 4:301ff.

[47] See, for example, the endless discussions by such teachers and philosophers on the proper hearing they should receive, e.g., Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.*; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.8, 10; 32.2; 72; Seneca. *Ep.* 52.11ff.

[48] Dill, *Roman Society*, 340–341; cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.12; 72.11.

Lucian provides the best source for the sharp reaction that such preachers caused. His polemic was explicit and attached itself to | the medical images that were in vogue. He was familiar with the metaphors of surgery and cautery as applying to the philosopher's speech and with the description of the philosopher as a healer of the passions.[49] In his polemic against the vagabond preachers he repeatedly mentioned the attraction they had for the masses. In *Vitarum auctio*, Lucian described the work of the Cynic through the mouth of one such physician of men's ills (8). The man claimed that the Cynic should be impudent, bold, and abuse everyone, for then the people would admire him and consider him manly. Education was altogether unnecessary (10–11). Elsewhere Lucian likewise observed that people tolerated the outspokenness of such preachers, delighted in their therapy, and cowered under their censure.[50] Particularly the common, simple people, especially those who had nothing more pressing to do, admired such preachers for their abusiveness.[51] Despite their flailing of others, these preachers themselves were immoral and greedy. The masses, however, were reticent to speak against them, both out of fear and because such preachers were thought to be superior persons by virtue of their belligerence.[52] In his inimitable way, Lucian sketched what would be the disastrous effect on society of such preachers: industry would grind to a halt.[53] While Lucian thus satirically polemicized against these severe charlatans, he recognized that they did have a considerable following—his reason, in fact, for taking both them and their followers to task.

Lucian did, however, see much in true Cynicism that he admired.[54] That is most clearly evident in his tractate *Demonax,* but it also emerges from the picture he sketched of the Cynic in *The Downward Journey* (*Cataplus*). In the latter tractate a Cynic, appointed an observer and physician of men's ills (7), was being judged. Although the Cynic had been free-spoken, critical, and censorious (13), Lucian did not find fault with him. In the final judgment scene, the Cynic is told that wickedness leaves marks on the soul which only the judge can see, but there are no such marks on the Cynic. Then Lucian used the image of "searing" in a new way. Though

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[49] Cf. Lucian, *Pisc.* 46, 52; *Apol.* 2.
[50] Lucian, *Fug.* 12.
[51] Lucian, *Peregr.* 18; *Bis acc.* 11, of Stoics who act in the same manner.
[52] Lucian, *Fug.* 12; *Symp.* 12–19; cf. *Somn.* 10–11.
[53] Lucian, *Fug.* 17; cf. *Peregr.* 18: The wise prefect runs Proteus out of town.
[54] See Rudolf W.O. Helm, "Lucian und die Philosophenschule," *NJahrb* 9 (1902): 351–369, for what Lucian found attractive in Cynicism.

no marks of vice are found on the Cynic, there are many traces of searing (ἐγκαυμάτων) which somehow or other had been removed. The Cynic explains that he had earned them when in his ignorance he had still been wicked, but that when he began to live the philosophic life, after a while he had washed the scars from his soul (24). For Lucian, then, the searing that comes from vice must be removed before a person presumes to correct others.

Another reaction to the upbraiding of the Cynics can be identified. In a context in which every street preacher asserted his right to παρρησία, often conceived as the misanthropic railing of the | Cynic, it was natural 29 that serious philosophers would, on the one hand, distance themselves from such preachers, and on the other, give renewed attention to the nature of the true philosopher's παρρησία. It became customary for philosophers to describe either themselves or their heroes in an antithetic manner that would make the differences between themselves and the interlopers clear. This can be seen clearly in Dio Chrysostom as well as in other philosophers.[55] We have also seen that philosophers of higher culture and milder mien, when reflecting on the proper method of teaching, carefully specified how verbal cautery and surgery were to be used.[56] Yet they were equally careful to avoid specious frankness.

Plutarch's tractate *How to Tell* a *Flatterer from* a *Friend* (*Adul. amic.*), which utilized material from discussions of the philosopher's frankness, illustrates the concern of a serious philosopher.[57] True frankness is like a potent medicine, when it is used with moderation (74D),[58] but flattery, at its most insidious, can take the form of a specious παρρησία (61D–62C).

[55] See above and cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or* 32.11; 34.30; 42.11; 77/78.371; Lucian, *Demon.* 4, 8; Julian, *Or*. 6.200BCD. See further, Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse.'"

[56] See above, and cf. Cicero, *Off.* 1.136.

[57] The type of criticism Plutarch applies to the flatterer's supposed frankness is also leveled by the sophist Aristides at the Cynics in *Or.* 46 (2, 398–406 Dindorf), translated into French by André Boulanger, *Aelius Aristide* (Paris: Anciennes Maisons Thorin et Fontenmoing, 1923), 249–256. The summarizing paraphrase by Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion* of *Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2d ed.; 2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 1:500 n. 3, illustrates the parallels between the criticism of harsh Cynics and that of the heretics in the Pastorals: They preach virtue to others but are themselves corrupt; they are avaricious, their outspokenness is in fact maliciousness, they are antisocial and undermine households, etc.

[58] Cf. Themistius, *Or.* 22 (67, 4–6 Downey-Norman): The παρρησία of a true friend is like a physician who uses the proper treatment (drugs instead of cautery and surgery).

The flatterer, Plutarch charged, is himself diseased and in need of prudent remedies (62C) but is not thereby deterred from letting his flattery become a pestilence in society (49C). His “frankness” merely titillates (κνᾷ) and tickles (γαργαλίζει, cf. 51CD, 61B). It adds nothing to the powers of thinking and reasoning, but caters to pleasure, intensifies irrational temper, and engenders a tumor of conceit (cf. 59E). The flatterer’s presence is like a growth in that he always assaults the festering and inflamed conditions of the soul (cf. 59C–60B). In criticism of those who open themselves to this specious frankness, Plutarch warned that its vicious, secret attacks would produce in them an itching sore whose scar would remain even after it healed. Such scars or gangrenes lead to destruction(65CD).[59] These scars caused by vice are evidently what Lucian referred to as searings. Like Lucian, Plutarch did not object to frankness when it was properly applied, but demanded that the person who presumed to speak with boldness be without disease lest the listeners become infected.

Genuine philosophic frankness, according to Plutarch, should be employed for the philosopher’s as well as the listeners’ improvement and should not be used out of a desire for reputation or out of ambition. Using a different metaphor, he elaborated on the subject in his tractate *Progress in Virtue* (*Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus*), in which he warned against that bellicosity which might be mistaken for frankness.

> But most of all must we consider whether the spirit of contention and quarreling over debatable questions (ζητήσεις) has been put down, and whether we have ceased to equip ourselves with arguments, as with boxing gloves or brass knuckles, with which to contend against each other, | and to take more delight in scoring a hit or knockout than in learning and imparting something. For reasonableness and mildness in such matters, and the ability to join in discussions without wrangling, and to close them without anger, and to avoid a sort of arrogance over success in argument and exasperation in defeat, are the marks of a man who is making adequate progress. (80BC)

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Those who are insolent and filled with haughtiness and disdain are uninstructed in philosophy and will change when they train their minds, apply their stinging criticism to themselves, and in consequence be milder in their intercourse with others (81BC).

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[59] The comparison with gangrene had already been used by Lucilius, *Frg.* 7 Krenkel. See Wallach, *A History of the Diatribe*, 276–277.

## Conclusion

This historical and social context, in which the claims of certain harsh Cynics to be the healers of diseased humanity brought forth various responses, demonstrates how the language of health and disease function in the Pastoral Epistles. Like Lucian, the author accused harsh opponents of being ignorant, abusive, immoral, antisocial, and charged that they were received only by the ignorant of whom they took advantage. Into this fairly standard picture of charlatans the description of specious παρρησία represented by Plutarch was woven. Contemporary harsh preachers intoned their own superiority as physicians and found cause for their pugnaciousness in the diseased condition of their hearers' minds and souls. The author of the Pastorals, in rebuttal, accused the heretics, as Plutarch did the flatterer, with being diseased of mind and morals. Their verbal battles do not eradicate disease in others, but are the products of their own disease, and will further infect those who, with irrational lusts, will listen to them with itching ears which wait only to be tickled. When the author described the heretics' consciences as seared, he probably meant that they were still seared with sin, as had been Lucian's Cynic before his conversion to philosophy. Therefore, he implied, they were in no condition to heal others. In light of the popularity of the metaphor of cautery, however, his use of the image might perhaps have had an added barb: not only were they themselves still seared by sin, their sinful condition was so extreme that their own consciences had been cauterized.

The use of the medical imagery in the Pastorals is thoroughly polemical. There is no picture, as in the moral philosophers, of the intellectually and morally ill person who will be cured by reason through the application of the drugs, surgery, and cautery of παρρησία. While it is affirmed that the orthodox do have understanding, it was not the rationality of the sound teaching that made them so, but rather the apostolic tradition. That the "sound words" may bring about health of soul is an inference the reader may be tempted to draw, but it is not part of the function to which the images are put. That function is polemical.

The contrasting picture of the orthodox teacher as gentle and mild, knowing when to be severe, concerned with personal moral progress, who preached to benefit others, and who promoted social stability, is similar to that sketched by Dio Chrysostom of himself and the ideal philosopher in antithesis to misanthropic, antisocial Cynics. This presentation of the Christian teacher is in harmony with the overall tendency of the Pastoral Epistles to present Christianity as a responsible part of society.

That the author of the Pastorals made use of such typical descriptions does not compel us to conclude that they were not applicable to actual situations confronted. Dibelius was correct in his insistence that the language with which we have been concerned be understood as it would have been by the original readers. Those readers would not only have recognized the language, but the types as well. They could see and hear them in the streets. The literary and polemical traditions we have traced developed in and found application to actual situations. In the absence of compelling reasons to believe the contrary, we would hold the same to be true for the Pastoral Epistles.

CHAPTER NINE

# ANTISTHENES AND ODYSSEUS, AND PAUL AT WAR*

Paul's use of military imagery in 2 Cor 10:3–6 deserves closer attention than it has received. Moffatt's translation vividly reflects the descriptions of ancient sieges that underlie Paul's statements:

> I do live in the flesh, but I do not make war as the flesh does; the weapons of my warfare are not weapons of the flesh, but divinely strong to demolish fortresses—I demolish theories and any rampart thrown up to resist the knowledge of God, I take every project prisoner to make it obey Christ, I am prepared to court-martial anyone who remains insubordinate, once your submission is complete.

Most commentators have been content to list parallel expressions, but have rarely examined at any depth the literary or philosophical traditions that may have influenced Paul.[1]

## Proverbs, Philo, and Paul

Proverbs 21:22 LXX, "A wise man assaults fortified cities, and demolishes the fortification in which the ungodly trusted" (πόλεις ὀχυρὰς ἐπέβη σοφὸς καὶ καθεῖλεν τὸ ὀχύρωμα, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐπεποίθεισαν οἱ ἀσεβεῖς), is frequently simply cited,[2] suggested as a passage to which | Paul alludes,[3] or claimed to be the 144

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* Originally published in *HTR* 76 (1983): 143–173; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 91–119.

[1] Albrecht Oepke's article on "ὅπλον" (*TDNT* 5 [1968]: 292–294) and Otto Bauernfeind's on "στρατεύομαι" (*TDNT* 7 [1971]: 701–713) are singularly unhelpful. The Stoic parallels to the Pauline use of the military metaphor, especially those in Seneca, have frequently been noted. See Jan N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (NovTSup 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 156 n. 2. But 2 Cor 10:3–6 is usually neglected or entirely omitted from discussion. Sevenster approaches the subject from the virtue of bravery and denies that Paul has anything in common with Seneca.

[2] Carl F.G. Heinrici, *Das zweite Sendschreiben des Apostel Paulus an die Korinther* (Berlin: Hertz, 1887), 417 n. 2; John H. Bernard, "The Second Epistle to the Corinthians," in *The Expositor's Greek Testament* (ed. W. Robertson Nicoll; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912), 3:95.

[3] Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (ICC 34; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1915), 276; Hans Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (KEK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), 297; Werner G. Kümmel

basis of his thought.[4] Paul's reference to confidence (τῇ πεποιθήσει) in v. 2 and his claim to demolish fortresses (καθαίρεσιν ὀχυρωμάτων) in v. 4 have strengthened the suspicion that this passage loomed large in his thinking. Paul and Proverbs do both have in mind a fortified city that is attacked, but sieges were so common in antiquity, and the terminology of siegecraft so widespread, that the sharing of these few words hardly constitutes proof of dependence.[5]

Paul's description of his attack is much more detailed than that of Proverbs. In addition to the general statement that he has weapons to demolish fortifications (πρὸς καθαίρεσιν ὀχυρωμάτων), he views his attack as part of a campaign (στρατευόμεθα, στρατεία), refers to the special nature of his weapons, draws attention to a particular defensive measure—a rampart that is thrown up (ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον)—threatens to take every thought (νόημα) captive, and claims that he is prepared (ἐν ἑτοίμῳ ἔχοντες) to punish every disobedience. Certain of these details call for special comment. This is the only place where ὀχύρωμα appears in the NT. Its nonliteral use in the LXX (cf. Lam 2:2), especially in Prov 21:22, has led scholars to surmise that the OT provided Paul with the image. The word was widely used, however, for military fortifications,[6] so that an appeal to the OT must be supported by other evidence. Paul's description of one feature of the defensive fortification as a "raised rampart" (ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον) also belongs to the military science of siegecraft. Chrysostom identified ὕψωμα with πύργωμα, a defensive tower,[7] but it has been objected that ὕψωμα with this meaning cannot be found in Greek usage.[8] The word ὕψος for a tall defensive structure, however, is frequently found, for example, in the | directions of Aeneas Tacticus (32.2) to "throw up in opposition wooden towers or other high structures" (ἀνταείρεσθαι πύργους ξυλίνους ἢ

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in Hans Lietzmann, *An die Korinther 1/2* (HNT 9; Tübingen: Mohr, 1949), 208; Philip E. Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 351 n. 7; C.K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 251. Less confident is Adolf Schlatter, *Paulus der Bote Jesu* (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1934), 615 n. 9.

[4] Bauernfeind, "στρατεύομαι," *TDNT* 7 (1971): 710.

[5] See Arnold W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), in general, and for a list of accounts of attack and defense, 53–66.

[6] See Xenophon, *Hell.* 3.2.3; Polybius 4.6.3, and for the papyri, MM, 470.

[7] John Chrysostom, *In epistolam secundam ad Corinthios*, Homily 21 (PG 61:543), where he also states that Paul continues the metaphor in order to express the thought better.

[8] Thus Lietzmann, *Korinther*, 141; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 252. Werner Straub (*Die Bildsprache des Apostels Paulus* [Tübingen: Mohr, 1937], 92) questions whether ὕψωμα still belongs to the image.

ἄλλα ὕψη).[9] Paul's use of the less usual ὕψωμα may have been suggested by ὀχύρωμα and νόημα, and is in any case an example of his play on nouns that end in -μα, which, according to BDF 488.3 (p. 259), belongs "to the dainties of the Hell[enistic] artists of style." Paul's claim to be prepared to punish is also stated in a phrase (ἐν ἑτοίμῳ ἔχοντες) used of military preparedness.[10] The imagery of siegecraft that Paul uses, therefore, was so common that there is not sufficient reason to think that he had Prov 21:22 in mind.[11]

Philo also makes extensive use of the image of the siege and applies it to the personal lives of individuals. For example, according to him, those persons "who take refuge in virtue, as in an indestructible and impregnable fortress (ἀκαθαίρετον καὶ ἐρυμνότατον τεῖχος) disregard the darts and arrows aimed at them by the passions that stalk them."[12] Stated otherwise, reason (λόγος) is a weapon against the passions; thus Moses was given a reasoning faculty (λογισμός) to engage in a campaign on behalf of virtue (στρατεία ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς). If the passions are not fought, they will storm the citadel of the soul and lay siege to it.[13]

Philo's *De confusione linguarum* 128–131 has been regarded as particularly relevant to the interpretation of 2 Cor 10:3–6. The basis for this section is 107–114: Philo takes Gen 11:4, "Come let us build for ourselves a city and a tower whose top shall reach to heaven," as his point of departure. In addition to ordinary cities, he says, the lawgiver thinks there are ones that men carry about established in their souls. The fool's mind summons as allies and coworkers the senses and passions | to help build and fortify 146

[9] Cf. 40.1; Thucydides 1.90.3; 1.91.1; 2.75.6.

[10] For ἐν ἑτοίμῳ ἔχειν, see Polybius 2.34.2; Philo, *Legat.* 259; without ἔχειν, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 8.17.1; 9.35.6; 9.12.14.

[11] It is equally unnecessary to seek the origin of Paul's use in a particular campaign or in Paul's own past. Arthur P. Stanley (*The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians* [London: Murray, 1858], 516) suggests that Paul may have had in mind the campaign of Pompey against Mithridates and the Pirates. Bauernfeind ("στρατεύομαι," *TDNT* 7 [1971]: 711 n. 37) asserts that Paul "did not borrow directly from the usage of Roman troops and their commanders" and suggests that the language may very well have come from "Paul's past as a Pharisee, if not strict zealot."

[12] Philo, *Prob.* 151. The translations of classical authors that follow are those of the LCL (sometimes adapted) when available. The others are my own.

[13] Philo, *Leg.* 3.13–14, 155; 2.91. Cf. *Somn.* 2.82: εὐλάβεια is to man what a wall is to a city. In *Somn.* 1.103 λόγος is described as a weapon of defense. In it man has a most strong redoubt and impregnable fortress (μέγιστον ἔρυμα καὶ φρουρὰν ἀκαθαίρετον). The LCL translators note (5:350 n. b) the difficulty of distinguishing between "reason" and "speech" as the meaning of λόγος, and compromise with "rational speech" or "rational speech and thought." See further n. 50.

the city, which has a tower as a citadel, a most secure palace (βασίλειον ὀχυρώτατον) for the tyrant vice. The tower "seeks to rise to the regions of celestial things, with the arguments of impiety and godlessness in its van."

In 128–131 Philo describes the battle with the cities so constructed and provides a further interpretation of the cities and the tower. The cities had been fortified to menace (ἐπετείχισαν) the unhappy souls. Taking his clue from Judg 8:8–9, 17, Philo interprets the tower to signify a turning away from God. Built through the persuasiveness of arguments, its purpose was to divert and deflect the mind from honoring God. Justice, however, demolishes these structures. Gideon always stands prepared (ἀεὶ . . . εὐτρέπισται) to demolish this stronghold (πρός γε τὴν τοῦ ὀχυρώματος τούτου καθαίρεσιν), able to do so by virtue of the strength he had received to demolish every argument that would persuade the mind to turn away from holiness (καθαιρήσειν πάντα λόγον ἀποστρέφειν διάνοιαν ὁσιότητος ἀναπείθοντα). The similarity to 2 Cor 10:4, πρὸς καθαίρεσιν ὀχυρωμάτων ("to demolish fortresses"), was so striking to Hans Windisch that he was almost tempted to find a literary connection between Paul and Philo, but he decided that they both proceeded from Prov 21:22. He thinks the perspective and terminology of the conflict between philosophers and sophists, which clearly stand out in Philo, are used by Paul in his battle against the Corinthian *gnosis*.[14]

What Philo shares with Prov 21:22 is essentially that the fortifications were built by the ungodly. However, his point of departure appears to have been Judg 8, which he embellished with the military imagery that was common and which he frequently uses elsewhere in his writings. One would conclude that this is a case of literary dependence only by relying on a narrowly focused use of the concordances. The similarities between Paul and Philo, however, are more striking. They both develop the imagery in greater detail than Proverbs and use it in their descriptions of religious psychology. For example, they both refer to preparedness for battle, the ability to undertake it, the struggle as a campaign (στρατεία),

[14] Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 297. He is followed by Hans Dieter Betz (*Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition* [BHT 45; Tübingen: Mohr, 1972], 68, 140–141), who stresses the anti-sophistic use of the image. It should be noted that references to this passage from Philo had been made long before Windisch but had not really been put to fruitful use in interpreting 2 Cor 10:4. See Johann J. Wettstein, ed., *Novum Testamentum Graecum* (2 vols.; Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1962; orig. pub. Amsterdam: Dommer, 1751–1752), 2:203; Henry St. J. Thackeray, *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought* (London: Macmillan, 1900), 239.

and both introduce the intellect (λογισμός; for Philo, also λόγος and διάνοια) into their discussions.

There are, nevertheless, substantial differences between the ways | the military imagery is used in 2 Cor 10:3–6 and in *De confusione linguarum*. To begin with, while the nature of the fortifications seems similar, their purposes are different. The structures Paul attacks are defensive in nature, but for Philo the cities Gideon attacks are offensive in purpose. Ἐπιτειχίζειν describes the building of a walled city that would serve as a base for sorties to menace or secure an area.[15] In Philo it is the unhappy soul who is at the mercy of the citadel of vice. More importantly, Philo and Paul differ in their presentation of the contestants' relation to the fortifications. In *De confusione linguarum* it is the sophistical elements that make use of the fortifications in their attacks on the intellect. Philo can speak of the rational faculties as armament and the struggle for virtue as a campaign, but he does not do so in the passage that has been used to interpret Paul's use of the imagery. For Paul, on the other hand, it is not sophistries but the cognitive element that is related to the fortifications. The λογισμοί, which are the reasoning faculties[16] and not sophistries,[17] constitute the defensive measures, the fortifications (ὀχυρώματα), and the rampart raised (ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον) against the attack by the knowledge of God, and what is taken captive is every thought (νόημα), which is made to obey Christ. Thus, while Paul shares some details with *De confusione linguarum* 128–31, he differs from it not only in the functions of the fortifications, but also in the fact that the issues at stake are cognitive and volitional rather than sophistical. One is therefore not justified in asserting that Windisch had demonstrated the anti-sophistic origin of the imagery Paul uses.[18] In this particular passage Philo utilizes the imagery in an anti-sophistic manner, but it is also clear from the passages outside *De confusione linguarum*

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[15] In addition to the references provided by LSJ, s.v. ἐπιτειχίζω, see esp. Yvon Garlan, *Recherches de poliorcétique grecque* (Athens: Ecole Française d'Athènes, 1974), 33–38. For Philo, see André Pelletier, "Les passions à l'assault l'âme d'après Philon," *REG* 78 (1965): 52–60.

[16] As it does in Philo, e.g., see n. 13. See further Ioannes Leisegang, *Indices ad Philonis Alexandrini opera* (Berlin: Reimer, 1930). H.W. Heidland ("λογίζομαι," *TDNT* 4 [1967]: 287) is correct in his judgment that the philosophical term is in view here. See further below.

[17] Thus Plummer, *Second Corinthians*, 276; Lietzmann, *Korinther*, 141. See also Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 68, 121. For λογίζεσθαι as a slogan in the Corinthian discussion, see Dieter Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief: Studien zur religiösen Propaganda in der Spätantike* (WMANT 11; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964), 222–223, 226–227.

[18] Thus Betz (*Apostel Paulus*, 68), who does, however, recognize the difficulty of the passage.

alluded to above, as well as references to Epictetus that Windisch provides, that there is a philosophical background to the imagery.

## 148 | Antisthenes and the Philosopher's Armament

Paul and other early Christians were not unique in using martial imagery.[19] It was used in a transferred sense by all kinds of persons, including philosophers, adherents of the mystery cults, and orators.[20] Johannes Leipoldt may be overstating the matter somewhat with his claim that the application of the imagery to the personal lives of individuals is essentially Greek and not Jewish in origin, and that this is the source of the Christian use, but he is on the mark in so far as 2 Cor 10:1–6 is concerned.[21] The imagery that Paul uses here is part of a tradition that goes back at least to the fifth and fourth centuries BC. The following discussion will be concerned not so much with the ultimate origin of the imagery as with one tradition that appears to lie behind 2 Cor 10:1–6.

It is not clear who first used martial imagery to describe the spiritual or intellectual struggle of individuals.[22] For our purposes it suffices to note that the custom had attained currency by the time of Socrates's immediate followers.[23] The increased usage of the imagery was at least partly due to the idealization of the Spartans, which can be explained by the political

[19] The usage elsewhere in the Pauline literature: 1 Thess 5:8; 2 Cor 2:14; Col 2:15; Eph 6:14–17. On the use in the NT and other early Christian literature, in addition to Bauernfeind, "στρατεύομαι," and Oepke, "ὅπλον," see Adolf Harnack, *Militia Christi* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1905; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963); Carl Schneider, *Geistesgeschichte des antiken Christentums* (2 vols.; Munich: Beck, 1954), 1:705–707; Johannes Leipoldt, "Das Bild vom Kriege in der griechischen Welt," in *Gott und die Götter: Festgabe für Erich Fascher zum 60. Geburtstag* (ed. Hans Bardtke; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1958), 16–30; Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:350–351.

[20] For the mystery cults, see Franz Cumont, *Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism* (London: Routledge, 1911; repr., New York: Dover, 1956), 213 n. 6; Richard Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistische Mysterienreligionen* (3d ed.; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1927), 192–197; John Gwyn Griffiths, *Apuleius of Madauros: The Isis Book* (*Metamorphoses*, *Book XI*) (EPRO 39; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 254–255.

[21] Leipoldt, "Bild vom Kriege," 22. He argues that, while Paul uses Jewish language, he adapts it. He does not mention 2 Cor 10:3–6.

[22] For Heraclitus, see Leipoldt, "Bild vom Kriege," 17–18; for Pythagoras as Socrates's source, see Hilarius Emonds, "Christlicher Kriegsdienst: Der Topos der militia spiritualis in der antiken Philosophie," repr. in Harnack, *Militia Christi*, 131–162; see 137–141.

[23] E.g., in Plato, *Apol.* 28D–29A; *Phaed.* 62D. For other references, see Leipoldt, "Bild vom Kriege," 16–18.

conditions and ideology of the period.[24] Spartans on principle rejected the efficacy of fortifications.[25] Their attitude is contained in laconic apophthegms attributed to various Spartans, beginning with Lycurgus and Theopompus, but especially to generals from the end of | the sixth and beginning of the fifth centuries. The attribution of the same or similar statements to different persons makes it difficult to be certain that any one of them did in fact say what he is claimed to have said. What is important, however, is that the attitude expressed was taken to be Spartan and that it enjoyed wide circulation for centuries. 149

The Spartans held that a city is well fortified when it is surrounded by brave men.[26] They are, in effect, its walls,[27] and the virtue of its inhabitants provides sufficient fortification.[28] They charged, with contempt, that cities fortified in the ordinary manner were places for women to dwell in.[29] These sentiments recur with regularity for centuries, most frequently, but not always, identified with the Spartans, and they appear in all sorts of literature. In addition to Plutarch, who collected many of the apophthegms, such popular philosophers as Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom registered their admiration for these ideas of the Spartans,[30] and the apophthegms found their way into the gnomologies.[31] The popularity that the apophthegms enjoyed is illustrated by their use in rhetorical exercises and in orations.[32] That the Spartan ideas should then appear without any

[24] See Garlan, *Recherches*, 91–103.

[25] Garlan, *Recherches*, 98–99.

[26] Plutarch, *Lyc.* 19.4.

[27] Plutarch, *Apoph. lac.* 217E, 228E.

[28] Plutarch, *Apoph. lac.* 210E.

[29] Plutarch, *Reg. imp. apophth.* 190E; *Apoph. lac.* 212E, 215D, 230C. Cf. 228DE: Lycurgus forbade attacks on walled places so that brave men might not die at the hands of a woman, child, or any such person.

[30] Epictetus, *Frgs*. 39, 61 (Heinrich Schenkl, ed., *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae* [*editio maior*; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1916], 39, 61); Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.31; 22.2; 80.4. On Dio's admiration for Sparta, see Paolo Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: Un intellettuale greco nell' impero romano* (Messina/Florence: G. D'Anna, 1978), 248 n. 40, 463 n. 13a. Cf. also Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll*. 1.38.

[31] E.g., *Gnom. Vat*. 69 (Leo Sternbach, ed., *Gnomologium Vaticanum* [repr. ed.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963], 32). For the passages in Stobaeus, see the apparatus in Sternbach and Schenkl, *Epictetus*.

[32] For exercises, see Seneca, *Suasoriae* 2.3.14, Philostratus, *Vit. soph*. 1.514; cf. 2.584. See also Menander Rhetor, *Peri Epideiktikōn* 381, line 11; Spengel (= Donald A. Russell and Nigel G. Wilson, eds., *Menander Rhetor* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], 100 and 286) for comment. For the use in practice, see Aelius Aristides 26.79 (Bruno Keil, ed., *Aelius Aristides, Quae supersunt omnia* [Berlin, Weidmann 1898], 2); Maximus of Tyre 32.10 (Hermann Hobein, ed., *Maximi Tyrii philosophoumena* [Leipzig: Teubner, 1910], 378, line 17). Note the rejection of Plato, *Resp*. 6.496D in Maximus of Tyre 10.10 (195, lines 13–19 Hobein).

attribution in the works of historians and in Christian literature is only to be expected.[33]

While other philosophers admired the Spartans, the Cynics had a special affinity for them, and they may have figured importantly in the transmission of the apophthegms attributed to them.[34] Antisthenes and | 150 Diogenes, each of whom was regarded in antiquity (as in modern times) as the founder of the school,[35] are represented in the doxographic tradition as admiring the Spartans.[36] Of special significance for us in the present context is Antisthenes, who adopted and elaborated the Spartan view of moral armament, thus initiating the development of a theme that would continue to occupy philosophers, Stoics and Cynics in particular.

According to a number of fragments representing his thought, Antisthenes applied the image of the fortified city to the sage's soul. In a statement preserved by Epiphanius, he is said to have affirmed that one should not be envious of others' vices (or what they regard as shameful), for while cities' walls are ineffectual against a traitor within, the soul's walls are unshakable and cannot be broken down.[37] While he here stresses inner security, Antisthenes also recognized the importance of associating with persons of moral excellence. Elsewhere he directs,

> Make allies of men who are at once brave and just. Virtue is a weapon that cannot be taken away (ἀναφαίρετον ὅπλον ἡ ἀρετή). It is better to be with a handful of good men fighting against the bad, than with hosts of bad men against a handful of good men.[38]

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[33] E.g., in Polybius 9.10.1 and Ps.-Justin, *Cohortatio ad Graecos* 3.

[34] On the idealization of Sparta, see François Ollier, *Le mirage spartiate* 1 (Paris: Boccard, 1933), 2 (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1943). For the philosophers in general, see 1:195–440; for the Cynics, 2:3–20; for the apophthegms, 2:21–54. On the latter, see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 252.

[35] Cf. Julian, *Orat.* 6.187C, and see n. 122. See Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 6: Antisthenes began doing philosophy; Diogenes brought it to perfection. The Cynic epistles are referred to according to Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles* (SBLSBS 12; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977). For an account of the modern debate, see Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 5–21.

[36] Diogenes: Diogenes Laertius 6.27, 39, 59. Antisthenes: Diogenes Laertius 6.2; cf. Plutarch, *Lyc.* 30; *Frg.* 195 (Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, ed., *Antisthenis Fragmenta* [Milan: Cisalpino, 1966], 74); cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.10.7.1411a24.

[37] Epiphanius, *Pan.* 3.26 (*Frg.* 90 Caizzi).

[38] Diogenes Laertius 6.12 (*Frg.* 71 Caizzi). On the need of friends for correction, see Plutarch, *Inim. util.* 89B (*Frg.* 77 Caizzi); the same sentiment is attributed to Diogenes in Plutarch, *Adol. poet. aud.* 74C, 82A. For a rejection of the Cynic view that virtue cannot be lost, see Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.19.

Nevertheless, what is essential here is that the sage's association is to be with others like him, that is, persons who possess virtue that cannot be lost.[39] It is the virtuous man's prudence (φρόνησις) that has a firm base (ἀσάλευτον).[40] Thus Antisthenes affirmed,

> Prudence is a most secure stronghold, for it does not crumble nor is it betrayed. We must build walls of defense with our own impregnable reasonings.
> | τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν· μήτε γὰρ καταρρεῖν μήτε προδίδοσθαι. 151
> τείχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς·[41]

Here for the first time we have Paul's imagery in which the reasoning faculties (λογισμοί, φρόνησις) function in the inner fortification of a person. The image becomes common, and we shall trace it as it is used by Stoics and Cynics. Before doing so, however, it will be profitable to observe how Antisthenes applied this concern with moral armament to his interpretation of Odysseus. Odysseus came to represent a certain type of moral philosopher, and Antisthenes's brief for him is not without interest to the reader of 1 and 2 Corinthians.

The Sophists, among them Antisthenes's teacher Gorgias, had attacked Odysseus for being unscrupulous. Antisthenes defended him in two sophistic speeches and in a statement preserved in the Homeric scholia. The speeches represent two types of persons. They treat the "tension between the straightforward and honorable Ajax, who is alien to all intrigues, compromises, or innovations, on the one hand, and the crafty Odysseus on the other, the man who always comes off best by his inventiveness, adaptability and shamelessness."[42] Antisthenes's Odysseus is the prototype of one kind of Cynic who becomes well known in later centuries. The setting for

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[39] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.105: the philosopher is a friend to his like (φίλος τῷ ὁμοίῳ).

[40] *Apud* Philo, *Prob.* 28. Cf. Stobaeus, *Flor.* 3.14.19 (3:474, 10–13 W-H).

[41] Diogenes Laertius 6.13 (*Frg.* 88 Caizzi); cf. Hesychius Milesius, *De viris illustribus* 7. The translations of the second line differ. Robert D. Hicks in LCL translates, "Walls of defense must be constructed in our impregnable reasonings." Léonce Paquet (*Les cyniques grecs. Fragments et témoignages* [ColPhil 4; Ottawa; Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1975], 40) renders it "Il faut édifier dans nos âmes des remparts inexpugnables." Caizzi ("La tradizione antistenico-cinica in Epitetto," *Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica* [Pubbl. del centro di studio per la storia della storiografia filosofica 4; Gabriele Giannantoni, ed.; 1977], 113) correctly translates it "Occorre erigere un muro con i propri raggionamenti inespugnabili" and justifies her rendering (n. 76) by referring to Aeschylus, *Cho.* 613, where ἐν λόγοις means "with speech."

[42] Höistad, *Cynic Hero*, 94–102, here 96. Other commentaries on the speeches: Caizzi, "La tradizione," 90–91; William B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero* (2d ed.; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1976), 96–99.

the two speeches is the contest of Ajax and Odysseus for Achilles's arms, and the contest is interpreted as being about virtue.[43]

In *Ajax* the speaker is represented as brave and forthright. He insists that he is a man of deeds and not words. War is not to be judged by words that will not benefit anyone in battle. He had come to Troy willingly, was always arrayed foremost in battle, and was alone, without the protection of a wall. His actions are proof that he deserves to receive the armor. It is the wrong people who are presuming to be judges of virtue. Odysseus, Ajax says, is a man of words. He is cowardly and would not dare (τολμήσειε) use Achilles's weapons. His | participation in the battle was underhanded, for he put on rags and sneaked into Troy. He acts in secret and willingly suffers ill treatment, even to the point of being flogged, if he might thereby gain (κερδαίνειν) something.

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Odysseus is made to reply in a longer speech. The *Odysseus* is directed not only to Ajax, but to all the other heroes, because Odysseus claims that he has done the expedition more good than all of them put together. Ajax is ignorant, but the poor fellow cannot help it. Is he really so brave? After all, he is protected by his famous shield, a veritable wall made of seven bulls' hides. Compared with Ajax, Odysseus is unarmed. He does not rush the enemies' walls but enters their city stealthily and overpowers them from within with their own weapons. "I know what is on the inside and what the enemies' condition is, and not because I send someone else to spy the situation out. In the same way that steersmen look out night and day how to save (σώσουσι) the sailors so do I myself and I save (σώζω) both you and all the other men." All the dangers that Odysseus endured were for their benefit. He flees no danger, nor would he dare (ἐτόλμων) to strive for reputation, even were he a slave, poor man or flogged. He had no weapons given him for battle, yet is constantly prepared, night and day, to fight any individual or group. While Ajax is snoring, Odysseus is saving him—the only weapons over which he disposes being the servile ones (δουλοπρεπῆ ὅπλα) of the rags he wears. Ajax makes the mistake of equating physical strength with bravery. One day a poet skilled in discerning virtue will come and portray Odysseus as enduring, rich in counsel, resourceful, sacker of cities, and as the one who alone sacked Troy.

[43] The texts followed are those of Caizzi, *Frgs*. 14 (*Ajax*) and 15 (*Odysseus*).

As Ragnar Höistad has shown, Antisthenes used the speeches as a means of propaganda for his conception of the virtuous man.[44] His enthusiasm for Odysseus had to be defended. In the sixth century, Theognis (*Eleg.* 213–218) had eulogized Odysseus:

> O heart, present a different tinge of character to every friend, blending your mood with that of each. Emulate the complex polypus that always takes the appearance of the adjacent rock. Cleverness is better than flexibility.

Stanford's comment is apropos and recognizes the similarity to Paul's self-description in 1 Cor 9:19–23:

> | Here one recognizes a special aspect of Odysseus's traditional versatility and resourcefulness—the Pauline quality of being all things to all men. But as this poet phrases it, and in its wider context of political spite and rancour, the eulogy has a distinctly unpleasant flavour. Its tone is machiavellian, rather than Homeric or apostolic.... We are faced here with one of the fundamental ambiguities in Odysseus's character. The border between adaptability and hypocrisy is easily crossed. Theognis had to make very little distortion to transform Odysseus's versatility into this despicable opportunism. Soon, when Pindar, Sophocles, and Euripides reconsider the matter, Odysseus will pay dearly for Theognis's admiration.[45]

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Antisthenes spoke to these calumnies. According to a scholion on the first line of Homer's *Odyssey*, "Tell me, Muse, of the *polytropic* man," Antisthenes attempted to absolve his hero of the charges of duplicity by interpreting the ambiguous πολυτρόπος to refer to Odysseus's skill in adapting his figures of speech ("tropes") rather than understanding it in the pejorative ethical sense of "often changing one's character, hence unstable, unprincipled, unscrupulous." Even Pythagoras, he says, taught his disciples to speak to children in childlike terms, to women in womanlike terms, to governors in governmental terms, and to ephebes in ephebic terms.

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[44] Whether he was allegorizing or not has been debated. See Ragnar Höistad, "Was Antisthenes an Allegorist?" *Eranos* 49 (1951): 16–30; J. Tate, "Antisthenes Was Not an Allegorist," *Eranos* 51 (1953): 14–22; cf. Renato Laurenti, "L'iponoia di Antistene," *RCSF* 17 (1962): 123–132.

[45] Stanford, *Ulysses Theme*, 91, and for discussion of the scholion that follows, 99. The scholion is printed as *Frg.* 51 Caizzi. For the debate over the meaning of πολυτρόπος, see T. Kakridis, "Die Bedeutung von πολυτρόπος in der Odyssee," *Glotta* 11 (1921): 288–291; P. Linde, "Homerische Selbsterläuterungen," *Glotta* 13 (1924): 223–224. On Antisthenes's interpretation, also see Eduard Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie," *JCPh* Suppl. 19.2 (1893): 394–395; A. Rostagni, "Un nuovo capitolo della retorica e della sophistica," *SIFC* 2 (1922): 150–159; George A. Kennedy, "Ancient Disputes over Rhetoric in Homer," *AJP* 78 (1957): 27–28; Caizzi, "La tradizione," 103.

In sum, Antisthenes used the military imagery in two different ways. On the one hand, the rational faculties are the wise man's fortifications. The imagery changes, however, when applied to Odysseus, the prototype of the virtuous man who seeks to benefit others. Odysseus willingly accepts ill treatment and adapts himself and his speech to changing circumstances in order to gain the good and save people. The only weapons he has are the servile rags he wears. These three items—the philosopher's intellectual armament, the philosopher's garb, and Odysseus as sage—continued to interest writers in the following centuries.

## The Fortification of the Wise Man

Military imagery to describe the sage's life became popular especially among Stoics, and particularly in the early Empire. Seneca's | dictum *vivere militare est* ("life is a battle") expressed the view of many.[46] As a general commands his army, so does the divine the universe,[47] and the wise man takes care to occupy the post assigned him.[48] He perceives the divine and the cosmic scheme of things, and his position within it, through reason (λογισμός).[49] Reason has been given to him as a weapon. Just as animals received from nature their several means of defense, so man has received reason.[50] With it as his weapon he overcomes all misfortune.[51] The popularity of the imagery, particularly that of the impregnable fortress, around

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[46] Seneca, *Ep.* 96.5: cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.31, 34.
[47] Ps.-Aristotle, *Mund.* 6.400b8–9, on which see W. Capelle, "Schrift von der Welt," *NJahrb* 15 (1905): 558 n. 6 for other references.
[48] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.9.16, 24; 3.1.19; cf. 3.13.14; 3.24.99–100; 3.26.29. He swears allegiance to God and does not complain: 1.14.15, cf. 1.29.29. For Seneca, see Emonds, "Christlicher Kriegsdienst," 143–148.
[49] Ps.-Aristotle, *Mund.* 6.399a32.
[50] Cf. Plutarch, *Fort.* 98DE; Maximus of Tyre 20.6 (249, 1–9 Hobein); cf. 31.4 (365, 14–15 Hobein), Ps.-Phocylides, *Sent.* 128. The notion is widespread, not only among Stoics, although they seem to have found it particularly apt. In its more popular use, it is speech that is said to distinguish man from the beasts, but it is not always possible to decide which meaning λόγος has in any particular context (cf. n. 13). On some occasions such words as φρόνησις and λογισμός provide clarity. On the topic, see Sherwood O. Dickerman, *De argumentis quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis et structura hominis et animalium petitis* (Diss.; Halle: Wichan und Burkhardt, 1909); Arthur S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum: Libri III* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955–1958; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 2:875–876; Pieter W. van der Horst, *The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* (SVTP 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 199–201.
[51] Menander, *Sent.* 515; cf. 582, 621.

the middle of the first century AD, is evident in Epictetus and especially Seneca, and its use illuminates 2 Cor 10:3–6.[52]

For Epictetus, the philosopher's thoughts are his protection.[53] In his depiction of the true Cynic, who represents for him the philosophical ideal, the philosopher's self-respect (αἰδώς), a concept central to Epictetus's view of the philosopher, constitutes his fortification.[54] The Cynic must be adorned on every side with self-respect as other men are with walls, doors, and doorkeepers.[55] His authority to censure others does not derive—like that of kings and tyrants—from weapons and bodyguards, but from his conscience and a purified mind.[56] His is an | inner protection; as a public man he is not hidden by walls and protective curtains.[57] 155

Seneca provides much more elaborate examples of the way in which the imagery of the fortified city was used to describe the philosopher's security.[58] He shares the Stoic confidence that the wise man withstands every attack and cannot be injured.[59] The sage is fortified against all possible inroads, is alert, and will not retreat from misfortunes.[60] Bravery is his impregnable fortress; surrounded by it he can hold out from anxiety during life's siege, for he uses his own strength as his weapons.[61] To be victorious, he must toughen his mind.[62] The Stoic should recognize that he can raise no wall against Fortune that she cannot take by storm. He should therefore strengthen his inner defenses; if they be safe, he can be attacked, but never captured,[63] for it is the power of the mind to be unconquerable.[64] He therefore girds himself about with philosophy, an impregnable wall that Fortune cannot breach to get at the independent

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52 For a few generations earlier, see Horace, *Ep.* 1.1.60 and *Sat.* 2.3.296–297, the latter referring to the Stoic Stertinius giving his convert Damasippus the Stoic precepts as weapons.

53 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.16.14.

54 On αἰδώς in Epictetus, see Benjamin L. Hijmans, *ἌΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* (Assen: van Gorcum, 1959), 27–30: Margarethe Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Vom Kynismus* (PhAnt 34; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 67–68.

55 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.8.33; cf. 4.3.7.

56 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.13–19, 94–95. Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.40.

57 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.14–16; cf. Marcus Aurelius 3.7.1.

58 See Emonds, "Christlicher Kriegsdienst," 152–154, who attributes Seneca's fondness for the metaphor to his teacher Quintus Sextius. See Wilhelm Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca* (Diss.; Freiburg: Gutenberg, 1952), 43–47; Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca*, 156–162.

59 Seneca, *Const. sap.* 3.4–5; *Ben.* 5.2.3–4.

60 Seneca, *Epp.* 59.6–8; cf. 64.3–4.

61 Seneca, *Ep.* 113.27–28.

62 Seneca, *Ep.* 51.5–6.

63 Seneca, *Ep.* 74.19.

64 Seneca, *Vit. beat.* 4.2.

soul who stands on unassailable ground.[65] The wise man may be bound to his body, but he is an absentee so far as his better self is concerned, and he concentrates his thoughts on lofty things (*cogitationes suas ad sublimia intendit*).[66] Virtue alone can attain to that height from which no force can drag it.[67] In short, as Seneca says of Stilpo's greatness of soul,

> though beneath the hand of that destroyer of so many cities fortifications shaken by the battering ram may totter, and high towers (*turrium altitudinem*) undermined by tunnels and secret saps may sink in sudden downfall, and earthworks rise to match the loftiest citadel (*editissimas arces*), yet no war-engines can be devised that will shake the firm-fixed soul.[68]

The perfect man,

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> | full of virtues human and divine, can lose nothing. His goods are girt by strong and insurmountable defenses.... The walls which guard the wise man are safe from both flame and assault, they provide no means of entrance, are lofty (*excelsa*), impregnable, godlike.[69]

The self-sufficient Stoic sage, secure in the high fortifications of his reason and trusting in his own weaponry, is very much like the objects of Paul's attack.

## The Philosopher's Dress as Armament

Antisthenes's other use of military imagery—to describe the philosopher's dress (σχῆμα)—also appears in the later philosophers.[70] The threadbare cloak worn without a tunic, together with a staff and a wallet, came to be associated especially with the long-haired and long-bearded Cynics and were important to them with respect to both their practice and their self-understanding. They could claim that their garb was not so unusual,

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[65] Seneca, *Ep.* 82.5.
[66] Seneca, *Ep.* 65.18.
[67] Seneca, *Vit. beat.* 15.5.
[68] Seneca, *Const. sap.* 6.4.
[69] Seneca, *Const. sap.* 6.8.
[70] See Johannes Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1909), 53–58; E. Schuppe, "Tribon," PW 6A (1937), 2415–2419, esp. 2417; Hans Dieter Betz, *Lukian von Samosata und das Neue Testament* (TU 76; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 133 n. 3; Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 47–53; B.R. Voss, "Die Keule der Kyniker," *Hermes* 95 (1967): 124–125; Walter Liefeld, "The Wandering Preacher as a Social Figure in the Roman Empire" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1967), 146ff., 167ff.; Jan F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (AUU: SGU 11; Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1976), 161–163.

since the statues of male deities, when they were clad at all, wore only a cloak.[71] Nevertheless, their garb did draw attention to them, and Cynics of the serious sort made use of the opportunity to instruct the audiences created in response to their dress.[72] In a *captatio benevolentiae* to such an audience, Dio Chrysostom says that by being drawn to him by his garb they honor philosophy, which itself is voiceless and without boldness of speech (ἀπαρρησίαστος).[73] They know that a man who has this appearance has prepared himself

> to admonish them and put them to the test and not to flatter or to spare any of them, but, on the contrary . . . to reprove them to the best of his ability by his words, and to show what sort of persons they are.[74]

| Thus, while the garb identifies him as a philosopher, it is also associated with personal challenge that more often than not met with rejection.[75] 157

Lucian's view that many Cynics dressed in the way they did only to make themselves conspicuous was true of many,[76] and even persons who favored the ideal were put off by their boasting about their garb.[77] But the serious Cynics, to whom we shall return later, boasted about their dress because they attached far greater significance to it. To them, taking up the garb was not simply a means of attracting an audience, but a deliberate act to demonstrate that the simplicity of soul for which they strived found expression in their way of life.[78] The Cynic assumed the dress at his "conversion" as part of his self-examination and self-discipline.[79] As he takes the "short cut to happiness," the practical life of virtue, and shuns the circuitous route of doctrine and intellectual speculation,[80] he dons

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[71] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 72.5; Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 20.

[72] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 34.2; 35.2–3.

[73] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12.9, cf. 72.16. On the philosopher's παρρησία, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

[74] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 72.9. The entire oration deals with the philosopher's garb. The crowds approach him with suspicion (7), active dislike (9), or curiosity (10–11).

[75] E.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.20, 24, 29, 74; 34.6; *Gnom. Vat.* 352; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 45.

[76] Lucian, *Nigr.* 24; cf. *Dial. mort.* 1.1; *Fug.* 4, 14, 20, 27; Seneca, *Ep.* 5.1–3.

[77] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.10, 50; 4.8.5; Maximus of Tyre 1.9–10 (15–18 Hobein). See Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes*, 139–140.

[78] Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 15.

[79] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.10. For an unconvincing debunking of Dio's account, see John L. Moles, "The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom," *JHS* 98 (1978): 79–100, here 88.

[80] On σύντομος ὁδός as a description of Cynicism, see Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 11; Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 6, 13, 16, 21; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 12, 30, 44, and see Victor Emeljanow, "A Note on the Cynic Short Cut to Virtue," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 18 (1965): 182–184.

the garb to assist him in stripping to essentials in his new life. His dress is his armament in the campaign he now conducts.[81] A gift from the gods,[82] these weapons aid him in a number of ways. They separate him from the multitude and its values, and drive him to rely on his inner self, where his security lies.[83] They show that he is opposed to popular opinion and is in a campaign against the appearances that war against life.[84] Taken up for the sake of frugality, the weapons are effective in driving away from him lovers of pleasures, and they aid him in exercising simplicity in spirit and everyday life.[85] In short, they demonstrate him to be a person who places the highest value on the exercise of his own free will.

These Cynics are like Antisthenes's Odysseus in that their lowly garb is described as weapons. Unlike him, however, their dress does not enable them to sneak up on someone's blind side, nor do they | associate it with versatility in speech. On the contrary, it draws attention to them and sets them apart, sometimes becoming the very cause of the ill treatment they receive. Far from being a symbol of adaptability, it asserts their independence from the conventions and values of society.[86] These Cynics are also unlike the Stoics, who chose to develop Antisthenes's other image. They do not use the image of the fortified city to describe the intellectual exercises by which the sage attains security, as the Stoics did, but in conscious rejection of the need or desirability of intellectual sophistication, they stress the practical life that is lived by willing it.[87] Hans Dieter Betz has shown—but without examining the military metaphor in detail—that discussions of the philosopher's σχῆμα lie behind part of the debate

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[81] Cf. Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8.

[82] Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 16, 23; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 34.

[83] Cf. Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 13; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 30 on security; Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 6, 16, 23; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 12, on separating from persons with different standards.

[84] Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 7, 34. Cf. Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 33.2: the Cynic's garb guards him.

[85] Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 23; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 15, 34.

[86] The Cynic's dress is therefore part of his "falsifying of the currency," on which see Diogenes Laertius 6.21–22, 71; Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* (London: Methuen, 1937; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967; 2d. ed., London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998), 20–22; Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus* (HB 1.40; Munich: W. Fink, 1979), 43–56. However, not all Cynics made the connection. According to Lucian, *Demon.* 5, Demonax wore the Cynic garb but lived the same life as everyone else.

[87] The image does appear, e.g., in Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 29.1, but not in the Stoic manner. On the Cynic self-understanding, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Vol. 3: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Ben F. Meyer and Edward P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 46–59, 192–197. [*Light*, 2:635–650]

in 2 Cor 10–13.[88] Before turning to Paul, it remains to examine the fate of Odysseus at the hands of his admirers and detractors after Antisthenes.

## Odysseus: Hero and Villain

Odysseus continued to meet with a mixed reception. He was sometimes used by the same author as both a positive and negative example.[89] "His traditional qualities, especially the ambiguous ones, are now manipulated and re-orientated to suit prevailing policies and doctrines."[90] He is still remembered as crafty, duplicitous, and too much given to expediency,[91] but although he is acknowledged to have done things in secret and without any witnesses, Ovid could also claim that Ulysses was superior in intellect to his allies.[92] According to Stanford, Ovid's account of the contest between Ajax and Odysseus is an | exhibition of Roman rhetoric in a mythological setting. 159 The contest had become a subject for declamations, and Ovid intended to illustrate the conflict between the man of action and the man of counsel. His own preference is clearly stated: "The event made clear the power of eloquence: the skilful speaker won the brave man's arms."[93] Other orators praised his eloquence and style, and Plutarch refers to him as a defender of the moderate form of the philosopher's bold speech (παρρησία).[94]

In general, the Stoics praised Odysseus.[95] They did have difficulty with his weeping, but they were more inclined to see him as an exemplar of virtue and wisdom.[96] Like Hercules, he was to them an ideal wise man

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[88] Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, esp. 47–57.

[89] On the use of examples in Greek and Latin literature, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986), 37–44.

[90] Stanford, *Ulysses Theme*, 118–119.

[91] Statius, *Achilleid* 1.784, Horace, *Carm.* 1.6.7; *Sat.* 2.5: Cicero, *Off.* 3.97. Stanford (*Ulysses Theme*, 266 n. 12) tries too hard to remove any unfavorable assessment of Ulysses from Horace.

[92] Ovid, *Metam.* 13.15.101–104, 360–369. See Stanford, *Ulysses Theme*, 138–143.

[93] *Metam.* 13.382–383, according to Stanford's interpretation.

[94] Cf. Cicero, *Brut.* 40, 177; *De or.* 1.31.142; 2.15.64; 27.120; *Tusc.* 5.46; Quintilian, *Inst.* 11.3.158; 12.10.64; Aulus Gellius 1.15.3; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 66F; cf. 74B. Plutarch's discussion of παρρησία is heavily dependent on Cynic and Stoic sources. For other Stoics, see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.24.26; Heraclitus, *Homerica Problemata* 67.5 (Felix Buffière, ed., *Heraclite. Allégories d'Homère* [Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1962], 72).

[95] Ganss (*Bild des Weisen*, 122) is wrong when he says that Odysseus had lost his earlier significance as a paradigm in the later philosophical literature. See Stanford, *Ulysses Theme*, 118–127.

[96] Cicero, *Fin.* 5.49; Horace, *Ep.* 1.2.17–18. Cf. Lucian, *Par.* 10, where Odysseus is criticized for not being a better Stoic. For the problem of his weeping, see Stanford, *Ulysses Theme*, 121.

because he was unconquered by struggles, despised pleasures, and was victorious over all terrors.[97] He was a man of sense (ὁ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων),[98] an example of the person who controls his passions with his reason (λογισμός).[99] Yet he was adaptable, striving in every word to be courteous and affable to all.[100]

The way in which Stoics dealt with his weakness is instructive. Epictetus simply dismisses Homer's description of Odysseus's weeping on the ground that if Odysseus had wept, he could not have been a good man, and it is self-evident to Epictetus that he had been.[101] Far more characteristic for Epictetus is that Odysseus trusted in his own judgments about which things are under our control and which not, while at the same time being an example of the way God governs | human affairs and of someone who does nothing without calling on God.[102]

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Two passages from Pacuvius's *Niptra*, which Cicero quotes, are particularly significant. In one, as she washes Ulysses's feet, his nurse recognizes him and approvingly speaks of "the gentleness of (his) speech, the softness of (his) body" (*lenitudo orationibus mollitudo corporis*).[103] Cicero is concerned whether to accept these qualities as good in the philosophical sense. His other quotation, in a discussion of the soul, is more illustrative.[104] Cicero holds that the soul has two parts, one with and one without reason (*ratio*). The one without is soft (*molle*). Reason by its own effort strives and becomes perfect virtue. It is man's duty to enable reason to rule over the other part. He does this when close associates shame a person when the soft part of his soul acts disgracefully. This happened to Ulysses when he was reproved for his wailing. Cicero says that Ulysses did not wail extravagantly but with restraint, and he then quotes Pacuvius. In this

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[97] Seneca, *Const. sap.* 2.1. As a philosopher, Seneca admired Ulysses; as a dramatist he denigrated him. See Stanford, *Ulysses Theme*, 144.

[98] Plutarch, *Conj. praec.* 139A. For ὁ νοῦν ἔχων as a description of the Stoic sage, see *SVF* 3:548, 563, 701, 717.

[99] Plutarch, *Adol. poet. aud.* 31B–D.

[100] Cicero, *Off.* 1.113.

[101] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.13–21, on which see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 42–64, esp. 49. [*Light*, 2:601–634]

[102] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.26.33–34.

[103] Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.46. According to Cicero, it is Anticlea, Ulysses's mother, but in the scene he and Pacuvius have in mind (*Od.* 19.390–391), Euryclea, Ulysses's nurse, does the washing. For *lenis* as a description of speech, see Cicero, *De or.* 2.43.183; Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.50; 9.4.127.

[104] Cicero, *Tusc.* 2.47–50.

respect, Cicero claims, Pacuvius has greater insight than Sophocles, who made Ulysses lament excessively, for Pacuvius says,

> You too, Ulysses, though we see you sore stricken, are almost too soft in spirit (*nimis paene animo es molli*), you who, accustomed to live life-long under arms (*consuetus in aevom agere*)...

On his deathbed Ulysses expressed the attitude that it is appropriate to complain at hostile fortune, but one is not to bewail it. Ulysses is therefore an example of the person in whose spirit the softer part obeyed reason just as a disciplined soul obeys a strict general.

Odysseus, therefore, despite the difficulty that his "softness" represents, was a paradigm for some Stoics.[105] He represented the sage who subdues the passions through reason. However, the military imagery that was often used by Stoics to describe the wise man's fortified soul does not appear to have been used extensively in discussing Odysseus, and other military images appear only incidentally, as they do | here in Cicero. Nor does Antisthenes's characterization of the philosopher's garb as his weapons find application to Odysseus among Stoics. The situation with the Cynics is altogether different. 161

During his Cynic period, Dio Chrysostom repeatedly compared himself with Odysseus.[106] At his conversion to the Cynic life, when he had been banished by Domitian, he consults Apollo and calls to mind Odysseus, who would become his example during his wanderings: "So after exhorting myself in this way neither to fear or be ashamed of my action, and putting on humble attire (στολὴν ταπεινήν) and otherwise chastening myself, I proceeded to roam everywhere."[107] At the end of his wanderings, when he heard of Domitian's death, he stripped off his rags, quoting *Od.* 22.1, "Then Odysseus of many counsels stripped him of his rags."[108] Dressed in this fashion, and grateful to the gods for preventing him from becoming

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105 Note also the Stoic allegorists' interpretation of Odysseus and the moly plant. According to Heraclitus, *Homerica problemata* 73.8–10, Hermes, who is the rational intelligence (λογισμός), gives Odysseus the μῶλυ, which signifies prudence (φρόνησις), to withstand the onslaught of the passions. According to Apollonius Sophista, *Lexicon Homericum*, s.v. μῶλυ, Cleanthes said that μῶλυ allegorically signifies the reason by which the ὁρμαί and πάθη are softened.

106 Moles, "Career," has called into question Dio's account of his Cynic period and scholarly acceptance of it. On Odysseus in Dio, see Jan F. Kindstrand, *Homer in der zweiten Sophistik* (SGU 7; Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1973), 34–35; Desideri, *Dione di Prusa*, 174 n. 2; Moles, "Career," 97.

107 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.10–11.

108 According to Philostratus, *Vit. soph.* 1.488.

an eyewitness to the injustices of Domitian, he went about "demanding crusts, not cauldrons fine nor swords" (*Od.* 17.222).[109] According to Dio, Diogenes too was like Odysseus in every respect as he moved among people in the guise of a beggar.[110] In this, we shall see, he does not agree with certain other Cynics. Dio knew that the philosopher's garb was referred to as his armament, and he is careful to distinguish himself from those Cynics who made much of their garb as their weaponry.[111] The philosopher's weapons, defenses, allies, and bodyguards in his battle against the passions, he says, are wise and prudent words and not the outward garb as the majority think. That most people judge philosophers by their dress, rather than by what they really are, is not surprising since the same mistake was made in the case of Odysseus, who was not distinguished from the beggar Irus because they were dressed alike. The professed philosophers Dio has in mind are those "who do many harsh things," that is, the rigoristic Cynics.[112]

Dio reflects the same concerns in *Orat.* 33. In his self-introduction (1–14) he distinguishes the ill-clad philosopher who censures people in order to improve them from the sleekly dressed sophist who flatters them for his own benefit. Thersites, to whom Apollo paid the highest | tribute because he first censured himself, is cited as an example of the former.[113] The philosopher enters a world that is full of vice and filled with enemy upon enemy (15). Like Odysseus, he

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> subdues his body with injurious blows,
> casts around his shoulders sorry rags, in
> guise a slave, steals into the wide-eyed town of those
> who hold debauch (*Od.* 4.244–246)

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[109] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.51.

[110] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 9.9. See Höistad, *Cynic Hero*, 196, for the similarities to Antisthenes's Odysseus.

[111] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 49.10–12.

[112] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.11, and for the type, Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse,'" 208–210 (see n. 73 above); "Self-Definition" (see n. 87 above).

[113] Thersites is usually represented unfavorably as the dour Cynic, e.g., Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 7; *Pisc.* 37; *Fug.* 30; *Ind.* 7. On Lucian, see K. Funk, "Untersuchungen über die Lucianische Vita Demonactis," *Philologus* Suppl. 10 (1907): 597; Rudolf W.O. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1906; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), 53–54, 196. Lucian (*Ind.* 7) pokes fun at Thersites as a Cynic making a popular speech (δημηγορῶν): If he should get Achilles's armor, he would not change immediately nor would he be able to use it. In *Demon.* 61 Thersites is called a mob-orator (δημήγορος) of the Cynic type. Demonax, however, accepted him as an illustration when it suited him (cf. 50), as does Dio. When Dio does characterize him, it is not as σκυθρωπός or δημήγορος, or from material derived from the *Odyssey*, but with words from *Il.* 2.246, as λιγὺς ἀγορητής, a "clear-voiced speaker."

in order to do his neighbors some good. In response, they either stir him up, or, what is of greater moment to Dio, they summon a philosopher who will appear to them to be an intractable and savage man as a speaker (δημήγορος), from whom they are eager to hear what they are in no condition to endure.[114]

The type of Cynic whom Dio represents, who submits to ill treatment and hardships in order to benefit his audience, goes back to Antisthenes, and so does Dio's use of Odysseus to describe himself as such a Cynic who wears the humble garb.[115] With Dio we have now moved from distinctions between Stoics and Cynics to differences among Cynics themselves. The harsh Cynics were most insistent in describing their form of dress as armament, a description that is also ultimately dependent on Antisthenes. But what is at issue here is not merely the continuing influence of Antisthenes in the Cynics' use of the imagery, but their self-understanding as it is related to the imagery. The differences become clear in the Cynic epistolary literature, which reflect the perception of those Cynics whom Dio opposes, and they cast light on his use of the Antisthenic tradition. The letters in question, certain of the ones attributed to Crates and Diogenes, date from the early Empire and represent issues under debate around the time Paul wrote 2 Corinthians.[116]

## | The Weapons of the Gods 163

Three of the letters attributed to Crates are hostile to the Antisthenic tradition. They assert that Diogenes and not Odysseus was the father of Cynicism, and that the Cynic's garb are the weapons of the gods or Diogenes with which the Cynic drives away those who would corrupt him.[117] In *Ep.* 19 the antagonism to Odysseus becomes vituperative.[118] In an attack

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[114] For the curious attraction such people had for the public, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays* on *the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980), 27. [*Light*, 1:117–134]

[115] On Dio as an Antisthenic Cynic, see Höistad, *Cynic Hero*, 164–165, 196–197.

[116] On the dates and authorship of the letters attributed to Crates and Diogenes, see Malherbe, *Cynic Epistles*, 10–21 (see n. 35 above).

[117] Ps.-Crates, *Epp*. 19, 23.

[118] See W. Capelle, "De cynicorum epistulis" (Ph.D. diss., Göttingen, 1896), 23, 52–53. Norden ("Beiträge," 394–395) states that most of the accusations made against Odysseus in the letter appear in the scholia to Homer as ἀπορίαι and are solved. According to Stanford (*Ulysses Theme*, 266 n. 12), Michelina Martorana (*Ulisse nella letteratura latina* [Palermo/Rome: R. Sandron, 1926], 75–80) discusses the Cynic rejection of Antisthenes's conception

on the view that Odysseus was the father of Cynicism, a bill of particulars against him is drawn up: he was the softest of all his associates,[119] he put pleasure above all else, he put the cloak on once, always looked to God for aid, and begged from everyone, even the lowly or base (ταπεινοί). Diogenes is then claimed to be the father of Cynicism: he wore the Cynic garb throughout his entire life, was superior to toil and pleasure, demanded his financial support but not from the ταπεινοί,[120] was self-sufficient, had confidence in himself (ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ θαρροῦντα),[121] trusted in reason, and was courageous in his practice of virtue. Odysseus is here made to represent the milder Cynic like Dio from whom the author wants to be distinguished, Diogenes the paradigm of the superior, consistent, rigorous, and demanding Cynic.

Another Cynic, writing under the name of Diogenes, also represents the interest of the period in the original invention of the Cynic garb.[122] It 164 is clear from *Ep.* 34 that the issue revolved around | Antisthenes's interpretation of Odysseus. "Diogenes" denies that he had received the lessons of the σχῆμα and begging from Antisthenes; what Antisthenes taught had already been anticipated by Homer and the poets. The statement indicates that Antisthenes is still identified with the garb but is removed as its inventor.[123] While "Diogenes" belongs to the same rigoristic type of Cynicism as "Crates," he does not share his low esteem of Odysseus, nor does he shrink from relating the Cynic to the gods, albeit in a typically

of Odysseus as the proto-Cynic, and suggests that Horace, *Sat.* 2.5, may reflect the same attitude.

[119] Softness frequently appears in vice lists describing the self-indulgent person, e.g., Lucian, *Tim.* 28; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.16.45; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 12, 29.2, 36.5. The self-sufficient Cynic's σχῆμα is contrasted to the self-indulgent person's soft garments by Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 17; cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28.1; Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 19; Cicero, *De or.* 1.226.

[120] Paradoxically, Cynic begging was viewed as a sign of independence: By surrendering his private property, the Cynic was freed from evil and showed himself superior to the values of popular opinion (Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 7; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 9); begging is really a demand for what belongs to him (Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 26, 27; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 10,2); he begs only from people who are worthy of him and his teaching (Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 2, 19, 22, 36; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 38.3–4).

[121] Cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 29: The harsh Cynic clad in the traditional garb will turn Dionysius away from his softness, take away his fears, and instill θάρσος.

[122] Various persons are credited with it. In addition to the Cynic epistles, the sources behind Diogenes Laertius 6.21 and Lucian, *Dial. mort.* 21, refer to Antisthenes. The epistles of Crates, Diogenes Laertius 6.22–23, and Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 72.11, 26, attribute it to Diogenes, the latter including Socrates, and Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8 finds it already in Heracles. On the tradition, see F. Leo, "Diogenes bei Plautus," *Hermes* 41 (1906): 141–146; Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 6–7. Kindstrand (*Bion of Borysthenes*, 162) thinks that this practice may have begun with Socrates.

[123] See Victor Emeljanow, "The Letters of Diogenes" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1974), 41.

Cynic manner. In *Ep.* 7 he calls himself heaven's dog who lives free under Zeus and attributes what is good to Zeus and not to his neighbors. It is his living according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and not according to popular opinion (κατὰ δόξαν) that is equivalent to his being free under God.[124] Quoting *Od.* 13.434–438, but not mentioning Odysseus by name, he claims that the garb is an invention of the gods and not of men. He lives under their protection, and therefore he calls for confidence (θαρρεῖν) in his dress.[125] He dons the garb with conscious determination as a reflection of his simplicity of soul and demonstration that his spoken claims conform to his life.[126] No enemy would dare to campaign against such a person.[127]

These formidable Cynics, then, still use the tradition that begins with Antisthenes but, offended by the relative moderation in Cynic life that had come to be associated with Antisthenes, they denied their indebtedness to him and distanced themselves from his Odysseus. The old charges against Odysseus are now applied to their fellow Cynics, namely, that they are not consistent, that they lack courage, associate with the base, and are soft. The Cynic letters do not comment on Odysseus's versatility of speech, but other sources do,[128] and the rigoristic Cynics' criticism of the adaptation of a philosopher's speech to particular circumstances is well documented.[129] Theirs was not a view of Odysseus that would permit a treatment such as that of the Stoics of Pacuvius's hero, gentle in speech and soft in body, who through reason | subdued his weakness. Such an Odysseus was not a positive example for them, but was to be used in their polemic against their competitors. 165

To summarize before turning to 2 Corinthians: Two military images that were popular in the first century were derived from Antisthenes. He applied the image of a city fortified against a siege to the wise man's rational faculties with which he fortifies himself, and he applied the image of a soldier's personal armor to the garb of Odysseus the proto-Cynic, who through his versatility and self-humiliation adapted himself to circumstances in order to gain the good of his associates and save them. The imagery of the fortified city was adopted by Stoics and developed in their

124 For an attempt to place this passage in the context of Cynic attitudes toward religion, see Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus," 50–51, and for a modification, Malherbe, "Self-Definition," nn. 73–75.

125 Cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 10.1.

126 Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 15.

127 Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 46.

128 E.g., Horace, *Sat.* 2.5.27–44; see Martorana, *Ulisse*, n. 118 above.

129 See Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse'" (see n. 73 above).

description of the sage who is secure in the citadel of his reason. The imagery of the philosopher's garb as his armor became popular among Cynics, who do not appear to have used the imagery of the fortified city to any great extent to describe the philosopher's personal security.

Odysseus received the attention of both schools of philosophy. The Stoics were embarrassed by his softness and weeping, but with the aid of their psychology and view of cosmic determinism could redeem him by representing him as a person who overcame his passions and hardships through his reason and who lived the life assigned him by the divine. The Cynics, who did not possess such a well-developed doctrine of intellectual and moral development, and who placed the greatest value on the volition of the independent man, were divided over him. In their debates, the philosopher's garb was taken as a symbol for his entire disposition and demeanor. Cynics of more moderate bent identified with him as the wandering preacher of Antisthenes who went about clad in rags and suffered humiliation. The rigoristic Cynics, on the other hand, rejected the Odysseus of Antisthenes as their model and claimed that their garb was armament received from the gods. It functioned not only in their relation to the masses they excoriated, but also to distinguish themselves from other Cynics who, like Odysseus, appeared to be inconsistent in their behavior, were soft in body, and were abjectly dependent on others, even the base. Some of them decried Odysseus's dependence on the divine, but others interpreted this relation to the divine to refer to the Cynic's life of opposition to society's values and conventions. Not brought up in relation to Odysseus by these Cynics, but frequently discussed by other writers not well disposed to him, was his adaptability in speech, a feature rigorous Cynics roundly rejected.



In 2 Cor 10:3–6, Paul uses both images, in conjunction with each other, to introduce this polemical section of the letter. He describes his own weapons in terms approximating the self-description of the rigoristic Cynics and describes his opponents' fortifications in terms strongly reminiscent of the Stoic sage. As in the tradition we have surveyed, the imagery represents two types of self-understanding, but by Paul they are brought into conflict with each other in a detailed image of a successful siege. In his warfare (στρατευόμεθα) Paul is armed to demolish fortifications, and his attack is described as taking place in three successive stages: demolishing

all fortifications, taking captives, and punishing resistance.[130] The precise relationship between these verses, and indeed 10:1–6, to the rest of chapters 10–13 is difficult to determine, and cannot be pursued here. A number of observations, however, are in order.

Paul uses this particular imagery only here.[131] Why? It is not unlikely that the opposition he encountered suggested it to him. To determine whether this was indeed the case, it will be necessary to give closer attention to the charges brought against Paul.

It is important for Betz to decide whether 10:1, "I who am humble (ταπεινός) when face to face with you, but bold (θαρρῶ) to you when I am away," is to be interpreted in light of 10:10, "For they say, 'His letters are weighty (βαρεῖαι) and strong (ἰσχυραί), but his bodily presence is weak (ἀσθενής), and his speech of no account (ἐξουθενημένος),'" and be understood as part of the accusation against Paul, as most commentators do, or whether to read 10:1 as already a reply to 10:10, as Betz does.[132]

What is decisive for Betz is what is understood under the terms ταπεινός-θαρρεῖν which describe the inconsistency and incongruity of Paul's actions. To illuminate the matter, Betz traces a tradition in which the philosopher, particularly Socrates, is described as ταπεινός. The Cynics appropriated this tradition when they discussed the absurdity of the garb, which rested for them on their principle of "counterfeiting the coinage." The pair ταπεινός-θαρρεῖν could therefore assume the positive value that it also has here in Paul. In 10:1, Betz | holds, Paul responds to the charge of 10:10, 167 but does not use the same terms, which suggests that it is Paul himself who introduced the pair ταπεινός-θαρρεῖν. The criticism in 10:10 of Paul's inconsistency in communication between his speech, when present, and his letters, when absent, is formulated in terms derived from the field of rhetoric. In response, Paul also uses such terms. Thus τολμᾶν ("to be bold") and θαρρεῖν both came from contemporary rhetoric and were used in the

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130 The three participles, καθαιροῦντες, αἰχμαλωτίζοντες, ἔχοντες, are grammatically dependent on στρατευόμεθα and explicate how the campaign takes place.

131 The closest parallel in Paul is 2 Cor 2:14–16, if one accepts the interpretation of some commentators. See Ernest Bernard Allo, *Saint Paul. Seconde epître aux Corinthiens* (2d ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956), 45–47; Hughes, *Paul's Second Epistle*, 77–78; Kümmel, *An die Korinther*, 198; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 98.

132 See Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 44–57.

conflict between philosophers and sophists.[133] Paul's apology is thus part of this tradition, and Betz interprets 10:1–6 in light of that conflict.[134]

Betz is correct in drawing attention to the philosophical discussions of the philosopher's σχῆμα and to the Cynic character of the self-deprecating irony with which Paul begins the section.[135] He does not, however, do justice to the military imagery that dominates 10:1–6, nor does he satisfactorily discuss its relation to the charge against Paul mentioned in v. 2, by "certain persons who reason (λογιζομένους) that we are conducting ourselves according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα)." These issues must be explored before interpreting 10:1–6 in light of the reconstructed philosophic-sophistic controversy, especially since the terms explicitly used by Paul to describe criticism of his speech and letters do not appear here.

Exactly what Paul's opponents meant when they accused him of living κατὰ σάρκα is much debated.[136] They may thereby have meant that he had no visions or ecstatic experiences and that he did not "behave in an authoritarian, self-assertive way that could be ascribed to spiritual authority and superiority."[137] But the use of the same phrase in 2 Cor 1:17 does lend some concreteness to its use here. In defending himself against the charge that his failure to carry out his announced visit to them proved his insincerity, Paul in two rhetorical questions reflects the language in which the charge was made:[138] "Was I vacillating when I wanted to do this? Do I make my plans according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), so as to say at the
168 same time 'Yes, yes' and | 'No, no'?" Here the inconsistency between his stated plans and his deeds is ascribed to duplicity. In 1:12–14, where he protests his sincerity, consistency and clarity, he also denies that his conduct in the world and especially in relation to the Corinthians had been in fleshly wisdom (σοφίᾳ σαρκικῇ). The same concern with his inconsistency is reflected in 10:1, and it is therefore likely that κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν is the Corinthians' interpretation of his conduct. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that the occasion for Paul's use of the military imagery is

[133] On τολμᾶν, see further Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 67–68, who is followed by Josef Zmijewski, *Der Stil der paulinischen Narrenrede* (BBB 52; Cologne/Bonn: Hanstein, 1978), 234–235.

[134] Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 68.

[135] For the Cynic irony, see Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes*, 55–56, and Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes*, 183.

[136] See the catalogue of interpretations in Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 64 n. 44. Windisch (*Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 295 n. 2) compares the construction to Diogenes Laertius 6.11, which refers to a statement by Antisthenes on the wise man's conduct.

[137] Thus Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 250, on the basis of the content of chs. 10–13.

[138] See Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 64.

criticism of what is perceived to have been the inconsistency and adaptability in his behavior.

The same criticisms, we have seen, were made of Odysseus, viewed by some as a proto-Cynic. Other elements of 10:1–2, which Betz interprets in terms of contemporary rhetoric, also are part of the tradition we have traced, and when seen from that perspective, clarify the connection between vv. 1–2 and 3–6.[139]

Paul's inconsistency of behavior is described in 10:1 in terms of the contrast between the baseness or humiliation (ταπεινός) he exhibited when present and the confidence (θαρρῶ) with which he acted when away. It is not immediately obvious whether Paul's opponents formulated their complaint in these words or whether it is Paul himself who does so. What he is referring to is clarified by 11:7, where he describes his decision to support himself by manual labor as his voluntary self-humiliation (ἐμαυτὸν ταπεινῶν). In referring to his plying his trade as something humiliating, he reflects the upper class attitude toward manual labor.[140] However, Paul viewed his employment as belonging to the hardships that characterized his apostleship,[141] and the practice of his trade was therefore part of his apostolic self-understanding. His refusal to accept financial support from the Corinthians when he was with them, but to maintain himself by tentmaking, could thus appear as humiliating, but it also involved Paul's and the Corinthians' understanding of apostleship.

When Paul was away, it was charged, he acted with guile by enriching himself by means of the collection for Jerusalem (12:16). However, in 10:2 Paul does not contrast his humiliation with his purported guile, but with confidence (θαρρῶ). The connection between ταπεινός and θαρρεῖν becomes intelligible when viewed in light of the Cynic | descriptions of 169 the philosopher's dress as the armament of the gods. The rigorous Crates affirms that, although it is appropriate for the Cynic to receive financial aid from others, he was not to accept anything from the base (ταπεινοί) but was to show his independence by selective begging[142] and be confident in himself (ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ θαρροῦντα). Stated differently, his confidence was to be

[139] Betz concentrates on the former, where he espies traces of the philosophic-sophistic controversy, hence the latter is a difficult passage for him (see *Apostel Paulus*, 681).

[140] See Ronald F. Hock, "Paul's Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class," *JBL* 97 (1978): 555–564, and Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), esp. 36, 60, 64.

[141] Cf. the reference to his manual labor in the list of apostolic hardships in 1 Cor 4:9–13 (v. 12), and see Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 334.

[142] See n. 120 above.

in his dress, which is an invention of the gods and not men, a symbol of the conscious determination with which he undertakes his campaign and a means by which he distinguishes himself from others. Such a person is different from the two-faced Odysseus, who begged from everyone.

Paul appropriates the language of the Cynics, but he applies it to himself in a completely different manner. Paul differs from the rigorous Cynics in not being concerned with the ταπεινότης of others but his own, namely, the self-humiliation of which his manual labor is part. In the voluntariness of his self-humiliation, he is like Antisthenes's Odysseus, whom these rigorists reject. He further differs from them in that he does not beg and indeed refuses financial aid from his converts. His practice of supporting himself by manual labor was not, however, contrary to the practice or ideals of all Cynics. To some, the independence thus gained was to be strived for, and Ronald Hock has demonstrated that Paul's statements about his work should be seen in that context.[143] Nevertheless, viewed socially, and in the Corinthian debate theologically, his practice was humiliating. Where Paul does agree with Crates, ironically, is that his practice also distinguished himself from others (cf. 11:12).

That Paul can describe himself as ταπεινός does not, however, mean that he accepts abjectness as its corollary. To make that clear, he stresses his confidence (θαρρῆσαι τῇ πεποιθήσει) and boldness (τολμῆσαι) in 10:2. In this respect he is like the rigoristic Cynics who have confidence in the armor of the gods although, as we shall see, he understands it differently. The boldness in this context refers to boldness in battle, not to speech. Agesilaus, for example, is reported to have said that a general should have boldness (τόλμα) toward the enemy and kindness toward the men under him.[144] For our purposes it is noteworthy that Odysseus's boldness or lack of it was a point at issue in Greek literature,[145] and we have encountered it in Antisthenes's account of the contest between Ajax and Odysseus. There Ajax accuses Odysseus of not having the boldness to take up Achilles's arms; he would rather be underhanded and submit to humiliation. Odysseus, | who has only his humble garb as armor, sarcastically replies that he would not be so bold as to strive for reputation, but would be content with the maltreatment he receives if he might thereby save others. Implicit in his reply is that his boldness resides in his total

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143 Hock, *Social Context of Paul's Ministry*, esp. 39–40, 56–59.
144 Plutarch, *Apoph. lac.* 213C; *Gnom. Vat.* 70. Cf. also Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.19.
145 See Gottfried Fitzer, "τολμάω," *TDNT* 8 (1972): 181–182.

behavior as symbolized by his rags. It becomes explicit in the later Cynics, who debate his appropriateness as a model for them, although they use θαρρεῖν instead of τολμᾶν. The words, however, are equivalent in meaning,[146] and Paul links them with πεποίθησις ("confidence") in 10:2 to stress the confidence with which he threatens to act against those who accuse him of conduct according to the flesh, that is, of acting underhandedly and inconsistently.

The imagery that lies behind 10:1–2 becomes explicit in vv. 3–6. Paul rejects the charge that he lived κατὰ σάρκα in such a way as to introduce the military imagery. Instead of saying "For though we live in the flesh we are not living according to the flesh," he says, "For though we live in the flesh (ἐν σαρκί) we are not carrying on a war according to the flesh (οὐ κατὰ σάρκα στρατευόμεθα)." The criticisms leveled against him had to do with his conduct, and he responds to them by describing his conduct in explicitly martial terms. "In the flesh" is to be understood simply as "in the world,"[147] and "according to the flesh" in the sense in which it was used by his opponents, that is, as describing his mean, inconsistent, underhanded conniving conduct. Paul's warfare, then, consists in his manner of life. Far from being abject, the Paul who is ταπεινός is combative. In this respect he is like the Cynic who appears in humiliating circumstances and garb but is actually at war.

In an explanatory parenthesis (v. 4), Paul qualifies the nature of his equipment in the war: his weapons are not fleshly (σαρκικά) but powerful in God's service (δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ). This qualification distinguishes Paul's use of the imagery from that of the Cynics and, while it expresses his confidence, refers it to God. "Fleshly" is used in the Pauline sense of what is opposed to God;[148] thus he does not contrast "fleshly weapons" to "spiritual weapons," which one might expect, but to weapons that are δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ, thereby laying the stress on the effectualness and divine origin of his weaponry.[149] What he means by δυνατὰ τῷ θεῷ is not immediately clear. The construction can be | intensive and be rendered "very powerful,"[150] or it can be a 171

[146] See Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 294–295; Fitzer, "τολμάω," 184 n. 17.

[147] Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 250; Eduard Schweizer, "σάρξ," *TDNT* 7 (1971): 126: "the earthly life in its totality"; Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (2 vols.; New York: Scribner's, 1951), 1:235: "in the sphere of the obvious, or the earthly-human, or the natural."

[148] See Schweizer, "σάρξ," 128.

[149] Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 297; Plummer, *Second Corinthians*, 276.

[150] Thus C.F.D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 184. The construction would then be a Hebraism.

*dativus commodi*, "powerful for God" in whose services the weapons are wielded.[151] In view of Paul's treatment of weakness and power in this letter, the latter is the correct meaning. It is God's power that enables him to endure the hardships that characterize his apostleship;[152] he will boast in his weakness, for in it God's power is perfected.[153] The hardships may be viewed as demonstrations of weakness[154] and as belonging to his mean life, but Paul reevaluates them by making them the opportunity for the demonstration of God's power.[155]

Paul is like the Cynics in describing his manner of life, which for them was symbolized by their garb, as weapons, and by relating them to God. He differs radically from them, however, in that his confidence is not in himself but in God's power.

When Paul describes his own armament, he makes use of that part of the tradition that originated with Antisthenes and found its way into Cynics' discussions of their self-understanding. However, when he describes the objects of his attack, it is the Stoic appropriation of the other image that he finds useful. The self-sufficient, self-confident Stoic, secure in the fortification of his reason, represents a type antithetical to Paul's own self-understanding and provides him with the description of his opponents. Like Seneca, they feel secure in their elevated citadel. Paul had already made use of such Stoic self-descriptions elsewhere in his Corinthian correspondence to describe certain Corinthians, so it comes as no surprise that he does so here, but now he uses military imagery.[156]

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[151] Thus Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 297; Barrett, *Second Corinthians*, 251, and most commentators.

[152] Note the association of God's power with the so-called *peristasis* catalogues in 4:7–11 and 6:4–7.

[153] See 11:30–12:10 and cf. 13:3–4.

[154] Cf. the ironic references to his weakness that enclose the list of hardships in 11:21–29.

[155] See R. Leivestad, "'The Meekness and Gentleness of Christ' II Cor X.1," *NTS* 12 (1966): 156–164, esp. 162.

[156] For the use of Stoic (and Cynic) terminology, see Robert M. Grant, "Hellenistic Elements in I Corinthians," in *Early Christian Origins: Studies in Honor of Harold R. Willoughby* (ed. Allen Wikgren; Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), 60–66. For the terminology in Paul's response to the Corinthian slogans, see Stanley K. Stowers, "A 'Debate' over Freedom: 1 Corinthians 6:12–20," in *Christian Teaching: Studies In Honor of LeMoine G. Lewis* (ed. Everett Ferguson; Abilene, Tex.: Abilene Christian University, 1981), 59–71. Note the parallel between the attitude expressed in Lucian, *Hermot.* 81, that the Stoic, if he learns Stoic cosmology properly, will be "the only rich man, the only king, and the rest slaves and scum (καθάρματα) compared to (him)," and 1 Cor 4:8, "Already you have become rich! Without us you have become kings!" followed by a *peristasis* catalogue that concludes, "we have become, and are now, as the refuse of the world, the offscouring of all things (ὡς περικαθάρματα τοῦ κόσμου ἐγενήθημεν, πάντων περίψημα ἕως ἄρτι, v. 13)." Windisch (*Der*

The reasonings (λογισμοί) of his | opponents are the fortifications that 172 protect their thoughts (πᾶν νόημα) against the knowledge of God (γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ). On the surface, this appears to be an intellectual confrontation: Paul proclaims the knowledge of God, which overpowers the corrupt thoughts of his opponents.[157] Paul does speak in 4:4–6 of the νοήματα of unbelievers and the knowledge of God that is preached, and in 11:6 he does claim knowledge for himself. But the discussion in 10:1–6 has to do with his conduct. His humble life, in which God's power is manifested, is the armament with which he attacks his opponents. Thus he calls on his readers, not to listen to him, but to look at what is right in front of their eyes (10:7).[158]

## Conclusion

We return to the question why Paul uses the Antisthenic tradition. His opponents may have described him in terms reminiscent of the unflattering depiction of Odysseus, to which Paul responded by applying the tradition in his own way. The similarities between the criticisms made of Odysseus and Paul are obvious. Only those directly relevant to the argument presented here have been taken up. It is not impossible that a conscious comparison was made by Paul's opponents. However, what was important about Odysseus was that he represented a certain type of preacher who to an observer might appear similar to Paul. There can be no doubt that Paul was familiar with the different types of philosophers and that he took great care, on the one hand, to distinguish himself from some of them and, on the other hand, to describe himself in terms commonly used to depict certain ideal philosophers.[159] If Hermann Funke is correct, Paul had already in 1 Cor 9:24–27 made use of Antisthenic tradition to describe his ministry.[160] And we have seen that in the immediately preceding verses he describes himself in a manner that echoes Antisthenes's Odysseus. It is therefore likely that

*zweite Korintherbrief*, 25) lists a number of similarities between the ways Paul describes his opponents in 1 and 2 Corinthians, a major difference being that in 2 Corinthians the opposition is more vehement and personal and the details of the opposition are different in some respects.

[157] Νόημα always has a negative connotation in 2 Corinthians; cf. 2:11; 3:14; 4:4; 11:3.

[158] Cf. 12:6, where, although he speaks of his speech and boasting, he again draws attention to what people can see in him.

[159] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80 [*Light*, 1:41–51], and Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse'" (see n. 73 above).

[160] Hermann Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus," *Hermes* 98 (1970): 459–471.

173 it is Paul who in some respect thought of himself along the lines of the | Antisthenic ideal. Having once introduced the tradition in the discussion with Corinth, he now also uses it to defend himself.

Paul obviously assumed that his method of argumentation would be intelligible to his Corinthian readers. His use of military imagery in writing to Corinth was particularly apt. The location of the city on the isthmus lent it great strategic importance.[161] It was known for its extensive fortifications, particularly those of Acrocorinth, from which, according to Strabo, one could look down on the isthmus.[162] Formidable in appearance and in fact, it could withstand a direct onslaught but was not immune to stealth.[163] The Spartans, however, appear to have viewed it with contempt, and Corinth came to represent in the apophthegmata the city whose walls offered ineffectual protection to its unworthy citizens.[164] Paul is equally disdainful of his Corinthians' defenses.

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[161] Polybius, 18.11.5–6. See Winfried Elliger, *Paulus in Griechenland* (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1978), 202.

[162] Strabo, 8.6.21; see Rhys Carpenter and Antoine Bon, *Corinth. 3.2: The Defenses of Acrocorinth and the Lower Town* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936).

[163] Cf. Plutarch, *Arat.* 18.3–4; 21.2.

[164] See Plutarch, *Reg. imp. apophth.* 190EF (cf. 190A); *Apoph. lac.* 215D; cf. 212E, 221F, 230C; Valerius Maximus 3.7.8. See n. 29.

CHAPTER TEN

# EXHORTATION IN FIRST THESSALONIANS*

It is generally recognized that 1 Thessalonians contains a good deal of moral exhortation. Chapters 4 and 5, which constitute almost one half of the letter, are clearly paraenetic. The paraenetic intention of the letter becomes an even more prominent feature should one accept the claims that the point of the entire letter is found in 4:1–2 and 4:10b–12, and that 4:1–5:11 is the body of the letter,[1] and that all Pauline thanksgivings, in this case 1:2–3:13, have either explicitly or implicitly a paraenetic function.[2] In an earlier study I examined 1 Thessalonians against the background of ancient paraenesis and concluded that the entire letter could be understood as paraenetic.[3] The present paper builds on that earlier one. The change from "paraenetic" to "exhortation" does not represent a change in my assessment of the letter; it is made in the hope that attention will focus on what is presented here rather than on terminology. Suffice it to say that the ancient use of "paraenetic" was broader than the modern, which is indebted to | Dibelius's concentration on the formal aspects of moral instruction.[4] 239

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* This paper was presented in substantially its present form to the Seminar on the Thessalonian Correspondence during the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in San Francisco, on December 20, 1981. I wish to thank members of the Seminar, and especially its chairman, Professor William Baird, and my respondent, Professor Calvin Roetzel, for their contributions to the discussion. This article first appeared in *NovT* 25 (1983): 238–256. It was later published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 49–66.

[1] Carl J. Bjerkelund: *Parakalô: Form, Funktion und Sinn der Parakalô-Sätze in den paulinischen Briefen* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1966), 134. For a recent assessment of the letter, see Hendrikus Boers: "The Form-Critical Study of Paul's Letters: I Thessalonians as a Case Study," *NTS* 22 (1976): 140–158.

[2] Paul Schubert, *Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings* (BZNW 20; Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1939), 16–20, 88–89.

[3] Abraham J. Malherbe, "I Thessalonians as a Paraenetic Letter," presented to the SBL Seminar on Paul in Los Angeles in 1972. The paper is incorporated in Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333. [*Light*, 2:675–749] Leo G. Perdue, "Paraenesis and the Epistle of James," *ZNW* 72 (1981): 241–256, esp. 242–246, provides an extensive summary of my discussion of paraenesis.

[4] For a detailed treatment of paraenesis, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986). Helmut Koester, "I Thessalonians—Experiment in Christian Writing," in *Continuity and Discontinuity in Church History: Essays Presented to George Huntston Williams on His 65th Birthday* (ed. F. Forrester Church and Timothy George; SHCT 19; Leiden: Brill, 1979),

Two recent studies have offered contrasting views of 1 Thessalonians. Edgar Krentz has drawn attention to the marked Hellenistic character of the letter and claimed that the letter would readily have been understood by its readers as a document of the first century.[5] He thus stressed the letter's continuity with its environment. Helmut Koester, although giving attention to the traditions Paul used, emphasized Paul's accomplishment in creating something new.[6] I suggest that both are correct, but that more should be said: Paul adopts a manner of exhortation that most likely was familiar to his readers, and he uses popular philosophical traditions with which they can be expected to have been familiar, yet he does so in a way different from the philosophical preachers of his day. I thus share the interest of Elpidius Pax in Paul's manner of exhorting recent converts, but whereas he seeks to illuminate 1 Thessalonians with Jewish advice to converts, I draw attention to the Graeco-Roman tradition of moral exhortation.[7]

In adducing material from this tradition I am not primarily interested in arguing that Paul drew directly from it, although there seems to be no good reason that he should not have done so. Similar use may possibly be found to have been made by other Hellenistic Jews, and one suspects that Philo might offer evidence for this. My present concern, however, is with the application and modification of hortatory devices in this letter, which was written to | recently converted Greeks. A concentration on this aspect of the letter may enable us to discern more clearly what would have been striking in it to its recipients.[8]

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35, rejects the definition of the letter as paraenetic and suggests that it rather represents the protreptic letter. Paulus Hartlich, "De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole," *Leipziger Studien* 11 (1889): 207–336, had distinguished between paraenesis and protrepsis, but was refuted by Theodore C. Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," *SCP* 3 (1902): 89–248, and his views were further modified by Rudolf Vetschera, *Zur griechischen Paränese* (Prague: Rohlicek & Sievers, 1912).

[5] Edgar Krentz, "I Thessalonians: A Document of Roman Hellenism," paper presented to the SBL Seminar on the Thessalonian Correspondence in New York, 1979.

[6] Koester, "I Thessalonians—Experiment in Christian Writing."

[7] Elpidius W. Pax, "Beobachtungen zur Konvertitensprache im ersten Thessalonicherbrief," *SBFLA* 21 (1971): 220–262, and "Konvertitenprobleme im ersten Thessalonicherbrief," *BibLeb* 13 (1972): 24–37.

[8] For a similar interest, see Nikolaus Walter, "Christusglaube und heidnische Religiosität in paulinischen Gemeinden," *NTS* 25 (1979): 422–442.

## Hortatory Features

Before offering examples of the way in which Paul utilizes and modifies elements of that tradition, I shall identify some hortatory features that pervade the letter throughout.

In my earlier study I suggested that the letter was not apologetic and argued that while chapters 4 and 5 are clearly paraenetic, the first three chapters, which are autobiographical, already function paraenetically by laying the foundation for the specific advice that would follow in the second half of the letter. In arguing my case, I pointed to elements of paraenesis in ancient theory and practice, both rhetorical and epistolary, and showed that they were scattered throughout 1 Thessalonians. The conscious use of traditional material, frequently *topoi* on the moral life, has frequently been detailed and will receive attention below. That what was said was not new is indicated by the repeated use of such phrases as καθὼς οἴδατε (1:5; 2:2, 5; 3:4), καθάπερ οἴδατε (2:11) or simply οἴδατε (2:1; 3:3; 4:2; 5:2).[9] There is therefore no need to write or speak any further on the subject, οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν (4:9; 5:1).[10] It is enough to remind the readers, either implicitly by the use of οἴδατε, or explicitly (μνημονεύετε, 2:9; ἔχετε μνείαν ἡμῶν, 3:6) of the type of life they are to lead,[11] or perhaps to compliment them for already doing so and encouraging them to do so more and more (καθὼς καὶ περιπατεῖτε, 4:1; καὶ γὰρ ποιεῖτε, 4:10; καθὼς καὶ ποιεῖτε, 5:11; ἵνα περισσεύητε μᾶλλον, 4:1, cf. 10).[12] A major part of ancient paraenesis was the offering of a model to be imitated (ὑμεῖς μιμηταὶ | ἡμῶν 241 ἐγενήθητε, 1:6, cf. 5:7; 2:14),[13] the delineation of which is done antithetically (οὐ . . . ἀλλά).[14]

To these features others can be added that are characteristic of hortatory speech. It is noteworthy, for example, that a wide range of hortatory terms occur in this short letter and that they are scattered throughout the letter:

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[9] Cf. καθὼς καὶ προείπαμεν ὑμῖν καὶ διεμαρτυράμεθα, 4:6; Isocrates, *Nic.* 40 (ἃ καὶ σὺ γιγνώσκεις); Seneca, *Ep.* 94.26 (*scis, scitis*).

[10] Cf. Isocrates, *Phil.* 105, περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖν πλείω λέγειν; Cicero, *Fam.* 1.4.3; 2.4.2.

[11] Cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 8.24.1, "The love I bear you obliges me to give you, not indeed a precept (for you are far from needing a preceptor), but a reminder that you should resolutely act up to the knowledge that you already have, or else improve it."

[12] Cf. Cicero, *Quint. fratr.* 1.1.8; Seneca, *Ep.* 25.4 (*ut facis*); 1.1 (*ita fac*); Cicero, *Fam.* 6.10b.4 (*idque ut facias, etiam atque etiam te hortor*); Seneca, *Ep.* 13.15; Ign. *Rom.* 2.1.

[13] Cf. Seneca, *Epp.* 6.5–6; 11.9–10; 95.72.

[14] Cf. Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 9–11; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.12.14; 4.1.159ff.; Lucian, *Demon.* 3–8; Maximus of Tyre 25.1 (297, 5ff. Hobein), 36.5 (420ff. Hobein).

παράκλησις (2:3), παρακαλέω (2:12; 3:2, 7; 4:1, 10, 18; 5:11, 14), παραμυθέομαι (2:12; 5:14), (δια)μαρτύρομαι (2:12; 4:6), στηρίζω (3:2), παραγγελία (4:2), παραγγέλλω (4:11), ἐρωτάομαι (5:12), νουθετέω (5:12, 14), ἀντέχομαι (5:14), and μακροθυμέομαι (5:14). Most of these terms appear as descriptions of different types of exhortation in the Greek and Roman sources, and their use in 1 Thessalonians shows that Paul is concerned with a wide variety of types of exhortation.[15]

The philophronetic element in ancient letters, which sought to overcome the separation of writer and recipient, and in paraenetic letters provided the framework for the exhortation given, is also found in 1 Thessalonians.[16] Such letters were regarded as substitutes for their writers' presence and intended to be exactly what the writer's conversation would have been had he been present.[17] The letters therefore speak at length about the writer and firmly establish his relations with his readers.[18] In 1 Thessalonians Paul also firmly cements his relations with his readers in a number of ways.[19] In addition to reminding them in various ways of his 242 past | relations with them, Paul modifies a convention of the friendly letter by substituting the expression ἀπορφανισθέντες … προσώπῳ οὐ καρδίᾳ for the παρών/ἀπών cliché and further heightens the emotional element by repeating his desire to see them in 3:6 (ἐπιποθοῦντες) and 3:10 (δεόμενοι εἰς τὸ ἰδεῖν ὑμῶν τὸ πρόσωπον).[20] His personal relationship with them is still further stressed by the frequent use of personal pronouns, especially

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[15] Cf. Seneca: Admonitory and preceptorial (paraenetic) speech, which is directed to particular situations (*Ep.* 94.1, 32, 35–36), consists of at least the following varieties: *consolatio, dissuasio, adhortatio, obiurgatio, laudatio* (*Ep.* 94.39), *admonitio* (*Ep.* 94.59; cf. 95.34, 65). On Seneca's psychagogy, see Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), here, esp. 8ff. See also Musonius, *Frg.* 49 (142 Lutz): *hortatur, monet, suadet, obiurgat*.

[16] On philophronesis in letters, see especially Heikki Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (STAT Series B 102.2; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 1956); Klaus Thraede, *Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik* (ZMKA 48; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1970).

[17] Cf. Seneca, *Epp.* 6.5–6; 40.1; 75.1ff., and for the theory, see my *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 12–14.

[18] For the function of Seneca's "Selbstdarstellung" in his letters, see Hildegard Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae Morales* (SSKPG 18; Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), and Hadot, *Seneca*, 174ff.

[19] *Pace* Koester, "I Thessalonians," 36–37, but see 41–42 and his "Apostel und Gemeinde in den Briefen an die Thessalonicher," in *Kirche: Festschrift für Günther Bornkamm zum 75. Geburtstag* (ed. Dieter Lührmann and Georg Strecker; Tübingen: Mohr, 1980), 287–298.

20 Cf. Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 1 (text and translation in my *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 32–33). The purpose of writing this type of letter is that the writers "think that nobody will refuse them when they write in a friendly manner, but will rather submit and heed what they are writing." The sample follows:

in conjunction with each other, for example, as they are strung together in 1:5–6, ἐν ὑμῖν δι᾽ ὑμᾶς καὶ ὑμεῖς μιμηταὶ ἡμῶν.[21]

In describing his own work with the Thessalonians, Paul uses the images of nurse (2:7) and father (2:11–12) to convey his special concern for them. These images were current in his day to describe the special understanding of the moral philosopher who adapted his manner of exhortation to the condition of his hearers. Thus Plutarch, when giving instruction on the proper occasions on which to speak frankly, adduces the example of nurses: "When children fall down, the nurses do not rush up to berate them, but they take them up, wash them, and straighten their clothes, and, after all this is done, then rebuke them and punish them."[22] Paul intensifies the image by likening his behavior to that of a nurse towards her own children (τὰ ἑαυτῆς τέκνα), not merely those under her charge.[23]

| Paul moves from the image of the nurse (2:7–8) to refer to his giving of himself and his practice of self-support (2:9–10) before comparing himself to a father who exhorts his own children (2:11–12). His self-support is an example of his intention not to be burdensome or demanding (ἐν βάρει, v. 7; ἐπιβαρῆσαι, v. 9) on any of them (τινα ὑμῶν),[24] but it may be introduced at this point as a natural transition to the image of father. That a desire for money had precedence over family relationships is an opinion well documented by ancient moralists of pessimistic bent. They thought that covetousness caused children to be hostile to their fathers 243

> Even though I have been separated from you for a long time, I suffer this in body only. For I can never forget you or the impeccable way we were raised together from childhood up. Knowing that I myself am genuinely concerned about your affairs, and that I have worked unstintingly for what is most advantageous to you, I have assumed that you, too, have the same opinion of me and will refuse me in nothing. You will do well, therefore, to give close attention to the members of my household lest they need anything, to assist them in whatever they might need, and to write to us about whatever you should choose.

On 1 Thess 2:17, see Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 95–97. On πόθος in letters, see Thraede's index and Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 174–75. On orphans, contrast Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.14, which, according to Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 62, is paraenetic.

[21] Cf. also 1:2, 9; 2:6, 7, 8, 11, 17; 3:6, 12, where ἡμεῖς and ὑμεῖς appear together.

[22] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 69BC. Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.74, and for a more detailed treatment, see my "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217, esp. 211–214. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

[23] Cf. Plutarch, *Cons. ux.* 609E: A mother's nursing of her own child is a sign of maternal love.

[24] That Paul's practice had much wider significance for him than this is argued successfully by Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980).

to the point that they betrayed (προδίδονται) them, and that parents in turn became more demanding (βαρύτεροι) of their children.[25] Taking false oaths in the pursuit of wealth is also frequently condemned.[26] It is possible that Paul is aware of such statements and that he disavows any greed by reminding them of his sharing his own life with them (2:8)[27] and of his foregoing the opportunity to be βαρύς (2:8). He further calls not only on God as witness that he had acted ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀμέμπτως towards the Thessalonians but first calls on the Thessalonians as witnesses to his claim.[28] He then calls to mind the various types of exhortation that he had applied (2:12). According to Lucian (*Demon.* 8), Demonax also, instead of being self-seeking, | helped his friends by cautioning some, consoling others, reconciling brothers, making peace between husbands and wives, etc.

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Of interest in this connection is the way in which Paul describes himself as father. It is possible that the original context of paraenesis was that of a father giving advice to his son,[29] but it had become common by Paul's time for the sage to exhort his listeners as their father and to think of them as his children.[30] According to Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 77/78.41–42),

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25 The evidence is presented by Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 14ff. The reference alluded to here is Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.84 (5:764, 2ff. and 765, 12 W-H). Προδίδωμι appears in such contexts elsewhere, e.g., *Ceb. Tab.* 40.3; Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 7.

26 See Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 45–46, for the evidence; cf., e.g., Theognis, *Eleg*. 1.199–200, εἰ δ᾽ἀδίκως παρὰ καιρὸν ἀνὴρ φιλοκερδέι θυμῶι κτήσεται, εἴθ᾽ὅρκωι πὰρ τὸ δίκαιον ἑλών.

27 Is it possible that μεταδοῦναι ὑμῖν … τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχάς is meant to counter προδιδόναι? But see Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 3.15, who never accepted money from those who would willingly give it, but rather shared (μεταδιδούς) the little he had with others. Cf. also Lucian, *Nigr.* 25–26; *Demon.* 8, 63, who shares a view that is more like that of Acts 20:34 than Paul himself, who speaks of giving himself. See Koester, "Thessalonians," 41–42, and "Apostel und Gemeinde," 290, for the argument that Paul's giving of himself to the Thessalonians who had become his ἀγαπητοί and fellow workers made him different from the philosopher, whose freedom would be violated by such a commitment. In general, I agree, but in view of the philosopher's motivations for preaching (κηδεμονία, εὔνοια, φιλανθρωπία), the matter should not be overstated. The issue was indeed of concern to philosophers such as Dio Chrysostom. See the concern to retain one's individuality, n. 31 below.

28 In 2:5 it is only God who is witness that he had not acted ἐν προφάσει πλεονεξίας. Cf. Isocrates, *Nic.* 46, αὐτοί μοι μάρτυρές ἐστε in paraenesis.

29 See Josef Kroll, *Theognis-Interpretationen* (*Phil.* Suppl. 29; Leipzig: Dieterich, 1936), 99. Cf. Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.*; Pliny, *Ep.* 8.13.

30 For Epicurus, see Norman W. De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), 99, 323; for Stoics, Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.82; and for Pythagoreans, Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 198 (Diels, *FVS* 1471, 25ff.). The convention is also found in rhetoricians: Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 2.2.5, who instructs that the teacher of rhetoric, who is to be a moral as well as rhetorical example, should adopt a parental attitude toward his students. Pedro Gutierrez, *La paternité spirituelle selon Saint Paul* (*EBib*; Paris:

despite the fact that some people deride the philosopher for, among other things, neglecting the opportunity to become rich, the philosopher believes that his fellow citizens, kinsmen and friends are more closely related and bound to him than others, and he is more kindly disposed to each (ἑκάστῳ) of them than even a father or brothers or friends. This special relationship causes him not to hide anything from them, but to increase the intensity of his νουθεσία and παρακέλευσις.

Dio does not here describe the philosopher as a father, although he thinks of a relationship that transcends the normal. His statement is referred to here because of the significance it attains when seen in the context of discussions of the need for the philosopher to give attention to individuals and to vary his exhortation according to the condition he addresses. Earlier in the discourse (37–38) he had affirmed that the philosopher, while retaining his individuality, would lead people to virtue by adopting different means of persuasion, τὰ μὲν πείθων καὶ παρακαλῶν, τὰ δὲ λοιδορούμενος καὶ ὀνειδίζων . . . ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἀπολαμβάνων καὶ ἀθρόους νουθετῶν.[31] The desirability of individual and personalized instruction was widely recognized.[32] When Paul | therefore reminds the Thessalonians 245 that he had exhorted them ἕνα ἕκαστον and describes his exhortation as παράκλησις, παραμυθία, and μαρτυρία, he is claiming to have acted in so responsible a manner.[33] Paul, of course, differs from Dio in that his relationship to his converts as their father is different from Dio's philosopher to his public. According to 1 Cor 4:16–17, he begot his converts by means of the gospel and on that basis (οὖν) exhorted them to become imitators of him.[34] But such reflection on his spiritual paternity is absent from 1 Thess 2:11–12, except to the degree that the goal of his exhortation is conduct worthy of God. As the ὡς indicates, he uses the image by way of illustration,

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J. Gabalda, 1968), 29 n. 1 and 51–54, argues that the paternal image is not found in Greek didactic texts as it is in Jewish sources. The device appears frequently in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, e.g., *T. Sim.* 6:1; *T. Levi* 10:1; *T. Naph.* 4:1; 8:1, etc.

[31] Cf. also 13.31, on which see Paolo Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: Un intellettuale greco nell' impero romano* (Messina/Florence: G. D'Anna, 1978), 24 n. 44. Examples of Dio's instruction to individuals have been preserved, e.g., 55; 56. Synesius, *Dio* 1.11 (12, 11–12 Treu; LCL 5:375), says that Dio admonished people of all stations καθ' ἕνα καὶ ἀθρόους.

[32] See especially Plutarch. *Rect. rat. aud.* 43E–44A and *Adul. amic.* 70D–71D; Apollonius of Tyana, *Ep.* 10 (addressed to Dio), and Philo, *Decal.* 36–39. On the Epicureans, see De Witt, *Epicurus*, 94, and further on the subject, Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954), 272ff., 317 n. 99, and Hadot, *Seneca*, 64–66.

[33] Cf. Acts 20:31. The classification of, or distinction between, the various types of exhortation mentioned by Paul is fraught with the same difficulty in Paul as it is in Seneca.

[34] Note the paraenetic elements in 1 Cor 4:14–21: antithesis (οὐ . . . ἀλλά; vv. 14, 15, 19, 20), νουθετῶν (14), πατέρας (15), παρακαλῶ (16), μιμηταί (16), ἀναμνήσει (17).

and his primary interest in using the image is, as it has been in vv. 7–10, to confirm his special relationship with them. The reflexive pronoun in τέκνα ἑαυτοῦ contributes to this as it did in τὰ ἑαυτῆς τέκνα in v. 7.

Paul's interest in exhortation in the letter is not confined to the various stylistic features that he adopts and to his reflection on his own pastoral method. The type of concern that he had exemplified was also to characterize the Thessalonians themselves, and is taken up especially in chapters 4 and 5. Thus, in each of the sections taking up specific matters, Paul mentions some aspects of the concern they should have for each other: 4:6, τὸ μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν … τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ; 4:9, τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἀλλήλους (cf. 3:12); 4:18, παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους; 5:11, παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους, and of course 5:12–15. The mutual edification is further specified as having to take place εἷς τὸν ἕνα (5:11), which is not simply equivalent to ἀλλήλους, but is probably to be taken in the sense of εἷς ἑνί, "man to man," as in Theocritus 22.65.[35] Finally, various types of exhortation and other actions 246 as appropriate to persons with particular | needs and to the community as a whole are mentioned in 5:14: νουθετεῖτε τοὺς ἀτάκτους, παραμυθεῖσθε τοὺς ὀλιγοψύχους, ἀντέχεσθε τῶν ἀσθενῶν, μακροθυμεῖτε πρὸς πάντας.[36]

## Paul's Modification of the Tradition

Among the elements that Paul adopts from the hortatory tradition and modifies is his statement that the Thessalonians had become his μιμηταί (1:6). Paul's use of the imitation motif is in line with contemporary paraenesis, but there are also noteworthy differences.[37] The use of the motif in

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[35] Ἀνὴρ ἀνδρί, "man to man," in Maximus of Tyre 38.4 (443, 5 Hobein). The equivalence to ἀλλήλους is listed in BAGD, s.v. εἷς 5.a. and BDF § 247.4, and the construction is described by the latter as dependent on a Semitic, especially Aramaic, model. The closest parallel in the NT is 1 Cor 4:6, εἷς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἑνός. But there is no need not to do justice to the stress on the individual in the construction; cf. 2 Thess 1:3, πλεονάζει ἡ ἀγάπη ἑνὸς ἑκάστου πάντων ὑμῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους.

[36] The practice of mutual edification in philosophical communities and Paul's advice and practice in relation to it call for exploration. For the practice, in addition to Rabbow (n. 32) and Hadot (n. 15), see Heinz G. Ingenkamp, *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele* (Hyp. 34; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971). For the practice among Epicureans, see Norman W. De Witt, "Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups," *CP* 31 (1936): 205–211, with the corrections by Marcello Gigante, "Philodème: Sur la liberté de parole," in *Actes du VIII^e Congrès, Assoc. Guillaume Budé* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1969), 196–217, and further discussion of Philodemus by Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 269–270, 276, and Hadot, *Seneca*, 64–65.

[37] See Hans-Heinrich Schade, *Apokalyptische Christologie bei Paulus: Studien zum Zusammenhang von Christologie und Eschatologie in den Paulusbriefen* (GTA 18; Göttingen:

exhortation is well known and requires little documentation,[38] but certain contrasts between Paul and his contemporaries should be noted.

*Words and Deeds*

While the philosophers did use the motif, they were hesitant to call others to follow their own examples. In fact, there was a (lesser) hesitancy among them even to advance contemporary worthies as paradigms.[39] This diffidence is clearest in the Stoics.[40] Paul, in contrast, asserts that his readers had already become imitators of him and his associates and the Lord, the only place in his letters where he does so. By doing so | here, Paul in good paraenetic fashion reminds them of the relationship that had existed between them, and that would undergird the advice that he is about to give. That he is interested in personal relationship rather than authority that flows from his apostleship appears from the concentrated use of pronouns. Thus, while Paul's adoption of the imitation motif is in good hortatory style, the self-confidence with which he writes is extraordinary. 247

Contemporary Cynics, however, did make confident claims about their own accomplishments, sometimes comparing themselves with Heracles. Like Heracles, they asserted, they had been victorious in their πόνοι, and by enduring had attained the ideal.[41] On the basis of their own lives, they could then preach to others. That the philosopher's λόγος should conform to his ἔργον was a requirement not confined to Cynics,[42] but in their case

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981), 118–119, 123–126, for discussion of the most recent literature. Schade denies that the imitation motif has an ethical dimension. I maintain that its place in the autobiographical section of the letter, which already functions paraenetically, imparts an ethical dimension to it.

[38] See, e.g., Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 11, 36; Seneca, *Epp.* 11.9–10; 100.12; Pliny, *Ep.* 8.13; Lucian, *Nigr.* 26; Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 19. Cf. the sample of the παραινετικὴ ἐπιστολή provided by Ps.-Proclus, ζηλωτὴς ἀεί, βέλτιστε, γίνου τῶν ἐναρετῶν ἀωδρῶν (p. 8 Hercher).

[39] On the use of historical examples, see George C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace: A Study in the Classical Theory of Imitation* (UWSLL 7; Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1920; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1966): 159ff. Recent examples are offered, e.g., Teles, *Frg.* 3 (23, 12 Hense); Musonius, *Frg.* 9 (49, 12 Hense); Lucian, *Demon.* 1ff., 7; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 7.81, 125–26, but are done so self-consciously and in contrast to the normal practice. Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 83.13. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 21.10–11, reflects the attitude, which is discussed by Bernhard A. van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past: Essay on an Aspect of Greek Thought* (PhAnt 6; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1953), 6ff.

[40] See my "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 42–64, esp. 55–56. [*Light*, 2:601–634]

[41] See Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus," 58–59.

[42] See, e.g., Seneca, *Ep.* 108.35–37; cf. 6.5–6; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 70.6; Julian 7.214BC; Lucian, *Peregr.* 19. For the application of the criterion, see Rudolf W.O. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1906; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), 40–41.

it expressed their self-confidence. Lucian says of Demonax that it was the conformity of his life to his boldness of speech (παρρησία) that enabled him to point to himself as an example.[43] Cynics of more radical leaning claimed that the Cynic's superiority in his deeds was the basis for the harshness of his speech.[44] So, whereas the correspondence between a philosopher's speech and his conduct was generally regarded as an index to his trustworthiness, it was yet another way in which Cynics expressed their self-confidence and justified their demands that they be emulated.

Immediately before Paul refers to the Thessalonians as his μιμηταί, he also mentions his λόγος (1:5). Paul's λόγος, however, is not compared with his ἔργον, which would have drawn attention to his trustworthiness because of his own deeds. Instead, he writes, οὐκ ... ἐν λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ [ἐν] πληροφορίᾳ πολλῇ, thus distinguishing himself from the philosopher by not stressing any particular deeds of his own but drawing attention to the way in which the gospel came to them. A philosopher would have said that *he* had come οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ μόνον, 248 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἔργῳ. Paul, however, does not draw attention to his | accomplishments, but to his gospel, which he further describes as the gospel of God (2:2, 9) with which he had been entrusted (2:4), or as the word of the Lord (1:8) or of God (2:13). Furthermore, the gospel came to his readers in the Holy Spirit (1:5) and was received by them with joy of the Spirit (1:6). Attention is thus drawn, not to Paul's actions which underlie his confident expression, but to the way in which the gospel came to them and was received by them. It was neither Paul's ἔργον nor his speech that gave him confidence, but God's election (cf. 1:4). The issue is neatly summarized in 2:13, οὐ λόγον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ... λόγον θεοῦ, ὅς καὶ ἐνεργεῖται ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν. Not Paul's action, but the Spirit's ἐνέργεια, not, precisely, even his speech, but the gospel empowered by the Spirit. As that divine power, manifested in the gospel, was reflected in the lives of Paul and his associates, the Thessalonians became their emulators when they received the word.[45] The themes of μίμησις and ἔργον/λόγος are thus utilized by Paul but are completely recast.

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[43] *Demon.* 3. See Marcel Caster, *Lucien et la pensée religieuse de son temps* (CEA; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1937; repr., New York: Garland, 1987), 73–74.

[44] See Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 20, 21; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 15, 27, 28, 29; Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 4, 7.

[45] See John H. Schütz, *Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority* (SNTSMS 26; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 126–127.

## *Paul's Frankness*

Paul's modification of the hortatory tradition to describe himself as bearer of the divine message is further illustrated by his adaptation in chapter 2 of the description of the ideal philosopher and his exercise of παρρησία. Elsewhere I have attempted to demonstrate that in the first half of the chapter Paul uses Cynic traditions about the ideal philosopher to describe his early ministry in Thessalonica.[46] The content as well as the form of what he says about himself has remarkable parallels in Dio Chrysostom's description of the ideal Cynic (*Or.* 32.7–11). Here I wish to focus more narrowly on what he says about his παρρησία.

Originally a political term, by Paul's time παρρησία had come to be associated with the philosopher's freedom of speech, which he exercised as a physician of men's souls. Having himself attained moral freedom, he felt compelled to turn others to it by harshly pointing out their shortcomings and holding up the fulfillment of human potential that the rational life would bring. As part of his self-commendation the Cynic would stress the harsh treatment that he had received from the mobs who would not listen to him. By emphasizing his courage under attack and his tenacity in preaching, | the Cynic established his credentials as a preacher and expressed his intention to continue convicting the crowds of their sins.[47] Paul uses the themes of ὕβρις and παρρησία (2:2), but in a way different from the Cynics. 249

First, although he begins with a reference to his maltreatment in Philippi, his suffering is not put to the use it customarily was by Cynics. It does not serve to justify Paul's harsh παρρησία. On the contrary, using other *topoi*, Paul goes on to describe his ministry as gentle, like a nurse suckling her own children, and as understanding, like a father who gives individual attention to his own children as he exhorts them in different ways. The tradition of the philosopher's suffering is therefore used, but not to justify Paul's harsh demands. The relationship Paul shares with the Thessalonians is not based on his demonstration of his fortitude, but on his giving of himself on their behalf.[48]

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[46] "'Gentle as a Nurse'" (n. 22), concentrating on Dio Chrysostrom, *Or.* 32.7–11. The discussion of παρρησία that follows is based on evidence in the article. For suggested modifications of my argument, see Desideri, *Dione di Prusa*, 150–152, 172 (n. 31 above).

[47] Note the criticism of Bellerophon in Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.12: He allowed himself to be driven out of the towns by the ὕβρις of people, and thus lost his παρρησία.

[48] Thus also Koester, "Apostel und Gemeinde," 290–291.

Second, his freedom of speech does not have its source in anything that he has attained. He says, “we waxed bold in our God to speak to you the gospel of God” (2:2). While the moral philosopher was impelled by an awareness of his own moral freedom, acquired by reason and the application of his own will, to speak boldly to the human condition and demand its reformation, Paul regards his entire ministry, as to its origin, motivation, content, and method, as being directed by God. God grants him the boldness to speak, and what he says is not philosophical or rational analysis of the human condition, but the gospel of God. The traditions Paul uses in this chapter are primarily Cynic, although they are also found in other philosophers. But Paul’s dependence on God for his speech is completely non-Cynic. The similarities to Stoicism have to be examined in greater detail than they have been or than I can on this occasion.

In the first part of the letter, then, Paul makes generous use of the hortatory traditions current in his own day but changes them to express his conception of himself as bearer of the divine message. The traditions were so common that one may assume that Paul’s converts were familiar with them, and that his modifications of them would have been striking.

250 | Paul’s Practical Advice

The moral directions Paul gives in the latter half of the letter exhibit the same combination of the new and the old. I shall treat three examples from chapter 4 by way of illustration. Paul’s reference to the instruction that he had given them, οἴδατε γὰρ τίνας παραγγελίας ἐδώκαμεν ὑμῖν (4:2), is in good paraenetic style. Παραγγελία is here equivalent to *praeceptum* or παράγγελμα, a special precept of living addressed to a particular situation.[49] Οἴδατε concentrates the memory on what the readers already know.[50] What is not customary in 4:1–2, of course, is Paul’s specification of his exhortation as ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ and διὰ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ and the requirement that the Thessalonians live ἀρέσκειν θεῷ. This combination of philosophical moral

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[49] George Milligan, *St. Paul’s Epistles to the Thessalonians* (London: Macmillan, 1908), *ad loc.*, already pointed to the equivalence of παραγγελία and *praeceptum.* For *praecepta* in paraenesis, see Seneca, *Epp.* 94.1, 14, 32; 95.1, and Michelangelo Giusta, *I dossografi di etica* (2 vols.; PFLUT 15.3–4; Turin: G. Giappichelli, 1964–1967), 1:162–163, 177ff. Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 2.2.4.1104a9 uses παραγγελία, but παράγγελμα was the more common term; Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 44, and the titles of Plutarch’s treatises γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα (138A–146A) and πολιτικὰ παραγγέλματα (798A–825F). Instructive for 1 Thess 4:1–2 is the snatch from Zeno, τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν ὡς δεῖ ζῆν . . . προσέχειν *(SVF* 1:238).

[50] See especially Seneca, *Ep.* 94.25–26, and cf. nn. 11 and 12 above.

tradition and Christian religious or theological warrant also appears in what follows.

In 4:3–8, verses 4 and 6 have received most attention. It is not necessary for my immediate purpose to enter into a detailed discussion of these verses. The exegetical difficulties confront us in those verses that reflect traditional moral instruction, and our interpretation may be helped as we learn more about those traditions. Paul's advice on sex and greed might not have sounded so strange to someone who had heard the teaching of a philosopher such as his contemporary Musonius Rufus. Musonius, in a discussion of sexual indulgence in and outside marriage, also writes of honor, lust, and wronging the man whose wife is taken in adultery.[51] But Paul's words would have had a sharper ring of familiarity if they were stripped of the motivational language in which his directions are couched.

In this passage, Paul stresses the motivation for the actions rather than the actions themselves. The pericope is framed by ἁγιασμός (vv. 3 and 7; cf. πνεῦμα ἅγιον, v. 8), which forms an *inclusio*, thus | indicating Paul's interest. As part of this stress, he further advances as motivations the knowledge of God, God's will and vengeance, and the Holy Spirit. 251

He must have had a reason for this extraordinary stress on the motivations for the Christian moral life, and I suggest that it is precisely this kind of motivation that in Paul's eyes, and probably his readers', made his instruction different from the popular philosophical traditions he uses.

Whether morality had a close connection with religion in the Graeco-Roman world has been and continues to be debated.[52] That the discussion can continue would suggest that the connection, if it did exist, was not pronounced or essential. Philosophical writers did, of course, support their ethics with a theoretical framework, but whether or precisely how religion informed the moral life is not always clear. In the eyes of Jews and Christians at any rate, a major difference between their and pagan ethics, indeed a mark of their superiority, was that they always began with God. This is intoned most explicitly by the *Letter of Aristeas* and by the

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[51] Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 12 (165, 2ff. Hense). Krentz, "I Thessalonians," 12–13, also draws attention to Musonius.

[52] See Arthur Darby Nock, "Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background," in *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (ed. Zeph Stewart; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 1:63ff.; Karl Prümm, *Religionsgeschichtliches Handbuch für den Raum der altchristlichen Umwelt* (2d ed.; Rome: Päpstliches Bibelinstitut, 1954), 322–327. A more nuanced view is that of John H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). See also Willem den Boer, *Private Morality in Greece and Rome: Some Historical Aspects* (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 57; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979).

Christian Apologists.[53] What was new in Christian teaching, according to A.D. Nock, was its motivation (fear of God, devotion to Jesus) and its claim to supply the power to satisfy its requirements.[54] This, I suggest, explains Paul's emphasis on motivation. He insists that Christian ethics be grounded in religion. Philosophical traditions are used, but without their preoccupation with the use of reason or the nature of character development. Paul is concerned with the sanctified rather than the rational life.

Something similar is found in 4:9–12, but not nearly to the same degree. Most elements of the advice would have sounded familiar.[55] Ἡσυχία, living quietly, was a well-known *topos* in his day;[56] πράσσειν | τὰ ἴδια, to mind one's own affairs, was a bit of advice already found in Plato and frequently after him;[57] manual labor was frequently discussed;[58] εὐσχημοσύνη, decorum, was a self-evident ideal to most philosophers, as was self-sufficiency.[59] The way in which these terms, frequently overlooked in exegesis, were used, may be illustrated by a line from Ps.-Musonius, "The true end of our being born into the world is to live orderly and with decorum (τεταγμένως καὶ εὐσχημόνως), our minds being furnished by nature with reason as

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[53] *Let. Aris.* 132, 189, 200, 235; Aristides, *Apol.* 15; Theophilus, *Autol.* 3.9, 15; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 11; *Diogn.* 6–7. On Lactantius, see Liebeschuetz, *Continuity*, 265ff. and 271–275.

[54] Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 218–220; see Günter Wagner, *Pauline Baptism and the Pagan Mysteries* (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1967), 48.

[55] For what follows, see the more extensive discussion and the material collected in my "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament" (n. 3). See also Krentz, "I Thessalonians," 13–14.

[56] Some of the material was collected by F. Wilhelm, "Plutarchs ΠΕΡΙ ΗΣΥΧΙΑΣ," *RhMus* 73 (1924): 466–482. For conditions in the first century that made withdrawal from active political involvement desirable, see Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966; repr., London: Routledge, 1992), ch. 2, and cf. André-Jean Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Sather Classical Lectures 26; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), ch. 4.

[57] *Resp.* 6.496D, 4.433A; Dio Cass. 60.27.4. Note the influence of *Resp.* 10.596Cff. (and also *Ep.* 7.325E and *Phaedo* 89D) in Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 24, which also speaks of retirement. See Johannes Sykutris, *Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker* (SGKA 18.2; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1933; repr., New York: Johnson, 1968), 78–79.

[58] See Hock, *Social Context of Paul's Ministry* (n. 24 above).

[59] On εὐσχημοσύνη, see *SVF* 3:140, 501; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.2 (ἀσχημονέω). On self-sufficiency, see Audrey N.M. Rich, "The Cynic Conception of αὐτάρκεια," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 9 (1956): 23–29; Rüdiger Vischer, *Das einfache Leben: Wort- und motivgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu einem Wertbegriff der antiken Literatur* (SAW 11; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), 60–87; Konrad Gaiser, "Das griechische Ideal der Autarkie," *Acta Philologica Aenipontana* (ed. R. von Muth; Innsbruck: Wagner, 1976), 3:35–37.

overseer and guide for this purpose."[60] The social responsibility and demeanor that Paul inculcates have nothing extraordinary or surprising about them. Elsewhere I have suggested that Paul, in using these well-known *topoi*, may have had in mind preventing the Thessalonians from adopting social attitudes like those of the Epicureans.[61] The combination of the *topoi* on love and quietism point in that direction, as do certain details and the way Paul uses them. The traditions, then, are recognizable, but once again the Pauline edge is clearly evident.

To begin with, Paul does not speak of φιλία or φίλοι, but of brotherly love and brothers. He is familiar with the *topos* on friendship,[62] but he avoids the term as he does the description of Christians as friends. His reason for doing so may be that the terms carried connotations that were too anthropocentric, and that he thought of Christian relationships as determined by God's call and | not human virtues.[63] At any rate, he uses 253 a term describing blood relationship to describe a spiritual one. Given the importance Paul attaches to love within the Christian community, it is not unlikely that the similarities to and differences from the discussions of friendship would have been obvious to his readers.

What does stand out is the way Paul introduces his exhortation. The Thessalonians, he says, have no need to be written to about brotherly love, for they have been taught by God to love one another. Θεοδίδακτοι, taught by God, is a Pauline coinage and provides the reason for Christian love of the community. Paul's use of the word at this point takes on special significance if my suggestion that he has Epicureans in mind has any merit. Friendship was highly valued by the Epicureans, but they were criticized for their utilitarian view of it, namely, that it was prompted by need and was a means to happiness.[64] Stoics, on the contrary, thought

60 Ps.-Musonius, *Ep. Pancr.* 2 (137, 15–16 Hense); cf. 4 (138, 15ff. Hense).
61 Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Rockwell Lectures at Rice University; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977; 2d ed. enlarged, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 24–27.
62 See Hans Dieter Betz, *A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches of Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 221–233. To the bibliography on the *topos* provided by Betz should be added Jean-Claude Fraisse, *Philia. La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique* (BHP; Paris: J. Vrin, 1976); John M. Rist. "Epicurus on Friendship," *CP* 175 (1980): 121–129.
63 Thus Jan N. Sevenster, "Waarom spreekt Paulus nooit van vrienden en vriendschap?" *NedTT* 9 (1954/1955): 356–363.
64 E.g., Cicero, *Fin.* 2.82–85.

of it as a divine gift, springing from nature,[65] and Plutarch, the Platonist, charged the Epicureans with being void of philanthropy and untouched by any spark of the divine.[66] By saying that love is divinely taught, Paul would thus tacitly be sharing Plutarch's criticism of the Epicureans. If one considers θεοδίδακτος to be a conscious rejection of something that is αὐτοδίδακτος, self-taught, or ἀδίδακτος, untaught, or of someone who is αὐτουργὸς τῆς φιλοσοφίας, a self-made philosopher, the criticism becomes more pointed. Such words were frequently applied by themselves or others to philosophers who by reason developed the knowledge that is inherently or potentially in all people.[67] Epicurus above all others fostered the reputation that he was self-taught.[68] But even if it is thought a bit too much to | speculate that Paul has Epicurus or Epicureans in mind, his claim that Christians are taught by God to love one another is of a piece with the preceding theological motivations for Christian ethics.[69]

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The last pericope to which I draw attention, 4:13–18, is of a different character. A major Pauline eschatological passage, it would appear to justify Koester's assessment, made in his discussion of the genre of the epistle: "In the case of the 'instructions' it is still possible to cite the philosophical and moral epistle as an analogy or parallel; but no analogies exist in letters of any kind for the eschatological admonitions which are found

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[65] E.g., Cicero, *Amic.* 19–20, 27; Seneca, *Ep.* 9.17. See G. Bohnenblust, "Beiträge zum *Topos* ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΙΑΣ" (Ph.D. diss., Berlin, 1905), 7–8, 44.

[66] Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* 1098DE.

[67] Αὐτοδίδακτος: Diogenes, *ap.* Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.32.11 (5:782, 17–20 W-H); cf. *Flor.* 4.32.19 (5:784, 19–20 W-H); Juvenal, *Sat.* 13.19–22; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 10.5 (118, 6ff. Hobein), 38.1 (438, 5ff. Hobein); ἀδίδακτος: Julian 6.183B; 7.209C; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12.42; cf. Plutarch, *Brut. an.* 987B; *Quaest. conv.* 673F; *Adv. Col.* 1122E; Sext Emp, *Adv. Math.* 9.96; αὐτουργὸς τῆς φιλοσοφίας: Xenophon, *Symp.* 1.5; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.9, 63 (see Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* [London: Methuen, 1937; repr., Hildesheim; G. Olms, 1967; 2d ed., London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998], 150ff.).

[68] Cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 1.71. The material has been collected by Eduard Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (5th ed.; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 3.1:374 n. 2, and discussed by André-Jean Festugière, *Epicurus and His Gods* (trans. C.W. Chilton; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956; orig. pub. *Épicure et ses dieux* [MR 19; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1946]), 34.

[69] See Koester, "I Thessalonians," 39, who draws attention to Philo. I disagree with him that θεοδίδακτοι "emphasizes that the recipients are not dependent on the writer's instructions." There is an emphasis in the use of the term, but it is better explained in light of the emphasis in 4:1–8 as well as the traditions Paul uses here. Furthermore, the stress in chs. 1 and 2 on Paul as God's spokesman makes a distinction between God's word and a human word. The formulation οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς θεοδίδακτοί ἐστε functions as a reminder of that instruction. Cf. 4:11, καθὼς ὑμῖν παρηγγείλαμεν in the same pericope, and 5:1–2, οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε ὑμῖν γράφεσθαι, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀκριβῶς οἴδατε, the latter of which must also refer to Paul's earlier instruction.

in I Thess 4:13–5:11."[70] Koester is, of course, correct so far as the content of the eschatological material is concerned. But when it is observed that the eschatological statements function to comfort Paul's readers (4:18; 5:11), the absoluteness of his claim must be called into question. Paul is not providing eschatological instruction to inform his readers, but to console those who were grieving. In doing so, Paul's direction exhibits a number of similarities to themes found in the letter of consolation, a well-known epistolary genre in antiquity.[71] To the church fathers, who knew the classical genres, this section of the letter appeared close to a consolatory epistle.[72]

Consolation was conceived of as belonging to paraenesis,[73] and | the letter of consolation was discussed in epistolographic handbooks in terms that reflected its paraenetic character.[74] Philosophers, in particular, engaged in consolation in speeches, tractates, and letters.[75] These consolations, which have much in common with epitaphs, illustrate the consolatory character of 1 Thess 4:9–13. For example, they minimize death by 255

[70] Koester, "I Thessalonians," 39.

[71] On consolation literature, see Rudolf Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur* (ZMKA 18; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1958); Robert C. Gregg, *Consolation Philosophy: Greek and Christian Paideia in Basil and the Two Gregories* (PatMS 3; Cambridge, Mass.: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975); Yves-Marie Duval, "Formes profanes et formes bibliques dans les oraisons funèbres de saint Ambroise," in *Christianisme et formes littéraires de l'antiquité tardive en occident* (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XXIII: Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1977), 235ff. (for bibliography).

[72] This appears, for example, from the way in which Theodoret comments on the passage (PG 82:648). See also Gregg, *Consolation Philosophy*, 155–156 (n. 71 above).

[73] Cf. Theon, *Progymn.* 10 (2.117 Spengel), for whom consolation, judging by the length of his treatment, is a major example of protreptic. Protreptic and paraenesis were not yet distinguished at this time. See also the instruction of Menander Rhetor, Περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικῶν 413–414 (Spengel; 160–164 Russell-Wilson), that the speech should begin with what is well known and end with an exhortation.

[74] Note the sample provided by Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 5: "Since I happened not to be present to comfort (παρακαλεῖν) you, I decided to do so by letter. Bear, then, what has happened as lightly as you can, and exhort yourself just as you would exhort someone else (καθὼς ἄλλῳ παρῄνεσας, σαυτῷ παραίνεσον). For you know (ἐπίστασαι) that reason will make it easier for you to be relieved of your grief with the passage of time." Text and translation available in my *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 34–35. Cf. also Seneca, *Ep.* 99.32, "These words I have written to you, not with the idea that you should expect a cure from me at such a late date for it is clear to me that you have told yourself everything you will read in my letter."

[75] See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 27.7–9; 28; 30; Plutarch, *Superst.* 168C; Julian 7.223BC. See K. Buresch, *Consolationum a graecis romanisque scriptarum historia critica* (Diss., Leipzig, 1886), 38.

making it resemble sleep.[76] They call for grief to cease,[77] sometimes at the very beginning of the consolation,[78] which may be followed by recalling a teacher's words.[79] They complain that the deceased had been snatched away by death,[80] but take comfort in the hope that he is now dwelling with the gods and virtuous persons of the past,[81] and that he will be joined by those who are still alive,[82] over whom he has no advantage.[83]

256 | In 4:13–18 Paul offers comfort to the Thessalonians who were grieving. He begins with their grief for those who had fallen asleep (v. 13), then uses various traditions to provide the reason (γάρ, v. 14) they should not grieve, and on that basis (ὥστε) directs them to comfort one another (v. 18). That there are similarities in what he says to the consolatory themes I have identified would seem to be obvious, but there are also some obvious differences.[84] Whereas the consolations urge that reason limit the grief lest it become immoderate, for Paul it is the Christian hope, based on Christ's resurrection and coming, that makes possible comfort.[85]

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[76] Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.34.92; Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. Apoll.* 107D–F. See Roland Herkenrath, *Studien zu den griechischen Grabschriften* (Feldkirch: Im Selbstverlage der Anstalt, 1896), 21, 18; Richmond Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (UISLL 28.1–2; Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1942; repr., 1962), 82–83; Edward J. Kenney, ed., *Lucretius: De rerum natura Book III* (CGLC; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1971; repr., 1981), 207; Barbara P. Wallach, *Lucretius and the Diatribe against the Fear of Death: De rerum natura III 830–1094* (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 40; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 59ff.

[77] See Georg Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1878), 345, 3–4; Lattimore, *Themes*, 218; cf. 253 n. 299. For μὴ λυπῇς and similar expressions on tombstones, see Friedrich Preisigke, *Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten* (Strassburg: K.J. Trübner, 1915–), 3514, 3515, 3516, 5715, 5751, etc. These inscriptions are addressed to the deceased, but they would have a consolatory effect on the reader.

[78] E.g., Seneca, *Marc.* 6.1–2.

[79] E.g., Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 21.1–2; cf. Lucian, *Nigr.* 7.

[80] Cf. Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. Apoll.* 117BC (ἀναρπάζω, ἐξαρπάζω). For *rapio*, see Horace, *Odes* 2.17.5; 4.2.21; Pliny, *Nat.* 7.46; Ovid, *Pont.* 4.11.5 (in a consolation). For *eripio*, see Q. Curtius 10.5.10; Ammianus Marcellinus 30.5.18. On the other hand, *eripio* is also used for snatching someone from death, e.g., Cicero, *Verr.* 2.5.12; *Div.* 2.25.

[81] Note the instruction of Menander Rhetor, Περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικῶν 414, 16–17; 421, 16ff. (Spengel; 162, 176 Russell-Wilson), and for the practice, Seneca, *Marc.* 25.1, 26.3. See Gregg, *Consolation Philosophy*, 180–181, 204, 208–209.

[82] Seneca, *Marc.* 19.

[83] Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. Apoll.* 113D.

[84] One should do justice to Paul's emphasis that Christians will enjoy association with one another and the Lord in the eschaton; cf. ἅμα σὺν αὐτοῖς and πάντοτε σὺν κυρίῳ in 4:17, and ἅμα σὺν αὐτῷ in 5:11, ἄξει σὺν αὐτῷ in 4:14. Paul's use of ἁρπάζω in v. 17, when seen in this context, represents a neat twist. Whereas the word usually denoted the separation from the living, Paul uses it to describe a snatching to association with the Lord and other Christians.

[85] Cf. Theodoret: We do not use οἰκεῖοι λογισμοί, but our teaching is derived from the word of the Lord (PG 82:648).

The traditions that he uses do not have their origin in the consolations, but the way they are made to function is not foreign to those consolations.

## Conclusion

I have attempted to identify certain hortatory devices and terms used by Paul in writing to people who were most likely familiar with them. Paul's use of them demonstrates his continuity with the hortatory tradition and reflects his pastoral method. At the same time, his use of the traditional hortatory material is marked by profound change as he reshapes it to express his experience of God working in him, or stresses the theological and religious dimensions of ethics, or uses traditional Christian material to address issues also of concern to pagan consolers.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

# "IN SEASON AND OUT OF SEASON": 2 TIMOTHY 4:2*

Insufficient attention has been paid to what turns out to be a remarkable admonition to Timothy: "preach the word, be urgent in season and out of season (ἐπίστηθι εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως), convince, rebuke and exhort, be unfailing in patience and in teaching" (2 Tim 4:2). Because ἐπίστηθι has no object, the relation of the admonition to the rest of the sentence is unclear,[1] but it seems natural to take it as pointing to the preceding κήρυξον.[2] Understood thus, Timothy is commanded to have "an attitude of prompt attention that may at any moment pass into action."[3]

Εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως is an oxymoron and is "made still more emphatic by the omission of the copula."[4] It has sounded proverbial to some commentators,[5] and C. Spicq has pointed out that εὐκαιρία is a rhetorical term.[6] Exegetes have primarily been interested in the person or persons to whom the preaching should be opportune or inopportune. Some

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* Originally published in *JBL* 103 (1984): 235–243; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 137–145.

1 Some commentators do not discuss the relationship to the rest of the sentence or are themselves unclear on how they understand it, e.g., Walter Lock, A *Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (ICC 39; New York: Scribner's, 1924); Edmund K. Simpson, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 152; Joachim Jeremias, *Die Briefe an Timotheus und Titus* (NTD; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 56; Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 120; and Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épitres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 2:799.

2 As do Charles J. Ellicott (*A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* [Andover: Draper, 1882], 167); C.K. Barrett (*The Pastoral Epistles in the New English Bible* [NClB; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963], 116); J.N.D. Kelly (*A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* [HNTC; New York: Harper, 1963], 205); and, apparently, Burton S. Easton (*The Pastoral Epistles* [New York: Scribner's, 1947], 68).

3 Ellicott, *Pastoral Epistles*, 167.

4 Ellicott, *Pastoral Epistles*, 167; cf. Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 2:799; Simpson, *Pastoral Epistles*, 152.

5 Lock, *Pastoral Epistles*, 112–113; Kelly, *Pastoral Epistles*, 205.

6 Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 2:799.

236 have held that the reference is to Timothy,[7] others to Timothy's | hearers,[8] while some consider that probably both are in view.[9] The concern with the appropriate or inappropriate occasion on which to speak and how to speak stretches back to the fourth century BC, and an awareness of discussions of the subject may help us to place 2 Tim 4:2 in a new light. Spicq is on the right track when he refers to *Phaedrus* 272A, in which Plato requires that a speaker discern whether certain forms of speech are opportune or inopportune; but Spicq does not follow it up, and the other references that he provides are not quite to the point.[10]

## Timely Exhortation

According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Comp.* 12), the Sophist Gorgias was the first person to write about the necessity for a speaker to adapt his words to the actual circumstances, the καιροί, in which he delivers them.[11] His earlier contemporary, Protagoras of Abdera, had been the first, according to Diogenes Laertius (9.52), to emphasize the importance of seizing the right moment (καιρός) for delivering a speech, but Protagoras did not

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[7] Thus the Greek Fathers: Chrysostom, *In epistolam secundam ad Timotheum Commentarius*, Hom. 9.2 (PG 62:651); Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epistolas B. Pauli Commentarii* (ed. Henry B. Swete; 2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1880–1882), 2:223; Theodoret, *Interpretatio Epistolae II ad Timotheum* (PG 82:852); cf. Theophylact, *Epistolae secundae Divi Pauli ad Timotheum expositio* (PG 125:128). Among modern commentators the interpretation is held by Ellicott (*Pastoral Epistles*, 167), Simpson (*Pastoral Epistles*, 152), and Spicq (*Les épîtres pastorales*, 2:799). George H. Whitaker ("In Season, Out of Season," *ExpTim* 34 [1923]: 332–333) attempts to support Chrysostom's interpretation by adducing references that, however, either do not refer to an opportune time for speech (Polybius 5.26.10; Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1071D) or use εὐκαιρέω (Plutarch, *Apoph. lac.* 223D), which is not precisely the same as speaking εὐκαίρως.

[8] Easton, *Pastoral Epistles*, 69; Jeremias, *Briefe an Timotheus und Titus*, 56; Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 120.

[9] Lock, *Pastoral Epistles*, 111–112; Barrett, *Pastoral Epistles*, 116.

[10] Isocrates, *Antid.* 311, and Johann C.G. Ernesti (*Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae* [repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1962], 140), whose references are either wrong or beside the point.

[11] See George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 66–68. With respect to his statement that καιρός as a rhetorical term is largely restricted to the classical period, one should note Eduard Norden (*Die antike Kunstprosa* [5th ed.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958], 69 n. 1), who refers to, among others, Hermogenes, Περὶ ἰδεῶν 2.396.12 (*Rhetores graeci* [ed. Leonhard von Spengel; Leipzig: Teubner, 1853–1856; repr., Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966]) and Quintilian 9.3.102. See also Wilhelm Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Munich: Beck, 1940) I, 3/1, 65.

develop the idea, and it has been denied that it was part of the so-called καιρός-*Lehre* or that Gorgias had derived it from Protagoras.[12] It has been argued that the doctrine was influenced by the field of medicine: as a physician adapts his treatment to the condition and needs of his patient, so should the orator.[13] Whatever the original influences may have been, it will be seen that a speaker's consideration of the proper καιρός for his speech—especially that brand of speaking described as παρρησία, frankness, boldness—was later frequently compared to a good physician's discernment of his patient's condition.[14]

| The use of καιρός and its cognates became a commonplace.[15] A sampling from a wide range of material will serve to illustrate the point. According to Aeschylus, "words are physicians of ailing wrath if salve is applied at the proper time (ἐν καιρῷ)."[16] Philo of Alexandria, in a discussion of the correct καιρός, claims that untimely bold speech (παρρησία ἄκαιρος) is not really bold speech, but the products of diseased minds and emotions.[17] *Sentences of Sextus* 163a is somewhat similar: An untimely word (λόγος παρὰ καιρόν) is proof of an evil mind." Athenaeus (14.620–621) accuses Sotades of ἄκαιρος παρρησία and Dio Cassius (65.12.1) says that Helvidius Priscus imitated Thrasea's παρρησία but sometimes did so οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ. The anthologist Stobaeus, in his collection of *dicta* on παρρησία, also records that it should be ἐν καιρῷ.[18] Cicero's compliment to his friend Atticus (*Att.* 4.7.1), *Nihil* εὐκαιρότερον *epistula tua*, "nothing could be more apropos than your letter," reveals the currency that the term had attained by the first century BC. 237

The philosophical moralists from the first and second centuries of the Empire provide information that is particularly pertinent to our interest. They reflect the general concern for opportune speech as it relates to their own efforts. Thus Musonius Rufus advises that a philosopher, rather than

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[12] See Schmid, *Geschichte*, I, 3/1, 24 n. 3.

[13] See the bibliography in Schmid, *Geschichte*, I, 3/1, 24 n. 3; 58 n. 5; 65 n. 3.

[14] The following fragment from Democritus, Protagoras's contemporary and fellow-citizen, is of interest: οἰκεῖον ἐλευθερίας παρρησία, κίνδυνος δὲ ἡ τοῦ καιροῦ διάγνωσις (*Frg.* 226 Diels-Kranz). It is not clear, however, whether διάγνωσις should be understood in its medical sense or simply as "discern." We know nothing about Democritus's possible relationship to Protagoras.

[15] The Stoics' use of εὐκαιρία in their doctrine of εὐταξία is here left out of consideration. See Cicero, *Fin.* 3.14.45; *Off.* 1.142.

[16] Aeschylus, *Prom.* 380–382, used by Ps.-Plutarch (*Cons. Apoll.* 102B).

[17] Philo, *Somn.* 2.78–92.

[18] Stobaeus, *Flor.* 3.13.61 (3:466, 17 – 467, 2 W-H); cf. *Flor.* 3.13.59 (3:466, 6–13 W-H), ἐν ᾧ χρή.

rehearsing a multitude of arguments, should speak καιρίως about each.[19] Maximus of Tyre, on the other hand, says that there is no καιρός appropriate to the philosopher's discourse, but he appears to have in mind the social context peculiarly adapted to receiving philosophical instruction.[20]

In addition to sharing the interest generally, these philosophers were particularly concerned with the appropriate times for their efforts at moral reformation. Their psychagogy required serious consideration of the emotional and moral conditions of those persons they sought to benefit. In deliberating on the proper καιρός for their instruction, they were careful, as they were in other matters, to distinguish themselves from persons who did not show similar discrimination. This meant, frequently, that they distanced themselves from the Cynics. Thus, in his depiction of the ideal Cynic, Epictetus contrasts him to what was popularly conceived to be a Cynic trait, namely, to revile ἀκαίρως the people he | meets.[21] And Lucian, who gives a Cynic cast to the satirical comments of Momus, has him accused of inopportune censure (οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ νῦν ἐπιτιμῶν).[22] The serious philosopher, on the other hand, is not indiscriminate in his frankness, but only reproves a person when the situation is εὔκαιρος.[23] Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 38.4–5) shows that expressing one's fear that one's address might be ἄκαιρος had become a convention among such philosophers by the end of the century.

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## Determining the Proper Occasion

In determining the proper καιρός for their speech, philosophers took into consideration a number of things. To begin with, they had to decide where and to whom they would speak, for example, whether in a school, a salon,

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19 Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 1 (6, 6 Hense).

20 Maximus of Tyre 1.3 (4, 22–25, 8; 6, 39 Hobein).

21 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.50. Margarethe Billerbeck (*Epiktet: Vom Kynismus* [PhAnt 34; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978], 113–114) thinks that the meaning of ἄκαιρος here is "importunate" or "tasteless," that is, that it is modal rather than temporal. The distinction, however, does not hold in this kind of context.

22 Lucian, *Jupp. trag.* 43. Earlier in the dialogue, Momus's παρρησία had been permitted because it was thought to be aimed at the common good (19), but his ἐπιτίμησις was soon rejected (23). On Lucian's use of Momus, see Rudolf W.O. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1906; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), 147–148, 23.

23 Cf. Epictetus, *Ench.* 33.16; and on the different attitudes toward παρρησία, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

upon invitation elsewhere, or in the open air where all could hear them.[24] Except for those of their number who despaired of the human condition and withdrew from society[25] and the few who approved residence at court[26] or taught in their own homes,[27] in this period the majority of Cynics preferred to preach to the public at large.[28] While these differences in practice clearly existed among the Cynics, their critics took no interest in differentiating between them, but generally described all Cynics as street preachers, gross in their behavior and importunate in their speech.[29]

It was disconcerting to Stoics that little difference was seen to exist between them and the Cynics. Juvenal, for instance, said that they differed from the Cynics only in the shirt that they wore (*Sat.* 13.122), thus reducing the issue to a matter of class and style, as modern scholars also have done.[30] Some Stoics may indeed themselves have drawn the distinctions in | this way.[31] It should be noted also that as early as the first century BC there were Stoics abroad in the streets[32] who used the Cynics' means of propaganda.[33] Seneca himself highly admired his contemporary, 239

[24] See Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse,'" esp. 204–207.

[25] See, e.g., Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 2, 4, 7, 9; Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 24; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28.

[26] See Ronald F. Hock, "Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic," *GRBS* 17 (1976): 41–53.

[27] As, e.g., Lucian's *Demonax*.

[28] See, e.g., Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 1, 6; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.7–11.

[29] For the diversity among the Cynics, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Self-Definition among the Epicureans and Cynics," in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Volume 3: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Ben F. Meyer and Edward P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 46–59, 192–197.

[30] See Wilhelm Nestle, *Griechische Geistesgeschichte von Homer bis Lukian* (KTA 192; Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 1944), 390–391; Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966; repr., London: Routledge, 1992), 60, 308 n. 17. For other ancient evidence, see Dio Cassius 65.13 and the comments by Donald R. Dudley (*A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century AD* [London: Methuen. 1937; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms; 2d ed., London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998], 137) and Walter Liefeld (*The Wandering Preacher as a Social Figure in the Roman Empire* [Ph.D. diss., Columbia University; Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1967], 40–41).

[31] Lucian (*Hermot.* 18) has the Stoic Hermotimus say, "I used to see the Stoics walking with dignity, decently dressed, always thoughtful, manly in looks, most of them close-cropped; there was nothing effeminate, none of that exaggerated indifference which stamps the genuine crazy Cynic. They seemed in a state of moderation and everyone says that is best."

[32] See Horace, *Sat.* 2.3; see also Edward V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911; repr., London: Routledge, 1958), 111; José F. Mora, "Cyniques et Stoïciens," *RMM* 62 (1957): 20–36, esp. 22.

[33] For their propaganda, see Paul Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur* (3d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1912), 75–96; André Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne: Librairie Payot, 1926), 10; Michel Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères de*

the Cynic Demetrius, who is the first Cynic in the Empire about whom we have information, supplied largely by Seneca.[34] Yet Seneca wants it to be clearly understood that proper instruction differs from that of the Cynics. Unlike the Cynics, who were indiscriminate in their use of freedom of speech and "scattered advice by the handful" to all within hearing distance, Seneca would speak only to those who were in a condition to receive a benefit and would not threaten to drag the philosopher down to their level.[35]

In order to attain the most good, the philosopher might find it desirable or necessary to deal with people individually rather than in groups.[36] This required that the correct καιρός for the instruction be determined. The Epicurean communities provide examples of the procedure,[37] as do other philosophers.[38] Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 77/78.38–39) reflects the attitude as well as the medical language that was commonly used in this kind of context. The philosopher, he says, should admonish people privately and individually as well as in groups as frequently as he finds any καιρός, spending his life sound (ὑγιής) in words and deeds.

240 | Plutarch shows deep concern for attaining the greatest good in instruction,[39] and in *Quomodo adulator* he provides the handiest discussion for our immediate interest. The latter half of the treatise (65E–74E) is a detailed treatment of παρρησία. The conviction that people are injured if they are either praised or blamed ἄκαιρος (66B) leads Plutarch to a careful consideration of the proper and improper times for frank speech. Drinking parties clearly do not constitute the right καιρός for frankness (68CD), nor do times of misfortune (68E–69E). The person who applies frankness and stinging rebuke during the latter is like someone who applies a

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*l'église, de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie* (PatSor 1; Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1957), 49–50. For modification of the view that the diatribe was used by Cynics in their public preaching, see Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981).

[34] See Margarethe Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Popularphilosophie* (PhAnt 36; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979).

[35] Seneca, *Ep.* 29.1–5; cf. 108.4. See Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 171–172.

[36] For the desirability of personalized instruction, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," *NovT* 25 (1983): 238–56, esp. 244–245. [*Light*, 1:167–185]

[37] See Marcello Gigante, "Philodème. Sur la liberté de parole," *Actes du VIII$^{e}$ Congrès, Assoc. Guillaume Budé* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1969), 206–207.

[38] See Hadot, *Seneca*, 65–66.

[39] See, e.g., Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.* 43E–44A: Someone who listens to a lecture should approach the lecturer privately after the lecture, for what a philosopher says to an individual privately may bear profitable fruit.

vision-sharpening stimulant to a disordered and inflamed eye and thereby increases the pain (69AB). In such circumstances it is preferable to exhibit the gentleness of a nurse or to follow the example of Crates (69CD).

The proper καιρός for frankness is when the philosopher sees himself called to check the headlong course of vice (69E–70B). Plutarch gives advice on the specific ways in which this is to be done. In particular, it should be recognized that a καιρός for admonition is found after people have been reviled by others and are downcast. Then frankness is to be applied, but privately (70DE). Error should be treated as a foul disease, and all admonition and disclosure should therefore be made secretly, "with nothing of show or display in it to attract a crowd of witnesses and spectators" (70F–71A).

> And least of all is it decent to expose a husband in the hearing of his wife, and a father in the sight of his children, and a lover in the presence of his beloved, or a teacher in the presence of his students; for such persons are driven almost insane with grief and anger at being taken to task before those with whom they feel it necessary to stand well (71C).

Frankness should be therapeutic (θεραπευτικὴ παρρησία), and that it can be when, like a physician, the philosopher acts at the correct καιρός (73D–74A). As physicians continue their treatment after surgery, so those who use admonition should not abandon people after stinging them with their words (74DE).

## Timothy's Preaching

In light of this sustained concern with the opportune time for speech, the command to Timothy to preach εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως is remarkable. That the author knew it to be so is suggested by the omission of the copula for the sake of emphasis. He wants to draw special attention to this part of his admonition. The medical language frequently found in discussions of opportune and inopportune speech is also found in v. 3 and is part of the use the author makes of such language throughout the Pastorals.[40] Some

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[40] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays* on *the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35. [*Light*, 1:117–134] Jerome D. Quinn ("Jesus as Savior and Only Mediator [1 Tim 2:3–6]," in *Fede e cultura alla luce della Bibbia* [Atti della Sessione plenaria 1979 della Pontificia Commissione Biblica; Turin: Elle Di Ci, 1981], 251–253) thinks that the polemical use of the medical imagery could be viewed in the wider perspective of the σω(σ)- cluster of terms

241 of | the church fathers discerned something similar to medical treatment already reflected in the sequence ἔλεγξον, ἐπιτίμησον, παρακάλεσον in v. 2. Attributing to Paul the kind of concern one sees in Plutarch, they understood Paul to be advising Timothy to move from the harshest to the mildest admonition in the way a physician progressively administers surgery, drugs, and mild medicines.[41]

There is the strongest likelihood, therefore, that εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως should be understood in light of the material that has been presented here. Since in this material καιρός invariably refers to the time or circumstances with respect to the listeners and their condition or mood, it is reasonable to think that it also does so in 2 Tim 4:2. If it does, however, one is left with the task of explaining this deliberate flying in the face of the convention to determine and choose the right καιρός and avoid being ἄκαιρος. The problem becomes more acute when it is observed that at this point the author appears to be at cross-purposes with the way in which he has used the larger complex of philosophical traditions of which this one is part. Throughout the Pastorals the heretics are depicted as harsh, bellicose, and undiscriminating in their relations and speech, while the readers are advised to be gentle, understanding, and discriminating in their treatment of those within the community.[42] The description of the heretics matches that of the misanthropic, antisocial Cynics, that of the orthodox, the ideal philosopher who has in mind the nurture and progress of his hearers. Yet in 2 Tim 4:2 Timothy is commanded to speak ἀκαίρως, precisely what Cynics who were regarded as irresponsible were accused of doing. And, notwithstanding the addition of the dangling "in patience and in teaching," the characterization of the preaching provided by the middle three of the five imperatives is precisely that of the harsh and demanding Cynic speech.

Furthermore, although medical language is used so frequently elsewhere in the letters, despite the fathers' efforts to see in the verse an example of "Seelenleitung" analogous to medical treatment, the fact remains that

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in the Pastorals, which is used for a rescue or healing of persons. I wish to thank him for this reference and for other comments he has made on this paper.

[41] See n. 7 above. Chrysostom speaks more generally of the physician's surgery and drugs. Theophylact likens rebuke (ἐπιτίμησις) to surgery, and exhortation (παράκλησις) to milder drugs, while Theodoret likens reproof (ἔλεγχος) to surgery, and exhortation to milder measures. Jerome D. Quinn reminds me that Theodore of Mopsuestia (see n. 7 above) and Oecumenius (PG 119:229) continue this exegetical tradition.

[42] For the remainder of this paragraph, see Malherbe, "Medical Imagery." See n. 40 above.

it is not utilized here in the way one might expect it to have been used. Finally, neither in this passage nor anywhere else in the Pastorals is there an interest in private or individual instruction as there is, for example, in 1 Thess 2:12 and Acts 20:20, 31. On the contrary, Timothy's | duties are consistently portrayed as out in the public, for all to see.[43] 242

We shall take these problems up in reverse order. The lack of interest in private instruction may be explained by the circumstances envisaged in the letters. The heretics are the ones who sneak into households to upset the faith.[44] Yet their folly will be plain to all. They will not progress (προκόψουσιν) far or, ironically, will only "progress" to a worse condition (2 Tim 3:9, 13). Timothy, in contrast, is to preach and teach in public so that his progress (προκοπή) may be visible to all (1 Tim 4:15). The situation the author has in mind therefore does not permit the adoption of a standard "pastoral" method. Timothy must distinguish himself from his opponents in his method of teaching as much as in its content.

That εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως is brought into conjunction with medical imagery in 2 Tim 4:2–3 is quite understandable in light of the tradition that has been traced, and the fathers' attempt to extract a pastoral therapy in the way they did is not unexpected. But it is not surprising that the author himself does not develop such a therapy. That he does not is in keeping with the way in which he uses medical imagery throughout the letters. His use of the imagery is thoroughly polemical. It describes the diseased condition of the heretics, but is never utilized to describe a therapy for those sick souls. It is never explicitly said that the morally or religiously ill person will actually be cured by the sound of healthy words. That the speaker will in fact bring about health of soul in his opponents by applying sound words is at most an inference that the reader may wish to draw on the basis of such passages as Titus 1:13. But that is by no means certain and is not the case in 4:3, where it is said that they would not endure healthy teaching. In light of this consistently polemical use of the imagery, developing a therapy of the word which uses the same imagery would have been incongruous.

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43 E.g., 1 Tim 4:12–15; 5:19–21, 24–25; 2 Tim 2:2; cf. Titus 2:7–8.

44 2 Tim 3:6; Titus 1:11. See Spicq (*Les épîtres pastorales*, 2:799), who adduces (777) Jude 4 and *Ptol. ad Flor.* 7.1 in commenting on ἐνδύνω in 2 Tim 3:6. On the danger of women being led astray, see David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26: Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 84–85; and for women upsetting entire households, see Athenaeus 13.560C.

The admonition to preach ἀκαίρως is more problematical, but it too should be understood in light of the Pastorals' perspective. The persons the author has in mind are not well-meaning individuals who have gone astray and are open to reason and persuasion which would effect their return to the truth. They are obstinate and their unwillingness to endure sound teaching would appear to place them beyond the pale. There seems to be no prospect of amelioration in their condition that could justify that adaptation of speech which is at the heart of the admonition to speak εὐκαίρως only. Given the extremity of their condition, Timothy is directed to preach without giving consideration to whether it is opportune or inopportune to do so. That is the thrust of the oxymoron. In this respect the attitude is that | of the pessimistic Cynic who flays his deluded audience. 243

## Conclusion

There is another aspect of the matter, however, that distinguishes this admonition from the Cynic attitude. The reason (γάρ) given for the command is that there will be a καιρός when people will not heed sound words and will refuse to listen to the truth (v. 3). That καιρός is in fact already present. These are the last days when people apostatize from the faith.[45] But the seasons are divinely determined; they are καιροὶ ἴδιοι, the proper time, in which things are made known. The testimony to the ransom of Christ was or is made at the proper time (1 Tim 2:6), and God will make manifest the appearing of Christ at the proper time (1 Tim 6:15). Ages ago God promised eternal life and at the proper time manifested his word in the apostolic preaching (Titus 1:3). The ἴδιοι καιροί are thus part of a history of salvation in which preaching of the word belongs to the process of revelation. Timothy, as recipient of the apostolic message, continues in this process, but it is God who enacts the work of salvation.[46] The process is determined by God, not by the inclination of people to accept the word or not. The preaching should therefore take place irrespective of the condition of the listeners, which, in the case of the heretics, is beyond the hope of cure anyway.

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[45] 1 Tim 4:1; 2 Tim 3:1; see Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 2:800; Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 64, 115.

[46] Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 43, 131.

CHAPTER TWELVE

# PAUL: HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHER OR CHRISTIAN PASTOR?*

Modern interpreters have operated on the assumption that, like Tennyson's Ulysses, Paul was part of all that he had met, and that to understand him properly, it is necessary to view him in the cultural context in which he lived. As one might expect of him, however, Paul makes it difficult to decide precisely which context, the Jewish or the Greek, we should examine in order to understand his letters better. Born in Tarsus, an important Hellenistic university city of the day, but educated on both the secondary and tertiary levels in Jerusalem (Acts 22:3), he was exposed to both, and interpreters have tended to view him from either a Greek or Jewish perspective.[1] That Paul claims to have become all things to all people in order to save some (1 Cor 9:19–23) indicates that he was aware of the need to adapt to particular contexts in which he found himself, and should caution us not to force everything he said or did into one mold. In this paper I wish to comment on the Greco-Roman side of Paul, without thereby implying that it offers us the keys to unlock all the mysteries surrounding this enigmatic figure.

Modern scholarship was not the first to discover Paul's indebtedness to Greek culture. His letters, even on a superficial level, have many affinities with the popular philosophy of his day, especially as it was represented by Stoicism and Cynicism. It does not surprise us that Tertullian, who was on the side of Jerusalem rather than Athens, referred to Seneca, the Stoic philosopher who played chaplain to Nero, as "frequently our own."[2] Shortly afterwards, an anonymous Christian, impressed by the similarities he saw between Paul and Seneca, composed a correspondence that was supposed to have taken place between the two.[3] No wonder, then, that Jerome, one

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* Originally published in the *American Theological Library Association Proceedings* 39 (1985): 86–98; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 67–77.

[1] The evidence is discussed by Willem C. van Unnik, *Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth* (trans. George Ogg; London: Epworth, 1962).

[2] Tertullian, *An.* 20.

[3] See Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha* (English translation edited by Robert McL. Wilson; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963–1966),

hundred and fifty years after Tertullian, dropped Tertullian's qualifying "frequently," and referred to the Stoic simply as "our own Seneca."[4]

During the last century, NT scholars have shown that many aspects of Paul's life and letters are illuminated when they are examined in light of Greco-Roman culture. There is no longer any doubt that Paul was thoroughly familiar with the teaching, methods of operation, and style of argumentation of the philosophers of the period, all of which he adopted and | adapted to his own purposes. This is not to argue that he was a technical philosopher; neither were his philosophical contemporaries. The philosophers with whom Paul should be compared were not metaphysicians who specialized in systematizing abstractions, but, like Paul, were preachers and teachers who saw their main goal to be the reformation of the lives of people they encountered in a variety of contexts, ranging from the imperial court and the salons of the rich to the street corners.[5]

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The points of similarity between Paul and his philosophic competitors may be stressed to the point that he is viewed as a type of Hellenistic philosopher. In what follows I propose to note some of the similarities, but then to stress the function to which Paul put what he had received from the moral philosophers. That function is essentially pastoral, and Paul's adoption, and sometimes adaptation, of the philosophical tradition, reveals to us his awareness of the philosophic pastoral methods current in his day. By drawing attention to this function, I wish to sharpen the perspective from which the moral philosophical material in Paul's letters is to be viewed. I select examples from his practice in establishing and shaping Christian communities and the ways in which he adapted accepted means of persuasion to nurture his churches.[6]

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2:133–41. Recent books on the collection are reviewed by Aldo Moda, "Seneca e il cristianesimo: a proposito di tre libri recenti," *Hen* 5 (1983): 93–109.

[4] Jerome, *Jov.* 1.49.

[5] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333. [*Light*, 2:675–749] Still classic discussions are Ludwig Friedländer, *Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire* (trans. L.A. Magnus, John Henry Freese, and A.B. Gough; 4 vols.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1908–1913), 3:214–281; and Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian, 1956), 289–440.

[6] I have treated the subject at greater length in "Christian Community and Classical Culture: Paul and the Greeks at Thessalonica," delivered as the Haskell Lectures at Oberlin College in March 1985, published as *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

## Founder of Churches

In his letters, Paul frequently refers to his initial preaching when he founded churches and to the reception of his message.[7] Equally striking are his references to himself as an example that had either been followed by his converts, of which he reminds his readers, or that he offers for emulation.[8] In thus placing his own person at the very center of his teaching, Paul followed a procedure recommended by philosophers. Seneca illustrates the thinking in advice he gives to his friend Lucilius:

> "Cherish some man of high character, and keep him ever before your eyes, living as if he were watching you, and ordering all your actions as if he beheld them." Such, my dear Lucilius, is the counsel of Epicurus; he has quite properly given us a guardian and attendant. We can get rid of most sins, if we have a witness who stands near us when we are likely to go wrong. The soul should have someone to respect—one by whose authority it may make even its inner shrine more hallowed. Happy is the man who can make others better, not merely when he is in their company, but even when he is in their thoughts! One who can so revere another, | will soon be himself worthy of reverence. Choose therefore a Cato; or, if Cato seems too severe a model, choose some Laelius, a gentler spirit. Choose a master whose life, conversation, and soul-expressing face have satisfied you; picture him always to yourself as your protector and your pattern. For we must indeed have someone according to whom we may regulate our characters.[9]

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Seneca has in mind more than an exemplification of moral virtues that are to be imitated; he is equally interested in the forming of a relationship that would contribute to a sense of security and the continuing spiritual cultivation of the imitator.

The context in which Paul taught was totally different from Nero's court, yet he followed the practice recommended by Seneca. As a maker of tents, he plied his trade in a workshop, probably within the setting of a household of artisans, and there offered his practice as an example to be imitated (cf. 2 Thess 3:6–10). Some philosophers, too, were active in workshops and took the opportunity to demonstrate their teaching by their practice. Musonius Rufus, another contemporary of Paul, worked the

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[7] E.g., 1 Cor 2:1–5; 3:6, 10; 4:15; 2 Cor 1:18–19; Gal 4:12–13; Phil 4:1–3; 1 Thess 1:9–2:13.

[8] Cf. 1 Cor 4:16; 11:1; Gal 4:12; Phil 3:17; 1 Thess 1:6; 2 Thess 3:7–9. See Willis P. de Boer, *The Imitation of Paul* (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1962), and, for background to the NT use of personal examples, Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986).

[9] Seneca, *Ep.* 11.8–10.

land during his exile, but illustrates how manual labor could be viewed by teachers such as himself. He thought a philosopher's students would be benefited "by seeing him at work in the fields, demonstrating by his own labor the lesson which philosophy inculcates—that one should endure hardships, and suffer the pains of labor with his own body, rather than depend on another for sustenance."[10] Paul also thought of manual labor as a hardship (cf. 1 Cor 4:12) and required that his converts work with their hands in order to be economically independent (cf. 1 Thess 4:9–12). Recent investigation has demonstrated that his practice was informed by this Greek context rather than rabbinic custom.[11]

There are, however, sufficient differences between Paul and the philosophers to preclude our viewing him as a slavish, unreflective follower of current practice.[12] While some of the philosophers looked to the practice as an ideal, few actually followed it. Paul not only followed it, but his self-support was also an integral part of his understanding of his apostleship. Called by God to be an apostle, he had no other choice than to heed the call, but he exercised his freedom in the manner in which he chose to preach: exultantly to offer the gospel free of charge (1 Cor 9:15–19). Furthermore, in language one does not find in the philosophers, he describes his manual labor as a demonstration of his self-giving and love for his converts (2 Cor 11:7–11; cf. 1 Thess 2:9).

89 | Paul was also more confident than the philosophers when he called on his converts to imitate him, and the nature of that confidence still further distinguished him from them. Paul did not demand that his converts look to him as a paradigm of what one might accomplish through one's own effort, as the philosophers did. Writing to the Thessalonians, he reminds them of their initial encounter: "Our gospel came to you not only in word, but also in power and in the Holy Spirit and with full conviction. You know what kind of men we proved to be among you for your sake. And you became imitators of us and of the Lord, for you received the work in much affliction, with joy inspired by the Holy Spirit" (1 Thess 1:5–6).

Philosophers would have drawn attention to their words and deeds; Paul draws attention to the gospel and the divine role in their conversion. It is only as divine power is exhibited in Paul's ministry that he becomes

[10] Musonius Rufus, "Fragment 11," in Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: "The Roman Socrates"* (YCS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 83.

[11] The subject has been treated most fully by Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980).

[12] For further details, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," *NovT* 25 (1983): 238–56. [*Light*, 1:167–185]

an example that is to be followed. Finally, Paul differs from the philosophers in his goal to form communities of believers rather than only bring about change in individuals. The communal dimension of self-support is evident in the fact that it ensures that within the community some are not burdened with the responsibility to support others (1 Thess 2:9; cf. 2 Thess 3:6–10) and that, when the church in brotherly love works so as not to be dependent on others, they have the respect of outsiders (1 Thess 4:9–12).

When he first formed churches, therefore, Paul made use of elements from the Greco-Roman philosophical moral tradition, but adapted them to express his theological understanding of his enterprise and to form communities of believers.

## The Nurturer of Churches

By the first century AD, moral philosophers had developed an extensive system of pastoral care that aimed, through character education, at the attainment of virtue and happiness. Paul made use of this tradition as he nurtured the churches he established. His first letter to the Thessalonians illustrates clearly this indebtedness as well as his modification of the tradition.

In 1 Thess 2:1–12, Paul reminds his readers of his pastoral care when he had been with them and does so in terms used in descriptions of the ideal philosopher. The items that he chooses to mention and the antithetic style he adopts find their | counterparts in such descriptions as the one in Dio Chrysostom: 90

> But to find a man who with purity and without guile speaks with a philosopher's boldness, not for the sake of glory, nor making false pretensions for the sake of gain, but who stands ready out of good will and concern for his fellowman, if need be, to submit to ridicule and the uproar of the mob—to find such a man is not easy, but rather the good fortune of a very lucky city, so great is the dearth of noble, independent souls, and such the abundance of flatterers, charlatans and sophists. In my own case I feel that I have chosen that role, not of my own volition, but by the will of some deity. For when divine providence is at work for men, the gods provide, not only good counselors who need no urging, but also words that are appropriate and profitable to the listener.[13]

[13] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.11–12. For a detailed discussion of the passage, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

But, once again, as there are similarities between Paul and such philosophers as Dio, so are there differences.

Basic to the philosophers' approach was the frankness with which they laid bare the shortcomings of their listeners. Convinced of their own moral attainment, which gave them the right, indeed the responsibility, to correct others, they were fearless in their denunciation of moral error. When they were opposed or reviled, they turned their maltreatment into self-commendation; their behavior in the face of it exhibited their refusal to give quarter to any sinner and demonstrated their courage in continuing in their task. Paul uses the same technical language in describing his original preaching in Thessalonica: "though we had already suffered and been shamefully treated at Philippi, as you know, we waxed bold in our God to speak to you the gospel of God in the face of great opposition" (2:2). Here there is nothing of self-attainment, rather an awareness of God's power. What Paul engaged in was not a philosophical analysis of the human condition, but preaching God's gospel, and his boldness did not derive from his own moral freedom, but was engendered by God.

That Paul consciously worked with the philosophical traditions on the boldness of speech also appears from his use of the image of a wet nurse: "though we might have made demands as apostles of Christ, yet we were gentle among you, like a nurse suckling her own children" (2:6–7). In the first century, some Cynics, viewing the human condition as almost irredeemable, held that only the severest speech might have a salutary effect and therefore flayed their audiences mercilessly. In response, philosophers | of milder mien insisted that speakers should adapt their speech to the emotional conditions of their listeners, as nurses did: "When children fall down," according to Plutarch, "the nurses do not rush up to berate them, but pick them up, wash them, and straighten their clothes, and after all this is done, then rebuke and punish them."[14] Paul uses the same image, but again distances himself from philosophers such as Plutarch by renouncing personal authority in pastoral care and stating his reason for his demeanor: "So, crooning over you, we were ready to share with you not only the gospel of God but also our own selves, because you had become very dear to us" (2:8).

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The philosophers' concern to adapt their teaching to the conditions of their listeners is further illustrated by Dio Chrysostom:

[14] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 69BC.

> But as for himself, the man of whom I speak will strive to preserve his individuality in seemly fashion and with steadfastness, never deserting his post of duty, but always honoring and promoting virtue and prudence and trying to lead men to them, on some occasions persuading and exhorting them, on others reviling and reproaching them ... sometimes taking an individual aside privately, at other times admonishing them in groups every time he finds a proper occasion, with gentle words at times, at others harsh.[15]

Paul followed the same method of modulating his instruction according to individual needs: "You know how, like a father with his children, we exhorted each individual one of you and encouraged you and charged you to lead a life worthy of God, who calls you into his own kingdom and glory" (2:11–12). Unlike Dio, Paul is not concerned with virtue and prudence, nor does he engage in abuse and reproach. Neither does he share Dio's fear that his individuality or integrity might be compromised, and the eschatological dimension that dominates his work is totally foreign to the philosopher. Nevertheless, the method Paul used he inherited from the philosophers, and he made it part of his own pastoral practice, only now it was informed by a different perception of self and task.

The rapid spread of Christianity should not be taken to mean that the new faith provided a haven from the turmoils of life. On the contrary, as 1 Thessalonians shows, conversion resulted in psychological trauma, discouragement, grief, uncertainty about the implications of the new faith for everyday life and dislocation from the larger society. These conditions were exacerbated by the short periods that Paul remained with his new converts. That the | itinerant preacher would list as his chief apostolic hardship "the daily pressure upon me of my anxiety for all the churches" (2 Cor 11:28) does not, then, surprise us.[16] 92

Paul prepared his converts for the hardships they would endure, and in this respect shared some things with Seneca. Seneca often writes on the proper, philosophic attitude toward hardships. He reflects two standard arguments from the long tradition of consolation literature. "What, have you only at this moment learned that death is hanging over your head, at this moment exile, at this moment grief? You were born to these

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[15] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38. The most comprehensive treatment of ancient psychagogy is still Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954).

[16] On the Pauline hardships and the Graeco-Roman background of their description and function, see John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

perils. Let us think of everything that can happen as something which will happen."[17] They will happen because fate so decrees, and we can overcome them by anticipating them.[18] Paul evidently followed this advice, for he had told the Thessalonians that they should not be moved by their afflictions: "You yourselves know that this is to be our lot. For when we were with you, we told you beforehand that we were to suffer affliction; just as it has come to pass, and as you know" (3:3–4). Paul, of course, does not ascribe their experiences to impersonal fate; it is God who is in charge of their ultimate destiny, that is, their salvation through the Lord Jesus Christ (5:9). Nor does he desire Stoic impassivity; in fact, he shares their distress and affliction (3:7). What he does share with Seneca is a particular method of pastoral care.

## Paul's Continuing Interest

Paul continued the nurture of his churches when he was separated from them. He accomplished this by using intermediaries through whom he maintained contact with the novices in the faith who might otherwise have felt abandoned, and through his letters. A letter was described in antiquity as one half of a dialogue and was regarded as a substitute for one's presence.[19] Paul was familiar with ancient epistolary theory, especially with its requirement that the style of a letter be appropriate to the occasion and circumstance it addressed.[20] Recent research has demonstrated that Paul with sophistication and originality appropriated philosophical means of persuasion in his letters.[21] What has not sufficiently been appreciated is the way in which he used philosophical traditions of pastoral persuasion in his own pastoral care. To illustrate how he did so, I again turn to 1 Thessalonians.

As to style, 1 Thessalonians is a paraenetic letter.[22] Paraenesis was a style of exhortation used to influence conduct rather than teach

[17] Seneca, *Ep*. 24.15.

[18] Seneca, *Ep*. 91.4.

[19] For ancient views of letters and letter-writing, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

[20] The most comprehensive discussion is by Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986).

[21] See, for example, Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981).

[22] The subject is treated extensively in Abraham J. Malherbe, "First Thessalonians as a Paraenetic Letter," presented to the SBL Seminar on Paul, 1972, incorporated in "Hellenistic

something | new. It was, accordingly, used widely by moral philosophers who sought to modify the conduct of their audiences. Paraenesis stressed what was traditional, self-evidently good, and generally applicable. The stylistic devices used therefore sought to confirm the audience or readers in what they already knew by reminding them of it, complimenting them on what they had already accomplished, encouraging them to continue their practice, and offering models of virtue to be imitated. The assumption governing paraenesis was that a friendly relationship, frequently described as that between a father and his children, existed between the exhorter and the exhorted, which would set the tone and justify the advice. 93

Paul uses this style throughout 1 Thessalonians. He repeatedly impresses his readers with what they already know (1:5; 2:1–2, 5, 11; 3:3–4; 4:2; 5:2) and explicitly calls them to remembrance (2:9; 3:6). In paraenetic style he even says that there is really no need to write to them (4:9; 5:1), but compliments them for doing what they should and encourages them to do so more and more (4:1, 10; 5:11). He refers to the examples of the Judean churches (2:14), the Thessalonians themselves (1:7), and claims that they had already become imitators of himself (1:6). The entire autobiographical sketch in the first three chapters functions as a paraenetic reminder and is paradigmatic. He uses the images of nurse (2:7), father (2:11), and orphan (2:17, RSV “bereft”) to describe his warm relationship with them, and in highly affective language expresses his concern for and identification with them in their tribulations (2:17–3:10).

Paul’s use of these stylistic features makes 1 Thessalonians one of the best examples of ancient paraenetic letters. To appreciate Paul’s genius, however, it is necessary to move beyond matters of style to the function of the letter, which is essentially pastoral. Paul wrote to a small group of neophyte Christians who were in “tribulation,” experiencing difficulties in redefining themselves socially, uncertain of details with regard to the nature of the Christian life, and who felt abandoned by Paul and isolated in the world. Paul uses the paraenetic style to build their confidence.

His affective language and the images used to describe himself express his sense of the bond he feels with them. His repeated use of the paraenetic “as you know” makes the point that, despite their newness in the

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Moralists and the New Testament” (see n. 5 above), on which Leo G. Perdue, “Paraenesis and the Epistle of James,” *ZNW* 72 (1981): 242–46, and Darryl W. Palmer, “Thanksgiving, Self-defence, and Exhortation in I Thessalonians 1–3,” *Colloq* (Australia) 14 (1981) 23–31, are dependent.

faith, they already are possessors of Christian tradition, and his encouragement to continue in what they are doing draws attention to their achievement | rather than their shortcomings. As he had modulated his nurture when he was with them, so does he in the letter, where he exhorts (2:12; 4:10), charges (2:12; 4:6), commands (4:2, 11), and beseeches (5:12) them, and offers a basis for their consolation (4:18; 5:11). Paul has clearly used the paraenetic style to create the first Christian pastoral letter, which also happens to be the earliest piece of Christian literature we possess.

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## The Nurturing Church

Paul thought that, in addition to his own efforts, his congregations' concern for each member was necessary to the nurture of the church. It is striking how a communal concern pervades a letter such as 1 Thessalonians. Every item of conduct that Paul takes up in the latter half of the letter is communal in nature. Transgression in marriage is described as fraud of a Christian brother (4:6); social responsibility is inculcated in a context provided by brotherly love (4:9–12); and Paul provides information on the Parousia so that the grieving Thessalonians might comfort each other (4:13–18). He then becomes more explicit:

> Therefore, exhort and build one another up, one on one, as indeed you are doing. But we beseech you, brethren, to respect those who labor among you, who care for you in the Lord, and admonish you, and to esteem them very highly in love because of their work. Be at peace among yourselves. And we exhort you, brethren, admonish the disorderly, comfort the discouraged, help the weak, be patient with all. Beware lest someone repays evil with evil; rather, seek each other's good and that of all.[23]

A close comparison of the pastoral care Paul requires of the Thessalonians with his own reveals that theirs is to be an extension of his.

This description of communal soul care has parallels among certain philosophers. The philosophers who have so far come under consideration in this paper were concerned with individuals rather than communities, but the Epicureans formed communities that in many respects were similar to Christian congregations.[24] They were governed by detailed instructions on how admonition within the community was to be given

[23] 1 Thess 5:11–15.
[24] Although overstated, much of the material adduced by Norman W. De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964), is relevant.

and received.[25] Recipients of the admonitions were instructed on how to cultivate a proper disposition toward those who did the admonishing, to have the desire to be improved, and on the importance of maintaining harmony. Those | delivering the admonition were directed to speak without bitterness and always to have the goal of benefiting others by taking into consideration the different natures of people and adjusting their admonition accordingly, fully aware that excessive sharpness might result in retaliation.

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Paul's directions stress the same elements. His understanding of the Thessalonian community, however, differs radically from the Epicureans, and places his comments on the church's pastoral care in a different light. The church of the Thessalonians is "in God" (1:1); that is, it was created by God, who calls them "into his own kingdom and glory" (2:12). It is an eschatological community that Paul hopes he will boast of when Christ returns (2:19), and it will not be destroyed by death (3:11–13; 4:14–15, 17). In the letter, this language, which distinguishes Christians from the Epicureans, "reinforces the sense of uniqueness and solidarity of the community."[26]

## Conclusion

I return to the question in the title of this paper: Was Paul a Hellenistic philosopher or a Christian pastor? It may well be the case that when Paul is viewed as a theologian, the Hellenistic elements do not lie at the center of his thinking, but provide the means by which he conducts his argument. But when he and others discuss his ministry, it is extraordinary to what degree the categories and language are derived from the Greeks.[27] The same is also true when Paul is viewed as pastor. Paul is so familiar with the rich Greek traditions of pastoral care and uses them in so unstudied

[25] See Norman W. De Witt, "Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups," *CP* 31 (1936): 205–211, and the qualifications by Marcello Gigante, "Philodème. Sur la liberté de parole," *Actes du VIII^e Congrès de l'Association Guillaume Budé* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1969): 196–217. The primary source discussed is the work on frankness by Philodemus of Gadara; see Alexander Olivieri, ed., *Philodemi Peri Parresias Libellus* (BSGRT; Leipzig: B. Teubner, 1914).

[26] Wayne A. Meeks, "Social Functions of Apocalyptic Language in Pauline Christianity," in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East* (ed. David Hellholm; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1983), 694.

[27] See, e.g., Hans Dieter Betz, *Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition: Eine exegetische Untersuchung zu seiner "Apologie" 2 Korinther 10–13* (BHT 45; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972); Abraham J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 143–173. [*Light*, 1:135–166]

a fashion that it would be wrong to think that he only superficially mined the lode for his own purposes. He is as consistent and unconscious in his appropriation of the pastoral tradition as any of his pagan contemporaries. Like Ulysses, he had in fact become part of what he had met. At the same time, his apostolic self-understanding and theology so completely informed his pastoral care that the antithesis in the title is false. As to his method of pastoral care, Paul is at once Hellenist and Christian.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# "NOT IN A CORNER": EARLY CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC IN ACTS 26:26*

In 1960 W.C. van Unnik could with justification state that insufficient attention had been given to the purpose of the book of Acts.[1] During the last twenty-five years, however, since Acts has become a storm center of scholarly discussion,[2] there has been no lack of attempts to fill the need; and its purpose has been defined variously, frequently in theological terms.[3] A particular purpose that had earlier been discerned, an apologetic one, has also again received attention and been perceived in different ways.

## The Apologetic of Acts

It is frequently stated that Acts is an *apologia pro ecclesia*, written, with Rome in mind, for two purposes: to convince the civil authorities of the falsity of charges brought against Christians and to argue that Christianity should | be extended the privileges of a *religio licita*.[4] This argument has 194

* This paper was delivered as a lecture sponsored by the Program in Judaic Studies at Brown University in February 1985. It was later published in *The Second Century* 5 (1985/1986): 193–210, and subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 147–163.

[1] Willem C. van Unnik, "The 'Book of Acts' the Confirmation of the Gospel," *NovT* 4 (1960): 26–59 (= *Sparsa Collecta* [NovTSup 29–31; 3 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1973–1983], 1:340–373).

[2] Willem C. van Unnik, "Luke-Acts, a Storm Center in Contemporary Scholarship," in *Studies in Luke-Acts* (ed. Leander E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn; Nashville: Abingdon, 1966), 15–32.

[3] For the theological context of much of the recent discussion, see Ulrich Wilckens, "Interpreting Luke-Acts in a Period of Existentialist Theology," in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, 60–83; for the purpose of the work, see Robert L. Maddox, *The Purpose of Luke-Acts* (FRLANT 126; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982). An account of the investigation of Acts up to 1969 is provided by W. Ward Gasque, *A History of the Criticism of the Acts of the Apostles* (BGBE 17; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975).

[4] For example, Johannes Weiss, *Über die Absicht und den literarischen Charakter der Apostelgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897); Burton S. Easton, *The Purpose of Acts* (London: SPCK, 1936), repr. in his *Early Christianity* (Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury, 1954); and, with greater reservation, Henry J. Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts* (London: SPCK, 1927), 299–316. This view seems to be that of Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke* (New York: Harper, 1960), although he is unclear on the matter (see Paul W. Walaskay, *'And So We Came to Rome': The Political Perspective of St. Luke* [SNTSMS

recently been stood on its head by Paul Walaskay, who claims that the author is pro-Roman, and that what he writes for his church is in fact an *apologia pro imperio.*[5] Also regarding Acts as apologetic, but not in political terms, are those writers who think that it was directed to the wider Jewish community to settle internal disputes between Jewish sects, of which Christianity was one,[6] and those who regard Acts as presenting an intramural Christian defense of Paul.[7] The term apology as applied to Acts has also been extended to describe its author's perceived intention of converting the educated readers for whom he ostensibly wrote.[8]

I am here interested in the way Luke's presentation of Christianity, particularly in the person of Paul, may reflect an awareness of pagan criticisms of Christianity. I shall focus on Acts 26:26, where Paul makes claims for the public character of Christianity and his own preaching. Usually, when the purpose of Acts is seen to be the offering of a defense to non-Jews or non-Christians, the apology is defined in terms of political rights,[9] and attempts are then made to describe the historical, and in particular, political conditions that were | likely to have been the occasion of the writing. I am not prepared to offer a hypothesis on the latter, but, before turning to Acts 26:26, do wish to broaden the understanding of external apologetic with which the nature of Acts might be examined. Extensive comparisons between Luke-Acts and the Apologists, particularly Justin, have been made,[10] but they have concentrated on questions of theological

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49; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 9–10); and Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971), 630, 693–694. For problems with this understanding, see Robert J. Karris, "Missionary Communities: A New Paradigm for the Study of Luke-Acts," *CBQ* 41 (1979): 80–97.

[5] Walaskay, *'And So We Came to Rome,'* 9–10.

[6] For example, Conzelmann, *Theology of St. Luke,* 148, who thus thinks of both internal and external apologetic interests.

[7] Already represented by Ferdinand C. Baur, this view has recently been advanced most rigorously by Jacob Jervell, *Luke and the People of God* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972); Jervell, *The Unknown Paul* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984). See also Nils A. Dahl, "The Purpose of Luke-Acts," in Dahl, *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 87–98.

[8] John C. O'Neill, *The Theology of Acts in Its Historical Setting* (London: SPCK, 1970), 176.

[9] This is not always the case. See, for example, Gerd Luedemann, *Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 18–19, who does, however, refer to non-political features that are properly apologetic as "closely related to the apologetic aspect of Luke-Acts."

[10] See, for example, Franz Overbeck, "Über das Verhältnis Justins des Märtyrers zur Apostelgeschichte," *ZWT* 15 (1872): 305–349; Eduard Zeller, *The Contents and Origin of the Acts of the Apostles Critically Investigated* (2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1875), 1:114–139; O'Neill, *Theology of Acts*; Niels Hyldahl, *Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation*

affinity, literary dependence, or style of argumentation, while I wish to pursue social factors. The Christian Apologists of the second and third centuries enable us to gain such a broader understanding of the charges made against Christians and the nature of the Christian apologetic response. Their Apologies reveal that, while one of their purposes was to secure political rights, they were occupied at great length with what might broadly be described as social criticism of Christians, only part of which might have had political implications.[11]

I suggest that a number of characteristic features in Acts take on special, and in some cases new, significance when viewed in the light of such criticisms. For our immediate purpose, before turning to Acts 26:26 it will suffice to draw attention, by way of illustration, to two kinds of charges leveled at Christians.

| It is well known that Christianity was regarded as a lower class movement and that Christians were viewed as uneducated and socially insignificant, if not downright irresponsible or dangerous. According to one critic, they were "untrained in education, outcasts from humane studies, ignorant of even the meanest skills,[12] and they collected as converts "from the lowest possible dregs of society the more ignorant fools together with 196

*der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins* (ATDan 9; Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966), 260–272; William S. Kurz, "The Function of Christological Proof from Prophecy for Luke and Justin" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1977).

[11] The subject of pagan views of Christians, discussed extensively by Wilhelm Nestle, "Die Haupteinwände des antiken Denkens gegen das Christentum," *AR* 73 (1941–1942): 51–100; and Pierre C. de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne. Étude sur la polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe siècle,* (new ed.; Paris: L'Artisan du livre, 1948; orig. pub. 1934), has recently enjoyed renewed interest. See, for example, Wolfgang Speyer, "Zu den Vorwürfen der Heiden gegen die Christen," JAC 6 (1963): 129–135; Milton V. Anastos, "Porphyry's Attack on the Bible," in *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* (ed. Luitpold Wallach; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), 421–450, with bibliography in nn. 1 and 2; Stephen Benko, "Pagan Criticism of Christianity during the First Two Centuries A.D.," *ANRW* 2.23.2 (1980): 1054–1118; Benko, *Pagan Rome and the Early Christians* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1984); Robert L. Wilken, "Roman Criticism of Christianity: Greek Religion and Christian Faith," in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition* (ed. William. R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken; Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), 117–134; Wilken, "The Christians as the Romans (and Greeks) Saw Them," in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Volume 1: The Shaping of Christianity in the Second and Third Centuries* (ed. Edward P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 100–125, 234–236; Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); David Rokeah, *Jews, Pagans, and Christians in Context* (StPB 33; Leiden: E.J. Brill/Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1982).

[12] Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 5.4; Origen, *Cels.* 6.13. For a collection and discussion of the charges, see Graeme W. Clarke, *The* Octavius *of Marcus Minucius Felix* (ACW 39; New York: Newman, 1974), 18ff., 183 n. 38.

gullible women."[13] Until recently, that view of the social status of early Christians was widely held, if not so pejoratively stated, but it has come to be seen as an oversimplification.[14] The description, as abuse of a rival group or sect, was standard polemic.[15] Luke, in contrast, stresses the relatively high social standing of converts to Christianity, mentioning, among others, priests (Acts 6:7), a royal treasurer (Acts 8:26–40), a centurion (Acts 10:1–48), a proconsul (Acts 13:4–12), and a ruler of the synagogue (Acts 18:8).[16] The women who populate his story are not of the sort easily led astray,[17] but are examples of good works (Acts 9:36–43; cf. Luke 8:2–4), and they teach (Acts 18:26), provide meeting places for the church (Acts 12:12), and are generally from a professional class (Acts 16:14–15) or of high social standing (Acts 17:3, 12).[18]

197 | Related to this view of Christians as uneducated was their critics' denial that they were in any sense philosophical.[19] Such denials may have been occasioned by Christians' representation of the faith as philosophical and their demands that they receive the same treatment as philosophical sects.[20] Luke does describe the leaders of the church in Jerusalem as

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[13] Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 8.4; see Clarke, *Octavius*, 206 n. 105; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Apologetic and Philosophy in the Second Century," *ResQ* 7 (1963): 19–32. [*Light*, 2:781–796]

[14] For the social stratification that already marked the Pauline churches, see Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982); Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 51–75; Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (2d ed. enlarged; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983; orig. pub., Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 29–59, 118–121.

[15] Cf. the descriptions of Epicureans in Cicero, *Nat. d.* 1.72, 89; 2.74, as ignorant, and see Arthur S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum: Libri III* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955–1958; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 1:381–383.

[16] See Henry J. Cadbury, *The Book of Acts in History* (New York: Harper, 1955), 43; Eckhard Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller* (SUNT 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 22ff., 26, 30; Luedemann, *Paul,* 19. Cf. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 7.32.2ff.; 8.1.2ff.

[17] Cf. 2 Tim 3:6–7, applied to women led astray by heretics, and see Tatian, *Or.* 33; Origen, *Cels.* 6.24.

[18] For Luke's interest in women from the upper classes, see Martin Hengel, "Maria Magdalena und die Frauen als Zeugen," in *Abraham unser Vater: Juden und Christen im Gespräch über die Bibel: Festschrift für Otto Michel zum 60. Geburtstag* (ed. Otto Betz, Martin Hengel, and Peter Schmid; AGSU 5; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963), 243–256. Jacob Jervell, "The Daughters of Abraham: Women in Acts," in *The Unknown Paul*, 146–157, unconvincingly argues that Luke's women are subordinate and are simply devout Jews.

[19] See, for example, Origen, *Cels.* 1.9; 3.44, 75; 6.1.

[20] For Christianity as philosophical, see Justin, *Dial.* 8; Tatian, *Or.* 35; Melito, *apud* Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.26.7; Miltiades, *apud* Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 5.17.5, and for equivalent treatment to the philosophers, Athenagoras, *Leg.* 2; Tertullian, *Apol.* 39, on which see Robert L. Wilken, "Collegia, Philosophical Schools, and Theology," in *The Catacombs and*

simple and uneducated (Acts 4:17), but, as the later Apologists would find philosophical qualities exemplified in the simplest Christians,[21] so he, too, sketches a picture of the Jerusalem church in which it realizes the philosophical ideal of a communal sharing of resources, and does so in language that would have made his intention clear to a cultivated reader (Acts 2:44–45; 4:32).[22]

## The Philosophical Paul

It is particularly in the person of Paul that Luke provides a paradigm of the educated Christian preacher. According to him, Paul is well-educated in the Jewish tradition (Acts 22:3), but it is his description of Paul in the conventions used of moral philosophers that is of interest here. The scene of Paul in Athens is the most explicit.[23] In the marketplace Paul is confronted by Epicureans and Stoics who raise a question about him: "What does this babbler (σπερμολόγος) want to talk about?" (Acts 17:18). He is then taken from the marketplace to the Areopagus, where a discussion could proceed without disturbance, and where he is asked, "May we know what this new teaching is which you | present?" (Acts 17:19). The first question, 198 using the pejorative σπερμολόγος, effectively ranks him with the no-good street preachers of the day as described by Dio Chrysostom: they post "themselves at street-corners, in alleyways, and at temple-gates, pass around the hat, and play upon the credulity of lads and sailors and crowds of that sort, stringing together rough jokes and much babbling [σπερμολογίαν] and that rubbish of the marketplace."[24] Celsus gives a similar picture of

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*the Colosseum: The Roman Empire as the Setting of Primitive Christianity* (ed. Stephen Benko and John J. O'Rourke; Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson, 1971), 271–278.

[21] See Justin, *1 Apol.* 60; *2 Apol.* 10; Theophilus, *Autol.* 2.35; Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 16.5–6, and Athenagoras, *Leg.* 11.4, on which see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Athenagoras on Christian Ethics," *JEH* 20 (1969): 1–5. [*Light*, 2:829–835]

[22] Cf. Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* 30.168, and see Plümacher, *Lukas*, 16–18, for the philosophical background of "one soul" and "all things in common."

[23] See Martin Dibelius, "Paul on the Areopagus," in *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* (New York: SCM, 1956), 26–77; Hans Conzelmann, "The Address of Paul on the Areopagus," in *Studies in Luke-Acts*, 217–230; Haenchen, *Acts of the Apostles*, 514–531. For the philosophical material, see Bertil E. Gärtner, *The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation* (trans. Carolyn Hannay-King; ASNU 21; Uppsala: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1955). C.K. Barrett, "Paul's Speech on the Areopagus," in *New Testament Christianity for Africa and the World: Essays in Honour of Harry Sawyerr* (ed. Mark E. Glasswell and Edward W. Fasholé-Luke; London: SPCK, 1974), 69–77, is especially suggestive on the function of the reference to the Epicureans. Cf. also the description of Apollos as ἀνὴρ λόγιος (Acts 18:24).

[24] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.9.

Christians: “Moreover, we see that those who display their secret lore in the marketplaces and go about begging would never enter a gathering of intelligent men, nor would they dare to reveal their noble beliefs in their presence; but whenever they see adolescent boys and a crowd of slaves and a company of fools they push themselves in and show off.”[25] Having had Paul receive such abuse, Luke then removes him from the marketplace to precisely such a “gathering of intelligent men.” As has often been noted, to underscore the philosophical setting in which Paul here operates, Luke describes the scene with allusions to Socrates.[26]

The second question, on the newness of Paul’s teaching, contains one such allusion and represents what was a matter of major concern in antiquity.[27] Despite the fascination preachers of novelties held for the crowds,[28] innovation was suspect, for it could be a menace to the established order.[29] The newness of Christianity was therefore a damaging criticism, and the Christian Apologists constantly strove to meet it by stressing Christianity’s continuity with Judaism[30] | or the pagan philosophical tradition.[31] Luke elsewhere has Paul do the former;[32] here he does the latter. By having Paul explicitly quote from popular Stoicism (Acts 17:28), Luke

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[25] *Apud* Origen, *Cels.* 3.50; see 5.65 for Christian misunderstanding of philosophy. Lucian’s picture of Peregrinus, who became a Christian, is similar; cf. Lucian, *Peregr.* 11–13.

[26] See Plümacher, *Lukas*, 19, 97–98, for the literature, to which should be added Klaus Döring, *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum* (HermesE 42; Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1979), and see O’Neill, *Theology of Acts*, 160–171.

[27] For Socrates, see Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.1.1; cf. Plato, *Apol.* 24B; *Euthyphr.* 3B.

[28] Cf. *Dio* Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.9–10; 9.5.

[29] See Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 161; Timothy D. Barnes, “An Apostle on Trial,” *JTS* NS 20 (1969): 407–419, esp. 407ff., 415, 417ff.; Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 6.1, and Clarke, *Octavius,* 189 n. 64.

[30] Note Celsus’s contrasting of Jews and Christians in Origen, *Cels.* 5.25–26, 33, 61: Christians rebelled against the Jews; hence they could claim no continuity with them. In 2.4, Celsus sides with the Jew who similarly rejects the Christian attempt. See Franz Overbeck, “Über das Verhältnis Justins des Märtyrers zur Apostelgeschichte,” 322–323; Ramsay MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 2–3.

[31] See Nock, *Conversion*, 249–252; Clarke, *Octavius,* 15–16.

[32] For example, in Acts 13:16–41. Luke’s stress on the church’s continuity with Israel has been clarified by Jervell, *Luke and the People of God*, 41–74. Dahl, “Purpose of Luke-Acts,” 94, notes that “Luke-Acts is unique in its insistence that it was the God of the fathers who raised Jesus and in whose service Paul mediated salvation to the Gentiles.” For Paul’s adherence to the ancestral laws and customs, see Acts 22:3; 24:14; 28:17. For the rejection of pagan ancestral customs, cf. 1 Pet 1:18, on which see David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 82–84, and his argument that the intention of the code was apologetic.

aligns him with a venerable philosophical tradition in a manner reminiscent of the Apologists. It is noteworthy that Luke describes the Athenians and resident aliens as those delighting in novelties: "they spent their time in nothing except telling or hearing something new" (17:21). There is therefore a subtle turning of the tables: the pagan philosophers who question the apostle do not themselves hold to the legitimating tradition; it is Paul who does.[33] Luke does not here argue the way the Apologists later would, that biblical religion was older than pagan philosophy, which, they claimed, was derived from it. He in fact does not even quote from the Old Testament at all. Nevertheless, by juxtaposing Paul's appeal to the philosophical tradition to the philosophers' preoccupation with novelties, he does adopt a strategy that would accommodate the Apologists' claim of the priority of biblical religion.[34]

Another speech in which Paul speaks as a philosopher is his farewell address at Miletus (Acts 20:17–35). Coming at the end of his missionary labor in the eastern Mediterranean, the speech offers a summary of his work as a founder of churches. In recent years the speech has been compared to the departure speeches of scriptural characters, with which it clearly has affinities, but the Greco-Roman elements used in it to describe Paul's psychagogy have been neglected.[35] I shall identify only enough of those elements to illustrate the point | I am making. When Paul claims that he did not shrink from teaching his hearers what was profitable to them (Acts 20:20, 27),[36] that he taught publicly and privately (Acts 20:20; 200

[33] See Karl Loening, "Das Evangelium und die Kulturen: Heilsgeschichtliche und kulturelle Aspekte kirchlicher Realität in der Apostelgeschichte," *ANRW* 2.25.3 (1984): 2632–2636.

[34] See Klaus Thraede, "Erfinder," *RAC* 5 (1962): 1247–1268.

[35] For the so-called *Abschiedsrede,* see, for example, Johannes Munck, "Discours d'adieu dans le Nouveau Testament et dans la littérature biblique," *Aux sources de la tradition chrétienne. Melanges offerts à M. Maurice Goguel à l'occasion de son 70. anniversaire* (ed. Pierre Benoît; BT[N]; Neuchâtel and Paris: Delachaux and Niestlé, 1950), 155–170; Heinz Schürmann, "Das Testament des Paulus für die Kirche—Apg. 20, 18–35," in Schürmann, *Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den synoptischen Evangelien* (KBANT; Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1968), 310–340; Hans-Joachim Michel, *Die Abschiedsrede des Paulus an die Kirche Apg. 20, 17–38* (StANT 35; Munich: Kösel, 1973); Jan Lambrecht, "Paul's Farewell Address at Miletus (Acts 20, 17–38)," in *Les Actes des Apôtres. Traditions, rédaction, théologie* (ed. Jacob Kremer; BETL 48; Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1979), 306–337. Jacques Dupont, *Le discours de Milet. Testament pastoral de saint Paul* (*Actes 20, 18–36*) (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1962), does not place Paul's pastoral practice in the context of contemporary Graeco-Roman discussion. For the speech as a personal apology of Paul, see Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles*, 155–157; Barnes, "Apostle on Trial."

[36] For speaking ἀνυποστόλως, see Ps.-Plato, *Clitophon* 407A; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 11.27; 13.16; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 60C. This is tantamount to speaking with παρρησία, on which see the discussion below. For the orators, see Demosthenes, *Or.* 1.16; 4.51; Isocrates 8.41.

cf. 18:28; 16:37),[37] and that he gave them individual attention (Acts 20:31),[38] he is detailing procedures that were followed by responsible moral philosophers and were widely discussed. His description of rival teachers as fierce wolves (Acts 20:29–30) is standard fare,[39] as is the procedure of using them as a foil for sketching his practice as an example to be followed (20:31–35).[40] The example itself is sketched in normal paraenetic style:[41] it is introduced with an imperative (20:31) and concluded with what is functionally an imperative (δεῖ, 20:35); it calls his hearers to remembrance (20:31) and draws their attention to what they already know (20:34). The conduct he outlines is similarly standard: a disavowal of greed (20:33) and working in order to help those in need (20:34–35). This last point may seem surprising in a moral-philosophical self-commendation, but Ronald Hock has convincingly | shown that the moral philosopher who so demonstrated his self-sufficiency and took care of others was a well-known ideal.[42]

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Paul's speeches are most frequently examined for evidence of Luke's theology, but their apologetic value in the sense we have used the term should be obvious.

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[37] On speaking privately as well as publicly, cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.23.33–34; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.31; 77/78.37–38; Synesius, *Dio* 1.11, and see Paolo Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: Un intellettuale greco nell' impero romano* (Messina/Florence: G. D'Anna, 1978), 24 n. 44. For criticism of speaking in only well-selected places, cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.8–11, on which see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess. ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

[38] For individual, personalized instruction, cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.37–38; Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.* 43–44A; *Adul. amic.* 70D–71D; and see Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954), 272ff., 317 n. 99; and Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 64–66.

[39] For the harshness and greed of false philosophers, cf. Lucian, *Pisc.* 35–36, and see Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80. [*Light*, 1:41–51]

[40] For the contrast between such brutal, demanding preachers and the genuine philosopher, cf. Lucian, *Demon.* 6–8. For the use of personal example, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986).

[41] For these characteristics of paraenesis, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," *NovT* 25 (1983): 238–256, esp. 240–241. [*Light*, 1:167–185]

[42] Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980). The true philosopher does not take money from others: Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 3.14–15; Lucian, *Nigr.* 25–26.

## Paul's Defense to Agrippa

We turn now to Acts 26, which contains Paul's last defense, delivered to Agrippa II in the presence of Festus, the Roman procurator, and a gathering of military tribunes and prominent men of the city.[43] In the style of a forensic defense speech,[44] Paul undertakes a defense against "all the accusations of the Jews" (26:2) and rehearses his biography: his exemplary religious life as a youth, his persecution of the church, his call on the Damascus road, and his fulfilling of his commission in Damascus, Jerusalem, Judea, and to the Gentiles, for which he was seized by the Jews. When he declares that Christ's death, resurrection, and proclamation to the people and the Gentiles were all in fulfillment of the prophets (26:22–23), Festus interrupts him by shouting that Paul's great learning had driven him mad (26:24). The interruption and the dialogue that ensues (26:24–29) are of interest to us, particularly Paul's *captatio benevolentiae* that Agrippa knew what he had been talking about, "for this was not done in a corner" (26:26).

### *Not in a Corner*

Commentators have paid insufficient attention to οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν γωνίᾳ πεπραγμένον τοῦτο. The majority refer to it simply as a classical tag, well-| known idiom, or proverb,[45] although it has also been identified as a 202 means by which Luke elevates his subject to the plane of world history.[46] Ernst Haenchen is correct when he states that "these words light up Luke's presentation in Acts from beginning to end. . . . The entire history of Christianity—it is no secret society!—is enacted publicly and before high

[43] Acts 26:2–23; cf. 22:1–21; 24:10–21. See Robert F. O'Toole, *Acts 26: The Christological Climax of Paul's Defense* (*Ac 22:1–26:32*) (AnBib 78; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1978), for an extensive treatment of this section of Acts.

[44] See Allison A. Trites, "The Importance of Legal Scenes and Language in the Book of Acts," *NovT* 15 (1974): 278–284; Frederick Veltman, "The Defense Speeches in Acts" (Th.D. diss., Berkeley Graduate Theological Union, 1975); Veltman, "The Defense Speeches of Paul in Acts," in *Perspectives on Luke-Acts* (ed. Charles H. Talbert; Danville, Va.; Association of Baptist Professors of Religion, 1978), 243–256; Jerome H. Neyrey, "The Forensic Defense Speech and Paul's Trial Speeches in Acts 22–26: Form and Function," in *Luke-Acts: New Perspectives from the Society of Biblical Literature Seminar* (ed. Charles H. Talbert; New York: Crossroad, 1984), 210–224. In Acts 26 Paul is "an orator of some distinction," according to Colin J.A. Hickling, "The Portrait of Paul in Acts 26," in *Les Actes des Apôtres*, 501.

[45] E.g., Frederick F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952), 448–449; A. Wikenhauser, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (RNT 5; Regensburg: Pustet, 1956), 273; Charles S.C. Williams, *A Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles* (BNTC; London: Black, 1957), 265; I. Howard Marshall, *The Acts of the Apostles* (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 399.

[46] Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles*, 2.

and exalted personages. Christianity is not an inconspicuous event any longer, but a factor of world history."[47] One can go further than Haenchen does: Luke's use of the tag reflects his awareness of an old charge, already encountered in the New Testament, that Christianity was obscure,[48] and he here offers a defense against it. Christians would later respond to the charge by asserting that the faith had been disseminated throughout the world,[49] and Orosius (*Hist.* 5.2.10) eventually used the tag when describing how widespread Christianity was. A close investigation, however, will reveal that much more than geographical expansion is in view in Acts 26:26. Some major occurrences of "in a corner" were collected by Wettstein and have been repeated without examination of their function in polemic.[50] Such an examination, of a larger collection of occurrences, will illuminate Luke's use of the phrase in this context and demonstrate that here, too, he is presenting Paul as speaking in the manner of a philosopher and that this presentation is part of his apologetic program.

We begin with Plato, *Gorgias* 485D, where an old man who still gives himself to philosophical study is criticized. It is charged that he would become unmanly by fleeing from the centers and marketplaces of the city and would | cower down and spend the rest of his days whispering in a corner with three or four lads, and never utter anything free or high or spirited. Five hundred years later, Aulus Gellius quotes extensively in Greek from this section of the *Gorgias* and applies it to those who pay "futile and childish attention to trifles which contribute nothing to the conduct and guidance of life,"[51] and two hundred years after him Themistius refers and alludes to *Gorgias* 485D when he repeatedly speaks of those who withdraw

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[47] Haenchen, *Acts of the Apostles*, 691–692; see Hans Conzelmann, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (HNT 7; Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), 139; Plümacher, *Lukas*, 21, 22–25. For the public impact of Jesus's ministry already, according to Luke, see John Nolland, "Impressed Unbelievers as Witnesses to Christ (Luke 4:22a)," *JBL* 98 (1979): 219–229, esp. 226–228.

[48] See Gustav Stählin, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (NTD 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), who refers to Matt 2:6; 4:14ff.; John 1:46; 7:3–4, 41, 52; 18:20, Luke 24:18.

[49] See the collection of texts in Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 2:1–32.

[50] Johann J. Wettstein, ed., *Novum Testamentum Graecum* (2 vols.; Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1962; orig. pub. Amsterdam: Dommer, 1751–1752), 2:635; repeated, for example, by Jannes Reiling, *Hermas and Christian Prophecy: A Study of the Eleventh Mandate* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 54–55 n. 8; and O'Toole, *Christological Climax,* 139 n. 45.

[51] Aulus Gellius, *Noct. att.* 10.22.17–24.

from society.[52] For at least seven hundred years, therefore, "to speak in a corner" was used pejoratively, especially by orators or philosophers of rhetorical bent, of people, particularly philosophers, who did not engage in public life. In addition, the tag was used in a general, proverbial manner.[53]

It would appear that philosophers were put on the defensive by such criticism. Two Stoics from the latter half of the first century, thus roughly contemporary with Luke, illustrate this concern in their intramural use of the phrase. Their discussions reflect the intense preoccupation among certain philosophers of the period with the propriety or legitimacy of retiring from public life.[54] Seneca, drawn to leave the imperial court for the contemplative life, is aware of the danger of withdrawal and the criticism with which it would meet.[55] He therefore advises his correspondent Lucilius to retire from public affairs but to hide his retirement (*Ep.* 68.2). He justifies himself by asserting that, since the entire universe is the sage's field, when the Stoic withdraws he is not apart from public life, but has abandoned only one little corner of it. Seneca here alludes to the pejorative description of philosophers who seek privacy and defends them, | not without Stoic superiority, by drawing out the implications of the Stoic view of world citizenship and applying the tag to the arena of his would-be critics.[56] 204

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[52] Themistius refers to *Gorg.* 485D in *Or.* 22.265BC, and alludes to it in *Or.* 23.284B; 28.341D; 26.322B.

[53] See also Cicero, *De or.* 1.13.56; *Rep.* 1.2.2; Seneca, *Polyb*. 13.3; Plutarch, *Curios.* 516B; Lucian, *Deor. conc.* 1.1. I am indebted to Rabbi Saul Leeman of Providence, R.I., for drawing my attention to *Midr. Gen. Rab.* 39:2, on Gen 12:1, "To what can we compare Father Abraham? To a vial of perfume lying in a corner and its fragrance was not spread about. However, when it was moved around, its fragrance was spread about. Thus the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Father Abraham, 'Move yourself about from place to place and your name will become great in the world'" (Leeman's translation). Leeman also points out that *yoshuai keranot* ("those who sit in corners") means "idlers" and that the phrase is used in the *Hadran* to distinguish idlers from diligent students of Torah.

[54] See the material collected by Friedrich Wilhelm, "Plutarchos ΠΕΡΙ ΗΣΥΧΙΑΣ," *RhMus* 73 (1924): 466–482; see André-Jean Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Sather Classical Lectures 26; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), ch. 4.

[55] For the political dimension of withdrawal, see Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966; repr., London: Routledge, 1992), ch. 2.

[56] See Rita Degl'Innocenti Pierini, "*In angulo defixus:* Seneca e l'emarginazione dell' esilio," *SIFC* 53 (1981): 225–232, for a discussion of Seneca, *Polyb.* 13.3; *Ep.* 28.4. For the Cynic view of the world citizen's superiority, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 42–64, esp. 62–63; [*Light*, 2:601–634] Harold C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 101–112. For Stoic cosmopolitanism, see Baldry, *Unity of Mankind*, 151–166, 177–194, and

Epictetus is especially valuable for our purpose. He conducted a school of philosophy to prepare young men for participation in public life and constantly had to counter their tendency to find refuge in the school. Aware of the criticism of retiring philosophers, he uses the tag to chide those of his students who were hesitant to assume the challenges of public life (*Diatr.* 1.29.36). He criticizes them when they are content to confine themselves to a corner and quibble, when they should be examples of the philosophic life (*Diatr.* 1.29.55–57), and he draws a sharp contrast between the philosopher who practices his dialectic discourse in a corner and the one who takes on someone of consular rank (*Diatr.* 2.12.17). He offers Socrates and Diogenes as examples of men who spoke fearlessly to people in power. If his students set such a premium on their classroom exercises, he thinks it best that they left such matters to the brave and slink to their corners, there to spin syllogisms and propound them to others of similar inclination (*Diatr.* 2.13.24–26).

Toward the end of his discourse on the ideal Cynic, he introduces another element (*Diatr.* 3.22.95–98).[57] Speaking of the philosopher who does involve himself in human affairs, he insists that it cannot be said that such a man is a busybody or meddler in others' affairs, for he speaks with the boldness (παρρησιάζεσθαι) of a friend and servant of the gods, always with the prayer "Lead thou me on, O Zeus and Destiny" at hand (95–96). The person whose life cannot stand public scrutiny, however, had best retreat to his own little corner (97). Thus, in contrast to whispering in his corner, Epictetus's ideal philosopher, always guided by the divine, does not cower in a corner, but speaks fearlessly to rulers and presents himself as a public example. We shall see the same elements appearing in Luke's presentation of Paul.

It is informative to examine pagan comments on Christian secretiveness against this background. A.D. Nock has pointed out that while Christians may | have been in the public mind, they were not in the public eye,[58] 205

Gregory R. Stanton, "The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius," *Phron.* 13 (1968): 183–195.

[57] On this discourse, see Margarethe Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Von Kynismus* (PhAnt 34; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978). On the Stoic features in his description of the ideal Cynic, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Volume Three: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Ben F. Meyer and Edward P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 194 n. 27.

[58] Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion,* 192. See Robert M. Grant, *Augustus to Constantine: The Thrust of the Christian Movement into the Roman World* (New York: Harper, 1970), 174–175, on the Christians' "almost Epicurean avoidance of publicity."

and Stanley Stowers has recently corrected the popular view that Paul's practice corresponded to that of the philosophers who regularly preached in the marketplace.[59] As we have seen, Celsus on occasion described Christians thus, but that was standard polemic. More characteristic is his view of Christians as forming secret conventicles and his description of them in the language we have examined. Christians, he says, "perform their rites and teach their doctrines in secret" to escape prosecution, to which Origen replies by referring to the secrecy of the Pythagoreans and "other philosophers" (*Cels.* 1.3), thus finding precedence for Christian conduct among philosophers.[60]

The vehemence with which Celsus attacks Christians on this score is most evident in *Against Celsus* 4.23, where he inveighs against Jews and Christians, comparing them all "to a cluster of bats or ants coming out of a nest, or frogs holding council round a marsh, or worms assembling in some filthy corner." One reason for his abusiveness was the domestic unrest Christianity caused, which he associated with Christian gatherings in private homes.[61] Celsus was not alone in viewing with suspicion what Christians gabbled in corners.[62] To such charges, Minucius Felix, as did many other Christians, referred to *Timaeus* 28C, "It is difficult to find the Maker and the Father of this universe, and when one has found him, one cannot speak of him to the multitude," and he argued that Plato, too, recognized the difficulty of speaking of God to the multitude.[63] Origen claimed that the structured Christian catechumenate was superior to the

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59 Stanley K. Stowers, "Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching: The Circumstances of Paul's Preaching," *NovT* 26 (1984): 59–82.

60 Elsewhere, Celsus takes issue with the particularity of the Christian claim that the divine Spirit was present in Jesus. Making use of an Epicurean taunt, he asks why God, at last waking from slumber, sent this spirit into one corner and not all over the world (*Cels.* 6.78; cf. 5.50). See Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig/Berlin: Teubner, 1907), 256, and cf. *Cels.* 4.36 for the Jewish fable of the creation, composed in some dark corner of Palestine.

61 Cf. *Cels.* 3.55, and see Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, 1:393–398; Eric R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine* (Wiles Lectures, 1963; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 115–116.

62 Cf. Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 8.14, and Clarke, *Octavius*, 209 n. 108.

63 Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 19.14; see Clarke, *Octavius*, 272 n. 260. Celsus knows this application of *Tim.* 28C, but denies Christians the ability to understand it properly. Cf. Origen, *Cels.* 7.42; see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers," *Kyriakon, Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (2 vols.; Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 1:214–225, esp. 218–219. [*Light*, 2:849–865]

206 Cynics' | practice of preaching to anyone they chanced to meet.[64] For his part Tatian, adept in anti-philosophical polemic that he was, turned the sophists' charge on the pagan philosophers.[65]

It is in this context of the polemical and apologetic use of the tag that Paul's defense and reply to Festus should be understood. Luke has Paul, like the moral philosophers, claim divine guidance (26:16–17, 22), deny that his activity has been confined to a corner (26:26), speak fearlessly to rulers (26:26), and offer himself as an example to all (26:29). Luke's apologetic aim in this scene, to present Christianity in Paul's person as philosophical, would seem to be clear.

### *Paul's Madness*

Other elements in the dialogue initiated by Festus's interruption further support the claim that part of Luke's apologetic intention is to present Paul as a philosopher, and I now turn to them. By having Festus say that Paul's great learning had driven him mad (Acts 26:24), Luke achieves two things: an acknowledgment of Paul's learning by the Roman Festus and an occasion for Paul to claim that he had been conducting his mission in a manner befitting a responsible philosopher. Having secured the former, Luke has Paul disavow a charge often slung at Cynics, namely, that they were mad.

Commentators have been reluctant to take Festus's charge at face value and have attempted to relate it to ancient ideas of the madness of divine inspiration.[66] Whatever justification for his charge Festus might have found in Paul's preaching is beside the point for our purpose. We are not here concerned with what may have been the historical situation, but rather with Luke's account of it. On the literary level, it is important to note that Paul denies the charge and counters by claiming that he spoke words of truth and prudence (26:25). John O'Neill has drawn attention to Justin, *Dial.* 39.4, where Trypho similarly accuses Justin of madness and Justin denies it. This seems to O'Neill "to be a stock apologetic situation which no doubt occurred often enough, but which may have been a common ingredient in the accounts of debates between Christians and

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[64] Origen, *Cels.* 3.51. For Seneca's uneasiness about preaching to the masses, see Hadot, *Seneca*, 171–172.

[65] Tatian, *Or.* 26.3; cf. Hermas, *Mand.* 11.13, who applies it to false prophets, and see Reiling, *Hermas and Christian Prophecy*, 54–55.

[66] E.g., Bruce, *Acts of the Apostles*, 448.

unbelievers.[67] I agree with him on the apologetic nature of the interchange, but would suggest that Paul's response is illuminated by statements from the moral philosophers of Luke's day.

| Cynics were frequently regarded as mad because of their rigorous, ascetic life[68] or their unconventional or vulgar behavior.[69] More moderate philosophers who spoke in public had to come to terms with this attitude. Dio Chrysostom was such a philosopher and contemporary of Luke, and he illustrates how they did so. Despite being thought mad, he says, the true philosopher would be outspoken and hide nothing, but would persist in speaking the truth.[70] Especially instructive are places in Dio's public speeches where he introduces himself to his audience in such a way as to distinguish himself from the unscrupulous street preachers. In contrast to those who think the philosopher mad, Dio claims that his audience comes to him because he speaks the truth (*Or.* 12.8–9). In *Discourse* 34 he begins by saying that Cynics are thought not to be of sober mind (σωφρονεῖν) but crazy (μαινομένους) (2), and then makes a pun on the concept of madness (4). If they do consider him mad, they should listen to him because, and here Dio plays on the Greek association of divine inspiration with madness, he came to them by divine counsel. Elsewhere (*Or.* 45.1), he introduces himself by referring to his teaching throughout the world and claims that he is not goaded by "madness or desperation to do these things, but [trusts] in a greater power and source of aid, that which proceeds from the gods, though most men deem it useless." 207

In these self-introductions of Dio we find the same elements that are present in Paul's response to Festus's interruption: the contrast between the public preacher's madness and the genuine philosopher's speaking words of truth and prudence.[71] The similarities between the two extend further. Earlier in Acts 26, in the account of his call, Paul claimed that he had been sent by the divine to witness for him (26:16), that he had done so throughout his mission in the eastern Mediterranean (26:20), constantly depending on help from God as he spoke fearlessly to great and small (26:22), as he now does to Festus and Agrippa (26:26).

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[67] O'Neill, *Theology of Acts*, 15.

[68] Cf. Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 6.1; 9.3; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 66.25; 77/78.41; Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 5.

[69] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.36; 9.8.

[70] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.41–42; cf. 33.

[71] For the contrast between μανία and σωφροσύνη, see Plümacher, *Lukas*, 22 n. 86, who refers to Plato, *Phaedr.* 244A; *Prot.* 323B; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.1.16.

### *Paul's Boldness of Speech*

Another element from the philosophical context that Luke includes in this account is found in his characterization of Paul's speech. When Paul describes his speech to Agrippa as boldness (παρρησιαζόμενος), he uses a word that had come to be associated with the philosopher's boldness of speech.[72] The | philosopher's outspokenness betokened a fearlessness in pointing out human shortcomings; it also reflected the speaker's confidence in his right to do so. Every philosopher's παρρησία should therefore be backed by character, especially when he attempts to bring other people to their senses (σωφροσύνη). That, Plutarch claims, is what happened when Xenocrates converted Polemo to the rational life.[73] Thus, as we have already seen from Epictetus, the outspoken philosopher was to give himself to freedom and παρρησία and to present his life as an example to others.[74] That is the direction Paul's dialogue with Agrippa will take.

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### *Instantaneous Conversion*

The philosophical tradition may also cast some light on yet another element in the dialogue that has puzzled commentators, namely Agrippa's response to Paul, "So rapidly would you persuade me to become a Christian!" (26:28).[75] Of interest here is the contemporary philosophical discussion of instantaneous changes people might undergo. Stoics held the view that the person who made consistent moral progress would experience a change to the stage of the wise man so suddenly that he might be unaware of it.[76] Some Platonists accepted the possibility of such a sudden change,[77] but others, for polemical reasons, resurrected an earlier form of Stoicism

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[72] See Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse,'" 208–216, and the literature cited there. For another perspective, see Willem C. van Unnik, "The Christian's Freedom of Speech in the New Testament," *Sparsa Collecta* (3 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1973–1983), 2:269–289; van Unnik, "The Semitic Background of παρρησία in the New Testament," *Sparsa Collecta*, 2:269–289; Stanley B. Marrow, "Parrhesia and the New Testament," *CBQ* 44 (1982): 431–446.

[73] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 71E.

[74] Cf. Lucian, *Demon.* 3.

[75] For discussion of the problems of this statement, see Kirsopp Lake and Henry J. Cadbury, *The Beginnings of Christianity: Part I: The Acts of the Apostles: Volume IV English Translation and Commentary* (ed. F.J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake; 5 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1920–1933), 4:322–324; Haenchen, *Acts of the Apostles*, 689; O'Toole, *Christological Climax*, 141–145.

[76] See John M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 90–91.

[77] E.g., Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 2.20.

more susceptible to attack and derided the idea of sudden change.[78] More generally, the notion was conveyed in the many accounts of conversion to philosophy,[79] and it finds its Christian counterpart in Augustine's account of his conversion.[80]

| Accounts of such conversions, or the claim that one had undergone a sudden change, expectedly met with ironic, if not outright sarcastic, responses.[81] Such responses are the more intelligible when it is recognized that the conversion accounts had a protreptic purpose,[82] especially when they drew attention to the speaker or another convert as an example to follow.[83] This is what Justin does after recounting his conversion: "And, further, I could wish that all should form a desire as strong as mine, not to stand aloof from the Savior's words" (*Dial.* 8.2). Paul's rejoinder to Agrippa, closing this last account of his sudden conversion, "I could wish that rapidly or gradually, not only you, but all who are listening to me would be as I am—except for these chains" (28:29), could be seen as functioning in the same manner. That the apologetic dialogue should end on a protreptic note is not surprising, for early Christian apologetic had strong affinities with the protreptic tradition.[84] 209

There is a difference, however, between Justin and Paul. Justin makes use of the *topos* of going from one philosophy to another,[85] until his search

[78] E.g., Alcinous, *Didask.* 30.2; Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 75C–E; *Stoic. abs.* 1057E–1058C; *Comm. not.* 1062B. See Daniel Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969), 15–18.

[79] E.g., the stock example of Polemo, who responds instantly to Xenocrates's teaching on ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη: Lucian, *Bis acc.* 17; Diogenes Laertius 4.16 (for Christian use of the account, see Ambrose, *Hel.* 12.45 [PL 14:712]; Augustine, *C. Jul.* 1.4.12 [PL 44:647]). See Arthur Darby Nock, "Conversion and Adolescence," in *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (ed. Zeph Stewart; 2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 1:469–480, esp. 471–472. For other examples, see Plutarch, *Sera* 563CD; Diogenes Laertius 2.48; 7.2; Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* 4.20. In actuality, conversion more likely was a gradual process. See Arthur Darby Nock, "Bekehrung," *RAC* 2 (1954): 107–108.

[80] Augustine, *Conf.* 6.7.11–12.

[81] E.g., Lucian, *Nigr.* 1.

[82] See Olof Gigon, "Antike Erzählungen über die Berufung zur Philosophie," *MH* 3 (1946): 10–11.

[83] Cf. Lucian, *Nigr.* 38. For a collection of Christian texts, see John Foster, *After the Apostles: Missionary Preaching of the First Three Centuries* (London: SCM, 1951), 86–91. For the motives of conversion accounts, see Elisabeth Fink-Dendorfer, *Conversio: Motive und Motivierung zur Bekehrung in der Alten Kirche* (RST 33; Regensburg: Peter Lang, 1986).

[84] See Jean Danielou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique* (Tournai: Desclée, 1961), 11–19. For the relationship between missionary preaching and apologetic, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Apologetic Theology of the *Preaching of Peter*," *ResQ* 13 (1970): 205–223. [*Light*, 2:867–882]

[85] *Dial.* 2.3–6. See Hyldahl, *Philosophie und Christentum*, 148ff.

culminated in Christianity, to score the point that Christianity could not only bear philosophical scrutiny, but that it satisfied his inquiring mind as the philosophical schools could not. This description has the protreptic function of inviting the reader to follow Justin's example and join him in the true philosophy. It also functions apologetically in that it would put the lie to pagan accusations that Christians demanded that people simply believe, without any rational demonstration, and that they flee scientific inquiry, which required greater intellectual capacity and commitment.[86]

210 | Luke, on the other hand, describes Christian conversion as an instantaneous response to preaching,[87] which might appear to leave him open to the pagan charge that Christian conversion was simple-minded acceptance of outlandish claims made by hucksters. Paul's appeal to the prophets (26:27) might also seem to be a departure from the philosophical mode. His appeal, however, can be compared to the Christian Apologists' insistence that the prophets were philosophical and that they could contribute to one's conversion to Christianity.[88] The sermons elsewhere in Acts, moreover, either make use of a proof from prophecy that has affinities with the Aristotelian enthymeme,[89] or, as we have seen, are attached to the philosophical tradition. It is for Luke, therefore, their inherent persuasiveness, not the credulity of the audience, that results in conversion.[90] It is typical, then, that Paul's *apologia* begins with an allusion to the prophets (26:6) and ends by aligning him with the prophets and Moses (26:22–23), and that the appeal to Agrippa is based on the prophets (26:27). Nevertheless, Agrippa rejects the impetuous response that he understands Paul to call

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86 Cf. Celsus, *apud* Origen, *Cels.* 1.9; 3.75; Nock, *Conversion*, 205; and esp. Richard Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians* (OCPM; London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 14–15, 48ff.; 57ff.; 89ff.

87 See Acts 9:1–19; 13:42–43, 48; 16:14–15, 29–33; 17:2–4, 10–11; 22:6–16, and cf. Luke 15:17; 19:1–8, for other examples of sudden conversions. Apollos, the ἀνὴρ λόγιος from Alexandria, represents another side (Acts 18:24–26). Already instructed in the faith, he speaks with παρρησία in the synagogue, but receives further detailed instruction from Prisca and Aquila. Cf. Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 3.37.3, for multitudes converting "at the first hearing."

88 E.g., Justin, *Dial.* 7–8, and Niels Hyldahl, *Philosophie und Christentum*, 227–231. On the superiority of the prophets and their philosophical character, see Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers," 220–222. For the strength of the Christian argument, see Nock, *Conversion*, 237–241; also Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, 1:279–289.

89 See William S. Kurz, "Function of Christological Proof"; Kurz, "Hellenistic Rhetoric and the Christological Proof of Luke-Acts," *CBQ* 42 (1980): 171–195.

90 See Dieter W. Kemmler, *Faith and Human Reason* (NovTSup 40; Leiden: Brill, 1975), 11–142. For Luke, it is not so much the content of this speech that is philosophical as Paul's conduct and means of persuasion. The resurrection is still the bone of contention in this defense (26:23–24), as it had been in Athens (17:31–32).

for. And to this, Paul can only intimate that conversion could be either sudden or gradual.

## Conclusion

In sum, the dialogue that follows the last account of Paul's conversion in Acts contains themes that Luke had developed earlier. Specifically, he had represented Paul as speaking in language derived from discussions by and about the moral philosophers of his day. An important feature of his depiction of Christianity is the public character of the church. He combines these two themes in the dialogue that follows Paul's last defense. There Paul argues apologetically in a manner analogous to the Apologists of the second century, which suggests that Luke was aware of the same issues that would confront them. This is not to say that Acts is to be understood purely as apologetic, even in a broader sense than that in which the term is generally used; it is to maintain that an examination of its apologetic intent deserves a wider focus than it has received.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# "PASTORAL CARE" IN THE THESSALONIAN CHURCH*

This paper seeks to shed some light on 1 Thess 5:14–15, Paul's command to the Thessalonians to "admonish the disorderly, comfort the faint-hearted, help the weak, be patient with all," and not to retaliate. In an earlier study, I focused primarily on Paul's role in nurturing the Thessalonian church.[1] Here, I wish to develop what I discussed only very briefly in that study about the Thessalonians' own care for each other.

Even a rapid survey of comment on the passage reveals quite different interpretations.[2] Some interpreters think that Paul's directions are very general, of wide applicability, and have no direct connection to the Thessalonian situation. Others modify this view somewhat, acknowledging the general nature of Paul's advice, but still claiming that the advice was directed to a concrete situation.

Still others are not at all convinced that Paul's commands were as general and unrelated to the Thessalonians as has been claimed. These interpreters believe themselves able to identify elsewhere in the letter three groups Paul mentions: the ἄτακτοι are the unemployed he has in mind in 4:9–10, and the ὀλιγόψυχοι are those who grieve and are addressed in 4:13–18. Those representing this line of interpretation differ more widely on the identity of the ἀσθενεῖς, some thinking they were like the weak of 1 Cor 8 and Rom 14, who had scruples about matters of diet and the religious calendar,[3] others thinking that the weak were those who required instruction on sexual behavior, such as that given in 4:3–8,[4] while another

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* Originally published in *NTS* 36 (1990): 375–391. This was the main paper presented on July 27, 1989, at the 44th General Meeting of the Society for New Testament Studies in Dublin.

[1] Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987). The technical studies on which the book is based are collected in Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989).

[2] See the discussion of various positions by David A. Black, *Paul, Apostle of Weakness: Astheneia and Its Cognates in the Pauline Literature* (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 26–29.

[3] E.g., Ernest Best, *The First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians* (BNTC; London: Black, 1972), 231.

[4] E.g., James E. Frame, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians* (ICC 38; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1912), 198; I. Howard Marshall, *1 and 2 Thessalonians* (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 151.

376 opinion holds that they were persons who were worried | about the delay of the Parousia, an issue thought to be reflected in 5:1–11.[5]

I shall approach the text from a different perspective. I propose that, rather than characterizing discrete groups, Paul is describing certain dispositions of character or psychological conditions to which he matches treatment appropriate to the particular case. In doing so, I suggest, Paul utilizes methods and traditions derived from moral philosophers who for centuries had been engaged in the moral reformation of people.[6] In this psychagogic enterprise a major concern was to be discriminating in one's speech to one's auditor. The first half of the paper will take up some elements from ancient psychagogy that will help us place 1 Thess 5:14–15 in a new light. Then I shall turn to Paul's own pastoral method before returning to his directions to the Thessalonians.

## Ancient Psychagogy

In sketching the context in which the necessity of discrimination in speech is stressed, it is convenient to begin with a passage from Plato in which he discusses the philosopher's rhetoric. Rhetoric, according to Plato, is an art that leads the soul by means of words (τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, *Phaedr.* 261A). Our interest here is not to argue for Plato's originality in what he says, nor to understand the details of his views on psychology;[7] rather, the *Phaedrus* is a convenient place to begin, for here items are enumerated that were standard fare in the discussion and practice of moral discourse.

In *Phaedrus* 270B Socrates asserts that the art of rhetoric is much the same as that of the practice of medicine because both begin with careful diagnosis.[8] He then examines rhetoric accordingly. The goal of the person whose rhetorical teaching is a real art is to produce conviction in the

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[5] Black, *Apostle of Weakness*, 45–53; Black, "The Weak in Thessalonica," *JETS* 25 (1982): 307–321.

[6] For bibliography on ancient psychagogy, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 81 n. 65; for the moral philosophers, Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco–Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986).

[7] See Ernst Heitsch, *Platon über die rechte Art zu reden und schreiben* (Mainz. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur: Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrg. 1987.4; Stuttgart/Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1987), and the review by Thomas A. Szlezák in *Gn* 60 (1988): 390–398.

[8] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," *JBL* 103 (1984): 235–243, esp. 236 (= *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 137–145). [*Light*, 1:187–196]

soul (270E, 271A). In seeking to achieve this goal, the serious speaker will attend to three things.

| First, he will describe the soul with perfect accuracy and explain the nature of that to which his words are to be addressed (270D–271A). 377

Second, he will say what the soul's "action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is acted upon and by what" (271A).[9]

Third, "he will classify the speeches and the souls and will adapt each to the other, showing the causes of the effects produced and why one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not" (271B). The student of rhetoric will "acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life."

Socrates then adds a fourth consideration, the opportune time (καιρός) for speech. One can only claim to speak by the rules of the art of rhetoric if one adds to one's analysis of one's audience and one's applications of proper speech "a knowledge of the times (καιρούς) for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favorable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes of speech which he learned." (272A).

In the literature after Plato, these items occur in writers of all philosophic persuasions. How widespread they were appears from the following illustrations. For the sake of expediency, I shall discuss them under the rubrics of the classification of the human condition addressed by speakers and the diversity of methods by which persons of various dispositions are to be addressed.

### *Classification of Conditions and Dispositions*

The assumption behind such a classification is expressed by Cicero in his *Tusculanae Disputationes*: "just as everyone blest with excellent health can yet appear to have a greater natural proneness to some one disease, so one soul is more disposed to one set of vices, another to others" (4.81). In the style of Stoic analysis, and by way of example, Cicero identifies some people as "prone to fear, others to another disorder in consequences of which in some cases we speak of anxiety, in other cases of irascibility," and he then discusses the differences between them. For Cicero this discussion

[9] The translations of classical authors are those of the Loeb Classical Library, where available, but are sometimes slightly modified.

378 is illustrative, for "this proneness of some people to one disease and | others to another is of wide application; for it applies to all disorders" (4.27).

Such classification was pursued in minute detail by Stoics, but, as Seneca shows, had already been applied to searchers for truth by Epicurus.[10] In *Ep.* 52.3–4 Seneca enumerates the classes identified by Epicurus: first are those who have found their way to the truth without assistance. Secondly, there are those who can only be saved if there is someone to help them along the way. The third group are those "who can be forced and driven to righteousness, who do not need a guide as much as they require someone to encourage and, as it were, to force them along" (cf. *Ep.* 71.30–37).

Although Seneca has special praise for the first two classes, he does not neglect the third. They are the weak (*inbecilliores*) and are especially in need of the assistance rendered by paraenesis (*Ep.* 94.50–51, cf. 30–31). Unlike those who quickly seize on virtue, the weak ones "will be assisted and freed from their evil opinions if we entrust to them the accepted principles of philosophy" (*Ep.* 95.37).

Of special interest is the evidence of Philodemus, who in his tractate Περὶ Παρρησίας provides insight into how important the analysis of dispositions and psychological conditions was in Epicurean communities.[11] These communities, known for the friendship their members had for each other, on the basis of friendship were outspoken in their efforts to contribute to each other's moral growth. But, since some members of the community were not able to endure frankness and might be caused by it to abandon philosophy altogether if spoken to overly sharply, special care was taken to identify the personal qualities or psychological states of those whom one sought to help.

Young persons are said to be stubborn and easily irritated, and if they are to be made amenable to correction, they are to be treated with kindness and gentleness, always taking into consideration their capacity to endure the reprimand and admonition of their teachers (Περὶ Παρρησίας 2; 10; 38). Only if the therapy applied to them in this way is recognized to be diverse and multiple will it be a true help (βοήθεια, 18; 43; 67; 86).[12] Such persons are weak (ἀπαλοί, ἀσθενεῖς)[13] and are not cured by frankness

[10] See Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 155–158.

[11] Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 42–43, 85–87.

[12] See Marcello Gigante, "Philodème. Sur la liberté de parole," in *Acts du VIII^e Congrès, Association Guillaume Budé* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1969), 209–210.

[13] See Diogenes of Oenoanda, *Frg.* 24 Chilton: Anger and partiality are signs of weakness.

(7; 59; Tab. IIIG; cf. cols. IX; | XXII; XXIV). On the other hand, there are others who are forceful and strong and need frankness of a harsher sort, and some of an ugly disposition who must be tamed by frankness (7; 10; col. XXII).[14] Some also desire honor and like to show off, and some are lazy and procrastinate (34; col. V). If the condition is more complex, so must be the correction, which may then be compounded of reproof, praise, and exhortation (58; 68).[15] In view of the complexities he faces, a teacher should not give up quickly, but like a physician who repeats and modifies his treatment, he too should be patient and repeat his therapy (64; 67; 69).[16] 379

This brief sketch of the interest in analysis of one's auditors has introduced three items that require further attention, namely, the human condition described as weak, the desire to help the weak, and the patience to do so effectively.

In the texts already alluded to, the weak are those who have difficulty in living up to the demands of the virtuous or philosophic life.[17] Their condition is frequently likened to a physical disease or disposition.[18] This condition Cicero and Diogenes Laertius describe as weakness (*imbecillitas*, ἀσθένεια), a condition that accompanies moral illness, exemplified, for example, by "a fond imagining of something that seems desirable," such as fame, love of pleasure, and the like.[19] Chrysippus, already, had held that by way of analogy souls could be spoken of as being weak or strong,

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[14] See Gigante, "Philodème," 208; Mark T. Riley, "The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates," *Phoenix* 34 (1980): 65–66.

[15] See Gigante, "Philodème," 208–209.

[16] For the medical metaphor in Epicureanism, see Marcello Gigante, "'Philosophia medicans' in Filodemo," *Cronache Ercolanesi* 5 (1975): 53–61; J.F. Duvernoy, "Le modèle médical de l'éthique dans l'épicurisme," in *Justifications de l'éthique. XIXe Congrès de l'Association de sociétés de philosophie de langue française, Bruxelles-Louvain la Neuve, 6–9 September 1982* (Brussels: University of Brussels, 1984), 171–177; Martha Nussbaum, "Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle," in *Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 31–74; A.J. Voelke, "Santé de l'âme et bonheur de la raison. La fonction thérapeutique de la philosophie dans l'épicurisme," *Études de Lettres* 3 (1986): 67–87.

[17] Cf. Philo, *Migr.* 144: Related to moral weakness (εὐένδοτος), ἀσθένεια is the inability of the rational faculty to bear virtue's hardships; Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.34; 5.3; *Leg.* 1.29: Bad habits and false beliefs twist weak minds and turn them in whatever direction they are inclined; cf. *Fam.* 7.8.1.

[18] For the popularity of the metaphor among Stoics, see Michael Frede, "The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Souls," in *Norms of Nature* (see n. 16 above), 92–110; Robert J. Rabel, "Diseases of Soul in Stoic Philosophy," *GRBS* 22 (1981): 385–393; Hadot, *Seneca*, 142–146.

[19] Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.29; Diogenes Laertius, 5.115; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.42: *imbecillitas* is self-indulgent.

380 diseased or | healthy, just as bodies are,"[20] and the notion of weakness found a place in the Stoic theory of cognition: it is because of our weakness (ἀσθένεια), they said, that we assent to false mental images.[21] Erroneous behavior, then, is due to the slackness (ἀτονία) and weakness (ἀσθένεια) of the soul.[22] Weakness is a vice, and every transgression issues from weakness (*imbecillitas*) and instability.[23]

Seneca illustrates how this conception of weakness was present in the thinking of someone engaged in moral formation of others. Although Seneca held that the weak should be helped (*Ep.* 95.37), he considered it a difficult task. The first step to virtue, he said, was difficult because it is characteristic of a weak and diseased mind to fear what is unfamiliar.[24] While still weak, one's judgment can be turned aside by the crowd.[25] So, those who are weak should not be exposed to the temptations of drink, beauty, flattery, or any other possible seduction (*Ep.* 116.5). One should be aware that the weak person (*pusillus*) struggles and maligns the order of the universe, and would rather reform the gods than reform himself (*Ep.* 107.12). The fear of death is part of human weakness, and mourning a sign of it.[26] Another sign of weakness that engaged Seneca considerably was anger (*Ira* 1.20.3). He knew that people are not all angered by the same thing, so counseled that we should know our own weak spot (*Ira* 3.10.4). He also claimed that it is weak people who are most easily offended,[27] and who retaliate when they are offended (*Ira* 2.34.1).

Moral philosophers considered themselves born to render help, even to strangers.[28] The ways in which one was to help were often discussed. One was to do so out of compassion, especially desiring to relieve the misfortunes of people who did not deserve them.[29] In rendering such help by persuading people to withstand misfortune courageously, one is confronted by certain hazards. For instance, one should realize that one's

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[20] *SVF* 3:471.

[21] Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1122C; *Stoic. rep.* 1057AB (= *SVF* 3:177); Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 7.151 (= *SVF* 1:67); cf. *SVF* 3:172; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.15.

[22] *SVF* 3:473.

[23] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.5b (2:58, 5 – 59, 3 W-H = *SVF* 3:95); Cicero, *Fin.* 4.77 (*SVF* 3:531).

[24] Seneca, *Ep.* 50.9; cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 5.43.

[25] Seneca, *De otio* 1.1; *Ep.* 7.1; cf. *Ep.* 44.1.

[26] Seneca, *Ep.* 82.23; cf. Cicero, *Fin.* 1.49; 4.64; Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. Apoll.* 116E. On weeping: Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.60; Pliny, *Ep.* 1.12.12; cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.23.

[27] Seneca, *Const. sap.* 14.2; 17.1; cf. Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.* 46E.

[28] Seneca, *Ira* 1.5; cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.40; Diogenes of Oenoanda, *Frg.* 1 III, V Chilton.

[29] Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.46; cf. 56.

persuasion should not consist of a | facile repetition of clichés, but that it is the inculcation of the principles of philosophy that will help, especially the weak.[30] 381

Another danger is to be too severe and peremptory in one's castigation, for example, of someone for his irascibility. One should rather follow the examples of physicians who patiently progress from mild to harsh treatments. Thus Seneca, on the supposition that "human life is founded on kindness and concord, and is bound into an alliance for common help, not by terror, but by mutual love" (*Ira* 1.5.3), directs the teacher

> to heal human nature by the use of words, and these of the milder sort, as long as he can, to the end that he may persuade (*suadet*) someone to do what he ought to do, and win over his heart to a desire for the honorable and the just, and implant in his mind hatred of vice and esteem of virtue. Let him pass next to harsher language, in which he will still aim at admonition (*moneat*) and reproof (*exprobret*). Lastly, let him resort to punishment (*poenas*), yet still making it light and not irrevocable (*Ira* 1.6.3).

Philodemus, we have seen, used the same image, as did many other writers, and he cautions that too harsh a form of "persuasion" is likely to result in retaliation against those who want to help (Περὶ Παρρησίας 35; 56; 63), a concern widespread among moral philosophers.[31]

This rapid survey has identified an interest in taking seriously the diverse conditions of those one wished to help, and has drawn attention to one group, the weak, who required patience and a modulation of styles and techniques of exhortation. With this enumeration of various kinds of exhortation we have anticipated the next rubric.

### *The Diversity of Exhortation*

If one truly wishes to benefit someone, it was said, one would become thoroughly familiar with his circumstances, and it was therefore natural to stress the value of individual, personalized instruction.[32] According to Iamblichus (*De vita Pythagorica* 19), it | was Pythagoras who discovered the 382

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[30] Seneca, *Ep.* 82.23: *Quod auxilium iuvenis inbecillitate humanae? Ep.* 95.37: *inbecilliores adiuvabit*; cf. *Epp.* 77.7; 94.50.

[31] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 87 n. 104. For non-retaliation, see Albrecht Dihle, *Die goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgärethik* (SAW 7; Göttingen: Vandenheock & Ruprecht, 1962), 61–71.

[32] To the discussion in Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 56–57, 82, 86, should be added Paolo Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: Un intellettuale greco nell'Impero romano* (Messina/Florence: G. D'Anna, 1978), 240–241; Nussbaum, "Therapeutic Arguments," 41–45, 51.

method of communicating to each person only that part of wisdom that was appropriate to his nature and ability. Plutarch tells us that Pythagoras had adopted the method after he had publicly treated a youth roughly, who went and hanged himself (*Adul. amic.* 71F). Plato knew the method well, and advised others to use it (cf. Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.* 39A, 43E–44A). So did Dio Chrysostom, whose ideal teacher would spend his life caring for people and trying to lead them to virtue and

> partly by persuading (πείθων) and exhorting (παρακαλῶν), partly by abusing (λοιδορούμενος) and reproaching (ὀνειδίζων) in the hope that he might thereby rescue someone from folly and from low desires and intemperance and soft living, taking them aside privately one by one (ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον) and also admonishing (νουθετῶν) them in groups every time he finds the opportunity (καιροῦ), with gentle words at times, at others harsh. (*Or.* 77/78.38)

The intention to find a style of address that would bring about the desired result was not always fulfilled. In fact, concentration on an individual may have a quite opposite effect from that desired, as Plutarch illustrates:

> yet if anybody draws them to one side and tries to teach (διδάσκῃ) something useful, or to advise (παραινῇ) them to some duty, or to admonish (νουθετῇ) them when in the wrong, or to calm (καταπραύνῃ) them when incensed, they have no patience with him; but, eager to get the better of him if they can, they fight against what he says, or else they beat a hasty retreat (*Rect. rat. aud.* 39A).

We see again that retaliation is a major possibility faced by those who would reform others.

There existed a lexicon of hortatory terms describing various types of address used by moral philosophers. They discussed these terms and their proper use in detail, showing a special concern to match their manner of address to the condition of their listeners,[33] in the process also being careful to determine whether an occasion was appropriate for a particular type of exhortation.[34] Seneca provides ample illustrations of these terms in *Epistulae* 94 and 95, as does Clement of Alexandria in *Paedagogus* 1.1.8. The two types mentioned in 1 Thess 5:14, comfort, or consolation (παραμυθία, *consolatio*), and admonition (νουθεσία, *admonitio*), are discussed extensively. The treatment these receive in NT commentaries

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[33] See Seneca, *Ep.* 64.7–10; *Marc.* 1.8; 2.1; *Ira* 1.6; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 9.7–8; Lucian, *Nigr.* 35–37. For the problems inherent in adaptation, see Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian, 1956), 343–346. For the flatterer adapting, see Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 55AB.

[34] See Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," (see n. 8 above).

and | lexica, however, suggests that more might profitably be said about them. 383

It was not only philosophers who engaged in consolation; practice in writing letters of condolence already took place in the schools.[35] Yet philosophers believed that comfort could be derived from philosophy and thought it their duty as comforters to do away completely with distress.[36] Cicero enumerates the ways in which well-known philosophers had sought to do so (*Tusc.* 3.76), and Plutarch in his letters of condolence to his wife and to Apollonius exhibits how standard the *topoi* had become. The distress with which consolation had to do was not only that brought about by death. Cicero, for example, is mostly concerned with the distress caused by adverse political conditions,[37] and Dio Chrysostom, in addition to death, lists loss of wealth or social status as distressing experiences that drive people to the comforting words of a philosopher (*Or.* 27.7–9). Although written words of consolation were important, it was the spoken word to which most value was attached (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.8). By arguments one would seek to convince a bereaved person, for instance, that death was no evil (Julian, *Or.* 7.223BC), and well-known examples of people who had courageously endured exile, imprisonment or death were ready to hand. Indeed, Seneca says that the telling of such stories as part of instruction in consolation had "been droned to death in all the schools" (*Ep.* 24.6).

Equally widely practiced, but not as clear to type as consolation, was admonition (νουθεσία, *admonitio*). Admonition was a form of bold outspokenness (παρρησία),[38] and always ran the danger of exceeding its proper bounds. It was intended to improve those in error (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 51.7; 72.13), and was particularly needed by those who were still weak, but were making some progress toward virtue (Seneca, *Ep.* 94.49–52). It was defined as the instilling of sense in someone and teaching him what should

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35 On consolation, see Karl Buresch, "Consolationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia critica," (Diss., Leipzig, 1886); Rudolf Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und römischen Konsolationsliteratur* (ZMKA 18; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1958); Robert C. Gregg, *Consolation Philosophy: Greek and Christian Paideia in Basil and the Two Gregories* (PatMS 3; Cambridge, Mass.: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975); Yves Marie Duval, "Formes profanes et formes bibliques dans les oraisons funèbres de Saint Ambroise," in *Christianisme et formes littéraires de l'antiquité tardive en occident* (ed. Alan Cameron and Manfred Fuhrmann; EnAC 23; Vandoeuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1977), 235–301.

36 Lucian, *Nigr.* 7; Diogenes Laertius 6.68; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.61.

37 E.g., Cicero, *Fam.* 5.13, 16 for political conditions; *Fam.* 4.5 for death.

38 See Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 50B, 72B, 72E.

384 and | should not be done.[39] Although there was thus a didactic aspect to it, admonition was directed to the will rather than the mind.[40] It was to be undertaken out of goodwill, and the person doing so was required to examine himself and apply his admonition to himself.[41] The speaker would rebuke (ἐπιτιμάω) and reprove (ἐλέγχω), but would be sensitive to remain within the boundaries of what constituted true admonition.[42] He would speak without anger, for when he spoke in anger, he lapsed from admonition into mere fault-finding.[43] Neither would he revile or abuse people, for overly harsh admonition will offend rather than mend someone (*Ira* 3.36.4), and abusing is what enemies do, admonition what friends do (Plutarch, *Inim. util.* 89B). Nevertheless, admonition was so unpleasant that it had best be done in private rather than in public.[44]

Speakers were cautioned to realize that admonition was unpopular, and to be discriminating in reserving it only for the most important matters, and even then to follow it up with gentle speech.[45] The theory, at least, was that admonition should be welcomed when it was given without animus,[46] yet even in an Epicurean community such as the one mirrored in Philodemus's *De libertate dicendi*, the theory did not reflect the reality. Members of the community are told that they should lay bare their failings to those who would admonish them (39–40) and take their admonition to heart (26, 36).[47] Philodemus shows great concern about the younger members' capacity to stand admonition,[48] for he fears that the admonished student might retaliate by slandering the person who admonishes 385 him (13). Plutarch also is well aware of the | tendency to retaliate, and although Dio thinks that people who admonish should be loved for it,

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[39] Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 7 (Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* [SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988], 34–35).

[40] Johannes Behm, "νουθετέω, νουθεσία," *TDNT* 4 (1967): 1019. See Pedro Gutierrez, *La paternité spirituelle selon Saint Paul* (*EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1968), 188–197.

[41] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 51.5; 77/78.42; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 71E–72A.

[42] Rebuke: Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 73.10; reproof: Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.10; 72.9–10.

[43] Anger: *Gnom. Byz.* 258; 259; fault-finding: Plutarch, *Adul. amic..* 66E.

[44] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 70D–71D; cf. Plato, *Apol.* 26A.

[45] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 73A–C, 74DE.

[46] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 67B.

[47] See Siegfried Sudhaus, "Epikur als Beichtvater," *AR* 14 (1911): 647–648; Norman W. De Witt, "Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups," *CP* 31 (1936): 206; Gigante, "Philodème," 211; Wolfgang Schmid, "Contritio und 'ultima linea rerum' in neuen epikureischen Texten," *RhMus* 100 (1957): 301–327; Schmid, "Epikur," *RAC* 5 (1962): 741–743; Nussbaum, "Therapeutic Arguments," 49.

[48] Philodemus, *Lib.* 38; cf. Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 66A, 67EF, 73E, 74D.

he well knows that they are frequently hated instead as both Socrates and Musonius Rufus had been.[49]

I suggest that this theory and practice of appropriate speech provide the context in which 1 Thess 5:14 is to be understood.

## First Thessalonians: Paul's Exemplary Pastoral Work

The first three chapters of 1 Thessalonians are autobiographical and serve a paraenetic purpose in laying the foundation for the advice Paul would give in chapters 4 and 5.[50] What Paul says about himself in the first part of the letter reminds the Thessalonians of some features of his ministry to them, and one is justified in supposing that in this paradigmatic section Paul recalls those features that provide a concrete example of the conduct to which he calls them in the latter part of the letter.[51] Paul's self-description is indebted to the types of psychagogic traditions so far discussed in this paper, as is illustrated by three features of Paul's self-description.

First, as to the notion of Paul as paradigm: early in the letter (1:6), Paul claims that the Thessalonians had become his imitators (μιμηταί, 1:6), and that they in turn had become examples (τύποι) to other believers in Macedonia and Achaia (1:7). This is the language of paraenesis, in which the teacher becomes a model to his followers (cf. Seneca, *Epp.* 6.5–6; 11.8–10). What is unusual for Paul is that, rather than call his readers to follow his example, he says that the Thessalonians had already become imitators of him at their conversion (1:6–7). He is claiming a special relationship with his readers, which emerges again in 3:6, when he refers to the good news Timothy brought that the Thessalonians continued to have a good remembrance of Paul. Paul's use of μνεία here is to be understood in light of its use in paraenesis, in which one merely reminds someone of a particular moral precept or of a teacher who could provide the novice with security (cf. 2:9).[52] If this suggestion has | any merit, Paul would be ending 386 his description of the epistolary situation with a claim that his original

[49] Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 72EF; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 51.4–5, 7 (Socrates); *Or.* 3.122 (Musonius).

[50] For much of what follows, see Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," *NovT* 25 (1983): 238–256 (= *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 49–66). [*Light*, 1:167–185]

[51] Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 74–78.

[52] Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 66–67. On reminding or remembering, see Cicero, *Fam.* 2.1.2; Seneca, *Epp.* 11.9; 94.21, 25–26; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.2. On imitation, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 55.3–7; Seneca. *Ep.* 95.72.

relationship with the Thessalonians, in which he had presented himself as their model, was continuing.

Within this section, Paul uses other features derived from the tradition of moral exhortation, especially in 2:1–12. I have elsewhere attempted to demonstrate Paul's indebtedness, in this self-description, to such descriptions of the ideal philosopher as that found in Dio Chrysostom, *Oratio* 32.[53] I have also pointed out that Paul's use of the image of the nurse comes from contemporary discussions of the proper use of παρρησία: as a children's nurse is not unrelievedly harsh with her charges, but waits for the right moment to take them to task, and then does so in an appropriate manner, so, claims Paul, had he been gentle rather than harshly demanding (2:7).

Related to this image is that of father, which Paul uses in 2:11–12, where he provides more information about his "pastoral care" of his converts. What he says about his method is, again, quite in line with the psychagogic tradition of which we have examined some features. To begin with, Paul reminds his readers that he had paid attention to them individually (ἕνα ἕκαστον ὑμῶν). We have seen that the reason moral philosophers did so was not only to avoid embarrassing their auditors, but also to apply the exhortation appropriate to their individual circumstances. This Paul, too, appears to have done by applying παράκλησις, παραμυθία and μαρτυρία to the Thessalonians.

Παρακαλεῖν is the most general and inclusive of the three terms. The suggestion that παραμυθεῖσθαι and μαρτύρεσθαι specify more particularly the nature of the exhortation is to the point.[54] Μαρτύρεσθαι means to make an emphatic declaration, as it does in Gal 5:3 and Eph 4:17. That it may include a note of warning would appear from 1 Thess 4:6, where Paul uses διαμαρτύρεσθαι to describe his earlier teaching that God avenges 387 evil.[55] But our | main interest here is in παραμυθεῖσθαι, which also appears in 5:14.

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[53] Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217; [*Light*, 1:53–67] Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," 248–249 (= *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 58–60).

[54] Anton Grabner-Haider, *Paraklese und Eschatologie bei Paulus: Mensch und Welt im Anspruch der Zukunft Gottes* (2d ed.; NTAbh NS 4; Münster: Aschendorff, 1985), 11–13; Traugott Holtz, *Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher* (EKKNT 13; Zurich: Benziger, 1986), 90.

[55] See Hermann Strathmann, "μαρτύρομαι, κτλ," *TDNT* 4 (1967): 510–512; George Milligan, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians* (London: Macmillan, 1908), 51, thinks διαμαρτύρεσθαι is stronger than μαρτύρεσθαι.

That Paul always uses παραμυθεῖσθαι or its cognates in conjunction with some form of παράκλησις (5:14; 1 Cor 14:3; Phil 2:1) has obscured the fact that it also describes a very particular kind of exhortation, namely consolation or condolence.[56] As we have seen, the παραμυθητικὸς λόγος, or *consolatio*, was addressed, in addition to people who were bereaved, to those who suffered other distresses, such as poverty or social criticism or scorn (e.g., Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.57–58). Cicero at length discusses the steps one might take in comforting someone (*Tusc.* 3.77), and draws attention to an important way in which to prepare people for whatever distress they might suffer, namely, that of helping them to anticipate the difficulties that will come their way:

> a human being should ponder all the vicissitudes that fall to man's lot. And do not doubt that here is found the ideal of that wisdom which excels and is divine, namely in the thorough study and comprehension of human vicissitudes, in being astonished at nothing when it happens, and in thinking, before the event is come, that there is nothing which may not come to pass.[57]

This premeditation of the hardships that are destined to befall human beings was widespread among philosophers and constituted part of their psychagogy.[58]

Paul says that he too had anticipated the afflictions of his converts (3:3–4). He did not want them moved by their afflictions. "You yourselves know that this is to be our lot. For when we were with you, we told you beforehand that we were to suffer affliction; just as it has come to pass and as you know." This anticipation of future distress or affliction may very well have been part of Paul's παραμυθία when he was with the Thessalonians. There is no evidence that he had consoled Christians whose relatives or friends had been lost to death. It is more likely that Paul has in mind the distress or affliction brought upon the Thessalonians by their conversion, whether he viewed such affliction as the eschatological sufferings of the

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[56] See Gustav Stählin, "παραμυθέομαι, κτλ," *TDNT* 5 (1967): 820–821, who regards παραμυθία as merely supplementary to παράκλησις and finds it impossible to distinguish between the two.

[57] Cicero, *Tusc.* 3.30. The theme occupies him in 3.28–60; cf. also 77; 4.12, 14, 37, 60, 64. See also Seneca, *Epp.* 2.15; 91.4; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.103–104.

[58] Jackie Pigeaud, *La maladie de l'âme. Étude sur la relation de l'âme et du corps dans la tradition médico-philosophique antique* (CEA; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1981), 276–278. For the use of the theme in psychagogy, see Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954), 16–71; Hadot, *Seneca*, 59–61. See also Samuel Vollenweider, *Freiheit als neue Schöpfung: Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT 147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 51–53.

righteous or not. Θλίψις and θλίβεσθαι are frequently used to describe 388 the distress converts to philosophy or, in | the case of Aseneth (*Jos. Asen.* 12:11), proselytes to Judaism felt when they were criticized by and alienated from their former friends and relatives.[59] That Paul is interested in social relations is evident from 4:9–12 and 4:3–8, and from the unusual concentration of kinship language in the letter, as though he is trying to nurture a new, fictive kinship to compensate for the ones lost by his readers' conversion to Christianity. The point is that Paul's παραμυθία did not have in view bereavement caused by death; rather, other conditions that required comfort appear to have existed in Thessalonica from the earliest days of the church's existence. Paul's account of his pastoral work informs his direction to the Thessalonians, and to that we now turn.

## The Thessalonians' Pastoral Activity

Paul views the Thessalonians' pastoral caring under two aspects, that of receiving (5:12–13) and of giving it (5:14–15). He does not have in mind two discrete groups of individuals, one with the (vested?) responsibility of engaging in pastoral care, the other dependent on them for their spiritual betterment. Paul rather has in mind the Thessalonians' mutual edification, as the reciprocal ἀλλήλους in 5:11 shows. This verse marks a transition from the preceding eschatological section to the paraenesis on pastoral care. By virtue of (διό) being the community of the last days, the Thessalonians are to exhort and edify each other, and how that is to take place receives further specification in what follows.[60]

Of interest, particularly in light of its neglect in translations and commentaries, is the phrase εἷς τὸν ἕνα. It is unusual, but is not simply equivalent, to ἀλλήλους, as is sometimes thought.[61] It is probably to be taken in the sense of εἷς ἑνί, "person to person," as in Theocritus 22.65. It draws attention to the individual element in the community's care for each other. As Paul himself had given attention to individuals, and as other 389 responsible preachers were | doing, so were the Thessalonians to do. He

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[59] For conversion as an unsettling experience, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 36–52.

[60] See Ernst von Dobschütz, *Christian Life in the Primitive Church* (New York: Putnam, 1904), 88; Josef Hainz, *Ekklesia: Strukturen paulinischer Gemeinde-Theologie und Gemeinde-Ordnung* (BU 9 MUS; Regensburg: Pustet, 1973), 85–95; and Hans von Campenhausen, *Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), 63–65.

[61] E.g., Best, *First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians*, 220, who also records the opinion that it is Semitic in origin.

does not, however, use medical imagery or refer to an opportune time for appropriate speech, as is so common in the contemporary moral literature.[62]

We have seen that admonition (νουθεσία) was quite sharp speech. Indeed, it is the harshest speech mentioned in the letter, but from its occurrence in 5:12 it would appear that Paul did not consider it a rare activity in Thessalonica. In 5:14 it is the ἄτακτοι who are to be admonished. Because the verb ἀτακτέω and its cognates are used in 2 Thess 3 to describe people who were not working, as they also do in a few papyri, commentators simply render ἀτάκτους by "idlers." Ceslas Spicq has correctly shown, however, that the word refers to people who refuse to submit to accepted norms of behavior, and it thus describes a deficiency of character rather than an objective class of delinquents.[63] Spicq's understanding of ἄτακτοι is in perfect agreement with the moral philosophers' view of admonition as discussed above. Admonition was addressed to the human will, even when it was part of the philosophers' comfort of someone who was grieving. They were not interested in rigid classifications of groups of people to whom certain types of speech were to be limited; rather, they were concerned to match their speech to the character or disposition of those they sought to benefit.

We should understand Paul's command to admonish the ἄτακτοι in the same way. Throughout the letter he had been assiduous in nurturing communal relationships. The loafers were jeopardizing the relationships within the church as well as those with the larger society (4:9–12), and they were to be admonished.[64] What is striking, however, is that Paul does not call them ἀργοί but ἄτακτοι. What is important for him here is not that they represent a particular group, indeed, the social dimension of their behavior or the action the church is to take is not in view at all (contrast 2 Thess 3:6–15). What is important for Paul is the character trait responsible for their social conduct. They are willful, disorderly, and for that require admonition. Paul wants his readers to act in a psychagogically responsible manner.

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[62] Both conventions are used in the Pastoral Epistles, but polemically rather than positively. See Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season'" (see n. 8 above); Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35; repr. in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 121–136. [*Light*, 1:117–134]

[63] Ceslas Spicq, "Les Thessaloniciens 'inquiets' étaient-ils des paresseux?" *ST* 10 (1956): 1–13; Spicq, *Notes de lexicographie néotestamentaire* (2 vols.; OBO 22; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 1:157–159.

[64] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 92, 95–107.

390 | The ὀλιόψυχοι were people who were easily discouraged, or were despondent. They are frequently identified with those who were uncertain about eschatological matters or were having difficulty enduring the tribulations that came upon them. John Chrysostom opted for the latter, adding that they were unable to take the insults from their pagan neighbors.[65] We have seen that the παραμυθητικὸς λόγος was a well-known type of exhortation addressed to people grieving for someone lost to death, or for reverses in financial matters, loss of reputation, social alienation, etc. The Vulgate's translation of ὀλιγόψυχοι by *pusillanimes* closely relates the ὀλιγόψυχοι to the weak, for *pusillanimes* is frequently used interchangeably with *imbecilliores* to describe the weak.[66] But Paul is not interested in narrowly defining a particular group in Thessalonica. What is in view here is rather the despondency of people who were beginning to find their way in the new life. Paul describes a psychological condition rather than a discrete group, and in the manner of a responsible pastor requires that appropriate speech, παραμυθία, be applied.

It is frequently said that before the NT, ἀσθένεια was not used of religious or moral weakness.[67] As we have seen, however, the notion of moral weakness was widespread in Greek and Latin writers. From Chrysippus on, people were described as ἀσθενεῖς, or by writers such as Cicero and Seneca as *imbecilli* or *imbecilliores* when they found it difficult to live up to the virtuous life, and were still tempted by reputation, pleasure and the like. In light of the psychagogic traditions Paul has been using, and the general nature of his description of the Thessalonians in this verse, it is reasonable to assume that he shared this view of moral weakness. It was commonly held that such persons had to be helped, even if they were easily offended if one insistently pointed out their short-

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[65] Béda Rigaux, *Saint Paul. Les épitres aux Thessaloniciens* (*EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956), 584; Chrysostom, PG 62:457.

[66] This rare word occurs only here in the NT, and its basic meaning, that of religious despondency, was probably informed by the LXX (see G. Bertram, "ὀλιγόψυχος," *TDNT* 9 [1974]: 666). Nevertheless, Frederick F. Bruce's comparison (*1 & 2 Thessalonians* [WBC 45; Waco: Word, 1982], 123) with Aristotle's μικρόψυχος (*Eth. nic.* 4.3.7.1123b10) has real merit. While for Aristotle, the mean-souled individual is one who does not insist on what is due him, among the later moralists he is avaricious (Philo, *Virt.* 92) or allows himself to be angered (Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 10 [78, 9–10 Lutz]). For the association with weakness, see also Plutarch, *Cohib. ira* 456E–457A; *Tranq. an.* 468D. See esp. *1 Clem.* 59.4, in a prayer, ἐξανάστησον τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας· παρακάλεσον τοὺς ὀλιγοψυχοῦντας (cf. Isa 57:15, ὀλιγοψύχοις διδοὺς μακροθυμίαν).

[67] E.g., G. Stählin, "ἀσθενής," *TDNT* 1 (1964): 492, apparently depending on Theodor Nägeli, *Der Wortschatz des Apostels Paulus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905), 46.

comings. So, once again, we have to do with an aspect of character | 391 with which an appropriate pastoral response, helping, is matched (cf. 1 Cor 12:28; esp. Acts 20:35).

The moral philosophers were well aware that successful care of souls required the utmost patience, and it is fitting that Paul similarly should conclude his directions to care givers to be patient with all they seek to benefit. Psychagogists were also painfully aware that they might meet with retaliation. Paul, too, addressing the entire community in 5:15, warns against retaliation.[68]

## Conclusion

Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians shows him to have been aware of the psychagogic traditions of his time. He not only claims to have used the methods his contemporaries advised responsible teachers to use, but instructed his readers to do the same. The perennial questions raised by such a study as this are whether Paul could realistically be expected to have been as familiar with these traditions from the philosophers as this paper assumes him to have been, and whether it is not more likely that his Jewish heritage informed his practice.

The answer to the first question, I submit, is found in the evidence presented. What Paul shares with the philosophic psychagogic enterprise is not only the odd term picked up here and there or a borrowed metaphor or two. We have seen him use entire complexes of terms and do so in a manner approximating the use of the moralists. Given the aim of this paper, it is natural that the accent has been on similarities, but that should not lead to the assumption that Paul has been made into a Greek philosopher. His self-perception and goal were quite different from those teachers from whom he learned his pastoral method.

A positive answer to the second question will have to be given by someone more knowledgeable than I am about the Jewish material. To be convincing, such an answer would not merely adduce scattered parallels, but would trace traditions, identify complexes of ideas and descriptions, and situate 1 Thessalonians, the earliest extant Christian pastoral letter, within that enterprise.

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[68] See also εἰρηνεύετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς in 5:13, addressed to the entire community after specific advice to those who receive instruction.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

# DID THE THESSALONIANS WRITE TO PAUL?*

Paul chose letters as the means by which to address the issues that engaged him and his churches. Other forms of literature that he could have used, such as treatises or epitomes, conceivably would have shown us how he treated subjects systematically or didactically rather than argumentatively. His letters, on the other hand, draw attention to him as a communicator as much as a theologian, and the epistolographic and rhetorical examination of his letters has attained a firm place in Pauline studies. Paul's conversation partners in his correspondence, by contrast, are generally regarded merely as the recipients of his letters, and with few exceptions are not viewed as communicators in their own right. This is not due to the myopia of Pauline scholars, but rather to the fact that Paul only seldom comments on communication he received from his churches.[1] The subject requires an imaginative approach, and 1 Thessalonians has been so approached.

First Thessalonians is the earliest extant Pauline letter, and thus the earliest preserved Christian writing. It may in fact be the first letter Paul wrote to a church, but that is beyond proof.[2] Nevertheless, in 1 Thessalonians Paul is continuing a conversation with the Thessalonians that had begun with his arrival in their city months earlier.[3] This letter,

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* Originally published in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn* (ed. Robert Fortna and Beverly Gaventa; Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 246–257.

[1] For the difficulties in connection with 1 Corinthians, which provides more information than any other Pauline letter, see Nils A. Dahl, "Paul and the Church in Corinth according to I Corinthians 1–4," in *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox* (ed. William R. Farmer, C.F.D. Moule, and Richard R. Niebuhr; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 313–335.

[2] For discussion of 1 Thessalonians as the earliest letter, see Werner G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* (rev. ed.; trans. Howard C. Kee; Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), 257; Willi Marxsen, *Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher* (ZBNT 11.1; Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1979), 15; Philipp Vielhauer, *Geschichte der urchristlichen Literatur* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), 82. For discussion of it as the earliest preserved Christian writing, see Ernst von Dobschütz, *Die Thessalonicherbriefe* (KEK 10; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1909), 18–19.

[3] For the ancient view of a letter as one-half of a dialogue, see, for example, Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 223; Cicero, *Amic.* 12.30.1. The texts are available in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 16–17, 26–27. Marxsen, *Der*

however, does not only continue the conversation, but it has also been thought to provide information about earlier communication between Paul and the Thessalonians.

## Correspondence before 1 Thessalonians?

We should note at the outset that Paul mentions no communication, either oral or written, that had occurred between himself and the Thessalonians in the interval between his departure from Thessalonica | and the writing of 1 Thessalonians. He had sent Timothy to Thessalonica from Athens (1 Thess 3:1–2), but he gives no indication that he had done so in response to anything that he had heard from or about the Thessalonians.[4] Rather, according to Paul, it was his anxiety about the Thessalonians' faith that compelled him to reestablish contact with them (2:17–3:5). His comments on Timothy's mission stress that he wanted, by means of Timothy, to strengthen their faith (3:2, 5) and ascertain whether they still looked to him as their teacher (3:6), but he provides no explicit information about any letter that he might have written or even any message that he might have sent them.[5]

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Rendel Harris, however, surmised that already on this occasion Timothy carried a letter from Paul to the Thessalonians, traces of which Harris thought are discernible in 1 Thessalonians.[6] This letter would have stressed Paul's desire to see them (2:17; 3:2, 6) and his concern whether his work with them had been in vain (3:5). That such concerns were conveyed by Timothy is surely likely. In the absence of stronger evidence, however, Harris's suggestion of a letter has not met with favor.

Harris also advanced the hypothesis that the Thessalonians responded to Paul in a letter that was brought to him in Corinth by Timothy (Acts 18:5), to which 1 Thessalonians was the reply.[7] Harris found evidence of this letter in elements of epistolary form as well as the content of

*erste Thessalonicherbrief*, 9–11, stresses the ongoing conversation between Paul and his recent converts.

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[4] Paul had heard about their circumstances (see 1 Thess 1:7–10; 2:14), but he does not | relate Timothy's mission to this news. For the purpose of this essay, the account of Acts 17:10–18:5 may be left aside.

[5] See the fuller discussion in my commentary, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000); also Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 62–68.

[6] J. Rendel Harris, "A Study in Letter-Writing," *The Expositor*, 5th ser., 8 (1898): 193.

[7] Harris, "Study in Letter-Writing," 167–173.

1 Thessalonians. As to epistolary form, Harris considered “you always have a good remembrance of us” (3:6) and “we also [as you do in your letter] thank God constantly for this” (2:13) to be references to the thanksgiving period of the letter (see 1:2). As to the content of 1 Thessalonians, Harris thought that the repeated statements that the readers knew what Paul was saying (1:5; 2:1–2; 3:3; 4:2), and that they remembered (2:9), made it possible to reconstruct their letter to Paul.

Chalmer Faw regarded Harris’s suggestion as ingenious, but judged his evidence elusive.[8] Faw thought that other elements of the form and content of 1 Thessalonians provided stronger evidence of a prior letter from the Thessalonians.

1. Faw held that the introduction of a series of comments with περὶ δέ (4:9, 13; 5:1) or δέ (5:12) compares with 1 Cor 7:1, 25; 8:1; 12:1; 16:1, 12, which are generally thought to introduce Paul’s responses to written inquiries from the Corinthians (see 1 Cor 7:1). It is only in 1 Corinthians and 1 Thessalonians that Paul uses περὶ δέ, but elsewhere in the NT it also very specifically has to do with replies (Mark 12:26; 13:32; John 16:11; Acts 21:25).

2. Faw further argued that the transitions at 4:9, 13 and 5:12 would be very abrupt if they were not responses. More important, Paul is reluctant to discuss brotherly love and the times and seasons (4:9; 5:1) | and does so only because his readers had asked him for advice on these matters, but even then he goes on to tell them to continue in what they were already doing (4:1, 2, 10). The content of the Thessalonians’ letter, which would have been written by their leaders (5:12), can be determined, according to Faw, primarily from chapters 4 and 5, and dealt with brotherly love (4:9–12), Christians who had died (4:13–18), and the time of the end (5:1–11). The letter would have been supplemented by Timothy’s report, echoes of which are found in chapters 1–3, particularly in comments revolving around thanksgiving and personal defense, although it is not always possible to distinguish Paul’s two sources of information. 248

The hypothesis of a letter from the Thessalonians has been accepted by some interpreters, regarded as possible by others, and as improbable by

[8] Chalmer E. Faw, “On the Writing of First Thessalonians,” *JBL* 71 (1952): 217–225. See also James Moffatt, *An Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 67.

perhaps the majority.[9] The objections most frequently raised are that Paul would have mentioned such a letter at 3:6 and that too much weight is attached to περὶ δέ on the basis of 1 Cor 7:1: "one example of Paul's method does not create an essential pattern."[10] To these could be added the fact that Paul's references to what his readers knew are not allusions to a letter but belong to the paraenetic style in which 1 Thessalonians is written. Furthermore, the epistolographic conventions require closer investigation, especially in the context of ancient epistolographic practice, than they have received. I have elsewhere examined the letter's paraenetic style.[11] Here I wish to look more closely at epistolographic conventions.

## An Earlier Letter to the Thessalonians?

An investigation of epistolographic conventions, especially in 2:17–3:10, which reflects the historical situation in which 1 Thessalonians was written, reveals significantly more such elements than have been identified previously.[12]

We look first at Paul's comments about the sending of Timothy, thus at the occasion on which he may have written to the Thessalonians, as was suggested by Harris.

1. Paul's description of the letter's setting concludes the autobiographical section of the letter (chs. 1–3) and constitutes its climax.[13] It is bracketed by

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[9] For example, accepted by James E. Frame, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians* (ICC 38; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1912), 9, 107; Charles Masson, *Les deux épitres de Saint Paul aux Thessaloniciens* (CNT 11A; Neuchatel/Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1957), 7–8, 66; Ernst Fuchs, "Hermeneutik?" *ThViat* 7 (1960): 44–60; regarded as possible by George Milligan, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians* (London: Macmillan, 1908), xxx, 126; Kirsopp Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul: Their Motive and Origin* (London: Rivingtons, 1911), 86–87; regarded as improbable by von Dobschütz, *Die Thessalonicherbriefe*, 19; B. Rigaux, *Saint Paul. Les épitres aux Thessaloniciens* (*EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1956), 55–56.

[10] Ernest Best, *A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians* (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1972), 15.

[11] For such reminders, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," *NovT* 25 (1983): 238–256, esp. 240–241. [*Light*, 1:167–185] A longer discussion of the letter's paraenetic features appears in Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333. [*Light*, 2:675–749]

[12] See Klaus Thraede, *Grundzüge griechisch-römische Brieftopik* (ZMKA 48; Munich: C. H. Beck, 1970), 95–97.

[13] Paul Schubert, *Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings* (BZNW 20; Giessen/Berlin: Töpelmann, 1939), 20–21; John L. White, *The Body of the Greek Letter* (SBLDS 2; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1972), 119.

statements lamenting Paul's involuntary separation from the Thessalonians and assurances that he wishes to see them face to face (2:17; 3:10). When Paul could bear this separation no longer, he sent Timothy (3:1). The themes of enforced bodily absence but spiritual presence and a desire to see one's correspondents were standard features in epistolographic theory and practice, as seen, for example, in | P.Lond. 1926, 17–18: "Even though in body I have not come to your feet, yet in spirit I have come to your feet."[14] These themes are also reflected elsewhere in Paul.[15] Such statements appear in correspondence between family members and friends, and 1 Thessalonians has much in common with such letters.[16] The reason for writing in this style was that writers thought "that nobody [would] refuse them when they [wrote] in a friendly manner, but [would] rather submit and heed what they [were] writing."[17] Paul has adopted features of the style of the friendly letter to express his feelings toward the Thessalonians and to set the tone for the advice he will give them in chapters 4 and 5. 249

2. In friendly and family letters writers frequently emphasized their loneliness by drawing attention to their family relationships, as two examples illustrate.[18] In BGU 385, 4–6, a daughter writes to her father: "I want you to know that I am alone. Keep in your thoughts, 'I have a daughter in Alexandria,' so that I too might know that I have a father, lest I be regarded as without parents." In PSI 1161, 11–19, a woman bemoans her loneliness in a letter to her mother: "I have no one with me, neither sister nor brother nor son, no one but God. I urge you, my mother and lady, remember me even if (only) for one day, lest I die in a strange land without anyone." Paul conveys the same feeling of loneliness when he introduces this section of the letter by saying that he "had been orphaned

[14] For the theory, see the sample of the friendly letter in Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 1 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 32–33); for practice, see BGU 1080, 6ff.; P.Oxy. 963; PSI 1261, 10ff., and for discussion, see Heikki Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (STAT Series B 102.2; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1956), 175–180.

[15] See 2 Cor 10:10–11; 1 Cor 5:3, on which see G. Karlsson, "Formelhaftes in Paulusbriefen?" *Eranos* 54 (1956): 138–141; Klaus Thraede, "Untersuchungen zum Ursprung und zur Geschichte der christlichen Poesie II," JAC 5 (1963): 141–145; Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 97–102.

[16] Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 95–97. On letters of friendship, see Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 58–70.

[17] Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 1 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 32–33).

[18] See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 110.

[ἀπορφανισθέντες] by being separated from" the Thessalonians (2:17) and by calling attention to his having been left alone in Athens.[19]

3. Paul's reference to himself by name (2:18), which is unusual for him in the body of a letter (compare Phlm 9), also finds its counterparts in friendly letters, where such references express a particularly close relationship, although in these letters they appear toward the end of the letter.[20]

These epistolographic elements express Paul's emotional need for communication, as they do in other ancient letters.[21] They are precisely the kinds of statements that would have been natural in a letter written in Paul's circumstances, and may seem to lend further support to Harris's suggestion that Paul had sent a letter to the Thessalonians with Timothy. However, two facts speak against Harris's hypothesis. First, the epistolographic elements I have identified are not related to written communication, but to Timothy's mission. Second, these elements do not appear in a letter in which a writer attempts to reestablish contact, as they normally do, but in one that comments on how renewed contact had been effected. We should, therefore, ask how these statements function in 1 Thessalonians, but before we do so we must examine Paul's comments on Timothy's return.

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Paul's account of Timothy's return (3:6) is confined to Timothy's report about the Thessalonians, and does not mention any sort of communication from them. It does, however, continue the pathos with which Paul had expressed his constant desire to remain in contact with the Thessalonians, and it contains epistolographic elements, only some of which have been noted before, that may support the hypothesis that Timothy had brought Paul a letter from them. There are two sets of epistolographic elements that come under consideration.

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[19] His use of ἀπορφανισθέντες to describe his deprivation of their fellowship is especially significant in view of the extraordinary concentration of kinship language in the letter. See Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 48–51.

[20] Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 124. See Gregory of Nazianzus, *Epp.* 64.5; 93; Chariton, *Chaer.* 8.4.5–6; cf. 1 Cor 16:21; 2 Thess 3:17; esp. Phlm 19.

[21] See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 73–75.

*The Report about the Thessalonians*

We turn first to the epistolographic elements that have been identified and to Paul's characterization of Timothy's report, which is also given in epistolographic terms.

1. Ancient letters teem with expressions of longing (πόθος) for absent friends.[22] Timothy brought Paul the good news that the Thessalonians yearned (ἐπιποθοῦντες) to see him, thus reciprocating Paul's longing for them (3:6).

2. A letter was proof that one had not been forgotten, and letters of friendship stress the constant remembrance in which friends were held.[23] Timothy brought the good news that Paul's converts constantly held him "in good remembrance" (3:6).[24]

These two epistolographic elements describe precisely the circumstances in which friendly letters were said to have been written, and they would have been perfectly at home in a letter written to Paul. That they appear in a letter written by Paul and not the Thessalonians does pose a problem, but that Paul uses epistolographic clichés to describe their mood and attitude supports the surmise that they had communicated with him by letter, particularly if it could be shown that he elsewhere appropriates clichés from his correspondents' letters. The surmise would be further strengthened if it could be shown that Paul elsewhere uses such language to describe a mediator's report about a church while remaining silent about a letter that the mediator had brought from the church. Paul in fact does so, and we shall consider such cases. For now, we note that, in addition to the description of Timothy's report, other epistolographic elements may point to a letter from the Thessalonians.

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[22] See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 174–175; Thraede, *Grundzüge*, index, s.v. πόθος, here, esp. 96–97.

[23] See, e.g., Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 1 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 32–33); Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 123–127. Basil, *Ep.* 271, provides a good example: "For how much would it have been worth to me to see the most excellent Eusebius, and to embrace him, and to return again in memory to our youth, and to recall those days when one home was ours, and one hearth, and the same teacher, and leisure.... Of how much worth do you think I consider it to renew all these things in | memory through meeting you.... But though the enjoyment of all this has escaped me, yet of the privilege of seeing your Excellency through the agency of a letter ..." 257

[24] For the suggestion that, in addition to its epistolary function, this language reflects the paraenetic practice of recalling one's teacher as a paradigm for one's life, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 66–67.

3. The strongest case for a Thessalonian letter, in epistolographic terms, has been made on the basis of the use of περὶ δέ (4:9, 13; 5:1). Taken by itself, this evidence is inconclusive. The main proof that περὶ δέ introduces a response to a written inquiry is derived from 1 Cor 7:1 and the 251 assumption, generally held, that subsequent occurrences of περὶ δέ or | δέ in 1 Corinthians (7:25; 8:1; 12:1; 16:1, 12) refer to items brought up in the Corinthians' letter to Paul. That assumption itself should be called into question, however, particularly when it is observed that περὶ δέ is used in letters in a number of different ways: (a) It frequently occurs in papyri and other letters as well as treatises simply to introduce a new topic.[25] This does not, however, decisively contradict, as is sometimes thought,[26] the possibility that Paul is responding to a letter. (b) While περί with or without δέ does not necessarily introduce a reply to a written request, it does so at times.[27] (c) It also introduces a response to an oral report.[28] On occasion it is not clear whether it introduces a reply to a written or an oral report. P.Eleph. 13 provides an instructive example with parallels to 1 Thessalonians:[29]

> Andron to his brother Milon greeting. If you are well and everything is to your mind, it would be as I desire. I myself am in good health. On the arrival of Sanos I received your letter, and it was a pleasure to read it and hear your news.

Compare 1 Thess 3:6–9, Paul's joy over Timothy's arrival with good news. Andron continues by expressing his willingness to meet any need of the bearer of the letter, and matters are then taken up that may have been communicated in the letter or by the bearer:

> About the twenty drachmae [περὶ δὲ τῶν εἴκοσι δραχμῶν], Phlion has not yet received them, for we have not found Pistocles. About the wine [περὶ δὲ τοῦ οἰναρίου], Praxiades has not yet come in from the country, but from what his mother tells me ...

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[25] For example, PSI 438, 10; P.Tebt. 22, 15; P.Hamb. 27, 4; see Edwin Mayser, *Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus Ptolemäerzeit* (Berlin/Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1934) 2/2, 449–450; Demosthenes, *Ep.* 3.1; Diogenes Laertius 8.80; *Did.* 7.1; 9.1; 11.3; compare David Bradley, "The Topos as Form in the Pauline Paraenesis," *JBL* 72 (1953): 238–246.

[26] See Bradley, "Topos as Form"; Hendrikus Boers, "The Form Critical Study of Paul's Letters: 1 Thessalonians as a Case Study," *NTS* 22 (1976): 140–158.

[27] See, e.g., P.Edg. 65; P.Lille 26, 7; P.Oxy. 1664, 9ff.; 1593, 14–15; 1766, 10.

[28] See P.Hal. 166.

[29] The text and translation are published in *Select Papyri* (ed. Arthur S. Hunt, C.C. Edgar, Denys L. Page, and D.M. Leahy; 4 vols.; LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), 1:280–283.

Compare 1 Thess 4:9, 13; 5:1. It is not clear whether Andron uses περὶ δέ to introduce his replies to inquiries in Milon's letter, or whether περὶ δέ introduces topics of interest to Milon about which Andron had heard from Sanos or Praxiades's mother. The letter concludes with an assurance that the writer is prepared to render further assistance, which is equivalent to the polite formula offering to meet a friend's need:[30] "Now you will do me a favor if you take care of yourself and do not hesitate to write and tell me what I can do to please you." In correspondence, then, περὶ δέ can, but does not necessarily, refer to a written request. In the absence of supporting evidence, 1 Thessalonians cannot be read as proof that Paul is replying to a letter from the Thessalonians.

4. One bit of evidence that has received insufficient attention is the epistolographic convention of referring to a correspondent's needs. It was common for friends to express in letters their need (χρεία) for advice—or for anything else, for that matter.[31] The preparedness to do | so was enhanced by epistolary clichés expressing the desire of friends to be helpful. Frequently little more than perfunctory expressions of politeness,[32] especially in official correspondence, such clichés nevertheless appear in genuine invitations to readers to make requests of writers. From countless examples, we note two: P.Oxy. 930, "do not hesitate to write me about anything of which you may have need [περὶ ὧν ἐὰν χρείαν ἔχῃς],"[33] and PSI 333, "And please write yourself if you ever have need of anything here (ἐὰν τινος τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς χρείαν ἔχῃς]." Either in reply to such an invitation, or simply because of a friendly relationship with the reader, a correspondent might write for something he or she needs, such as in P.Cair.Zen. 59426: "For I have need [χρείαν γὰρ ἔχω] of it for my eyes." On two occasions Paul assures the Thessalonians that they have no need (οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε) to be written to about brotherly love and the last days (4:9; 5:1). In the light of the epistolographic practice of referring to one's correspondent's needs, it is not unreasonable to understand these references, as Faw did, as reflecting the Thessalonians' written requests for information. Thus Paul would be replying to a letter. Once again, however, the evidence is inconclusive, especially since these statements function

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[30] See the examples in Henry A. Steen, "Les clichés épistolaires," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 1 (1938): 128–130.

[31] See Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 166–167.

[32] See Steen, "Les clichés épistolaires," 119–176.

[33] See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 68–69, and see P.Mich. 23, 8; 85, 5; P.Oxy. 1664; P.Cair.Zen. 59250, 5; 59251; P.Petr. 2.42b; 3.42[9](g).

paraenetically and are of a piece with other assurances in the letter that the Thessalonians already have knowledge of essentials.[34] Its value would be considerably enhanced if evidence were available that Paul did in fact recognize real needs and addressed them in 1 Thessalonians.

### *Paul's Reception of Timothy's Report*

The epistolographic elements related to the Thessalonians' communication are supplemented by others relating to Paul's reception of their communication.

1. As it was standard to express joy upon the receipt of a letter,[35] so Paul says that he is overjoyed upon learning of the Thessalonians' attitude toward him and the condition of their faith (3:9).

2. As ancient writers thanked the gods that communication had been effected,[36] so does Paul thank God (3:9).

3. The most important evidence for a Thessalonian letter is found in Paul's statement at the end of his account of Timothy's return (3:10) that Paul prayed night and day to see the Thessalonians face to face and to supply what was lacking (καταρτίσαι τὰ ὑστερήματα) in their faith. His enforced absence made him turn to a letter to meet their needs, although he does not explicitly mention the letter he is writing. This opinion, held by all commentators I know, is supported by the fact that the preoccupation, night and day, with the inability to see one's correspondent in person and a view of one's letter as a surrogate for one's physical presence 253 are well-known epistolographic conventions.[37] | What is noteworthy for our purpose is that Paul describes himself in these terms, which usually provide reasons for writing a letter, but does not mention a letter. It is this fact, which turns out not to be a lone occurrence, that suggests that the report Paul ascribes to Timothy in v. 6 could have been conveyed in a letter Timothy brought from the Thessalonians.

This possibility receives support from a closer examination of what Paul says about his intention in v. 10 and from two parallel passages. Rather

[34] See 1:5, 8; 2:1, 2, 5, 9, 11; 3:3, 4; 4:2; 5:2, and see n. 11 above.
[35] See, e.g., P.Eleph. 13, 2–3; P.Hamb. 88, 3; see also Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 75–77.
[36] See, e.g., P.Oxy. 1481, 9–10; P.Vat.Mai A, 8.
[37] For wishing to see one's correspondent, see P.Oxy. 1676, 20–25; 1761, 6–8; P.Lond. 1244, 3ff.; on night and day, see P.Mich. 203, 17ff.; P.Oxy. 528, 6ff.; P.Giss. 17; on a letter as a surrogate see P.Oxy. 963, 1ff.; PSI 1261, 10ff.; compare Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 12. On these topics generally, see Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 170.

than mention his own letter, Paul speaks of wishing to supply a lack in his readers' faith. The expression of a writer's desire to fill or meet a correspondent's need by means of a letter is, however, another epistolographic cliché that has not been introduced into the discussion. It requires more attention than I can give it here, but the following example may be sufficient to demonstrate Paul's practice of not always mentioning letters, but rather of referring to individuals who carried letters between himself and his churches.

By means of a letter one was thought to satisfy or supply the want (ἀποπληροῦν τὸ ἐνδέον) caused by one's physical separation from one's readers.[38] Stated in another way, a letter completes or substitutes for a writer's physical presence (διὰ γραμμάτων πληρῶ τὰ τῆς παρουσίας).[39] Paul does not here use a form of πληροῦν, but καταρτίζειν is related and forms the same epistolary function. So does Seneca's *satis facere*, in his response to Lucilius's request for moral guidance: "I shall fill your want [*desiderio tuo satis faciam*], encouraging your virtues and lashing your vices" (*Ep.* 121.4). As we have seen, specific needs such as these are frequently mentioned and described as χρεία. The verb χρήζειν is also used frequently, as is ὑστερεῖν, which functions as an equivalent in letters.[40] P.Merton 83, 23–24 illustrates how ὑστερεῖν may function in an epistolary exchange. The letter concludes: "If you wish me to give (the money), write me and I shall send whatever you need (χρήζῃς).... So as soon as you receive this letter, write back to us... so that you will not lack whatever you need (οὗ ἐὰν χρήζῃς μὴ ὑστερήσῃς)."

Such conventional language supports the opinion that Paul in 3:10 refers to what he would write in chapters 4 and 5 in response to the Thessalonians' needs. It does not yet, however, prove that those needs were expressed in a letter from Thessalonica. The objection that he does not mention such a letter is partly weakened by the fact that neither does he in 3:10 refer to his own letter. It is further weakened by two other texts in which Paul does not explicitly mention a letter although he has one in mind. These texts also happen to use the convention of supplying a reader's need, but they differ from 3:10 in that they express the intention of Paul's correspondents, not his own. The reason for drawing attention to them is not to suggest that the Thessalonians had | written to Paul with 254

[38] See Basil, *Ep.* 297.
[39] See Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep.* 68.1.
[40] See P.Enteux. 86, 3.11; P.Cair.Zen. 59025, 2.12.

the purpose of fulfilling his needs. Rather, I introduce these texts into the discussion because they also leave letters unmentioned. That they use this particular convention is coincidental.

In 1 Cor 16:17 Paul expresses his joy over the arrival (παρουσία) of Stephanas, Fortunatus, and Achaicus, for they had supplied the needs of the Corinthians (τὸ ὑμέτερον ὑστέρημα … ἀνεπλήρωσαν) by refreshing both his spirit and that of the Corinthians. Paul does not mention a letter, but the epistolographic formula suggests that he does have a letter in mind that they had brought him from Corinth. Indeed, on the basis of historical reconstruction, the view generally held by students of 2 Corinthians is that Stephanas was the bearer of the letter in which the Corinthians asked Paul for advice.[41] Yet, instead of mentioning the letter, Paul applies the epistolographic language to the bearer(s) of the letter. That letter thus performed two functions: First, it satisfied the need of the Corinthians that was caused by their separation from him. So Paul stresses the mutuality of affection that was strengthened by the delegation and probably their delivery of the letter. Second, the letter was also a means by which the Corinthians expressed their need for advice (7:1). Timothy's report to Paul about the Thessalonians accomplished at least the former, and probably the second as well.

The other text is Phil 2:25–30, which speaks of Epaphroditus, who is usually thought to have been the bearer of a letter from Paul to the Philippians, although that is not expressly stated.[42] The commendation of Epaphroditus is introduced with "I thought it necessary to send" (ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἡγησάμην … πέμψαι), a phrase Koskenniemi has identified as an "ἀφορμή formula," which was used to introduce an intermediary who was also a bearer of a letter.[43] Paul uses other epistolographic conventions in describing Epaphroditus and his mission: Epaphroditus yearned (ἐπιποθῶν) for the Philippians and was distressed about them, and Paul sends Epaphroditus so that he and the Philippians might be reunited and

[41] See, e.g., Dahl, "Paul and the Church at Corinth," 324–325. For Stephanas as the bearer of the letter, see John C. Hurd, *The Origin of* 1 *Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1965), 49–50.

[42] This was already the view of the Marcionite Prologues and is still that of scholars who hold to the unity of the letter (see Kümmel, *Introduction*, 323) as well as those who favor a theory that the letter is a composite of fragments (see Hans-Martin Schenke, Karl M. Fischer, Hans-Gebhard Bethge, and Gesine Schenke, eds., *Einleitung in die Schriften des Neuen Testaments* [2 vols; Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1978–1979], 1:127, and Helmut Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament* [2 vols; 2d ed.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1995–2000], 2:53–54).

[43] For the exact formula, see P.Ryl. 235, 2ff.; P.Lond. 1925, 3ff., and for a discussion, see Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 81–87, 122.

so rejoice. So, once again, the bearer of a letter is described in epistolographic terms, while the letter is not mentioned at all.

Equally striking about Phil 2:25–30 is that two references to the correspondents' need frame the text, thus forming an *inclusio*, and both references deal with Epaphroditus's role as the Philippians' delegate to Paul. In v. 25, he is their messenger and minister to Paul's χρεία, and in v. 30 the purpose of his mission is identified as fulfilling their need (ἀναπληροῦν τὸ ὑμῶν ὑστέρημα) in their ministry to Paul. This is, then, another instance in which an intermediary's function is described in terms normally used of letters. It is not only possible, but highly likely, that Epaphroditus had brought Paul a letter, in addition to the contribution, from the Philippians.[44]

These texts clearly show that Paul on these occasions does not mention | letters, although in each case the intermediaries he does mention carried letters between himself and his churches. They further show that Paul was in the habit of using epistolographic clichés, sometimes from letters he received from his churches, to describe the carriers and their reports. 255

## Conclusion

Paul uses epistolographic clichés to an exceptional degree when he describes Timothy's work as an intermediary between himself and the Thessalonians. These clichés reflect the freedom with which friends expressed their needs to each other and the preparedness of friends to meet the needs of each other. Although Paul does not mention earlier correspondence between himself and the Thessalonians, it is quite possible that he had written to them when he first sent Timothy to them, and it is highly probable that they in return wrote him for advice. That he does not mention these letters, especially the one from Thessalonica, should not be

[44] Phil 4:10–11 confirms this suggestion: "I rejoice greatly" (ἐχάρην μεγάλως) was a standard acknowledgment of receipt of a letter. See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 75–76. On 3 John 2, see Robert W. Funk, "The Form and Structure of II and III John," *JBL* 86 (1967): 424–430. Given what now appears to have been Paul's practice of reflecting in his own letters characteristic phrases from the letters he received from his churches, vv. 10–11 may also hint at the letter Epaphroditus brought to Paul. Commenting on the propitiousness of the time to write was part of the ἀφορμή formula (Koskenniemi, *Studie*n, 82) and suggests that their letter began with such a formula (compare ἠκαιρεῖσθε). Further, it is not unlikely that Paul's denial that he is speaking καθ' ὑστέρησιν may reflect a comment in their letter that they wished to fulfill his needs (cf. 2:25, 30).

surprising, for he elsewhere does not mention letters where he could have been expected to do so.

An awareness of the clichés is important exegetically, for they impress one with the desire of both parties to remain in contact with each other. Despite being clichés, they are part of the pathos with which Paul, always on the run, could not let go of the little community he had founded in Macedonia, and they disclose that church's effort to hold on to Paul and his guidance. Paul, through Timothy's report and their letter, was well informed about their needs and addressed them in 1 Thessalonians.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

# TRADITIONS AND THEOLOGY OF CARE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT*

The NT for the most part consists of writings aimed at the moral, religious, and theological formation of people relatively young in the faith. The pastoral methods in these writings were indebted to Jewish and Greco-Roman traditions. The latter were highly developed and widely used in the culture of the time. The Gospels describe the ministry of Jesus in a manner that relates him to the church's needs; Paul's letters are themselves forms of pastoral persuasion; and Paul's successors to various degrees adapt his practice to the needs of the consolidating church.

## The Greco-Roman Context of NT Practice

Pastoral care in the Greco-Roman tradition was part of a rich and wide-ranging enterprise known as psychagogy, which also included what we mean by spiritual exercises, psychotherapy, and psychological and pastoral counseling. Developed by philosophers concerned with human moral formation, psychagogy aimed, through character education, at the attainment of virtue and happiness, an achievement of which one could justly be proud. Elements of the endeavor are found as early as Socrates, but a more highly developed system was created by Epicurus (fourth century BC), and by the first century AD was in common use by philosophers of all persuasions.

Moral philosophers were viewed as physicians of sick souls, and their goal was to benefit their hearers by bringing them to their senses. This they sought to accomplish by frank speech, with which they laid bare the human condition and pointed to the rational life as the way to attain fulfillment of one's potential as a human being. These philosophers performed their tasks in public and in private, in the marketplaces and in homes, schools, philosophical communities, aristocratic salons, and the imperial court. The topics that occupied them ranged as widely as human

* Originally published in the *Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling* (ed. Rodney J. Hunter; Nashville: Abingdon, 1990; rev. ed. Nancy J. Ramsay, 2005), 787–792.

experience, including such concerns as marriage, the rearing of children, old age, death, happiness, grief, anger, joy, modesty, pride, dissipation, and self-control. While the content of what they said remained quite traditional, responsible philosophers adapted themselves to the social circumstances and emotional conditions of the persons they sought to help, and gave serious attention to the approaches and methods most likely to result in their benefit.

The forms in which they engaged themselves in the lives of others extended from private sessions with individuals through talks with small groups, to letters to individuals or larger groups, open letters, and tractates. In addition, they often spoke and wrote of their understanding of the enterprise itself and their role in it. This tradition of pastoral care was therefore not confined to private contexts, nor was it the province of one professional class. The moral philosophers developed the manner in which such care was exercised, and it is their writings that reflect at greatest length on it, but there is ample evidence that they also served as models whom non-philosophers emulated.

## Jesus and Pastoral Care

### *The Gospels as Evidence*

Modern critical study of the NT has established that, before the Gospels were written, the traditions about Jesus that they employed had already been adapted to the church's needs. The Gospels therefore reflect, in the first instance, the church's conceptions of Jesus rather than that of Jesus himself. Nevertheless, the church continued to be challenged by Jesus, and the Gospels are themselves evidence of the church's constant effort to conform to the person and teaching of its Lord, and of the restraint with which it worked on the Jesus traditions. The multiple sources of the Gospels contain sufficient evidence to allow us a picture of some characteristics of Jesus, that of the church's Pastor or Shepherd (John 10:11–12, 16; 1 Pet 2:25; 5:4).

### *Jesus's Goal*

The center of Jesus's concern was not human moral education, as it was with the Greeks, but the kingdom of God. Jesus acted with an authority that set him apart from other people (Mark 11:27–33) and was not shared even with his disciples (Matt 23:8–12). As the recipient of divine revelation,

he proclaimed the good news of the kingdom, the message of God's active, concrete ruling in human affairs (Matt 12:28), known primarily in God's forgiveness of sins (Luke 15:11–32). His emphasis on God's initiative and action did not minimize human responsibility, but threw new light on it. Confronted by God's invitation, listeners could no longer rest secure in their presumed personal relationship with God, nor might they delay decision, but had to respond instantly (Matt 22:1–14). Acceptance of the good news of the kingdom entailed a change in values and a rejection of attempts to hold onto both human merit and divine mercy (Matt 20:1–16). It required confidence in God (Luke 11:5–10) and a perspective that conceived of the kingdom as both a present and future reality | (Luke 17:20–21; Mark 9:1; Luke 13:28–29). Jesus's pastoral approach was informed by this message. 788

*The Compassion of Jesus*

In some of his parables Jesus drew attention to God's mercy that attends the coming of the kingdom (Matt 18:23–35; Luke 10:29–37, 15:11–32). The Gospels describe Jesus as the exemplification of that compassion. In response to the objection that he associated with tax collectors and sinners, he replied, "Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. Go and learn what this means, 'I desire mercy and not sacrifice.' For I came not to call the righteous but sinners" (Matt 9:12–13, cf. 12:7; 23:23). Thus what determined Jesus's relationship with people, even those whom he called to form the inner circle of his disciples, was not scrupulous legal interpretation that might separate him from outcasts, but mercy and compassion that recognized their need.

According to the Gospels, Jesus's compassion was manifested in a variety of ways in his ministry. Because he viewed the throng of people around him as sheep without a shepherd, out of compassion he taught them (Mark 6:34), and for the same reason he sent the twelve on their limited mission to preach the message of the kingdom (Matt 9:36–38). Jesus's compassion also led him to meet the physical needs of those who came to him, as when he fed the four thousand (Matt 15:32–39; Mark 8:2–10), and when he healed the sick (Matt 14:14). When a leper expressed his trust in Jesus's power to heal him, Jesus compassionately did so (Mark 1:41). Mark is explicit that a plea for compassion must issue from faith in Jesus (Mark 9:21–23).

It is especially in Matthew that the mercy of Jesus comes to the fore and that he is presented as a model of compassion to the believing

community. As the Suffering Servant who takes infirmities and diseases upon himself, Jesus exorcises demons and heals the sick (Matt 8:17). As the Servant who gives his life for many, he provides an example to those who would be leaders (Matt 20:20–28). A practical demonstration of what it meant for Jesus to be the Suffering Servant is provided by the story of the healing of the two blind men, which immediately follows the discussion of leadership. When the blind men ask him for mercy, Jesus out of pity restores their sight (Matt 20:29–34).

Compassion is also an essential quality in the relationships between members of the community. In chapter 18, Matthew describes Jesus as discussing the community's responsibility to its offending members and stressing the need to forgive them (see below). By way of elaboration, the parable of the unmerciful servant (18:23–35) then makes the point that forgiveness does not depend on calculation of someone else's obligations, but on a deep awareness of one's own forgiveness by God. The experience of God's mercy, which is beyond calculation, should enlarge the disciples' capacity to forgive each other (cf. Luke 6:36). Rather than self-vindication, the appropriate response to a petition for patience is not calculated postponement of the day when impossible obligations are to be met, but compassion that forgives.

### *Jesus's Methods of Communication*

Jesus performed mighty deeds, taught, preached, and polemicized, but did not engage in pastoral care narrowly conceived. Yet some characteristic ways in which he communicated are of interest to us.

#### *Parables*

Jesus frequently used parables to bring about a change in people's normal perceptions. In their present form, parables sometimes deliver a moral lesson but their original function can still be discerned. Luke 12:13–21, for example, contains a lesson against greed, but Jesus places the vice in the perspective, not of legal rights, but of one's relationship with God and his actions. The parables contain strong elements of surprise, as when they deal with the unexpectedly imminent kingdom (Mark 13:28–29), or the capacity for growth (Luke 13:18–19), or joy (Luke 15:3–32). They were frequently used by Jesus to reverse people's values (Luke 10:30–37, 16:19–31), but not to the degree that human responsibility was removed (Matt 22:1–14). They call for decision (Matt 25:1–30; Luke 14:28–32), but conceive of human

action as grounded in the nature of God who is ready to heed human needs (Luke 11:5–8; 18:2–5).

### *Questions*

Jesus was Socratic in that some of his questions drew correct answers from his listeners, thus impressing the answers more effectively on them (Matt 17:24–27, 21:28–32), but the authority that he claimed for himself and with which he spoke set him apart even from Jewish teachers (Matt 7:28–29). Jesus frequently responded to hostile questions with questions of his own to show up his opponents' inconsistency (Mark 2:24–26, 12:13–17) or the weakness of their case (Luke 5:29–32). Confronted by a hostile attitude not expressed in questions, Jesus himself might, with questions of his own, focus the issue (Luke 14:1–6). Of perhaps greater importance to his pastoral method was his use of questions when he was confronted by what he considered inappropriate. In replying to an inappropriate request, he might reject it with a question that embodied his reason for doing so, continue with a warning that revealed the real, ignoble reason for the request, and tell a parable to amplify his response and bring about a change in perspective (Luke 12:13–21). In such an instance, his question sharply lodged his point and formed the transition to his treatment of the deeper problem. Related to this use of a question is Jesus's response to a request made with the wrong attitude. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, for example (Luke 10:29–37), the parable exposes the self-righteousness of the lawyer, and Jesus's concluding counter-question (v. 36) reformulates the issue. His rhetorical questions frequently were designed, not to evoke a verbal response, but to express his exasperation (Mark 9:19), add weight to what he was saying (Matt 5:13; 7:9–10), or secure his listeners' assent (Matt 7:16; Luke 15:8).

### *Jesus and the Individual*

The story of Jesus and Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1–10) illustrates one way in which he fulfilled his mission in his encounter with an individual, and the story may have served the church as a paradigm of pastoral care. As in stories of other encounters (e.g., Mark 10:17–22; Luke 7:36–50), it is not Jesus who first takes the initiative. Zacchaeus has to overcome social, religious, and physical difficulties in order to see Jesus (cf. Mark 2:3–5). He was not motivated by faith, but by simple curiosity about Jesus (v. 3). Jesus initiates the actual encounter and invites himself into Zacchaeus's house, thus underlining the

789 unusual nature of his mission. | His action meets with the disapproval of the self-righteous crowd (vv. 5–7). What is noteworthy in this encounter is that it is not Jesus's words, but his actions which transgress against the conventional understanding of religious law and result in a response that transcends the strict requirements of that law (vv. 8–10).

Jesus's encounter with the Samaritan woman (John 4:7–30) is a classic example of his dealing with a hostile person whom he wishes to benefit. Unlike the incident with Zacchaeus, here it is Jesus who initiates the encounter and relentlessly pursues his goal by engaging her in a dialogue. The evangelist recounts the story to say something about Jesus's self-disclosure to and acceptance by the Samaritans. From the perspective of pastoral care, however, the story is instructive for the way in which it presents Jesus as overcoming the woman's defenses in his goal to help her attain her own spiritual good. The dialogue is occasioned by a simple request for a drink of water (v. 7), which the woman cuttingly rejects on the basis of race, religion, sex, and social convention (v. 9). Jesus refuses to be deflected by these barriers, but replies by speaking of the gift of God (v. 10). The woman then raises a practical objection (v. 11), and again turns *ad hominem.* Undaunted, Jesus enigmatically offers her the water of eternal life (vv. 13, 14). She now turns sarcastic, daring him to give her that water (v. 15). Finally, Jesus focuses on her (v. 16), and her evasive reply (v. 17) does not turn him from revealing his knowledge of her personal circumstances (vv. 17, 18). She acknowledges that Jesus is a prophet (v. 19), but tries once more to divert him by now introducing a religious issue (v. 20). Jesus replies by asserting that a new order of things is at hand, which renders her objection irrelevant (vv. 21–24). When she retorts that it is the Messiah who would reveal all things (v. 25), Jesus claims to be the Messiah (v. 26). It is not explicitly said that the woman believed his claim, but it may be implied in her announcement to the people of what Jesus had disclosed about himself, which then brings about their faith (vv. 29, 39). Eventually, however, they believe because of what they themselves hear (v. 42).

### *Jesus and the Community*

Matthew 18 reveals how one writer, and perhaps the church with which he was associated, understood how Jesus's pastoral concern was to be expressed in the Christian community. Jesus is presented as beginning the discourse by stressing the need for humility rather than a concern about prominence in rank (vv. 1–4, cf. 20:20–28, 23:1–12). Probably with church

leaders in mind, responsibility towards members of the community is asserted (vv. 5–9), particularly toward individuals who may be held in low esteem (vv. 10–14). The integrity and value of the individual are also the theme in the discussion of the community's discipline. The primary concern should be to preserve the offending member, and to bring this about, a procedure along Jewish legal lines (cf. Deut 19:15–21; 1 QS 5:25–6:1) is to be followed that requires private (v. 15) and semi-private (v. 16) steps before the entire community becomes involved (vv. 17–20). Nevertheless, Jesus's message of forgiveness remains the guiding principle: in spite of the concern to maintain group boundaries by the disciplining procedure outlined, Matthew concludes the discourse by stressing the need to forgive offending members of the community as God has forgiven all (vv. 21–35).

## Paul

### *Paul's Goal*

Paul has a view of Christian formation that is quite unlike the Greco-Roman one with its understanding of character education. He does not think that the Christian progresses to virtue as innate human potential is fulfilled through reason and self-discipline. He rather views Christian existence from different, interrelated theological perspectives. He believes that God predestined those whom he called to be conformed to the image of his Son (Rom 8:29). This formation requires an intellectual transformation that rejects conformity to the world and aims at discerning the will of God (Rom 12:1–2). In addition to these theological and christological dimensions, there are others. The Holy Spirit is active in this transformation (2 Cor 3:18), which takes place within an eschatological perspective (2 Cor 4:16–18). There is, furthermore, an ecclesial dimension, for Paul does not conceive of personal growth as separable from membership in the Christian community. The called share collectively in a partnership with Christ (1 Cor 1:9) and the Holy Spirit (2 Cor 13:14), in grace (Phil 4:14), and sufferings and comfort (2 Cor 1:7). Paul considers his own function to be the upbuilding of the body of Christ, that is, the nurture of the church in Christ (2 Cor 10:8, 13:10, cf. 12:19), or, as he exclaims in Gal 4:19, using the image of a pregnant mother, "My little children, with whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you!"

### *Paul's Method: In Person*

While Paul's letters primarily witness to his pastoral method when he was separated from his churches, they do provide glimpses into his life and approach when he was with them. Among his letters, 1 Thessalonians may serve as our main source, for it was written to people who had been Christians for only a few months and in whose minds Paul's sojourn was fresh, and whose circumstances called for pastoral exhortation and comfort rather than doctrinal explication or correction.

### *Founding the Church*

Paul's opponents did not think highly of his oratorical ability (2 Cor 10:10), and he seems to have agreed that he was not a skilled speaker (2 Cor 11:6). He rather stressed the content of his preaching (2 Cor 4:5; 1 Thess 1:9–10) and his conviction that God through the Holy Spirit was active in bringing his listeners to faith (1 Cor 2:1–5; 1 Thess 1:4–5, 2:13). The theological perspective for his later nurture of his converts was thus already formed as people accepted the message. It should be appreciated what becoming a Christian meant to people such as the Thessalonians. In addition to the religious and theological reorientation they underwent, they experienced social dislocation and, in many cases, psychological trauma, with a pervading sense of isolation or, in the language of Jewish proselytes, a feeling of having been orphaned from their families, friends, patriarchal traditions (cf. 1 Pet 1:18), as well as rejection by the society in which they had been reared. These were also the experiences of converts to Judaism, and it is not surprising that Paul's letters and the methods of care they represent betray an awareness of them.

### *Nurturing the Church*

As important as Paul's initial missionary preaching and his continuing theological instruction were, it is striking how frequently he gives | indications that in establishing a church he equally stressed behavior. Intellectual reconstruction was an ongoing process, but it was engaged in as part of the total process of forming the behavior and growth of the individual and the community. At the center of the effort stood the person and example of Paul.

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Paul's demeanor did more than provide a concrete example of what he taught, in the manner of moral philosophers who required that one's deeds conform to one's words. Paul describes the Holy Spirit as active in

both his preaching and his hearers' acceptance of it, and in making them joyful in their afflictions. In this they became imitators of Paul and the Lord (1 Thess 1:5–7). It was more than a practical method to organize the church around himself, for to Paul it was theologically unthinkable that his converts might be independent of him (cf. 1 Cor 4:14–21). Yet Paul stresses, and the mood of 1 Thessalonians confirms it, that in drawing the converts into a community around himself, he did so with gentleness rather than on the basis of his prerogatives as an apostle (1 Thess 2:6–7; cf. 2 Cor 10:1), and that, although his demeanor was designed to offer them an example to follow (2 Thess 3:6–9), it was equally designed not to burden them or impede the progress of the gospel.

In describing his original pastoral work with his converts, Paul repeatedly makes use of Greco-Roman psychagogic traditions, and there is no reason to assume that his comments are due to literary convention and do not reflect his actual practice.

In the first century, scores of individuals took up the role of the moral guide whose frank speech would heal the masses. Some of them saw the essence of that frankness in brutal excoriation of all human shortcomings, and considered any gentleness in a speaker a sign of weakness or lack of integrity. In response, more humane philosophers reflected at length on the proper nature of courageous outspokenness. Plutarch, for example, agreed that frankness is salutary and necessary, but insisted that it be applied properly, and in his discussion used the image of the nurse to illustrate his point that frankness should be modulated and used at the correct time. "When children fall down," he wrote, "the nurses do not rush up to berate them, but pick them up, wash them, and straighten their clothes and, after all this is done, then rebuke them and punish them" (*Adul. amic.* 69BC). Paul uses the technical language of such discussions when he refers to his courageous outspokenness in Thessalonica (1 Thess 2:1–2), and also uses the image of the gentle nurse who croons over her charges instead of being rough with them (1 Thess 2:6–8). This was the correct psychagogic approach to his converts. Paul differs from his contemporaries, however, not only in the way he introduces his relationship with Christ and the gospel of God into the discussion, but especially in his perception of his method as a giving of himself to his converts.

Another aspect of the philosopher's care is also reflected in Paul. The true philosopher was more kindly disposed toward those he would benefit than even to a father, brothers, or friend. He would nevertheless not shrink from admonishing or exhorting them. On the other hand, he would be discriminating in deciding when to speak and what speech would

be appropriate. While the responsible philosopher would always safeguard his own integrity, he would give attention to individuals and vary his speech according to the conditions of the persons he addressed. He would lead people to virtue by adopting different means of persuasion, on some occasions persuading and exhorting them, on others reviling and reproaching them, "sometimes taking an individual aside privately, at other times admonishing them in groups" (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.41–42). Paul, too, had a special relationship with his converts that led to similar personalized care: "you know how, like a father with his children, we exhorted each one of you and encouraged you and charged you to lead a life worthy of God, who calls you into his own kingdom and glory" (1 Thess 2:11–12). Again Paul's psychagogic method is the same as that of the genuine philosopher, but his goal is not virtue, rather a life worthy of God, which is placed within an eschatological perspective. This preparedness to adapt himself to people whom he attempted to gain for the faith was characteristic of Paul (cf. 1 Cor 9:19–23), despite the charges of his opponents that he was inconsistent and without integrity (2 Cor 10:1–2, 10; Gal 1:10).

The Thessalonians had suffered for their new faith (1 Thess 1:6; 2:14), and in addressing this issue Paul in at least one respect is like the philosophers. Seneca writes repeatedly on the proper attitude toward hardships. One remedy that he stresses is that one should not be surprised by misfortune. "What, have you only at this moment learned that death is hanging over your head, at this moment exile, at this moment grief? You were born to these perils. Let us think of everything that can happen as something which will happen" (*Ep.* 24.15). Therefore, nothing ought to be unexpected by us. Our minds should be sent forward in advance to meet all problems, and we should consider, not what is wont to happen, but what can happen. For what is there in existence that Fortune, when she has so willed, does not drag from the very height of its prosperity?" (*Ep.* 91.4). Affirming that misfortunes were in the very scheme of things and were due to arbitrary fate, and that one way to vanquish them was to anticipate them, was a standard part of consolation.

Paul had also prepared the Thessalonians for the hardships that they would endure. Having heard that they were again suffering, he had sent Timothy to establish them in their faith and exhort them not to be moved by their afflictions. "You yourselves know that this is to be our lot. For when we were with you, we told you beforehand that we were to suffer affliction; just as it has come to pass and as you know" (1 Thess 3:2–4). Once again, Paul's psychagogic technique has affinities with those of the

philosophers, but the theological framework within which it is applied is radically different. Paul does not attribute Christian experience to arbitrary fate, nor does he advise stoic impassivity or think that victory over the difficulties is purely an attainment of the rational person. On the contrary, it is God, who has their salvation in mind, who has a hand in their affairs (cf. 1 Thess 5:9). That is why he is so concerned about their faith. For Paul it is faith that makes a new relationship with God possible and allows us to perceive a significance in our sufferings that results in joy (cf. Rom 5:1–5; 1 Thess 1:6). In | his own experience, it was the comfort he had experienced when in dire straits that enabled him to comfort others (2 Cor 1:3–11). 791

Such features in Paul's work allow us to see how he as an individual worked with his converts and how he understood that work. But a major thrust of his work was to form a community that exemplified the principles he taught and would continue his work of pastoral care. Thus after their conversion he taught them to love one another in obedience to God, who had loved them (1 Thess 4:9, cf. 1:4). It is striking how often Paul's instructions have to do with relationships within the church. Even sexual morality is discussed as it relates to the rights of others in the community (1 Thess 4:6). That formation of a strong sense of community would foster a feeling of belonging in those converts who had been wrenched from their former security is understandable. Paul, however, was equally concerned that Christians not form a ghetto (cf. 1 Cor 5:9–10), but that their love for one another provide the basis for their relationship to the larger society (1 Thess 4:9–12, cf. 3:12).

### *Paul's Method: In His Letters*

Paul was frequently forced to leave his newly founded churches before they were firmly established (cf. Acts 13:42–52, 17:5–8, 13–14), and sometimes was prevented from returning to them later to continue his work (1 Thess 2:17–18). Such separation weighed heavily on Paul (e.g., 2 Cor 10:2, 11; Gal 4:20; Phil 1:27, 2:12; cf. 2 Cor 11:28) and sometimes caused strained relations with the churches (e.g., 2 Cor 1:15–2:4). One way in which he attempted to overcome the problem was through the use of his coworkers as intermediaries (e.g., 1 Cor 4:16–17; Phil 2:19–24); another was through letters. Letter writing was a well-established means of communication and was self-consciously discussed by writers. A letter was defined as one half of a dialogue, regarded as a substitute for one's physical presence and expected to be written in a style appropriate to the aim the writer sought to achieve.

Letters had come to be used in the psychagogy of individuals by writers such as Seneca, and of his communities by Epicurus. Although Paul in many ways is unique as a letter writer, there were therefore precedents to his use of letters as instruments of pastoral care. First Thessalonians is the best example of such a Pauline letter, and shows how in the letter Paul built on his previous experience with the Thessalonians.

The first striking thing about the letter is the ways in which Paul stresses personal relationships. He refers to himself as an apostle only once, and then to disavow any special standing that apostleship might confer on him (2:6). Rather, he is a nurse (2:7), father (2:11), or orphan (2:17, RSV "bereft"), who yearns to see them as they do him (3:6, 10). The heavy use he makes of personal pronouns, frequently in conjunction with each other, further demonstrates that Paul views his role as pastoral director as one that is formed by the intertwining of his and his converts' lives. The family language extends further. The Thessalonians are called brethren eighteen times in this short letter, and God is called father four times. They are, further, imitators of Paul (1:6), his hope, joy, glory, and crown of boasting (2:19–20). The combination of this emphasis on relationships rather than authority or hierarchical positions with the affective language throughout the letter and the many different terms for varieties of exhortation sets the tone for the letter and is precisely what one would expect in an ancient (and modern) pastoral letter to a situation such as that in Thessalonica.

The manner in which Paul exhorts his readers by way of reminder (2:9, cf. 3:6), or by references to what they already know (1:5; 2:1, 5; 3:4; 4:2; 5:2), or by saying that they need no further instruction (4:9, 5:1), but only need to continue in what they are already doing (4:1, 10, 11), is part of the same pastoral style that assumes a warm relationship between the two parties and seeks to strengthen confidence. It, too, is the style frequently adopted by moralists. Pliny (*Ep.* 8.24.1) provides an example: "The love I bear you obliges me to give you, not indeed a precept (for you are far from needing a preceptor), but a reminder that you should resolutely act up to the knowledge you already have, or else improve it." But once again, while Paul adopts the style from his contemporaries, he puts it to service in the expression of his conviction that the behavior he inculcates is pleasing to God, and that his precepts are given through Christ (e.g., 1 Thess 4:1, 2, 9). And when he gives directions on marriage, his stress is not on the concrete behavior he demands, with which many moralists would agree, but on sanctification, which frames his advice, and on other theological motivations for Christian behavior (4:3–8).

Paul's religious and theological perspective thus informs his pastoral care and marks the difference between him and his contemporaries. This is nowhere so clear as in his prayers. Four prayers punctuate 1 Thessalonians. The first two are thanksgivings that set the tone of the letter. In 1:2–3 he expresses genuine thanks for the Thessalonians' faith, hope, and love, but in doing so introduces themes to which he returns later in the letter. It is thus clear that the prayer itself performs a hortatory function. To slightly different degrees this is also true of the other three prayers that occur at strategic points in the letter (2:13, 3:11–13, 5:23, cf. 3:9–10). The pastoral care in which Paul engages in the letter is not only couched in a style that conveys a sense of immediacy to his readers; it is offered in the presence of God, to whom Paul turns in thanksgiving and petition.

### *The Christian Community*

Paul feels a special responsibility to his converts, but as during his time with them he had been at great pains to develop a community, so in his letter he continues to foster that communal sense and to impress on them their responsibilities to each other. For Paul the community is not simply a social entity, but is a creation of God's love (1:4–5) that will continue to the Parousia and beyond (3:11–13). It is noteworthy, then, that each time Paul takes up a specific matter, he discusses it in terms of the Christians' concern for each other (4:6, 9, 17–18, 5:11).

His final directions of this nature (5:12–15) are particularly significant for our interest. Whereas elsewhere he had engaged in pastoral care, here he treats the way members of the congregation should be responsible for each other. In the preceding verse, already he had directed them to encourage one another and build one another up (5:11). The moralists' and his own interest in the individual is thus also laid on the congregation. So is the concern with the proper relationship between those | extending and those receiving pastoral care (5:13), and especially his urging that the treatment be appropriate to the conditions they aim to better: "And we would urge you, brothers, to admonish the careless, encourage the faint-hearted, support the weak, and to be very patient with them all" (5:14 NEB). Just as Paul describes his own pastoral care in terms of relationships, so does he theirs. There is no interest here in any particular office, but rather in functions that are performed by persons who continue Paul's pastoral activity.

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## Paul's Successors

The later writings of the NT generally do not reflect, as clearly as Paul's letters do, the church's actual practice of pastoral care. Increasingly confronted by doctrinal crises, the church in defense became more highly structured and tended to relegate certain functions to particular offices in the church. While an overstatement, it is true to say that these writings represent greater interest in doctrinal, institutional and moral consolidation than in the pastoral care that we assume continued to take place.

Acts 20:17–35 provides a view of Paul's pastoral work that contains some of the elements that characterized Paul, but also marks changes characteristic of the later period. First, the apostolic farewell address is a charge to the church leaders who are called elders (v. 17) and bishops (v. 28, RSV "overseers"), appointed by the Holy Spirit to pastor (v. 28, RSV "care for") the church. This function is confined in these writings to apostles (John 21:15–17) and elders or bishops (1 Pet 5:1–2). The apostolic paradigm that Luke sketches, and that the leaders are to follow, is familiar: Paul had been outspoken in public, in homes, and to individuals, and had provided them with an example of self-sacrifice of which he could remind them. The entire discourse, however, is shaped by the expectation of the imminent arrival of heretics, and we gain little information on exactly how the leaders are to feed the flock.

The Pastoral Epistles, despite their traditional nomenclature, offer a very similar picture. Beleaguered by heresy, the church is structured as the supporter and defender of the truth with no regard for the appropriateness of when the message should be preached or convincing, rebuking or exhortation be engaged in (2 Tim 4:2), and, even when the responsibilities of Timothy (1 Tim 4:11–16) and Titus (Titus 2:7–8), or their gentle demeanor (1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:24–26) is described, the author has the battle against heretics in mind. There are exceptions in this literature, which do reflect on the pastoral care of the congregation (e.g. Heb 13:7, 17; 1 Pet 5:1–5), but the main tendency is to make the traditions of pastoral care that we have discovered serve the developing ecclesiological interests and needs.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

# *PAULUS SENEX**

Thomas Olbricht is known for his passionate interest in the history of the religious movement of which he is so much a part. The Restorationists of the nineteenth century are his intimate acquaintances, and so are the folks in the often small churches of his youth. They are woven into the seamless memory that is an essential part of who and what he is. Tom long occupied himself with that memory, and now that he is about to attain his majority and have more time for reflection and writing, he will, more self-consciously, remember as he moves toward old age. It may not be inappropriate, then, if one similarly situated offers to our honorée some thoughts on old age. It will not surprise him that these reflections center on the NT and the moral teachings of the society in which it came into existence.

There is no need to document the current interest in aging and the aged; communications media of every sort deluge us with information and propaganda on the subject. Whereas twenty years ago there was clearly an emphasis on alerting us to the greying of America and, in a certain segment of the religious press, inculpating the churches for neglecting the elderly,[1] the situation now is otherwise. The growing political power of the elderly and organizations such as the American Association of Retired Persons have been recognized by politicians and government on every level, and the aged and the phenomenon of aging are hot topics.

In view of this preoccupation with the elderly, one is struck by the fact that so little serious, extensive work on old age in the Bible has been done. Broadly conceived theological studies on the topic have been published,[2] and more focused studies on particular aspects—for example, on wisdom and old age—are beginning to appear,[3] but it is fair to say that the subject

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[1] A sounder response was *Toward a Theology of Aging* (ed. Seward Hiltner; special issue of *Pastoral Psychology* [New York: Human Sciences, 1975]). The topic became so popular that in 1984 a journal devoted to aging, *Journal of Religion and Aging*, began publication.

[2] E.g., J. Gordon Harris, *Biblical Perspectives on Aging: God and the Elderly* (OBT 22; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

[3] Ulrich Förster, *Weisheit und Alter: Konzeptionen von Lebensklugheit in Antike und Gegenwart* (EHS, Series 11 Pädagogik, vol. 536; Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993).

still awaits intensive and imaginative study. On the face of it, the NT evi-198 dence does not | encourage us to hope for much. Old men and women are mentioned in passing,[4] and elders of the church or the synagogue appear with some frequency,[5] but neither the phenomenon of old age itself nor the personal characteristics of particular old people interest the NT authors. Or so it seems.

I wish to suggest that the Pastoral Epistles portray their author as an old man. These three letters come from a period when the churches they have in view already had a history and were in need of stabilization, consolidation, and planning for the future that was now seen to stretch out ahead.[6] A literary device used to this end elsewhere in the NT is the farewell discourse. In such discourses the protagonist, as he anticipates his departure or death, recalls his life and presents himself as a model to be emulated, thereby ensuring that succeeding generations will have the means to take care of their needs by remembering him and adhering to the teaching and traditions received from him.[7] Taken together, these three letters may be seen as the consolidating instructions of an aged Paul represented in 2 Timothy as saying farewell.[8]

This picture of Paul as an old man emerges from the description of his circumstances, for the letters say nothing about his age. In Phlm 9, however, Paul calls himself a πρεσβύτης, an old man, a word describing someone at least in his late fifties,[9] and on most readings the Pastoral Epistles

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[4] E.g., Luke 1:36; 2:36; John 3:4; 8:57; 21:18; Acts 4:22; 7:23; 1 Tim 5:2; 2 Tim 1:5; Titus 2:3.

[5] Jewish elders: Mark 7:3, 5; 8:31; 11:27. Christian elders: Acts 11:30; 14:23; cf. 15:2, 4–6; 1 Tim 5:17, 19; Titus 1:5; Jas 5:14; 1 Pet 5:1; 2 John 1; 3 John 1. Günther Bornkamm, "πρεσβύς," *TDNT* 6 (1968): 651–653, focuses on the institutional aspect.

[6] For a sketch of this development, see Leonhard Goppelt, *Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Times* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Margaret Y. MacDonald, *The Pauline Churches: A Socio-Historical Study of Institutionalization in the Pauline and Deutero-Pauline Writings* (SNTSMS 60; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[7] See Acts 20:18–35; 2 Pet 1:12–15. On farewell discourses, see Jan Lambrecht, "Paul's Farewell Address at Miletus (Acts 20:17–38)," in *Les Actes des Apôtres. Traditions, rédaction, théologie* (ed. Jacob Kremer; Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1979), 307–337, and Anitra Bingham Kolenkow, "The Literary Genre Testament," in *Early Judaism and Its Modern Interpreters* (ed. Robert A. Kraft and George W. Nickelsburg; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986), 259–267.

[8] There has been a tendency to be overly precise in delineating the farewell speeches as a distinct genre. I do not think that 2 Tim can be compressed into such a "genre." For discussion of the problem, see Michael Prior, *Paul the Letter-Writer and the Second Letter to Timothy* (JSNTSup 28; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 91–112; and Kenneth L. Cukrowski, "Pagan Polemic and Lukan Apologetic: The Function of Acts 20:17–38" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1994).

[9] See Joachim Gnilka, *Der Philemonbrief* (HTKNT 10.4; Freiburg: Herder, 1982), 43. There was no agreement on when old age began, as there was not even on the precise divisions of the life span. For example, Cicero at one point (*Sen.* 4) divides life into three periods,

were | written either by Paul some years after Philemon or by someone else representing Paul years later and writing just before his death. I think the latter is more probable. What interests us, however, is not what is said about him as an old man, but how what were conceived of as characteristics or viewpoints of old people are reflected in the Pastorals. Ceslas Spicq has drawn attention to what he identifies as psychological characteristics of an old man in these letters,[10] and I wish to follow his lead. 199

## Ancient Discussions of Old Age

The portrayal of Paul as an old man in the Pastorals shares much with ancient opinions of the aged. By the end of the first century AD, there was already a long literary tradition on old age representing widely differing attitudes.[11] Before Plato, there was a tendency to dwell on such negative aspects of old age as the diminution of faculties and physical pleasures and the ill treatment the aged receive from their family and friends. Even Socrates was reported to have preferred death to the disabilities of old age.[12] Plato's *Republic*, on the other hand, on which Cicero depended for part of his own discussion of old age, set forth an intensive moralizing of old age, which continued in the centuries that followed.

Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* represents the unflattering and pessimistic view. Because the aged have been deceived and made mistakes, he says (2.13.1389b), "and since most human things turn out badly, they are positive about nothing, and in everything they show an excessive lack

childhood, youth, old age, and at another (*Sen.* 33) adds middle age to represent the more common four ages. On the subject, see Emiel Eyben, "Die Einteilung des menschlichen Lebens im römischen Altertum," *RhMus* 116 (1973): 150–190. In *Opif.* 105, Philo records a tradition that there are seven ages (the little boy, the boy, the lad, the young man, the man, the elderly man, the old man) and that these ages are measured by multiples of seven though not in regular succession. According to this calculation, the span for an elderly man (πρεσβύτης) would be from fifty to fifty-six and that for an old man (γέρων) would begin thereafter. But he has a different division in *Ios.* 127.

[10] Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:147–53. The Fourth Gospel had been subjected to a similar but more extensive interpretation by Gerhard Hoffmann (*Das Johannesevangelium als Alterswerk: Eine psychologische Untersuchung* [NTF 4.1; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1933]).

[11] A convenient point of entry into this material is provided by J.G.F. Powell, *Cicero: Cato Maior de Senectute* (CCTC 28; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 24–30, and his commentary throughout. The major philosophic sources that come under discussion are Plato, *Resp.* 1.328D–330A; Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.13.1389b–1390a; Cicero, *Sen.*; Seneca, *Epp.* 12, 26, 30, 58, 77; Plutarch, *An seni respublica gerenda sit*.

[12] E.g., Xenophon, *Apol.* 6–8.

of energy. Diffident, they see only the bad, are suspicious and minimalistic in their desires, and are cowardly and inclined to anticipate evil." Aristotle goes on (1390a) to charge that their bad experiences in life have left them little given to hope. Furthermore, since hope has to do with the future, of which so little remains for them, they incessantly talk about the
200 past, taking pleasure in their | recollections. He also finds fault with their moralizing: "In their manner of life there is more calculation than moral character, for calculation is concerned with that which is useful, moral character with virtue."

Such negative statements were not uncommon, but they were frequently repeated only to be rejected by, among others, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, who tended to offer what had become the traditional views on old age and its advantages.[13] It is this discussion of old age that has informed the depiction of Paul as an old man in the Pastoral Epistles.

## Generational Awareness in the Pastoral Epistles

The Pastoral Epistles are unique in the NT for their attention to the different generations within the churches of their acquaintance. They know a grandmother (Lois, 2 Tim 1:5) and specify the qualifications of a special order of widows, some of whom at least were likely to be grandmothers, who must be at least sixty years old (1 Tim 5:3–10). Other older women of unspecified age are also advised on their responsibilities (1 Tim 5:2; Titus 2:3–9). We do not hear of any grandfathers, but older men, whether elders (1 Tim 5:17–22; Titus 1:5–9; cf. 1 Tim 3:1–7) or not (Titus 2:1), are mentioned.

There are also younger men (1 Tim 5:1; Titus 2:6) and women (1 Tim 5:2; Titus 2:4). Among the latter, a particular group, young widows (1 Tim 5:11–15), is especially beset by problems. Children also are mentioned as cared for (1 Tim 3:4–5, 12; 5:10; cf. Titus 1:6), but they and grandchildren are in turn responsible for the support of their parents and grandparents (1 Tim 5:4).

[13] Cicero's *De Senectute* is the most systematic refutation of four major accusations: that old age withdraws us from active pursuits (15–20), makes the body weaker (27–38), deprives us of physical pleasures (39–66), and marks the nearness of death (66–83). In each case, the truthfulness of the complaint is either denied, or what is seen as a misfortune is discovered to be a boon.

The addressees of Paul the writer exemplify the letters' generational interest. Timothy has a grandmother and mother (2 Tim 1:5) who taught him the sacred writings from childhood (2 Tim 3:15). While Titus and Timothy both have considerable responsibilities in the church, the household of the living God (1 Tim 3:15),[14] they yet run the risk of being looked down upon (Titus 2:15) or having their youth despised (1 Tim 4:11–16), and they are warned to flee youthful lusts (2 Tim 2:22). They are also directed to treat their elders, whether men or women, with proper deference (1 Tim 5:1–2).

What is particularly striking in view of this real generational stratification is that the writer more frequently than in other letters ascribed to | 201 Paul refers to his addressees as his children (1 Tim 1:2, 18; 2 Tim 1:2; 2:1; Titus 1:4), reserving this term for them and avoiding such terms as brother (e.g., 1 Thess 3:2) or fellow worker (e.g., Rom 16:21), which are applied elsewhere to Timothy and others. The point is that the Pastorals know of generations of Christians before the young leaders they address and anticipate further generations to come after them (cf. 2 Tim 2:2). The incongruity of which the author is aware is that his addressees, who are so important for the future of the church, are young and liable not to escape easily the criticisms of youth.[15] That itself invites further attention, but for our present purposes it suffices to turn to the picture of the old man who is concerned about the future of the church.

## The Old Paul Speaks

At first glance, Paul evinces the pessimism that Aristotle attributes to old men. Looking ahead he sees, in Fichte's words, "the age of perfected sinfulness" (1 Tim 4:1–3; 2 Tim 3:1–9; 4:3–4). No wonder he appears, as critics of the aged said, to be one of those old men who are "morose, troubled, fretful, and hard to please." One can understand, if not entirely excuse them for this, Cicero says, on the ground that "old men imagine themselves ignored,

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[14] See David C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles* (SBLDS 71; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983).

[15] It is perhaps not as incongruous as might appear at first glance. For the tradition of advice to young rulers, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986). See Christopher Hutson, "My True Child: The Rhetoric of Youth in the Pastoral Epistles" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1997), in which some of these concerns are treated.

despised, and mocked at."[16] This is the Paul of the Pastorals, who has been abandoned by people as far away as Asia (2 Tim 1:15; cf. 4:10, 14–16) and is deeply aware of the shame that they may associate with him and the cause he represents (2 Tim 1:16; cf. 1:8, 12; 2:15).

Paul has finished his race and now is prepared to face death (2 Tim 4:6–7). It is natural to use the metaphor of an athletic contest in connection with an old person. Plutarch, for example, begins his essay *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs* (*Praec. ger. rei publ.* 783B) with the metaphor and uses it throughout. He rejects the excuse that old age absolves one from joining in the contest of life. More usual, however, is the use of the metaphor to describe completion of the contest of life as the old man now looks death in the face.[17] Of such an old man Seneca says, "But this old man had the greatest weight with me when he discussed death and death was near.... But an end that is near at hand, and is bound to come, calls for tenacious courage of soul; this is a rarer thing, and | none but the wise man can manifest it."[18] Paul does what is expected of an old man, but there is very little in him of Seneca's Stoic wise man. He will indeed receive a crown of victory for his efforts (2 Tim 4:8), but from the Lord who empowered him in his ministry.[19] This alerts us to the fact that, while the Pastoral Epistles use current conventions in their representation of an old man, it is a Christian old man who depends on God.

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Aristotle's criticism that old people indulge in reminiscence is true to life and was remarked upon by the ancients. According to Cicero, "It is most delightful to have the consciousness of a life well spent and the memory of many deeds well performed."[20] Such satisfaction is also found in the Pastorals, where Paul's life is to be remembered and followed (2 Tim 3:10–14). On the surface, it might appear as if it is again the paradigm of the ideal Stoic that is foisted on Paul. The reality is quite different, however, for the old Paul remembers that it was through divine grace and mercy that he had become the example of sinners who would believe and receive eternal life through Christ's perfect patience (1 Tim 1:12–17).

A frequent complaint against old age was that it made the body weaker.[21] Cicero admits the truth of the complaint, to a degree, but claims that even

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[16] Cicero, *Sen.* 65.

[17] E.g., Cicero, *Sen.* 83; Seneca, *Ep.* 30.13.

[18] Seneca, *Ep.* 30.8.

[19] 2 Tim 4:8, 17; cf. 1 Tim 1:12. The Lord grants him power (2 Tim 1:7), furnishes him with what he needs (1 Tim 6:17), and guards what has been entrusted to him (2 Tim 1:12).

[20] Cicero, *Sen.* 9; cf. 14, 21–24 (the elderly do not lose their memories; cf. 71).

[21] See Cicero, *Sen.* 15, 27–38, and Powell's commentary.

in old age one can preserve some vigor through exercise and just the right amount of food and drink.[22] Philosophers were restrained, however, in their praise of physical exercise and insisted that of greater importance, particularly to old people, was exercise of mind and soul.[23] The Pastorals share a similar evaluation of bodily training (σωματικὴ γυμνασία, 1 Tim 4:8), but, in the philosopher's understanding, the training it encourages is not that which leads to a sounder mind. Rather, it is that which has godliness (εὐσέβεια) as its goal.[24] It is the appearance and instruction of God's grace | that enable the believer to renounce the ungodly life for the godly and await redemption (Titus 2:11–14). 203

In a society in which there must not have been many old people,[25] it was taken for granted by many that old men would give advice. Plutarch demands of them

> counsel, foresight, and speech—not such speech as makes a roar and clamor among people, but that which contains good sense, prudent thought, and conservatism; and in these the hoary hair and the wrinkles that people make fun of appear as witnesses to a man's experience and strengthen him by the aid of persuasion and the reputation for character. For youth is meant to obey and old age to rule (*An seni* 789DE).

If old men in general could have such positive influence, how much more one's father? Consequently, the figure of a father guiding his son morally became archetypical for a special type of exhortation, paraenesis, that has stretched from Ps.-Isocrates's *Demonicus*, through Shakespeare's Polonius, to Kipling's "If."[26]

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[22] Cicero, *Sen.* 34, 36; cf. Plutarch, *An seni* 793B.

[23] For a variety of viewpoints: Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.4: Enough exercise is to be taken to benefit the soul (cf. Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 9); the superior exercise of mind and soul: Plato, *Resp.* 6.498B; Seneca, *Epp.* 15.5; 80.2–3; Pliny, *Ep.* 3.1; Plutarch, *An seni* 788B.

[24] The writer evidently has in mind persons of a rigorously ascetic sort, whose regimen included abstinence from marriage, and certain food and drink (1 Tim 4:3; 5:23). There was a certain type of Cynic who fit this description; see Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 47, against marriage; see Ps.-Crates, *Ep.*; Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 9.3 on drinking cold water only. On 1 Tim 4:7–10, see Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), 171–177. See also 1 Tim 6:12; 2 Tim 2:5, for the author's partiality for the metaphor.

[25] Peter Brown (*The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1988], 6) estimates that in the second century AD the average life expectancy was twenty-five years and that only four out of every hundred men, and fewer women, lived to be fifty.

[26] On paraenesis, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco–Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 124–129; Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," in *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333, esp. 278–287. [*Light*, 2:675–749]

The Pastoral Epistles belong to this tradition of exhortation. Although Paul never calls himself their father in these letters (contrast 1 Cor 4:15; 1 Thess 2:11), he gives advice to his sons in the faith on a wide range of topics in a style developed by moral philosophers. At the center of his concern are life in the church and the life of the church in the larger society. In specifying what behavior is required, he adopts a particular kind of paraenesis, that of the παραγγέλματα, "precepts" or "advice," devoted to a particular topic.[27] For Paul, that topic is conduct in the household of the living God (1 Tim 3:15). He writes vigorously, even with some asperity, making liberal use of means of persuasion that had come to him from the | philosophers of his own day.[28] He knows the conventions of such discourse, but with an assertiveness uncharacteristic of most of his contemporaries, he is not constrained by them. An example of the freedom with which he adapts what he has received is found in his advice to Timothy to speak "in season and out of season" (2 Tim 4:2), thus flying in the face of an axiom that a responsible speaker would be careful to determine the right time and season for his speech and never speak inappropriately, that is, "out of season." For this Paul, there is an urgency that brooks no reticence.[29]

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Aristotle knew that the old are regarded as self-controlled (σωφρονικόι, *Rhet.* 2.12.1389a13–14), but, rather than consider their self-control a virtue, he attributed it to calculation. The old, he insisted, are at best self-controlled and cowardly (σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί, *Rhet.* 2.14.1390b3). But Cicero knew old men who were self-controlled and moderate in their lives, and it is

[27] Παραγγελία and παραγγέλλω are used frequently in 1 Timothy (1:3, 5, 18; 4:11; 5:7; 6:13, 17) but not in the other two letters. There are differences among the three letters, but the similarities outweigh them. The RSV translates the word by "charge" or "command," which stresses the peremptory quality of the advice. That Paul does sometimes mean "command" is true, but on occasion "precept" fits the context equally well, if not better. For examples of such advice on particular topics, see Plutarch's Γαμικὰ Παραγγέλματα (*Conj. praec.*) and Πολιτικὰ Παραγγέλματα (*Praec. ger. rei publ.*). Although παράγγελμα is the more common word, παραγγελία is also used, for example, by Aristotle, in *Eth. nic.* 2.2.4.1104a7. For the view that it is by their precepts that old men lead the young to virtue, see Cicero, *Sen.* 26; *Off.* 1.122–123.

[28] See Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorals*, 1:151, for an interpretation of Paul's vigorous intellectual engagement as that of an old man.

[29] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," *JBL* 103 (1984): 235–243; repr. in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 137–145. [*Light*, 1:187–196] For a similar modification of tradition, see Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Christian Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35; repr. in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 121–136. [*Light*, 1:117–134]

no accident that he began his treatise on old age by complimenting his reader for his *moderatio animi*.[30]

*Paulus Senex* is, if nothing else, the apostle of moderation. How important this quality is for him appears from Titus 2:1–10, where σωφροσύνη and its cognates are used four times in the description of the qualities Titus should inculcate in the Christian community.[31] Such moral decency or self-control, thought of in that society as reasoned behavior, is part of a series of similar qualities that contribute to a picture of moderation and decorum in daily life, even, perhaps especially, when the church is at worship (1 Tim 2:8–15).[32] Above all else, the virtues in these letters are social in nature and are not new. One can perhaps understand why someone as critical as Aristotle could ascribe such an ethic to temerity; Paul, however, will have none of that. Almost as though he were answering such a charge, he claims that "God did not give us a spirit of timidity (δειλίας) but a spirit of power and love and self-control (σωφρονισμοῦ) (2 Tim 1:7). And, once again, it is God's saving grace that trains (παιδεύουσα) us to live with moderation, justice, and godliness (σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς) (Titus 2:12).

| Plutarch knew that the aged man can easily succumb to idleness, cowardice (δειλία), and softness when he becomes domestic,[33] hence his advice that old men engage in public affairs and instill "good sense, prudent thought, and conservatism" in the young (*Praec. ger. rei publ.* 789D). The conservatism of the aged is not only to hold on to the past, but to transmit what is of value to the future. They are like a farmer, Cicero says, who being asked for whom he is planting, will reply, "For the immortal gods, who have willed not only that I should receive these blessings from my ancestors, but also that I should hand them on to posterity."[34] 205

The author of the Pastorals is similarly conservative. He places a premium on what he has been entrusted with, which is what he has handed on to Timothy, and what Timothy is to hand on to others, who will in

[30] Cicero, *Sen.* 1; cf. 7, 33. *Moderatio* is Cicero's word for σωφροσύνη.

[31] According to the RSV, v. 2, "sensible"; v. 4, "to train"; v. 5, "sensible"; v. 6, "to control themselves." See also 1 Tim 2:9, 15; 3:2; Titus 1:8.

[32] E.g., the following, with their cognates: κοσμέω, 1 Tim 2:9; 3:2; Titus 2:10; σεμνός, 1 Tim 2:2; 3:4, 8, 11; Titus 2:2, 7; ἡσυχία, 1 Tim 2:2, 11, 12. For the social side, see P.A. van Stempvoort, "Decorum, Orde en Mondigheid in het Nieuwe Testament," Inaugural Address, Groningen (Nijkerk: G.F. Hallenbach, 1956), esp. 8–10.

[33] Plutarch, *An seni* 784A; cf. 785D, 788F; 792B.

[34] Cicero, *Sen.* 25.

turn hand it on to still others.[35] The operative word in this transmission is "guard": Timothy is to guard the tradition that he receives from Paul, but to do so in the confidence that God is able to guard the deposit until that Day (2 Tim 1:12–14). Here there is no room for novelty.

The author's social conservatism is revealed in his attitude toward the state and relations with the larger society. Christians are to pray for representatives of the state so that they may live quiet, peaceable, and godly lives (1 Tim 2:1–3). The letters are also shot through with directions on Christians' social relations. Not only does the reaction of outsiders serve as motivation for the conduct of the community (Titus 2:5, 8, 10), or are Christians to conduct themselves in ways deemed appropriate by unbelievers (1 Tim 2:9–10; 5:8), but most surprising of all is that a good reputation among pagans is one of the requirements for church office (1 Tim 3:7).

Nowhere is the author's conservatism as evident as in his efforts to strengthen the Christian families in the churches for which he writes. His preoccupation with the household, however, is not due solely to an innate social conservatism; there were good practical reasons for his concern. False teachers forbade marriage (1 Tim 4:3) and, more disruptive, used households, apparently especially those with tractable women in them, as bases for their operation, in the process subverting entire families (2 Tim 3:6–7; Titus 1:11). It is noteworthy that the author does not deal with divorce, as Paul does in 1 Cor 7, but that the specific problems he addresses have to do with the social roles of two kinds of women, the culturally emancipated and widows.

206 | The author complains of intellectually emancipated women who are forever learning and who open their doors to purveyors of falsehood (2 Tim 3:6–8). Educated women, at least in the Roman upper class, were not unknown,[36] and a strong case for the philosophic education of women was made by moral philosophers such as Musonius Rufus.[37] Juvenal, misogynistic and ever satirical, testifies of such educated women in Roman society, which appears to have troubled not a few.[38] The conservative response is represented by Plutarch, whose work *Advice to Bride and*

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[35] 1 Tim 1:18; 6:20; 2 Tim 2:1–2. Of greatest personal importance to Timothy would be what he had learned from childhood (2 Tim 3:14–15).

[36] See Beryl Rawson, "The Roman Family," in *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives* (ed. Beryl Rawson; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 40.

[37] See *Frg.* 3, *That Women Too Should Study Philosophy*, and *Frg.* 4, *Should Daughters Receive the Same Education as Sons?* in Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: "The Roman Socrates"* (YCS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947).

[38] Juvenal, *Sat.* 6.398–456; cf. Martial 11.90.

*Groom* (*Conjugalia Praecepta*) encourages the young bride to study philosophy as an antidote to quackery, but to learn it from her husband, her "guide, philosopher, and teacher in all that is lovely and divine" (145C) and to shut the door against all preachers of divinities other than her husband (140D). The instructions in 2 Tim 3:6–8 and 1 Tim 2:11–12 are not totally dissimilar.[39]

In 1 Cor 7:8–9 Paul expresses his preference that widows remain single; only if they lack self-control are they to marry. In 1 Tim 5:11–15, young widows are advised to marry, for that is what they want to do anyway. Perhaps more important is their social behavior if they do not remarry and neglect their domestic responsibilities. "They learn to be idlers, gadding about from house to house, and not only idlers but gossips and busybodies, saying what they should not." The solution is that they "marry, bear children, govern their households, and give the enemy no occasion to revile" them.

The directive that young widows marry would have satisfied Augustus's requirement that widows under the age of fifty marry within two years of their husbands' deaths. The traditional ideal, however, that a widow remain unmarried, continued to be held and is reflected in the qualification of a special class of widow, the "real widow," in 1 Tim 5:9, who must have had only one husband.[40] Such widows were entered on the church's rolls, evidently to perform particular functions (1 Tim 5:3–10).[41] What qualifies the "real widow," other than that she must be at least sixty years old, is that she has been exemplary in performing the traditional domestic duties expected of a woman and that she has no family able to care for her. That the latter was a | responsibility recognized far and wide in ancient society is recognized by the author.[42] 207

The value the author attaches to the traditional virtues is also clear from his discussion of bishops and deacons (1 Tim 3:1–13; Titus 1:5–9). What were lists of virtues generally to be developed have become qualifications for particular offices.[43] It is noteworthy that, as in the case of the widows, bishops and deacons must also have been married only once and

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[39] Also compare 1 Tim 2:9–10 with Plutarch, *Conj. praec.* 145EF.

[40] Rawson, "The Roman Family," 31–32.

[41] See Bonnie Bowman Thurston, *The Widows: A Woman's Ministry in the Early Church* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989).

[42] See Theophrastus, *Char.* 6; Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.2.1–6; Philo, *Decal.* 113–118; Plutarch, *Am. prol.* 495A–C.

[43] See John T. Fitzgerald, "Virtue/Vice Lists," *ABD* 6 (1992): 857–859. According to Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia:

fulfilled their domestic responsibilities. The notion that successful household management was indispensable in the preparation for public service was commonly held and was part of the conservative social philosophy of persons such as Plutarch.[44] The old Paul consistently instructs his younger readers in an ethic that is tried and true.

## Conclusion

I have only touched the subject, as the ancients would say, "with the tip of my finger." Space does not allow fuller exploration of what has been touched upon or doing more than merely mentioning some other features of these letters, for example, an aged man's appreciation for the importance of the institutional dimension of the church, the picture of young people that emerges from the letters, and their responsibilities and attitudes toward the elderly. It is quite clear that the author is reflecting on the relationship among the different generations in the churches and that he has Paul represent the attitudes of an old man.

In this depiction of Paul, the author makes use of conventional elements from the discussions of old age, but he always does so from a perspective determined by God's saving act in Christ and his empowering of the church's leaders. The old Paul of these letters may be at the point of death, but he is still vigorously involved in the affairs of his community.

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Fortress, 1972), 50–51, these lists came from a convention in which the virtues had come to describe duties, as of military leaders.

[44] For the first and second centuries AD, see Philo, *Ios.* 38; Plutarch, *Lyc.* 19.3; *Adul. amic.* 70C; *Conj. praec.* 144BC; *Sept. sap. conv.* 155D; *Reg. imp. apophth.* 189E. The notion is part of the larger discussion of the household as the beginning or source of the constitution. See David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), esp. 21–59, and Balch, "Household Codes," in *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres* (ed. David E. Aune; SBLSBS 21; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 25–50.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

# DETERMINISM AND FREE WILL IN PAUL: THE ARGUMENT OF 1 CORINTHIANS 8 AND 9*

In this paper I shall examine Paul's argument on determinism and free will in 1 Cor 9. This passage has been worked on intensively in recent years, and scholars have frequently agreed on problems they see in the text if not on their proffered solutions.

A perceived roughness in the transition between chapters 8 and 9 has contributed to the description of chapter 9 as a digression from Paul's discussion of idol meat. The digression has then been thought explanatory, particularly of 8:13. Alternatively, 9:1 has been regarded as a transition from a discussion of the Corinthians' ἐξουσία to eat idol meat to one of Paul's ἐξουσία to receive financial support, the latter having been occasioned by concerns in the Corinthian church that caused Paul to defend his practice of not accepting financial support from the Corinthians. The view that the present position of chapter 9 in the letter is due to a redactor further separates the chapter, and thus Paul's argument in it, from chapter 8. Opposition to such radical surgery, however, has not meant that the use of ἐξουσία in 8:9 as well as 9:4, 5, 6, 12, 18 has been regarded as important evidence that the two chapters belong together.[1]

| The apparent lack of coherence within chapter 9 has also drawn attention. Commentators have been unable to explain why Paul introduces freedom into his discussion in 9:1. Scholars have seen freedom as a standard theme of the wandering Cynic preachers, referring to Epictetus (*Diatr.* 3.22.48), but have not made much of the observation. Not many have followed Johannes Weiss, who was unable to make much sense of Paul's reference to freedom here, and suggested therefore that it originated as 232

* Originally published in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 231–255. I wish to thank Wayne Meeks and Troels Engberg-Pedersen for their valiant efforts to sharpen my argument.

[1] In addition to the commentaries, see F. Stanley Jones, *'Freiheit' in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus: Eine historische, exegetische und religionsgeschichtliche Studie* (GTA 34; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 28–42; Samuel Vollenweider, *Freiheit als neue Schöpfung: Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT 147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 199–201.

a gloss. For the most part, scholars have tried to determine the nature of the freedom Paul had in mind (from the Law, from financial dependence, to eat idol meat, or as a description of social status). But the relationship between Paul's freedom (9:1) and the discussion of ἐξουσία that follows has been left unclear. This lack of clarity even led Joachim Jeremias to discover an elaborate chiasm in chapter 9, which further disjointed Paul's discussion of freedom and authority.[2]

The spate of recent scholarship on the text, as illuminating and suggestive as it is on certain details, has not yielded clarity on how Paul's argument within chapter 9 coheres and whether or how that argument connects with what he says in chapter 8. I propose that chapter 9 is part of an argument that begins as early as 8:1 and continues to 9:23 (actually to 11:1), and that the argument is made intelligible by examining it in light of the popular philosophic deliberations on the theme of the sage's independence, particularly as it related to determinism and free will. This involves the notion of ἐξουσία, which can be translated "permission," "right," and "power," or "authority." Furthermore, since Paul quotes Stoic slogans some of the Corinthians had introduced into the discussion, his own adoption of Stoic categories was deliberate, and he expected that his argument would be followed.[3]

A note of caution is in order at this point. My attempt to trace Paul's argument does not imply that I think the issue between Paul and some of the Corinthians was in the first place philosophical. The issue was, | 233 rather, one of behavior, which Paul wanted to influence. In attempting to do so, he worked out the implications of the claims they made to justify this behavior. These claims were made in the form of popular philosophical slogans, and Paul's strategy was to work out the implications of these claims, thus laying a theoretical base for the practical direction he gave. Constraints of space require that I concentrate on one theoretical dimension of these chapters.

[2] Johannes Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (KEK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), 231–232; Joachim Jeremias, "Chiasmus in den Paulusbriefen," in his *Abba: Studien zur neutestamentlichen Theologie und Zeitgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 276–290.

[3] Others, particularly Jones and Vollenweider, have brought the philosophers into the discussion, but have not succeeded in demonstrating how an awareness of the philosophical issues lends coherence to the Pauline text.

## The Corinthians' Knowledge and Their Claim to Ἐξουσία

Paul begins his discussion of the problem of idol meat by relativizing the knowledge the Corinthians claimed for themselves (8:1–6). He contrasts this vaunted knowledge (8:7, 11) and those who have it (8:10) with the weak consciences of some in the church (8:7, 10, 12) and the weak who have such consciences (8:9, 11). Paul thus understood that at the heart of the problem caused by the self-assertive Corinthians was their insistence on their cognitive superiority.

This would seem rather obvious, but it has not sufficiently been appreciated that Paul's description of some Corinthians as weak further defines the issue. I do not think that weakness here describes their social status, as Gerd Theissen has argued, but that it is rather to be understood in light of the moral philosophers' description of some people as weak.[4] Philosophers of all sorts described certain persons as morally and intellectually weak, as has been pointed out recently, but here I want to draw attention to only those features of that description | that are relevant to my immediate argument, and to concentrate on the Stoics.[5] 234

The weak were generally identified by philosophers as people who found it difficult to live up to the demands of the virtuous life. Weakness was frequently described as a condition that accompanies moral illness and as a condition or disposition of the self-indulgent (Diogenes Laertius 7.115; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.29, 42). By way of contrast, the person who takes up the philosophic life purifies his governing principle (his ἡγεμονικόν

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[4] Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 70–73, 121–143. I am not at this point claiming that those who refused to eat idol meat were not socially impotent (the "weak") according to Theissen's interpretation of 1:26–28. They very likely were, and their intellectual "weakness" may indeed have been congruent with social status. But in this paper I confine myself to the philosophical (viz., theological) argument and do so consciously at the expense of the social dimension of the issue. The limit set for this paper permits no more. Furthermore, Paul does not here use "weakness" in connection with other possible social indicators, as he does in 1:26–28, but with γνῶσις and συνείδησις, which shows that his argument has in view matters cognitive rather than social. For a more sympathetic treatment of Theissen, see Dale B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 118–124.

[5] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church," *NTS* 36 (1990): 375–391; [*Light*, 1:229–245] Stanley K. Stowers, "Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason," in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 253–286; Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (NovTSup 81; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).

[Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.19–22, 93–96]). Bad habits and false beliefs were said to twist weak minds (Cicero, *Leg.* 1.29), and both received considerable attention. Intellectual immaturity was described as intellectual weakness (Cicero, *Fin.* 5.43). According to the Stoic theory of cognition, it is because of our weakness that we give our assent (συγκατάθεσις, *adsensio*) to false judgments (*SVF* 1:67; 3:177; Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1122C; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.15), and wrong conduct is due to the slackness and weakness of the soul (*SVF* 3:471, 473).[6] An effort to help the weak better themselves recognizes the hold on them of their habits and past associations, for weak minds fear the unfamiliar (Seneca, *Ep.* 50.9). Knowing their own weakness, the weak are not to expose themselves to those things by which they may be seduced (Seneca, *Ep.* 116.5), and they are to avoid the crowd, for their own judgment can easily be turned aside by the crowd (Seneca, *Ep.* 7.1; *De otio* 1.1; cf. *Ep.* 44.1).

What Paul says about the weak in chapter 8 has much in common with the moralists' views of the weak, for example, that the conscience of the weak is not pure but still defiled (v. 7). Paul associates weakness with cognition, and he recognizes the importance of habituation for their condition. A closer examination of these elements and of his psychagogic instruction in light of the philosophers' comments on | how the weak should be treated would be rewarding, but that cannot now detain us. We turn to the main thread of his argument—the notion of freedom.

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It is likely that those Corinthians who claimed knowledge for themselves were the same ones who called others in the congregation weak.[7] Paul himself uses the term to describe certain persons in Thessalonica (1 Thess 5:14) and uses the term again in Rom 14. But in 1 Cor 8 he picks up the term from those who use it pejoratively. He corrects them and, in the process, works out the implications of the claims they make for themselves and about others. What is important for us to note is that it is in the context of his concern for the weak that Paul introduces the Corinthians' proud claim that they have ἐξουσία (ἐξουσία ὑμῶν αὕτη, "this right of yours," 8:9) into his argument. The fact that he introduces it with a warning demonstrates the significance he attaches to it in his criticism

[6] See Woldemar Görler, "Ἀσθενὴς συγκατάθεσις. Zur stoischen Erkenntnistheorie," *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* NS 3 (1977): 83–92 (= *Kleine Schriften zur hellenistisch-römischen Philosophie* [ed. Christoph Catrein; PhAnt 95; Leiden: Brill, 2004], 1–15), for details of the argument that is, perhaps, overly simplified in what follows.

[7] They may have done so in response to a charge by the scrupulous non-eaters that they were idolaters. On the other hand, see Stowers, "Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason," 276, 279.

of their attitudes. That this claim of the Corinthians is similar to the etymologically related πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν ("I have the right to do all things") of 6:12—which was a well-known philosophic slogan—has frequently been observed, but the full implications of the philosophic notions embodied in the slogan for Paul's argument have yet to be drawn.[8] In other words, the Corinthians' claim to have knowledge is inextricably tied to their assertion of their ἐξουσία. In this they are similar to Stoics who held that it is the person who is free who has ἐξουσία, freedom being defined as "the knowledge of what is allowable and what is forbidden, and slavery as ignorance of what is permissible (ἔξεστιν) and what is not (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 14.18).

The ἐξουσία of the wise man was one of the Stoic paradoxes. The wise man, Stoics said, "alone is free and bad men are slaves, for freedom is the right to act independently (ἐξουσία αὐτοπραγίας), and slavery is the deprivation of independent action (στέρησις αὐτοπραγίας)" | (Diogenes Laertius 7.121). The wise man alone is free and has received from divine law the power of independent action, and ἐξουσία is defined as the power of decision that conforms to (natural) law (*SVF* 3:544; cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.145–146, 156–158). This means that we have ἐξουσία over ourselves in matters of good and evil (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.12.8–9), for no one has ἐξουσία over someone else's judgments (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.29.11, 50–52). Controlling someone's body or possessions does not mean that one has ἐξουσία over him (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.9.15; 25.2), but the person who exercises ἐξουσία over those externals we desire to avoid is our master (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.2.26; cf. 13.14; 4.7.10; *Ench.* 14.2).

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So, as in the view of the weak, in the matter of ἐξουσία we again find ourselves in the midst of Stoic cognitive theory when Paul discusses the very ordinary but different issue as to whether it was permissible for the Corinthians to eat meat offered to idols. Only the educated, Stoics said, are free (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.1.23, 25). One is set free by learning the things that are one's own, and that knowledge is the power to deal with external impressions (χρῆσις φαντασιῶν [Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.67–70; 4.1.81–83]).[9]

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[8] On 6:12, see Stanley K. Stowers, "A 'Debate' over Freedom: 1 Corinthians 6:12–20," *Christian Teaching: Studies in Honor of LeMoine G. Lewis* (ed. Everett Ferguson; Abilene, Tex.: Abilene Christian University Press, 1981), 59–71.

[9] On the intellectual requirement of this χρῆσις φαντασιῶν, see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.20. The philosopher must interpret the will of nature to follow it (*Diatr.* 1.17.16) and must become a σχολαστικός if he desires to examine the decisions of his own will (*Diatr.* 1.11.39–40). The study of those decisions takes a long time (*Diatr.* 1.11.40; 20.13; 3.9.11), and defending them requires expertise in Stoic logic (*Diatr.* 1.7.1–4). Philosophers exercise their pupils in theory as well as the difficulties of life (*Diatr.* 1.26.3), and the two are organically

External things are obstacles or hindrances (Epictetus, *Diatr*. 1.1.9, 28; 4.4.15; 7.10; *Ench*. 1), and it is important that dealing with the external impressions takes place without any hindrance or compulsion whatever; otherwise one would be under the ἐξουσία of whoever or whatever exercises such force (Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.24.67–70; 4.1.59, 81–83; 10.8). The ability to choose or reject—namely, the ability to make correct use of the external impressions—is a divine gift, and the person who cares for it will never be thwarted or hindered (Epictetus, *Diatr*. 1.1.12). Training (ἄσκησις) 237 is needed to distinguish between those things | that are not one's own and therefore are hindrances, and those things that are one's own and therefore not hindrances. The latter are our proper concern and no one else has ἐξουσία over them or can hinder them (Epictetus, *Diatr*. 4.1.81–82; cf. 2.13.7–8). If someone does not make the distinction properly, he will be hindered, but if he does make it properly, no one will be able to compel (ἀναγκάζειν) him or hinder him, and he will do nothing against his will (ἄκων [Epictetus, *Ench*. 1]).

Stoics and writers susceptible to Stoic influence cautioned against the misappropriation of this notion of ἐξουσία. Epictetus warned that no one has ἐξουσία to do wrong with impunity (Epictetus, *Diatr*. 4.1.119), and Musonius Rufus cautioned that a tyrant could not for long justify his actions by saying ἔξεστιν μοι ("it is permissible for me") rather than καθήκει μοι ("it is fitting for me," *Frg*. 31). Dio Chrysostom reflects his uneasiness with the declaration that the person who has the power to do whatever he wishes is free, and corrects it by arguing that it is not permissible (οὐκ ἔξεστιν) to do mean and unprofitable things (*Or*. 14.13–16). And when Epictetus says that the philosopher's consciousness of his commission to reform others affords him the ἐξουσία to censure them (Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.22.94), he betrays a view of ἐξουσία that is not entirely self-centered.

Paul's response to the question of idol food is informed by such views as these. He accepts his readers' philosophic slogans and engages them on that level, but not without his own peculiar twists, as he had also done in 6:12–20.[10] After introducing the subject by focusing on the meat eaters' claim to knowledge (8:1–6), he picks up their description of the non-eaters

connected (*Diatr*. 3.10.10). See Adolf F. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa: Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie* (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1890; repr., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F. Frommann, 1968), 6ff.; and, for ongoing education, Benjamin L. Hijmans, *ἌΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* (WTS 2; Assen: van Gorcum, 1959), esp. 33–41. See further, n. 24 below.

[10] For Paul's method, cf. *Rhet. Her.* 4.54–56.

as weak and grants the assumption implicit in such a description that the latter lack knowledge. Paul is addressing those who claim that they have knowledge, and he does not deny that claim, nor does he deny their claim to ἐξουσία. Indeed, it is essential to his later argument that they are acknowledged to have ἐξουσία.

Paul introduces the issue in terms recalling the philosophers' description of the weak as persons with limited cognitive faculties (8:7) and then argues that neither eating nor drinking affects our standing before God (8:8). Eating and drinking are what a Stoic would have described as externals—things that should be regarded as ἀδιάφορα.

| The second part of Paul's reply is more pointed and ironic. Now he introduces the ἐξουσία of those with knowledge and cautions lest this ἐξουσία of theirs become a stumbling block. This part of his response extends from 8:9–13 and is bracketed by πρόσκομμα in v. 9 and σκάνδαλον in v. 13, which form an *inclusio.* Herein lies the irony—that the ἐξουσία of those with knowledge should be treated as a hindrance to the weak. The Stoics, whose slogans the meat eaters were using, were concerned lest the free person, a friend of God, who had ἐξουσία and made rational use of what had been given him, valued the externals, which are potential impediments and hindrances (cf. Epictetus, *Diatr*. 4.3.9–12). What the Corinthians—the ones with knowledge—should have regarded as externals or things indifferent, they rather insisted upon on the grounds of their ἐξουσία, and this insistence became an impediment to the weak, whose conscience they thus defiled (v. 7) and wounded (v. 12), and whom they caused to stumble (v. 9) and destroyed (v. 11)! The *ad hominem* nature of the argument is clear—Paul uses the Stoic definitions of the Corinthians but then introduces the notion of impediment (also a Stoic concern) to bring them up short. He had already adopted this manner of argument in 6:12–20, and would do so again. 238

In the second bracket of the *inclusio* (v. 13) Paul personalizes the argument by referring to his preparedness to forgo eating meat and so not be a stumbling block to the weak, thus setting up the ensuing presentation of himself as an *exemplum* of not insisting on his own ἐξουσία.

## Paul's Freedom and Ἐξουσία

It may be useful to state explicitly at this point what I have assumed in my interpretation so far. If Paul knew that the meat-eating Corinthians were proud of their own knowledge and ἐξουσία, and looked down on the

weak, and that they described themselves and the others in Stoic terms, it is reasonable to assume that he expected his readers to be able to follow his argument, in which he used Stoic notions.

The idea of freedom was integrally related to that of ἐξουσία and is implicit in 8:9–13. It becomes explicit in chapter 9, and Paul's mentioning of his freedom in 9:1 and repetition of it in 9:19 should cause neither surprise nor consternation as it has done. According to the | Stoics, one's freedom is inextricable from one's ἐξουσία, and Paul also argues from freedom (9:1) to ἐξουσία (9:3 and following). That the two are related in his mind also appears from 10:23, 29, where he again works with Stoic ideas.

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The introduction to Paul's exemplary self-presentation consists of four rhetorical questions and an *ad hominem* application to his readers (9:1–2). The form of the questions, with οὐ ("not"), anticipates an affirmative answer. He is free, is an apostle, has seen the Lord, and the Corinthians are his work in the Lord. The first three questions are bound up together—Paul's freedom is a corollary to his apostleship, which derives from his having seen the Lord (cf. Gal 1:12–27; 1 Cor 15:8). So, while Paul does retain the Stoic category, he changes its meaning. The Stoic's freedom was the result of his training; Paul's freedom derived from his encounter with Christ. Paul elsewhere makes similar adjustments to popular philosophic terminology he uses. Thus in 2 Cor 3:17 it is his encounter with the Lord and the Spirit that provides freedom and the παρρησία with which he carries out his ministry (3:12).[11] Such modification of important philosophic terminology is also found in 1 Thess 2:2, where παρρησία is not grounded in Paul's own effort to obtain freedom, as it was with the Stoics, but is attributed to God's agency.[12] So, while the outline of Paul's argument in 1 Cor 8 and 9 and the terminology he uses may be the same as that of the Stoics, his self-understanding is not.

The fourth question lodges the argument in the concrete situation in Corinth. Paul is not defending himself but is applying his self-assertions to his readers. "If I am not an apostle to others" (v. 2) is hypothetical; the stress is on the second member of the antithesis: he *is* an apostle to them, for they are the seal of his apostleship (v. 3). The reason he so intones the obvious is to strengthen the basis on which he can construct the remainder of his argument.

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[11] See David E. Fredrickson, "Paul's Bold Speech in the Argument of 2 Corinthians 2:14–7:16" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1990).

[12] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Exhortation in 1 Thessalonians," in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 58–60. [*Light*, 1:167–185]

Verses 3–12 are the next stage of his argument. By referring to this section as ἡ ἐμὴ ἀπολογία τοῖς ἐμὲ ἀνακρίνουσιν ("my defense to | those who would question me"), Paul is not indicating that there were people who were bringing specific charges against him that required a self-defense.[13] His defense is not against such charges but has in view the anticipated reactions of his readers to his warning in 8:9 that their ἐξουσία not become a πρόσκομμα ("stumbling-block") to the weak. That Paul expected his readers to react in such a way appears from 10:23, 29, 32, where the same issues turn up again.[14] Paul expected that his instructions not to insist on their ἐξουσία on the ground that it would be an impediment to the weak would meet with the retort that he was asking them willingly to submit to a limitation of their freedom. That is why Paul provides a self-presentation in terms of his own freedom. He has introduced freedom in vv. 1–2 and will return to it in vv. 13–18, but first he must make the case beyond any doubt for his own ἐξουσία. 240

Compared with the philosophers whose traditions the Corinthians and Paul used, Paul was notoriously loath to speak of his own ἐξουσία.[15] He was equally hesitant to allow others the exercise of their ἐξουσία lest they paradoxically become enslaved to it (see 6:12: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐγὼ ἐξουσιασθήσομαι, "I shall not be placed under authority"). Paul does not attempt here to secure his ἐξουσία; his discussion rather drives to the conclusion in vv. 11–12, where he applies it to the Corinthians' insistence on their own ἐξουσία.

| In vv. 3–12 a series of arguments, teeming with rhetorical questions, confirm that Paul did have ἐξουσία to demand financial support. First, 241

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[13] Contra most commentators, I read τοῖς ἀνακρίνουσιν as conative. Paul's ἀπολογία anticipates a retort to the advice he is giving (probably in response to a request for direction; see 7:1).

[14] I read vv. 29b–30 as the interjections of an interlocutor. For the problematic nature of these verses and the various solutions proposed, see Wendell L. Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10* (SBLDS 68; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985), 246–250; Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 486 n. 52. Claude Anthony Pierce (*Conscience in the New Testament* [SBT 15; Chicago: Allenson, 1955], 77–78) and the REV take it in the way I do. Read thus, the interlocutor here objects to Paul's qualification (vv. 24–29a) of the earlier interjection (v. 23) by claiming ἐξουσία and the concomitant notion of freedom (γάρ in v. 29b is exclamatory, "What!" [BAGD, s.v. γάρ 1.f.]). The problem with this interpretation lies in οὖν in v. 31, but is mitigated if one takes οὖν as introducing the inference of the advice Paul had given in vv. 23–29a, particularly v. 26.

[15] The references to his or his readers' ἐξουσία are concentrated in the Corinthian correspondence, particularly in the section of 1 Corinthians in which he addresses attitudes expressed in popular philosophical slogans (1 Cor 6:12; 7:4, 37; 8:9; 9:4, 5, 6, 12, 18; 10:12; see also 2 Cor 10:8; 13:10; 2 Thess 3:9).

customary apostolic rights within the Christian community are adduced (vv. 4–5), then the common rhetorical examples of the soldier, vinedresser, and shepherd are introduced to show that the practice of providing financial support is self-evidently right (v. 7),[16] and, finally, the Law is claimed to say the same thing (vv. 8–10): The farmer has a right to share in the results of his labor.

Paul makes the application to the Corinthians in vv. 11–12, where he advances his own practice as an example of forgoing one's ἐξουσία, thus rounding off the discussion begun in 8:8–9. A rhetorical question, which continues the bucolic metaphor and has proverbial force (cf. Rom 15:27; see Gal 6:6), establishes Paul's right to financial support from the Corinthians (v. 11). The conclusion to this part of the argument is rhetorical and *ad hominem* (v. 12): "If others share in your ἐξουσία, do not we the more? Yet we have not made use of this ἐξουσία, but endure all things lest we place any impediment (ἐγκοπήν) in the way of the gospel of Christ."[17]

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Paul is only halfway through his argument at this point. Why does he go on? Verses 13 and 14 seem completely repetitive, and vv. 15–18 seem to

[16] For a similar set of examples, see 2 Tim 2:4–6, substituting the athlete for the shepherd, and for this *lex scholastica*, cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 2.20.9; Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.5.3.

[17] This translation of τῆς ὑμῶν ἐξουσίας ("in your ἐξουσία") has in its favor that it would form the second bracket of an *inclusio* that begins with ἡ ἐξουσία ὑμῶν αὕτη ("this ἐξουσία of yours") in 8:9 (see also πρόσκομμα in 8:9 and ἐγκοπή in 9:12) and that it appears to be the obvious meaning. However, εἰ ἄλλοι τῆς ὑμῶν ἐξουσίας μετέχουσιν (9:12) could also mean "if others share in ἐξουσία over you," especially since discussions of ἐξουσία frequently are concerned with the exercise of authority over others or over things (e.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.25.2: ὧν ἐξουσίαν οἱ ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν; cf. 1.9.15; 4.1.82; 10.30, etc.), a concern Paul has already expressed in 6:12: οὐκ ἐγὼ ἐξουσιασθήσομαι ὑπό τινος ("I shall not be placed under the authority of anything" [or "anyone"]). If 9:12a were read thus, Paul would ironically be saying that while the Corinthians insisted on their own ἐξουσία, they placed themselves in a position where others (including Paul!) had ἐξουσία over them! Paul could have arrived at this by reasoning along the lines of Epictetus (*Diatr.* 2.2.26), who held that if we care for externals, the person who has ἐξουσία over those externals will be our master and we his slave. Paul assumed that the Corinthians placed value on the matter of financial support to which he had ἐξουσία, but he considered financial support an external, and he therefore had ἐξουσία over them. In 8:8–9, when he introduced the issue of their ἐξουσία, he had also warned that their insistence on eating idol food, another external, would result in their becoming an impediment to the weak. Paul himself, though, did not make use of the ἐξουσία in order not to be an impediment, thus being able to offer himself as a model for the advice given in chapter 8.

some commentators to be superfluous in the context.[18] Is this then just another instance of Paul not leaving well enough alone? In fact, however, in vv. 13–18 Paul comes to the heart of his argument.

Instead of saying in v. 12 that he had not been an impediment to the weak, as one would have expected him to say (cf. 8:9, 13), and that would have nicely concluded his exemplary self-portrayal, Paul says his goal was not to let his ἐξουσία be an impediment to *the gospel*. Once more he adduces a self-evident example in support of his contention (v. 13) and then reaches the culmination of the series of warrants for his claim to financial support, namely a command of the Lord that those who proclaim the gospel should live by the gospel (v. 14). This word of the Lord is introduced to highlight Paul's claim that he had not made use of any of these rights (οὐ κέχρημαι οὐδενὶ τούτων, v. 15, alluding to vv. 4–6). The same claim is made at the end of this section (μὴ καταχρήσασθαι τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ μου ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ, v. 18), thus forming an *inclusio.* The section thus enclosed deals with the preaching of the gospel; εὐαγγέλιον and εὐαγγελίζεσθαι occur eight times in vv. 13–18 and once, to round off the discussion, in v. 23. By way of contrast, ἐξουσία occurs only in v. 18.

Superficially viewed, it may appear that Paul is changing subjects; in actuality, however, he is now focusing on what was at the heart of the Stoics' and his own thinking on ἐξουσία: freedom of choice. This is, then, not an appendix to, but the culmination of, Paul's discussion of the problem of ἐξουσία already introduced in 8:9. Freedom has been the subtext all along; now it begins to emerge as Paul deals with compulsion and voluntarism as they relate to his preaching of the gospel, and then it becomes explicit as he introduces the final section of the argument in v. 19.

| There is a strong strain of determinism in Paul's argument here. The Lord has commanded, necessity is laid upon Paul, he can act unwillingly, and he is charged with a commission. This raises the question whether Paul did not understand himself to be in the prophetic tradition, according to which the prophet is commissioned by God, even against his own wishes. My claim that Paul's argument is conducted with the aid of Stoic notions of determinism and free will does not mean that I think Paul saw himself as a Stoic philosopher, particularly with respect to his place in the cosmic order of things. Paul thought of his call or conversion as 243

[18] E.g., Ernst Käsemann. "A Pauline Version of the 'Amor Fati,'" in his *New Testament Questions of Today* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 218: these verses "seem to be totally superfluous, because the design of the whole is quite clear even without them."

analogous to that of a prophet such as Jeremiah. The initiative was God's, and Paul's understanding of his call could well be understood as part of his Jewishness, as the discussions of his conversion or call have clearly shown. My interest is not to contest that view of Paul's self-understanding, but to make another point.[19]

In 1 Cor 9 Paul makes use of Greek philosophic terminology as he discusses the compulsion under which he is to preach the gospel. He does so, not because he is a Greek philosopher, but partly because the practical issue that he is addressing was raised in philosophic terms. When he discusses his call in Gal 1:10–17, he does so in clearly prophetic terms, presumably because it was the appropriate manner in which to do so in that context. It is easier to identify the traditions—Greek and Jewish—that Paul uses and to observe how they are made to function than it is to press beyond their use in argumentation to Paul's actual apostolic self-understanding. The latter is not our interest right now; nevertheless, I do not think that Paul's reason for arguing in the manner he does here is due entirely to the exigencies of the moment. The sense that I have of his letters to the Corinthians is that the means of persuasion he employs in them is less a matter of strategy he picks up or lets drop at will than a mode of intellectual engagement prompted by the Corinthians, but no less genuine and self-revealing for that. To think of Paul as either Jewish or Greek is not only superficial but wrong. If one | simply cannot work without labels, that of eclectic may be applied to him but only if that label were not taken to describe him as though he indiscriminately collected thoughts from hither and yon.[20] For the moment, however, I pursue my argument that Paul's thought in 1 Cor 9 has affinities with that of some Stoics, and I shall comment briefly on Stoic determinism and free will in order to illuminate Paul's reasoning in vv. 13–18.[21]

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[19] For discussion, see Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadephia: Fortress, 1979), 64–71; Alan F. Segal, *Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 3–8.

[20] For a more positive and realistic understanding of the phenomenon, see John M. Dillon and Anthony A. Long, eds., *The Question of 'Eclecticism': Studies in Later Greek Philosophy* (HCS 3; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

[21] The subject is discussed with great frequency, e.g., by Anthony A. Long, "Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action," in his *Problems in Stoicism* (London: Athlone, 1971), 173–199; C. Stough, "Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility," in *The Stoics* (ed. John M. Rist; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 203–231; esp. Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of* Oikeiōsis*: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy* (SHC 2; Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), 207–234. The sim-

According to the Stoics, the world, frequently compared to a city, is governed by divine wisdom and providence (Cicero, *Nat. d.* 2.78–80; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 36.27–32, 37). Of interest to us is the concern of the Stoic with his proper place (τάξις) in the cosmic scheme of things (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.1.19–20; 24.95). As a citizen of the universe one is required to remain in the station to which he is appointed (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.9.24) and to hold to God, who administers the world providentially (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.9.7; 4.1.98). That is the only guarantee one has of security, and the responsibility to do so lies in oneself. According to Epictetus, the training that has to do with security is engaged in only by those who are already advancing (προκόπτοντες) to wisdom but have not yet attained the state of performing perfect actions (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.2.1, 5; 4.10.13).

This view of an ordered universe accentuated for Stoics the problem of individual freedom. Through one's participation in the Logos, which determines the harmony of the universe, one's freedom is limited by universal law with its implications of causality and determinism. The problem of human freedom, as seen by them, lay in their conviction that on the one hand one is a free agent, but on the other, since one is | in the world, one is subject to cosmic law. While as rational beings we are free, there is only one natural law that absolutely orders and preserves this natural order. 245

The Stoics sought to solve the problem by distinguishing clearly between what is in our power and what is not. The confidence that we are not passive in relation to the universe and its law was expressed in the conviction that the soul is more powerful than Fortune. Freedom comes, they said, not to the person over whom Fortune has slight power, but to the one over whom it has no power at all (Seneca, *Ep.* 110.20). Such confidence is possible when we understand that Fortune does not bestow good or evil on us, but only the raw material of good and evil—the sources or things that, in our keeping, will develop into good or evil (Seneca, *Ep.* 98.2). To be free is not to be a slave to any circumstance or necessity (*necessitas*) or chance, but to compel Fortune to engage us on equal terms (Seneca, *Ep.* 51.9). What this implies is seen from the Stoic understanding that only the wise man is free (Diogenes Laertius 7.121). He is not compelled by necessity (ἀνάγκη) but performs virtuous actions willingly (ἑκών) and not unwillingly (ἄκων [Philo, *Prob.* 60]). He cannot escape necessities (Seneca, *Ep.* 37.3), for

plified account that follows focuses on those aspects of the discussion that appear to me to illuminate Paul's argument.

example, death. But it can be said that he does escape them when he does nothing unwillingly—that is, when he wills to do what necessity is about to force on him (Seneca, *Ep.* 54.7). What is bound to be a necessity if one rebels is not really a necessity if one desires it (Seneca, *Ep.* 61.3).

The pantheistic piety of the Stoics gave a religious coloring to this aligning of individual will with universal law. The classic example of this was the often quoted prayer of Cleanthes (Seneca, *Ep.* 107.11):

> Lead me, O Master of the lofty heavens,
> My Father, whithersoever thou shalt wish.
> I shall not falter, but obey with speed.
> And though I would not, I shall go, and suffer,
> In sin and sorrow what I might have done
> In noble virtue. Aye, the willing soul
> Fate leads, but the unwilling drags along.[22]

246 | Man must attend uncomplainingly upon God under whose guidance everything progresses (Seneca, *Ep.* 107.9; cf. *Vit. beat.* 15.4–5). The free man is a friend of God, and obeys him willingly (ἑκών [Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.3.9]). He can then say to God, "I am one mind with you . . . lead me where you will" (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.16.42; 19.26).[23] He does nothing under compulsion, suffers nothing against his will, nor is he God's slave, but gives his free assent to God (Seneca, *De prov.* 5.6).

As we have seen, freedom is possible only through the correct use of reason. God gave freedom of the will to the mind to liberate it from necessity (Philo, *Deus* 47–48). Every good man lives sensibly (φρονίμως) and will have ἐξουσία to do all things and live as he pleases (Philo, *Prob.* 59). Wisdom is the only real freedom, the very service of philosophy being to make us free (Seneca, *Ep.* 37.4; cf. 8.7).[24]

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22 See also Seneca, *Vit. beat.* 15.5–6; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.23.42; 3.22.95; 4.4.34; *Ench.* 53; Marcus Aurelius 10.28.

23 See also Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.12.17; Marcus Aurelius 9.1, and Willy Theiler, "Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre," in *Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühll* (ed. Olof A. Gigon; Basel: B. Schwabe, 1946), 35–90, esp. 85ff.

24 In this context, philosophy is primarily conceived of as logic and physics. To live rationally and use impressions rationally is to live according to nature (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.1.25–26), and that requires a knowledge of physics, for life according to nature must be based upon the system and government of the entire world (Cicero, *Fin.* 3.72–73). Logic provides a method by which assent can correctly be given and by which truth can be defended. It makes possible the correct χρῆσις φαντασιῶν by which freedom comes (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.57ff.; *SVF* 2:974–1007), and, since the best use of the impressions rests on one's προαίρεσις, he is free to whom everything happens κατὰ προαίρεσιν (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.12.9; cf. 1.30.4; 3.22.103).

Of more direct relevance to our present inquiry is how those philosophers who set out to reform others saw themselves in relation to the determined order of things. A few examples will suffice. Epictetus begins his description of the ideal Cynic by cautioning that the task could not be undertaken without God.[25] In this great city, the world, God assigns each and everything its place, and nothing should be attempted without God (*Diatr.* 3.22.2–8, 53; cf. 21.12). Everything else in Epictetus's description then assumes that the philosopher would act in conformity with the divine will. Further, when Epictetus speaks of such | philosophic prototypes as Odysseus and Heracles, the same point is made—they did nothing but follow the role the Divine assigned to them (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.13–21; cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.55, 57). So, too, Dio Chrysostom claimed that he himself had not chosen his philosophic role as an act of his own volition, but by the will of some deity, for when divine providence works for people, the gods provide both counselors and words that are appropriate and profitable to listeners (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.12).[26] It is this Stoic language of a divine commission that has appeared to some scholars to constitute the closest parallel to Paul's idea of apostleship.[27] 247

When such Stoic moral reformers affirmed their place in the divine scheme of things, they did not thereby sacrifice their free will. Epictetus may serve as an example. Although he affirms the necessity of a divine commission,[28] he assumes at every step that the ideal Cynic has the freedom of will to align himself with the divine will.[29] This is, then, a particular application of the general Stoic understanding.

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[25] Not enough attention has been given to the function of such affirmations, which were frequently made, for example, to distance the ideal from popular misconceptions, as is done in Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.2–8 (contrast 9–10); 23 (contrast 50); cf. 21.11 in context.

[26] See Eugen Wilmes, "Beiträge zur Alexandrinerrede (*Or.* 32) des Dion Chrysostomos" (Ph.D. diss., Bonn, 1970), 8–13, for apt comment.

[27] The problem is infinitely more complex than one might suspect from comments by *Neutestamentler* who draw a comparison between the ideal Stoic-Cynic [*sic*] sage and the Christian apostle. See Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 13 n. 10, and for much of value on the motivation to undertake the philosophic life, see John L. Moles, "'Honestius quam ambitiosius'? An Exploration of the Cynic's Attitude to Moral Corruption in His Fellow Men," *JHS* 103 (1983): 103–123.

[28] E.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.13, 19–20.

[29] Margarethe Billerbeck (*Epiktet: Vom Kynismus* [PhAnt 34: Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978]) identifies the major Stoic elements in Epictetus's description of the ideal Cynic. For an attempt to distinguish between Stoics and Cynics on determinism and free will, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 56–58. [*Light*, 2:601–634]

Before returning to Paul, it will be useful to situate the Cynics in this discussion of determinism and free will, for they will come to the fore below. Cynics had much in common with Stoics, and Epictetus could use the ideal Cynic, the representative of the stark life of commitment to virtue, to describe his essentially Stoic philosophic ideal. But when it came to providence and free will, Stoics and Cynics were poles apart. There were differences among Stoics as there were among Cynics, but in broad outline and for our present purposes the following generalization | will hold. Cynics rejected the Stoic attempt to make free will conform to necessity or providence. Oenomaus of Gadara, for one, inveighed against all attempts to do so (*apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 6.7, 255B–260D).[30] He rejects the notion that he must will what necessity forces him to will even if he should be unwilling to do so. The Cynic is fully aware of the difference between choice and compulsion, and insists that we are masters of our own will, and that we cannot be virtuous unwillingly or without choosing to be so.

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Oenomaus debates in a philosophical manner, but most Cynics approached the matter otherwise. They rejected tortuous doctrine and intellectual speculation and chose the "shortcut to happiness," the practical life of virtue, which most people regard as disgraceful (Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 6, 13, 16; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 12).[31] In contrast to the Stoics, for whom security lay in the intellectual endeavor by which they aligned themselves with divine providence, the Cynics insisted that their security lay in the toilsome free life (Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 13; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 30). Cynics looked to the same philosophic prototypes as the Stoics, but interpreted them as illustrating the importance of exercising one's own free will (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.28–33; Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8), and they scoffed at the Stoic heroes who did nothing without God (Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 19). The practical life the Cynics chose placed the highest value on the exercise of free will. They lived under no compulsion, but freely chose a life scorned by others (Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 13–15), symbolized by the humble attire they assumed when they adopted that life (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 19).[32]

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[30] For a useful discussion, see Jürgen Hammerstaedt, *Die Orakelkritik des Kynikers Oenomaus* (AMA BKP 188; Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1988); also, David Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque. Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles* (RTHP 3/19; Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1945), 127–134.

[31] Victor Emeljanow, "The Cynic Short Cut to Virtue," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 18 (1965): 182–184.

[32] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 104.

The important point to note about the Cynics is that their adoption of their garb and their unconventional life was not merely a means by which to set themselves apart from the majority of people and thus draw attention, or to fly in the face of convention thus "falsifying the currency" (e.g., Diogenes Laertius 6.71; Julian, *Or*. 6.188A). It did all | that, but more importantly it reflected their self-understanding as persons who made a free choice to live simply, according to nature, and to demonstrate that choice in their manner of life as they urged others to accept their message. 249

It is in the context of such discussions of determinism and free will that 1 Cor 9:15–18 becomes fully intelligible. Paul makes it clear that refraining from financial support is a matter of καύχημα ("boast") to him (v. 15) which, he understands, sets him apart from other preachers (cf. 2 Cor 11:10–12). In this respect, Paul was like the Cynics. As their humble attire was disdained by the masses and set them apart, so Paul's manual labor, which enabled him to forgo financial support, was also esteemed low in his society and set him apart.[33] Preaching the gospel, however, is not a καύχημα to him, for ἀνάγκη ("necessity") is laid upon him to do so. Woe to him if he does not preach! Here he differs from Stoic and Cynic alike, for neither countenanced the idea of acting under compulsion. The Stoic only willed himself to conform and the Cynic put even greater emphasis on personal decision, while Paul acknowledged constraint.

But then Paul considers the alternative ways in which it was possible to conform to the necessity laid upon him in a manner reminiscent of contemporary discussions of determinism and free will. Preach he must, but he could either preach ἑκών ("willingly") or ἄκων ("unwillingly"), which were alternatives Stoics considered when arguing about the way the sage retained his freedom in an ordered universe.[34] If Paul were to preach unwillingly (εἰ δὲ ἄκων is hypothetical), he nevertheless has been entrusted with an οἰκονομία ("stewardship").[35] Such terms of | household 250

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[33] See Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 35–36; Heinz Schulz-Falkenthal, "Zum Arbeitsethos der Kyniker," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg*, Gesellschaftsreihe 29 (1980): 6, 91–101.

[34] See Seneca, *De prov.* 5.4, 6; *Vit. beat.* 15.5–7; *Ep.* 96.2; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.89; Marcus Aurelius 10.28.

[35] My interpretation differs from that of most commentators, who take εἰ δὲ ἄκων as a real condition, interpreting it in light of ἀνάγκη. See the alternatives discussed by Fee, *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 419–420. This would mean that (unlike the other apostles) Paul had no right to financial support. Thus: Jacques Dupont, "The Conversion of Paul, and Its Influence on His Understanding of Salvation by Faith," *Apostolic History and the Gospel: Biblical and Historical Essays Presented to F.F. Bruce on His 60th Birthday* (ed. W. Ward

management were used by Stoics in their description of the ordered universe as a city or a house.[36] Thus, οἰκονομία referred to the organization of the universe to which we must conform.[37] It was also used of management within that universe, *oeconomia* being a special instance of statecraft.[38] Especially in view is the wise man, who alone is οἰκονομικός and has the οἰκονομία of the household.[39] Significant for our purpose is that Epictetus begins his description of the ideal philosopher with the warning that no one assumes the position of οἰκονόμος in this divine household without being assigned by the Master (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.3). So, by saying that he has an οἰκονομία entrusted to him and that he must therefore preach, Paul is working with Stoic terminology and ideas. He, too, has been assigned a place in the divine economy.

As we have seen, however, Stoics exercised their free will in the manner in which they conducted themselves within the providential scheme of things. So does Paul. He willingly does what necessity has laid upon him, thus exercising his freedom, the topic that has engaged him throughout this long argument. That it is his freedom of action that predominates in his thinking and not compulsion is evident from vv. 18–19. There he provides the grounds for forgoing his ἐξουσία—his freedom did not compel him to insist on his ἐξουσία, but allowed him to forgo it.

Paul's discussion is practical, and he applies the philosophic categories to the practice that exemplified his freedom, namely his refusal to accept financial support. All the warrants for his ἐξουσία that he has adduced had to do with earning rewards.[40] Paul attaches his assertion of | his free will in v. 17 to that preceding list of warrants. In addressing the issue at hand, he uses and modifies Stoic ideas on the problem of how to harmonize their free will with their view of cosmic determinism. Paul's argument seems to run as follows. Although he has necessity laid upon him

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Gasque and Ralph P. Martin; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 192. In addition to the difficulties inherent in the Pauline text itself, confessional loyalties have complicated attempts to understand Paul's argument (see esp. Käsemann, "A Pauline Version of the Amor Fati"). My major objection to the current majority interpretation is that it does not do justice to the coherence of Paul's argument, which already begins in chapter 8, and that it in particular does not grasp the significance of the philosophical debates for that argument.

[36] For references, see Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Von Kynismus*, 49 (on Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.4), and *SVF* 2:1127–1131.

[37] Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1049F–1050B; cf. 1050C (= *SVF* 2:937).

[38] Philo, *QG* 4.165(= *SVF* 3:624).

[39] *SVF* 3:623; Philo, *Ios.* 38.

[40] The soldier, vinedresser, and shepherd (v. 7), the farmer (vv. 10–11), and the temple functionaries (v. 13).

to preach the gospel, he does so willingly and has a reward. Were he to preach unwillingly, he would nevertheless have to preach, for he has been entrusted with an οἰκονομία. What is the reward that accrues to him from his voluntary preaching? Paradoxically, his free decision not to receive pay for his preaching, but to offer the gospel free of charge. The point of this tortured mixture of philosophical and commercial language is to make the case that by exercising his free will in the manner in which he preached, he did not make full use of his ἐξουσία.[41]

For Paul, the gospel does not provide a freedom to be exercised without regard to others. Insisting on one's ἐξουσία can in fact be an impediment to the gospel itself (v. 12). The manner in which Paul labors in the gospel, however, is without compulsion; his free offer of the gospel is the practice of someone who is himself free. In this he approximates the Cynics, whose practical life—not philosophic speculation—demonstrated their freedom. This similarity to a strain of Cynicism that asserted its free decision to adopt a humbling life in order to benefit others will be explored below.

## Paul's Freedom to Adapt

Paul reaches the conclusion of his argument in vv. 19–22, which is not a general statement of principle but an integral part, indeed, the culmination of his argument about how the non-eaters should be treated. He | is still speaking about freedom and now explains (γάρ, "for") the practical consequences of his freedom (ὤν is circumstantial) for the manner in which he preaches the gospel. Paradoxically, Paul, who is free from all things, made himself a slave for all people. His "slavery" has as its goal the benefit of others (cf. Gal 5:13), and that goal is given specificity in vv. 19–22—his "slavish" life is that of the missionary who wishes to gain (κερδαίνειν, vv. 19, 20, 21, 22) and save (σῴζειν, v. 22) people.

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[41] On the commercial language, see esp. Ronald F. Hock, "Paul's Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class," *JBL* 97 (1978): 555–564; Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1987), 295–306, both of whom are aware of the philosophical dimension of Paul's argument, but neither quite does justice to it. It is noteworthy that, although Paul here certainly does have in mind his manual labor, which enabled him to forgo his apostolic rights, and that the Corinthians would have recognized that he was alluding to it (cf. 4:12), he never explicitly mentions it. Paul is, after all, not now concerned with that practice and its attendant problems, but with another practice, the eating of meat offered to idols. He therefore alludes to his manual labor only to the extent that language belonging to that sphere of life coincides with that of the philosophical argument he conducts.

Paul's "slavish" freedom takes the form of accommodation to others in order to save them. His willingness to forgo his rights thus has the exact opposite result to the meat eaters' insistence on theirs. Paul wants to save people; they destroy the weak (8:9). Paul goes still further by identifying himself with the weak, as he does when he omits the ὡς ("as") before ἀσθενής ("weak," v. 22) that he uses with Ἰουδαῖος ("Jew") and ὑπὸ νόμον ("under Law," v. 20) and with ἄνομος ("without law," v. 21).

What Paul means by this identification with the weak receives clarification from 2:1–3. Rather than preach to the Corinthians with persuasive words of wisdom, he resolved to know only the crucified Christ. He had preached ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ("in weakness") and with much fear and trembling (cf. 2 Cor 7:15; Phil 2:2; Eph 6:5). Weakness here should probably be understood in its cognitive sense: 1 Cor 2:1–3 is Paul's exemplary application of 1:17–25, where he also contrasts destruction and salvation (1:17), wisdom with preaching the crucified Christ to Jews and Greeks (1:18–24), and declares that the weakness of God (!) is mightier than human beings (1:25). In his missionary preaching, Paul had preached a message with no claim to human intellectual superiority, either as to its content or in the way he proclaimed it. Paul himself was weak while through the preaching he saved those who were now insisting on the rights they thought accrued to them from their intellectual superiority.

Only v. 19a in this section sounds Stoic, but the Stoics would roundly reject v. 19b—Paul's claim that, free from all things, he made himself a slave to all people (cf. Gal 5:13).[42] Paul has more in common with | the Cynics, if not precisely in the way he claims his paradoxical slavery. In 2 Cor 10:3–6 Paul exhibits knowledge of a tradition that goes back to Antisthenes. In two speeches, Antisthenes contrasted Ajax and Odysseus, representing Ajax as strong and uncompromising and Odysseus as inventive and adaptable.[43] Odysseus, thus perceived, was to become the prototype of

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[42] Stoics were open to the charge that they made the will a slave of fate (see Plotinus, *Enn.* 3.1.2, 15–17). Chrysippus attempted a compromise (Cicero, *Fat.* 39), which Cynics found unacceptable (e.g., Oenomaeus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 6.7, 255C [still a half-slave]; cf. Lucian, *Jupp. conf.* 7), despite the insistence of someone like Seneca (*De prov.* 5.6): "I am under no compulsion, I suffer nothing against my will, nor am I God's slave, but I give my assent to him."

[43] See *Socraticorum reliquiae* (ed. Gabriele Giannantoni; 4 vols.; Rome: Edizioni dell' Ateneo/Naples: Bibliopolis: 1983–1985), 2 (1983): 339–343; 3 (1985): 231–237; Herbert D. Rankin, *Antisthenes Sokratikos* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1986), 155–171; Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 98–101. For the moral philosophers' recognition of the need to adapt to the conditions and circumstances of the persons they addressed, see

one kind of Cynic in later centuries, when Cynics interpreted their ancient heroes in a manner agreeable to their own self-understanding.

In his speeches, Antisthenes has Ajax accuse Odysseus of being underhanded, willing to suffer ill-treatment, even allowing himself to be flogged, if he might thereby gain (κερδαίνειν) something. Odysseus replies that he intimately knows the enemies' condition and that he strives night and day to save (σῴζειν) all people, possessing as his only weapons the slavish rags (δουλοπρεπῆ ὅπλα) he wears. This picture of Odysseus would continue to be used by philosophers as they explained why they undertook the thankless task of speaking to people in order to improve them. For example, Dio Chrysostom, Paul's younger contemporary, when introducing himself, justifies his preaching by quoting Homer, *Odyssey* 4.244–246, which refers to Odysseus, who "subdues his body with injurious blows, casts around his shoulders sorry rags, in guise a slave" (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.15; cf. 1 Cor 9:27).

Many Cynics rejected this view of the philosopher's willingness to be humiliated as he sought to benefit people, and scorned the policy of adapting speech to particular circumstances. The point to be made, however, is that this way of describing a philosopher's mien and demeanor was one among others at the time Paul wrote 1 Corinthians. That Paul should here express himself in the manner of the moderate Cynic is not surprising, for he does so elsewhere (e.g., 1 Thess 2:1–12; 2 Cor 10:3–6). We have to stop here, but it is not irrelevant to note | that in the verses that follow (vv. 24–27), Paul again makes use of a Cynic tradition that has also been thought to go back to Antisthenes.[44] Nevertheless, Paul differs from those Cynics with whom he has much in common. They did not quite call themselves slaves; rather, the *manner* in which they chose to present themselves appeared servile to others. Paul goes beyond even these Cynics when he claims the paradox that his freedom was expressed in his voluntarily enslaving of *himself* for the benefit of others.

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Paul clearly resonated to that quality of independent action he observed in his unkempt contemporaries, and it is striking how often it finds a place in his descriptions of his own ministry.[45] It does so here, when he wants to stress his freedom while preaching at God's behest. Stoics, too, found room for voluntary action within a predetermined order, but Paul's use

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Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 50–55, 65–67.

44 Hermann Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus," *Hermes* 98 (1970): 459–471.

45 See Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 35–48, 119.

of Cynic traditions at the culmination of his argument shows where he wants to place the emphasis—on the side of freedom. Unlike the Stoics, who required philosophical training, especially in logic, when considering how one exercises freedom of choice, Paul, like the Cynics, places a premium on action, unconventional and contemptible, as a means of benefiting his hearers. That is ultimately his argument to those Corinthians who insisted on their right to eat meat offered to idols.

## Conclusion

I have proposed that Paul conducts a sustained argument in 1 Cor 8–9 and that an appreciation of the philosophic dimension of the issues he addresses allows us to make sense of those elements in the text that otherwise appear disjointed.

The transition between the two chapters is not abrupt. Basic to the problem he takes up is the notion of personal freedom, an issue that occupies him much in this section of the letter (6:12; 7:4, 36, 37, 39; 10:27, 29) as well as elsewhere (e.g., Rom 7:15–20; 9:16; 2 Cor 8:3, 7, | 17; Gal 5:17; Phlm 14).[46] The discussion of his ἐξουσία in chapter 9 is grounded in his assertion of his freedom in 9:1, which in turn is called forth by the meat eaters' insistence on their freedom and its attendant ἐξουσία, without any regard for the weak. Paul's clarification of the freedom with which he forgoes his right while under compulsion to preach culminates the argument on freedom and introduces his final exemplary statement on his own conduct as he adapted himself to Jews and Gentiles and identified with the weak.

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In this long argument, Paul shows that he is familiar with the philosophic slogans of the Corinthians and with the assumptions underlying those slogans. He draws out the philosophical as well as practical consequences of the Corinthians' and his own philosophical claims, and does so with some sophistication. The philosophic traditions are for him not merely a pile of *topoi* or slogans from which he can draw in order to lay a pseudo-intellectual veneer over a wooden argument. Neither does he, conversely, use these traditions in a manner that shows him to be captive to any one school of thought. What is clearest of all is that the philosophic traditions do not constitute a "background" against which Paul

[46] See Paul W. Gooch, *Partial Knowledge: Philosophical Studies in Paul* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), esp. 85–101.

is to be viewed. Paul is rather to be seen as working within a milieu in which issues that engaged him and his converts were already widely discussed. As his readers appropriated some elements from that discussion to describe their Christian existence, so did Paul, and his mode of self-expression, although in this instance triggered by the Corinthians, was as natural to him as any other that he employed.[47]

[47] It is of interest to note that another Pharisee, later in the first century, said of the Pharisees that they too affirmed that some things were the work of fate but that room was left for free will (Josephus, *B.J.* 2.162–163; *A.J.* 13.172; 18.13). "Josephus is able to draw on Stoic terminology, by now to some extent common currency.... In Josephus, there is no evidence of serious immersion in Stoic philosophy; he seeks merely to express his own beliefs in terms intelligible in Greek" (Tessa Rajak, *Josephus, the Historian and His Society* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983], 100). Stoicism, in my judgment, is more integral to Paul than this assessment claims is the case with Josephus.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

# GOD'S NEW FAMILY IN THESSALONICA*

First Thessalonians has not impressed commentators for what it contributes to our understanding of Paul's view of the church. Such Pauline images of the church as temple, field, and body are not used in the letter, nor is the church's relationship with Christ of special interest.[1] If it is the elaboration of such images or christological reflection that makes for a significant ecclesiology, then Paul indeed has not given much thought to the nature of the church in this letter. I think the matter is otherwise and wish to follow the lead of Wayne Meeks in examining the view of the church that underlies Paul's exhortations in the letter.

We are all deeply in debt to Meeks for the light he has shed on the social dimension of early Christianity, particularly of its Pauline wing, and I have personally been enriched by a colleagueship that is now in its third decade. Of special concern here is the interest he and his students have shown in the household as the locus of Pauline churches, in matters of the family, and in kinship language.[2] Exactly how these elements were related in Paul's mind is still to be discovered, but already Meeks and his students have made it possible for us to see more clearly how Paul's theology was inextricably related to social reality, both his own and that of his churches. This, I wish to | argue, is the case in Paul's first letter to his converts in Thessalonica, whom Meeks calls "this new 'family of God.' "[3] 117

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* Originally published in *The Social World of the First Christians: Studies in Honor of Wayne A. Meeks* (ed. L. Michael White and O. Larry Yarbrough; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 116–125.

[1] The most extensive treatment of the ecclesiology of 1 Thessalonians of which I am aware is Raymond F. Collins, "The Church of the Thessalonians," in his *Studies on the First Letter to the Thessalonians* (BETL 66; Leuven: University Press/Peeters, 1984), 285–298.

[2] On the household, see Wayne A. Meeks, The *First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 75–77; Meeks, *The Moral World of the First Christians* (LEC 6; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 110–113; L. Michael White, *Building God's House in the Roman World: Architectural Adaptation among Pagans, Jews, and Christians* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). On the family, see O. Larry Yarbrough, *Not Like the Gentiles: Marriage Rules in the Letters of Paul* (SBLDS 80; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985). On kinship language, see Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 48–51.

[3] Meeks, *Moral World*, 129.

Paul appears in this letter in the first instance to be engaged in pastoral care rather than doing theology. He clearly has in view a group of recent converts from paganism who need direction on various aspects of the Christian life. In providing that direction, Paul stresses his relationship with them and on the basis of that relationship addresses their problems. Yet, in doing so, he emphasizes corporate dimensions of the faith which betray a particular view of the church. In what follows, I wish to show that a coherent view of the church, as the family of God, underlies his practical thinking in this pastoral letter.

## The Family Created by God

Throughout the letter, Paul stresses God's initiative and continuing activity. Paul knows that the Thessalonians, loved by God, were elected from the way in which they accepted the gospel (1:4–5). While Paul initially describes that gospel as "our gospel" (1:5), when he deals at greater length with his ministry, he is careful to specify that it is God's gospel (2:2, 4, 8, 9) with which he has been entrusted (2:4). He had been empowered by God to proclaim the gospel (2:2), and when he did so the gospel came to his hearers with dynamic force, the Holy Spirit and full conviction (1:5). Those who received the gospel received it not as human discourse but as what it truly is, God's word, which continues to be at work in them (2:13). Paul is thus at great pains to describe the founding of the Thessalonian church as a creation by God through the preaching of God's word.

The interest in God's creative work was also represented, but in a different way, in the initial message that Paul had preached in Thessalonica. Referring to that message in 1:9–10, Paul describes the God to whom the Thessalonians had converted from idols as θεὸς ζῶν καὶ ἀληθινός ("living and true God").[4] The description of God as θεὸς ζῶν ("living God") appears frequently in sources that reflect Hellenistic Jewish propaganda to Gentiles, where it refers to God as the creator of the universe. It does so, for example, in Bel and the Dragon 5Θ, οὐ σέβομαι εἴδωλα χειροποίητα,

[4] What follows is elaborated in a Yale Ph.D. dissertation by Mark J. Goodwin, "Conversion to the Living God in Diaspora Judaism and Paul's Letters" (1992); see Goodwin, *Paul, Apostle of the Living God: Kerygma and Conversion in 2 Corinthians* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2001). See also Claus Bussmann, *Themen der paulinischen Missionspredigt auf dem Hintergrund des spätjüdisch-hellenistischen Missionsliteratur* (EHS Series 23, Theology, vol. 3; Bern: Herbert Lang, 1979). That 1 Thess 1:9–10 reflects Christian preaching to pagans, heavily informed by Jewish precedents, is now generally accepted. See Traugott Holtz, *Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher* (EKKNT 13; Zurich: Benziger, 1986), 53–62.

ἀλλὰ τὸν ζῶντα θεὸν κτίσαντα τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν ("I do not worship handmade idols, but the living God who created heaven and earth").[5] This | usage is also seen in Acts 14:15, where Paul and Barnabas urge the Lycaonians ἐπιστρέφειν ἐπὶ θεὸν ζῶντα ὃς ἐποίησεν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ("to turn to the living God, who made heaven and earth and sea and everything in them"). 118

The matter calls for further study, but it may already be observed that Paul in 2 Cor 3:3 uses this description of God when referring to the conversion of the Corinthians πνεύματι θεοῦ ζῶντος ("with the Spirit of the living God"). Also noteworthy is the complex of ideas in 2 Cor 6:16–18, where a contrast is drawn between Christians, who are ναὸς θεοῦ ... ζῶντος ("a temple of the living God"), and idols. To confirm this contrast, Paul quotes a pastiche of OT passages to describe God's offer to create a new people from among the unclean, from whom they should separate, and concludes with an allusion to 2 Sam 7:14 and Amos 3:13 LXX: καὶ ἔσομαι ὑμῖν εἰς πατέρα, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔσεσθέ μοι εἰς υἱοὺς καὶ θυγατέρας, λέγει κύριος παντοκράτωρ ("And I will be a father to you, and you shall be my sons and daughters, says the Lord Almighty"). The same combination of ideas appears in Rom 9:24–25, Paul's claim that God had called vessels of mercy from among Gentiles as well as Jews, in support of which he combines and modifies Hos 2:1 and 2:25: "Those who are not my people I will call 'my people,' and her who was not beloved I will call 'my beloved.' And in the very place where it was said to them, 'You are not my people,' they will be called sons of the living God (υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος)."[6] To speak of the conversion of Gentiles, Paul here uses language used formerly of the return of apostatized Israel to God. It is important for Paul that God called the Gentiles because he loved them. Accordingly, he changes Hos 2:25 LXX, ἐλεήσω τὴν οὐκ ἠλεημένην καὶ ἐρῶ τῷ οὐ λαῷ μου λαός μου εἶ σύ ("I will show mercy to her who received no mercy and will say to those who were not my people, 'You are my people'"), to have it speak of God's love rather than God's mercy.[7]

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[5] See also Sir 18:1; *1 En.* 5; *Sib. Or.* 3:763; *Jos. Asen.* 8:5–6.

[6] For Paul's use and modification of Hosea, see Goodwin, "Conversion to the Living God," 12–15. Hosea also appears in *Jub.* 1:25, "And I shall be a father to them, and they will be sons to me, And they will all be called 'sons of the living God.' And every angel and spirit will know and acknowledge that they are my sons and I am their father in uprightness and righteousness. And I shall love them."

[7] Elpidius W. Pax has pointed out that proselytes to Judaism were described by the rabbis as being "loved by God" ("Beobachtungen zur Konvertitensprache im ersten Thessalonicherbrief," *SBFLA* 21 [1971]: 234–235).

These passages show that Paul thought of the God of creation as calling Gentiles into a new relationship with himself in which he would be their father and they his beloved children. This, according to 1 Thess 1 and 2, God had accomplished through Paul's preaching of the gospel. The new relationships effected by the gospel are central to Paul's understanding of the church in Thessalonica, but before exploring that subject, a little more needs to be said about the notion of God as father. God is, of course, the father of Jesus Christ (1:10). It was also natural that, since a father was | viewed as progenitor, God as creator would be referred to as father. This is already so in Plato; and Philo, under Platonic, and especially Stoic, influence, uses πατήρ ("father") as his favorite term to describe God as creator.[8] It is evidently such thinking that is behind 1 Cor 8:6, a tradition in which God the father was described as creator and Jesus Christ the agent of creation: (ἀλλ' ἡμῖν εἷς θεὸς ὁ πατήρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν, καὶ εἷς κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ ("yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist"). The term πατήρ ("father") applied to God thus carries for Paul a creative connotation: God the Father is creator of both the universe and the new relationship(s) into which he calls those he loves.[9]

This is the way, I suggest, we should understand 1:1, the only place in the letter where Paul refers to the Thessalonians as a church: τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ Θεσσαλονικέων ἐν θεῷ πατρὶ καὶ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ ("to the church of the Thessalonians in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ"). The church, or better, the assembly in Thessalonica, is described in a manner unusual for Paul. In the first place, the *nomen gentilicum* ("Thessalonians") rather than its geographical location is used to describe the church.[10] Attention is thus drawn to members of the church rather than the church's location. In the second place, and more importantly, the assembly's relationship to God is described with a dative ἐν θεῷ πατρὶ ("in God the Father"). The

[8] E.g., Plato, *Tim.* 28C, 37C; Philo, *Cher.* 44; *Migr.* 193, 194; *Opif.* 45, 46; *Spec.* 1.41; 2.225. Cf. *Mart. Pol.* 19.2, πατὴρ παντοκράτωρ ("Almighty Father"). On God as father in Stoicism, see Gottlob Schrenk, "πατήρ," *TDNT* 5 (1967): 955–956; and see further Hildebrecht Hommel, *Schöpfer und Erhalter: Studien zum Problem Christentum und Antike* (Berlin: Lettner, 1956), 122ff.

[9] Note also the collocation of θεὸς ζῶν, πατήρ and παντοκράτωρ in 2 Cor 6:16–18.

[10] Contrast, for example, "to all those in Rome" (Rom 1:7); "to the church of God in Corinth" (1 Cor 1:2); "to the churches of Galatia" (Gal 1:2).

practical reason for relating the church to God and Christ in this way may be to make clear to the recent converts that their assembly is different from others by virtue of its relationship to God. I propose, however, that an additional nuance is present: the dative here is instrumental, as it is in 2:2 (ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἡμῶν, "we were emboldened by our God"), and Paul modifies ἐκκλησία ("church") in this way to remind his readers that their assembly exists due to God the Father's action. Paul nowhere else speaks of being "in God,"[11] but in the Stoically influenced Acts 17:28 he is made to speak about the creator as a god who is the ground of human existence: ἐν αὐτῷ . . . ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν ("in him we live and move and exist"). Acts 17 uses traditions from Hellenistic Jewish propaganda, as Paul did in Thessalonica (1:9–10) and in Rom 1 and 2.[12] It is possible that Paul | derived this description of God as Father who cre- 120 ates and sustains the church from such traditions, which were indebted to Stoicism. Paul's use of prepositional formulations, here ἐν θεῷ πατρὶ ("in God the Father"), may also show the Stoic influence that is also evident in 1 Cor 8:6 (cf. Rom 11:36).[13] In that case, he would be combining scriptural, Jewish, and philosophical traditions to present a view of the creator of the cosmos as father to the new community. A.D. Nock notes that, although on the pagan side such views as that of the creator as father originated with the philosophers, in time they came to be held by the masses, so that Christian preaching of God as Father would have been easily accepted by them.[14]

[11] But see Rom 2:17; 5:11.

[12] For Rom 1 and 2, see Emil Weber, *Die Beziehung von Rom.* 1–3 *zur Missionspraxis des Paulus* (BFCT 9.4; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1905); Heinrich Daxer, *Römer 1.18–2.10 im Verhältnis zur spätjüdischen Lehrauffassung* (Naumburg: G. Pätz, 1914); Günther Bornkamm, *Early Christian Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 47–70.

[13] E.g., Marcus Aurelius 4.23, ἐκ σοῦ, ἐν σοί, εἰς σέ. But the formulation was used by other philosophers as well. See André-Jean Festugière, "Le 'compendium Timaei' de Galien," *REG* 65 (1952): 106ff.; Robert M. Grant, "Causation and 'The Ancient World View,'" *JBL* 83 (1964): 34–40. Contra Lucien Cerfaux, *Christ in the Theology of St. Paul* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1959), 450. On 1 Cor 8:6, see Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 144–145.

[14] Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 229–231.

### The Members of God's Family

First Thessalonians does not provide information on how people responded to the preaching of this message, as, for example, Gal 3:26–4:6 does. There, using an early tradition according to which the convert at baptism responds with the cry, "Abba! Father!" Paul employs the metaphor of adoption to describe the convert's introduction as God's new child into a new family who had responded in like fashion. According to Wayne Meeks, this "is a vivid way of portraying what a modern sociologist might call the resocialization of conversion. The natural kinship structure into which the person has been born and which previously defined his place and connections with the society are here supplanted by a new set of relationships."[15] We may safely assume that the Thessalonians were similarly initiated, for Paul calls God "our Father" (1:3: 3:11, 13) in a manner suggesting that his readers understood its significance.

Paul, whose preaching of the gospel was the means by which God called them, stresses the relationship between himself and the Thessalonians when he reminds them of their conversion (1:4–6). This stress is evident not only in the heavy preponderance of personal pronouns in these verses, as indeed elsewhere in the letter, but also in his reminder, unusual for him, that they had become imitators of him and the Lord when they received 121 the | Word.[16] The notion of imitation was widespread in Paul's day, and his use of it was informed by but not totally identical to that of the moral philosophers, who stressed the importance of having someone after whom to model oneself. People who imitated a leader, especially a teacher, held him in their memory so as to have a constant guide, especially when they were separated from him. Paul was anxious, after leaving Thessalonica,

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[15] Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 87–88; see also Meeks, "The Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol of Early Christianity," *HR* 13 (1974): 165–208. On what follows, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 48–52.

[16] Paul usually calls his readers to imitation: 1 Cor 4:16: 11:1: Phil 3:17; cf. 1:30: 4:9. For the paraenetic use of imitation, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333, esp. 282; [*Light*, 2:675–749]. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 125, 135–137. For caution that imitation is not confined to paraenesis, see Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (HUT 28; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1991), 49–50. For Paul's distinctiveness in claiming that his converts had imitated him, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 56–58. For more extensive treatment, see Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986).

whether, having once looked to him as their example, the Thessalonians no longer did so. Timothy's report that they still remembered him (3:6) brought him great relief.[17] Such moral philosophical language continues in 2:1–12, when he recounts his ministry with them.[18]

Paul also uses familial terms to describe his relationship with the Thessalonians. As they had been loved by God (1:4), so they had become Paul's ἀγαπητοί ("beloved," RSV "very dear"), in proof of which he did manual labor in order not to burden them (2:8–9). The letter teems with the language of family, but the picture that emerges is neither consistent nor hierarchical. This is clearest in 2:7, the only place where Paul mentions apostleship and its harsh prerogatives, only to forgo them in favor of treating his converts gently, like a wet nurse who nurses her own children. The imagery is derived from the moral philosophers.[19] But, then, a few verses later (2:11–12), he is like a father to them as he pays individual attention to them and adapts his pastoral care to their dispositions or emotional states. This, too, Paul derives from the psychagogy of the moral philosophers.[20] A few verses later, however, he is an orphan (ἀπορφανισθέντες, RSV "bereft") because he is separated from them (2:17), and this time he uses a Jewish | tradition which he deftly twists: Proselytes 122 were described as orphans because of the social ostracism and feeling of desolation that their conversion caused.[21] Paul identifies with his new converts by describing himself as an orphan. It is thus clear that Paul's kinship language, derived from pagan and Jewish traditions, does not describe a hierarchically structured community, but is part and parcel of

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17 On remembering the model, see Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 9–11: Lucian, *Nigr.* 6–7; Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moraıists," 282–283. On 1 Thess 3:7, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church," *NTS* 36 (1990): 375–391, esp. 385–386. [*Light*, 1:229–245]

18 See Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse,'" in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 35–48. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

19 See Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse.'" The role of the wet nurse is receiving considerable attention these days. See Keith R. Bradley, "Wet-nursing at Rome: A Study in Social Relations," in The *Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives* (ed. Beryl Rawson; Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1986), 201–229; Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), ch. 2.

20 Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists," 283. Although 2:11–12 shares paraenetic elements with 1 Cor 4:14–21, one notes the differences between the passages: for example, in the latter Paul *is* their spiritual father, *therefore* has the right to expect that they imitate him and to threaten punishment.

21 See, e.g., *Jos. Asen.* 12:11; 13:11; Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 43–45. But also see Plato, *Phaed.* 116A: "we felt that he was a father to us and that bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans," of Socrates's disciples' anticipation of his death.

the pathos of the letter, intended to strengthen the bond between Paul and his readers.

Paul, in addition, is the Thessalonians' sibling. Paul addresses them as ἀδελφοί ("brothers") thirteen times and describes various Christians as brothers three times. This is the highest incidence of the term in all of Paul's letters. Pagans as well as Jews described members of various conventicles and associations as brothers, and we do not know what Paul's source was for his usage.[22] In any case, what is more important is the way in which he uses the term.

Paul thinks of "brothers" as constituting the church's gatherings (5:25–27), but the directions on different aspects of life outside the assembly which he gives in the latter part of the letter also have in view relationships among the brothers. In giving advice on sexual morality, for example, he warns against transgressing and wronging one's brother, evidently by committing adultery with his wife (4:6). Paul prays that, as he loves them, so they would love one another (3:12), and when he exhorts them to social responsibility (4:9–12), he does so with the conviction that they have been divinely instructed about φιλαδελφία ("love of the brothers"), and already love all the brothers throughout Macedonia (4:9–10). The problem that 4:13–18 addresses is the grief caused by a surmise that Christians who had died would be separated from those who would be alive at the Parousia (4:15). In response, Paul emphasizes the eventual restoration of relationships with each other and the Lord, and ends with the injunction that they comfort one another with his words (4:17–18). So, membership in the family of brothers demands particular conduct.[23]

The most detailed and explicit instructions on how the Thessalonians are to relate to one another are given in 5:11–22.[24] As Paul had cared for each one of them individually (2:11–12), so are they to do, εἷς τὸν ἕνα, "one on one" (5:11), and Paul then proceeds to specify how the Thessalonian | 123 brothers are to treat one another as members of the congregation, at one time offering exhortation, at another receiving it. Love again enters the discussion, but, characteristically for Paul, here mutual concern expressed

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[22] Meeks thinks Judaism was the more likely source (*First Urban Christians*, 87). For the most extensive discussion, see Klaus Schäfer, *Gemeinde als "Bruderschaft": Ein Beitrag zum Kirchenverständnis des Paulus* (EHS 23.333; Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1989).

[23] See also 1 Cor 5:11. 6:5–8; cf. Phlm 15–16.

[24] Discussed in greater detail in Malherbe, "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church."

in reciprocal actions and attitudes is more important. He thus takes up various responsibilities: the brothers are to respect and love those who care for them pastorally (vv. 12–13); the brothers who engage in such care must, as Paul had done, adapt their treatment to the conditions of those they seek to benefit (v. 14); and they are all to exercise great prudence toward prophets in the Christian community: they must not devalue prophecy but must test it for the good that it contains and they must accept (vv. 19–22).

## A Family Forever

Eschatology suffuses 1 Thessalonians, and the eschatological language and images that Paul uses reinforce the point that this is not an ordinary group of people who happen to be called a family. God the Father's election of the Thessalonians became manifest in their reception of Paul's gospel (1:3–5), and Paul prays that together they will stand in holiness before their divine Father at the coming of the Lord Jesus and the heavenly host (3:12–13; cf. 2:19).[25] The community will then be reconstituted, so that even death will be seen to present no permanent danger to the fellowship (4:14–17).

God's call was not confined to the past event of their conversion. Paul twice describes God as ὁ καλῶν ("he who calls"), the one who continues his call in the present but does so with a view to the eschatological future. He who calls Paul's readers is faithful, and they can be confident that he will sanctify them and keep them secure at the coming of the Lord Jesus (5:23–24). Paul's pastoral care for them, as a father paying individual attention to his children, is aimed at fostering conduct worthy of God who calls them into his kingdom and glory (2:11–12). It is by virtue of being an eschatological community, children of the day and of the light (5:4–5), that they are likewise to continue their own edification and nurture (5:11). It is this eschatological dimension that makes the psychagogical description that follows different. Unlike pagans, who also engaged in admonition and comfort, and helped their fellows, the Thessalonian brothers were to do so because ("therefore") they believed in God's eschatological purpose for them.

[25] On the church as the eschatological community, see Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (2 vols.; New York: Scribner's, 1951), 1:308–309.

God's call to holiness has not only a future referent (e.g., 5:23–24; cf. 3:13). Wayne Meeks has reminded us of the paraenetic elements in apocalyptic and | suggested that the connection between the two in Thessalonians is more subtle.[26] It is also explicit when Paul speaks of God's call. God called them to a particular quality of life now, not to live in uncleanness, but ἐν ἁγιασμῷ ("in holiness," 4:7). What this call to holiness means, practically, is specified in 4:3–8, the warning to abstain from sexual immorality, to "take a vessel" (wife?) in holiness and honor and thus not to wrong one's brother. As children of the day (5:6), the ἀδελφοί ("brothers," 5:1, 4) further clothe themselves with faith, hope, and love (5:8–9). All this sets them apart from the society in which they live. Their behavior is to be different from that of the Gentiles who do not know God (4:5), and the Thessalonians should not live like the children of night and of darkness (5:6–7).

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The references to their call and their life as a community of the last days thus distinguish them from others and reinforce their own sense of uniqueness, as Meeks has also emphasized.[27] This negative view is indeed evident elsewhere in the letter, where the eschatological element is also present: non-Christian Gentiles are idolaters and will evidently experience the coming wrath (1:9–10); they have no hope and therefore grieve in the face of death (4:13), and they oppose the gospel, thus already incurring, somehow, eschatological wrath (2:14, 16).

Paul's view of the Thessalonians as an eschatological family does not, however, result in a consistently negative attitude toward non-Christians. One might expect that the more emphasis that is laid on the church as a unique family, the greater would be not only the contrast with, but the antipathy toward, non-Christians—yet the exact opposite is true. The readers are to love not only one another but all people (3:12). It is precisely in 4:9–12, which affirms that φιλαδελφία ("brotherly love") is divinely taught, and which compliments the Thessalonians for loving Christians throughout the province of Macedonia, that Paul, in terms derived from contemporary moral discourse, urges the Thessalonians to act εὐσχημόνως πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ("becomingly to outsiders"). So, as the family instructed in proper behavior by God, the church is most clearly unique when it is viewed from an eschatological perspective. This love of the brethren does

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[26] Wayne A. Meeks, "Social Functions of Apocalyptic Language in Pauline Christianity," in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East* (ed. David Hellholm; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1983), 689–695.

[27] Meeks, "Social Functions," 694.

not, however, result in a disregard of society; on the contrary, it is the family members, who are taught by God to love each other and already do so throughout Macedonia, who engage in manual labor and so win the approval of outsiders.[28]

## | Conclusion

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This survey reveals how Paul describes the Thessalonian church in familial terms even though he does not explicitly call the church the family of God. His reason for describing the church in this way may simply be that the traditions he used to describe their conversion spoke of the relationship between God and the elect in kinship language, and that Paul consistently applied it to the intracommunal relations of this young church, whose memory of their conversion was still fresh. The intensity with which he uses the language and images, however, and the wide range of pagan and Jewish traditions from which they are derived, suggest a more immediate reason for Paul's heavy emphasis on the various relationships he describes, and for the particular, familial way in which he describes those relationships.

It may very well be that it was the experience of new converts, who underwent a painful reorientation of social relationships, sometimes including marriage relations (cf. 4:2–8), that made Paul's approach particularly appropriate to the situation to which he wrote.[29] The Synoptic tradition reflects the domestic problems caused by the new missionary religion (e.g., Luke 12:51–53), but holds out promise for new relationships to substitute for the old ones in this age and the one to come (e.g., Mark 10:29–30).[30]

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[28] Paul makes a similar connection between love and manual labor in 2:8–9. It is striking that in 4:9–12 the only properly theological reason given for the love of the brethren is that they are taught by God to do so. For the philosophical traditions Paul employs in this section, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 12–20.

[29] I have attempted to describe the feeling of alienation experienced by converts in general, and the Thessalonians in particular, in *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 36–52.

[30] For Christianity viewed as a domestic troublemaker, see the material collected by Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 1:393–398; see Eric R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine* (Wiles Lectures, 1963; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 115–116.

Paul, too, appears to be aware of the problem, and he addresses it in this finely crafted pastoral letter by using language of kinship to describe the new fellowship. In literary terms, he achieves his pastoral purpose by writing a familial, paraenetic letter to God's new family in Thessalonica, which quite possibly was still meeting in the house of Jason.[31]

[31] On the notion of familial letters, which were not identified as a separate type by ancient epistolary theorists, see Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 42–43, 71–76. It is possible that letters of friendship could assume a familial cast or be paraenetic (which did receive a special classification), depending on the purpose the author had in mind. On 1 Thessalonians as a paraenetic letter, see Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists," 278–293; on the pastoral function of the paraenetic style, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 68–78. On the household of Jason, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 12–20.

CHAPTER TWENTY

# PAUL'S SELF-SUFFICIENCY (PHILIPPIANS 4:11)*

This paper deals with Phil 4:11, specifically, with Paul's statement that he was αὐτάρκης in all things. I wish to argue that the statement should be understood in the context of ancient discussions of friendship and not the technical Stoic idea of αὐτάρκεια. It is quite popular to say that αὐτάρκεια is a Stoic term, but there is considerable difference of opinion on the degree to which and the manner in which Paul is thought to appropriate the Stoic notion.

For example, Edward N. O'Neil, in speaking of the term, says of the text in which it occurs in Philippians, "the whole passage (vv. 11–13) must be considered. These words of Paul could just as easily have been uttered by Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates, or even Teles."[1] That, of course, is gross overstatement.

Rudolf Bultmann is more interesting. First, he portrays what he considers the Stoic view. According to Bultmann, the Stoic must free himself from his emotions. "For these seek to attach him to 'alien things.' He must strive for self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια), both within and without. He must cultivate renunciation and endurance. For then he will be free and happy, and nothing can assail him.... He withdraws into himself and with clarity of mind perceives the divine, universal law, which, when all is said and done, he cannot alter."[2] Bultmann then interprets Paul in light of this view of self-sufficiency. Paul's freedom is said to be his radical openness for the future. "Such a conception of freedom," says Bultmann,

> seems to bring Paul very close to Stoicism. Indeed, the very fact that he defines genuine human existence in terms of freedom, a concept unknown to the Old Testament and Judaism, is itself to suggest an affinity between Paul and the Stoics, to say nothing of the actual vocabulary he uses. The

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[1] Edward N. O'Neil, "De cupiditate divitiarum (Moralia 523C–528B)," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. Hans Dieter Betz; SCHNT 1; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 312.

[2] Rudolf Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary Setting* (Cleveland: Collins, 1956), 139.

> Stoic wise man is, like Paul, free from all external necessities and claims
814 from the outside world, its conventions, judgments | and values.[3]

In Bultmann's interpretation, then, Phil 4:11 describes Paul's interior detachment:

> Like Paul, the Stoic could say: "I know both how to be abased, and I know how to abound." . . . But he would not continue: "I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me" (Phil 4:12–13). This is just where the difference lies. The Stoic is free because of his reason. He concentrates on reason by turning his back on all encounters and claims from the outside world. This makes him free from the future. He is enabled to escape from the toils of life in time. Paul, on the other hand, is free because he has been made free by the grace of God, and has surrendered freely to his grace. He has been freed from all the claims which seek to bind him to all reality, present, transitory and already past. He has become free for the future, for encounters in which he will experience God's grace ever anew as a gift from the outside.[4]

Other commentators, without Bultmann's originality, have also drawn attention to the Stoic use of the term but have been careful to point out that Paul was quite un-Stoic in claiming that it was Christ who supplied the power by which Paul could live as he did. Yet others have recognized that, while the term was used by Stoics (and Cynics), it "had a wider currency than simply that of a technical expression in the Cynic-Stoic (*sic*) school," and that Paul transformed the term.[5] These interpretations generally focus on the word, rather than the larger context of the text in Philippians. And they almost never give serious attention to the fact that αὐτάρκεια frequently appeared as part of larger complexes of ideas, some of which are also present in Paul's discussion here. One of the commonplace discussions in which self-sufficiency was often taken up was that of friendship.

## Friendship Language in Philippians

The importance of friendship in ancient society needs no extended discussion, and its importance has become increasingly clear to NT scholars

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[3] Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity*, 185.
[4] Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity*, 186.
[5] Ralph P. Martin, *Philippians* (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1976), 162, referring to Jan N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (NovTSup 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 113–114; Marvin R. Vincent, *The Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon* (ICC 37; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897), 143; Wilhelm Michaelis, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Philipper* (THKNT 11; Leipzig: Deichert, 1935), 70; Francis W. Beare, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians* (HNTC; New York: Harper, 1959), 152–153.

in recent years. For instance, a group in the Society of Biblical Literature, recently organized by John Fitzgerald to study Hellenistic moral philosophy and early Christianity, in its 1991 session devoted seven hours to the examination of friendship in a wide selection of ancient writers and documents, and in 1992 devoted three papers to Phil 4:10–20 | from the perspective of ancient discussions of friendship.[6] I shall draw attention to the language of friendship in Phil 4:10–20, but before doing so, I briefly point to the occurrence of such language in other parts of the letter. Paul's use of this language is in fact at the heart of his strategy in dealing with the problems faced by his readers.[7] 815

Two short definitions of friendship, occurring already in Aristotle, are used by Paul in Philippians: friends are people of one soul (1:27; cf. 2:2), and they think the same thing (2:2; 4:2); a third one, that friends have all things in common, is reflected in Paul's repeated concern with sharing in the letter (1:5, 7; 2:1).[8] In addition, numerous clichés from the literature on friendship are scattered throughout the letter: friends rejoice together (1:4, 18, 25; 2:2, 28, 29; 3:1; 4:1, 4, 10),[9] have confidence in each other because of their constancy and loyalty (1:6, 14, 25; 2:24),[10] defer to each other (2:8, 17, 27, 30),[11] and engage in mutual enterprises (note the cognates with σύν: συνεργός, 2:25; 4:3; συναθλέω, 1:27; 4:2; συστραπώτης, 2:25; σύζυγος, 4:3; συγκοινονός, 2:8, 17, 27, 30). The point is that 4:10–20 is not unique in using

[6] Ken L. Berry, "The Function of Friendship Language in Philippians 4:10–20" (Unpub. paper, 1992); John T. Fitzgerald, "Philippians 4 in Light of Some Ancient Discussions of Friendship" (Unpub. paper, 1992); John Reumann, "Philippians, Especially Chapter 4, as a 'Letter of Friendship,'" (Unpub. paper, 1992). I am particularly indebted to Berry, who deals with some of the same material I do.

[7] See also L. Michael White, "Morality Between Two Worlds: A Paradigm of Friendship in Philippians," in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 201–215.

[8] Clichés describing friendship are conveniently collected by Gottfried Bohnenblust, "Beiträge zum Topos Περὶ φιλίας." (Inaug. Diss., University of Bonn; Berlin: Gustav Schade [Otto Francke], 1905). μία ψυχή: Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.8.2.1168b7–10; Diogenes Laertius 5.20; Plutarch, *Amic. mult.* 96E; cf. Acts 4:36; τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν: Cicero, *Amic.* 15, 16, 21; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 34.20; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ant. rom.* 4.20.4.2; 7.59.7.5, 9; 8.15.1.6; κοινὰ τὰ φίλων: Plato, *Lysis* 207C; Cicero, *Off.* 1.51; Diogenes Laertius 8.10; cf. Acts 4:32.

[9] On this commonplace in letters, see Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 61, 65, 83, 99, who provides examples.

[10] Cicero, *Amic.* 33–34, 64–65; Plutarch, *Amic. mult.* 95AB; *Adul. amic.* 52A–53B. See further, Fritz-Arthur Steinmetz, *Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios: Nach einer Analyse von Ciceros 'Laelius de amicita'* (PMTKA 3; Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1967), 116–123.

[11] Cicero, *Amic.* 34, 69–73.

friendship language, but is in fact the culmination of a letter that employs such language from its very beginning.

## Friendship Language in Philippians 4:10–20

Modern scholarship has interpreted 4:10–20 as Paul's thank you note for a financial contribution he had received from the Philippians, but has then found it difficult to fit this text into the remainder of the canonical letter or the historical situation that the canonical letter may be taken to presuppose. The frustration caused by Paul's "*danklose Dank*,"[12] expressed so late in the letter, has contributed to a preparedness | to view these verses as a thank you note written on an earlier occasion, which a later redactor combined with a number of other fragments to compose the letter in the form in which we now have it.[13] I do not wish here to address in detail the matter of the letter's integrity; suffice it to say that I think the letter in its present shape makes perfectly good sense. My interest is rather to point out that 4:10–20 contains a number of the clichés of friendship also found elsewhere in the letter, and that it is reasonable to attempt to understand the passage in light of Paul's playing on the theme of friendship. Let me just note a few of those themes which will assist us in gaining a firmer grasp on Paul's intention.

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Basic to ancient friendship was the notion of sharing, including sharing the adversity encountered by a friend. Cicero says, "Friendship adds a brighter radiance to prosperity and lessens the burden of adversity by dividing and sharing it" (*Amic.* 22); one may have pride in aiding a friend and sharing his dangers (Lucian, *Tox.* 7). So Paul speaks of the Philippians as sharing his affliction (4:14).

Friends also shared benefits, including those of a material sort, and this "mutual interchange is ... inseparable from friendship" (Cicero, *Amic.* 26). Commercial language, for example, that of credits and debits, taken from

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[12] A description by Martin Dibelius, *An die Thessalonicher I–II, An die Philipper* (HNT 11; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1937), 95, often repeated, most recently by Markus Schiefer Ferrari, *Die Sprache des Leids in den paulinischen Peristasenkatalogen* (SBB 23; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1991), 271. Gerald W. Peterman, "'Thankless Thanks': The Epistolary Social Convention in Philippians 4:10–20," *TynBul* 42 (1991): 261–270, has suggested that Paul follows a convention according to which one withheld verbal gratitude from social intimates. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, 61, refers to the commonplace that friends need not verbally express their thanks.

[13] For discussion, see John T. Fitzgerald, "Philippians, Epistle to the," *ABD* 5 (1992): 318–326.

the terminology of accountancy, was used to describe this interchange (Cicero, *Amic.* 26). The obligation to share could result in cold calculation, however, and Cicero warned against it: "It surely is calling friendship to a very close and petty accounting to require it to keep an exact balance of credits and debits (*ratio acceptorum et datorum*). I think that true friendship is richer and more abundant than that and does not narrowly scan the reckoning lest it pay more than it has received" (*Amic.* 58). Paul uses exactly the same language when in 4:15 he writes of the Philippians who had shared with him in giving and receiving (λόγος δόσεως καὶ λήμψεως = *ratio acceptorum et datorum*).

Seneca reflects another concern about sharing one's friendship when he considers when one should return a benefit. There is a fine line to be drawn. One does not want to be gauche and return a benefit too promptly. "He who hastens at all odds to make a return shows the feeling, not of a person that is grateful, but of a debtor. And, to put it briefly, he who is too eager to pay his debt is unwilling to be indebted, and he who is unwilling to be indebted is ungrateful" (*Ben.* 4.40.5). That does not mean, however, that one should delay in returning a benefit. Seneca again: "No gratitude is felt for a benefit when it has lingered long in the hands of him who gives it.... Even though some delay should intervene, let us avoid in every way the appearance of having deliberately delayed; hesitation is the next thing to refusing, and gains no gratitude" (*Ben.* 2.1.2). But it is otherwise when circumstances prevent | one from reciprocating: "I am not responsible for the delay if I lack either the opportunity or the means" (*Ben.* 4.40.3). 817

I suggest that it is in the context of such discussions of friendship that we should understand Phil 4:10. The understanding of v. 10 reflected by the RSV has led to the consternation about the verse. That translation reads, "I rejoice in the Lord greatly that now at length you have revived your concern for me; you were indeed concerned for me, but you had no opportunity." Ralph Martin illustrates the difficulties commentators have with the verse. He thinks v. 10a is a "roundabout and oblique allusion to the church's gift" which has caused scholars to describe it as Paul's "thankless thanks."[14] Martin surmises that Paul wrote in this way because he "felt a certain embarrassment over money matters, and that his ambiguous way of writing reflects something of a conflict between his desire to express gratitude for the gift received both recently and earlier (v. 15) and

[14] Martin, *Philippians*, 160.

a concern to show himself superior to questions of depending on others for financial support."[15]

I wish to argue that once one recognizes the conventions about friendship with which 4:10–20 is replete, Paul is not roundabout or oblique, nor does he write a thankless thanks, nor is he embarrassed about money matters. What he does, rather, is to draw out, with the aid of such conventions, the significance of the gift as an act by which he and his readers had been drawn more closely together.

To begin with, Paul affirms that the Philippians had been concerned for him, had shown that concern on more than one occasion, and done so concretely from the time of his earliest association with them (vv. 15–16). Furthermore, he interprets the delay in their most recent contribution as due to a lack of opportunity, thus letting them know that he does not think they had deliberately delayed or hesitated. Seneca had said that no gratitude was felt for a benefit when it was long delayed. Paul, on the other hand, presuming that there was good reason for the delay, rejoiced greatly for their expressed concern. So, delay there had been, but rather than chiding them for it, Paul interprets it as failing to thwart the friendly intentions of his readers.

The positive way in which Paul interprets the Philippians' action is further evident in his use of ἀναθάλλειν, translated "revive" in the RSV ("now at length you have revived your concern for me"). I choose to translate ἀνεθάλετε τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ φρονεῖν (4:10) as "you have bloomed again, so far as your care for me is concerned." Commentators and lexicographers agree that this rendering is possible, even if most of them prefer another. My translation is influenced by my perception of the language of friendship in this letter. It is not unusual in such language to use agricultural or horticultural metaphors in describing friendship and its benefits. So Cicero 818 | says that friendship is "desirable, not because we are influenced by the hope of gain, but because its entire fruit is in the love itself" (*Amic.* 31). And the response to an unsought kindness, he says elsewhere, should be to "imitate the fields, which return more than they receive" (*Off.* 1.15.48). Such language describes the generosity and lack of calculation with which true friends render benefits to each other. If understood thus, Paul's use of ἀναθάλλειν is intended as a compliment of the spontaneity and good will with which the Philippians made the contribution rather than as chiding for finally having ceased their neglect of him. In other words, rather than

[15] Martin, *Philippians*, 161.

continuing to draw attention to the timing of the gift, as he had with ἤδη ποτέ ("now finally"), Paul prefers to drive to the disposition that led to the contribution. The same thing is seen in his affirmation in v. 17 that rather than seek the gift, he seeks the fruit that accrues to their credit.[16] So, rather than beginning the discussion of the Philippians' gift in the awkward fashion often attributed to him, Paul in fact does so positively, in a complimentary manner indebted to the discussions of friendship. Such discussions also inform vv. 11–13, the immediate context for his claim in v. 11 that he is αὐτάρκης.

## A More General View of Αὐτάρκεια

Before examining Phil 4 more closely, I wish to draw attention to the idea of self-sufficiency, particularly in its non-technical meaning. I confine myself to the Cynics and Pythagoreans, who are adequate for my argument.[17]

Audrey Rich summarizes the Cynic view as follows:

> To Diogenes the Cynic, αὐτάρκεια meant, broadly speaking, two things: on the physical plane, contentment with the bare necessities of life; and on the spiritual level, complete detachment from the world and worldly values. The αὐτάρκης was the man who had dispensed with the superfluous in every department of life and reduced his needs to a minimum. All that he required for his material well-being was food, | shelter and clothing of the meanest 819

[16] Attention has already been drawn to this type of language by Martin Ebner, *Leidenslisten und Apostelbrief: Untersuchungen zu Form, Motivik und Funktion der Peristasenkatalogen bei Paulus* (FB 66; Würzburg: Echter, 1991), 349 n. 118, who also points (348 n. 102) to καρπός (viz., *fructus*) in Cicero, *Fam.* 13.22.2; 50.2; 65.2; *Amic.* 31 (see also 22); Aristotle, *Ep.* 3.

[17] The literature on self-sufficiency is immense. Useful general discussions are P. Wilpert, "Autarkie," *RAC* 1 (1950): 1039–1050; Hannah Rabe, "Autarkie, autark," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (ed. Joachim Ritter et al.; Basel: Schwabe, 1971), 1:685–691; Rüdiger Vischer, *Das einfache Leben: Wort- und motivgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu einem Wertbegriff der antiken Literatur* (SAW 11; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), 60–87; Ebner, *Leidenslisten und Apostelbrief*, 338–343. For the Cynics, see Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus* (HB 1.40; Munich: W. Fink, 1979), 148–206, esp. 155–158, 184–198. While it is always important to do justice to the differences between philosophical schools on a particular matter, there was nevertheless a tendency toward a vulgarization of philosophical ethics. On the phenomenon, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333, esp. 332. [*Light*, 2:675–749] It may be that people were no longer interested in the philosophical foundations of such moral topics (thus Albrecht Dihle, "Ethik," *RAC* 6 [1966]: 646–796, esp. 666; cf. 652–654), yet their philosophical allegiances nevertheless provided distinct perspectives on the common coin of moral discourse. It is sufficient for my immediate purpose to draw attention to common elements in that discourse.

> sort; his spiritual needs could be satisfied by virtue alone, the possession of which was sufficient to ensure happiness. The Cynic, then, had no desire for wealth, knowledge, pleasure or friendship. In his mind all these would be classed together as unnecessary luxuries. Nothing, in fact, that was to be derived from any source external to himself had any value for him or could affect him in any way. The Cynic aimed at αὐτάρκεια as it was exemplified in Diogenes, and his motive in doing so was obvious. Self-sufficiency alone, in the Cynic view, can give security and immunise man against the ills inflicted by Fortune.[18]

Self-sufficiency in its most uncompromising form continued to be the ideal of many Cynics. A few examples illustrate this attitude. The Cynic in the pseudo-Lucianic *Cyniscus* (15) prays:

> I pray that I may not need bedclothes any more than the lions, nor expensive fare than the dogs. But may I be αὐτάρκης in having for my bed the whole earth, may I consider the universe my house, and choose for food that which is easiest to procure. Gold and silver I do not need, neither I nor any of my friends. For from the desire of these grow up all men's ills—civic strife, wars, conspiracies and murders. All these have as their fountainhead the desire for more. But may this desire be far from us, and never may I reach out for more (πλεονεξία) than my share, but be able to put up with less than my share.

Another example is provided by the rigorous Cynic Demetrius, the friend of Seneca, and thus a contemporary of Paul. According to Seneca, Demetrius used to scorn theory and scientific speculation because they served no practical purpose. For example, Demetrius claimed that people given to gluttony and lust could not know true pleasure. True pleasure, he said, comes, not from the hedonistic life, but comes from on high and is

> constant, serene, always unclouded, (and) is experienced by the man who is skilled in the laws of gods and men.... Such a man rejoices in the present, and puts no faith in the future; for he who leans upon uncertainties can have no sure support. Free, therefore, from the great anxieties that rack the mind, there is nothing that he hopes for or covets (*cupit*), and, content (*contentus*) with what he has, he does not plunge into what is doubtful. And do not suppose that he is content with a little, for all things are really his as a wise man.[19]

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[18] Audrey N.M. Rich, "The Cynic Conception of αὐτάρκεια," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 9 (1956): 23–29, esp. 23.

[19] Seneca, *Ben.* 7.2.4–5. For Demetrius's freedom from want, see Margarethe Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaizerzeitlichen Popularphilosophie* (PhAnt 36; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), 20–31, and further, on his philosophy, Jan F. Kindstrand, "Demetrius the Cynic," *Phil* 124 (1980): 83–98.

A reaction against the austere Cynicism represented by Demetrius had already set in two centuries earlier. Bion of Borysthenes represented this milder strain of Cynicism. The term αὐτάρκεια does not occur in the surviving fragments of his work; of greater significance is that he represents the attitude of this type of Cynicism toward the world which became widespread. For such Cynics, αὐτάρκεια was not so much a stern renunciation of the world as an attempt to adapt oneself to the | world and changing 820 circumstances just as an actor adapts himself to the varied roles he has to play.[20] Here self-sufficiency becomes synonymous with the widely used phrases ἀρκεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, "to be satisfied with what is at hand," and χρᾶσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, "to make do with what is at hand."[21]

How self-sufficiency was understood in this sense appears from the tractate Περὶ Αὐταρκείας by Teles, in which Teles is primarily concerned with the wise man's attitude toward poverty. Teles develops the theme that the wise man adapts himself to circumstances, and that he is not really in want of things since he has learned to be satisfied with what is at hand. As the good actor performs well whatever part the poet assigns him, so the good man acts well whatever role Fortune should lay upon him. The good man therefore does not fight poverty, for it does not really deprive him of the necessities of life. The hungry man, for instance, eats with greater relish than the man who habitually stuffs himself. The good man does not blame the circumstances in which he finds himself, nor does he attempt to change them, but prepares himself to adapt to them, just as sailors prepare themselves for the sea. They do not attempt to change the wind and sea, but prepare themselves to turn with them. In the same way, the good man uses what is at hand and so is self-sufficient. He lives with the circumstances allotted to him. If he deals with them in one way they will appear favorable and easy, but if in another, they will appear harsh. This αὐτάρκεια, then, is not a withdrawing into oneself, but an acceptance of one's circumstances and a concern to discover value in them.[22]

Characteristic of these Cynic attitudes is their individualism; only very seldom is the focus wide enough to include anyone else. Other

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[20] See the discussion in Jan F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (AUU: SGU 11; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976), 64–67.

[21] For ἀρκεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, see Xenophon, *Symp.* 4.42; Teles, *Fr.* 4A (38, 10–11; 41, 12 Hense); Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.1.27; cf. Heb 13:5; 1 Tim 6:8. For χρᾶσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, see Philo, *Prob.* 122; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 30.33; Plutarch, *Exil.* 606D.

[22] Teles, *Frg.* 4B; text and translation in Edward N. O'Neil, *Teles* (*the Cynic Teacher*) (SBLTT 11; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), 48–54.

philosophers, however, did take into consideration the social dimension. Note, for example, the way the ideal king, who is taken to be the paragon of self-sufficiency, is described in a tractate on kingship attributed to the Pythagorean Ecphantus:

> In so far as (the ideal king) has a sacred and divine mentality he will cause all good things, but nothing that is evil. And he will clearly be just, one who has κοινωνία with all. For κοινωνία consists in equality (ἰσότης), and while in the distribution of equality justice plays the most important part, yet κοινωνία has its share. For it is impossible to be unjust while giving a share of equality, or to give a share of equality and not be κοινωνός. And could anyone doubt that the self-sufficient man is self-controlled? For extravagance is the mother of self-indulgence, which in turn is the mother of insolence (ὕβρις), from which most human ills arise. But self-sufficiency does not beget extravagance or her brood. Rather, self-sufficiency, being a primal | entity, leads all things, but is itself led by nothing, and precisely this is a property alike of God and the king himself, to be the ruler, but to be ruled by no one.... In ruling over men and in controlling his own life he uses one and the same virtue, not amassing acquisitions on account of any lack, for his personal service, but doing as one does in a life of action according to nature. For although κοινωνία exists, each man nevertheless lives sufficient unto himself. For in conducting his life the self-sufficient man needs nothing outside himself; and if he must live an active life, and take other factors into account, he nonetheless will keep his self-sufficiency. For as he will have his friends as a result of his own virtue, so in making use of them he acts in accordance with no other virtue than what he uses also in his own life.[23]

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For our purpose, it is important to notice that αὐτάρκεια has become widely used, by people of many persuasions, most frequently without the intellectual or psychological baggage of Stoicism. It is also of interest that the non-Cynic self-sufficient man is concerned with κοινωνία, φιλία, and virtue, and that in his social relations his self-sufficiency consists in equality. As self-sufficient, he lacks nothing. He takes into consideration the circumstances under which he lives, but nevertheless remains self-sufficient.

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[23] This extract of Stobaeus (*Flor.* 4.7.66 [4:278, 22 – 279, 20 W-H]) is printed in Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A. Humaniora 30.1; Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1965), 83, 18–84, 8. For this and other Neopythagorean tractates on kingship, see Erwin R. Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” *YCS* 1 (1928): 52–102.

## Friendship and Self-Sufficiency

Below the surface of Ecphantus's text shimmers a problem that becomes overt in discussions of friendship: how could a friend claim self-sufficiency and still participate in the exchange of benefits, which, we have noted, was central to friendship? The problem was discussed with great regularity, particularly in connection with the motives or reasons for friendship. A variety of reasons were given, two of which concern us. The highest form of friendship, according to Aristotle, was that which arose between two people because of their similarity in character or virtue (*Eth. nic.* 8.3.1–9.1156a6–1156b33). A less noble reason, advocated by Epicurus and roundly rejected by others, especially the Stoics, was utilitarian, namely, that friendship arises out of need or for the attainment of certain goals, such as happiness or tranquility.[24]

Cicero shows us how these two conflicting views had entered non-technical discussion by the first century BC. "Virtue," he says, "is the parent and preserver of friendship and without virtue friendship cannot exist at all. To proceed, then, let us interpret the word 'virtue' by the familiar usage of our everyday life and speech, and not in pompous phrase apply it to the precise standards which certain philosophers use; and let us include in the number of good men those who are so considered... | who satisfy 822 the ordinary standard of life" (*Amic.* 21; cf. 33, 100). "It is far from being true that friendship is cultivated because of need (*indigentiam*); rather it is cultivated by those who are most abundantly blessed with wealth and power and especially with virtue, which is man's best defence; by those least in need of another's help; and by those most generous and most given to acts of kindness.... It is not the case, therefore, that friendship attends upon advantage, but advantage (*utilitas*) attends upon friendship" (*Amic.* 51).

Friends show goodwill and affection for each other, rejoice with each other, and share the burdens of adversity: "Friends, though they be absent, are at hand; though in need, yet abound; though weak, are strong; and—harder saying still—though dead, are yet alive" (*Amic.* 23). All this being so, how can friends be said to be self-sufficient?

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[24] See Diogenes Laertius 10.120; Phillip Mitsis, *Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability* (CSCP 48; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 98–128, for the Epicureans. For rejection of their position, see Cicero, *Amic.* 27–28, 30; Seneca, *Ep.* 9.17.

Cicero's answer is that:

> To the extent that a man relies upon himself and is so fortified by virtue and wisdom that he is dependent on no one and considers all his possessions to be within himself, in that degree is he most conspicuous for seeking out and cherishing friendships. Now what need did Africanus have of me? By Hercules! None at all. And I, assuredly, had no need of him either, but I loved him because of a certain admiration for his virtue, and he, in turn, loved me, because, it may be, of the fairly good opinion which he had of my character. (*Amic.* 30)

Yes, "the wise man is self-sufficient. Nevertheless, he desires friends, neighbors, and associates no matter how much he is sufficient unto himself.... In this sense the wise man is self-sufficient, that he can do without friends, not that he desires to do without them" (Seneca, *Ep.* 9.3, 5).

So, it is on the basis of virtue, understood in the ordinary, general sense, that a friendship is formed. One seeks out the person who is worthy of one's friendship, Plutarch says, and attaches oneself to him (*Amic. mult.* 94E). The more fully one understands this, the more fully one grasps the truth that one does not develop friendships because of need; indeed, true friendship does not proceed from need but virtue, the virtuous person seeking a friend who is like himself.

## PHILIPPIANS 4

Now, how does Philippians 4 read in light of all this? We begin with v. 8, Paul's exhortation that his readers reflect on a list of moral qualities which constitutes the most Greek verse in all of Paul's letters. That ἀρετή, virtue, occurs in the climax of the list should not disconcert us; we remember that Cicero spoke of virtue in an ordinary sense, descriptive of a good person.[25] The qualities Paul enumerates are precisely those which would universally characterize such a person. Parallel to what the Philippians are to reflect on (λογίζεσθε) in v. 8 is what they are to do | (πράσσετε) in v. 9, and that is what they have heard, received, and heard from Paul. In other words, Paul is to continue to be the paradigm for their moral conduct. While it is

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[25] Ἀρετή, understood in the Greek sense of moral achievement or excellence, appears contradictory to Paul's ethics. See Wolfgang Schrage, *The Ethics of the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 217–218, and the literature cited there. Siegfried Wibbing, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderes Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte* (BZNW 25; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1959), 103, correctly thinks that Paul uses the word here in a general sense.

not explicitly stated that Paul embodies the virtues enumerated, the list functions to delineate the paradigm he presents. Cicero would say that the quality of character without which friendship could not exist was present in Paul and that the Philippians had accepted him as worthy of their friendship.

In v. 10, I have argued, Paul compliments them for the friendly disposition with which they had recently shown their friendship to him. Then, in vv. 11–13, he is at great pains to make certain they understand that he did not consider their gift in a utilitarian manner: Paul had rejoiced over their gift, which should not, however, be taken to mean that he rejoiced because his need was met, for he was αὐτάρκης. Self-sufficiency is thus introduced in a discussion of friendly social relations. The circumstances in which Paul learned to be αὐτάρκης are illustrated by a series of six infinitives, which reveal an understanding of self-sufficiency very much like that of Teles: Whatever the circumstances one encounters, go with them. Paul can do so because Christ empowers him.[26]

There is no Stoic introspection present here despite the long exegetical tradition that has brought the Stoic notion into play. Paul is essentially concerned with personal relationships rather than introspection. His purpose, here in the conclusion of his letter, is to strengthen the tie of friendship that binds him and his readers by raising the matter of their gift to a higher plane, that of friendship. But, in denying that he viewed their gift in terms of need, Paul stresses his sufficiency to such a degree that the value of the gift could be put in question. Anticipating this, Paul qualifies (πλήν) his statement, once more with a cliché of friendship: they nevertheless did well in sharing in his affliction (v. 14), thus acting in the way friends act.

To say that Paul describes his relations with the Philippians in the clichés of friendship and that he does not indulge in introspection is not to imply that there is no other dimension to that relationship. Verses 10–20 open with a thanksgiving to the Lord for the Philippians' concern for him (v. 10), and the section closes with a doxology (v. 20). Within this *inclusio* Paul expresses the conviction that as he was empowered to be αὐτάρκης in all circumstances, God out of his riches will supply the Philippians' every need (v. 19). Indeed, what Paul had already received was a sacrificial gift acceptable to God (v. 18). As he does elsewhere, then, Paul uses the moral

[26] The formal features of Paul's statement heightens the significance of ἐν τῷ ἐνδυναμοῦντί με. See Schiefer Ferrari, *Die Sprache des Leids*, 273–277.

824 philosophical language of his day, but places it within a larger framework | quite foreign to the philosophical tradition he uses.[27]

Paul's deft use of the language of friendship shows that he was fully aware of how the subject was being discussed and was able to use the language for his own purpose. What strikes one, however, is that he does not actually use φίλος or φιλία. This omission could only have been deliberate, but why did Paul avoid these words? He does so elsewhere, too, and various reasons have been suggested for the omission.

Paul may in general have avoided these words because of the anthropocentric connotations they carried, whereas in his view Christian relationships were determined by God.[28] There may, however, also have been local circumstances that contributed to his avoidance. He may have admitted them from 1 Thess 5:9–12 because he wanted his readers to avoid social attitudes like those associated with the Epicureans, which were tied up with φιλία.[29] Perhaps he did not use them in his correspondence with the Corinthians because he refused their offer of friendship with its attendant obligations.[30] Something similar may also have been behind his omission in Philippians; it is likely, I think, that Epaphroditus, with the Philippians' contribution had brought a letter from them in which they expressed their desire, as Paul's friends, to meet his needs.[31] Paul's denial that he is speaking καθ' ὑστέρησιν could then mark a move to a yet higher level of discussion that even dispenses with φίλος and φιλία. But the matter deserves closer scrutiny.

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27 For numerous other examples where he does the same thing, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989). See also Stanley K. Stowers, "Friends and Enemies in the Politics of Heaven," in *Pauline Theology I: Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, Philemon* (ed. Jouette M. Bassler; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 117–121, on friendship and theology in the letter.

28 Jan N. Sevenster, "Waarom spreekt Paulus nooit van vrienden en vriendschap?" *NTT* 9 (1954/1955): 356–363.

29 Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophical Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 104.

30 Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987).

31 Abraham J. Malherbe, "Did the Thessalonians Write to Paul?" in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn.* (ed. Robert T. Fortna and Beverly R. Gaventa; Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 254 and n. 44. [*Light*, 1:247–260]

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

# THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF A *TOPOS* (LUKE 12:13–34)*

Commentators on Luke 12:13–34 have not done justice to v. 15, Jesus's warning against covetousness. Two shortcomings, in particular, have been an overly narrow focus in identifying the tradition of moral instruction behind this verse and the relationship of the verse to the larger section, vv. 13–34.

Most often, attention has been drawn to Jewish instruction on greed, such as Sir 11:18–19 LXX and *T. Jud.* 18–19, to illuminate our text.[1] The purpose of this essay is to introduce ancient Greek and Latin deliberations on greed into the discussion and to demonstrate Luke's awareness of the conventions used in those deliberations. That πλεονεξία was a common *topos* in moral instruction which may be relevant to our understanding has either not been recognized,[2] or, when the pagan material has been adduced, its importance has not been fully exploited.[3]

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* Originally published in *NovT* 38 (1996): 123–135.

[1] The fullest treatment is Egbert W. Seng, "Der reiche Tor: Eine Untersuchung von Lk xii 16–21 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung form- und motivgeschichtlicher Aspekte," *NovT* 10 (1978): 136–155, followed by Friedrich W. Horn, *Glaube und Handeln in der Theologie des Lukas* (GTA 26; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 61; already in Walter Grundmann, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (2d ed.; THKNT 3; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1961), 257; Jacques Dupont, *Les béatitudes* (3 vols.; new ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969–1973), 3:113, 118; Josef Ernst, *Das Evangelium nach Lukas* (RNT; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1977), 398. *First Enoch* 97:8–10 has also come under discussion, for example, by Matthias Klinghardt, *Gesetz und Volk Gottes: Das lukanische Verständnis des Gesetzes nach Herkunft, Funktion und seinem Ort in der Geschichte des Urchristentums* (WUNT 2.32; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1988), 46–49.

[2] Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Luke* (5th ed.; ICC 28; New York: Scribner's, 1902), 323; I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 522; David P. Seccombe, *Possessions and the Poor in Luke-Acts* (SNTSU B.6; Linz: A. Fuchs, 1982), 139–140; Eduard Schweizer, *The Good News according to Luke* (trans. David E. Green; Atlanta: John Knox, 1984; German orig. 1982), 207; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *The Gospel according to Luke* (2 vols.; AB 28; New York: Doubleday, 1981–1985), 2:970.

[3] Horn, *Glaube und Handeln*, 60; Luise Schottroff and Wolfgang Stegemann, *Jesus and the Hope of the Poor* (trans. Matthew J. O'Connell; Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1986; German orig. 1978), 96–98; Luke Timothy Johnson, *The Gospel of Luke* (SP 3; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 1991), 198; John Nolland, *Luke 9:21–18:34* (WBC 35B; Dallas: Word, 1993), 695.

124 | Despite one judgment that the warning against covetousness "does not quite fit either the question (v. 14) or the narrative that follows,"[4] the parable of the Rich Fool (vv. 16–21) is generally thought to illustrate or comment on v. 15.[5] The connection of vv. 16–21 to vv. 22–34, however, has been more difficult to discern: the latter is sometimes regarded as a contrast to what precedes,[6] or, on the contrary, as logically connected to it,[7] or is not discussed at all.[8] The argument has indeed been made that the entire section, vv. 13–34, should be seen as a coherent unit created by Luke out of traditional material available to him. In this redactional approach to the larger unit, stress is laid on the importance of Luke's formulation of v. 15b as an anticipation of vv. 16–20 and on v. 21, which summarizes in anticipation the conclusion to the larger section, viz., vv. 33–34.[9] On this reading, which appears to me correct, there is a logical unity that can be discerned in vv. 13–34, but the identification of that unity does not sufficiently appreciate the extent to which the entire text is shot through with items from the *topos* on greed.

In what follows, I shall first give attention to this *topos*, emphasizing those elements in it that are reflected in the Lukan text, and shall then turn briefly to vv. 13–34.

## The *Topos* περὶ πλεονεξίας

By *topos* I mean a fairly systematic treatment of a topic of moral instruction which uses clichés, maxims, short definitions, etc., rather than the latter themselves. A particular writer's immediate purpose in writing on the topic may cause him to give preference to certain elements in such standardized presentations of the topic, or his own philosophic perspective may determine the individual viewpoint from which he treats the topic.[10] The

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[4] Schweizer, *Good News according to Luke*, 207. See also Seccombe, *Possessions and the Poor*, 139, who thinks that vv. 13–21 "constitute a manifest interruption and lend themselves to be treated in isolation."

[5] Plummer, *Gospel according to Luke*, 323; Fitzmyer, *Gospel according to Luke*, 2:971; Seccombe, *Possessions and the Poor*, 141; Horn, *Glaube und Handeln*, 61–63.

[6] Marshall, *Gospel of Luke*, 525.

[7] Plummer, *Gospel according to Luke*, 325.

[8] Fitzmyer, *Gospel according to Luke*, 2:975.

[9] Dupont, *Les béatitudes*, 3:183–185; Horn, *Glaube und Handeln*, 58–68.

[10] See Hermann Wankel, "Alle Menschen müssen sterben: Variationen eines Topos der griechischen Literatur," *Hermes* 111 (1983): 129–154; Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 144–145.

discussion of πλεονεξία that follows is limited in that | it does not take note 125 of the individual differences between the authors cited; for our restricted purpose it is sufficient to identify the themes that appear with some regularity in the discussions of covetousness. For the sake of convenience, Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17, which catches many of the themes in which we are interested, will serve as representative of such discussions.[11]

Dio begins his treatment of covetousness by apologizing for saying things everyone knows; his goal, however, is not to inform but to make people change by choosing a better way of life (1–6). Everyone knows that covetousness "is neither expedient nor honorable, but the cause of the greatest evils" (6), not only to oneself, but to one's neighbor as well (7). There are thus two aspects to covetousness, the personal and the social.

## A Social Vice

Dio turns first to the social dimension of the vice. He uses a modified form of Euripides, *Phoen.* 531–540, to sketch the antithesis between covetousness and equality (ἰσότης) (8–9), the latter establishing "a common bond of friendship and peace for all toward one another," whereas quarrels, internal strife, and wars are due to nothing else then the desire for more (τὴν τοῦ πλείονος ἐπιθυμίαν), with the result that each side is deprived even of a sufficiency (10).[12] The gods exemplify the quality of keeping to one's own place (11), and there are many ancient and modern examples of the dire consequences of greed (12–15). That God by his very nature punishes the covetous is illustrated by examples from Spartan and Athenian history (16–17).

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For bibliography, see Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333, esp. 320 n. 252. [*Light*, 2:675–749]

[11] The Loeb Classical Library editions and translations of all ancient authors will be used, where available. For discussions of covetousness and wealth, see Gerhard Delling, "πλεονέκτης, κτλ," *TDNT* 6 (1968): 266–274; Friedrich Hauck and Wilhelm Kasch, "πλοῦτος, κτλ," *TDNT* 6 (1968): 318–332, neither of which, however, gives a clear picture of the *topos* as such. For further identification of passages which deal with covetousness and wealth, see the relevant indices in André Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne: Librairie Payot, 1926) and Léonce Paquet, *Les cyniques grecs. Fragments et témoignages* (ColPhil 4; rev., corr. and expanded ed.; Ottawa: Les Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1988). An extensive discussion of covetousness is to be found in David A. Holgate, "Prodigality, Liberality and Meanness in the Parable of the Prodigal Son: A Greco-Roman Perspective on Luke 15:11–32" (Ph.D. diss., Rhodes University [South Africa], 1993), esp. 70–109. For the vice in Latin literature, see esp. Horace, *Sat.* 1.1, and the commentary on it by Hans Herter: "Zur ersten Satire des Horaz," *RhMus* 94 (1951): 1–42.

[12] On the philosophical ideal of ἰσότης, see Delling, "πλεονέκτης," 267–268.

### 126 | The Proper Use of Wealth and Superfluity

Dio then turns to consider the personal side of covetousness, beginning with some comments on wealth and its uses (18). It is this personal dimension that is of greatest interest to us, and contains themes that will be highlighted because of their relevance to our Lukan text.

As in the case of health, so in that of wealth, it is of advantage to sacrifice a part, for "what exceeds the right proportion (τὸ γὰρ πλέον . . . τοῦ συμμέτρου) is very troublesome" (18). Dio will return to the right proportion as it has to do with the body and its care, but for the moment he distinguishes between proper and improper wealth, a subject that naturally belongs to treatments of covetousness.

Wealth in proper proportion (μέτριος) is put to use (ἔχων τὴν χρείαν). The notion that wealth is to be put to practical use (χρεία), to meet human need (also χρεία), appears frequently in discussions of wealth and covetousness. For Plutarch, wealth is noble when used for human needs; indeed, natural wealth has a boundary, drawn around it by χρεία as by a compass.[13] Epicurus sharpened the matter further by requiring that human need be reduced to the bare essentials: "one does not become rich by adding superfluities (τὰ περιττά) to one's substance, but by cutting away much from what one needs."[14] Human needs are met when those things necessary (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα) are taken care of; anything more is superfluous (τὸ περιττόν).

One has always to be on guard, for "the craving of the superfluous (τὰ περιττά) follows close on the use of the necessities (τῇ χρείᾳ τῶν ἀναγκαίων),"[15] and the superfluities serve luxury and pleasure.[16] Plutarch does not think that it is poverty that ails a person with such a craving, but rather

> insatiability and avarice, arising from the presence in him of a false and unreflecting judgement; and unless someone removes this, like a tapeworm, from his mind (τῆς ψυχῆς), he will never cease to need superfluities—that is, to want what he does not need (δεόμενοι τῶν περιττῶν, τουτέστιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες ὧν οὐ δέονται).[17]

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[13] See Plutarch, *Per.* 16.6; *Cupid. divit.* 524F, 527B.

[14] According to Stobaeus, *Flor.* 3.17.6 (3:502, 4–6 W-H). See also Plutarch, *Comp. Arist. Cat.* 4.2: Self-sufficiency, which requires no private superfluities (τὰ περιττά), is a boon to public service.

[15] Plutarch, *Sept. sap. conv.* 159E. See also *Sol.* 2.3 for the contrast between τὰ περιττά and the χρεία τῶν ἀναγκαίων.

[16] Philo, *Ios.* 243; cf. Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 527B–D; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.84 (5:762, 12 W-H).

[17] Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 524D. See Edward N. O'Neil, "De cupiditate divitiarum (*Moralia* 523C–528D)," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. Hans Dieter

| Wealth in the right proportion (μέτριος), on the other hand, does not cause grief (λυπεῖ) to those who possess it, Dio says, but makes their lives easier and free from want. But if wealth becomes excessive, it causes far more anxieties (τὰς φροντίδας) and distress (λυπηρά) than that which passes for pleasures (τῆς δοκούσης ἡδονῆς). 127

## Pleasure and Anxiety

It is natural that wealth be associated with the pleasures it makes possible, and the moralists lost no opportunity to link covetousness and wealth with the hedonistic life.[18] In the Cynic summary of the vicious life as φιλόδοξος, φιλήδονος, and φιλοχρήματος, the two are linked,[19] and they frequently appear together in other philosophers with a moral interest.[20] For Plutarch, it is a misuse of wealth to indulge one's proclivities to pleasure.[21]

The philosophers took great delight in pointing out the irony that chasing after wealth results in a miserable life.[22] A few illustrations will suffice. Ps.-Lucian (*Cyn.* 8) claims that in the pursuit of pleasure, "you choose to have worries and troubles rather than to live a carefree life. For those many costly provisions for happiness, in which you take such pride, come to you only at the cost of great misery and hardship." Seneca (*Ep.* 115.16) exclaims:

> What tears and toil does money wring from us! Greed is wretched in that which it craves and wretched in that which it wins! Think besides of the daily worry (*sollicitudines*) which afflicts every possessor in proportion to the measure of his gain! The possession of riches means even greater agony of spirit (*maiore tormento*) than the acquisition of riches.[23]

Betz; SCHNT 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 314. See also Seneca, *Ep.* 4.11, "It is the superfluous things (*supervacua*) for which men sweat—superfluous things that wear our togas threadbare, that free us to grow old in camp, that dash us upon foreign shores. That which is enough is ready to hand."

18 See Holgate, "Prodigality, Liberality and Meanness," 122–126.

19 E.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.84; Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 18. See Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 58–59.

20 E.g., Seneca, *Ep.* 110.15; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.84, 92 (5:765, 7; 767, 10 W-H); and Cicero, *Nat. d.* 3.71; *Fin.* 2.27; 3.75; *Leg.* 1.51.

21 Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 527A–D.

22 See Hans Dieter Betz, *Essays on the Sermon on the Mount* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 104–118, who treats Matt 6:25–34 and discusses anxiety, but paints with a broad brush and does not relate anxiety specifically to discussions of covetousness and wealth.

23 See also Seneca, *Polyb.* 9.5; *Ben.* 7.2.4, on which see Margarethe Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Popularphilosophie*

Wealth, however obtained, causes grief. Palladas (according to *Anth. Gr.* 9.394) did not know what to do with it: "Gold, father of flatterers, | son of pain and care, it is fear to have thee and pain not to have thee." The wise person therefore does not contemplate a future devoted to seeking riches, but

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> rejoices in the present, and puts no faith in the future; for he who leans on uncertainties can have no sure support. Free, however, from the anxieties that rack the mind, there is nothing that he hopes for or covets, and content with what he has, he does not plunge into what is doubtful.[24]

And according to a widely circulated anecdote, Anacreon came to a decision soon after acquiring wealth. Returning a gift of gold he had received the preceding day, he said, "I hate the gift which forces me to stay awake at night."[25]

## Covetousness and the Night

Night as a time spent in worrying about wealth or when the covetous person steals from his neighbor appears often.[26] Juvenal (*Sat.* 14.295–297) sketches the picture of a man who, mad for profit, sails into the teeth of a storm: "Poor wretch (*infelix*)! On this very night perchance he will be cast out amid broken timbers and engulfed by the waves, clutching his money-belt with his left hand or his teeth." Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 16.8) similarly warns,

> You misguided man (ὦ μάταιε)! Even if everything else turns out as your heart wishes, yet what assurance have you of living even till the morrow, and not being suddenly, in the midst of everything, torn from your fancied blessing? Consequently, this is the first thing about which you should be in painful anxiety and fear (λυπεῖσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι).[27]

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(PhAnt 36; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), 24, for other references in Seneca. Cf. Juvenal, *Sat.* 14.304, "it is misery to have the guardianship of a great fortune."

[24] Seneca, *Ben.* 7.2.6.

[25] According to Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.91 (5:767, 1–4 W-H); see also *Gnom. Vat.* 72 Sternbach, and the references there for other places where the anecdote appears in the gnomological tradition. A slightly different version appears in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.78 (5:759, 12 – 760, 2 W-H). See also *Flor.* 4.31.84 (5:765, 6 W-H) for the φροντίδες αἰσχραί among those things which attend riches, and 4.31.90 (5:766, 16–21 W-H).

[26] For the former, see Gregory of Nazianzus, *Poet.* 1.2, 13–14 (PG 37:865), on which see Ulrich Beuckmann, *Gregor von Nazianz: Gegen die Habsucht* (*Carmen 1, 2, 28*) (SGKA NS 2.6; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1988); see also Horace, *Sat.* 1.1.70–79; Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 524B; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.96. On the latter, see Plutarch, *Gen. Socr.* 585B.

[27] For the uncertainty of wealth, see Lucian, *Nav.* 25–27.

Dio in this oration deals with pain (λύπη), and he does not here speak specifically of wealth or covetousness and their attendant pleasures. But his "fancied blessing (δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν)" would accommodate the | "fancied 129 pleasure (τῆς δοκούσης ἡδονῆς)" which is surpassed by the anxieties (τὰς φροντίδας) and distress (λυπηρά) caused by excessive wealth.

## Material Needs

Dio next brings into the discussion the body, a prime example of the proper proportion (τὸ σύμμετρον) and harmony that would be destroyed by overreaching (πλεονεκτεῖν). We have received a small portion (μέτρον) of life from the gods and should live accordingly, not as though we were going to live for a thousand years (20). As a host who has invited fifteen guests to a banquet does not prepare for five hundred or a thousand, so we should know that the needs of the body (τὰς τοῦ σώματος χρείας) are easily counted: we need clothing, shelter, and food (21). This reduction of human needs, characteristically Cynic, functioned widely in popular philosophy in antithesis to covetousness, wealth, and luxury.[28] Nature and the gods may have given us the entire earth to enjoy, but we are not to use everything (οὐχ . . . χρώμεθα ἅπασι), but only such as each of us needs most.[29]

Despite knowing this, however, in our greed we gather (συνάγοντες) supplies as if for an army, the majority of people in fact having in their hearts a whole army of desires (τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν). As for clothing, people do wear the right size, but they all desire (real) property (οὐσίαν) much too large for their needs.[30]

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[28] See Rüdiger Vischer, *Das Einfache Leben: Wort- und motivgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu einem Wertbegriff der antiken Literatur* (SAW 11; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), esp. 60–88. For major discussions, see Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 18A, 18B (on food) and 19 (on clothing and shelter), on which see Anton C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (rev. ed.; WTS 8; Assen: van Gorcum, 1963), 96–118; Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.*; cf. Epictetus, *Ench.* 33.7.

[29] Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 5, 7. See Cicero, *Nat. d.* 2.60, and the references gathered in Arthur S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum: Libri III* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955–1958; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 2:690–691, dealing with the notion that we receive all benefits from the gods.

[30] See Juvenal, *Sat.* 14.140–172. Commenting on *T. Benj.* 6:2, Harm W. Hollander and Marinus de Jonge (*The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. A Commentary* [SVTP 8; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985], 427) point to passages in the wisdom literature where συνάγειν is used to describe the wicked man's gathering of riches (e.g., Sir 31:3). Holgate ("Prodigality, Liberality and Meanness," 119) draws attention to Plutarch, *Sera* 563D, of a moneygrubber who did not collect (συνήγαγεν) a large fortune (οὐσίαν), but did acquire in brief space a considerable reputation for wickedness. See also Menander, *Frg.* 250 Koerte (= 301 Kock).

## The Insatiability of Covetousness

Dio concludes (22) by citing the example of Croesus, who, wishing to expose the insatiable greed of people, invited them to take whatever they
130 wished from his storehouses. They cut a ridiculous figure as, loaded | down with gold and twisted out of shape by the weight of their new acquisitions, they stumbled about. Certain people, Dio charges, are equally ridiculous because of their πλεονεξία. The insatiability of covetousness is one of the most commonly criticized characteristics of the vice, which explains why Dio ends his discourse on covetousness at its high point with the ridicule characteristic of the diatribe.[31]

## The *Topos* in Luke 12:13–34

We now return to our Lukan text simply to note the relevance of the *topos* on covetousness without going into exegetical detail, but rather confining ourselves to the flow of the narrative. It is not surprising that Luke should show an awareness of the *topos*, for elsewhere in Luke-Acts he evinces an interest in other qualities of concern to the moral philosophers, e.g., δικαιοσύνη (Acts 17:31; with ἐγκράτεια in 24:25), σωφροσύνη (Acts 26:25; with παρρησία in v. 26);[32] φιλανθρωπία (Acts 28:2); φιλανθρώπως (Acts 27:3); φιλοφρόνως (Acts 28:7); the description of the disciples as φίλοι (Acts 10:24; 27:3),[33] the view that friends have all things in common and are of one soul (Acts 4:32),[34] etc. These appear for the most part in Acts, but it is not insignificant for our purposes that the Greek proverb, "The rich have many consolations," appears in Luke 6:24, and that the parable of the Prodigal

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[31] For insatiability, see Horace, *Carm.* 3.16, 42; *Ep.* 1.2.55–56, 146–148, 155–157; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.84 (5:764, 12–15 W-H); Seneca, *Ep.* 115.17; Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 523E–524D; Juvenal, *Sat.* 14.125, 138–151. On gathering from everywhere, see Euripides, *Frg.* 419 Nauck; Seneca, *Ep.* 110.14; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.95; Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 8, and see Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 12–13.

[32] For the context, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Not in a Corner': Early Christian Apologetic in Acts 26:26," *SecCent* 5 (1985/1986): 193–210 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989], 147–183). [*Light*, 1:209–227]

[33] Cf. also Luke 12:4, and see Gustav Stählin, "φίλος, κτλ," *TDNT* 9 (1974): 159–164.

[34] See Alan C. Mitchell, "The Social Function of Friendship in Acts 2:44–47 and 4:32–37," *JBL* 111 (1992): 255–272. For other popular philosophical conventions, see Kenneth L. Cukrowski, "Pagan Polemic and Lukan Apologetic: The Function of Acts 20:17–38" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1994).

Son is replete with the language and themes belonging to the discussion of the (ab)use of wealth.[35]

## | The Setting (8:9–18; 12:3–12) 131

We begin by observing some similarities between Luke 12:2–34 and 8:9–18, Luke's interpretation and application of the parable of the Sower. For Luke, the seed is the word that is preached, the mysteries once the prerogatives of the disciples alone. Of concern to him is the way the word is appropriated by those who hear it. One class of hearers are those who hear the word, but as they go on, are choked ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν καὶ πλούτου καὶ ἡδονῶν τοῦ βίου (v. 14). The word is to be preached openly, so that it can be received in a manner that will result in bearing fruit (vv. 16–18).

The same elements appear in chapter 12, where they are treated more fully, almost as a commentary on 8:9–18. In 12:2–12 Jesus deals with the conduct of those who proclaim the word. He affirms the public nature of the proclamation (vv. 2–3), and then seeks to allay the fears of his φίλοι (vv. 4, 5, 7). As sparrows enjoy God's protection, how much more do they. As they preach, confess and defend, they are not to be anxious (μὴ μεριμνήσητε), for God through the Holy Spirit will provide them with what they are to say (vv. 11–12).

The setting for our passage (vv. 13–34) is therefore the preaching of the word, the fear and anxiety that attend it, and God's calming of the disciples' fear. Our text deals with the same issues, but now as they have to do with the lives of those who receive the word.

## The Superfluity of Covetousness (12:13–15)

Our text begins with someone from the crowd asking Jesus to divide his and his brother's inheritance between them, a request Jesus denies (vv. 13–14). Jesus considers the request to be ignobly motivated, for he responds with a warning against covetousness, and provides a reason for the warning, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ περισσεύειν τινὶ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων (v. 15). Translators and commentators have had difficulty in translating

[35] For the proverb, see Plato, *Resp.* 1.329E, and for the thought, Cicero, *Sen.* 3.8. Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 17 (93, 7–9 Hobein = 110, 20 Lutz), thinks the thought erroneous. On the Prodigal Son, see Holgate, "Prodigality, Liberality and Meanness."

this clause because of the awkward syntax and the opaqueness of the thought. Τὸ περισσεύειν is most frequently translated as "abundance" (e.g., by NRSV and NIV) and less frequently as something like "more than enough" (e.g., REV). In light of our identification above of the concern with superfluities (τὰ περιττά) when speaking of covetousness, it is likely that this is what τὸ περισσεύειν means here, and that the thought expressed is that found frequently in our *topos:* superfluities by definition exceed what is necessary for life. Understood thus, the clause would read, "because one's life is not dependent on | the superfluities of one's possessions."[36] Two further considerations support such a translation: (1) The parable of the Rich Fool that follows immediately illustrates what is in mind here, and (2) the conclusion of the larger section (v. 30) explicitly speaks of what is needed (ὅτι χρῄζετε τούτων), thus representing the second bracket of an *inclusio* which contains what is in effect a characterization of πλεονεξία.

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## Insatiability and Hedonism (12:16–21)

The parable of the Rich Fool uses the Lukan device of the soliloquy,[37] thus offering Luke's reflection on the subjective dimension of covetousness. The rich man's greed is insatiable: in a quandary about where to gather his crops (ποῦ συνάξω τοὺς καρπούς μου;), he decides to tear down his barns, build larger ones, and there gather all his grain and goods (συνάξω ἐκεῖ τὸν σῖτον καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά μου) (vv. 17–18). This is the attitude of the typical self-centered (μου), acquisitive covetous man given to gathering (συνάγειν) superfluities.

Secure in his possessions, he turns inward, assuring his soul that he has many goods laid up for many years to come (v. 19). As that which is addressed, ψυχή here stands for the entire person, the self in its totality.[38]

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[36] Cf. Luke 21:4, the rich give ἐκ τοῦ περισσεύοντος αὐτοῖς, the widow gave πάντα τὸν βίον ὃν εἶχεν. Luke maintains the traditional distinction: ζωή is life *intensive* (*vita qua vivimus*), the antithesis to death; βίος is life *extensive* (*vita quam vivimus*), here, the means by which that life is sustained. Thus Richard C. Trench, *Synonyms of the New Testament* (9th ed., 1880; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 91.

[37] On this and Luke's other uses of the device (12:42–46; 15:11–32; 16:1–8; 18:1–5; 20:9–16), see Philip Sellew, "Interior Monologue as a Narrative Device in the Parables of Luke," *JBL* 111 (1992): 239–253.

[38] See Gerhard Dautzenberg, *Sein Leben Bewahren:* Ψυχή *in den Herrenworten der Evangelien* (StANT 14; Munich: Kösel, 1966), 90. For addressing the soul, see Chariton, *Chaer.* 3.2, καρτέρησον, ψυχή, προθεσμίαν, σύντομον, ἵνα τὸν πλείω χρόνον ἀπολαύσῃς ἀσφαλοῦς ἡδονῆς, referred to by Frederick Field, *Notes on the Translation of the New Testament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899), 64.

The soul (ψυχή) and life (ζωή) are related in Greek thought, the former being the cause of the latter, and in the Old Testament, natural man is called a ψυχὴ ζῶσα (e.g., Gen 2:7, 19), so the suggestion that ζωή in v. 15 and ψυχή in vv. 19–20 are synonymous is not without merit.[39] The point at issue is whether the human self is dependent on an overabundance of material possessions. Plutarch, we saw, thought it necessary to remove this wrong judgment from the soul in order to | be free from superfluities. 133 Luke approaches the matter differently, but still uses the themes from the *topos* on covetousness.

Luke represents the insatiably covetous rich man as a hedonist. The man calls on his soul to take its rest, eat, drink, be merry (ἀναπαύου, φάγε, πίε, εὐφραίνου). With some variations, this motto was widely associated with the licentious or hedonistic life that held out no prospect for existence after death.[40] Εὐφραίνεσθαι is a favorite Lukan word, and the fact that ἀνάπαυσις appears in Sir 11:19, in connection with the covetous man, may lead to the surmise that Luke has now expressed himself partly in terms derived from his Jewish background.[41] Εὐφραίνεσθαι appears, however, in one variation of the motto,[42] and is also used elsewhere of the dissolute life.[43] What is important for our present purpose is that Luke, in line with the *topos* on covetousness, describes the man, insatiable for possessions, as a hedonist.

We noticed above the stress on the foolishness of depending on the uncertainty of wealth, sometimes expressed in an exclamation or an exclamation beginning with a vocative (*infelix*!, ὦ μάταιε), and warning that everything might be lost before the night had passed. So also Luke, with equal sharpness, has the rich man interrupted: "Fool (ἄφρων)! This night your soul is required of you; and the things you have prepared, whose will they be?" (v. 20).[44] It is God who interrupts, and the asseveration that follows is in fact a threat of judgment.

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[39] Rudolf Bultmann, "ζάω, κτλ," *TDNT* 2 (1964): 832–843. At 861 n. 241 Bultmann considers the two synonymous in vv. 15 and 20, but there is no good reason why v. 19 should not also be included.

[40] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80, esp. 76–77 (= *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 84–85) [*Light*, 1:41–51], and the extensive collection of references in Walter Ameling, "ΦΑΓΩΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΙΩΜΕΝ," *ZPE* 60 (1985): 35–43.

[41] See Dupont, *Les béatitudes*, 3:47–50, 174 n. 2.

[42] See Ameling, "ΦΑΓΩΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΙΩΜΕΝ," 39–41.

[43] See Euripides, *Alc.* 780–787; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 32.2; Aelian, *Var. hist.* 1.32; 2.18.

[44] See Horace, *Sat.* 2.3.159: The covetous man is a fool and madman (*stultus et insanus*). Ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτί may be an addition to the tradition Luke had received (cf. Luke 17:34; Acts 27:23).

Dio, too, thought that the divine punished the covetous. But there is a difference. What is really at stake appears from the concluding statement (v. 21): “So is he who lays up treasure for himself and is not rich toward God (μὴ εἰς θεὸν πλουτῶν).” Whereas the *topos* focuses on the social and subjective aspects of the vice, for Luke its viciousness consists in being self-centered (θησαυρίζων ἑαυτῷ) and not finding the goal of the endeavor to be rich in being rich toward God (μὴ εἰς θεὸν πλουτῶν). Θησαυρίζων and πλουτῶν are here synonymous, the latter describing benevolent action that gains a treasure with God. That | appears from vv. 33–34, which v. 21 anticipates.[45] The pagan *topos* also knows of using wealth for the benefit of others, e.g., Hecaton of Rhodes as quoted by Cicero (*Off.* 3.63):

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> But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity: for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state.

A noble attitude indeed, but the crucial distinction is that the formulation of this altruism is εἰς τὸ κοινὸν πλουτεῖν,[46] while for Luke it is εἰς θεόν.

## Anxieties about Basic Needs (12:22–32)

Luke continues the argument against covetousness by taking up the theme of anxiety, which in the *topos* was closely related to pleasure. Because (διὰ τοῦτο) of the fatal end of hedonism, as exemplified in the parable of the Rich Fool, the disciples are not to be anxious (μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ) about what to eat or with what to clothe their bodies, for the soul is greater than food and the body than clothing.[47] The ravens, fed by God, are an object lesson. Anxiety does not prolong life, so why be anxious? God clothes the fields with lilies and grass, quite ephemeral in nature; how much more will he take care of the disciples? They should not seek what to eat and drink, nor be anxious.

Dio Chrysostom reflected on material needs when discussing covetousness, and so does Luke, but once again they approach the matter differently. For Dio, the thing to do was to attain the proper proportion

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[45] See Horn, *Glaube und Handeln*, 65, who refers to Philo, *Praem.* 104; *Spec.* 4.73, for wealth in heaven. See also 1 Tim 6:18–19.

[46] See Lucian, *Sat.* 24; Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* 4.8; cf. Euripides, *Orest.* 394.

[47] Cf. Luke 10:41–42, μεριμνᾷς καὶ θορυβάζῃ περὶ πολλά, ὀλίγων δέ ἐστιν χρεία ἢ ἑνός; 21:34, μεριμναὶ βιωτικαί.

and reduce material needs to an absolute minimum. For Luke, it is God who knows that they need these things (v. 30), and he will provide. What is required of them is that they have faith (cf. ὀλιγόπιστοί, v. 28) and see the kingdom—their needs will be met by God, not through some rigorous self-abnegation which reduces their needs to manageable proportions. They need not fear, for their Father is pleased to give them the kingdom they should seek.

## | The True Treasure (12:33–34)

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The section ends paraenetically. It had begun (v. 15) with the correction of a misunderstanding behind covetousness, that one's life depends on a superabundance of possessions, and had rejected the acquisitiveness of the rich man and the seeking by the disciples who have little faith. The conclusion is dramatically opposed: the disciples are to *sell* their possessions and give alms. That this explicit social dimension is so briefly treated in comparison with Dio and other moralists does not diminish its importance. This act, which is completely contrary to covetousness, will be their treasure, in heaven, and there will be their hearts. Luke's treatment of the *topos* ends on a more elevated note than Dio's ridicule.

## Conclusion

Luke makes use of the *topos* on covetousness to expound on part of his explanation and application of the parable of the Sower, which speaks of the proclamation of the word and the threat that anxieties, wealth and pleasure pose for those who receive it. The same concerns are present in 12:2–34. The first part (vv. 2–12) of this section calms the fear of the disciples as they preach and encourages them not to be anxious, for the Holy Spirit will provide them with what they need. The *topos* comes into play especially in vv. 13–34, for it allows Luke to write in terms widely known in his day. The similarities to the popular conventions associated with covetousness are numerous and striking. Equally striking is the way Luke has placed his own theological imprint on those conventions, in the process Christianizing the *topos.*

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

# CONVERSION TO PAUL'S GOSPEL*

For some time it has been pointed out that Paul's preaching, particularly the Lukan version presented in the book of Acts, shares some features with the ancient accounts of conversion to philosophy.[1] The person who was most perceptive in exploring the similarities and differences between Christian and pagan philosophic conversion was A.D. Nock, Everett Ferguson's and my mentor, whom Ferguson also served as assistant in instruction.[2] Werner Jaeger, also at Harvard at the time, held a similar view,[3] and it is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that Ferguson, adducing the example of Lucian of Samosata's *Nigrinus*, has held that "conversion to philosophy ... was the nearest parallel to Christian conversion."[4] This view has been widely, but not universally, held.[5]

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* Originally published in *The Early Church and its Context: Essays in Honor of Everett Ferguson* (ed. Abraham J. Malherbe, Frederick W. Norris, and James W. Thompson; NovTSup 90; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 230–244.

[1] See Johannes Weiss, *Earliest Christianity: A History of the Period A.D. 30–150* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959; orig. German pub., 1914), 233–257.

[2] Especially in Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 14, 164–186; see also Nock, "Bekehrung," *RAC* 2 (1954): 107–108; Nock, "Conversion and Adolescence," in *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (ed. Zeph Stewart; 2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 1:469–80.

[3] Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 10.

[4] Everett Ferguson, *Backgrounds of Early Christianity* (3d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 353.

[5] For the importance of philosophy to conversion, see Gustave Bardy, *La conversion au christianisme durant les trois premiers siècles* (Paris: Aubier, 1949), 46–49; Paul Aubin, *Le problème de la "conversion." Étude sur un terme commun à l'hellénisme et au christianisme des trois premiers siècles* (ThH 1; Paris: Beauchesne, 1963), 17–31, 49–68; Philip Rousseau, "Conversion," *OCD*[3], 386–387; M.J. Edwards, "Conversion," *OCD*[4], 371. For a contrary view, emphasizing supernatural power and the bestowing of miraculous benefits by which conversion is brought about, see Ramsay MacMullen, *Christianizing the Roman Empire A.D. 100–400* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 3–5, and the examples in Ramsay MacMullen and Eugene N. Lane, *Paganism and Christianity 100–425 C.E.* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992), 6–7, 207–215. But see Averil Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Power: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Sather Classical Lectures 55; Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 22–23, 39–40, for dissent.

231 | I gave some attention to Luke's accounts of conversion in an article published in *The Second Century*, the journal founded and edited by Everett Ferguson,[6] and also briefly dealt elsewhere with conversion in Paul's writings and the similarities between Paul's and the philosophers' view of conversion.[7] Our honoree will recognize our teacher's influence, to which he also is still clearly captive, as I now continue to try to get it right by dealing with one dimension of the phenomenon in Paul's ministry. My earlier efforts in dealing with Paul's Thessalonian converts have primarily been concerned with the immediate consequences of their conversion. Here I wish to concentrate on the conversion experience itself. While taking brief notice of similarities to other descriptions of conversion, I here focus on Paul. In dealing with similarities and differences, I am reminded of the comment by Yogi Berra Jr., who, in response to a remark that his malapropisms were similar to those of his father, replied, "Yes, but our similarities are different."

With some exceptions, according to Acts people converted in response to preaching, and they did so instantaneously.[8] The preaching made use of proofs from prophecy and adapted traditions borrowed from Hellenistic Jewish propaganda and popular philosophy.[9] The impression left is that the inherent persuasiveness of the preaching brought about conversion.[10] The content of the preaching is always Jesus, and its aim is repentance of
232 sins and conversion (Luke 24:46–49). For the Jews in | Jerusalem, the call is to repent of their complicity in the killing of Jesus (Acts 2:33, 36; 3:13–15, 19; perhaps 5:31).

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[6] Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Not in a Corner': Early Christian Apologetic in Acts 26:26," *SecCent* 5 (1985/1986): 193–210; reprinted in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), 147–163. [*Light*, 1:209–227]

[7] Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 21–33.

[8] Acts 2:37–41; 8:26–38; 13:16–43, 44–48; 16:14–15, 29–37; 17:2–4. Combined with demonstrations of the Spirit: 10:34–48. Paul's conversion, of course, is instantaneous, but is more in the nature of a call, and is not in response to preaching (9:1–19; 22:6–16). See also the example of Zacchaeus (Luke 19:1–8). The Prodigal Son's "conversion" ("coming to himself," Luke 15:17) may be the culmination of growing remorse. See Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 3.37.3, for many people converting "at the first meeting."

[9] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 150–163.

[10] Emphasized especially by Dieter W. Kemmler, *Faith and Human Reason: A Study of Paul's Method of Preaching as Illustrated by* 1–2 *Thessalonians and Acts 17, 2–4* (NovTSup 40; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975). For the argument that Luke uses an Aristotelian enthymeme, see William S. Kurz, "The Function of Christological Proof from Prophecy for Luke and Justin" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1977), and Kurz, "Hellenistic Rhetoric and the Christological Proof of Luke-Acts," *CBQ* 42 (1980): 171–195.

In the preaching to Gentiles, other elements enter. At the end of his sermon in Athens, after speaking of God the Creator, Paul calls for repentance in view of the eschatological judgment to be executed justly by Jesus (Acts 17:30–31). The moral element implicit here becomes more accentuated in Paul's recountal to Agrippa of his conversion: The purpose of his commission was to open the Gentiles' eyes "that they may turn from darkness to light" (Acts 26: 18) and to preach forgiveness to them "that they should repent and turn to God and perform deeds worthy of their repentance" (26:20). The enumeration of such worthy deeds in Luke 3:6–14 makes clear how important moral reformation was in Luke's view of conversion.

What is striking in these conversion accounts is how relatively restrained people are emotionally in their response to preaching. The Lystrans responded with enthusiasm to Paul and Barnabas (Acts 14:18); the Beroeans received the word gladly (Acts 17:11; cf. Luke 8:13); and Peter's audience on Pentecost was cut to the heart in remorse (Acts 2:38). But, for the rest, the response is not as dramatic as one might expect from accounts which had, at least partially, a protreptic purpose.[11] It is on this response to preaching, particularly Paul's preaching as reported in 1 Thess 1:6, that I wish to focus in this paper. Before turning to that passage, some preliminary considerations will be in order.

## Mixed Emotions in Conversion

Conversion "implies rejection of one way of life for another, generally better, after brief and intense insight into the shortcomings of self or the demands of circumstances."[12] The moral philosophers of Paul's day in their speeches sketched in vivid detail the error in their listeners' lives they should reject and held out the possibility that their hearers might attain their human potential by living rational lives. The philosophers' method was to destabilize their listeners, making them at one moment delighted, then at another grieved at the same thing, thus unsettling their | souls (Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 4.77–78). They wanted people to feel disturbed about their own moral condition and to be prepared to convert to a better way of life. 233

[11] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 161–163.

[12] Rousseau, "Conversion," 386. For a treatment of conversion from the perspective of modern psychology of religion, see Lewis R. Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

They expected their converts to respond emotionally as well as rationally, shuddering, feeling ashamed, repenting, and experiencing joy and wonder (see Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 49).[13]

Many of the accounts of conversion to philosophy were propagandistic in the sense that they illustrated the human condition that required an act of will for the person's betterment. That they were stylized enhances their value as expressions of what was thought typical of an ideal conversion.[14] A vivid description of such a conversion, perhaps of his own, is given by Lucian of Samosata (*Nigr.* 3–5), the example mentioned by Ferguson, as he recounts a response to a philosopher's words:

> I took it all in with eager, wide-open soul, and at the moment I couldn't imagine what had come over me; I was all confused. At first I felt hurt because he had criticised what was dearest to me—wealth and money and reputation,—and I all but cried at their downfall; and then I thought them paltry and ridiculous, and was glad to be looking up, as it were, out of the murky atmosphere of my past life to a clear sky and great light. (Harmon, LCL)

This account was by no means unique.[15]

There are striking similarities, *mutatis mutandis*, between the philosophers' view of the matter and the examples of conversion from more recent times adduced by William James. For the preacher's expectation, James cites Jonathan Edwards:

> Surely it is not unreasonable that before God delivers us from a state of sin and liability to everlasting woe, he should give us some considerable sense of the evil from which he delivers us, in order that we may know and feel the importance of salvation.... It appears agreeable to this wisdom, that those who are saved should be made sensible of their Being, in those different states. In the first place, that they should be made sensible of their | 234 state of condemnation; and afterwards, of their state of deliverance and happiness.[16]

[13] See Plutarch, *Adol. poet. aud.* 36E; *Rect. rat. aud.* 46D. The subject is discussed, with copious documentation, in Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 21–28.

[14] See Johannes Hahn, *Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft: Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der hohen Kaiserzeit* (HABES 7; Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1989), 59–60.

[15] See, for example, the popular account of the conversion of Polemo in response to Xenocrates's instruction in virtue and temperance: Lucian, *Bis acc.* 17; cf. Horace *Sat.* 2.3.253–257; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.1.14; Diogenes Laertius 4.16.

[16] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature* (The Gifford Lectures, 1901–1902; rev. repr., New York: Longman's Green, 1920), 229.

An account of conversion shares with Lucian's the same emotional turmoil and even the same image of light and darkness:

> I came out as from a sepulchre, from an abyss of darkness; and I was living, perfectly living. But I wept, for at the bottom of that gulf I saw the extreme of misery from which I had been saved by an infinite mercy; and I shuddered at the sight of my iniquities, stupefied, melted, overwhelmed with wonder and with gratitude. . . . I can answer nothing save this, that on entering the church I was in darkness altogether, and on coming out of it I saw the fullness of the light.[17]

Paul's converts experienced similar emotional turmoil when they accepted his message.

### "In deep distress and with joy inspired by the Holy Spirit"

Paul writes more about his preaching than about its reception. I have discussed the matter elsewhere[18] and here wish to concentrate on what we can discern about the reception of Paul's preaching, about which he offers mere hints. Empowered by God, Paul says, he stormed the fortified human intellect and laid siege to it (2 Cor 10:3–6), demanding that it then be renewed and the new believer be transformed in the process (Rom 12:3).[19] The way in which he brought about conversion was by engendering faith in his hearers' hearts through preaching (Rom 10:8–10). This subjective response to his preaching was the work of the Spirit, who was active in his preaching (1 Cor 2:1–5) and moved his hearers to oral confession (1 Cor 12:3). Something similar resulted when Christian prophets, moved by the Spirit, spoke in orderly fashion: if "an unbeliever or spiritually ungifted person enters (the assembly), he is convicted by all, the secrets of his heart are laid bare: and so, falling on his face, he will worship God and declare that God is really among you" | (1 Cor 14:24–25).[20] This subjective response 235

[17] James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, 225–226.

[18] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 28–33, for documentation. What follows is discussed in greater detail in my commentary *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000).

[19] See Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 163–173; repr. in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 91–119. [*Light*, 1:135–166]

[20] Whether Paul preached with "enthusiasm" and his message was received with ecstatic exclamations acknowledging God as their Father (Gal 4:6; Rom 8:15) is debated. See the bibliography cited in Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 32 n. 111.

combined distress and joy, according to 1 Thess 1:6, the same emotions we have seen present in other conversions.

The reason this verse has not been considered evidence of a conversion response is that most commentators take θλῖψις to refer to "tribulations" or persecutions which Paul's converts in Thessalonica experienced as a consequence of their conversion. Sometimes Acts 17:5–9 (cf. 1 Thess 2:2) and 1 Thess 2:14 are brought into the discussion to identify the persecutors.[21] Even if Paul had in mind their post-conversion experience, θλῖψις need not be taken to refer to persecution but could have a subjective connotation. The Thessalonians experienced social, intellectual, and religious dislocation when they converted, and they must have suffered confusion, bewilderment, dejection, and despair.[22] This was the experience of converts to Judaism as well as philosophy, and the experience was described as θλῖψις, a deep distress.[23]

It is much more likely, however, that θλῖψις refers to the Thessalonians' experience when they became imitators of Paul and the Lord by receiving the word (1 Thess 1:6). If δεξάμενοι describes action contemporaneous with their becoming imitators,[24] as I think it does, it will be epexegetical, describing a correspondence between the modality of the | preaching and its attendant circumstances.[25] What Paul says about his preaching in Thessalonica casts light on the meaning of θλῖψις in 1:6.

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Paul's ministry in Thessalonica was conducted "in the midst of a great struggle" (ἐν πολλῷ ἀγῶνι, 1 Thess 2:2), which may have been a combination of external dangers and anxiety.[26] While in Thessalonica, Paul had

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[21] See, e.g., Ernest Best, *A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians* (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1972), 79. For the view that these θλίψεις are the eschatological sufferings of the righteous, according to Judaism (Mark 13:9; Matt 24:21), see Heinrich Schlier, "θλῖψις," *TDNT* 3 (1965): 143–148; Raymond F. Collins, *Studies in the First Letter to the Thessalonians* (BETL 66; Leuven: University Press, 1984), 191–193, 291–293.

[22] See Ernst von Dobschütz, *Die Thessalonicher-Briefe* (7th ed.; KEK 10; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1909), 73–74; Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 36–46; Rainer Riesner, *Die Frühzeit des Apostel Paulus: Studien zur Chronologie, Missionsstrategie und Theologie* (WUNT 71; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] 1994), 329–339.

[23] For proselytes, see *Jos. Asen.* 12:11; 13:11; Elpidius W. Pax, "Beobachtungen zur Konvertitensprache im ersten Thessalonicherbrief," *SBFLA* 21 (1971): 240–241. For philosophy, see Epictetus, *Ench.* 24, and Schlier, "θλῖψις," 139–140.

[24] Thus Charles J. Ellicott, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians* (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1864), 10; von Dobschütz, *Die Thessalonicher-Briefe*, 73.

[25] Anton Roosen, "Das Zeugnis des Glaubens in 1 Thessalonicher 1,6–10," *StMor* 15 (1977): 359–383, esp. 363.

[26] So already, John Chrysostom, *Hom. 1 Thess.* 2 (PG 62:401).

forewarned his converts that it was their lot to suffer θλῖψις (1 Thess 3:4) and later had sent Timothy to exhort them not to be agitated by his afflictions (1 Thess 3:3; cf. v. 8, his ἀνάγκη καὶ θλῖψις, "anguish and distress").[27] He also uses θλίβεσθαι in 2 Cor 4:8–10 at the head of a list of hardships which describes his ministry. The other terms in the list suggest that he primarily has in mind internal distress.[28] Paul, therefore, uses θλῖψις of the personal distress he suffered in his ministry.

Paul's statement that his converts became imitators of him and the Lord finds further clarification from his demeanor and the content of his preaching, the reception of which caused them distress and joy. Paul elsewhere summarizes that content as Christ crucified (1 Cor 1:23; 2:2; Gal 3:1), who died for the sins of others (1 Cor 15:3). In his ministry, Paul himself suffered and endured (1 Cor 4:9–13; 2 Cor 6:3–10; 11:22–12:10), identifying fully with the death of Jesus as in distress he carried out his ministry (2 Cor 4:8–10). But Paul's distress was relieved by joy (2 Cor 7:4; 8:20), especially as he anticipated salvation (Phil 1:18–19); thus he at the same time experienced anxiety and joy (2 Cor 6:10; 7:4) as he preached.

Paul does not mention the cross in 1 Thessalonians, but his readers knew that Christ had died for their sake (5:10) and that their relationship with Paul had come into existence when the gospel of the self-giving | 237 Lord had become transparent in his life for their sake (1:5).[29] As an expression of his love for them, Paul gave to them in his preaching, not only the gospel, but himself by toiling laboriously night and day with his hands (2:8–9), an activity he thought, as did other people of his social level, to be burdensome (1 Cor 4:12), servile (1 Cor 9:19), and humiliating (2 Cor 11:7). By working in this manner, he provided a model for them to imitate (4:9; cf. 2 Thess 3:7–10). Their identification with this Paul and the Lord thus preached resulted in a mixture of distress and joy. Their distress would continue, as would Paul's (3:3–4), but so should their joy (5:16), Paul in this also providing them with an example to imitate (3:7–9).

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[27] That ταύταις refers to Paul's rather than the Thessalonians' distress is the opinion of a long line of interpreters (e.g., John Chrysostom, *Hom. 1 Thess.* 2 [PG 62:442]; von Dobschütz, *Die Thessalonicher-Briefe*, 134–135; Traugott Holtz, *Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher* [EKKNT 13; Zürich: Benziger, 1986], 135). Best (*A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians*, 135) thinks it refers to both.

[28] See John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 172–174.

[29] See Franz Laub, *Eschatologische Verkündigung und Lebensgestaltung nach Paulus: Eine Untersuchung zum Wirken des Apostels beim Aufbau der Gemeinde in Thessalonike* (BU 10; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1973), 84.

## "How you turned to God from idols to serve a living and true God"

In 1 Thess 1:9–10 Paul provides more information about the message to which the Thessalonians responded and reveals the sermonic context of his proclamation of Jesus. Paul is dependent on Hellenistic Jewish propaganda for much of this material, but he does not here present an outline of his own sermon to the Thessalonians, as is sometimes claimed.[30] More precisely, he summarizes what his converts had accepted and does so in a manner that focuses on God, in whom they had come to believe (v. 8). Paul does so already in the introductory reminder that they had converted to God from idols rather than in the traditional order, from idols to God (cf. Acts 14:15). He then continues chronologically, first describing God as living and true; then Jesus, who is awaited, is described in terms of his relationship to God, as his son and as raised from the dead by God; and he concludes with the affirmation of God's wrath from which Jesus delivers. All this was new to Paul's converts, and acceptance of his message 238 required an intellectual reorientation in | which they had to change their understanding of human nature and the obligations flowing from their new relationship to God, as well as a new view of the cosmic scheme of things. Every item in the summary had a strong moral component.

Philosophers also used the term ἐπιστρέφειν and its cognates to describe conversion as Paul does (v. 9), but their usage of the term was generally not as specific as it was in the use of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, Paul's younger contemporary,[31] who is more representative of the philosophers with whom Paul had much in common. For a philosopher like Epictetus, conversion was a sobering up or coming to one's senses, a turning away from all human values and opinions and turning to oneself.[32] Philosophers might use traditional religious language such as turning to the divine in pursuit of wisdom or truth,[33] but they conceived of the

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[30] For the Jewish material, see Claus Bussmann, *Themen der paulinischen Missionspredigt auf dem Hintergrund der spätjüdisch-hellenistischen Missionsliteratur* (2d rev. ed.; EHS 23.3; Bern: H. Lang/Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1975). For the formulation of the preaching and its reception, see Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (2 vols.; New York: Scribner, 1951–1955), 1:65–91, followed by others, e.g., Ulrich Wilckens, *Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte: Form- und traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (WMANT 5; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1963), 81–91.

[31] See Aubin, *Le problème de la "conversion,"* esp. 59–66, on Epictetus.

[32] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.16.15; 22.39; 23.16, 137; 4.4.7; cf. Lucian, *Bis acc.* 17; Marcus Aurelius 9.42.

[33] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.20.22; cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 34.1.

enterprise in noble, humanistic terms, of a commitment to the rational life that would lead to virtue.

Paul's use of ἐπιστρέφειν, however, was informed by the Septuagint and later Jewish usage, where it describes turning to God. The word came to describe the conversion of Gentiles to Judaism, with a focus on God, whose nature may be reflected upon, as in *Jos. Asen.* 11:10–11, "But I have heard many saying that the God of the Hebrews is a true God and a living God (ἀληθινὸς . . . καὶ ζῶν) . . . therefore I will take courage too and turn to him (ἐπιστρέψω πρὸς αὐτόν) and take refuge in him."[34] By Paul's time, ἐπιστρέφειν had become a technical Christian term for conversion, as appears from the only other two places in his letters where he uses it and plays on it (2 Cor 3:16; Gal 4:9). It is also used in this way in Acts (e.g., 3:19; 9:35; 11:21; 15:19).

How radically different this notion of conversion is from that of the philosophers appears from the statement that Paul's readers had turned, not from a false set of values or from a dissolute life, as the philosophers had it, but from idols (cf. Acts 14:15). For Jews, the worship of idols was the height of foolishness (Isa 44:9–20; Epistle of Jeremiah) and the cause of immorality (Wis 14:12). Paul thought that idolatry was servitude to beings that were not gods (Gal 4:8–9) and, deflecting people | from the knowledge of God, had tragic moral consequences (Rom 1:18–32). 239

Conversion in response to Paul's preaching had two goals, expressed in complementary infinitives, to serve (δουλεύειν) and to wait (ἀναμένειν) (1 Thess 1:9–10). Service to God required total obedience, as a slave owed his master exclusive loyalty. This obedience to God was the aim of Paul's ministry; and when his listeners came to faith through his preaching, it could be said that they had obeyed the gospel.[35] As servitude to idols led to immorality, so, to Paul's mind, serving God required a moral, but more than a moral, a sanctified life, which was made possible by the knowledge of God that was offered in his preaching.[36]

The demand that one God, the Creator, the living God,[37] alone be served, was extraordinary in the Graeco-Roman world, where worshipping

[34] See Ps 21:28; Isa 19:22; Jer 18:8, 11.

[35] See Rom 6:15–23 (cf. Matt 6:24; Luke 11:13); 10:16–17; 15:18 (cf. 16:18–19; 2 Cor 10:5–6).

[36] See Rom 6:16–23; 1 Thess 4:3–5 (cf. 1 Pet 1:14–16); 2 Cor 4:4–6.

[37] Acts 14:15, "the living God, who made the heaven and the earth and the sea and all that is in them"; cf. Bel 5; see Mark J. Goodwin, "Conversion to the Living God in Diaspora Judaism and Paul's Letters" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1992); Goodwin, *Paul, Apostle of the Living God: Kerygma and Conversion in 2 Corinthians* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2001).

a number of gods was thought to increase one's security in this life and beyond. Indeed, in the popular view, the security of cities and states as of individuals depended on worshipping the traditional gods, particularly those related to certain areas, in special ways. When Christians refused to worship those gods, they were accused of atheism, of being the cause of society's misfortunes, and were sometimes executed as a consequence.[38] The commitment to the God Paul preached was thus psychologically and socially unsettling, and could be dangerous.

The second goal of conversion was eschatological, pointing to the divine dénouement, when God's son would deliver the Thessalonians from the divine wrath. Although the Greek tragedians and almost all philosophers criticized the anger of the gods of Greek myth, their very criticism testified to the widely held view that the gods' anger required expiation.[39] Paul's view, of course, was derived from Judaism, as is | evident from the apocalyptic traditions he uses in 1 Thess 2:16 in a way that assumes that his recent Greek converts in Thessalonica had been instructed by him about the certainty of God's judgment.

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More important for our immediate purpose are two observations. First, Paul's instruction to the Thessalonians had promised divine vengeance on the sexually immoral (4:6) and, more generally, on the dissolute (5:1–10). Second, although he was emphatic about the certainty of God's wrath on the dissipated, he was equally emphatic about his converts' salvation from God's wrath by virtue of Christ's redeeming work (5:10; 1:10). We shall return to these matters but will first consider how striking the major themes in Paul's preaching must have been to his hearers.

In turning to God, they were required to change their understanding of the divine and service to him; they had to think anew of human nature, no longer in terms of human potentiality and virtue, but from a perspective of their relation to God and his will (4:1, 3); they had to reconstruct their view of a cosmic order to one that is under God's judgment while they themselves had a hope of deliverance from that judgment. And running through all of this new understanding was the theme of their moral responsibility. For Paul's contemporaries, on the other hand, morality was

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[38] See, for example, Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 8; Tertullian, *Apol.* 40; cf. the references collected by Graeme W. Clarke, *The* Octavius *of Marcus Minucius Felix* (ACW 39; New York: Newman Press, 1974), 204–205. In this Christians were heirs to the Jews; see Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (3 vols.; Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and the Humanities, 1974–1984), 2 (1980): 545, for references.

[39] See Hermann Kleinknecht, "ὀργή," *TDNT* 5 (1967): 382–392, esp. 386–387.

grounded otherwise, in philosophy, for example. There was not thought to be an essential connection between morality and religion, and in only a few unusual cases was a call to a moral transformation part of conversion.[40] This was not an easy connection for the Thessalonians to make, and Paul had to return to it when he wrote to them.[41] | 241

That his message was emotionally unsettling made his task all the more difficult.

### "According to my gospel, God judges the hearts of men by Jesus Christ"

Paul expands in Rom 1:18–2:16 what he states succinctly in 1 Thess 1:6, 9–10 and confirms the exposition of his message that I have offered. This section of Romans makes use of Hellenistic Jewish propaganda and the philosophical traditions already used in that propaganda as Paul builds on his claim that the gospel is God's power to save (Rom 1:16).[42]

In developing his theme, Paul begins with a description of the human condition that demonstrates the need for the gospel of God's salvation. As in 1 Thess 1:9–10, he takes up, but now develops, the topics of the knowledge of God as Creator, idolatry, service to God, and divine judgment, but not deliverance from God's wrath. These early chapters of Romans lay the foundation for the following chapters of the letter, but the protreptic origin of his material shimmers through and provides hints about

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[40] Nock, *Conversion*, 138, 155; Wayne A. Meeks, *The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 18–76. For philosophy as providing a rationale for morality, see Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 7DE; Musonius Rufus, *Frgs*. 8 and 16. The lack, or looseness, of a connection between pagan religion and morality is debated, but early Christian comment on the matter (e.g., by Lactantius, *Inst.* 5.5.20), although apologetic, is no less credible for that. See John H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 265, 272–275.

[41] It is noteworthy, for example, that when Paul fills up what was lacking in the Thessalonians' faith (3:10), he introduces his detailed moral advice in chapters 4 and 5 with a reminder that he had taught them to please God (4:1) and then proceeds to describe the will of God, their sanctification (4:3). The stress Paul lays on the connection between Christian religion and morality appears from the twelve times that he in one way or another theologically undergirds his paraenesis in the first eight verses of chapter 4.

[42] See Günther Bornkamm, *Early Christian Experience* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 47–70; Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Apologetic Theology of the *Preaching of Peter*," *ResQ* 13 (1970): 205–223, for the Jewish and pagan philosophical materials and how they are used by Paul. [*Light*, 2:867–882]

the nature of his missionary preaching.[43] The protreptic elements in Rom 1:18–2:16 add to our understanding of Paul's view of the human condition his preaching had in view and lends a keen edge to what follows.

Paul is quite different from the Stoic philosophers to whom he is ultimately indebted here in that he shows no interest in using the categories of natural theology to describe moral development that takes place in step with the development of reason. On the contrary, he begins with the emphatic claim that the knowledge of God is plain to them (1:19). Paul 242 is not, in the first place, engaged in philosophical, nor even | theological, exposition although he does provide a theological explanation for his claims. Rather he engages in an indictment that begins with a charge that divine wrath is already revealed against all ungodliness and wickedness of people who willfully suppress the truth (1:18). He wants to render them without excuse (1:20; 2:1; cf. 2:15) and so make them subject to God's judgment (1:18; 2:2–6, 8, 16); hence he does not speak of salvation at this point in his argument.

Paul achieves this end by sketching a bleak picture of human willfulness. Despite their knowledge of God, people did not honor or thank him (1:21), but became fools and practiced idolatry (1:22–23). They exchanged the truth of God for a lie and determined not to acknowledge God in their lives (1:25, 28), rejecting with full knowledge God's moral decrees (1:32). In all this, they think themselves superior: they judge others (2:1), presume on God's kindness, forbearance, and patience (2:4), and have hard and impenitent hearts (2:5).

Because of their willful rejection of the Creator, God handed them over to sexual immorality (1:24, 26, 28), for the consequences of which they are responsible. They store up for themselves wrath on the day when God will judge them according to their works (2:5–8). Then they will experience inner turmoil (2:15–16), tribulation (θλῖψις), and distress (στενοχωρία) because they had done evil (2:8–9). That God will judge the secrets of people's hearts by Christ Jesus is, Paul says, according to his gospel (2:16). Paul here has in mind eschatological judgment, but he has said that God's eschatological wrath is already revealed (1:18), and the

[43] An exponent of this view is Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (FRLANT 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910; repr., 1984). Paul's use of the rhetorical device of the "diatribe" lends credence to this view, especially as it relates to Romans. For a more scholastic setting of the diatribe, see Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981). On the protreptic character of this section of Romans, see Stowers, *A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 97–109.

idea of eschatological events as presently realized finds expression in 1 Thessalonians (cf. 2:16; 5:3–7).[44]

It should be noted, however, that Paul's indictment is made in service of his thesis that the gospel is God's power to save (1:16). The offer of salvation was made in Paul's preaching and created a crisis for the person who heard it: it demanded a decision that could not be delayed (2 Cor 6:1–2), a choice between destruction and salvation (2 Cor 2:14–17) which was bound to cause stress. The good news was that acceptance of the gospel of Christ's vicarious death and resurrection enabled believers to rejoice in the θλίψεις that would follow, knowing that they would be saved by Christ from God's wrath (Rom 4:24–25; 5:3, 9).

| Paul had preached such a gospel in Thessalonica. He had offered 243 his listeners a knowledge of God the Creator (1:9) which made possible, indeed, required, a sanctified life (4:4). He also told them of the coming judgment (1:9; 4:6), which already impinged on their lives, requiring them to live morally (5:3–5). The culmination of the message was that Christ had died for them as part of God's design to save them (5:9) and deliver them from his wrath (1:10). When they accepted this gospel, they did so with a combination of distress and joy (1:6).

## Conclusion

We must understand better the ways in which Paul was indebted to the moral philosophers of his day if we are to gain a firmer grasp of how he expressed himself to his Greek readers. Paul spoke in terms natural to the context in which he and they lived, and in each case it must be determined whether his philosophical terminology was merely the affectation of the σπερμολόγος the philosophers in Athens thought he was (Acts 17:18), or whether it was for him the natural way to express matters of the greatest importance. The latter generally seems to have been the case, and it clearly was so on those occasions when he was required to engage his converts philosophically when they expressed themselves in philosophical categories natural to themselves. What complicates the matter is that on even such

[44] See James D.G. Dunn, *Romans* (2 vols.; WBC 38A–B; Dallas: Word, 1998), 1:102, "It is characteristic of Paul's thought that there is a continuity between present and future, with regard to both justification . . . and to divine wrath."

occasions his discussion was governed by basic theological convictions which gave a new cast to the philosophical claims under review.[45]

That was also the case with Paul's view of conversion. A cursory view reveals many similarities to philosophic conversion: Conversion is the response to a speech by someone who calls for a radical reassessment of one's existential condition and who demands a commitment to a rational existence—an emotionally destabilizing experience. In the process, the philosopher who summons his hearers to conversion *de facto* exemplifies his message and the values he is inculcating.[46]

By focusing on one element of the Thessalonians' conversion experience, however, we have been able to see how Paul, while using the | same rubrics as the philosophers did, invests them with a radically different content. His converts' distress and joy are not the result of discovering their moral inadequacies in comparison with a rational life of virtue held out to them; nor is their imitation of Paul and the Lord an acceptance of paradigms of the rational life. Rather, Paul and Jesus represent lives of self-giving, in the course of which Paul experiences distress and joy.

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Paul's converts had the same experience when they were brought to an understanding of their own condition before God. The deep distress that their moral condition, thus revealed, causes is at the same time compensated for by the good news that, although they had been destined for θλίψεις (3:3–4), they had not been destined for God's wrath (5:9–10), but would be saved from it by God's son (1:10). That was cause for joy.

[45] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Determinism and Free Will in Paul: The Argument of 1 Corinthians 8 and 9," in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 231–255. [*Light*, 1:289–311]

[46] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 52–53; *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 57–58.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

# ANTI-EPICUREAN RHETORIC IN 1 THESSALONIANS*

The breadth of Dieter Lührmann's learning is revealed in his bibliography. Two of his articles especially drew my attention when they first appeared, for they confirmed the work done by David L. Balch, one of my students at Yale, that theretofore unexplained ancient philosophical treatments of household management provided the context for the NT household codes.[1] Balch and Lührmann had worked independently of each other, but both demonstrated the importance of looking at ancient philosophy beyond Stoicism, whose relevance to the study of the NT has been well established.[2] It was sheer joy, a little more than a decade later, to welcome Dieter Lührmann to Yale, where he spent the spring semester with us in 1989.

In this homage to our honoree, I wish to draw attention to some Epicurean elements in Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians. This letter is shot through with moral philosophical traditions,[3] but its contacts with the Epicureans have so far mostly escaped notice.[4] This contribution is an ἀρραβών on the fuller treatment in my Anchor Bible commentary on the letter, which will soon appear. Epicureanism was once thought to be of

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[1] Dieter Lührmann, "Wo man nicht mehr Sklave oder Freier ist: Überlegungen zur Struktur frühchristlicher Gemeinden," *WD* 13 (1975): 53–83; Lührmann, "Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und antike Ökonomie," *NTS* 27 (1980): 83–97. David L. Balch, *'Let Wives Be Submissive': The Origin, Form and Apologetic Function of the Household Duty Code* (*Haustafel*) *in 1 Peter*, (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1974); now published as *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981). See also Klaus Thraede, "Zum historischen Hintergrund der 'Haustafeln' des Neuen Testaments" in *Pietas: Festschrift für Bernhard Kötting* (ed. Ernst Dassmann and Karl S. Frank; JAC Ergänzungsband 8; Münster: Aschendorff, 1980), 359–368.

[2] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333, esp. 268–270, 304–306. [*Light*, 2:675–749]

[3] See the various discussions in my *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989).

[4] But see my *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 25–27; Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 96–106; Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists," 321–324.

importance to the study of Paul,[5] but then fell out of favor, partly because of a perceived excess in the drawing of parallels, but mostly, one suspects, because the Epicurean materials are more difficult for NT scholars to work with than are the more familiar Stoic sources. The situation has begun to change, partly because of the renewed interest in ancient discussions of friendship and in the practice of psychagogy.[6]

137 | With the Epicureans now having caught the eye of scholars, perhaps bringing them into the conversation about 1 Thessalonians will not appear more incongruous than the Peripatetic, Epicurean, Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic and other texts that Balch, Lührmann and Klaus Thraede introduced into the conversation about the NT *Haustafeln*. In this article I shall draw attention to Paul's use of Epicurean elements in two contexts, the discussions of eschatology and social morality.

## An Epicurean Slogan

Paul's eschatological discussion in 1 Thess 4:13–5:11 makes use of Jewish apocalyptic traditions, and the history of the interpretation of the letter shows that attention has been almost exclusively focused on Paul's application of those traditions to the situation in Thessalonica. In 5:3, however, it has been thought, εἰρήνη καὶ ἀσφάλεια is the equivalent of *pax et securitas*, a political slogan that described conditions produced by the *Pax Romana*.[7] Situating the slogan in political propaganda is made easier by the fact that it does not appear in apocalyptic writings nor in the OT passages (Jer 6:14; 8:11 [not in the LXX]; Ezek 13:10) of which commentators are reminded.[8]

The political interpretation of the slogan, however, is dubious, and is not supported by the unlikely derivation of παρουσία (4:15) and ἀπάντησις (4:17) from language describing, respectively, the arrival and meeting of

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[5] E.g., by Norman W. De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954).

[6] See esp. John T. Fitzgerald, ed., *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World* (NovTSup 82; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996); Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (NovTSup 81; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995). The new edition of *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism*, with introduction, translation, and notes by David Konstan et al. (SBLTT 43; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), is likely to stimulate further investigation.

[7] E.g., Klaus Wengst, *Pax Romana and the Peace of Christ* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 73–78.

[8] Helmut Koester, "From Paul's Eschatology to the Apocalyptic Schemata of 2 Thessalonians," in *The Thessalonian Correspondence* (ed. Raymond F. Collins; BETL 87; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 449.

a king or other dignitary,[9] which in any case do not concern us here. I submit that this is Paul's own ironic formulation to describe the views of false teachers that he is countering.[10] Norman W. De Witt correctly drew attention to the Epicurean nature of the slogan,[11] but his failure to treat 5:3 exegetically resulted in a discussion without nuance. It is important to determine the situation Paul was addressing when he injected the slogan into his apocalyptic language.

Paul introduces this section of the letter by reminding his readers that there was no point in speculating about the χρόνοι καὶ καιροί, for they knew that the Day of the Lord would come unexpectedly and suddenly (5:1–2). These terms occur together in the OT (see esp. Dan 2:21; cf. 7:12 Symmachus), and the notion they conveyed of divinely fixed periods of time led to apocalyptic calculations to determine when critical | events would take place.[12] Such apocalyptic curiosity is connoted here and in Acts 1:7, the only other place in the NT where the two words occur together.[13] It is not immediately clear how v. 3 is related to vv. 1–2, for it has no transitional particle. Some manuscripts (א² B D 0226 syʰ) supply δέ, which would draw a contrast to what precedes, while others (Ψ 0278 a vg) supply γάρ, which would offer an explanation of vv. 1–2. The content of the passage suggests a contrast: Paul's readers know that the coming of the Day of the Lord will be a surprise while others confidently proclaim peace and security. The contrast between his readers and these unnamed people is picked up again in v. 4, where he again addresses his readers.

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Paul, in using impersonal verbs (λέγωσιν, ἐκφύγωσιν), does not identify the persons whose views he summarizes with the slogan, for they are already known to his readers.[14] While the slogan is not derived from the OT, it nevertheless is reminiscent of Jer 6:14's warning against false

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9 Robert H. Gundry, "The Hellenization of Dominical Tradition and the Christianization of Jewish Tradition in the Eschatology of 1–2 Thessalonians," *NTS* 33 (1987): 162–163; Koester, "From Paul's Eschatology," 449–450.

10 Wolfgang Harnisch, *Eschatologische Existenz: Ein exegetischer Beitrag zum Sachanliegen von 1. Thessalonicher 4,13–5,11* (FRLANT 110; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), 79–82, except that he errs in identifying them as Gnostics.

11 De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus*, 41–53.

12 See the interpretation of Jer 25:11 in Dan 9:24–27; cf. *4 Ezra* 4:33–37, 44–47, 51; *2 Bar* 25–30; Paul Volz, *Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter, nach den Quellen der rabbinischen, apokalyptischen und apokryphen Literatur dargestellt* (2d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr, 1934), 145–146.

13 For the curiosity, see Mark 13:4; cf. Matt 24:3; Luke 21:7.

14 The only other place where Paul uses an impersonal verb is 2 Cor 10:10, where he also disagrees with the person in mind. Cf. *inquit* in Seneca, *Ep.* 102.8; 121.14. See Joachim Dalfen, *Formgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Selbstbetrachtungen Marc Aurels* (Ph.D. diss.,

prophets. And Paul's command in 5:20–21 to test all prophetic utterances supports the surmise that with the slogan he is referring to utterances that were made by prophets who claimed to have discovered the divine timetable.[15] The effect of this prophetic proclamation would be to defer the Parousia and thereby dramatically reduce the eschatological tension in which the Christian life would be lived. To counter this error, Paul introduces the imagery of the Day of the Lord, which provides him with the opportunity to stress a view of realized eschatology in which Christians are already children of the day and light, and are to live sober lives (vv. 3–10).[16]

Much of the language, as commentaries regularly document, is derived from or is indebted to Jewish apocalyptic traditions. Yet the slogan, which provides the clearest access to the false teachers' position, does not derive from those traditions, although it is evocative of them. It is rather Paul's formulation that describes their views, and he does so by using language used by Epicureans to argue for the ideal of a firmly grounded life which they could live quietly in the company of friends, which distinguished them from the ambitious lives of others in society.[17]

139 | The security they yearned for, according to Epicurus, "is in fact the ἀσφάλεια which results from a quiet life (ἡσυχίας) and the retirement from the world,"[18] whose opinion of them they considered irrelevant to their happiness. Security is provided by friendship,[19] is a security from people, and is confined to this life, there being no security against death.[20] Epicureans focused totally on life with friends in the here and now, rejecting fear of the gods and mythical stories about postmortem existence.[21] "There is no profit in attaining security (ἀσφάλεια) in relation to people, if things above and things beneath the earth and indeed all in the boundless universe remain matters of suspicion."[22]

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Munich, 1967), 151–152, for its use in the diatribe, where an impersonal verb introduces a statement that is corrected.

[15] See 1 Cor 2:6–16 for prophetic inquiry; cf. 1 Pet 1:10–12; Eph 3:4–7 for their interest in the scheme of redemption. See Allen R. Hunt, *The Inspired Body: Paul, the Corinthians, and Divine Inspiration* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1996), 63–70.

[16] See Koester, "From Paul's Eschatology," 451–454.

[17] Lucretius, *De rer. nat.* 5.1120–1130.

[18] Epicurus, *Kyriai Doxai* 14; cf. 7.

[19] Epicurus, *Kyriai Doxai* 28, quoted by Cicero, *Fin.* 1.20.68; cf. Philodemus, *Lib.* 78; see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.20.8.

[20] Epicurus, *Sent. Vat.* 31.

[21] Epicurus, *Kyriai Doxai* 12.

[22] Epicurus, *Kyriai Doxai* 13.

Given their eschatological beliefs, the Thessalonian false prophets could not have held such a view of security, and it must therefore be Paul's formulation in which he as sharply as possible likens their teaching to an Epicurean commonplace and in a quite un-Epicurean manner threatens them with judgment (οὐ μὴ ἐκφύγωσιν).[23] It was customary in antiquity to call a religious or philosophical opponent an Epicurean or to describe his teaching in Epicurean terms,[24] and Paul's ironic language belongs to that polemical tradition. It becomes less incongruous that Paul should use such language here when it is observed that he has already used related language earlier in the letter.

## Living Quietly

In 4:9–12, the oldest Christian text dealing with social ethics, Paul instructs his readers in responsible social conduct while practicing φιλαδελφία and ἀγάπη, the Christian counterparts of Epicurean φιλία: they are to continue to work with their hands.[25] Paul thus directs them to do what he had done when he was with them, working with his hands as a demonstration of his love for them by not burdening any of them (2:8b–9). Paul is probably responding to an inquiry from the Thessalonians about the degree to which their love for each other required them to extend financial support, probably in the form of hospitality, to members of the church.[26] Paul's practical advice in v. 11, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν, reflects contemporary comment on social conduct, | particularly Epicurean conduct. We have already noted that 140 Epicurean φιλία and ἡσυχία provided the context for the much vaunted Epicurean ἀσφάλεια, and now wish to consider the broader setting of Paul's directions.

In a society that prized φιλοτιμία, Epicureans stood out for their rejection of the ambitious drive for honor and reputation characteristic of their contemporaries. As we have seen, they held that there was no security in being famous and highly regarded, a contention regarded as scandalous

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[23] Cf. 1 Cor 6:12–13, where Paul also breaks off the recitation of philosophical slogans (πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν, οὐ πάντα συμφέρει) with a threat of judgment (ὁ θεὸς ... καταργήσει).

[24] Richard P. Jungkuntz, "Fathers, Heretics and Epicureans," *JEH* 17 (1966): 3–10.

[25] I have discussed this passage in *Social Aspects*, 25–27, and *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 96–106.

[26] In NT παραίνεσις, φιλαδελφία and ἀγάπη were to be expressed in a practical manner through the extension of hospitality (Rom 12:9, 10, 13; cf. Heb 13:1–2; 1 Pet 4:8–9; cf. 1:22).

by those moral philosophers like Plutarch, who thought that love of honor was a social virtue, for it led individuals to contribute to the common good. Rather than lead an inactive or quiet life, like the Epicureans claimed to do, people who are ambitious (φιλότιμοι), they maintained, should be active in public affairs (πολιτευόμενοι καὶ πράσσοντες τὰ κοινά).[27]

Paul is diametrically opposed to this view of things. He exhorts his readers to continue in loving each other, doing so more and more. The καί before φιλοτιμεῖσθαι is explicative, which makes φιλοτιμεῖσθαι the explanation of how their love is to increase. Φιλοτιμεῖσθαι takes three complementary infinitives. The first two, ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια are a hendiadys and form an oxymoron with φιλοτιμεῖσθαι, thus drawing attention to themselves. The first infinitive, ἡσυχάζειν, described, despite the criticisms by philosophers like Plutarch, the ideal of many thoughtful people who wished to withdraw to a contemplative life or to prepare for reentry into the public fray.[28] It was specially associated with the Epicureans, however, so that Seneca, Paul's Stoic contemporary, for example, was aware of the danger of being identified with the Epicureans by encouraging or considering retirement.[29]

With the second infinitive, πράσσειν, which with various objects (e.g., τὰ ἴδια, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ) described one's own affairs, the hendiadys was common before Plato and was frequently used by him and by later writers.[30] Plato did not have in mind that the state would be well run when only philosophers, statesmen, and benefactors tended to what was properly their own affairs, but also when craftsmen worked at their trades.[31] Paul's third infinitive, ἐργάζεσθαι, again introduced by an explicative καί, thus clearly belongs to such discussions of social responsibility, and makes clear that the Thessalonians were to live quietly and tend to their own affairs by working with their hands. The series of infinitives are therefore to be seen as progressively explaining how they were in practical ways to increase in love for each other. The ἵνα clause is final, stating the purpose of the conduct Paul has just inculcated, which is to ensure favorable relations with non-Christians.

It thus emerges that in giving directions on the Thessalonians' social behavior, Paul uses terms that Epicureans used to describe their own ideal

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[27] Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 465F–466A; cf. *Suav. viv.* 1099D; 1107C.
[28] See n. 4 above.
[29] Seneca, *Ep.* 68.10; cf. Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1033C.
[30] *Resp.* 4.441DE, 6.496D; *Gorg.* 526C; cf. Dio Cassius 60.27; Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 24–26.
[31] Plato, *Charm.* 161E–162B; *Resp.* 4.443CD.

existence, namely that of a community living quietistically bound together by love for each other. Not Epicurean | are Paul's way of introducing his 141 explanation of how they are to continue in love, by being ambitious, and his concern for their relationship with outsiders. It is reasonable to suppose that some members of the congregation presumed on the practical demonstration of the church's love and failed to work, thus living quietly, with gaze turned inward and having no regard for outsiders' opinions. There is no indication that they looked to the Epicureans as examples of this type of conduct.

It is, nevertheless, clear that with a series of infinitives Paul progressively forecloses that possibility. His ironic use of φιλοτιμεῖσθαι to describe how they are to increase in love is un-Epicurean, but not so are the ways in which they are to be ambitious, to live quietly and tend to their own affairs. That they are to do this by continuing in their manual labor could, but need not, be un-Epicurean,[32] but clearly un-Epicurean is the stated purpose of the behavior he inculcates, to act becomingly in the eyes of outsiders. That Paul is not as sharp here as he is in 5:1–3 is probably due to the fact that he is responding to a request for advice rather than to egregious misconduct.[33] His advice, in the end, is that love does not free one from working, but that love results in working in order not to burden anyone, which had been precisely his reason for working when he was with them (2:8–9).

## Eschatological Soberness

As Paul in 5:3 combines an Epicurean term with a traditional Jewish one to form a hendiadys, so he does again in v. 6: γρηγορῶμεν καὶ νήφωμεν. Γρηγορεῖν in an eschatological sense is well attested,[34] but this is the first time that it is combined with νήφειν (cf. 1 Pet 5:8). The combination of being sober (νήφειν) and awake (ἀγρυπνεῖν) appears in the moral philosophers,[35]

[32] The superior attitude toward manual labor expressed in Philodemus, *Oec.* 23, may be more a reflection of the favored social class to which Philodemus belonged than of Epicureans in general.

[33] The command, νουθετεῖτε τοὺς ἀτάκτους, in 5:14 is quite sharp and probably refers to those who were not working. There is no need, however, to limit the ἄτακτοι to idlers and, furthermore, the command appears as one in a series of psychagogic instructions.

[34] Matt 24:42–43; 25:13; Mark 13:35–37; Luke 12:37; see Evald Lövestam, *Spiritual Wakefulness in the New Testament* (AUL NS 1.55.3; Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1963), 45–58.

[35] E.g., Plutarch, *Princ. iner.* 781D.

among whom νήφειν describes the quality of mind that philosophy makes possible, with λογισμός as the subject.[36]

The notion of sobriety played an important role in discussions among and about Epicureans. Epicurus considered pleasure the goal of the happy life, and thought of pleasure as sober and abstemious,[37] and that it was to be found with friends, friendship "dancing around the world proclaiming to us all to awake to the praises of a happy life."[38] His later critics, 142 of course, poked fun at the Epicurean sobriety.[39] For most | people, the slogan, "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die," typified the Epicurean life.[40]

Paul, in a typically anti-Epicurean manner, uses one form of this slogan, which coincides with Exod 32:6, in 1 Cor 10:7 to describe the dissolute life. He uses a different form, which coincides with Isa 22:13, in 1 Cor 15:32, in his argument about the resurrection. He reveals the anti-Epicurean bias of his contemporaries in the latter passage, when he warns his readers in vv. 31–34 of evil associations by quoting from Menander's *Thais*, which in the context applies to people who live an Epicurean-like life. He closes by polemically challenging them to sober up (ἐκνήψατε) and being explicit that he is writing to shame them. This is the only place outside 1 Thess 5:6, 8 that Paul uses a form of νήφειν, and here too his language is anti-Epicurean.[41]

In 1 Thess 5:3, Paul used the Epicurean notion of ἀσφάλεια to describe the false security preached by the false prophets. He corrected it by using the apocalyptic tradition of the Day of the Lord. In vv. 5b–6 he affirms the eschatological identity of the Thessalonians, in consequence of which (ἄρα οὖν) he exhorts them, "let us not sleep as the rest (οἱ λοιποί) do, but let us be awake and sober." The λοιποί are those who have no hope (4:13); those who, unlike the false prophets, have a proper sense of their eschatological identity, are to be sober. The irony is evident. In v. 8 the contrast is even clearer.

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[36] See Philo, *Ebr.* 166; Diogenes Laertius 10.132. For the idea, see Seneca, *Ep.* 53.8.

[37] Diogenes Laertius 10.128; Seneca, *Vit. beat.* 12.4; Philodemus, *Hom.* 3.28.

[38] Epicurus, *Sent. Vat.* 52; cf. Horace, *Carm.* 2.10.5–8. See Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 84–86.

[39] E.g., Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1123F.

[40] See the collection of material in Walter Ameling, "ΦΑΓΩΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΙΩΜΕΝ," *ZPE* 60 (1985): 35–43.

[41] See the discussion in Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 84–86; also Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80. [*Light*, 1:41–51]

## Conclusion

In addition to the passages considered in this paper, there are others in the letter (4:5, 13) in which Paul uses formulations that to his readers may very well have sounded anti-Epicurean. This is not strange, when one considers that there were perceived similarities between Christians and Epicureans, and that the two groups were frequently lumped together by their opponents.[42] It is therefore understandable that Christians would later engage in sharp polemic against Epicureans.[43] Paul is not as overt, but he uses anti-Epicurean rhetoric subtly and ironically to guide his readers in their newfound life.

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42 See Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists," 324.

43 See Wolfgang Schmid, "Epikur," *RAC* 5 (1962): 880–883.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

# THE APOSTLE PAUL AS A PASTOR*

## Introduction[1]

Paul the Apostle stated, as the principle that guided him in his ministry, that he became all things to all people that he might save some (1 Cor 9:22). By this he meant that he adapted himself to the background and circumstances of the people to whom he preached the gospel. Paul thought that he could be adaptable without compromising the integrity of the gospel, but some of his fellow Christians saw in his adaptability only inconsistency, a reflection to them of a desire to please, and so a weakness of character. Paul thus faced the hazard all pastors do who attempt to identify with those to whom they minister.

Modern scholars have, until recently, viewed Paul's adaptability not from the perspective of his pastoral work but of his theology. The issue has been complicated by the different cultures in which Paul worked. Some scholars have focused on Paul's Jewish background and sought the explanation for much of what he wrote in the theological issues debated at the time. Other scholars have stressed the importance of Paul's and his converts' experience in the Graeco-Roman world and found the key to understanding his letters in his engagement of that world. What further complicates matters is that Paul's strong convictions evoked as much opposition as adulation and the heat he generated has engaged much of New Testament scholarship for more than one hundred and fifty years.

98–100 | Sometimes, Paul has been approached from a historical perspective, for his role in the spread of Christianity from Palestine to Rome. In this connection, the account of the book of Acts has come in for intensive

* Originally published in *Jesus, Paul, and John* (ed. Lo Lung-kwong; Chuen King Lecture Series 1; Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999), 97–139.

[1] I attempted to explore some dimensions of this Paul in the Chuen King Lectures of 1996 in the hope that they might be of practical benefit to the ministers for whom they were intended. I am indebted to those ministers who heard the lectures for the discussions that followed. Above all, it is with great pleasure and warm memories that I express my and my wife's gratitude to Dr. Lo Lung-kwong for the invitation to deliver these lectures, and for the gracious hospitality he and his colleagues at Chung Chi College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, lavished on us.

scrutiny. In connection with this approach, there has also been a focus, from time to time, on Paul's missionary strategy. Of special interest to our present purpose is the examination of how he went about founding churches in particular localities. These studies have frequently described Paul as concentrating his efforts in the capital cities of Roman provinces, which were centers of government, economic power, and culture. From these centers the gospel would spread into the outlying areas.

All this may be true, but it is not quite satisfactory if our interest is in how those first churches, little communities in a society marked by great diversity, came into existence and struggled to persevere. To understand how this happened another approach is required. I suggest that we approach Paul as a pastor who daily felt the pressure of anxiety for all his churches (cf. 2 Cor 11:28). It is that anxiety that made him become involved in the particularities of his converts' lives and the affairs of the churches. Consequently, he wrote as he did, bringing his theological insights to bear on the diverse practical problems. Viewed in this way, the Paul who emerges from his letters is more sympathetic, gentle, and understanding than he is frequently given credit for being.

I propose that as we look at Paul as a pastor, we do so under the rubrics of his understanding of himself and his task, the nature of his message and how people responded to it, Paul's relationship to his churches, his use of letters as means of persuasion, and, finally, his churches as themselves engaging in what we would call pastoral care. The major sources for our study will be the letters of Paul, which are reflections of his pastoring. These rubrics capture a considerable number of what might be called Paul's pastoral methods and will afford us at least some impression, if not much more, of him as a first century pastor. One hopes that by getting to know him under this aspect we may be enriched | as we reflect on our own ministries. 101

## Paul the Pastor: His Self-Understanding and His Task

### *Paul's Self-Understanding*

In our attempt to understand how Paul understood himself, we shall concentrate on those elements in his thought that are important to our present interest: to approach him as a pastor.

Paul's call to be a Christian was at once a call to preach to the Gentiles (Gal 1:15–16).[2] At the heart of his call was the revelation of Christ to him,

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[2] Cf. Acts 9:1–18; 22:6–16; 26:12–18.

and his apostleship cannot be separated from that revelation (1 Cor 9:1; 15:7–9). Paul's preaching consisted, then, in drawing a placard of Christ before people (Gal 3:1). There was a very close connection between Paul's understanding of the message he preached and the nature of his own ministry. His message claimed that knowledge of the glory of God was offered in the proclamation of Christ (2 Cor 4:1–6), but the message of Christ that Paul preached was of Christ's crucifixion (1 Cor 2:2). His own ministry therefore identified with a crucified one, carrying in his own body the death of Jesus (2 Cor 4:7–12).

There is a larger framework within which Paul conducted his ministry. Paul thought of himself as in the prophetic tradition (Gal 1:15; cf. Jer 1:5), which meant that he was a minister of the Spirit (2 Cor 3:6). It was the Spirit who empowered him as he carried out his commission as Christ's servant. It is important to understand how Paul conceived of God working through the Spirit in his preaching, for this lies at the heart of his view of what we would call his pastoral work. Paul was at great pains to stress that what he preached was not a human word, | but God's word, which was at work in those who accepted it (1 Thess 2:13). It was not his rhetorical ability that brought about faith in his hearers, but the activity of the Spirit, with power (1 Cor 2:3–5; cf. Rom 10:14–15). 102

Central to Paul's understanding of his preaching was that the Spirit was active in every stage of the process by which someone became a Christian. The Holy Spirit was involved, with power, in his preaching (1 Thess 1:4–5); it was at the Spirit's urging that the preaching was accepted with the confession that Jesus is Lord (1 Cor 12:3); and the Spirit was active in the baptism of the believer (1 Cor 3:1–3). Paul thought that the Spirit was then received by the new believer (Gal 3:1–3) who was sanctified by the Spirit in his conversion (2 Thess 2:13–14; cf. 1 Cor 6:11).

### *Paul's Pastoral Task*

It is conceptually possible, even useful, to distinguish between Paul's missionary preaching and his pastoral work with those who converted in response to his preaching. It should be recognized, however, that in practice he was engaged in both activities at the same time. He was always preaching to gain new converts and at the same time giving attention to those who had already accepted his message. Paul did not appear to make the distinction and thought that the "pastoral" activity of Christian prophets (1 Cor 14:5) could lead to the conversion of outsiders (1 Cor 14:24–25). It is more accurate to see Paul's pastoral activity as an extension of what was initiated in his missionary preaching. This appears from the way in which

elements of that preaching occupied him as he worked with his converts and how the same elements describe the goal of his pastoral work. We select four by way of illustration.

First, for Paul the gospel was God's power to save (Rom 1:16; 1 Cor 1:8; 103 2:4–5) and as Christians continued in the gospel they | were being saved (1 Cor 15:1–2) as they awaited a savior from heaven (Phil 3:20). Within that temporal framework, marked by their conversion at one end and the coming of Christ at the other, Paul the apostolic pastor was assiduous in working with his converts, providing them with an example of how they should give themselves for the salvation of others (1 Cor 9:19–22; 10:31–11:1) and encouraging them to work out their own salvation as well (Phil 3:12).

The same perspective is true with regards to sanctification. Those who accepted God's call through the preaching were already sanctified, but Paul prays that God may sanctify them at the coming of the Lord (1 Thess 2:13; 5:23). The sanctified life is a moral life, and Paul the pastor applied the notion of holiness to various aspects of morality (1 Cor 6:11; 1 Thess 4:3–8) with the conviction that the end of the sanctified life is eternal life (Rom 6:19–23). The pastoral enterprise for Paul was more than a matter of methods or techniques or the realization of one's human potential; it had to do with a life lived in response to God who gives his Holy Spirit.

Related to this is the theme of knowing Christ. Paul's thinking is well summarized in Phil 3:8–11, which provides the perspective for Paul's existence from the time when he had come to know Christ, when the Lord laid hold of him, to the full knowledge of Christ he hoped for in the resurrection. In the meantime, as Paul worked with his spiritual children, he struggled to have Christ formed in them (Gal 4:19; cf. Rom 12:2).

Finally, the same view is represented in Paul's thinking on glory. The glory of God was already encountered in Paul's preaching (2 Cor 4:6), but he still looked forward to "an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison" (4:17).[3] In the meantime, Christians were transformed as they beheld the Lord's glory (2 Cor 3:16–18).

### 104 | *Paul's Predecessors and Contemporaries*

According to the information available to us, Paul had no counterpart in either Judaism or Graeco-Roman practice for his activity as a missionary and as a pastor who nourished the communities he had founded.

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[3] This and all translations are from the RSV.

Paul thought of himself as in the prophetic tradition, but he was different from his prophetic forebears in many respects. They, too, may have thought that they spoke for God, but Paul thought of himself as a prophet of the last days. The salvation about which Isaiah (49:8) had spoken was offered by Paul himself: "Behold, now is the acceptable time, now is the day of salvation" (2 Cor 6:2). Furthermore, while prophets were also sent to speak for God, they spoke to God's people, while Paul spoke to Gentiles, extending God's promise to them (Rom 9:22–26) and serving as God's agent as God called them into fellowship with his son (1 Cor 1:9) in the church God created (1 Thess 1:1). We discover such a sense of personal mission nowhere else in Judaism.

Nor do we find any Jew who formed new communities of believers around himself in the way Paul did. There were Jewish teachers abroad who sought to bring people to their views (Matt 23:15), but they appear to have aimed their efforts at fellow Jews; there is no firm evidence of a Jewish mission in a Pauline sense. Traveling Jewish teachers were rather given to correct what they thought inadequate adherence to the Law's requirements by Gentiles who had already been drawn to Judaism.[4] In this, they were more like those Christians who caused problems for Paul than Paul himself (see Acts 15:1).

Paul preached beyond Palestine, in a world striking for its mobility.[5] | In 105 a world of great diversity, Paul preached, according to Acts, in such public places as marketplaces and courts, but mostly in such semi-secluded settings as synagogues and homes. The physical context we should visualize for Paul's churches is the household, which represented a considerable cross-section of Greek and Roman society. Paul mentions house churches frequently, and the social and economic diversity they likely represented would tax his capacities as a pastor.[6]

The closest parallels to Paul are to be found among certain Greek philosophers, who also felt compelled to give themselves to the reformation of people. Their views of the human condition varied in some respects, but they all thought that by applying one's will and living rationally, one could improve oneself and so find security and contribute to society at large. Such teachers could be found in places as varied as the court of Nero, the

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4 E.g., Josephus, *A.J.* 22.34–48.

5 Note the picture presented by Acts 13–21, and the number of people mentioned in Rom 16, whom Paul had known in the eastern Mediterranean, but who were in Rome when he wrote Romans.

6 E.g., Rom 16:3–16; 1 Cor 16:19; Phlm 2.

salons of the wealthy, private schools, workshops, the marketplaces, and street corners. Although they had different views on many fundamental matters, they shared a common concern to help people by teaching them about the virtuous life. They also shared a common terminology (e.g., sin, repent, convert) to describe the human condition and how it should be changed. Christians would pick up this terminology, fill it with their own meaning, and use it for their own purpose.

These moral philosophers also developed methods or techniques which they used in the moral and spiritual formation of the people with whom they worked. These techniques of what we would call pastoral care, but which they called psychagogy, were used by all groups regardless of their philosophical slant. They developed in infinite detail what might be called a lexicon of exhortation.

106 | Most of the philosophers were concerned with reformation of the individual. Epicurus, however, formed a community around himself, and it is he who initiated the development of a system of pastoral care. Based on mutual friendship and respect, the Epicurean communities thought that the individual would develop as a member of a sustaining group. The methods developed in these Epicurean conventicles were used widely, far beyond the Epicureans, by the time Paul came on the scene. They continued to be developed in fine detail and ultimately found a place in medieval monastic orders.

Paul used the language and methods of the moral philosophers. That does not mean that he used them with the same presuppositions or that he always understood the terminology in the same way his philosophic contemporaries did, but an awareness of the cultural context in which Paul worked will help us to discern more clearly both his indebtedness to his environment as well as the originality and imagination with which he created something new.

## Paul's Message and the Response to It

To appreciate Paul's work as a pastor, one begins by recognizing that he was concerned with newly established churches. All his letters were written to such churches and the issues the letters address are for the most part issues natural to persons who were not yet established in the faith. It is noteworthy that Paul was more concerned in his letters to instruct his recent converts in the implications for their lives of their new faith

than in the doctrinal content of their faith. This does not mean that Paul minimized doctrine. It means rather that his immediate task was to nourish the faithful lives of the recently converted.

It will therefore be useful to discover as well as we can what | Paul preached, what appeal his message might have had for those who listened to him, how they responded to his message, and what his immediate task was when they did accept it. By approaching the matter in this way, we shall be better able to understand why Paul approached things in the way he did. 107

### *The Message Paul Preached*

Paul did not preach exactly the same sermon to all the people he encountered. Our main sources for what he did are his own letters, though the book of Acts, despite its tendency to present an account in keeping with its own purpose, does provide us with useful information. Acts indicates that, although his message always had Jesus as its content, there were marked differences between his approach to Jews and Gentiles.

In preaching to Jews, according to Acts, Paul would base his sermons on the OT and speak in terms of promise and fulfillment (e.g., Acts 13:26–41; 17:2–4). When speaking to Gentiles, however, he began by speaking of God as Creator and would end with the judgment from which Jesus saves (Acts 17:22–31). It is interesting that, although Acts is quite emphatic about Paul's being an apostle to the Gentiles, it really focuses on Paul's preaching in the synagogue to Jews and the Gentiles who had been drawn to worship there.

It may be the case that Paul has in mind converted Jews and God-fearers in his letters, but that is difficult to determine. For our purposes, it is safest to assume that his audience in his letters consisted primarily of Gentiles who had come to their new faith without the nurture of the synagogue and the Scriptures. That certainly was the case with the Thessalonians, who had only been Christians for a matter of months when Paul first wrote them. We want to focus for a while on 1 Thessalonians, which provides | wonderful insights into how Paul first preached and nurtured new coverts. 108

We begin by examining 1 Thess 1:9–10 for information about Paul's preaching to Gentiles. Paul does not say that these two verses represent what he had preached but what they had received. In other words, the focus is on what his readers had accepted. It is a practice of Paul to begin

discussions of important matters by reminding his readers of what they had accepted as fundamental.[7] He is then in a position to draw out the implications of their basic beliefs. This is essentially what he does in 1 Thessalonians, with 1:9–10 serving as an introduction of the major contents of the letter. For our purposes, it will be useful to understand what changes in thinking were required by a Greek who heard and accepted this message.

Paul required that people "turn" or convert (ἐπιστρέφειν) in response to his message. This term was used in Paul's day, especially by philosophers who called upon people to assume a new direction in their lives. Their assumption was that if one turned from ignorance and willfulness, came to one's senses (literally, "turned to oneself"), and undertook to live rationally, then one had hope of a life that could fulfill one's human potential. The phenomenon of conversion was thus well-known, but Paul's understanding of it was radically different.

In the first place, Paul does not think that conversion has to do with human potential or its failure to have attained it; rather it has to do with an escape from idolatry and demonic dominion. The person who listened to Paul had to think on the supernatural level, for idols were associated with demons who attended the sacrifices offered around them (1 Cor 10:10) and led people astray (1 Cor 12:2) who were enslaved to them (Gal 4:4).

109 In the second place, Paul believed that the worshipper of idols | had no knowledge of God and was therefore unable to live a moral life (Rom 1:18–32; Gal 4:8–9). The connection between idolatry and immorality is a Jewish one (Wis 14:12). People were to be holy as God is holy (Lev 14:44–45; 19:2), living the sanctified life (cf. 1 Pet 1:14–16). The danger of lapsing into servitude to demons was real to Paul's converts (1 Cor 10:7; Gal 4:8–9).

In the third place, the convert does not turn to himself but to God. Paul describes God as "the living God," which in missionary sermons refers to God as the Creator.[8] That God is true means in this kind of language that he is truly God in contrast to idols who are not. The convert therefore turns to a God who is not defined by people or locality.

In the fourth place, the purpose of conversion is to serve or owe total allegiance to God as a slave does to his master (Rom 6:15–23). This requires total obedience and excludes service to any other gods, a notion strikingly different from pagan thought and practice which sought security by

[7] E.g., 1 Cor 15:1–2; 8:1, 4–6; 12:1–2.
[8] E.g., Acts 14:15; cf. Rom 9:24–26; 2 Cor 3:3.

increasing worship of the divine under whatever form it is discovered. Furthermore, the knowledge of God, made available in the preaching (2 Cor 4:4–6), makes possible the sanctified moral life (1 Thess 4:3–5; Rom 6:13, 23).

The person who listened to Paul must also have been struck by the strangeness of the claim that the Creator's son would descend from heaven and that life should be lived, not in terms of one's fulfilling of one's human capacities, but in view of that coming. Judging from 1 Thessalonians, this eschatological element in Paul's preaching was at once challenging and comforting.

The further specification that the son who would return had been raised by God was at the heart of the preaching. Christ's resurrection is shown to have many implications for the Christian in Paul's letters and in preaching to Jews was a sign of God's | fulfillment of his promises (e.g., Acts 13:32–33). To the Gentiles, however, Paul spoke of Christ's resurrection as preparatory to his coming (cf. 1 Thess 4:14), thus bracketing history with two divine actions that provide the perspective for human existence. 110

Finally, it must have been disconcerting to hear that history will be concluded by God's judgment. The wrath of God continued to be something difficult to accept, but Paul was relentless in preaching it as part of his gospel (Rom 2:16). Paul preached about judgment, not only to stress God's condemnation of sin but also to promise that Jesus delivers believers from God's wrath (cf. Phil 3:20).

### *The Appeal of the Christian Message*

The changes in thinking that a person would have to undergo when taking such a message seriously were considerable. As presented, they might almost seem so formidable that few would respond favorably, yet the elements that seem, on the surface, to have been the most challenging were, in fact, the most appealing.

Chief among them was the belief in one God, an idea that was gaining ground in the first century. Monotheism was no longer an oddity but was increasingly accepted, especially by philosophers whose view of reality was distinctly religious. In talking about the divine, they used language that could accommodate both popular pagan religion as well as the personal God of Jews and Christians.

Related to Christian monotheism was Christian morality. This connection was very striking to pagans, although Christians and Jews often stressed it. In contrast to the pagan world, the motivation for Christian

behavior was religious rather than what was nobly human and the promise of divine power to assist in living the moral life.

The Christian elaboration of God as the Creator who controlled history and determined its end also had an appeal. | Christian eschatology gave meaning to human history and held it accountable to some sense of divine justice. Certain elements of it, such as the resurrection, however, remained problematic.

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The little Christian congregations fascinated Roman society in much the same ways Jewish synagogues did. On the one hand, Christians were scoffed at for their exclusiveness, the humble social status of their members, and the beliefs that held them together. On the other hand, their relatively high standards of morality and the sense of belonging they offered had a definite appeal.

### *The Response to the Preaching*

Despite the appeal that the Christian message had, it should not be thought that Christianity was viewed as a solution to all of life's problems or that the church offered a haven of calm in a sea of troubles. Such a view of the situation does not agree with reality, nor does it explain Paul's constant efforts to address problems caused for converts by their new faith.

People did not respond to Paul's preaching by adding up what might be appealing about it. They responded to the preaching of the death of Jesus for their sake and God's raising him for their salvation (Rom 10:8–10). Whatever the appealing features of the faith one might itemize, the response to the preaching was determined by the demands of this gospel, and it created serious difficulties for the convert, which Paul had to deal with pastorally.

To begin with, there was the troubling experience of conversion itself. From all indications it was unsettling, accompanied by distress and joy at the same time (1 Thess 1:6). Conversion was an experience that laid one bare in the most intimate way (cf. 1 Cor 14:24–25); something not bound to imbue one with a sense of security. That one was saved by Christ meant that one had been lost in one's sin, and awareness of that tended to cause distress | (Rom 2:9). That Christ offered a way to come to terms with one's condition was a cause of joy, but a person who had been forced to come to terms with himself may have had a hard time overcoming his sense of vulnerability.

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Additionally, converts of all sorts are known for their uncertainty about the progress they may be making or should have made in their new faith.

This problem would have been increased for Paul's converts because he did not stay with them for any length of time, and he left them not completely organized and without any catechism or extensive written instruction. The record of his attempts to overcome this problem through letters and intermediaries shows his awareness of it and how severe the problem was.

Converts also suffered the strain and fracturing of social relations with family, friends, business associates, and the society at large. Christians (and also Jews) were accused of atheism for not honoring the gods honored by society, of hatred of humanity because they distanced themselves from many social practices, of being socially irresponsible because they sought a good higher than social well-being. Also they were generally of the lower classes and therefore suspect. The Gospels reflect these social realities and promised new social relations to substitute for the old ones (Luke 12:51–53; Mark 10:29–30).

In addition, it was impossible for new converts to grasp fully and accept the changes in their thinking and behavior that the fundamental mission preaching required. It is clear from Paul's letters that on some things as basic as the belief in one God not all Christians had the right view (1 Cor 10:7). Nor were they clear on the moral implications of their conversion (1 Cor 6:9–11, 12–20) or what should be their relations with the larger society (1 Thess 4:9–12).

## | *The Immediate Task* 113

Paul's letters show that he continued to address such matters. In the process, he applied methods of pastoral care that had been developed before him, sometimes doing so in new ways appropriate to his self-understanding as a minister of Christ. It is instructive, however, to take note of what he did initially, when people first responded to his preaching.

Our sources for Paul's earliest teaching and practice are his letters. The book of Acts provides us with almost no information about Paul's work with the churches he established. The major exception in the book is Paul's own speech to the elders of Ephesus (Acts 20:18–35). It is striking that this account agrees in many respects with 1 Thessalonians, in which Paul reminds his recent converts of what he had done and said while he was with them. One cannot reconstruct a post-baptismal catechism from his words, but his reminders are sufficient to give some indication of what he thought most necessary as a foundation on which to continue his care of his readers.

Paul frequently reminds his readers in 1 Thessalonians of the relationship that he had developed with them (2:1, 5, 9, 19). In fact, all of the first three chapters of this letter recount the history of Paul's relationship with them and specifies repeatedly that it was through the gospel that the relationship came into being. Paul's pastoral care will therefore proceed on the basis of a relationship in which he is respected and loved.

Paul also reveals that he had given instruction on how they should relate to each other (4:9) and comments that they were in fact still engaged in mutual strengthening of each other (5:11). Paul thus thinks of pastoral care in communal terms, not only in terms of the pastor and individuals in his congregation. | He reminds them that he had shown them an example of social responsibility when he worked with his hands (2:9; cf. 4:10–12; 2 Thess 3:7–10). Paul had given further instruction in behavior by teaching them about sexual morality within the church (4:3–8), and he stresses the motivation for their behavior.

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It is noteworthy, so far, how much attention Paul had given to behavior and communal concerns. He recognized the need to provide a new social entity within which the newly converted would live out their new faith. It is also striking that, when he could not return to them and wrote to "supply what was lacking in [their] faith" (3:10), he went on to write (in chs. 4 and 5) about behavior that is always related to the community. Paul does remind his readers, however, of theological matters in which he instructed them. Besides recalling the preaching they had accepted (1:9–10), he reminds them of eschatological teaching they had received (4:6; 5:1–2) and that he had forewarned them of the continuing distress they were bound to experience (3:3–4).

This by no means exhausts the things in which Paul had sought to ground them. These are things that were important to him at the time he wrote 1 Thessalonians, and there may (probably were) things that had been more important when he was actually with them. But these at least give us a sense of where Paul began and, more than that, they reveal what was still important to Paul the pastor less than a year after he had first set foot in Thessalonica.

## The Pastor and His Church

Paul considered his relationship with his new converts to be of the greatest importance. | It was at the heart of his pastoral work, and he went to great lengths to foster it in the face of great difficulties. It was important that Paul

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develop very close relations with his converts, for he did not remain with them long before he left them.[9] Most of the time he left under pressure from the communities in which he had established the churches.

This alone would have caused the pressure of anxiety that he felt daily for his churches (2 Cor 11:28), but the problem was further aggravated by other preachers who came to those churches after his departure. At times they had messages that differed from Paul's (2 Cor 11:4–5; Gal 1:6–9) and, as they attacked his message, they challenged the allegiance his converts felt toward him (2 Cor 10:12, 18; 11:12, 20; 12:11). When this was the case, Paul began the letters to the churches that were thus threatened by affirming his right to advise them (Gal 1–2). Even when there was no such threat, Paul typically began his hortatory letters with an autobiographical section in which he reminded his readers of the relationship that he had with them from the beginning and which still formed the basis for his exhortation (1 Cor 1–4; Phil 1–3; 1 Thess 1–3).

In view of the importance that Paul attached to his personal relationship with his churches, it will be instructive to examine how he initiated that relationship and how it informed his pastoral work.

## *The Tie That Binds*

Given Paul's self-understanding, one might expect that he would have presented himself as an apostle with authority and made demands accordingly. It is therefore striking that he referred to his apostolic authority only when his message was challenged and even then did so reluctantly (2 Cor 10:8; 13:10; cf. 12:19).

Paul thought of his apostleship as a mandate to preach, not an office that defined his relationships with those below him in | God's hierarchy. 116 The demeanor with which he carried out his task was not what some people expected from someone commissioned by God, but was, in their eyes, that of a weak man, unimpressive in appearance and ineffective in speech (2 Cor 10–13). Paul, on the other hand, refers to his gentleness and humility (2 Cor 10:1), and he even reminds people who had turned against him how they had received him on grounds other than any authority he claimed (Gal 4:12–20).

Rather than use his apostolic status to form the basis for his exhortation, Paul used language that is affective, speaking to the emotions. Among

[9] Contrast Acts 18:11; 20:31.

these is the language of kinship and, in using this language, Paul chose family relations for their emotive force rather than hierarchical value. It is interesting that, especially when Paul uses this language, he reveals his pastoral method.

To begin with, Paul calls himself the father of his converts. In concluding his self-presentation in 1 Corinthians (chs. 1–4), Paul reminds his readers that he had become their father through the gospel (4:14–15). It is important to note, therefore, that while Paul did foster friendly relations with his converts, it was the gospel that was responsible for determining the true nature of the relationship (cf. 1 Thess 1:4–6). As a father, Paul had the responsibility to take care of his children (cf. 2 Cor 12:14), and he did this by requiring them to follow his example (4:16). Depending on their response, they could expect either gentleness or punishment (4:17–20).

When Paul was exasperated by the Galatians' actions in his absence, he was their mother who again experiences birth pains (Gal 4:18–19), a locution that was surely designed to make them feel a bit guilty. That Paul had no hierarchical scheme in mind when he uses this kind of language is clear from his comparison of himself with the gentleness of a mothering nurse, a person who was an | employee, and therefore not high in the family hierarchy (1 Thess 2:7). 117

To cap it all off, he uses the language of the orphan to describe himself when he was desolate because he was separated from the Thessalonians (1 Thess 2:17).

These examples illustrate the kind of relationship that Paul sought to cultivate right from the beginning of the association with his converts.

### *The Pastor's Example*

We can gain a firmer grasp on Paul's pastoral approach by examining one aspect of his relationship that issued from his relationship as father. In 1 Cor 4:15–16, he says that, because he is their father in the gospel, his readers are to imitate him. He has become their example in the faith. Paul, on occasion, calls on people to follow his example (e.g., 1 Cor 11:1; Phil 3:17).

In doing so, he was following the custom of the moral philosophers of his day. His contemporary, Seneca, gave the following advice (*Ep.* 11:8–10, [Gummere, LCL]):

> "Cherish some man of high character, and keep him ever before your eyes, living as if he were watching you, and ordering all your actions as if he beheld them." Such, my dear Lucilius, is the counsel of Epicurus; he has

> quite properly given us a guardian and an attendant. We can get rid of most sins, if we have a witness who stands near us when we are likely to go wrong. The soul should have someone whom it can respect—one by whose authority it may make even its inner shrine more hallowed. Happy is the man who can make others better, not merely when he is in their company, but even when he is in their thoughts! . . . One who can so revere another will soon be himself worthy of reverence. Choose therefore a Cato; or, if Cato seems too severe a model, choose some Laelius, a gentler spirit. Choose a master | whose life, conversation, and soul-expressing face have satisfied you; picture him always to yourself as your protector or your pattern. For we must indeed have someone according to whom we may regulate our characters; you can never straighten that which is crooked unless you use a ruler.

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By providing an example, one did a number of things. One showed integrity by having one's deeds agree with one's words. One also showed that what one taught was something that could be realized. Furthermore, the person who exemplified the teaching one had accepted provided a degree of security in the way of life one adopted as a result of one's teaching.

Paul used this method of pastoral care, though he differed from Seneca in some important respects. Seneca placed a great deal of emphasis on the personality of the model whom one undertook to imitate. As we have seen, Paul also talks about his demeanor; he would be like the gentle Laelius. For Paul, though, the relationship was not determined by personality but by the gospel. Personal demeanor has to do with the way in which that relationship affected by the gospel finds further expression, but is not what brings about the relationship. This was precisely the problem with those Corinthians Paul opposes in 2 Cor 10–13, who placed so much stock in the demeanor of some preachers who came after Paul and interpreted the gospel in terms congruent with that demeanor.

A case in point was Paul's custom to support himself in his initial preaching in a given locality. This custom must be seen in the larger context of Paul's thinking on it. Paul was called to preach, and he had no other option but to do so (1 Cor 9:16). Yet he was willing to forgo his right to financial support in carrying out his commission and in the process he exercised his freedom in how he would do so (1 Cor 9:18–23). Paul's practice of not receiving funds from some of his churches lay at the heart of his self-understanding and it was attacked by those who questioned his legitimacy as an | apostle (cf. 2 Cor 11:7–15; 12:11–13). The rhetoric in such discussions is heated, but it demonstrates how his manual labor belonged to his understanding of his ministry.

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The way in which his labor functioned when he established a church appears most clearly from his work in Thessalonica. From his letters to the church there, it appears that he sought to achieve a number of things by not receiving financial support from his converts. In the first place, by working with his hands, he demonstrated his love for them by not burdening them (1 Thess 2:8–9; cf. 2 Cor 11:11; 12:14–18). It is significant that his manual labor is again associated with the preaching of the gospel, a demonstration of Paul's giving of himself that accompanied his preaching. Another aspect of his labor was that he was demonstrating something he expected his converts to imitate (2 Thess 3:6–13). This is the more significant when it is recognized that Paul, himself coming from a more favored status of society than most of his converts, shared the attitudes of people from the favored classes that manual labor was a hardship (1 Cor 4:12), something slavish (1 Cor 9:19), and an abasement (2 Cor 11:7).

### *Paul's Foci of Attention*

Paul's preaching had as its goal the engendering of faith in the individual heart (Rom 10:5–17). His perspective, however, encompassed much more than the individual.

Paul's focus on the individual had very important consequences for the style of his pastoral ministry. Two images he uses in 1 Thess 2 illustrate his pastoral manner, and how it was informed by the custom of his time. The image of the gentle nurse (2:7) was used when people discussed how severe a teacher or speaker should be. The nurse was | advanced to illustrate how understanding one should be of the condition of those to whom one spoke and of being careful to scold or be gentle at the proper time.

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Even clearer is the example of the father. In 1 Cor 4:14–21, Paul said that, as a father, he would dispense his care in accord with the behavior of his spiritual children, coming either in gentleness or with a rod. In 1 Thess 2:10–11, Paul elaborates. As a father, he paid attention to his converts as individuals. The significance was that he could therefore adapt his pastoral care to their conditions. When needed, he would exhort, a more general activity. When someone grieved, he would encourage or console (cf. 1 Thess 3:3–4), and when they needed sterner treatment, he would be more demanding and charge them to do the right thing.

While Paul would care for the individual, he never thought of the individual apart from the congregation. Indeed, the force of the image of the body that he uses in 1 Cor 12 is that one's true individual endowment is only realized as part of the body. His letters were therefore all written to

churches, not individuals (even Philemon). The congregational dimension of Paul's thought has clear pastoral implications.

Paul's focus extended beyond the local church. Paul was assiduous in relating the little churches he had established or about which he knew to other churches. He constantly refers to other churches (Rom 16:4, 16), relates churches to each other (1 Cor 1:2; 2 Cor 1:1), and speaks of churches in terms of areas (1 Thess 2:14; 1 Cor 16:1, 19; Gal 1:2; 2 Cor 8:1; Rom 15:26; 2 Cor 1:1). He uses other churches as examples to encourage the churches to which he writes (1 Thess 1:7–8; 2:14; Rom 1:8; 2 Cor 8:1–2; 9:1–2), and he makes clear that his teachings applied to other churches than the ones he was addressing (1 Cor 4:17; 7:17; 11:16).

| A result of this constant reference to other churches must have been that the little churches had some sense of a large fellowship extending far beyond their own limited circumstances and conditions. Paul went beyond informing his little mission churches of the larger network of which they were a part. He encouraged them to assume responsibility beyond their own areas and, when they did so, complimented them for it and interpreted it as an extension of his own work (1 Thess 1:7–9). The contribution he gathered for the saints in Judea was a case in point. It was a major effort that required the utmost in pastoral skill. The contribution, which occupied Paul throughout most of his work in the eastern Mediterranean, was designed to aid the poor among the saints in Judea (Rom 15:26), though its significance was much larger. Paul thought of it as a fellowship, a spiritual debt his Gentile churches owed their Jewish predecessors (Rom 15:27), a paying of which would result in unity between the Gentile and Judean churches (2 Cor 8:13–15). 121

It would be superficial to view the collection simply in terms of ecclesiastical politics. It was part of Paul's attempt to expand the horizon of his converts and in that respect was itself pastoral in nature. The manner in which Paul urged his churches to participate in the collection further required a pastor's insight and tact. This becomes clear when one notices the ways in which Paul motivated the church in Corinth to join in the contribution (2 Cor 8–9): to do so is a matter of God's grace (8:1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 19; 9:8, 14); it requires a giving of oneself to the Lord (8:5); it is proof of the Corinthians' love (8:8, 24), of their ministry (9:13), and of Paul's boasting about them (8:24; 9:3); God supplies all needs (9:8–10); there is blessing in giving (9:6, 10–11); the contribution will result in thanksgiving (9:11–12); and in glorifying of God (9:13).

122 | Paul's clear pastoral concern, which is evident in his effort to make his churches feel that they were part of a large fellowship and to present the contribution as much more than a financial arrangement, shows that the contribution was to him more than a strategic move on his part to bring Jew and Greek together.

## Pastoring from Afar

Paul remained with the churches he established for only a short time so there was not much opportunity for him to act as a pastor in person. His letters teem with references to his absence and to his desire to see them again. He did not leave them destitute, however, but continued his pastoral work in two ways: through his coworkers who served as intermediaries between himself and the churches, and through his letters.[10]

### *Paul's Use of Coworkers*

Paul conducted a collegial mission. He was almost never alone and, when he did find himself alone, he commented on his desolation (e.g., 1 Thess 2:17; 3:1). Paul placed great stock in his coworkers, as is evident from such descriptions of them as partners and fellow workers (2 Cor 8:23), fellow soldiers (Phil 2:25), and fellow prisoners (Rom 16:7).

When they worked with Paul while establishing a church, these coworkers engaged fully in the mission, from preaching with Paul (2 Cor 1:19; cf. Rom 16:9) to taking down his letters as he dictated them (Rom 16:22). The point is that, although Paul thought that a special relationship had come into existence between himself and his converts through his preaching, when they first came to know him, he was part of a small group made of evangelists.

123 | When Paul was separated from his newly founded churches, he was worried about their welfare. It was therefore natural that he sent some of these coworkers whom his converts already knew to continue his ministry to them. A number of these persons illustrate how they continued Paul's ministry, sometimes being more successful than Paul could have been in person at the time he sent them.

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[10] E.g., 1 Cor 16:1–12; 2 Cor 7:5–16; Phil 2:25–30; 1 Thess 2:17–3:10.

Paul thought that he and Timothy shared a special relationship, of which the Philippians knew when Paul wrote to them. When he commends Timothy to them, as he does in Phil 2:19–24, it is not to introduce him but to emphasize the trust he has in Timothy. Interestingly, what commends Timothy to them is that he is as a son to Paul. His relationship to Paul in preaching the gospel and his genuine concern for the Lord explained why the Corinthians should receive him (1 Cor 16:10–11).

Earlier in 1 Corinthians, Paul had adduced himself as an example to be imitated (1 Cor 4:16). It was equally important for them to remember him as a model even when he was absent. Timothy was to engage in teaching that was particularly appropriate to their immediate situation. In doing this he was in effect extending and applying Paul's pastoral care to them. Paul promises punishment or gentleness, depending on their response (1 Cor 4:18–21). Timothy seems to have performed the same task of reminding the Thessalonians of Paul's example, for he reported that they had a good memory of him (1 Thess 3:6; cf. 1:6).

Timothy's role was particularly important in his mission to Thessalonica. At the time Paul sent him there, Timothy was still a young man, probably not more than twenty years of age. Paul had exhorted the Thessalonians when he was with them (1 Thess 2:11–12). Timothy thus continues Paul's ministry, but he does not do so independently of Paul. As we have seen, upon his return, Timothy reported that the Thessalonians still looked to Paul as their model (1 Thess 3:6; cf. 1 Cor 16:10–11). | Timothy worked within the framework of that relationship. 124

Titus illustrates another function Paul's emissaries were called upon to perform. Whereas Timothy appears to have extended Paul's pastoral care, Titus emerges as a rescuer of Paul's mission. Already at our first encounter with Titus, he is at the center of a controversy caused by Paul's Gentile mission (Gal 2:4), and he later emerges as the diplomatic emissary at a crucial stage in Paul's relationship with the church in Corinth.

Paul's relationship with the Corinthians deteriorated as his mission in the eastern Mediterranean drew to a close. Paul visited Corinth and was faced down by someone who, he says, wronged him (2 Cor 7:12). Returning to Ephesus, Paul then wrote a harsh letter to the church rather than make yet another visit to set matters aright (2 Cor 1:23–2:49; 7:8–12). Instead, he sent Titus as an intermediary to restore his good relations with the Corinthians and to return via Macedonia and Troas. Paul set out from Ephesus to meet Titus. When he did not meet him in Troas, his anxiety was palpable (2 Cor 2:12–13). But he experienced tremendous relief

when he met Titus in Macedonia and received a favorable report (2 Cor 7:5–7). Paul spoke of a ministry of reconciliation with God (2 Cor 5:16–21), but it was Titus who brought about reconciliation between Paul and the Corinthians.

*Pastoring by Letter*

Paul's letters are his abiding legacy to us. They are the residue of his communication with his churches. Letter writing was the favorite way of communicating in a mobile society like the one in which Paul worked. Handbooks on letter writing were widely used and both reflected and governed the ways in which people wrote letters.

125 | There were certain principles that were important, such as that a letter was one part of a dialogue. A writer would, therefore, say in a letter what he would have said had he been in the presence of his addressee. It was said that a letter was the image of its writer and that the writer would not change his personality in a letter but would demonstrate his integrity by being consistent.

At the same time, there were different kinds of letters, such as the letter of recommendation, which performed a particular function and assumed a definite form.[11] Letters were also written in different styles, such as exhortation, consolation, persuasion, or self-defense, depending on the circumstances at the time of writing and the purpose of writing. Letters were thus extensions of the communication people engaged in when present. This takes on added significance when we remember that letters were dictated and that they were read aloud by or to their recipients, as was the custom with all written documents. Paul and his churches must have carried on a lively correspondence of which we have only a residue. We know of some letters that the churches wrote him (1 Cor 7:1) and of some that Paul wrote that we do not have (1 Cor 5:9; 2 Cor 2:3, 9).

Paul's letters are our major source of information for his pastoral care. As we have seen, they provide us with some hints of how he worked with his converts when he was with them. But they are themselves pastoral, a means by which Paul sought to affect the behavior of his readers and contribute to their spiritual growth. Most of the time we read Paul's letters for his theology or for their contribution to our knowledge of history or literature. We are not used to reading them for their pastoral

[11] Acts 9:2; 22:5; 28:21; Rom 16:1–2; 2 Cor 3:1–3; Philemon.

understanding. Ancient commentators, such as John Chrysostom, were much more attuned to the pastoral Paul than we are. They also appreciated how much we can learn from him. A cursory | look at one of Paul's letters will illustrate how they represent him pastoring from afar. 126

First Thessalonians is the earliest letter of Paul that we possess. It is also the oldest pastoral letter in the NT. Paul uses the paraenetic style of exhortation, which had the following characteristics: paraenesis was given when speaker and listeners were friends or when a father spoke to his son; it used personal example as a hortatory device; it did not offer new information but reminded people of what they already knew; and it encouraged people to continue doing what they were already doing. This letter is the best ancient example of a paraenetic letter, but what is of interest to us is how well the style is suited to encouraging new converts who were experiencing the difficulties we discussed earlier.

The first three chapters of 1 Thessalonians are autobiographical and perform a number of pastoral functions. They provide an appealing picture of Paul, constant in his love for the Thessalonians and his efforts to see them. He established a close relationship with them and has been consistent in his care for them. He is described in terms that present him as trustworthy, someone who would not abandon them. Much like Seneca's lighthouse, he is their guide. It does not take much imagination to see how this Paul would strengthen new, insecure converts who must have felt abandoned by Paul, not because he did not care for them, but because Satan hindered him from returning. The relationship with the Thessalonians is described in very affective language. Not only the images of father, children, nurse, and orphan, but also the language of 2:17–3:10, so full of pathos, would serve to strengthen the bonds between Paul and his readers.

According to the theory of letter writing, a letter should reflect the same person whom the reader knew from personal contact. Paul is very careful in this letter to underscore the continuity between the self-description in chapters 1–3 and how he writes in chapters 4 and 5, when he gives them advice about their lives. As he had exhorted them (2:3, 11), so he now continues to do (4:1, 10, 18; 5:11). He charged them to live morally (2:12), and he now reminds | them of it (4:6). He had worked with his hands (2:9), now he commands them to do so (4:11). He had comforted them (2:12), now he wants them to comfort one another (4:18; 5:11). He had warned them about tribulation, and now reminds them of it (3:3–4). 127

New converts were uncertain about the degree of their knowledge and were not always certain about how to live the Christian life. Paul's paraenetic language is designed to speak to these problems. He repeatedly refers

to what they already know (1:5; 2:1, 2, 5, 11; 3:3, 4; 4:2, 9; 5:1, 2), reminds them of something (2:9; 3:6), says that there is no need to speak or write about something (4:9; 5:1), and compliments them by saying that they are already doing what they should (4:1, 10; 5:11). That is what a good pastor does, building up his people by affirming what is positive.

It is also noteworthy how Paul identifies with his readers. He knew that they would be distressed by his absence. He also knew that converts were frequently referred to as orphans because they had been cut off from their family and associates. Paul then describes himself as an orphan by virtue of his separation from them (2:17), and he writes as though he himself made contact with them when he sent Timothy. He nowhere says in the letter that he wrote because he had heard they needed anything from him. By writing in this manner, he expresses empathy with his readers, something the good pastor habitually does.

Paul uses the paraenetic style for his pastoral purposes, making the letter something quite different from any other paraenetic letter | we have. One of the major differences is that he includes five prayers at important places in the letter (1:2–3; 2:13; 3:9–10, 11–13; 5:23). These prayers are pastoral in a number of ways. As genuine prayers or prayer reports, they bring the readers before God. They provide the perspective for the quality of life Paul is inculcating. Finally, by thanking God for the qualities Paul discerns in his readers, he is implicitly hortatory, placing them under obligation to Paul and God to realize those qualities.

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Though 1 Thessalonians is the clearest example of Paul's pastoral method and interest, the same features are also found in others of his letters. We should not allow the different styles of the letters to blind us to their essential pastoral intention.

### *The Pastor Adapts to His People's Circumstances*

The principle inherent in acting like a nurse or a father (that is, that one should individualize one's care depending on the condition or disposition of the persons one cares for) also applies to letters. This explains some of the anomalies in Paul's letters. Paul's attitude is expressed in the basic statement in 1 Cor 9:19–22. We note that the aim is to save people and that in pursuing that aim Paul adapts himself to the particularity of his hearers. He is unwilling to compromise the gospel (Gal 1:6–9; 2 Cor 11:1–6), but he does take human particularity into consideration. We note a few examples of this approach.

In 1 Thess 4:13–18, Paul identifies himself with the Christians who will be alive when the Lord comes (vv. 15, 17), over against those who would have died by then (vv. 14, 16). In the letters to Corinth, however, he seems to include himself with those who will have died (1 Cor 15:51 [?]; 2 Cor 4:14; 6:14). It is unlikely that Paul had changed his mind in the few years between the writing of these letters. What is much more likely is that Paul writes on the subject | in a way that takes into consideration the problem he is addressing. In 1 Thessalonians, it is those who expect to be alive at the coming of the Lord who have the problem: they fear that they will have some advantage over those who will have died by then (vv. 13, 15). Paul therefore stresses that both groups will come together and be with the Lord always (4:17, 18; 5:10). The problem in Corinth was different. There, the problem was not about how the living and dead will relate at the coming of the Lord, but about the nature of the resurrection body. Some people thought that the resurrection had already been realized in some (probably spiritual) way (1 Cor 4:8–9; 15:19). Paul therefore speaks at length in 1 Cor 15 about death and the resurrection body (vv. 35–57). The discussion about the body continues in 2 Corinthians (4:16–5:10). This does not mark a new stage in Paul's thinking, but is more likely his way of writing empathetically, identifying with those who had raised the question he addresses.

Paul's adaptation had in view the benefit of his converts. But when people were not well disposed to him, they accused him of inconsistency that demonstrated his lack of integrity.[12] Pastors are always in danger of criticism that they are not consistent. Such charges are easy to make of pastors who attempt to be empathetic. Paul was fully aware of the risks he was running in pastoring from afar.

## | The Pastoring Congregation

It is remarkable that Paul does not seem to direct his churches to preach the gospel as he himself did. He assumes that they would preach, and he solicits their cooperation in his own mission, but, with the possible exception of

[12] For his change in travel plans, see 2 Cor 1:15–2:4; cf. 1 Cor 16:5–9. For different attitudes toward accepting financial support, see 2 Cor 11:7–11; cf. 2 Cor 12:14–18. For the difference in tone between his demeanor when present and his letters, see 2 Cor 10:10. For studied ambiguity, see 2 Cor 1:12–14; cf. 1 Cor 5:9–11.

Philippians, in his letters he does not instruct them to preach. Paul seems to have held the view that by nurturing viable Christian communities the gospel would in fact be preached and converts drawn by virtue of faithful congregations.

It is natural to concentrate on Paul's role in the development of his churches. Insufficient attention, however, has been given to the role he thought the churches should themselves have in their own nurture. If one conceives of pastoring as spiritual care aimed at the upbuilding of persons, then Paul thought that his churches should be engaged in that activity. He is quite explicit on the subject and we turn now to examine a number of texts by way of illustration.

### *Pastoring within the Congregation*

Paul thought of his churches as autonomous entities, which were in a special relationship with him, and he constantly made efforts to maintain contact with them and guide them in their new life. While he considered his relationship with them as of prime importance, he did not cultivate a dependence of such a sort that they were paralyzed from undertaking pastoral responsibilities themselves. We begin by looking at some texts that direct his readers in such activity without reference to the authority or spiritual presence of Paul.

The best example again is 1 Thessalonians, particularly 5:11–22, where he provides detailed instruction. There is no evidence that this church, founded only a matter of months before, had an organized leadership who counted among the responsibilities of their | office the pastoring of the church. What Paul does in this section is to require of the Thessalonian church the kind of activity in which he himself had engaged when he had been with them. Their pastoring would in effect be a continuation of his own, although he does not state this explicitly. His reminding them of his work with them in chapters 1–3 functions, however, as a delineation of himself as a pastor.

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In 1 Thess 2:8–11, he had recalled how he had shown his love for them by working, giving himself to them, and, like a solicitous father, paid attention to them individually and adapted his pastoral care, accordingly exhorting, comforting and charging them. In 5:11, he instructs them to exhort each other "one on one" and to build one another up. They are to do what Paul had done, applying their exhortation and edification individually, in accord with the conditions or dispositions of people. This is obviously not something new, for Paul says they are to continue doing what they

were already doing. What emerges is that this church had engaged in such mutual pastoring from its very inception.

Paul then goes on to state in much greater detail how this is to take place. He describes the different activities by which the exhortation and edification he has in mind will take place. Since he is concerned with functions rather than offices, we may well understand that he thinks of a situation in which a person may at one time be doing the exhorting and at another time be the receiver of exhortation. The major principle underlying Paul's thinking is that of reciprocity. His understanding of pastoring is that it is a two-way street and he works that out in what follows.

He turns first to the attitudes of those who receive exhortation (1 Thess 5:12–13). Paul is careful in cultivating this attitude not to command or direct his readers, but to "beseech" them (v. 12). He describes the functions they are to respond to with three participles, | which describe three pastoral actions: laboring, which for Paul designates preaching of the gospel; caring for others in the Lord rather than being over them (cf. Rom 12:8; 16:2); and admonishing, which was a rather severe form of urging someone to responsibility. The appropriate response to those who engage in this considerable range of actions is to regard them very highly in love and honor them not because of their office but because of their work. Paul has a dynamic, non-institutional view of the relationship between the giver and receiver of pastoral care. What further strikes one is that Paul does not want to lose sight of the congregational dimension of the activity, for he urges them to be at peace with each other. He is not thereby referring to schisms, which existed in the church, but reflects sensitivity to a possible reaction to being exhorted in such strong terms by a fellow member in the congregation.

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Paul then turns to the other side of the relationship by focusing on those who deliver the care (1 Thess 5:14–15). Again he does not command but "exhorts." His interest is in the activities in which the unspecified "brethren" are to engage. Again we have a diversity of activities, but this time they are carefully matched with persons who are described in terms of certain characteristics or conditions. They are to admonish, the harshest action mentioned in the letter, the "disorderly" (ἀτάκτους), which refers to those who do not live according to the accepted standards of behavior. From 2 Thess 3:6, 7 we learn that they were the ones who refused to work, thereby placing a burden on the church and evidently bringing the criticism of outsiders down on the church (cf. 1 Thess 4:9–12). A quite different activity is coupled with the "fainthearted," those who are dispirited.

They require consolation or encouragement. Finally, all people deserve one's patience. Paul is aware that the person who identifies needs in people and undertakes to encourage them | may concentrate on what is wrong in people and even settle old scores. He warns against this and once more enunciates the principle of reciprocity, "always seek to do good to one another and to all," before the general exhortation in 1 Thess 5:16–18.

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Basically the same principles are present in 1 Thess 5:16–22, which deal with a particular activity in Pauline congregations, that of prophesying. What Paul understands by prophecy emerges most clearly from 1 Cor 14:3, where the goal of prophecy is described as edification, encouragement, and consolation—the same themes we found in 1 Thessalonians. The principle that is to guide the church in the exercise of its gifts is reciprocity, the criterion being whether any particular activity builds up the church. The congregation decides whether this is in fact so even, or perhaps especially, in the case of prophecy (1 Cor 14:26–33). This is essentially what Paul directs the church to be about in 1 Thess 5:19–22.

With the exception of his comments on prophecy, nearly everything Paul says about these pastoral actions and the appropriate responses to them could have been said by a contemporary moral philosopher. In fact, the concerns Paul expresses and the terminology he uses were derived from them. The major differences are that Paul is concerned with the attention to individuals within a group, rather than with the relations between isolated individuals. Furthermore, the group he has in mind is the community of the last days (1 Thess 5:1–11; cf. 5:23) and the care that is being given is "in the Lord" (5:12), which make all the difference.

Paul did not expect that only churches established by himself were to engage in such a mutual ministry. In Rom 15:1–7 he directs a church to whom he was introducing himself how to act towards those of its members weak in faith. What he says is to be viewed against the background of Rom 14. He had there discussed what | was appropriate or permitted behavior in regard to matters of diet and the observing of religious days. Some persons, the more rigorous in outlook, he described as weak in the faith (14:1, 2), evidently assuming that those of different perspective were the strong. He condemns the judgmental attitude that exists in such situations (14:13; cf. 3) and urges his strong readers rather to accept those weak in faith (14:1), each group not to despise or judge the other, for God has accepted him (14:3). In chapter 15, Paul turns to the responsibility of the strong, confident that they are able to admonish one another (15:14). Because they are strong, they are under obligation to bear the weaknesses of the weak (v. 1). He then elaborates on that topic sentence

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in an exposition that provides the fullest rationale for the congregation's mutual pastoral ministry.

First, Paul has in mind actions of individuals rather than the congregation and in those actions they are not to please themselves (Rom 15:1; cf. 14:5, 12). Paul is not clear what form such self-pleasing may take.[13] Second, related to the first, is that the strong individual must please his neighbor. This does not mean that the effort is simply to make the neighbor feel good, but the aim is rather the good of his neighbor, the result being his edification, which is the goal of congregational pastoral care (1 Cor 14:3; 1 Thess 5:11). Christ provides both the example and the reason for the action: his giving of himself for the good of others defines the pleasing Paul has in mind (cf. 1 Cor 14:15).[14] Third, this is in keeping with the witness of the Scripture, which makes possible hope through the endurance and | encouragement it provides. Fourth, God himself can provide endurance and encouragement to live in unanimity with each other, so that they together with one mouth might glorify God, which should be their goal. Finally, summarizing in the most personal way, they should be accepting of each other, as Christ has accepted them, for the glory of God. 135

In Rom 15, Paul has in view the treatment of individuals weak in faith. In Gal 6:1–5, he deals with the treatment of individuals guilty of an actual trespass. Exactly what the nature of the trespass was we do not know, but it may have had to do with money. A glance at the text yields the following about Paul's advice.

First, the goal of one's treatment of the trespasser should be his restoration, correcting what had gone amiss. Second, the actions should be taken in gentleness and with a sense of one's own vulnerability. Third, the focus is on the individual, the person who trespassed, and the person who sinned. One therefore has the impression that Paul has in mind a trespass against an individual who then sets about improving the situation. Finally, one bears the other's burdens (βάρη), but apparently not his manageable load (φορτίον). By doing so, one fulfills the law of Christ, which evidently means that one forgoes one's right for another's good (1 Cor 9:21; cf. Rom 15:2).

[13] This possibly could have been avoiding association with the weak, discounting the position of the weak out of hand, or the strong exulting in their own emancipated views.

[14] The same thought is expressed in Phil 2:1–4, to which the Christ hymn in vv. 5–11 is adduced as an example.

In Rom 15 and Gal 6, Paul deals with the way individuals are to treat other individuals within the church. In 1 Cor 5, Paul gives directions on how the church is to act as a group in disciplining one of its members. We have time only to note the following.

136 | First, the action is not to be taken out of arrogance but sorrow. Second, the action is predicated on the assumption that the quality of life within the church is the church's concern, not that of the world outside. It is also assumed that the church's morality is higher than that of outsiders (cf. 1 Cor 6:1–6). Third, the action has in view the good of the individual (1 Cor 5:5). The offending person is not to be abandoned but is to be forgiven and comforted, or else Satan will overpower him.[15] The offender remains a Christian brother. Finally, the good of the congregation is also a motivation for the action to be taken, for "a little leaven leavens the whole lump of dough" (1 Cor 5:6).

### *Paul Receives Pastoral Care*

Paul is so much the pastor and so clearly has the care for the congregations and their members in mind. It is thus surprising that he describes himself as the beneficiary of the concern of his congregations. One would not expect him to accept admonition from his churches, judging from his response to the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians, though he does speak of the allaying of his anxiety in terms used of pastoral care.

This appears quite clearly in 2 Cor 7, where he describes the effect of Titus's report about the Corinthians, from some of whom Paul had been estranged, which caused him great anxiety. Paul begins the letter by presenting himself as the one who can provide comfort because God had comforted him (2 Cor 1:3–7). That may in principle have been true, but in his troublesome relations with the Corinthians matters had changed. He had been so anxious that in Troas he was unable to preach, although the Lord had opened | a door for him (2 Cor 2:12–13). 137

Then Titus delivers his report that the problems between Paul and his opponents had been resolved and Paul bursts forth:

> For even when we came into Macedonia, our bodies had no rest but we were afflicted at every turn—fighting without and fear within. But God, who comforts the downcast, comforted us by the coming of Titus, and not only by his coming but also by the comfort with which he was comforted in you,

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[15] Although 2 Cor 2:5–11 does not deal with the same instance, the principle is also present there. A similar concern is also expressed in 2 Thess 3:14–15.

> as he told us of your longing, your mourning, your zeal for me, so that I rejoiced still more. (2 Cor 7:5–7)

The tables had been turned: Paul received comfort from the Corinthians.

We close, as we began, with a text from 1 Thessalonians (3:6–8). We have already observed how Paul describes himself empathetically by referring to himself as an orphan and as abandoned (albeit willingly), thus identifying himself with the condition usually attributed to new converts. He then goes on, in masterly fashion describing himself as having benefited from the Thessalonians' pastoral concern. He had sent Timothy to strengthen them lest they had been unsettled by "these afflictions" (3:2–3).[16] He thus tacitly expresses gratitude for their interest in him.[17] They yearned to see Paul as he did to see them. Now Timothy had come and Paul, in all his distress and affliction, has "been comforted about you through your faith; for now we live if you stand fast in the Lord" (3:7–8). What had brought this about was that Timothy had reported that the Thessalonians still loved Paul and looked to him as their security.

The pastor, in his absence, benefited from such care. One reason Paul wanted to visit the church in Rome, which he had not established, was that he wanted to strengthen them, "that is," he | says, "that we may be mutually encouraged by each other's faith, both yours and mine" (Rom 1:12). What he hoped may occur in person, in his relationship with the Thessalonians, happened even in their separation, because the relationship between Paul the pastor and this church was so close.

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[16] A tradition of interpretation beginning with the Church Fathers has understood this to be Paul's afflictions.

[17] One may compare Phil 2:25–28, anxiety about someone else's well-being.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

# PARAENESIS IN THE EPISTLE TO TITUS*

The Pastoral Epistles (henceforth PE) are frequently as a group described broadly as exhortation or as moral exhortation.[1] This broad description has not meant that there has been no interest in describing the literary genre of the letters or the particular nature of the exhortation with greater precision. The majority of scholars hold that a distinction can be made between 1 Timothy and Titus on the one hand, which are thought to be similar to ancient church orders, and 2 Timothy on the other, which is taken to have affinities with the genre of the farewell discourse or the last will and testament.[2] The exhortation in all three letters is generally classified as paraenesis,[3] which is used in different ways, that in 2 Timothy being

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[1] For example, by Jouette M. Bassler, *1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 22–23; Mark Harding, *Tradition and Rhetoric in the Pastoral Epistles* (StBL 3; New York: P. Lang, 1998), 123–146. The most detailed description of the hortatory character of the letters is that by Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986), 10–25.

[2] See, for instance, Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (trans. Philip Buttolph and Adela Yarbro; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 5–8. Helmut Koester (*Introduction to the New Testament* [2 vols.; New York: de Gruyter, 1982–1995], 2:297–308) does justice to H. von Campenhausen's influence in the development of this understanding of the PE.

[3] So Jerome D. Quinn, *The Letter to Titus: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary and an Introduction to Titus, I and II Timothy, the Pastoral Epistles* (AB 35; New York: Doubleday, 1990), 6; Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*, 216–219. Michael Wolter, *Die Pastoralbriefe als Paulustradition* (FRLANT 146; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 133, 138–139, cautions that such a description does not suffice, for it depends on what is meant by paraenesis, which is not to be understood as a *Gattung* but in terms of its goal to move people to a certain manner of conduct. Wolter draws considerable attention (*Die Pastoralbriefe*, 156–202) to the so-called *mandata principis*, the dictates of authorities to their subordinates or delegates who are to put them into effect. Fiore (*Function of Personal Example*, 45–78) had already examined this literary tradition from the perspective of the use of personal example in exhortation. Johnson goes beyond Fiore and Wolter by speaking of a genre of "*mandata principis* letter," and uses this classification in a vigorous argument against the view that 1 Timothy and Titus are church orders (Luke Timothy Johnson, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* [AB 35A; New York: Doubleday, 2001], 96–97, 137–142; also reflected in the title of his popular commentary: *Letters to Paul's Delegates: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus* [NTC; Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996]). For a useful summary of

personal paraenesis addressed to an individual, and that in 1 Timothy and Titus addressed to the church at large.[4]

298 | In this essay I shall treat the paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus without regard to the supposed character of the letter as a church order, a supposition I consider dubious. It is ironic that, despite the claim that Titus shares affinities with 1 Timothy that show it to be a church order, it is also claimed that the core of Titus is chapter 2, especially vv. 1–15,[5] or, more inclusively, 2:1–3:8, which is clearly paraenetic. There are also paraenetic elements in the qualifications and functions of the elders/bishops in 1:5–13a, and in the command to Titus to continue their reproof of the heretics in 1:13b–16. But it is 2:1–3:8 that will receive major attention in the latter part of this paper, concluding with a focus on the three features of paraenesis emphasized by participants in the Oslo conference, namely, the conviction that what is advanced does not admit of contradiction, reminder of moral practices to be pursued or avoided, and the expression of a shared, articulated world view. But before concentrating on those three features, it will be useful to identify other paraenetic elements with which Titus is replete.

## Paraenetic Features in the Epistle to Titus

The salutation in Titus (1:1–4) is, with the exception of those in Romans and Galatians, the longest in the Pauline corpus. It provides Paul's bona fides, and performs a number of functions, one of which is of interest to us, namely, the description of Titus as γνήσιον τέκνον (v. 4) and its significance for the paraenetic character of the letter. Quinn's statement, following a reference to the salutation is to the point: "The body of the letter (1:5–3:11) then articulates the apostle's commission to the colleague who shares in

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the history of investigation of Tebtunis Papyrus 703, on which much of the discussion of the *mandata principis* turned, and sharp critique of Johnson, see Margaret M. Mitchell, "PTebt 703 and the Genre of 1 Timothy: The Curious Career of a Ptolemaic Papyrus in Pauline Scholarship," *NovT* 44 (2002): 344–370. Christopher R. Hutson ("My True Child: The Rhetoric of Youth in the Pastoral Epistles" [Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1996]) argues that the paraenesis of the letters exhibits the characteristics of advice to youthful leaders given by someone writing in the persona of an old man.

[4] See especially Wolter, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 140–156, for the differences.

[5] So Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 5; Lorenz Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (3 vols.; HTKNT 11.2.1–3; Freiburg: Herder, 1994–1996), 3:102 ("Gemeindeparänese"); Bassler, *1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus*, 191: "The instructions of 2:1–3:8 together with their theological warrants constitute the heart of this hortatory letter."

and carries out Paul's apostolate, as a man's son carries on the name and work of the father."[6] Put differently, the body of the letter describes the paraenesis in which Paul's son is to engage.

The description of a coworker as τέκνον is also used in the two other salutations in the PE (1 Tim 1:2 [with γνήσιος]; 2 Tim 1:2 [with ἀγαπητός]), and in addressing Timothy in 1 Tim 1:18 and 2 Tim 2:1. It is noteworthy that the author substitutes this word for such terms as ἀδελφός (1 Cor 16:12), συνεργός (1 Thess 3:2), and συστρατιώτης (Phlm 2), which are used in Paul's letters for coworkers.[7] Paul also describes Timothy as his τέκνον ἀγαπητὸν καὶ πιστὸν ἐν κυρίῳ in a paraenetic context in 1 Cor 4:17, and as his τέκνον who is ἰσόψυχος with Paul and who γνησίως τὰ περὶ ὑμῶν μεριμνήσει in Phil 2:20, 22. These are clichés from the language of | friendship,[8] as seen, 299 for example, in the use of γνήσιος in letters of friendship, illustrated in Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 52, τοὺς γνησίους φίλους, and *Char. epist.* 70 and 73,[9] and ἰσόψυχος,[10] which is equivalent to μία ψυχή,[11] a well-known cliché definition for friendship.[12]

The significance of this friendly filial language is that it establishes a *philophronetic tone* at the very beginning of the letter.[13] Philophronesis, particularly as it characterizes the relationship between father and son, formed the basis for much of ancient paraenesis.[14] In the Epistle to Titus, the philophronetic element is exhibited throughout the letter in the confidence that Paul has in Titus. It in fact undergirds the paraenesis in which

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[6] Quinn, *Letter to Titus*, 50.

[7] Hutson, "My True Child," 24.

[8] For Philippians as an ἐπιστολὴ φιλική, see the articles in John T. Fitzgerald, ed., *Friendship, Flattery, & Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World* (NovTSup 82; Leiden: Brill, 1996), especially "The Function of Friendship Language in Philippians 4:10–20," pages 107–124, by Ken L. Berry.

[9] Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 74, lines 11–13 and 78, lines 1–3, 10–12.

[10] See Cicero, *Amic.* 26, "In friendship there is nothing false, nothing pretended, whatever there is genuine (*verum*) and comes of its own accord" (Falconer, LCL).

[11] See Phil 2:27.

[12] See Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 9.8.2.1168b–1169b; Plutarch, *Amic. mult.* 96E.

[13] For philophronesis in "friendly letters" in general, see Heikki Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (STAT Series B 102.2; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 1956), 35–37, 115–127; Klaus Thraede, *Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik* (ZMKA 48; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1970), 125–146. In Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 1–4 the author affirms his friendship before declaring that he is writing a παραίνεσις (5).

[14] For the teacher addressing his student as τέκνον, see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.17.37, and the philosopher acting as a father to his followers, see Plato, *Apol.* 31B. The classic example is Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 44, a tradition continued through the centuries, for example, in Polonius's advice to Laertes in *Hamlet*, and in Kipling's "If."

he directs Titus to engage. Paul charges Titus to correct what is lacking in Crete and to appoint elders/bishops (1:5), assuming that Titus would be capable of judging whether they meet the moral and other qualifications enumerated (1:6–9). Titus is to oppose heretics (1:13), teach what befits sound doctrine (2:1), exhort members of the congregation (2:6) and himself be a model of good works (2:7). Titus is to speak, exhort, and reprove with self-conscious authority and allow no one to disdain him (2:15; see also 3:8). He is to remind the church of its traditional teaching (3:1), and should ostracize refractory members (3:10–11). The letter ends on a more gentle note: Paul bids Titus to hurry to him (3:12) and conveys to Titus the greetings of all those with him (3:15).

The *language* of the Epistle to Titus shares many features with paraenetic style.[15] The orator's criticism of philosophers' speech in Lucian, *Bis acc.* 28 as brief, full of disjointed questions and short paragraphs, describes some paraenesis, but not exclusively paraenesis.[16] Seneca, who has much to say | about paraenesis,[17] frequently expresses his views on the style appropriate for a philosopher. On the one hand, he criticizes the deliberate, slow style adopted by some speakers who say that they use it because they are handing down precepts to their students.[18] On the other hand, he is against a philosopher's speech that is rapid, rushing headlong, and forceful,[19] which is precisely the style of Titus, of which Seneca and Lucian would not have approved.

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[15] For epistolary paraenesis in general and in 1 Thessalonians, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333, esp. 278–293; Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 81–86 and Index of Major Subjects, s.v. "paraenesis." For paraenesis in the PE, see Wolter, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 133–140.

[16] The mistake should not be made to think of all paraenesis as consisting of short, loose-standing bits of moral advice. Dibelius, who is frequently thought to have been responsible for this widely held view, himself recognized the existence of extended admonitions and referred to the *Mandates* of the Shepherd of Hermas as a case in point (Martin Dibelius, *A Commentary on the Epistle to James* [rev. Heinrich Greeven; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976], 3). For Dibelius's place in the history of scholarship on paraenesis, see other contributions in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*. Paraenesis includes and sometimes consists of *praecepta* or παραγγέλματα, which may be found in different genres and forms. For example, in his extensive collection of γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα, Stobaeus (*Flor.* 4.23.1–65 [4:569–599 W-H]) includes one-line extracts from some authors such as Euripides, sizeable extracts from systematic discussions of marriage like those of Musonius Rufus, Nicostratus, and Plutarch. And Plutarch, in addition to the form of his *Conjugalia Praecepta*, discussed below, casts his *De tuenda sanitate praecepta* in the form of a dialogue, and his *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* in essay form.

[17] For example, in Seneca, *Epp.* 94, 95.

[18] Seneca, *Ep.* 40.3.

[19] Seneca, *Epp.* 40.2; 59.4–7; 75.1–7; 100.

The *syntax* of the Epistle to Titus is simple and inelegant. With the exception of elaborate sentences in the salutation (1:1–4) and the two major christological periods (2:11–14 and 3:3–7), the rest of the letter is made up almost entirely of short sentences, most frequently without connectives, as is the case in other paraenetic texts.[20] Explicit imperatives are used (1:13; 2:1, 6, 15; 3:1), and a final clause is implicitly imperatival (1:9) as is the reminder of the charge that Paul had given Titus (1:5). Δεῖ appears twice (1:7, 11), and it is possible that some infinitives are to be understood imperativally.[21]

The *vocabulary* of Titus is also what one expects in paraenesis. A few examples, some of which will be discussed below, must suffice. The content of the virtue and vice lists is largely standard fare. The author is preoccupied with good deeds (ἀγαθὰ ἔργα: 1:16; 3:1; καλὰ ἔργα: 2:7, 14; 3:8, 14), and states that the purpose of divine instruction is to live σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς (2:12). A gnomic statement (πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς, 1:15) introduces an antithesis. This is to remind the readers of what they already know, a characteristic feature that will be discussed below.[22] The commonplace that one's deeds should agree with one's words is turned against the heretics in 1:16.[23] The syntax as well as the content of the list of responsibilities of members of the community in 2:1–10 is, *mutatis mutandis*, thoroughly paraenetic.

| Of special interest is the advice to Titus, just before the author closes the series of injunctions by speaking to slaves (2:9–10): περὶ πάντα σεαυτὸν παρεχόμενος τύπον καλῶν ἔργων (2:7).[24] Seneca represented the thinking of many when he said, about learning from the example of others: "men who teach us by their lives, men who tell us what we ought to do and then prove it by their practice, who show us what we should avoid, and then are never caught doing that which they have ordered us to avoid."[25] The protreptic and apotreptic functions of personal examples are also at the heart of paraenetic letters. It is so in the characterization 301

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[20] For example, in Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 13–17.

[21] Perhaps εἶναι in 2:2, which could, however, be governed by λάλει in 2:1 (see παρακάλει σωφρονεῖν in 2:6). Probably ὑποτάσσεσθαι and εἶναι in 2:9 are imperatival and not dependent on παρακάλει in 2:6.

[22] See section below "Remembering Precepts," pp. 421–423.

[23] For discussion of the commonplace, see Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 111–112.

[24] For the use of personal example in paraenesis, see Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*; Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," 284–286; and Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 83–84, Index of Major Subjects, s.v. "example (personal)."

[25] Seneca, *Ep.* 52.8 (Gummere, LCL).

of paraenesis in Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 5,[26] "The paraenetic style is that in which we exhort (παραινοῦμεν) someone by urging (προτρέποντες) him to pursue something or to avoid something. Paraenesis is divided into two parts, encouragement (προτροπήν) and dissuasion (ἀποτροπήν)."[27] The style is then later demonstrated in the sample he provides of a paraenetic letter: "Always be an emulator, dear friend, of virtuous men. For it is better to be well spoken of when imitating good men than to be reproached by all men while following evil men."[28] The paraenetic character of the example itself is stated most clearly by Seneca in his important discussion of paraenesis: "For the frequent seeing, the frequent hearing of (good men) little by little sinks into the heart and acquires the force of precepts (*vim praeceptorum*)."[29]

The author of the Epistle to Titus uses the language of health and disease which, we shall see, is as integral to his thought as it was to that of the moral philosophers who used paraenesis. In contrast to the heretics, who are defiled in mind and conscience (1:15–16), he commands Titus to speak what befits sound and healthy teaching in 2:1, which introduces the series of precepts on community relations which begin the body of the letter. The heretics are to be rebuked sharply, which will make them healthy in the faith (1:13). Titus's speech, supported by his personal example, must be sound and irrefutable (λόγον ὑγιῆ ἀκατάγνωστον, v. 8). Philo illustrates the intellectual context from which such language is derived:

302 | For God, not deeming it meet that sense (αἴσθησιν) should perceive Him, sends forth His words to succour the lovers of virtue, and they act as physicians of the soul and completely heal its infirmities, giving holy exhortations (παραινέσεις ἱεράς) with all the force of irreversible enactments, and calling to the exercise and practice of these and like trainers implanting strength and power and vigour that no adversary can withstand (ῥώμην ἀνανταγώνιστον).[30]

[26] Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 68, lines 1–3; trans. 69, lines 1–3.

[27] Ps.-Libanius goes on to say that some incorrectly call this the συμβουλευτική type, which can admit of contradiction (see further below, "The Irrefutability of Paraenesis," pp. 418–421). Such a class is found in Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 11 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 36–37): "It is the advisory type when, by offering our own judgment, we exhort (προτρέπωμεν) someone to something or dissuade (ἀποτρέπωμεν) him from something."

[28] Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 52 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 74–75).

[29] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.40 (Gummere, LCL).

[30] Philo, *Somn.* 1.69 (Colson and Whitaker, LCL).

After the close of the body of the letter (3:7), the author expresses his wish that Titus speak confidently about the things he had detailed in 2:1–3:7, so that believers in God may exercise concern for good deeds (3:8). What he had been saying, largely in paraenetic style, is good and profitable (ὠφέλιμα) to people, but the wranglings of the heretics are to be rejected, for they are unprofitable (ἀνωφελεῖς) and useless (3:8b–9). As the body had begun, so it ends with language integral to the understanding of ancient paraenesis.

In view of the competition they faced from sophists and philosophical quacks, it is natural that serious moral philosophers insisted that speech be useful and profitable. Plutarch expounds on the subject in *De recta ratione audiendi.* Speech is profitable when it causes self-examination and leads to purification of the mind (42A–C). That happens only when close attention is paid to what is said (44A), especially when it hurts as the hearer is reproved (46F–47A). But a true friend will modulate his speech in order for it to be truly profitable (55CD).

Profitable speech need not be long; it should be just long enough to cause a decision to be made. At the beginning of *Oratio* 17, on πλεονεξία, in which he speaks paraenetically, Dio Chrysostom reflects on the nature of the speech he is about to make. Since people know what is right and wrong, Dio considers it most useful (μεγάλην ὠφέλειαν) "to remind men... without ceasing, and to appeal (παρακαλεῖν) to their reason to give heed and in their acts to observe what is right and proper." The main thing is not that people "in general should learn what things are helpful (ὠφελοῦντα) and what are injurious to their lives, but that they should make no mistake by their choice of them."[31] Dio would unabashedly speak repeatedly about such matters as money, reputation, and physical pleasure, for perhaps then his hearers might be benefited.[32]

Seneca, another contemporary of Paul, held similar views. He expresses his admiration for the statement by Demetrius the Cynic, "that it is far better for us to possess only a few maxims (*praecepta*) of philosophy that are nevertheless always at our command and in use, than to acquire vast knowledge that notwithstanding serves no practical purpose,"[33] and then provides a list of what he calls *praecepta* in 7.1,7, | which, however, 303

[31] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.2–3 (Cohoon, LCL).

[32] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.13–15.

[33] Seneca, *Ben.* 7.1.3 (Basore, LCL). The advice always to have a collection of *praecepta* at hand for every occasion was common. See Margarethe Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Popularphilosophie* (PhAnt 36; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), 35 n. 67, for references and bibliography.

according to his theoretical classification in *Epistulae* 94 and 95 are really *decreta*, philosophical doctrines which govern life as a whole.[34]

The useful advice in Titus 2:1–3:7 is precisely the kind of thing that the speakers who spoke paraenetically had ready to hand. Some regarded as most important "that department of philosophy which supplies precepts (*praecepta*) to the individual case... which, for instance, advises how a husband should conduct himself towards his wife, or how a father should bring up his children, or how a master should rule his slave."[35] The virtue and vice lists are also run of the mill. What is different, of course, is the theological warrants for the advice.

The advice contained in the precepts may have carried a force of their own,[36] but it is striking that, as is evident from the quotations in n. 34, the philosophers were much concerned with various modes of exhortation that were to be used in delivering their precepts. That is also the case in 1 Thessalonians, which is a paraenetic letter, and in which Paul uses various terms of exhortation eighteen times, in half of which he uses παρακαλεῖν or a cognate to describe his own appeal or what he desires of his readers.[37] In Titus, ten such terms are used: ἐπιδιορθοῦν (1:5), διατάσσεσθαι (1:5), negatively, διδάσκειν ἃ μὴ δεῖ (1:11), ἐλέγχειν (1:13), λαλεῖν ἃ πρέπει τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ (2:1), παρακαλεῖν (2:6), παρακαλεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν μετὰ πάσης ἐπιταγῆς (2:15), ὑπομιμνήσκειν (3:1), and νουθεσία (3:10).

One of the most characteristic features of paraenesis is its use of *antitheses*.[38] A famous example of paraenesis, Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 9–10

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[34] See, for example, Seneca, *Ep.* 95.44. So Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius*, 34, and on the differences between *praecepta* and *decreta*, see the essay by Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "The Concept of Paraenesis," in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*, 47–72. (References in this note are to the paper originally presented to the Oslo conference in 2001, later modified in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*.) Seneca is not always consistent in his classification, and Engberg-Pedersen's appreciation for Seneca's precision should perhaps be tempered a little. To illustrate: In *Ep.* 94.25, Seneca says, *Admonere genus adhortandi est.* Engberg-Pedersen understands *admonere*, *admonitio*, to which one may add *monitio*, to refer to paraenesis, and *adhortari* to refer to exhortation more broadly conceived, aimed at causing the mind to undergo "a certain shake-up." But later in the same letter (*Ep.* 94.39), after listing what are in fact a number of kinds of exhortation (*consolationes, dissuasiones, adhortationes, obiurgationes, laudationes*), Seneca says, *omnia ista monitionum genera sunt.* One may add the opinion Seneca ascribes to Posidonius, that *suasio*, *consolatio* and *exhortatio* were necessary (*Ep.* 95.65). Moralists like Dio Chrysostom did precisely that (see *Or.* 77/78.38–39, where he also uses vice and virtue lists).

[35] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.1 (Gummere, LCL).

[36] See, for example, Seneca, *Ep.* 94.27.

[37] See Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 139.

[38] See Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 155, 239, 244, 294, 295.

(Norlin, LCL), among other paraenetic characteristics, illustrates one type of antithesis:

> | Nay, but if you will but recall (ἀναμνησθείς) also your father's principles, you will have from your own house a noble illustration of what I am telling you. For he did not (οὐ) belittle virtue nor (οὐδέ) pass his life in indolence; on the contrary (ἀλλά), he trained his body by toil, and by his spirit he withstood dangers. Nor (οὐδέ) did he love wealth inordinately; but (ἀλλ'), although he enjoyed the good things at his hand as became a mortal, yet he cared for his possessions as if he had been immortal. Neither (οὐδέ) did he order his existence sordidly, but (ἀλλά) was a lover of beauty, munificent in his manner of life, and generous to his friends; and he prized more (μᾶλλον) those who were devoted to him than (ἤ) those who were his kin by blood; for he considered that in the matter of companionship nature is a much better guide than convention, character than kinship, and freedom of choice than compulsion. 304

The Epistle to Titus teems with antitheses, including the most simple form illustrated in this selection from Ps.-Isocrates (μή ... μή ... μή ... μή ... μή ... ἀλλά [1:7–9] οὐκ ... ἀλλά [3:5]). The purpose of the antithesis is to emphasize the second, positive member. Antithesis is also expressed in a final clause with μή (1:13–14), when a positive quality is followed by μή ... μηδέ, which disqualifies contrary qualities (2:3). A contrast is also drawn between what is professed by the heretics and what they actually do (1:16).

In addition, there is a constant juxtaposition between the quality of life of the faithful and that of the heretics (1:6–9 vs. 1:10–12; 1:15a vs. 1:15bc; 2:1 vs. 1:16; 3:8 vs. 3:9). Two larger sections of text also stand in antithesis to each other (1:10–16 vs. 2:1–10). On a number of occasions, there is a contrast drawn between the quality of life of heretics before and after reproof (1:13a vs. 1:13b–14), and of the true believers before and after their conversion (2:12a vs. 12b–13; 14; 3:3 vs. 3:4).

*Lists of virtues and vices* are common in Graeco-Roman moral literature, as they are in the PE, where their functions have been defined as apologetic, polemical, and paideutic.[39] These lists represent conventional moral views, and it is not possible to reconstruct from them the beliefs or practices of the heretics the author battles. In the Epistle to Titus they appear in all three chapters.

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[39] So Lewis R. Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles* (HUT 22; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986; pb ed., 2006), 171–176, who also provides bibliography, to which might be added John T. Fitzgerald, "Virtue/Vice Lists," *ABD* 6 (1992): 857–859.

The first list, of virtues, constitutes the qualifications of the elder/bishop, who is to be unimpeachable (ἀνέγκλητος, 1:6, 7) because he is God's οἰκονόμος. A somewhat similar list is also found in 1 Tim 3:2–7, which is introduced with the statement in v.1, εἴ τις ἐπισκοπῆς ὀρέγεται, καλοῦ ἔργου ἐπιθυμεῖ, which in effect urges the readers to develop the qualities enumerated and is therefore paraenetic. A similar statement does not accompany the list in Titus 1:6–9, but the paraenetic intent is implicit in the text itself. Another difference from the list in 1 Tim 3:2–7 is that 305 while there | διδακτικός appears early (in v. 3) in the list of qualifications, in Titus the elder's fidelity to orthodox teaching ends the list, in a position of emphasis, and leads to the description of his main function, to exhort the faithful in sound doctrine and rebuke those who speak against it (1:9). The significance for our present interest is the introduction of the terminology of health (v. 9), which will appear again (v. 13; 2:1, 2, 8) and occupy us further below.

To the virtue list is contrasted the vices of the opponents,[40] capped by a quotation of poetry (ascribed to various authors), or a proverb, as is often done in paraenesis.[41] But here it expresses the universally negative view of Cretans, further strengthened by the strong affirmation, "this testimony is true." Titus is commanded to extend the elder's reproof of the heretics

[40] It is relevant that the positive description is followed by a negative one, of the heretics. Such juxtaposition is endlessly used in the description of the good man, whose example is to be imitated. This is amply illustrated by Dio Chrysostom's speeches on kingship, in which the king is presented as the ideal man. See, for example, *Or.* 2.67–78 for the alternation of virtue and vice lists. In *Or.* 3.25 Dio defends himself against the charge that he always says the same things when speaking of the ideal king by appealing to the method of Socrates, in which virtues and vices alternate (28–41), and concludes, "Such was the sage's habitual message while he constantly incited (προτρέπων) to virtue and tried to make both rulers and subjects better" (42 [Cohoon, LCL]).

[41] See Quinn, *Letter to Titus*, 107–109 for discussion. For the appreciation of the poets, see Dio Chrysostom, who thought that some poets "give advice and admonition (συμβουλεύοντα καὶ παραινοῦντα) to the masses and to private citizens" (*Or.* 2.5 [Cohoon, LCL]) and express the thought and feeling of the masses generally (*Or.* 7.97–102). He held Euripides in especially high regard, claiming that he "strews (his characters) with maxims useful on all occasions, since he was not without acquaintance with philosophy" (*Or.* 18.7 [Cohoon, LCL]; see also Seneca, *Ep.* 8.8). Seneca thought that by introducing poetry among his precepts, a philosopher clarifies their meaning and makes them sink more effectively into the mind of the neophyte (*Ep.* 108.9–10). In the debate whether precepts need additional proof, Seneca claims that precepts are acknowledgedly true, and that the influence of the one giving the advice should avail without proofs. "It is like the opinions of a legal expert, which hold good, even though the reasons for them are not delivered. Moreover, the precepts that are given are of great weight themselves, whether they be woven into the fabric of song, or condensed into prose proverbs" (*Ep.* 94.27 [Gummere, LCL]; see Winfried Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung* (DAWB, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft 37; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962), 28–30). For proverbs, see Seneca, *Ep.* 94.46–47.

and his concern for sound doctrine, the gnome, “all things are pure for the pure” is used against them, and they are charged with saying one thing and doing another (1:10–16). The paraenetic elements, used polemically, are obvious.

The *Gemeindeparänese* that follows (2:2–10), constituting what is fitting to sound teaching, is an expanded list of social virtues. Again, the content of this paraenesis is quite conventional, which makes its apologetic purpose, as demonstrated by the purpose clauses introduced by ἵνα (vv. 5, 8, 10), possible.

| The theological warrant in 2:11–14 for this social instruction contains short lists of vices and virtues which contrast the readers' pre-Christian lives with the purpose for which they had been saved (vv. 12, 14). The second warrant (3:3–7) is similar but more clearly schematic. It is preceded by the paraenetic ὑπομίμνησκε which introduces a list of seven positive injunctions, analogous to the *Gemeindeparänese* in 2:1–10. Then follows the theological warrant, which contrasts the vicious life formerly (ποτέ) lived with the change that came about when (ὅτε) the kindness and philanthropy of God the Saviour intervened.[42] 306

The way in which the lists are used in these two passages recalls their use in protrepsis, in which lists of vices and virtues are used, in that order, urging listeners to change their lives of vice to ones of virtue.[43] A short example is Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 15:[44]

> Shun (φεύγετε) not only the worst of evils, injustice and self-indulgence, but also their causes, pleasures. For you will concentrate on these alone, both present and future, and on nothing else. And pursue (διώκετε) not only the best of goods, self-control and perseverance, but also their causes, toils, and do not shun (φεύγετε) them on account of their harshness. For would you not exchange inferior things for something great? As you would receive gold in exchange for copper, so you would receive virtue in exchange for toils.

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[42] For the temporal scheme marking a decisive change in existence, see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.10, 13, 20; 4.4.6; Diogenes Laertius 6.56; Peter Tachau, *'Einst' und 'Jetzt' im Neuen Testament: Beobachtungen zu einem urchristlichen Predigtschema in der neutestamentlichen Briefliteratur und zu seiner Vorgeschichte* (FRLANT 105; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 74–78; André-Jean Festugière, *Epicurus and His Gods* (trans. C.W. Chilton; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956; orig. pub. *Épicure et ses dieux* [MR 19; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1946]), 39. Nils A. Dahl, *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church: Essays* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 33–34, with no reference to the Graeco-Roman material, calls this the “Soteriological Contrast Pattern” as it appears in early Christian preaching, reflected in such passages as Eph 2:11–22; 5:8; Col 1:21–22; 1 Pet 2:10.

[43] See, for example, Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 36.4.

[44] Translation by Ronald F. Hock in Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* (SBLSBS 12; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), 65.

It may be debated whether this is protrepsis or paraenesis, but the matter need not detain us; it is not so clear that the distinction was consistently made in antiquity.[45] In any case, this summons to the virtuous life by renouncing 307 or | fleeing (φεύγετε) vice and pursuing (διώκετε) the good, lends itself easily to a paraenetic use (for the same pattern, see 1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22).

## The Irrefutability of Paraenesis

In the description of paraenesis in Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 5,[46] it is said that paraenesis does not admit of a counterstatement (ἀντίρρησιν), and in this respect differs from συμβουλή which does. Other authors made the same distinction, for example, Ammonius, *De adfinium vocab. diff.* 455, who adds as the reason for the irrefutability of paraenesis that it only inculcated generally acknowledged virtues. According to the anonymous grammarian in the hypothesis to Ps.-Isocrates, *To Demonicus* (32), it is only people who do not know paraenesis who try to refute it, for there is no room for controversy in paraeneses (οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα).[47] Ps.-Libanius makes the distinction because, he says, he knows of people who call paraenesis symbouleutic. That is evidently what Ps.-Demetrius,[48] in describing

[45] The very useful discussions by Diana M. Swancutt ("Paraenesis in Light of Protrepsis: Troubling the Typical Dichotomy," in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*, 113–153) and Clarence E. Glad ("The Rhetoric of Moral Exhortation in Clement's *Pedagogue*," in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*, 433–465) demonstrate how complex the discussion can become. My own view is what I think emerges from Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.1.1–3.3, which is essentially that protrepsis, as in his *Protrepticus* and in most philosophical protrepses, is aimed at moving the listener or reader to adopt a new way of life, and that paraenesis is mainly the subsequent instruction in that new life. (James Starr's essay ["Was Paraenesis for Beginners?" in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*, 73–111] is particularly relevant to this point.) This is also the view of Christoph Riedweg, *Ps. Justin (Markell von Ankyra?) Ad Graecos de vera religione* (*bisher "Cohortatio ad Graecos"): Einleitung und Kommentar* (2 vols.; SBA 25; Berlin: F. Reinhardt, 1994), 1:62–70, who then has to explain the title of Ps.-Justin, *Cohortatio ad Graecos* (Λόγος παραινετικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας), which belongs to the same genre as Clement's *Protrepticus*, while in Christian literature λόγοι παραινετικοί are always written to people who are already Christian. His answer is that the title was erroneously added by an editor who was influenced by the appearance of παραινεῖν in the first line of the *Cohortatio*, where it has a general and not "gattungsspezifisch" meaning (70). Paraenesis contains protreptic as well as apotreptic elements, illustrated in Ps.-Libanius's characterization of paraenesis in his *Characteres epistolici* 5, quoted above, n. 27. The characteristic use of antitheses is also a demonstration of this.

[46] Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 68, lines 5–6.

[47] For these references and others to rhetorical theorists, especially to Hermogenes, I am indebted to Riedweg, *Ps. Justin (Markell von Ankyra?) Ad Graecos de vera religione (bisher "Cohortatio ad Graecos")*, 1:67–69.

[48] *Char. epist.* 11 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 36, lines 19–26).

the symbouleutic letter does without actually mentioning paraenesis. It is relevant that Ps.-Demetrius in his description of the symbouleutic letter says that in it one offers one's own judgment (τὴν ἰδίαν γνώμην).

In practice, the person who delivers precepts has *auctoritas*, but "it is like the opinions of a legal expert, which hold good even though the reasons for them are not delivered. Moreover, the precepts which are given are of great weight themselves, whether they be woven into the fabric of song, or condensed into prose proverbs." (Seneca, *Ep.* 94.27). Thus, two things combine, in addition to the authority of teachers, to make precepts irrefutable: their intrinsic, self-evident rightness, and their acknowledgment by people generally as containing wisdom, such as is represented by poets and proverbs.[49] A consequence is that paraenesis represented traditional values and those who used it self-consciously repeated, not only what they | themselves had said, but what their predecessors had said.[50] 308 Thus Isocrates, in one of the earliest paraenetic discourses delivered, is frank on the subject:

> But the truth is that in discourses of this sort we should not seek novelties, for in these discourses it is not possible to say what is paradoxical or incredible or outside of the circle of accepted belief; but, rather, we should regard that man as most accomplished in this field who can collect the greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form.[51]

This did not mean that precepts were repeated mindlessly, regardless of particular situations. "Of course there are slight distinctions, due to the time, or the place, or the person; but even in those cases, precepts are given which have a general application" (Seneca, *Ep.* 94.35; see also 64.6–10).[52]

The paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus is represented as not admitting of refutation. To begin with, it has the authority of Paul, God's servant, behind it. The Paul who writes the letter was entrusted by the command

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[49] See n. 41. For paraenetic discourse as advancing what is ὡμολογούμενον ἀγαθόν, see Riedweg, *Ps. Justin (Markell von Ankyra?) Ad Graecos de vera religione (bisher "Cohortatio ad Graecos")*, 1:67, 69 n. 258. For this in debate, see Isocrates, *Antid.* 84; *Ad nic.* 52. For precepts repeating the obvious, see Seneca, *Ep.* 94.25. See Albrecht Dihle, *Die Goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgärethik* (SAW 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 90–91: Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* is the prime example of what is essentially a collection of *sententiae* which represent an ethic based on common sense. It can be compared to Ps.-Phocylides or Theognis, a reference to whom Isocrates makes in *Ad nic.* 4

[50] See, for example, Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 3.26–28; 13.14–15, 29; 17.1–2; Seneca, *Ep.* 94.26.

[51] Isocrates, *Ad Nic.* 41 (Norlin, LCL).

[52] For this feature in Seneca, see Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 179–184.

of God with his message, and his aim is that God's elect will have full knowledge of the truth that accords with godliness (1:1–4). The imperatives in the letter are natural to someone with such authority.

He left Titus in Crete to correct (ἐπιδιορθώσῃ) what was lacking,[53] and commanded (διεταξάμην) him to appoint elders/bishops. These men were to give themselves to sound teaching, in effect, paraenesis in the church's tradition, and reprove those who refute it (τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας), who thus, according to the rhetorical theorists, prove that they do not know what paraenesis is.

It is noteworthy that virtually all the commands to Titus enjoin him to inculcate what is essentially paraenetic in nature (1:13b–16; 2:1, 6, 15; 3:1). Titus is to give instruction with full authority (μετὰ πάσης ἐπιταγῆς) and brook no disrespect of himself (3:1). But Titus's instruction should be seen as valid not only because of his authority as Paul's true son and delegate. It is valid, in addition, because it is in accord with accepted wisdom expressed proverbially or poetically (1:12), which is acknowledgedly true (ἡ μαρτυρία αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀληθής), and it is for that reason (δι' ἣν αἰτίαν) that he is to bring about soundness in the faith. In the depiction that immediately follows, the gnome πάντα καθαρὰ τοῖς καθαροῖς, and the criterion that words and deeds should agree (1:12–14), further establish the context for Titus's use of paraenetic commonplaces that continues.

309 | The *Gemeindeparänese* befits sound doctrine (2:1) and therefore is irrefutable. It is unnecessary for us to demonstrate that each item in it is paraenetic in nature; let two suffice. In 2:6, Paul commands Titus, τοὺς νεωτέρους ... παρακάλει σωφρονεῖν. In this regard, Ammonius's description of paraenesis as instruction is enlightening, namely, that it is generally acknowledged to be good, and he goes on to illustrate that it is irrefutable, ὡς εἴ τις παραινέσει σωφρονεῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡμολογημένον ἀγαθόν.[54] In 2:7–8, Titus is told, in good paraenetic fashion, to present himself as an example of good works, and in his teaching to show incorruption, gravity, and sound speech that cannot be refuted (λόγον ὑγιῆ ἀκατάγνωστον), so that opponents would have nothing to say against Christians.

The virtues and vices that follow stand beyond refutation because of their christological warrants (2:11–3:7). Then comes another affirmation of

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[53] See 1 Thess 3:10, καταρτίσαι τὰ ὑστερήματα τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν, for a similar thought expressed in different words. Paul accomplished the end by writing 1 Thessalonians, a paraenetic letter. See also Seneca, *Ep.* 121.4.

[54] See Riedweg, *Ps. Justin (Markell von Ankyra?) Ad Graecos de vera religione (bisher "Cohortatio ad Graecos")*, 1:67, and his reference in his n. 249 to Isocrates, *Antid.* 84.

the trustworthiness of what has been said in this section (πιστὸς ὁ λόγος), and the command that Titus speak confidently (διαβεβαιοῦσθαι) about these things, which are καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (3:8), and are thus irrefutable.

## Remembering Precepts

If precepts are so evidently true and are generally accepted, the Stoic Aristo of Chios argued, "to one who knows, it is superfluous to give precepts; to one who does not know, it is insufficient. For he must be told, not only what he is being instructed to do, but also why."[55] Seneca responded that precepts do have value, for

> In the first place, they refresh the memory; in the second place, when sorted into their proper classes, the matters which showed themselves in a jumbled mass when considered as a whole, can be considered in this way with greater care.[56]

Furthermore, Dio Chrysostom insisted, since he observed

> that it is not our ignorance of the difference between good and evil that hurts us, so much as it is our failure to heed the dictates of reason on those matters and to be true to our personal opinions, I consider it a matter of great usefulness (μεγάλην ὠφέλειαν) to remind men of this without ceasing, and appeal to their reason to give heed and in their acts to observe what is right and proper.[57]

Since one knows what is right and wrong, "one must continually be brought to remember these facts."[58] Reminders of what one knows could also be used in sharp rebuke.[59]

| A special remembrance was that of one's teacher and his words. Seneca, among others, wrote eloquently on the need to have an individual after whom to pattern one's life,[60] even when one was separated from him and had to rely on one's memory of his behavior and teaching.[61] The device is 310

[55] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.11 (Gummere, LCL).
[56] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.21 (Gummere, LCL).
[57] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.2 (Cohoon, LCL modified).
[58] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.26; see also Isocrates, *Nic.* 12.
[59] As in Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 32.
[60] Seneca, *Ep.* 6.5–6.
[61] Seneca, *Ep.* 11.8–10; see also Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 9–10 (Norlin, LCL), cited above.

used in various ways elsewhere in the PE,[62] and in Titus 2:7, which, given the present purpose of Titus's modeling correct behavior, does not require remembrance.

People also remembered the occasion when they had turned to the life of reason and the words that led them to make the change. Lucian, perhaps writing autobiographically, writes of a man remembering the effect the philosopher Nigrinus had on him:

> I take pleasure in recalling his words to mind frequently, and have already made it a regular exercise: even if nobody happens to be at hand, I repeat them to myself two or three times a day just the same. [A comparison with remembering absent lovers follows.] So I too, in the absence of my mistress Philosophy, get no little comfort out of gathering together the words that I then heard and turning them over to myself.[63]

Nigrinus's words transformed his listener by ridiculing those things he valued, such as wealth, reputation, dominion, and glory.[64] Throughout the remainder of the discourse, there is an extended contrast between vices and virtues which characterized his pre-and post-conversion life. The contrast could be stated succinctly in lists of vices and virtues as it is in Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 15.[65]

Remembrance or reminder also plays a role in the PE. It is implicit in Paul's reference to his charge to Timothy to oppose those in Ephesus who are guilty of a list of vices he enumerates (1 Tim 1:3–7). It is explicit in 2 Tim 2:14, where Timothy is told to remind his hearers of a "sure word" (vv. 11–13) and charge them not to be disputatious or bellicose, behavior that is completely valueless (ἐπ᾽ οὐδὲν χρήσιμον) and ruins the hearers (v. 14).[66]

The pattern is clearest in the PE in Titus 3:1–8, the useful things (ὠφέλιμα) about which Titus is to speak with confidence (v. 8). Paul's instruction begins with the command, ὑπομίμνησκε, followed by seven positive precepts, strung together in paraenetic fashion without any connecting particles (vv. 1–2). The precepts, being self-evidently commendable, may require no reason for what is commanded; reminder might suffice. But an extended warrant (γάρ) for the positive directions does follow (vv. 3–7) in

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[62] For example, in 1 Tim 1:16; 4:12; 2 Tim 3:10–14. See Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*.
[63] Lucian, *Nigr.* 7 (Harmon, LCL).
[64] Lucian, *Nigr.* 4.
[65] See at n. 44 above.
[66] See Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 80BC for condemnation of bellicosity, and for an example of it, see Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 29.4–5.

the pattern of what was once (ποτέ) the condition of the readers, described by a list of eight vices, | ending with mutual hatred. To this is contrasted 311 the appearance at a particular time (ὅτε) of the kindness and philanthropy of God the Savior. God's initiative and saving action is emphasized by traditional christological and soteriological formulations (vv. 4–7) which would have been known by a community in the Pauline school. They may recall the rite of baptism, even if they had not been part of it, thus calling to mind the moment of the convert's change in existence.[67]

The temporal pattern appears succinctly in the texts referred to in n. 23, the contrast between the two kinds of existence which is described briefly in Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 15, and is extended in Lucian's *Nigrinus.* Where the Epistle to Titus differs from these pagan sources, of course, is in the nature of his theological warrant of his paraenesis. That brings us to the final section of this paper.

## Conceptual World and Paraenesis

One of the virtues of Troels Engberg-Pedersen's contribution to this volume is his insistence that paraenesis, defined as concrete advice for particular situations, is part of a broader reflection on the good life. He claims that it was the Stoics who developed the idea of paraenesis thus conceived:

> In particular, Stoic *paraenesis* was related to the fundamental, philosophical reflection about the good that issued in basic doctrines about the general shape of the world (including the gods) and the relationship between human beings to that. Within such a comprehensive picture, Stoic *paraenesis* obtained the role of spelling out in detail what the comprehensive picture meant for concrete human practice.[68]

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[67] For the traditional nature of the material, see Karoline Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* (HThSt 12; Münster: Lit, 1996), 98–102. Andrew Y. Lau (*Manifest in Flesh: The Epiphany Christology of the Pastoral Epistles* [WUNT 2.86; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996], 160–176), deals with the traditional material as well as the author's adaptation of it and the function it performs in its context in Titus. Quinn (*Letter to Titus*, 210–232), considers the possibility that there might have been various liturgical stages through which the passage had gone, being "reshaped in the tradition, probably the liturgical tradition for baptism, to form a prose, didactic prayer" (211). This is very speculative, but Quinn's reconstruction does draw attention to elements that would be widely recognized in the Christian community.

[68] Here and in what follows, my discussion relates to views tentatively expressed by Engberg-Pedersen ("Paraenesis"). For Engberg-Pedersen's final views see his "The Concept of Paraenesis," in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*, 47–72.

It is in light of this view of the matter that he can say, "Pauline paraenesis is Stoic paraenesis."[69]

312 | With good reason, however, Engberg-Pedersen is uncertain that it was Paul who first gave moral advice in light of Christian *dogmata*, or that there was any real influence from Stoicism at all. He does not want to rule out the possibility "that somebody before Paul had tied such teaching and exhortation explicitly to the 'religious' teaching and preaching they will also have been engaged in." Such writings as the *Letter of Aristeas*,[70] the Wisdom of Solomon, and, I would argue, 4 Maccabees, give expression to the Old Testament view that one's knowledge of God must result in concrete moral behavior.[71] This was so integral an understanding of the relation between religion and morality in Judaism and Christianity that it is wrong to assume that Paul was original in making the connection.

Engberg-Pedersen also thinks it reasonable to assume "that it makes overall best sense to claim both that it was Paul who adopted the letter-writing practice of incorporating (Stoic) paraenesis into his letters and also that in doing so he was in fact influenced (in whatever way) by Stoicism." I am uneasy with this bold assumption, but am in no position at the moment to demonstrate to what degree I agree or disagree with it. In any case, it is not of the greatest importance for this paper, which deals with a letter that claims to have been written by Paul, and thus implicitly acknowledges its dependence on Paul's epistolographic practice. Furthermore, the letter is paraenetic, as some of Paul's letters are, and is influenced by Stoicism, the pervasiveness of which at the time ensured that serious moral writers could hardly escape its force.

Before turning to the Epistle to Titus, I wish to draw attention to Plutarch's *Conjugalia Praecepta* and its potential importance for this section of the paper. Written about the same time as Titus, a few decades after Seneca expounded theoretically on the importance, nature, and function of *praecepta* in moral instruction, Plutarch's letter to two young friends,

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[69] I am less convinced by his reflections on Paul's use of παρακαλεῖν and Paul's failure to use παραινεῖν, but will forgo discussion of the matter since it is not germane to the point at hand.

[70] See *Let. Aris.* 189, 200, 235.

[71] See, for example, Lev 19:1–2, followed by specific moral injunctions related to this thematic statement (vv. 3–37). But it should be noted that in the three Jewish writings referred to, a strong Stoic element can indeed be discerned. But that need mean no more than that Judaism (and Christianity) of this sort found Stoicism congenial. The Hellenistic Jewish sources behind Acts 17:26–31, which moves from natural theology to moral judgment, put the connection to another use, and Paul in Rom 1:18–2:1 to yet another.

former students of his, provides us with an excellent example of how precepts could be put to practical use. Like Titus, the *Conjugalia Praecepta* is a letter, with an address, but no epistolary conclusion.[72] The body of the work consists of forty eight | precepts cast in the form of "brief similitudes (ὁμοιότησι βραχείαις), so that they are the more easily remembered, the main points of the teaching you have often heard in the course of your education in philosophy" (138C).[73] These and other statements in the preface provide us with a number of things of interest to our present purpose. 313

One immediately notices the importance of philosophy attributed to the study of marriage, "for philosophy charms those who come together to share their lives, and makes them gentle and amenable to each other." Plutarch wishes that the "tunefulness" of their "marriage and home (be assured by) reason, harmony, and philosophy" (138C). He returns to the importance of philosophy at the end of the letter (148BC). Plutarch's work belongs to the tradition of Stoic writings on duties, περὶ καθηκόντων,[74] which is the *pars philosophiae, quam Graeci paraeneticen vocant, nos praeceptivam dicimus*, according to Seneca.[75] The philosophy that most influenced his thinking in this work is Stoicism, but he is not reluctant to add his own viewpoint,[76] even if much of what he has to say is derived from the Stoics.

> He views the marital relationship through a philosophical lens, but the aspect of marriage he is interested in is not that of traditional philosophical analysis—not marriage as conforming to "natural law," or the needs of the Platonic *polis* or the rules of household management. His advice is intended for a husband and wife living together on the basis of traditional gender structures and values.[77]

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[72] The epistolary salutation, "Plutarch to Pollianus and Euridice, may you prosper," may be thought of as a dedication, but the preface (138B–D) and the conclusion, already beginning with the last precept (145A–146A), although containing no formal epistolary conclusion, show this to be a letter. For further discussion of the παραγγέλματα tradition, see n. 16 above.

[73] The translation is that of Donald A. Russell, printed in Sarah B. Pomeroy, ed., *Plutarch's* Advice to the Bride and Groom *and* A Consolation to His Wife*: English Translations, Commentary, Interpretive Essays, and Bibliography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5–13.

[74] Lisette Goessler, "Advice to Bride and Groom: Plutarch Gives a Detailed Account of His Views on Marriage" in Pomeroy, *Plutarch's* Advice to the Bride and Groom, 109.

[75] Seneca, *Ep.* 95.1.

[76] See esp. Cynthia Patterson, "Plutarch's *Advice to Bride and Groom*: Traditional Wisdom through a Philosophical Lens," in Pomeroy, *Plutarch's* Advice to the Bride and Groom, 128–137. Seneca, too, acknowledged his debt to his predecessors, but asserted his right to differ from their views or to add to them (*Vit. beat.* 3.2–3).

[77] Patterson, "Plutarch's *Advice to Bride and Groom*," 137.

There is thus philosophical education behind the precepts; in fact, the precepts were part of the philosophical instruction he gave his readers. The reason for writing them is not to tell them something new, but to remind them not only of the particular precepts they had been taught but also of the philosophy that provided the context for that instruction.

Much attention has been devoted to how derivative Plutarch was, particularly to his indebtedness to Stoicism. A lack of originality would fit well with the paraenetic character of his work. But, "the overall impression ... of Plutarch's attitude toward marital fidelity is that it is essentially neither Platonic nor Stoic, but is rooted in a pragmatic accommodation to traditional sexual and marital morality."[78] "Plutarch's academic arguments come from a wide range of philosophic traditions; on the other hand, many of his concerns are well known in Greek and Roman popular or literary traditions."[79]

314 | Plutarch thus gives advice that he knows his readers already know; he writes merely to remind them. Furthermore, what he has to say is generally accepted. All this is what one expects in paraenesis. What is of interest for this section of my paper is that the advice is given with the assumption that Plutarch and his readers share values and a world view which provide a context for the precepts, which had, in fact, provided the context for their first instruction in the precepts. That is similar to Titus 3:1–7, and more explicit in Titus 2:11–14, to which I now turn.

This is one of the major theological passages in the PE. I will confine myself to those elements of interest to this section of the paper and will, regretfully, because of limitation of space, only be able to state my understanding of the text without engaging contrary opinions or fully justifying my own.[80] The passage provides the theological warrant for the precepts in the immediately preceding *Gemeindeparänese* (γάρ, v. 11). The basic statement is ἐπεφάνη γὰρ ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις. The term ἐπιφάνεια and its cognates appear frequently in the PE, with the

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[78] Patterson, "Plutarch's *Advice to Bride and Groom*," 130.

[79] Patterson, "Plutarch's *Advice to Bride and Groom*," 137.

[80] For more detailed and extensive discussion, see Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe*, 92–98; Lau, *Manifest in Flesh*, 150–160, 243–250; Hanna Stettler, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* (WUNT 2.105; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 243–264. This part of the present essay overlaps with my contribution to a volume of essays devoted to soteriology in the New Testament: Abraham J. Malherbe, " 'Christ Jesus Came Into the World to Save Sinners': Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology* (ed. Jan G. van der Watt; NovTSup 121; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 331–358. [*Light*, 1:431–457]

meaning of a helpful intervention of God, which is accentuated in Titus, where it appears with σώζειν, σωτηρία or σωτήρ in 2:11, 13; 3:4. Indeed, all of 2:11–14 is to be understood as an elaboration of "the teaching of God our Savior" in v. 10. Although it is a saving quality of God that has appeared (as in 3:4), there can be no doubt that the reference is to Christ's earthly manifestation (see 2 Tim 1:9–10).

Salvation, in the PE, is frequently and variously connected with teaching,[81] thus a strong emphasis on cognition is associated with salvation but not exclusively so. According to 3:5, God saved in a single, past event, through baptism. So, one is brought up short by the un-Pauline statement that God's saving grace continues to train us (ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ … παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς). The author knows Paul's view of grace as God's free gift for our benefit,[82] but this statement has a distinctive Greek cast. I note only the educative function of grace, which is to result in the renunciation of ἀσέβεια and the adoption of a way of life akin to the Greek cardinal virtues (σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς), where εὐσέβεια takes the place of ἀνδρεία, as it does in philosophical Judaism as represented by Philo.[83]

| The concept of education as having a saving role is derived here from Hellenistic moral philosophy. Associated with this concept is the notion that the human condition, bereft of reason, is diseased.[84] 315

> For it is through man's folly (ἄνοιαν) and love of luxury (τροφήν) and ambition (φιλοτιμίαν) that life comes to be vexatious (δυσχερής) and full of deceit (ἀπάτης), wickedness (πονηρίας), and countless other ills (κακά). However, for these maladies one remedy and cure has been provided by the gods, to wit, education and reason (παιδείαν καὶ λόγον), and the man who throughout life employs that remedy with consistency comes at last to a healthy, happy end.[85]

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[81] For example, in 1 Tim 4:16; 2 Tim 3:14–17.

[82] See 3:7, which may, however, refer to Christ's power.

[83] See Stephen C. Mott, "Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion: The Philonic Background of Titus 2:10–14 and 3:3–7," *NovT* 20 (1978): 22–48, for the evidence. But also see Lucian, *Somn.* 10, where Παιδεία promises to adorn the soul with many noble adornments, the first ones listed being σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, and εὐσέβεια. It is of interest to note that Titus 2:10 also speaks of adornment, but of God's teaching by virtuous conduct.

[84] For what follows, see at greater length, Abraham J. Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Christian Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35; repr. in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989). [*Light*, 1:117–134]

[85] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.15–16 (Crosby, LCL).

Elsewhere, Dio advises that παιδεία is the instruction to practice σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, and that the teacher is like a physician who cures the soul of such diseases as licentiousness, covetousness, and all like infirmities.[86] There is much talk about the diseased human condition, philosophy or reason as the cure or saving force, and the philosopher's speech as the instrument by which the cure is applied with skill at the proper time, in a manner appropriate to the circumstance and time.[87] A person is purified or healed by submitting to someone else's reproof and admonition, and allowing the saving power of the speech to purify his reason, clearing away fogginess and dullness.[88]

The philosophy in mind does not dwell on introspection, but has a primary concern for the practical life, especially its social dimension, as summarized by Ps.-Plutarch:

> Wherefore it is necessary to make philosophy as it were the head and front of all education (παιδείας). For as regards the care of the body men have discovered two sciences, the medical and the gymnastic, of which the one implants health, the other sturdiness, in the body; but for the illnesses and affections of the mind philosophy alone is the remedy. For through philosophy and in company with philosophy it is possible to attain knowledge of what is honourable and what is shameful, what is just and what is unjust, what, in brief, is to be chosen and what to be avoided,[89] how a man must bear himself in relation to the gods, with his | parents, with his elders, with the laws, with strangers, with those in authority, with friends, with women, with children, with servants; that one ought to reverence the gods, to honour one's parents, to respect one's elders, to be obedient to the laws, to yield to those in authority, to love one's friends, to be chaste with women, to be affectionate with children, and not to be overbearing with slaves; and, most important of all, not to be overjoyful at success or overmuch distressed at misfortune, nor to be dissolute in pleasures, nor impulsive and brutish in

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[86] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.31–32.

[87] For the Stoic description of the human passions as diseases, see Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.10–13, 23–24, 27, 32–33, on which see Hadot, *Seneca*, 142–146. For the philosopher as physician, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 78/79.43–45; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 61A–F, 73A–D; Seneca, *Ep.* 22.1; 27.1; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.15.4–5; as savior, Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.9; for philosophy and common sense that saves, Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.28. For a pessimistic view of the human condition, see Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28; 29, and for the proper time and manner to apply the cure, Abraham J. Malherbe, " 'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," *JBL* 103 (1984): 235–243; repr. in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989). [*Light*, 1:187–196]

[88] Plutarch, *Adol. poet. aud.* 42C.

[89] The protreptic and apotreptic function of paraenesis: see Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 5, cited earlier; cf. notes 26 and 27 above.

> temper. These things I regard as pre-eminent among all the advantages that accrue from philosophy.[90]

These are the precepts Seneca has in mind in *Ep.* 94,1: "how a husband should conduct himself toward his wife or how a father should bring up his children or how a master should rule his slaves." The similarities to the *Gemeindeparänese* in Titus 2:2–10 are patently obvious. The theological warrant for that advice is the statement in 2:12 that God's saving grace appeared, educating us to renounce vice and live σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς.

In 2:1, the *Gemeindeparänese* is described as fitting to teaching that is sound or healthy. The elder/bishop is to give instruction in healthy teaching (1:9), and Titus is to reprove the heretics so that they might be healthy in the faith (1:13). Such language appears throughout the PE, especially in the description of the heretics, who are constantly described as cognitively deficient,[91] and with minds that are diseased.[92] The author of this letter made use of traditions available to him in a manner similar to the use that Plutarch made in his *Conjugalia Praecepta* of things suitable to his purpose. Also, like Plutarch, he used something new. In the Christian heritage of moral instruction the notion of intellectual disease to be corrected through divine παιδεία had not yet occurred. Such a cognitive notion of salvation is not found in the New Testament before the Pastoral Epistles.

We should recognize, of course, that while some of the language, paraenetic devices, and the way the argument holds together in Titus are similar to the moral philosophical traditions we have observed, there are considerable differences between the two. The cognitive element in Titus is not human reason reaching for the truth, but is knowledge derived from apostolic tradition and Scripture.[93] In 1 Tim 6:3, heterodoxy is contrasted to "the sound words of our Lord Jesus Christ," which may mean that Jesus was the source of the sound teaching, but that is uncertain. The PE, with the exception of 1 Tim 5:17–18, do not refer to words of Jesus;[94] their interest is rather in the transmission of apostolic tradition[95] and its preservation.[96] By applying their minds to what the Apostle has | written, the 317

[90] Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 7D–F (Babbitt, LCL).
[91] For example, in 1 Tim 2:4; 6:4, 9; 2 Tim 2:23; Titus 3:9.
[92] For example, in 1 Tim 6:4–5; 2 Tim 2:17; 3:8.
[93] 2 Tim 3:14–17; see 2:2; Titus 1:9.
[94] See Matt 10:10; Luke 10:7; 1 Cor 9:9, 14.
[95] For example, 2 Tim 2:2.
[96] 2 Tim 2:2.

readers will receive understanding from the Lord.[97] And in Titus 2:11–14, the christological and eschatological elements are of course markedly different from the philosophical tradition that is here in view.

In sum, in Titus 2, we have observed advice being given that is traditional, self-evidently right, and widely accepted. All of this makes it possible for the *Gemeindeparänese* to be used apologetically. But this practical side of the chapter should not obscure the fact that the warrant for the paraenesis is theological, or, more precisely, christological, and that it also is shared by the writer and his readers. Furthermore, the conceptual framework for this particular bit of paraenesis is the framework for the PE as a whole. "Education (παιδεία) is the constant and necessary companion to ethics"[98] and "Christology lives in ethics."[99]

## Conclusion

The Epistle to Titus is commonly viewed as a kind of church order, although the core of the letter, 2:1–3:8, is recognized as paraenetic. I trust that it has been demonstrated in this paper that paraenesis extends throughout the letter, and, most importantly, that the paraenetic elements are not disjointed pieces strewn about to provide general advice to the church. Rather, there is a conceptual framework, shared by the writer and his readers, that is expressed with traditional theological formulations, complemented by his personal contribution, the notion that God's saving grace educates believers to live moral and healthy lives.

[97] 2 Tim 2:7; see 1 Tim 3:15.
[98] Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 187.
[99] Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument*, 145.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

# "CHRIST JESUS CAME INTO THE WORLD TO SAVE SINNERS": SOTERIOLOGY IN THE PASTORAL EPISTLES*

## Introduction

The above quotation of 1 Tim 1:15 could stand as a short formula for NT soteriology in general.[1] On the face of it, there is nothing really exceptional about it, and the soteriology of the Pastoral Epistles (henceforth PE) has, until recently, generally shared in the low esteem in which other theological aspects of the letters have been held.[2] One commentator's assessment is representative of many others. A.T. Hanson considers the author of the letters unoriginal, dependent on traditions, including liturgical and hymnic formulas, which he presents without working them into a consistent whole. So, for example, the author of the PE describes both God and Christ as Savior, the reason being that he "expresses his doctrine of Christ by using titles for him rather than by expounding an ontological and soteriological theory."[3] The author was not only not conscious of the implications of the traditions he used, "One cannot help suspecting that Paul's profound doctrine of the cross was simply too deep for the author of the Pastorals."[4]

### *Overview of the Soteriology of the Pastoral Epistles*

The soteriology of the PE can easily be outlined as is done below. That is not to say that it is equally easy to discern whether the individual elements

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* Originally published in *Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology* (ed. Jan G. van der Watt; NovTSup 121; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 331–358.

[1] Thomas Söding, "Das Erscheinen des Retters: Zur Christologie der Pastoralbriefe" in *Christologie in der Paulus-Schule: Zur Rezeptionsgeschichte des paulinischen Evangeliums* (SBS 181; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 2000), 183.

[2] See Norbert Brox, *Die Pastoral Briefe* (5th ed.; RNT; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1989), 232–233; Lewis R. Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles* (HUT 22; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986; pb ed., 2006), 135–141; Frances M. Young, *The Theology of the Pastoral Epistles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 50–55; cf. Jürgen Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus* (EKKNT 15; Zurich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988), 363–365.

[3] Anthony T. Hanson, *The Pastoral Epistles* (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 39.

[4] Hanson, *Pastoral Epistles*, 42.

dealing with salvation cohere in a systematic whole, or, absent such coherence, whether any particular element dominates | or any theme pervades the letters. Often, the doctrine in the PE is made to suffer by comparing it negatively with Paul's teaching on salvation, and even a rapid survey reveals that we have to do with a mélange of Pauline and non-Pauline elements.

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According to the PE, God wants all people to be saved (1 Tim 2:4; 4:10), but focuses on those who have believed (1 Tim 4:10). God is named Savior (1 Tim 1:1; 2:3; 4:10; Titus 1:3), as is Jesus Christ (2 Tim 1:10; Titus 1:4; 2:13; 3:6), and it is not immediately clear what the role of each is in the salvation of mankind.

The theology of the PE is fundamentally theocentric. God is concerned with the salvation of all people, and he allowed his saving grace to appear in Christ.[5] It is claimed that the PE subordinate Christology to an epiphany scheme (see below), so that it loses its soteriological independence and merely fills a functional role in a system of salvation that preserves the total transcendence of God. According to this view, soteriology has returned to the doctrine of God, which means that the Christ event, stripped of its own import, now merely has the function of announcing God's universal scheme of salvation.[6]

There is, however, much more to the soteriology of the letters than could be inferred from this characterization. The heretofore prevailing view, that there is no cogent, systematic theology in the PE, but that the author uses pre-Pauline, Pauline, and other material in a sometimes haphazard way for different purposes,[7] has recently been challenged. It has been argued, for instance, that, while the Christological statements in the PE do not cohere in a closely-knit conception, there is a unifying theme, namely soteriology, that unites them.[8] Indeed, a summary of the soteriology of the PE can begin with the observation that the PE present Jesus Christ as the sole mediator between God the Savior and mankind,

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[5] Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 363–365.

[6] Victor Hasler, "Epiphanie und Christologie in den Pastoralbriefen," *TZ* 33 (1977): 197, 202–203. Also see Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles*, 139: "Jesus receives the title savior only in the midst of descriptions of the plan of salvation and only when the effects of his epiphany are being described. In fact, the three major passages in the Pastorals which paint the details of the salvation schema, the cosmological side of the οἰκονομία θεοῦ, are 2 Tim 1:9–10; Titus 2:11–14; and Titus 3:4–7."

[7] The thorough analysis by Hans Windisch, "Zur Christologie der Pastoralbriefe" *ZNW* 34 (1935): 213–238, has been the most influential presentation of the evidence in support of this argument.

[8] Karoline Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* (HThSt 12; Münster: Lit, 1996), esp. 175–180; see Söding, "Das Erscheinen des Retters: Zur Christologie der Pastoralbriefe," 183.

who gave himself as a ransom to redeem us from iniquity (1 Tim 2:3–6; cf. Titus 2:14), and it is through faith in him that people are saved (1 Tim 1:16; 2 Tim 3:15; cf. Titus 3:8: faith in God).

| Yet salvation depends on God's own purpose, kindness, and grace, not on human works.[9] It is not human righteousness, evinced in good works done, that brings about salvation; rather, it is God's mercy, which saves through the washing of regeneration (παλιγγενεσία), that is, baptism, and renewal of the Holy Spirit (Titus 3:5), so that justification rests on God's grace (Titus 3:7). But, by saving people, Jesus creates a people of his own who are eager for good works (Titus 2:14), and they are urged to perform such works (Titus 3:14), which are profitable or useful to all people (Titus 3:8). 333

Salvation can thus be conceived of as a past event (Titus 3:5) or something that can be acquired in the present (1 Tim 4:16). There is also a future dimension to salvation, described variously as eternal life (1 Tim 3:7; cf. 1:2), to be laid hold of in the present (1 Tim 6:12; perhaps v. 19), the crown of righteousness to be bestowed when the Lord appears (2 Tim 4:8), and the heavenly kingdom (2 Tim 4:18).

Paul and the church also have a role to play in the plan of God the Savior. Paul is himself the paradigm of those who are saved by God's mercy and grace, who believe in God for eternal life (1 Tim 1:12–17). Paul endures "everything for the sake of the elect, that they may obtain the salvation which in Christ Jesus goes with eternal glory" (2 Tim 2:10). Timothy, too, by his own conduct and teaching will save himself and his hearers (1 Tim 4:16).

### *A New Proposal*

This canvass of the soteriology of the PE, overly brief as it is, draws attention to some major elements of the doctrine, and, of particular interest to this paper, to the title of Savior as applied to God and Christ. One needs to beware of focusing on titles when dealing with Christology,[10] but in the case of the PE, it is essential to examine the appellation in the greatest detail. The treatment below will attempt to demonstrate that the title

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[9] 2 Tim 1:9; Titus 3:4–7; see Söding, "Das Erscheinen des Retters: Zur Christologie der Pastoralbriefe," 182–184.

[10] See, for example, Marinus de Jonge, *Christology in Context: The Earliest Christian Response to Jesus* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1988), 19, passim; Nils A. Dahl, "Sources of Christological Language" in *Jesus the Christ*: *The Historical Origins of Christological Doctrine* (ed. Donald H. Juel; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 113–136.

is part of the texture of the larger theology of the letters. What Leander Keck says about Christology applies equally to soteriology, and particularly to the soteriology of the PE. He describes Christology as "the discourse by means of which Christians account for what they believe they have experienced, and will experience through Jesus Christ (liberation, new life, forgiveness) | customarily understood as 'salvation' (Greek, σωτηρία)." In a coherent Christology, there is a correlation between the identity of the person of Christ and his saving work. Christ does not stand alone, but is, according to Keck, understood:

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> In specific relationships or correlations . . . the coherence of Christology refers to the requirement that the correlations be appropriate, that they make sense conceptually. Since the cure must fit the disease, the salvation effected by Jesus Christ must be correlated appropriately with the understanding of the human condition. In other words, the soteriological correlate implies an anthropology, and vice versa. Thus, if the human condition is essentially ignorance and folly, what is needed is instruction and wisdom. There is then no need for forgiveness—unless, of course, ignorance and folly are understood as sin against God. But then more is required than instruction and wisdom.[11]

The same can be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of God as Savior.

The way the soteriology of the PE fulfills the requirements stated by Keck can be discerned through close examination of major Christological passages in the letters. Two passages, Titus 2:11–14 and 3:3–7, are of major significance, augmented by a third, 2 Tim 1:9–11. The two passages in Titus will serve as windows through which to view the soteriology of the letters.

## Trained by the Saving Grace of God, Titus 2:11–14

### *Form and Origin of the Pericope and Its Language*

This major Christological and soteriological passage is a literary period, one long sentence consisting of a number of clauses that describe in brief

[11] Leander E. Keck, "Christology of the New Testament: What, Then, is New Testament Christology?" in *Who Do You Say That I Am? Essays on Christology in Honor of Jack Dean Kingsbury* (ed. Mark A. Powell and David R. Bauer; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1999), 193; see already Keck, "Toward the Renewal of New Testament Christology," *NTS* 32 (1986): 362–377, esp. 362–365.

God's salvific work. It ends with the eschatological waiting of the people Christ purified for himself, who are to be zealous to do good works.

11 Ἐπεφάνη γὰρ ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις
12 παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς,
ἵνα ἀρνησάμενοι τὴν ἀσέβειαν καὶ τὰς κοσμικὰς ἐπιθυμίας
σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι,
13 προσδεχόμενοι τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς
δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,
14 ὃς ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν,
ἵνα λυτρώσηται ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἀνομίας
καὶ καθαρίσῃ ἑαυτῷ λαὸν περιούσιον,
ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων.

| The literary limits of the passage are clearly marked by γάρ in v. 11 and λάλει καὶ παρακάλει καὶ ἔλεγχε in v. 15. The self-contained passage, tightly structured, contains some obviously traditional material.[12] The passage has, not surprisingly, been thought to be liturgical in origin, more precisely, a baptismal or eucharistic hymn.[13] Such an origin is highly unlikely, for the passage contains elements that are integral to both the theology of the PE and the literary context in which it appears.[14] Coming toward the end of the three letters, the author in Titus 2:11–14 and 3:4–7 composed two passages which contain salient points made throughout the preceding eleven chapters of the three letters. 335

*The Epiphany of the Savior's Saving Grace*

The sentence begins with ἐπεφάνη, repeated in the noun form in v. 13, to introduce a passage whose subject is salvation (σωτήριος, σωτήρ, λυτρόομαι). The notion of epiphany appears in all three of the PE (1 Tim 6:14; 2 Tim 4:1, 8), especially in connection with salvation (1 Tim 1:9, 10; Titus 2:11, 13; 3:4). Attempts have been made to discover the *religionsgeschichtliche* background of ἐπιφάνεια in order to cast light on its meaning in the PE.[15]

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[12] E.g., v. 14; cf. Mark 10:45b.

[13] E.g., Gottfried Holtz, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (2d ed.; THKNT 13; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1972), 224–229.

[14] I. Howard Marshall, *The Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 262–266, provides a judicious weighing of the evidence pro and con.

[15] See Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 287–296, for an assessment of this enterprise, and Lorenz Oberlinner "Die 'Epiphaneia' des Heilswillens Gottes in Christus Jesus: Zur Grundstruktur der Christologie der Pastoralbriefe," *ZNW* 71 (1980): 192–213, for a more independent interpretation. The inscriptional evidence is frequently adduced and claims made for its importance in clarifying the Christology of the PE. See, for example, Rudolf Bultmann

For the most part, it is the Hellenistic background that has been thought most relevant to the PE, and specifically, the use of the term to describe the unexpected, visible intrusion of the gods in human affairs,[16] and eventually its use in connection with a cult. The word group is also associated with σωτήρ, and the combination was used in veneration of the emperor. According to the influential commentary by Dibelius and Conzelmann, the author of the PE uses this elevated, formulaic, commonplace language to give a Hellenistic cast to his own.[17] More recently, however, the immediate background to the PE's use of the word group has been thought to be 2 Maccabees, which speaks repeatedly of divine manifestations by which God helps Israel in times of need.[18]

336 | It is not necessary at the moment to adjudicate between these claims; it is sufficient for our purposes to agree with the claim that epiphany language always describes the helpful intervention of a divine power.[19] That is the case with the PE, as its association with salvation demonstrates.

Of special relevance is 2 Tim 1:8–10, the only passage outside Titus where epiphany language is used in connection with salvation:

> ... the power of God, who saved (σώσαντος) us and called us with a holy calling, not in virtue of our works but in virtue of his own purpose and grace (κατὰ ἰδίαν πρόθεσιν καὶ χάριν), which he gave us in Christ ages ago, and now has manifested (φανερωθεῖσαν) through the appearance of our Savior Christ Jesus (διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ), who abolished death and brought life and immortality through the gospel.

Here ἐπιφάνεια refers to the manifestation of the earthly Jesus, but elsewhere it has an eschatological reference (1 Tim 6:14; 2 Tim 4:1, 8), to the Parousia, a term that is however not used in the PE.

The word ἐπιφάνεια is used in both senses in Titus 2:11, 13. Christians live between these two manifestations by virtue of the manifestation of God's grace in Christ. It is to be noted that in Titus 2:11 (and 3:4) the first

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and Dieter Lührmann. "ἐπιφαίνω, κτλ," *TDNT* 9 (1974): 7–10; Hasler, "Epiphanie und Christologie in den Pastoralbriefen"; Oberlinner, "Die 'Epiphaneia' des Heilswillens Gottes."

[16] Elpidius W. Pax, *ΕΠΙΦΑΝΕΙΑ: Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur biblischen Theologie* (MThS 10; Munich: K. Zink, 1955).

[17] Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 100–105, 143–146.

[18] Andrew Y. Lau, *Manifest in Flesh: The Epiphany Christology of the Pastoral Epistles* (WUNT 2.86; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996); see 2 Macc 3:24–28; 5:2–4; 12:22; 14:15; 15:27.

[19] Dieter Lührmann, "Epiphaneia: Zur Bedeutung eines griechischen Wortes" in *Tradition und Glaube: Das frühe Christentum in seiner Umwelt: Festgabe für Karl Georg Kuhn zum 65. Geburtstag* (ed. Gert Jeremias, Heinz-Wolfgang Kuhn, and Hartmut Stegemann; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 185–199.

manifestation is not described as that of Christ as in 2 Tim 1:10, but of a divine quality, God's saving grace. This does not mean that the manifestation of these qualities is separate from, or other than Christ's appearance, only that the author focuses on the qualities because they have special significance in their contexts in the Epistle to Titus.

The striking phrase, the saving grace of God (ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ σωτήριος), begins an extraordinarily compact summary of the PE's view of salvation. Much attention has also been focused on the derivation of σωτήρ. The OT describes God as Savior and Christian use can be traced to the formulaic use of Hellenistic Judaism. That cannot be said of the designation of Jesus as Savior; for there is no evidence that the Messiah was called Savior in Judaism. One must therefore look to the Greek world, and once again the emperor cult is thought to be the source for the language.[20]

| There is no persuasive argument against appealing to the cultural and social contexts of the PE to aid our understanding of the letters and of this passage in particular. But, in deciding where to go for enlightenment, one should begin with the passage itself, in its literary context, and with the function it performs in that context. The danger should be avoided of isolating a term or two, for which parallels are then sought here and there in Graeco-Roman sources; rather, a preliminary attempt must be made to discern the complex of thought of which the terminology is an integral part in the PE. With such a preliminary, heuristic description to guide and discipline the investigation, one may then approach the larger cultural context for what it may contribute to our understanding. That method will be applied here, beginning with a brief survey of Titus up to the point of the soteriological passage, 2:11–14. 337

### *The Context in the Epistle to Titus*

The Epistle to Titus is frequently described as being, like 1 Timothy, a rudimentary church order. In fact, its main purpose, broadly speaking, is moral exhortation, and its style, more precisely, is paraenetic. While 2:1–3:8

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[20] The most comprehensive treatment now is that by Franz Jung, *ΣΩΤΗΡ: Studien zur Rezeption eines hellenistischen Ehrentitels im Neuen Testament* (NTAbh 39; Münster: Aschendorff, 2002), which is useful for laying out the inscriptional evidence for the hypothesis of the emperor cult. Martin Karrer, "Jesus, der Retter (Σωτήρ): Zur Aufnahme eines hellenistischen Prädikats im Neuen Testament," *ZNW* 93 (2002): 153–176, provides a good analysis of the evidence, but concentrates on the power of Christ the Savior in overcoming death (2 Tim 1:10). Christfried Böttrich, "'Gott und Retter': Gottesprädikationen in christologischen Titeln," *NeueZST* 42 (2000): 217–236, examines what he claims to be the liturgical use of κύριος and other terms he considers equivalents.

is usually considered *Gemeindeparänese*,[21] Hellenistic paraenetic features in fact occur throughout the entire letter.[22] The philophronetic tone characteristic of paraenesis describes the author's relationship with his putative reader and the inelegant syntax, with short sentences, frequent imperatives, virtue and vice lists, proverbial and gnomic statements (e.g., 1:12, 15), use of personal example (2:7), antithesis, the concern with deeds that are καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα (3:8), are all characteristic of paraenesis. So also is the confidence that exudes from the letter—that its directions are irrefutable and that, despite the presumption that what is inculcated is self-evidently right, generally accepted and generally applicable, the individual directions assume a larger, coherent intellectual framework that inform them, even if that framework is not explicitly appealed to.[23] An awareness of these characteristics of Hellenistic paraenesis will give texture to a description of the literary context of Titus 2:11–14.

338 | The following brief sketch of Titus draws attention to features of special interest to the elucidation of 2:11–14. After a long salutation (1:1–4), the author forgoes the thanksgiving period customary in most of Paul's letters, and gets straight to the point: Titus is to set right what has gone awry in Crete by appointing presbyters/bishops, whose qualifications are detailed in the form of a virtue list (1:5–9a). The antithetic style, in which the qualifications are given (μὴ ... μὴ ... μὴ ... ἀλλά, vv. 7–8), is characteristic of paraenesis, and the content of the list likewise is at home in the moralist literature. The list shares much with a similar one in 1 Tim 3:1–7, but differs from it in a significant way. In 1 Tim 3:2, the qualification that the bishop be διδακτικός appears toward the beginning of the list, while in Titus 1:9 it crowns the list and is expanded, ἵνα δυνατὸς ᾖ καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ καὶ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐλέγχειν.

### *The Human Condition and Its Cure*

The reason why the elder/bishop is to be proficient in sound orthodox teaching is then given: there are many nefarious persons, whose characters

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[21] Dibelius and Conzelmann, Pastoral *Epistles*, 5; Lorenz Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (3 vols.; HTKNT 11.2.1–3; Freiburg: Herder, 1994–1996), 3:102; Jouette Bassler, *1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 191.

[22] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus" in *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (ed. James M. Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen; BZNW 125; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), 297–317, where the evidence is presented in full. [*Light*, 1:407–430]

[23] The evidence is presented in Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 129–136.

the author limns by means of a vice list, which describes them as antisocial and, above all, subverting entire households (1:10–12).

The author then turns to Titus's responsibilities, which are similar to those of the elders (1:13–16), but here the emphasis is on the diseased condition of the heretics' minds and consciences (μεμίανται αὐτῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνείδησις, v. 15). Titus's rebuke is to make them sound or healthy in the faith (ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει, v. 13). As it is, their diseased condition is accompanied by works that deny God; indeed, they are incapable of any good deed (v. 16). This language of disease and health is used in the other PE as well and is also derived from the moral philosophers, as will become clear. The heretics are said, for example, to be puffed up and to understand nothing. On the contrary, they are diseased (νοσῶν) and defiled in mind (διεφθαρμένων ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν) and thus deprived of the truth (1 Tim 6:4–5). Heretical teaching will eat its way like gangrene into their hearers (2 Tim 2:17). The putrid condition of such minds produces bellicosity and such other antisocial vices as envy, dissension, slander, suspicions, and wrangling, and destroys domestic order and tranquility.

The condition of the heretics, we shall see, is similar to that of people before they believed and came to a knowledge of the truth. In | the PE, 339 this condition is dismayingly pessimistic and is repeatedly delineated with long lists of vices (e.g., 1 Tim 1:9–10; 6:3–5; 2 Tim 3:1–5). It is caused by a cognitive deficiency (1 Tim 4:1–2; 6:4, 5; 2 Tim 3:8), which makes them oppose the διδασκαλικὴ ὑγιής (1 Tim 1:10; 6:3). This explains the emphasis in the PE on the importance of teaching, both that of the orthodox church and of the heretics.[24] Orthodox teaching is the tradition that is handed down from generation to generation (2 Tim 2:1–2). In contrast to the heretics, Timothy, for example, is to continue in the tradition of which Scripture is part:

> But as for you, continue in what you have learned (ἔμαθες) and have firmly believed, knowing (εἰδώς) from whom you learned it (ἔμαθες) and how from childhood you have known (οἶδας) the sacred writings which are able to instruct you for salvation (σοφίσαι εἰς σωτηρίαν) through faith in Jesus Christ. All Scripture is inspired by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be

[24] Of the heretics: ἑτεροδιδασκαλέω (1 Tim 1:3; 6:3); διδάσκω (2 Tim 2:2; Titus 1:11); διδάσκαλος (2 Tim 4:3); νομοδιδάσκαλος (1 Tim 1:7). Of the church and its leaders: διδάσκω (1 Tim 4:11; 6:2); διδαχή (2 Tim 4:2; Titus 1:9); διδακτικός (1 Tim 3:2; 2 Tim 2:24); διδασκαλία (1 Tim 1:10; 4:1, 6, 13; 5:17; 6:1, 3; 2 Tim 3:10, 16; 4:3; Titus 1:9; 2:1, 7, 10); διδάσκαλος (1 Tim 2:7; 2 Tim 1:11). The teaching of the orthodox is the only foundation for the moral life.

> complete, equipped for every good work (ὠφέλιμος πρὸς διδασκαλίαν, πρὸς ἐλεγμόν, πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν, πρὸς παιδείαν τὴν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, ἵνα ἄρτιος ᾖ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος, πρὸς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἐξηρτισμένος). (2 Tim 3:14–17)

The OT does not play a major role in the PE. Reference to it here mainly serves to stress its part in the normative tradition that has been received (cf. v. 14 with 1:5), and the cognitive aspects associated with it. Noteworthy for our purpose, too, is the moralists' language where Scripture's usefulness for psychagogy is described (vv. 16–17).[25]

### *The Social Dimension of Sound Teaching*

In contrast (Σὺ δέ) to the intellectually and morally ill people described in 1:10–16, Titus is commanded to teach what befits sound or healthy teaching (ἃ πρέπει τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ, 2:1), which in 3:8 is described as good works, which are *καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα* to people. This teaching is then summarized in 2:1–10, in a list of responsibilities of members of the community, which is a development of the Hellenistic | household codes adopted and adapted in Eph 5:22–6:8; Col 3:18–4:1; 1 Pet 2:13–3:7. This list takes up successively the behavior of older men, older women (and secondarily, younger women), young men, Titus himself, and slaves.

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There is very little in this list that is specifically Christian: only in vv. 6 and 10 is God mentioned. The behavior that is commanded is similar to that of the philosophic moral tradition, as is evident, for example, from the explicit statements about the positive response it should elicit from non-Christians (e.g., Titus 2:5, 9, 10; cf. 1 Tim 3:7). Yet, although in the conclusion of the section it is only said of slaves that in their entire conduct they are to adorn the teaching of God their Savior among all people (or in all respects; τὴν διδασκαλίαν τὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ κοσμῶσιν ἐν πᾶσιν, 2:10), according to the sentiment of the PE, it applies to all Christians.[26] We should not, however, be overwhelmed by the similarities between Christian and pagan behavior, for in 2 Tim 3:12 it is said that all who live εὐσεβῶς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ will be persecuted, so the author does retain some sense of a difference between Christian morality and that of the larger society.

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[25] For the use of such terms in psychagogy, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), esp. 308–327.

[26] For the image of adornment, see also 1 Tim 2:9. It is also a philosophical commonplace that virtues are the true adornment; see Seneca, *Ep.* 13.15; Philo, *Sacr.* 26; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 39B; Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 9.

*The Theological Warrant for Social Teaching*

The theological warrant for what Titus is to teach is given in 2:11–14. The connection of this passage with what precedes is evident from γάρ, which connects God's saving grace and instruction with v. 10. Verses 11–14 are an elaboration of "the teaching of God our Savior" in v. 10, and describe how God saves. Verses 11 and 12 do so in terms largely derived from the philosophical traditions which the author has used to describe the human condition that can only be rectified by correct teaching. A recognition of these traditions will allow us to see the contours of the soteriology of the PE more clearly, as we take account both of what the PE and the philosophers share and how they differ.

*Salvation Through Education*. Discussions on the background of σωτήρ in the PE have, especially because of its association with ἐπιφάνεια, concentrated on the | imperial cult, and neglected the philosophical background.[27] It is, however, philosophical traditions that the author uses to describe the human condition and salvation from it, and an awareness of them will help to clarify the soteriology expressed in Titus 2:11–14. 341

The author knows of grace in the Pauline sense of God's free gift for our benefit (see Titus 3:7), so one is struck by the combination of χάρις σωτήριος with the notion of παιδεία, whose goal is described negatively (renouncing vices) and positively (living virtuously). Here we are knee-deep in philosophical formulations.

The philosophers, and particularly the Stoics, likened human emotions to diseases,[28] and the extent to which their thinking and language was spread is richly illustrated by Philo of Alexandria. Philo thought of the soul as having two characters, the senior character honoring the cardinal virtues of wisdom, temperance, justice, courage, and virtue (φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, ἀρετή), and the junior honoring such things as wealth, reputation, office, and good birth. The soul is in a state of war, not yet completely purified (μήπω κεκαθαρμένη), its passions

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[27] For example, in Karrer, "Jesus, der Retter (Σωτήρ)," philosophy is mentioned in one sentence and receives four lines in a footnote (157), and in a book of 404 pages Jung, *ΣΩΤΗΡ: Studien zur Rezeption eines hellenistischen Ehrentitels im Neuen Testament*, devotes slightly more than one page (95–96) to one philosopher, Epicurus.

[28] See Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.10–13, 23–24, 27, 32–33, and the comments by Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 142–146.

and diseases still prevailing over its healthy reasonings (τῶν παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων παρευημεροῦντων τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας λόγους).[29]

People find themselves in this condition because of their willful ignorance, their failure to live according to reason. When passion in the soul rages savagely, the philosophers said, and produces itches and ticklings which arise from lust and indulgence, and if some vice spreads like festering shingles, it should be healed with some curative drug (σωτήριον φάρμακον) or be cut out with professional skill with the scalpel of sharp reason.[30] It is the philosopher who cures, through diet and cautery.[31] Like a physician, who works for the benefit (ὠφέλεια) of his patient, the philosopher's concern is for the cure (σωτηρία) of his hearers.[32] The idea was widespread that the philosophic teacher saved people, which is to say, helped them to conquer vice.[33] The philosopher can therefore be called σωτήρ,[34] for | he cures. It is of the greatest importance, then, that people listen to what is useful and salutary (χρήσιμον καὶ σωτήριον),[35] even if the philosopher's frank speech, like effective medicine, may be painful, for it has a salutary and benign (σωτήριον ... καὶ κηδεμονικόν) effect.[36]

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Described otherwise, still like physicians, they engage in a παιδεία that leads to true happiness, teaching the cardinal virtues of temperance, manliness, and justice (σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη).[37] A proper education is the source and root of all goodness, and people ought to cling to uncorrupted and sound education (παιδείας ... ἀδιαφθόρου καὶ ὑγιαινούσης).[38] Dio Chrysostom provides a short summary of the entire matter:

> For it is through man's folly (ἄνοιαν) and love of luxury (τρυφήν) and ambition (φιλοτιμίαν), that life comes to be vexatious (δυσχερής) and full of deceit (ἀπάτης), wickedness (πονηρίας), and countless other ills (κακά). However, for these maladies one remedy and cure has been provided by the gods, to wit, education and reason (παιδείαν καὶ λόγον), and the man who throughout life employs that remedy with consistency comes at last to a healthy, happy end (πρὸς τέλος ὑγιὲς καὶ εὔδαιμον).[39]

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29 Philo, *Abr.* 217–223.
30 Philo, *Det.* 110.
31 Seneca, *Ep.* 75.6–7.
32 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.10, 18.
33 Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 5; Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 6.6.
34 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.17–18.
35 Plutarch, *Adol. poet. aud.* 14F.
36 Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 59D; cf. *Virt. mor.* 452D.
37 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.31–32.
38 Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 6A.
39 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.15–16.

The philosophical education in mind does not deal with theoretical matters so much as practical ones. This is evident in the way the cardinal virtues have appeared in the texts alluded to or cited above. It is most explicit in the following statement on education:

> Wherefore it is necessary to make philosophy as it were the head and front of all education (παιδείας). For as regards the care of the body men have discovered two sciences, the medical and the gymnastic, of which the one implants health, the other sturdiness, in the body; but for the illnesses and affections of the mind philosophy alone is the remedy. For through philosophy and in company with philosophy it is possible to attain knowledge of what is honourable and what is shameful, what is just and what is unjust, what, in brief, is to be chosen and what to be avoided, how a man must bear himself in relation to the gods, with his parents, with his elders, with the laws, with strangers, with those in authority, with friends, with women, with children, with servants; that one ought to reverence the gods, to honour one's parents, to respect one's elders, to be obedient to the laws, to yield to those in authority, to love one's friends, to be chaste with women, to be affectionate with children, and not to be overbearing with slaves; and, most important of all, not to be overjoyful at success or | overmuch distressed at misfortune, not to be dissolute in pleasures, nor impulsive and brutish in temper. These things I regard as pre-eminent among all the advantages that accrue from philosophy.[40]

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The similarities between the philosophical background and Titus 2:11 are striking and extend to v. 12, where the twofold goal of the divine παιδεία is stated, to bring about renunciation of vices (ἀσέβεια and κοσμικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι) in order to live virtuously (σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς).

The human condition from which people are saved is immorality. It is here described as godlessness and worldly desires (ἀσέβεια καὶ κοσμικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι). Both terms have moral connotations,[41] and, as we have seen above, share much with the philosophers' conception of the irrational life. The condition is starkly painted in the PE with long lists of vices which describe heretics and unbelievers alike (e.g., 1 Tim 1:8–10; 6:3–5). Heretics, it is said ironically, will "progress" ever more in godlessness (ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ προκόψουσιν ἀσεβεῖς, 2 Tim 2:16). They have a form of εὐσέβεια but deny its power (2 Tim 3:5, 7), an association also made in Ps.-Plato, *Def.* 412E, which thinks of εὐσέβεια as a δύναμις θεραπευτικὴ θεῶν ἑκούσιος, and in

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[40] Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 7D–F.

[41] The latter obviously so. See 2 Tim 2:15–16 for the heretics' ἀσέβεια, and the list of vices in 3:2–5, and holding to a form of εὐσέβεια but denying its power. Cf. also Philo, *Det.* 72.

Hellenistic Judaism.[42] What heretic and unbeliever share is that they do not hold to the ὑγιαινούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ, and therefore lack the capacity to live morally.

*The Moral Goal of Divine Education.* The goal of the divine παιδεία is identified positively, to live virtuously, described with a triad of virtues in which the presence of εὐσεβῶς is noteworthy. In this, the author is like Philo, who adds εὐσέβεια to the standard Stoic virtues.[43] Lucian, too, adds εὐσέβεια to σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη, to which he then appends other noble qualities, all of which he describes as adornments with which the soul is adorned.[44]

We should not, however, uncritically focus too narrowly on the similarities, for the addition of ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι to the description of the "virtuous" life in which the saving grace educates in v. 12, alerts us to the fact that we 344 are dealing with a different perspective, even | though the words remain the same and in many respects share conceptualities. A cursory glance at two passages in 1 Timothy that demonstrate characteristic features of the author's view of εὐσέβεια, a term that is important in Greek, Jewish, and Christian thought will make the point.[45]

Εὐσέβεια occurs three times in 1 Tim 3:14–4:10, which is an excursus from an itemization of qualifications and duties of various church functionaries (3:1–4:16). An *inclusio* is formed by the use of the divine epithet θεὸς ζῶν in 3:15 and 4:10. The church is the pillar and support of the truth, which is described as τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον, which is then set forth in a creedal statement of six strophes which recount the Christological drama from Christ's manifestation (ἐφανερώθη) in the flesh to his ascension (3:16). This is most likely a fuller statement of what is in mind in 2 Tim 1:9–10 and Titus 2:11.

There are practical implications to εὐσέβεια, which include such matters as filial responsibility (cf. 1 Tim 5:4, τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον εὐσεβεῖν). In 1 Tim 4:7, Timothy is told to train (γυμνάζω) himself in εὐσέβεια, for while training of the body is of little benefit, εὐσέβεια is of benefit in every way, since it holds promise for life now and that which is to come (3:8). The argument

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[42] E.g., *Let. Aris.* 229; Wis. 10:12.

[43] E.g., in *Cher.* 73, 114, 143. See Stephen Charles Mott, "Greek Ethics and Christian Conversion: The Philonic Background of Titus II 10–14 and III 3–7," *NovT* 20 (1978): 22–48.

[44] Lucian, *Somn.* 10.

[45] For a discussion of εὐσέβεια in the PE, see Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 135–144; for a more wide-ranging treatment, see Werner Foerster, "εὐσεβής, κτλ," TDNT 7 (1977): 175–191, and for Epicurean as well as other philosophies, see Dirk Obbink, ed., *Philodemus, On Piety, Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

has an affinity with the philosophers' utterances about the value of physical exercise, which they too relativized.

Philosophers held that exercise should be short and simple and not keep one from matters of the mind, which should be exercised day and night.[46] Both types of training are necessary.[47] The noble man struggles to attain virtue throughout his entire life, which is a constant training aimed at progress toward virtue,[48] which promises to create happiness, calm and serenity, so progress toward virtue is progress toward each of these things,[49] and such progress is made through reason and philosophy.

In 1 Tim 4, the benefit accruing from physical exercise is also relativized, but the goal is not virtue or happiness, but εὐσέβεια, nor is there an explicit reference to education, as in Titus 2:12.[50] The | author has used 345 language from the philosophers and changed major features of their thinking, but it is not clear how his several pieces dealing with εὐσέβεια fit into a coherent theological whole. One might expect from 3:16 that εὐσέβεια should there be related to Christology, or from 4:1–5 to the doctrine of creation, but the connections are not made. We are left with a reference to the καλὴ διδασκαλία to which Timothy holds (4:6), which refers to matters of diet but probably also to his training in εὐσέβεια. And the entire discussion of the excursus has in some way to do with salvation, if we are to judge from the final epithet for God, with which it closes, ὅς ἐστιν σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων (4:10).

The connection of εὐσέβεια with teaching also appears in the other cluster in 1 Timothy where it occurs four times (6:3, 5, 6, 11), the first being of primary interest. Verses 3–5 form a subunit in a longer discussion on financial matters. The pericope accuses the false teachers of not heeding the sound words of the Lord Jesus Christ and the teaching that accords with godliness (μὴ προσέρχεται ὑγιαίνουσιν λόγοις τοῖς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῇ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλίᾳ). The καί is epexegetic, introducing an explanation of the sound teaching that it is in accord with godliness.

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46 Cicero, *Fin.* 2.64; Lucian, *Nigr.* 26; Seneca, *Ep.* 15.4.

47 Isocrates, *Ad Nic.* 11; Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 9, 12; Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 6.

48 Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.15.

49 Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.4.3.

50 Contrast 4 Maccabees, whose theme is that religious reason (εὐσεβὴς λογισμός) is master of the emotions (1:1; cf. 6:31; 7:16; 16:1). Reason is the intellect (νοῦς), which, with correct judgment, chooses the life of wisdom, and wisdom is knowledge of things human and divine and their cause. This latter formulation was a well-known definition of philosophy (e.g., Aetius, *Placita* 1.2 [p. 273, 11–13 Diels]; Alcinous, *Didask.* 1.1), but for 4 Maccabees, such wisdom is education (παιδεία) in the Law (1:15–17). Thus the reason that controls the emotions is that of the Jews' ancestral religion (ἡ πάτριος ἡμῶν εὐσέβεια, 9:29).

The major problem is whether the genitive is subjective or objective, thus, whether it is Jesus who teaches the sound words, which are in accord with εὐσέβεια, or whether it is the teaching about him that constitutes the sound words and is contrary to heretical teaching. The latter is more likely, for the PE do not reflect any of Jesus's teachings, with the possible exception of 1 Tim 5:17,[51] and 1 Tim 3:16 also exhibits an interest in the earthly Jesus, there described as the content of the mystery of the church's εὐσέβεια. What interests the author there as well as here are the practical dimensions of εὐσέβεια. The heretics do not hold to the sound teaching that is in accord with godliness, know nothing, and are steeped in vice (vv. 3–4).

346 | The second occurrence of εὐσέβεια in this cluster is in v. 5. Corrupt in mind and bereft of the truth, the heretics think εὐσέβεια is a profit-making affair. The verse provides a link with the following pericope, which begins with the ironic affirmation that εὐσέβεια is indeed of great profit if it is accompanied by self-sufficiency, which is the author's real interest. The topic takes up the next four verses (vv. 7–10a), which contain nothing specifically Christian; taken in isolation, they could as well have been written by a Stoic or a Cynic.[52] Even the progression from πορισμός to αὐτάρκεια, the favorite virtue of these philosophers, is a natural one in the discussions of how to secure one's livelihood.[53]

The moral commonplaces that crop up with monotonous regularity in discussions of self-sufficiency and avarice are trotted out in vv. 7–10a, but the author does not make clear how these one-liners are peculiarly religious, to say nothing of being Christian. We are simply left with the assertion that the practical, orthodox profession is of great profit, but only if it is accompanied by self-sufficiency. The author has lost interest in εὐσέβεια after his opaque assertion of v. 6, only mentioning it again in a list of virtues in v. 11.

At the risk of harsh overstatement and gross oversimplification, one has the impression that the author lays claim to a favorite Hellenistic moral term, εὐσέβεια, here and elsewhere in the PE, to describe a quality of Christian life in a manner that would make it intellectually appealing to a

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[51] Cf. Matt 10:10; Mark 6:8; Luke 9:3; 10:4–7; 1 Tim 5:18; 1 Cor 9:14.

[52] For a general view of αὐτάρκεια, see Malherbe, "Paul's Self-Sufficiency (Phil. 4:11)" in *Texts and Contexts: Biblical Texts in their Textual and Situational Contexts: Essays in Honor of Lars Hartman* (ed. Tord Fornberg and David Hellholm; Oslo/Boston: Scandinavian University Press, 1995), 813–826, esp. 818–821, and the literature cited. [*Light*, 1:325–338]

[53] Cf. Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 11.

literate reader. He does give it his own nuances, only some of which have been noted above. The major thing for him is that εὐσέβεια is possible only if the sound teaching is strictly adhered to. According to Titus 2:11–12, it is God's saving grace that educates his people to live εὐσεβῶς in the present age.

Similarities to the philosophical traditions continue even in v. 14, where the human condition from which people are redeemed is described as ἀνομία. What the author understands by this is probably explained by 1 Tim 1:8–10, where the ἄνομοι are associated with a long list of vices, καὶ εἴ τι ἕτερον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ ἀντίκειται. The notion of purification is also part of that tradition. According to Plutarch, a person is purified by submitting to reproof and admonition.[54] Philosophy exercises its salutary power as it purifies a person's reason,[55] clearing a foggy and dull mind.[56]

### | *Similarities and Differences*

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It is clear by now that the moral philosophers' view of the human condition, that it has been caused by a failure to live rationally and is purified by philosophic teaching which saves people, provides a conceptual framework also found in the PE, including its view of salvation. The similarities are numerous, but the differences are vast. Recognition of these differences in Titus 2:11–14 will help us to appreciate the way in which the author has appropriated philosophic conceptions and Christianized them in the process.

The first thing that strikes one as different is that the initiative lies with God. The moral scheme of things is seen from this perspective. In Ps.-Plutarch's listing of the relationships about which philosophy teaches, the relationship with the gods comes first, but in Titus, the issue is not learning about one's relationship to God, but rather that the *education itself* originates with God. Furthermore, the salvific education is described in terms of God's grace, a quality of God, which means that, strictly speaking, one cannot speak of human virtue that is attained by means of education. Nevertheless, the soteriology described in Titus 2:11–14 is at heart cognitive and ethical.

The Greek understanding of the education in view rested on the assumption that the human being can realize his true humanity only through education. This autonomous human ideal is changed in Titus into

54 Plutarch, *Inim. util.* 87C.
55 Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 59D.
56 Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.* 42C.

a theonomous ideal.[57] Here there is no concentration on the individual, innate human capacity or on character development, but on the divine plan of salvation that existed before creation (1 Tim 1:9–10). This plan attained a decisive moment in the first manifestation of Christ the Savior, and will come to fulfillment in the final manifestation of his glory. Christian existence is bracketed by these two manifestations. Its ultimate goal is not, then, the attainment of some personal fulfillment, like the Greek notions of happiness or virtue, but what is awaited is their blessed hope, which is the epiphany of another divine quality, "the glory of our great God and Savior Jesus Christ."

In this pericope, Christ is first called σωτήρ in v. 13, although there is an allusion to him in v. 11. Some scholars blanch at reading τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (2:13) as calling Christ God.[58] There 348 is a tendency to maintain a distinction between God and Christ and | to transfer the soteriological functions to Christ, who remains in a subordinate role.[59] A number of factors, however, suggest that the reference is to Christ,[60] among them the grammatical likelihood that the one article connects all that follows. Furthermore, when ἐπιφάνεια is used of a person in the PE, it describes the appearance of Christ (1 Tim 6:14; 2 Tim 1:10; 4:1, 8), even if only allusively in v. 11. Verse 14 states in what sense he is Savior and deserves the epithet. It is in a functional sense that Christ can be called God, but to introduce the notion of subordination here misses the point, for he exemplifies in his own actions the preeminent activity of God, namely, saving people according to God's eternal purpose.

Christ's work as Savior is described in v. 14 with the aid of traditions that are patently OT, Jewish, and Christian in origin. There are terms like καθαρίζω and καλὰ ἔργα, which would be congenial to the philosophers, but the weight has shifted. The author uses a formula which speaks of the significance of Jesus's death (Rom 8:30; Gal 1:4; 2:20; Eph 5:2, 25; cf. 1 Tim 2:6). The formula is given a further traditional cast by OT allusions to describe Christ's redeeming act (Ps 129:8 LXX) and his purification of a people of his own (Ezek 37:23 LXX; Exod 19:5 LXX). The corporate image of the people differs from the Greek focus on the individual, which is characteristic of the material to which reference was made above, and its

[57] Helmut Merkel, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (NTD 9/1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 99.

[58] For a full discussion of the issues, see Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 276–282.

[59] Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 143; Merkel, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 99–100.

[60] Hanna Stettler, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* (WUNT 2.105; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 256–260.

peculiar nature is intoned: the redeemed people are Christ's, and they are peculiarly his own, περιούσιος, a term derived from Exod 19:5 LXX, whose meaning would not have been intelligible to the average Greek reader. The OT idea that God's people have special responsibilities finds expression in the phrase that they are to be a people ζηλωτὴς καλῶν ἔργων, which is a Greek expression.[61]

What, then, can be said about the soteriological passage, Titus 2:1–14? Certainly it is not just a collection of old material, with no originality but only appropriated to give the letter a semblance of traditional teaching. It is, rather, part of the fabric of the context in which it is situated and of the PE as a whole. Its core is the saving action of God and Christ through education for the moral life, having rejected a life caught in vice because of ignorance. Christ is so fully engaged in this salvific activity that he can himself be called God.

## | The Savior's Kindness and Love for Humanity, Titus 3:3–7 349

### *Form and Content of the Pericope*

The discussion of this second soteriological passage will be briefer than that of 2:11–14, for in many ways it is similar to it as to content and function. It is, however, even more social in interest. It too is one long sentence, largely constructed out of traditional material:

3 Ἦμεν γάρ ποτε καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνόητοι, ἀπειθεῖς, πλανώμενοι,
δουλεύοντες ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς ποικίλαις,
ἐν κακίᾳ καὶ φθόνῳ διάγοντες,
στυγητοί, μισοῦντες ἀλλήλους.
4 ὅτε δὲ ἡ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλανθρωπία ἐπεφάνη
τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ,
5 οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων τῶν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ
ἃ ἐποιήσαμεν ἡμεῖς,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔλεος ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς
διὰ λουτροῦ. παλιγγενεσίας
καὶ ἀνακαινώσεως πνεύματος ἁγίου,
6 οὗ ἐξέχεεν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς
πλουσίως διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν,
7 ἵνα δικαιωθέντες τῇ ἐκείνου τῇ χάριτι κληρονόμοι
γενηθῶμεν κατ᾽ ἐλπίδα ζωῆς αἰωνίου.

[61] Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 143; Brox, *Die Pastoral Briefe*, 301.

The passage is not derived entirely from Paul, and what does have a Pauline origin is not always used in a strictly Pauline sense. Nevertheless, read superficially, it might look like "an epitome of Pauline theology,"[62] as it does to one scholar, or, as to another, "a pregnant expression of the gospel which articulates the inherent cooperation of the trinity in the work of salvation, wherein the role of the Holy Spirit is apparently underscored."[63]

Such views of the passage as a theological cameo tend to neglect its context and therefore its function, as do those who consider it a bit of liturgical tradition.[64]

The passage is an integral part of the last exhortation in PE, which extends from 3:1–11, and provides the theological basis for that exhortation. In this, it is like 2:11–14. It is further like that passage in that it begins with a statement about God the Savior and concludes with one about Christ the Savior. The significance of the passage | will become evident when it is seen within its immediate context, which must be understood in light of the PE as a whole.

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The structure of 3:1–7 is quite similar to that of 2:1–14. Each passage begins with paraenesis (2:1–10; 3:1–2), for which the soteriological passage then provides the theological ground (2:11–14; 3:3–7), in each case introduced by γάρ. Chapter 3 begins (vv. 1–2) with a paraenetic reminder, Ὑπομίμνησκε αὐτούς, followed by a series of commands which are strung together without any connectives, and with no reason given in vv. 1–2 for what is commanded.[65] It is in the nature of paraenesis that its precepts are self-evidently right and beneficial, as these are claimed to be in v. 8, ταῦτά ἐστιν καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, the antecedent of ταῦτα being the precepts and their justification given in vv. 1–7.

As to the content of the precepts, nothing surprises, yet some things are noteworthy.

First, the precepts have more to do with Christians' relations to the larger society than with their personal morality in intracommunal relations, as is the case in 2:1–10.

Second, responsibility to civil authorities is specified. In pagan lists, these officials would have been mentioned toward the top, as they are

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[62] Donald Guthrie, *The Pastoral Epistles* (TNTC 14; Leicester: Inter-Varsity, 1986), 216.

[63] Lau, *Manifest in the Flesh*, 161.

[64] Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe*, 101, with some hesitation.

[65] For paraenetic reminder, see Seneca, *Ep.* 94.21, 26; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.2; Isocrates, *Nic.* 12; Lucian, *Nigr.* 7; for paraenetic style in general, see Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 81–86; and Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus."

in 1 Pet 2:13.[66] We might therefore have expected them to be mentioned in 2:2, but by mentioning them separately, the author draws attention to them as leaders of the larger society in which the church lives. It is to be noted that they are mentioned at the beginning of a long sentence that ends with πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους. The quiet, irenic life of Christians is associated with obedience to civil authority. In 1 Tim 2:1–6, the responsibility toward civil rulers is prayer on behalf of all people, kings, and all in positions of authority, so that a quiet life might be possible and God the Savior's desire that all people be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth be fulfilled. The theme works differently in the two passages, but they have in common that God's and Christ's salvific purpose, which encompasses all human beings, requires behavior that is consistent with that purpose.

| Finally, it is to be observed that the irenic behavior of these Christians is in direct contrast to that of the heretics, but in their demeanor they are like the orthodox preachers. We shall return to this contrast. 351

### *The Theological Basis for the Paraenesis*

The theological basis for the paraenesis is given in the form of a contrast between the readers' lost pre-Christian condition and their saved state, brought about by God. The pattern of "once it was so but now it should be or is thus," a soteriological contrast pattern,[67] is used elsewhere in the NT (Rom 6:17–19; Eph 2:11–22; 5:8; Col 1:21–22; 1 Pet 2:10). This temporal scheme marking a decisive change in existence was well established in moral literature.[68] The pattern corresponds to the way in which vices and virtues were used in protrepsis, vices listed first, from which the listener is urged to flee, and virtues second, which the hearer is to pursue.[69] A short example illustrates the form:

> Shun (φεύγετε) not only the worst of evils, injustice and self-indulgence, but also their causes, pleasures. For you will concentrate on these alone, both present and future, and on nothing else. And pursue (διώκετε) not only the

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[66] See the quotation from Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 7D–F above.

[67] Thus Nils A. Dahl, "Form-critical Observations on Early Christian Preaching" in *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church* (ed. Nils A. Dahl; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976), 33–34.

[68] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.10, 13, 20; 4.4.6; Diogenes Laertius 6.56; see Peter Tachau, *"Einst" und "Jetzt" im Neuen Testament: Beobachtungen zu einem urchristlichen Predigtschema in der neutestamentlicher Briefliteratur und seiner Vorgeschichte* (FRLANT 105; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 74–84.

[69] See, for example, Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 36.4.

> best of goods, self-control and perseverance, but also their causes, toils, and do not shun (φεύγετε) them on account of their harshness. For would you not exchange inferior things for something great? As you would receive gold in exchange for copper, so you would receive virtue in exchange for toils.[70]

After conversion, the pattern φεύγετε . . . διώκετε is then used in paraenesis (see, e.g., 1 Tim 6:1; 2 Tim 2:22).

The temporal scheme (ποτε ὅτε) is used in Titus 3:3–7 to provide the theological basis for the paraenesis of vv. 1–2. The pre-conversion state is described in the harshest terms, beginning with ἀνόητοι, of which the other vices, according to the view of the philosophers we have observed earlier, are consequences of their lack of reason. The misanthropy revealed in this state is reminiscent of descriptions of a very pessimistic view of the human condition.[71] With the emphatic ἡμεῖς in v. 3, the author includes himself | with those who once shared in this condition. In 1 Tim 1:12–16, in presenting himself as an example of those who would believe, "Paul" mentions his own blasphemy, persecutions, and ignorance, from which he had been saved by the mercy and grace of the Lord Jesus, who had come into the world to save sinners. These elements are also present in this passage.

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What brought about the change in the author's readers, with whom he identifies, was the epiphany of God the Savior's kindness and love for humanity (v. 4). We thus again have to do with qualities of the Lord, in this case, those of the sort the writer wants Titus to cultivate in his hearers. The term that has drawn most attention is φιλανθρωπία, and it is usually pointed out that it originally described a virtue of the gods, and then of rulers. By the time of the Roman Empire, it also described people whose philanthropy was thought of as an imitation of the divine's goodness.[72] Such an interpretation would fit this context, where the writer wants the reader to imitate God's qualities.

We have seen that the PE are shot through with philosophical traditions, as indeed this passage is. Now, philosophers of the better sort spoke in order to benefit people and they personally exemplified the virtuous life.[73] Their motivation was sometimes identified as goodwill, and sometimes

[70] Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 15. Translation by Ronald F. Hock in Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* (SBLSBS 12; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), 65.

[71] E.g., Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28.

[72] Ceslas Spicq, *Lexique théologique du nouveau testament* (2d ed.; Fribourg: Éditions universitaires de Fribourg/Paris: Cerf, 1991), 1582–1587.

[73] See Seneca, *Ep.* 25.6; 52.8; 94.40–41; Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986);

as φιλανθρωπία. Epictetus, Paul's contemporary, illustrates how a sense of divine commission could go hand in hand with a philanthropic demeanor. Speaking of Diogenes, of whom he had a startlingly different view from that of the misanthrope who putatively wrote the pseudepigraphic letter referred to above, he says:

> Come, was there anybody Diogenes did not love, a man who was so gentle and loving of humanity (ἥμερος . . . καὶ φιλάνθρωπος) that he gladly took upon himself all trouble and hardships for the sake of the common good? . . . As became a servant of Zeus, caring for people indeed, but at the same time subject to God.[74]

It has been observed that in 2:11 the author attributes the educational function generally attributed to philosophers to the saving grace of God the Savior. He does something similar here. The noble qualities of the ideal reformer of human beings, the philosopher, are | theologized. They are presented as the divine qualities of God the Savior, who brought them to conversion. These noble qualities are combined with the notion of epiphany, which connotes divine initiative and an intention to benefit human beings. 353

The major difference in purpose between this passage and 2:11–12 is that, where in the latter the purpose of the epiphany is continuing training in moral conduct, here it is assumed that the epiphany of the kindness and love of humanity of the Savior God has already brought about a change in the human condition, the consequences of which are now to be expressed in the kind of life described in vv. 1–2. Verses 5–7 expatiate on that salvation, in which Christ plays a decisive role, as an expression of God's kindness and love of humanity.

The author is enough of a Paulinist to deny that human merit is a condition of salvation (v. 5; cf. 2 Tim 1:9) and to use the passive in v. 7, δικαιωθέντες τῇ ἐκείνου χάριτι. This sounds like Paul, but is not precisely Paul. Paul speaks of the Law, and faith as the means of salvation (Rom 3:20, 27–28; Gal 2:16), neither of which is present here. Furthermore, for Paul, faith is reckoned as δικαιοσύνη (Rom 4:1–4), whereas in the PE δικαιοσύνη is something to be pursued (διώκε[τε]/δικαιοσύνην; 1 Tim 6:11; 2 Tim 2:22), for which one will receive a crown of victory on the Day of Judgment

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Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 135–138.

[74] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.64.

(2 Tim 4:8). It is something one is trained (παιδεύω, παιδεία) for by the saving grace of God (Titus 2:11–12) or by Scripture (2 Tim 3:16).

It is not clear how δικαιοσύνη is to be understood in v. 5, but perhaps the philosophical tradition may be of assistance. Among the cardinal virtues, δικαιοσύνη is the one that keeps things in balance and within boundaries and is associated with the concept of benefit (ὠφέλεια). Its presence in one's soul makes one able to benefit not only others but also oneself, for justice is what keeps one's life in equilibrium. Such a person is able, Dio Chrysostom says, to care for people, "not by arousing strife or greed or contentions and jealousies and base desires for gain, but reminding [them] of sobriety and δικαιοσύνη and harmony."[75]

When the author says in v. 5 that God had saved them, not because of deeds performed in a state of righteousness (ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ), he is stating the obvious, for he had just in v. 3 described behavior that was anything but that of a just or righteous person. The reason for mentioning righteousness is to be found in the fact that it is the first part of an antithesis, which has the rhetorical function | of highlighting the second part.[76] Here, in the second member of the antithesis, it is God's mercy in saving them that he stresses. That also is the quality Christ is said to have demonstrated when he saved Paul (1 Tim 1:13, 15).

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A major difference between this formulation of salvation by God and that in 2:11–14, is that here the means by which God saved is a single, past event, unlike the continuing educative process conceived of by the philosophers, or the disciplined striving for good that, according to the author, continues after conversion. The means by which people are saved is a washing, that is, baptism, viewed here under two aspects, that of regeneration or rebirth, and renewal. The emphasis is thus on a complete transformation that is brought about in baptism. This radical change was brought about by virtue of God's mercy when his kindness and love for humanity appeared. The effective power in this transforming event is the Holy Spirit, whom God richly poured out on those being baptized.

The initiative resides with God, but Christ is the agent through whom God pours out the Spirit in baptism and he, too, is called Savior, evidently by virtue of his role in salvation as here conceived (v. 6). Justification here (v. 7) is not to be understood in the Pauline sense of being brought into a right relationship with God, but in a moral sense, a just life by virtue of

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[75] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.39.

[76] For antithesis, see Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, index, s.v. "antithesis."

Christ's grace. This fits the understanding of salvation as a moral conversion from the condition described in v. 3 and is in keeping with the philosophic understanding of conversion. But conversion here differs radically from that of the philosophers in that, at the very core of this understanding of salvation are God's initiative and aid, the role of the Spirit in the transformation that occurs in baptism, and Christ, as God's agent, in rendering converts just by grace.

### *The Reason for Describing Salvation in this Manner*

The reasons for constructing this soteriological passage in the way it has been done become clear from what immediately follows (vv. 8–11). The author expresses himself emphatically, wanting Titus to insist on the things he has just said.[77] It is striking how many | psychagogical terms, such as appealing, encouraging, comforting, confirming, establishing, beseeching, or edifying, are missing from the PE.[78] There are, however, a few occasions when rhetorical devices common in moral exhortation are used (e.g., 1 Tim 4:12; Titus 2:7), he is aware of the need to adapt one's advice to particular persons (e.g., 1 Tim 5:17), and Timothy and Titus are to exemplify what they taught (1 Tim 4:12; Titus 2:7) and to remind their hearers of what they already know (2 Tim 2:14; Titus 3:1), but even a reminder is made with harsh language (e.g., 2 Tim 2:11–14). Such speech is especially appropriate in addressing troublemakers (1 Tim 5:20; Titus 1:13). But the preacher's speech is not to be only severe, for a kindly, gentle approach may be more successful in leading people to a knowledge of the truth (2 Tim 2:24–26). 355

In the PE, there is no great concern for adaptable exhortation, as described by the philosophers, which takes into consideration the condition and circumstances of the hearers.[79] There is no room for private instruction; everything is to be in the open and factious people are to be avoided (Titus 3:10–11).

[77] He writes emphatically in all three letters. For example, in 1 Tim 5:21 he invokes the presence of God, Christ, and the elect angels as he delivers a charge; cf. other ways of expressing emphasis: 1 Tim 2:8; 5:14; Titus 2:15; cf. 4:11–12.

[78] Contrast 1 Thessalonians, on which, see the discussion in Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, index, s.v. "lexicon of exhortation."

[79] E.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38–39. See 2 Tim 4:1–5, and Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 137–145; 1 Thess 5:12–17, on which, see Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*.

In Titus 3:8, however, the author is careful to claim that what he wants Titus to say is noble and beneficial. That is standard fare among philosophers of the better class. So Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 34.4, claims, "I am here because there is nothing which I myself require of you, while on the contrary I have been much concerned to be of benefit to you." The way he benefits them is to teach the philosophical themes that have to do with conduct, which are beneficial and not new. People know the difference between good and evil. Dio again: "I consider it most beneficial to remind people of this without ceasing, and to appeal to their reason to give heed and in their acts to observe what is right and proper" (*Or.* 17.2). That is also what Paul wants Titus to do: Titus is to remind the Cretans (3:1) of the good works taught, which are also considered good by moral philosophers, and are stipulated in vv. 1–2, for they are excellent and beneficial. For our author, of course, it is the Christian tradition that provides guidance and is beneficial (cf. 2 Tim 3:14–17).

356 | In contrast to Titus's demanding, socially responsible teaching, which is excellent and beneficial, is the bellicose ranting of those who bedevil the church. The few words in v. 9 recall their depiction throughout the PE as harsh, bellicose, misanthropic, proud, arrogant, abusive, slanderous, fierce, haters of good, treacherous, reckless, swollen with deceit (e.g., 1 Tim 6:3–5). The type of speaker described here was well known at the time when the PE were written.[80] The author has applied the descriptions of these vituperative speakers to the unorthodox teachers, who, finally, are called ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ μάταιοι (v. 9).

The function of the soteriological passage is to be seen in this context. Titus must teach those under his influence to be socially responsible and gentle to all people. They have not always been thus, but had been steeped in personal and social vices until the kindness and love for humans of God the Savior appeared and saved them. The qualities of the genuine philosophers are ascribed to God, in a manner analogous to 2:11–12, but here there is no emphasis on cognition or education as in the former passage. The divine qualities are those the believers should have and that will set them apart from the unorthodox teachers. Soteriology in this passage serves first and foremost a moral and social function, with a special interest in the church's relations with the larger society.

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[80] See, e.g., Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 80BC; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 29.4–5.

## Conclusion

Examination of only two passages cannot justify broad declarations about the soteriology of the PE, but the two passages that we have studied permit some conclusions.

First, the soteriology of the letters is related to the human condition from which people are saved. That condition reflects a pessimistic view of human beings who have not come to a knowledge of the truth and do not live according to the sound teaching of the church. Salvation is therefore inextricably related to a process of learning, which is made possible because God's saving grace appeared in order to educate people how to live.

Second, the consequence of salvation is preeminently social ethics. The PE are more concerned with the corporate dimension of the church than with individuals in it. A major interest of the letters is with social institutions, including the church itself, and the salvation | experienced by the church is to determine its relationship to the larger society. 357

Third, salvation is not simply brought about by actions of God and Christ. Indeed, God takes initiative to save, and traditional formulas are used to describe Christ's work in salvation, but what is most striking is that salvation is effected by the appearance in history of certain qualities of God, which change the condition of those who come to a knowledge of the truth. That appearance was the manifestation of the earthly Jesus; another appearance, of his eschatological glory, determines the goal of those who have been saved. They do not aim at attaining virtue or happiness, but live in hope as they wait for that appearance (2:13) in order to become heirs of eternal life in accordance with that hope.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

# THE *VIRTUS FEMINARUM* IN 1 TIMOTHY 2:9–15*

NT scholarship has not been kind to the Pastoral Epistles. Critics have denied the author any originality of thought, alleged that he had only a superficial knowledge of traditions he derived from Judaism, Christianity, and paganism (especially popular philosophy), and judged him incapable of constructing a coherent system of his own.[1] However, of late some scholars have argued in detail that the author was more original and consistent in his thinking than has been thought,[2] and others have in general expressed a more favorable assessment of what he achieved.[3] In a couple of recent studies, I have proposed that the author | was more knowledgeable of contemporary philosophy than he has been thought to be, and that he adapted the philosophic paraenetic style to suit his own purpose.[4] Situating the Pastoral Epistles more firmly in their intellectual context considerably

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1 E.g., Anthony T. Hanson, *The Pastoral Epistles* (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 39, 42; Lewis R. Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles* (HUT 22; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986; pb ed., 2006), 135–141; Jürgen Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus* (EKKNT 15; Zürich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988), 363–365; Frances M. Young, *The Theology of the Pastoral Epistles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 50–55.

2 E.g., Karoline Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* (HThSt 12; Münster: Lit, 1996); Andrew Y. Lau, *Manifest in the Flesh: The Epiphany Christology in the Pastoral Epistles* (WUNT 2.86; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1996).

3 E.g., Raymond F. Collins, *1 & 2 Timothy and Titus: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002); Carl R. Holladay, *Critical Introduction to the New Testament* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2005), 436–441. If the letters are examined individually rather than as a collection, and each is understood in terms of the circumstances reflected in each individual letter, greater coherence in the theology of each letter is likely to be discovered. For viewing the letters thus, see especially the work of Luke Timothy Johnson, e.g., *The First and Second Letters to Timothy* (AB 35A; New York: Doubleday, 2001). A growing tendency to view the letters in this way is described well by Jens Herzer in a review article, “Abschied vom Konsens? Die Pseudepigraphie der Pastoralbriefe als Herausforderung an die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft,” *TLZ* 129 (2004): 1267–1282.

4 Abraham J. Malherbe, “‘Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners’: Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles,” in *Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology* (ed. Jan G. van der Watt; NovTSup 121; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 331–358; [*Light*, 1:431–457]. Malherbe, “Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus,” in *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (ed. James M. Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen; BZNW 125; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), 297–317. [*Light*, 1:407–430]

illuminates the letters, which is not to claim, however, that their theological coherence has become crystal clear in the process.

Having recently discussed aspects of the letters' theology and style, in this paper I wish to focus on 1 Tim 2:9–15, which deals with ethics. It has been argued forcefully by some commentators that this section of text does not cohere literarily, but, including v. 8, is a cluster of five distinct pieces,[5] a contention that has been countered by others on both literary and thematic grounds.[6] Most commentators think that 2:8–15, although it is a new section, is connected to 2:1–7, even if only loosely.[7] The main reasons for these assessments are that the grammar is awkward, making for disjointed statements, and a number of traditions are employed without being developed in this context or shown to cohere with each other. In contrast, attempts have been made to identify themes that unite the entire chapter, such as worship or mission,[8] or to view it in light of classifications | of the larger section, 2:1–3:13, such as the first church order,[9] or a scheme of domestic duties.[10]

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It is my contention in this paper that there is greater literary coherence to 2:9–15 than has been recognized, and that popular philosophical discussions of σωφροσύνη suggest that the text should be viewed within that rubric. The paper is a prolegomenon to exegesis of the passage.

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[5] E.g., James D. Miller, *The Pastoral Letters as Composite Documents* (SNTSMS 93; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 73.

[6] Ray Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure in the Pastoral Epistles* (JSNTSup 280; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2004), 36–40.

[7] See the discussion in Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure*, 83–85.

[8] More specifically, prayer: I. Howard Marshall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 415–416, but prayer associated with propagation of the gospel. Despite the confusion he observes in the "cluster," Miller, *Composite Documents*, 70, thinks that the catchword is προσεύχεσθαι (v. 8), and that the general issue addressed is "Directions for Public Worship." Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 107–108, thinks that worship in the larger context of 2:1–3:13 has to do with conduct in the household of God.

[9] So, briefly, Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (trans. P. Buttolph and A. Yarbro; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 35; more extensively, Jerome D. Quinn and William C. Wacker, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy* (ECC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), who understand the apostolic exhortations of 2:1–3:13 as addressed to "the whole community of believers and their ministers."

[10] Which might make the section part of the *topos* "Obedience to the Authorities." So Norbert Brox, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (5th ed.; RNT; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1989), 121–122, on 2:1–3:16. *Contra* Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 108–110.

## The Literary Coherence of 1 Timothy 2:9–15

It will be useful to view the text schematically, beginning by observing the way in which the author sets up his treatment of the behavior of women, which is his major interest in chapter 2.

> (2:1) First of all, then, I urge that petitions, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all people, (2) for kings and all those in prominent positions, that we may lead a calm and quiet life with all godliness and dignity (ἵνα ἤρεμον καὶ ἡσύχιον βίον διάγωμεν ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι). (3) This is good and acceptable in the eyes of God our Savior (τοῦτο καλὸν καὶ ἀπόδεκτον ἐνώπιον τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ), (4) who wishes all people to be saved (θέλει σωθῆναι) and come to know the truth. (5) For there is one God. [the creedal formulation and an autobiographical statement extend to v. 7].
>
> (8) I wish therefore that men pray in every place (of worship), raising holy hands without anger and dispute. (9) Likewise, (I also wish that) women adorn themselves (κοσμεῖν ἑαυτάς) with conduct that accords with order and decorum (ἐν καταστολῇ κοσμίῳ), with self-respect and moderation (μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης κοσμεῖν ἑαυτάς), (in particular), not (μή) with braided hair and gold, nor with pearls or extravagant dress, (10) but as befits (ἀλλ' ὃ πρέπει) women who profess reverence of God (θεοσέβειαν), (to adorn themselves) with good works (δι' ἔργων ἀγαθῶν). (11) A woman is to learn in quietness (ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ) and with full submission (ὑποταγῇ); (12) I do not (οὐκ) | permit a woman to teach or to exercise authority over a man, but (ἀλλά) she is to remain quiet (ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ). (13) For (γάρ) Adam was formed first, then Eve. (14) And Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and fell into transgression. (15) But she will be saved (σωθήσεται δέ) through childbearing, if they continue in faith and love and holiness with moderation (ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀγάπῃ καὶ ἁγιασμῷ μετὰ σωφροσύνης).

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The exhortation to pray (vv. 1–2) and the theological affirmation that follows (vv. 3–4) introduce terms that will be significant in vv. 9–15: quiet (ἡσύχιος), godliness (εὐσέβεια), and salvation (σωτήρ, σώζω). The first two describe conduct or demeanor, the third is part of the theological motivation for that conduct.

The literary coherence of the passage has been achieved in a number of ways. To begin with, the directive to men (v. 8) is brief, six times shorter than that to women. That they are to pray without being angry or disputatious is of a piece with the behavior described in vv. 1–2.

The author's real interest, the behavior of women, occupies him in three subsections (vv. 9–10, 11–12, 13–15). Each of these subsections picks up and gives behavioral specificity to the terms or their cognates introduced in vv. 2–4: θεοσέβεια (v. 10; cf. εὐσέβεια in v. 2); ἡσυχία (vv. 11–12; cf. ἡσύχιος in

v. 2), σώζω (v. 15; cf. v. 4; σωτήρ in v. 3). There is, therefore, some literary coherence to the entire chapter.

The section on which this paper focuses, 2:9–15, exhibits similar coherence. It leads off with the command that women "adorn themselves (κοσμεῖν ἑαυτάς) . . . with self-respect and moderation (μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης)," and ends by urging that they "continue in faith and love and holiness with moderation (μετὰ σωφροσύνης)." This *inclusio* invites us to view the entire section as practical demonstrations of a woman's moderation or prudence.

This is not the only place in the Pastoral Epistles where σωφροσύνη is important in describing communal responsibilities. Titus 2:2–10 is particularly instructive. There, a list of communal responsibilities, replete with the philosophical virtues found in 1 Tim 2:1–2, 9–15, is shot through with σωφροσύνη and some of the other terms attention has been drawn to: Titus 2:2, σώφρονας; v. 4, σωφρονίζωσιν; v. 5, σώφρονας; v. 6, σώφρονεῖν; v. 2, σεμνούς; v. 7, σεμνότητα; cf. vv. 5, 9, ὑποτάσσομαι (cf. 1 Tim 2:11, ὑποταγῇ); v. 7, καλῶν ἔργων (cf. 1 Tim 2:10, ἔργων ἀγαθῶν); and the section ends by urging that slaves "adorn (κοσμῶσιν) the teaching of God our Savior in all respects (v. 10)." As will appear below, this is rather standard philosophical advice. Christian communal | concerns, however, are revealed in the three ἵνα clauses in vv. 5, 8, and 10, and the directives are supported in vv. 11–15 by one of the major christological statements in the Pastoral Epistles. But even that statement, while containing traditional formulations, describes God's saving grace as having been manifested to educate people to live moderate, just, and godly lives (σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς, v. 12), which is a christianized form of the Greek cardinal virtues.[11]

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In Titus 2:1–10, σωφροσύνη is to characterize various members of the Christian community, women (vv. 3–5) and slaves (vv. 9–10) receiving most attention. In 1 Tim 2:9–15, the focus is entirely on women.

The first subsection (2:9–10) of the directives to women deals with a woman's personal demeanor. It is made up largely of philosophic commonplaces, and v. 9a contains the terms that provide the framework for vv. 9–15. The antithesis "not (μή) . . . but (ἀλλ')" need not be polemical, signaling social division caused by dress or personal decoration. The prescription is quite common, as is the antithesis, in which the stress rhetorically is on the second member.[12] The woman who professes reverence of God

[11] See Malherbe, "Christ Came into the World to Save Sinners," 340–343.

[12] See Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), Index of Major Subjects, s.v. "antithesis." The serious pitfall of detecting a

(θεοσέβειαν) adorns herself with good works. This is an instantiation of the life that is lived with all godliness and dignity (v. 2, ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι), and is the first concrete way in which she adorns herself with self-respect and moderation (μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ σωφροσύνης).

The second subsection (2: 11–12) takes up a quality of life that also derives from popular philosophy, and has a communal or social dimension. The subsection begins and ends with ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ("in quietness," "quiet"), and the reference forms an *inclusio*. What is enclosed by the two brackets applies the notion of quietness to two aspects of a woman's conduct in the community. No grammatical connective ties the subsection to v. 10, so it is not immediately obvious whether it is a totally new, freestanding topic, or whether it is somehow related to what precedes. The latter is more likely the case. Like v. 10, vv. 11–12 also pick up from v. 2b, "a calm and quiet life with all godliness and dignity (ἤρεμον καὶ ἡσύχιον βίον ... ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι)," which suggests that quietness | is a quality of behavior defined by godliness.[13] Two kinds of behavior are specified, namely, the acts of learning and teaching, and the relationship between husband and wife. 50

The third subsection (2:13–15) is connected to what immediately precedes by γάρ ("for"), which introduces the support for the directive given about the woman's ἡσυχία. This support utilizes Jewish-Christian traditions about the order of creation from which are derived Adam's priority and Eve's deception. But the woman will be saved (σωθήσεται) through childbearing (τεκνογονίας) if they (?) continue in faith and love and holiness with moderation or prudence (μετὰ σωφροσύνης). The subsection picks up the theme of salvation from vv. 3–4 and thus forms the second bracket of an *inclusio* which encompasses virtually the entire chapter. At the same time, it is also the second bracket of an *inclusio* that begins with v. 9, and provides the lens through which the woman's behavior appears as a life of σωφροσύνη.

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polemic behind every antithesis has not been avoided by much of NT scholarship. This antithesis points neither to social differences among the readers in view (so Lorenz Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe* [3 vols.; HTKNT 11.2.1–3; Freiburg: Herder, 1994], 1:90), nor to a contrast between modest Christian and ostentatious pagan women (so Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 449–450).

[13] Ἡσυχία can refer to social behavior (quietness, tranquility) or speech (silence). In 2:2b it has the former meaning, and it is likely that it does so in vv. 11–12 (esp. with ὑποταγή and αὐθεντεῖν). See Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:388–390; Spicq, *Lexique théologique du nouveau testament* (2d ed.; Fribourg: Éditions universitaires de Fribourg/Paris: Cerf, 1991), 688–694.

This overview of the chapter demonstrates that structurally, the text coheres. It still remains to be determined whether the substance of the moral advice similarly coheres.

## The Moderate Life

The advice in the chapter is of a sort that modern scholars describe as a bourgeois ethic,[14] the ethic representing the ideals of society, whose underpinnings were largely Stoic. New Testament scholars have detected a traditional quality to the advice. Sometimes they have been interested in relating 2:9 to 1 Pet 3:3, 5, and 2:11–12 to 1 Cor 14:33b–36 or have compared the use of the creation account in 2:11–14 with that in 1 Cor 11:7–12. The interest of this paper is rather in the way 2:9–15 is illuminated by the philosophical traditions current in the first century.

The relevance of the philosophical material is not questioned by modern scholars, even though there is sometimes an unwarranted inclination to hold that such material came to the author via Hellenistic Judaism.[15] | Hellenistic Jewish sources have not been used in this paper for lack of space, but also for another reason. These sources themselves appropriated the traditions under review here, and how they did so invites examination in its own right. It would be simplistic to assume that Hellenistic Judaism was the conduit through which Greek philosophical influence came to early Christianity. It is far more realistic to view Hellenistic Jewish and Christian literature vis-à-vis Hellenistic philosophy in terms of analogy rather than genealogy. A more complete study of the Pastoral Epistles will have to take those sources into consideration, but that is a task for another day.

A further caution is in order. The recognition that the Pastoral Epistles are indebted to philosophic traditions does not mean that one may presuppose that the philosophical argumentation that may underlie specific

[14] Heinrich J. Holtzmann, *Die Pastoralbriefe kritisch und exegetisch behandelt* (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1880), 307, originated the description. It was given wider currency by Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 8, 39–41. See also Brox, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 124–125; Collins, *1* & 2 *Timothy and Titus*, 54–59.

[15] So Martin Hengel in Hengel and C.K. Barrett, *Conflicts and Challenges in Early Christianity* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity, 1999). The commentaries by Roloff and Marshall sometimes tend in this direction. Collins, *1* & 2 *Timothy and Titus*, 64–75, makes excellent use of the OT as well as rabbinic traditions and Hellenistic Jewish writings in addition to the philosophic traditions to sketch a wide canvas against which the Pastoral Epistles are to be viewed.

ethical instruction similarly underlies the moral instruction of the Pastoral Epistles where those traditions are used. The problem lies on both sides of the comparison. The literary character of the Pastoral Epistles does not contribute clarity to their argumentation. Howard Marshall has stated the matter well: "There is a fair degree of unanimity in dividing up the epistles into their constituent small units, but there is little agreement on how to group the smaller units into larger wholes and trace a line of argument, or whether indeed this is the right way to understand the epistles at all."[16]

The same issues attend study of the philosophic material utilized by the Pastoral Epistles. Similar characteristics are illustrated, for example, by Plutarch's *Advice to Bride and Groom*, which is relevant to this inquiry. Plutarch does not provide philosophical arguments to buttress each bit of advice that he gives in this tractate, which begins with an epistolary salutation (138A), but he does emphasize the importance of philosophy to his ethical teaching and supposes that his young readers will remember what they had learned or what had been handed down to them.[17] We | can, of course, situate most of his precepts within certain philosophical frameworks, but that is not of concern to him. Most of the material adduced below comes from attempts to classify or define philosophic themes or terms, or are exhortation to the moral life, rather than philosophical argumentation. 52

The Pastoral Epistles are similar in this respect to Plutarch and the kind of literature represented by his tractate (letter) on marriage. The Pastoral Epistles also refer constantly to teaching the readers are assumed to know, yet the letters are not known for robust theological argumentation.[18] The issues are not substantially different from those regarding paraenesis, understood as consisting of freestanding precepts.[19] For our present interest, however, it is important to note that the author does not simply make a collection of precepts devoid of any Christian element. So, the

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16 Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 11.

17 Plutarch, *Conj. praec.* 138C, 148BC; see Cynthia Patterson, "Plutarch's *Advice to Bride and Groom*: Traditional Wisdom through a Philosophic Lens," in *Plutarch's* Advice to the Bride and Groom *and* A Consolation to His Wife*: English Translations, Commentary, Interpretive Essays, and Bibliography* (ed. Sarah B. Pomeroy; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 128–137.

18 The teaching function is important (2 Tim 4:2, διδαχή); it is κατ' εὐσέβειαν (1 Tim 6:3) and is to be followed or heeded (4:6, 13, 16; 2 Tim 3:10; 4:3); the tradition is to be handed on (2 Tim 2:2) and guarded (1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:14). For evaluation of the letters' theology, see above, esp. n. 1.

19 For extensive discussion of paraenesis, see Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, index, s.v. "paraenesis"; and Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus."

description of the Christian life in 2:2b is quite Hellenistic, but is said to be acceptable to God,[20] and its foundation is provided by the confession in vv. 5–6 and a reminder of Paul's apostolic appointment in v. 7. And the advice to women ends with traditional material in vv. 13–15. The two most extended christological formulations in the Pastoral Epistles also undergird instruction derived from the moral philosophers (Titus 2:11–14; 3:3–7), and are not mere appendages providing a theological sheen to rather prosaic moralizing.[21]

53 | All that having been said, the question remains whether we are ultimately left with no alternative but to view the three subsections of the advice to women in 2:9–15 as unrelated to each other, and at most to demonstrate the wide currency of the precepts by trawling for still more ancient parallels.[22] The structural analysis above suggests that more can be done. The section, 2:9–15, is enclosed by references to σωφροσύνη, and it is therefore methodologically natural to examine somewhat closely what was said about this virtue, especially as part of the complex of terms that are used in this passage.

## What *Sōphrosynē* Means

Σωφροσύνη possessed such a wide diversity of connotations that Helen North, in her magisterial study of the virtue, chose to transliterate the Greek word without italicizing it, and to use it as an English word.[23] I choose a

[20] Cf. 1 Tim 5:4, where the formula again appears immediately after Hellenistic moral instruction. According to Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 424, it is patterned after Deut 12:25, 28; 13:19; 21:9. For ἡσύχιος βίος, cf. Ps.-Pythagoras, *Ep.* 1 (152, 2; Alfons Städele, *Die Briefe des Pythagoras und der Pythagoreer* [BKP 115; Meisenheim: A. Hain, 1980], commentary 195). Plato's *Charmides* is of special interest. Its subject is σωφροσύνη, and it takes up many of the topics under review here. See 159B–161B for ἡσυχία, κοσμιότης, αἰδώς (160C: ἡσύχιος βίος), terms that occur in 2:9–15, and which will be discussed at greater length below.

[21] See Malherbe, "Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners"; Roloff, *Der erste Briefe an Timotheus*, 127–128, thinks that the tradition behind 2:9–10 is superficially Christianized, as v. 10 shows: the virtues of v. 9 are understood as divine reverence expressed in good deeds.

[22] Collins, *1 & 2 Timothy and Titus*, 51–78, illustrates the procedure well. He does not give attention to how 2:9–15 fits into the literary structure of the chapter, as was attempted above, nor does he explore the interrelationship of the terms he so well places in the philosophic tradition, as will be attempted below. On the use of parallels in this kind of study, see L. Michael White and John T. Fitzgerald, "*Quod est comparandum*: The Problem of Parallels," in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 13–39.

[23] Helen F. North, *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Restraint in Greek Literature* (CSCP 35; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), xi. See already, John Ferguson, *Moral*

middle way, using either the Greek or italicized transliteration. Modern NT scholars have similarly recognized the virtual impossibility of translating the word group; they have had to be content to render the Greek word according to the contexts in which it occurs, as meaning moderation, restraint, modesty, prudence, and self-control or to write summary accounts of its meaning.[24] The problem is not only a modern one; Cicero reflected the difficulty in 45 BC, in his *Tusculan Disputations* (3.16–17), one of the works in which he interpreted Greek | philosophy to his fellow Romans and created Latin philosophical terminology to render the Greek:[25] 54

> It is also probable that the temperate man (*temperans*)—the Greeks call him σώφρων, and they apply the term σωφροσύνη to the virtue which I usually call, sometimes temperance (*temperantiam*), sometimes self-control (*moderationem*), and occasionally also discretion (*modestiam*); but, it may be, the virtue could rightly be called "frugality" (*frugalitas*), the term corresponding to which has a narrower meaning with the Greeks ... but our term has a wider meaning, for it connotes all abstinence and inoffensiveness ... and embraces all the other virtues as well, (and in time) has come to include the three virtues of fortitude, justice, and prudence. ... They are all mutually linked and bound together. (trans. King, LCL)

W.R. Lamb draws attention to the intellectual element in the virtue: "The Greeks always tended to regard a moral quality as a state of the reasoning mind."[26]

### Sōphrosynē *among the Virtues*

Cicero could pile up somewhat equivalent terms, as he did elsewhere,[27] to describe expansively what the term means, and Stoicism allowed him

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*Values in the Ancient World* (London: Methuen, 1958), 32–33. See also W.R. Lamb, in the introduction to Plato, *Charmides* (Lamb, LCL), 3. Lisette Goessler, "Advice to the Bride and Groom: Plutarch Gives a Detailed Account of his Views on Marriage," in Pomeroy, *Plutarch's* Advice to the Bride and Groom, 101 n. *.

[24] See Ulrich Luck, "σώφρων κτλ," in *TDNT* 7 (1971): 1097–1104, esp. 1097, on the difficulty of translation; Collins, *1 & 2 Timothy and Titus*, index, s.v. "*sōphrosynē*"; and Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 182–184, under the rubric "self-control."

[25] On the task, see Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.1; *Nat. d.* 1.7–8, on which see the comments in Arthur S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum: Libri III* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955–1958; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 1:142–143; and for the problematic nature of the enterprise, see Kurt Scheidle, *Modus optumum: Die Bedeutung des "rechten Masses" in der römischen Literatur* (SKP 73; Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1993), 173–175.

[26] See n. 23 above.

[27] E.g., Cicero, *Off.* 1.15, 93, on which see Andrew R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 241–251; North, *Sophrosyne*, 267–268; Scheidle, *Modus Optumum*, 181–183.

to do so. My purpose here is not to offer an historical account of how *sōphrosynē* was conceived (at various times) by the Stoics, but to demonstrate that the virtue was part of a congeries of terms. Stoics accepted the common notion of four cardinal virtues, prudence (φρόνησις), moderation (σωφροσύνη), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and courage (ἀνδρεία). To each of these primary virtues others were subordinated. To σωφροσύνη were subordinated εὐταξία (good order), κοσμιότης (decorum), αἰδημοσύνη (modesty), ἐγκράτεια (self-control).[28] This Stoic penchant for classification | did not lead to their isolating virtues from each other. Their "basic conception was that virtue was unitary and was simply given different names in the different spheres of activity."[29] They held that the virtues imply one another (ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις), "and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles."[30]

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It was not only the Stoics who agglomerated such terms. This should caution us not to be too precise in our systematization. The treatise, *On Virtues and Vices*, falsely attributed to Aristotle but dating from the first century BC or the first century AD, sums up the qualities of σωφροσύνη by saying that it is accompanied by εὐταξία, κοσμιότης, αἰδώς, εὐλάβεια (proper arrangement, orderliness, modesty, caution; 1250b12–13). We are obviously dealing with a common, basic understanding of *sōphrosynē*, but Stoicism would continue to inform the popular conception of the virtue. The discussion that follows demonstrates that indebtedness.

### *A Royal Virtue*

*Sōphrosynē* was especially important to moral philosophers during the early Empire, and Musonius Rufus serves to illustrate how it was advanced in a discourse, *That Kings Too Should Study Philosophy*, addressed to a Syrian king.[31] Much of the discourse consists of commonplaces, but there is a marked Stoic element, especially in the second part.[32] Musonius argues that the king, the ideal man to the Stoics, should study philosophy, for

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[28] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.5(b1) (2:59, 4 – 60, 8 W-H = *SVF* 3:262, 264). For a more discriminating statement, see the discussion in Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Translations of the Principal Sources, with Philosophical Commentary* (vol. 1 of *The Hellenistic Philosophers*; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 383–384.

[29] Dyck, *De Officiis*, 242, with references; Scheidle, *Modus Optumum*, 182–183.

[30] Diogenes Laertius, 7.125. Cf. Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1046E and p. 521 n. a (Cherniss, LCL).

[31] Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 8 (60–67 Lutz; 32–40 Hense).

[32] See North, *Sophrosyne*, 229–230; and esp. Anton C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (rev. ed.; WTS 8; Assen: van Gorcum, 1963), 124–129, for the Stoic elements.

it enables him to distinguish between virtue and vice, a capacity lying at the heart of his various royal functions. Musonius claims that the study of philosophy is required to be just and courageous, two of the four cardinal virtues, and says the following about the king's σωφροσύνη, the fourth virtue (he here omits wisdom):

> The king must, furthermore, himself exercise self-control (σωφρονεῖν) and teach his subjects self-control (σωφρονίζειν) so that he might rule with moderation (σωφρόνως) and they accept his rule with decorum (κοσμικῶς), neither party living self-indulgently. For the ruin of ruler and subject alike is self-indulgence | (τρυφή). But how could someone be self-controlled (σωφρονήσειε) if he had not practiced controlling his desires (κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν), or an undisciplined person make others self-controlled (σώφρονας)? One can name no study (ἐπιστήμη) other than philosophy that develops self-control (σωφροσύνην). For it teaches us to live above pleasure and greed, to find contentment in a thrifty life and avoid extravagance. It makes people have respect (αἰδῶ ἔχειν) and to control their tongues (γλώττης κρατεῖν), and produces order (τάξιν), decorum (κόσμον), and propriety (εὐσχημοσύνην), and in general, what is fitting (πρέπον) in act and attitude.[33] When these qualities are present in a person they give him dignity (σεμνόν) and self-control (σώφρονα), but when they are present in a king they make him godlike and worthy of respect (αἰδοῦς ἄξιος).[34] 56

Musonius praised *sōphrosynē* more than any other of the cardinal virtues, and North claims that it "appears as a private, individual excellence. . . . Even in this instance the virtue remains entirely personal."[35] *Sōphrosynē* is a virtue to be cultivated by all individuals, the king exemplifying the ideal.

In the texts so far adduced, terms appear in discussions about *sōphrosynē* that are also used in 1 Tim 2 (κοσμιότης or cognates; αἰδημοσύνη or cognates; πρέπον or πρέπω; σεμνότης; and control of speech). For the sake of identifying a broader context, it will be useful to sketch how some of these terms or themes were used as they related to *sōphrosynē* generally, as part of a recurring complex of terms, before examining them as descriptive of a woman's *sōphrosynē*.

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33 On πρέπον, cf. *Frg.* 18B (120, 6–7 Lutz; 104, 15 Hense): One should choose cheaper over expensive food because it is "more conducive to temperance and fitting to a good man" (σωφρονικωτέρα καὶ πρέπει ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ). At table, "one should have regard for a fitting decorum and moderation" (κόσμου τε καὶ μέτρου). See further below.

34 62, 10–22 Lutz; 34, 12–35, 8 Hense. Musonius then goes on to speak of the king's fearlessness and ability in public discourse (62, 31–64, 9 Lutz; 36, 1–22 Hense). Women do not need this skill, and even in men he does not rank this ability highly (*Frg.* 4 [48, 20–23 Lutz; 19, 8–11 Hense]).

35 North, *Sophrosyne*, 229. It appears to me that this could not rule out a social dimension.

*A Congeries of Virtues*

Orderliness (κοσμιότης) and proper arrangement (εὐταξία) are subordinate to *sōphrosynē*, and are defined respectively as "knowledge of decorous and 57 indecorous movements" and "knowledge of when and in what order | to perform actions."[36] They belong together and are the subject with which *sōphrosynē* deals.[37] By them people exhibit their *sōphrosynē*.[38] Orderliness and *sōphrosynē*, in which temperance and self-control consist, are related so closely for Cicero that they are said to be one of the sources from which all that is morally right arises.[39]

One of the things that this virtue produces, Musonius claims, is control over one's speech. Also for Cicero, orderliness, to be observed in all conduct, includes selecting the appropriate occasion and manner of speaking.[40] *Kosmos* can describe both the ordered world and adornment, and Plato calls *sōphrosynē* "a kind of beautiful order (κόσμος πού τις)," an *ornatus vitae*, as Cicero would have it.[41] This aspect of *sōphrosynē* as adornment will receive more extensive treatment below.

*Sōphrosynē* has a connection with αἰδώς (respect, self-respect, modesty, shame), which is constitutive for it. According to Musonius, it is philosophy that produces self-respect as well as *sōphrosynē*. When boys and girls study philosophy, it produces prudence (φρόνησις) and they develop shame (αἰδώς) toward all things base. When these two qualities develop, the students are of necessity self-controlled (σωφρονεῖς).[42] Musonius's student, Epictetus, mentions αἰδώς more often than he does, but once more Cicero will suffice to illustrate what was meant by the concept, here translated by *verecundia*: "Since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of respect

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[36] North, *Sophrosyne*, 219, translating *SVF* 3:264 (see n. 26): ἐπιστήμη πρεπουσῶν καὶ ἀπρεπῶν κινήσεων and ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε πρακτέον καὶ τί μετὰ τί καὶ καθόλου τῆς τάξεως τῶν πράξεων. See Cicero, *Off.* 1.142, who finds it particularly difficult to translate technical Greek terms at this point. See Dyck, *De Officiis*, 320–322.

[37] Diogenes Laertius, 7.125–126.

[38] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.95.

[39] Cicero, *Off.* 1.15.

[40] Cicero, *Off.* 1.144. On the appropriate occasions for speaking, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," *JBL* 103 (1984): 235–243; repr. in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 137–145. [*Light*, 1:187–196]

[41] Plato, *Resp.* 4.430E; Cicero, *Off.* 1.93.

[42] Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 4 (48, 1–4 Lutz; 18, 4 Hense). The association of σωφροσύνη and αἰδώς is constant; see Spicq, *Lexique théologique du nouveau testament*, 1501 n. 3. See van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus*, 26–27, who does not do justice to the intellectual element in Musonius's view, which is implicit in the role Musonius assigns to philosophy and his use of ἐπιστήμη. Cf. Cicero, *Off.* 1.93–94, on which see the commentary by Dyck, *De officiis*, 249–250.

(*verecundia*)... and with a concern to avoid any conduct | unbecoming, from this seed given by nature develops judiciousness, modesty, justice and moral virtue generally."[43] Cicero, in *On Duties*, made much of *verecundia*, which avoids giving offense.[44] 58

Self-respect is also clearly related to τὸ πρέπον, what is fitting. Musonius's king, the paradigm of *sōphrosynē*, must behave, in act and attitude, in a manner that is fitting or appropriate (πρέπον).[45] This applies to the wise person's profession, that he will only do work that befits him and not violate his self-respect, the same principle applying also to what he eats and wears.[46] It is more than a matter of taste, etiquette or aesthetics, at least for Cicero, who translated πρέπον by *decorum*, whose essential nature is:

> that it is inseparable from moral goodness; for what is proper is morally right, and what is morally right is proper. The nature of the difference between morality and propriety can be more easily felt than expressed. For whatever propriety may be, it is manifested only when there is pre-existing moral rectitude.

Propriety is inseparable from *sōphrosynē*, for:

> Its relation to the cardinal virtues is so close, that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require any abstruse process of reasoning to see it. For there is a certain element of propriety perceptible in every act of moral rectitude; and this can be separated from virtue theoretically better than it can be practically.[47]

Propriety "shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of our fellowmen by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed." | In social relations, it even goes beyond justice, for while "it is the function of justice not to do wrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to wound their feelings; and in this the essence of propriety is best seen."[48] 59

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[43] Cicero, *Fin.* 4.18, translation by Robert Dobbin, *Epictetus, Discourses Book I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 88; cf. Cicero, *Off.* 1.14; in 1.93, *verecundia* is used for σωφροσύνη. For Epictetus, cf. especially *Diatr.* 1.28.19–23, and see Benjamin L. Hijmans, *ἌΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* (WTS 2; Assen: van Gorcum, 1959), 27–30; Margarethe Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Vom Kynismus* (PhAnt 34; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 67–69.

[44] North, *Sophrosyne*, 223.

[45] τὸ ἐν κινήσει καὶ σχέσει πρέπον (62, 20 Lutz; 35, 4–5 Hense). Cf. *SVF* 3:272, where the same phrase is used of κοσμιότης.

[46] Musonius, *Frg.* 11 (80, 19 Lutz; 104, 15 Hense); *Frg.* 18B (120, 6–9 Lutz; 104, 15 Hense); *Frg.* 16 (106, 14–15 Lutz; 88, 8–9 Hense).

[47] Cicero, *Off.* 1.94, 95 (trans. Miller, LCL).

[48] Cicero, *Off.* 1.98, 99.

The frequent references to Cicero have had a twofold purpose. They attempt to redress in a small measure the tendency to depend on Greek sources for philosophy at the turn of the eras. And, of immediate importance, Cicero allows us to observe the analysis that informed scholastic occupation with these virtues. Musonius is explicit about the role of philosophy in moral development, however, in the fragments of his discussions that have been preserved. He was practical rather than scholastic and used philosophical terms unself-consciously to describe the human condition and the way to virtue.[49] That is characteristic of the moral philosophers, including those who wrote about the *sōphrosynē* of women.

## The *Virtus Feminarum*

*Sōphrosynē* was the primary virtue of women in antiquity, the most common one, often the only one, ascribed to women on tombstones.[50] In the thinking of philosophers of diverse persuasion, it was preeminently their virtue, the *virtus feminarum*.

Musonius, a Stoic, urges *That Women Too Should Study Philosophy*,[51] for it makes people, man or woman, live well. A woman especially must be σώφρων, which means self-controlled and pure in sexual behavior and moderate in appearance and dress. The person, man or woman, who lives in the way philosophy inculcates, will be the most well-ordered (κοσμιώτατος). Philosophy enables women to run their households well. In serving her husband, a wife will be an ornament (κόσμος) to her relatives. 60 Philosophy claims that self-respect or modesty (αἰδώς) is the | greatest good, and teaches the greatest moderation (καταστολή)[52] and self-control (σωφρονεῖν).[53]

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[49] For Musonius, see further below; see also Ps.-Plutarch. *Lib. ed.* 7D–F; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.15–16.

[50] See Richmond Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (UISLL 28.1–2; Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1942; repr., 1962), 290–291, 335–337; Anne-Marie Vérilhac, "L'image de la femme dans les épigrammes funéraire greoques," in *La femme dans le monde méditerranéen* (ed. Anne-Marie Vérilhac; 2 vols.; CMOM 10, 19; Lyon: Maison de l'Orient, 1985–1990), 1:85–112, esp. 92, 102.

[51] *Frg.* 3 (38, 25–42, 29 Lutz; 8, 15–13, 3 Hense).

[52] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.10.15, αἰδώς καταστολή, ἡμερότης; Epictetus, *Ench.* 40: Girls should be taught that they are honored for nothing but their orderly behavior (εὐκοσμία) and self-respect (αἰδημοσύνη).

[53] Cf. Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 13 (64, 21–24 Smith), σωφροσύνη and κοσμιότης are expected of a wife. Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.23.54 (4:587, 6–7 W-H): The κόσμος of a wife reflects on her husband.

One difference between men and women is that women do not require skill in speaking, like men do,[54] for they pursue philosophy as women.[55] Musonius, as usual, states the matter more positively than the traditional view of women. So Plutarch (*On Talkativeness* 507B) can assume that a woman lacked *sōphrosynē* because she could not hold her tongue,[56] and Sophocles (*Ajax* 586) assumed that a woman's *sōphrosynē* consisted in her silence: "Do not question, do not ask; *sophronein* is good." Euripides (*The Children of Heracles* 476–477) thought that the combination of silence (σιγή), modesty (σωφρονεῖν), social quietism (ἥσυχον) and staying at home were best for a woman.[57]

We have taken note above of the connection between orderliness and *sōphrosynē*. *Kosmos* and its cognates were utilized in countless comments on a woman's clothing and physical appearance, playing on the two meanings of "order" and "ornament" or "decoration." In his *Advice to Bride and Groom*, Plutarch repeatedly commends inner qualities rather than outward appearance. It is *sōphrosynē*, not outward appearance that counts (141D); the *sōphron* woman wears self-respect (αἰδώς) in place of clothes; a woman adorns herself with wise sayings from great ancient women (145DF), and so on. One of the gnomic statements of Antiphanes excerpted by Stobaeus for his collected sayings on marriage reads: "Wish not to brighten your body with cosmetics, but your heart with pure works and habits."[58] Parallels from Greek and Roman as well as Jewish texts to 1 Tim 2:9 and 1 Pet 3:3–4 are found in all good commentaries, and need not be repeated here.[59] Of interest to our present purpose are two texts | that have to do with Crates, the Cynic philosopher (fourth–third century BC). 61

In *Advice to Bride and Groom* 141E, Plutarch recounts an anecdote about Lysander, tyrant of Sicily, who refused to accept finery and jewels for his daughters. He justifies his refusal with what purports to be a quotation from Crates: "Adornment (κόσμος)," says Crates, "is what adorns (τὸ κοσμοῦν); and what adorns a woman is what makes her better ordered (κοσμιωτέραν)

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[54] *Frg.* 8 (62, 31–64, 9 Lutz; 36, 1–22 Hense). Cf. n. 32.

[55] *Frg.* 4 (48, 20–23 Lutz; 19, 8–11 Hense).

[56] In his description of the king, evidently a loquacious man as well as a woman does not have σωφροσύνη.

[57] Cf. Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 724–725, ἡσύχως … σεσωφρονισμένως.

[58] *Frg.* 264 Kock (Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.23.3 [4:569, 14–15 W-H]).

[59] See the texts and discussion in Bruce W. Winter, *Roman Wives, Roman Women: The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 97–122.

not gold or emerald or scarlet, but whatever gives an impression of dignity (σεμνότης), good order (εὐταξίας), and self-respect (αἰδοῦς)."[60]

The play on the two meanings of κόσμος is basic to a paraenetic letter erroneously attributed to Crates, perhaps written in the first or second century AD:

> Do not abstain from the most beautiful ornament (κόσμου), but adorn (κόσμει) yourself every day so that you may stand out. The most beautiful ornament (κόσμος) is the one that decorates (κοσμῶν) you most beautifully, but the one that decorates you most nobly is the one that makes you most decorous (κοσμιωτάτην), and it is orderliness (κοσμιότης) that makes you most decorous (κοσμιωτάτην). Both Penelope and Alcestis, I think, adorned (κεκοσμῆσθαι) themselves with it and even now they are praised and honored for their virtue. In order, then, that you, too, might become like them, try to hold fast to this advice.[61]

Neopythagoreans were particularly interested in the subject of women, and two texts, purportedly written by women, add to the picture.

The first is a treatise, *On a Woman's Sophrosyne*, by Phintys, preserved in two fragments.[62] According to Phintys, a woman's chief virtue | is σωφροσύνη (152, 3–4). There are virtues that are particularly appropriate to men (152, 9–10), and some to women, such as those having to do with domestic matters (152, 10–11) and pleasing her husband, and some men and women have in common (bravery, justice, prudence (152, 11). But σωφροσύνη is particularly appropriate to women (152, 17–18). Among the ways by which a woman learns this virtue are, most important, the holiness and godliness (ὁσιότητός τε καί εὐσεβείας) of the marriage bed

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[60] Translation by Donald A. Russell in Pomeroy, *Plutarch's* Advice to the Bride and Groom, 9 (modified).

[61] Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 9, trans. Ronald F. Hock (slightly modified) in Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles* (SBLSBS 12; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), 61.

[62] The authorship and date of the work are disputed. The text, preserved in Stobaeus (*Flor.* 4:588, 17 – 593, 11 W-H), is reprinted in Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* (Acta Academiae Aboensis, Humaniora 24/3. Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1961), 151–154, to which the citations refer. English translations are available in Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, *The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library* (Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1987), 263–264 (Guthrie paraphrases Thomas Taylor's original translation); Vicki Lynn Harper, "On A Woman's Sophrosyne," in *Ancient Women Philosophers, 600 B.C.–500 A.D.* (vol. 1 of *A History of Women Philosophers*; ed. Mary Ellen Waithe; Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1987), 26–31. For adornment and *sōphrosynē* elsewhere in the Neopythagoreans, see David L. Balch, "Neopythagorean Moralists and the New Testament Household Codes," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 380–411, esp. 399–401; Johan C. Thom, *The Pythagorean Golden Verses* (RGRW 123; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), index, s.v. σωφροσύνη.

(152, 20–21, 25), for procreation (τέκνων γενέσει; 153, 1–2), and bodily adornment (152, 21; 153, 2–28), which should be simple and unostentatious.[63]

The other document is a pseudonymous letter probably dating from the early Empire:[64]

> It appears to me that on your own accord you have acquired considerable noble qualities. For that you eagerly wish to hear what adorns (εὐκοσμίας) a woman justifies the hope that that you will grow old in virtue. The temperate (σώφρονα), freeborn woman must live with her legal husband adorned with quietness (ἡσυχίᾳ κεκαλλωπισμένην),[65] clad in neat, simple, white dress without extravagance or excess. She must avoid clothing that is either entirely purple or is streaked with gold, for that kind of dress is worn by hetaerae when they stalk the masses of men. But the adornment | (κόσμος) of a woman who wishes to please her own husband is her character and not her clothing. For the freeborn woman must be beautiful to her own husband, not to the men of the neighborhood. 63
>
> You should have a blush on your cheeks as a sign of modesty (αἰδοῦς) instead of rouge, and should wear nobility, decorum (κοσμιότατα) and temperance (σωφροσύναν) instead of gold and emeralds. For the woman who strives for virtue must not have her heart set on expensive clothing but on the management of her household. She must please her husband by doing what he wishes, for a husband's wishes ought to be an unwritten law to an orderly wife (κοσμίᾳ γυναικί), and she should live by them. She should be of the opinion that, together with herself, she brought to him her orderly behavior (εὐταξίαν) as the most beautiful and largest dowry. For she must trust more in the beauty and riches of her soul than of her face or money. For envy and illness can strip away the latter, but the former continue to death.

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[63] It is instructive to compare Plutarch, *Amat.* 767E, who thinks of σωφροσύνη as "a mutual self-restraint which is a principal requirement of marriage." He then contrasts the temperance that comes from without and through usage is imposed by shame or fear, to Love (*Eros*), who "has in himself enough self-control (ἐγκρατείας), decorum (κόσμου), and mutual trust (πίστεως), so that if he ever but touches the heart even of a profligate, he turns him from his other lovers, drives out insolence, humbles pride and intractability, and brings in modesty, silence, and calm (αἰδῶ, σιωπήν, ἡσυχίαν). He clothes him with the robes of decorum (κόσμιον) and makes him deaf to all appeals but one" (trans. Helmbold, LCL). The examples that he goes on to adduce show that he thought the same thing of women (768A–D).

[64] Ps.-Melissa, *Ep. Clearetum.* My translation is from the Doric text in Städele, *Briefe des Pythagoras*, 160–162. The translation is available in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 83. A Koine version, P. Haun. II 13, with English translation, has been published in Edwin A. Judge, "A Woman's Behaviour," *NewDocs* 6 (1992): 18–23.

[65] I accept P. Haun. II 13's reading of ἡσυχίᾳ for αἰσχύνᾳ (modesty), approximating αἰδῷ, which also makes sense in a context like this.

Phintys connects *sōphrosynē* to marriage for the sake of procreation. This is part of the fabric of domestic responsibilities inculcated in the Neopythagorean writings, and also in many other texts.[66] Not all philosophers thought that to be married was the best way of life, at least not for individuals who committed themselves to the philosophic life.[67] Some did hold that one reason for marriage was that nature intended sexual relations to result in procreation.[68] Musonius held the view that sexual 64 intercourse | was to be confined to married couples, and even then, only to procreate.[69] It is not surprising then, that having many children was thought highly desirable by some.[70]

## Conclusion

Helen North has drawn attention to "Paul's" use of *sōphrosynē*:

> To Paul sophrosyne usually signifies self-control and mastery of the appetites. He associates it with *aidos* (1 Tim 2.9), with *enkrateia* (Titus 1.8), one of the Gifts of the Spirit (Gal 5.23), with sobriety (Titus 2.2, 6; 1 Tim 3.2), and in the case of women, with conjugal love (*philandria*: 1 Tim 2.9; Titus 2.2, 5). Although, like most moralists in the Greek world, he construes sophrosyne as the essential virtue of women (Titus 2.6; 1 Tim 2.9), he also enjoins it upon

[66] For example, Antipater of Tarsus (apud Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.22.25 [509, 9; 510, 3–5 W-H = *SVF* 3:255, 9; 256, 4–6]; trans. in Will Deming, *Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7* [2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004], 225, 227), assumes a husband is to teach his wife about household management. Philo, *Spec.* 3.169–171, has much in common with Phintys. See David L. Balch, *Let Wives be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 52–54.

[67] See O. Larry Yarbrough, *Not Like the Gentiles: Marriage Rules in the Letters of Paul* (SBLDS 80; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985), 32–41; Deming, *Paul on Marriage and Celibacy*, 50–107.

[68] The subject is pursued in Musonius, *Frg.* 13A, 13B, 14, and 15, on which see van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus*, 62–71. The popularity of the topic is reflected in the extensive treatment it receives in the popular handbook by Hierocles (*On Appropriate Acts*, excerpted by Stobaeus, translated in Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*, here, pp. 100–104). See also the medical writer, Soranus (*Gyn.* 1.40). For early Christian writers, see Carolyn Osiek and David Balch, *Families in the New Testament World: Households and House Churches* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 149–151. For the philosophical background to procreationism, see Kathy L. Gaca, *The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity* (HCS 40; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

[69] Musonius, *Frg.* 12 (86, 4–6 Lutz; 64, 1–4 Hense).

[70] See references to Musonius and Hierocles in n. 68. But other comments as well as legislation to increase the birth rate point to an unwillingness to have many children. See Beryl Rawson, ed., *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 1–57, 170–172.

> men of every age (Titus 2.2, 6) and specifically lists it among the qualifications of a bishop (Titus 1.8; 1 Tim 3.2).[71]

She claims further that the function of *sōphrosynē* in the Pastoral Epistles conforms to contemporary pagan usage, but that it is christianized.[72]

The evidence laid out above shows her to be correct with respect to women, whose behavior and demeanor are described in 1 Tim 2:9–15 under the rubric of *sōphrosynē*. The details of that behavior have a place in conventional Graeco-Roman discussions of the virtue: order/adornment, quietness/silence, self-respect/modesty, appropriateness of behavior, marital relations and having children.

There is a philosophical background to this congeries of terms, but philosophical argumentation is not constitutive to the fabric of discourse when the purpose is moral exhortation, as is the case with 1 Tim 2:9–15. The individual details are like the tesserae in a mosaic; they contribute to the whole picture, but their functions in doing so are determined by the design or pattern to which they contribute. The image of a mosaic also captures the static nature of the individual parts, and the fact that they are to be seen in relation to the whole.

| These are features we should do well to heed in working with texts like the one before us. Marshaling the evidence as has been done in this article is only the first step. The effort is justified because *sōphrosynē* is such an important quality of character in the Pastoral Epistles. But questions remain that must still be addressed. Why did the author choose the conventions he did, how does he use them, and why does he use them in this way? The answers to those questions can only be gained through exegesis of 1 Tim 2:9–12, which has not been the purpose of this paper, and which I have, in fact, studiously avoided. What has been done here is preliminary to that exegesis, and, I would say, is its *sine qua non*. 65

[71] North, *Sophrosyne*, 317.
[72] North, *Sophrosyne*, 316–318. See at n. 11 above.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

# HOW TO TREAT OLD WOMEN AND OLD MEN: THE USE OF PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS AND SCRIPTURE IN 1 TIMOTHY 5*

The three Pastoral Epistles are classified variously, for example, as church orders, paraenesis, or *mandata principis*. Yet they all have the purpose of moving their readers to particular behavior, and in this respect can find room under the large umbrella of moral exhortation.[1]

The content of this exhortation is, for the most part, unremarkable from the perspective of Graeco-Roman moral literature, as are the literary forms and hortatory devices used.[2] Yet the author's knowledge of moral philosophy is not as superficial or spotty as it has frequently been characterized as being, nor is his appropriation of it as mindless and devoid of argumentation as is frequently alleged.[3] In an earlier article, I suggested that the author of the Pastorals wrote in the persona of an old man, and adduced evidence, frequently from the moralists, to support my argument.[4] In this article, in keeping with Carl Holladay's interest in Scripture and tradition, I wish to extend that discussion of the Hellenistic moral traditions about old age and examine whether they illuminate the quotation of Scripture in 1 Tim 5:18–19 in its literary context. My examination of the two traditions, moral philosophical and Scriptural, will be illustrative rather than exhaustive. It will be useful to begin with some observations on Scripture.

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[1] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," in *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (ed. James M. Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen; BZNW 125; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), 297–317, for discussion and bibliography. [*Light*, 1:407–430]

[2] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The *Virtus Feminarum* in 1 Timothy 2:9–15, in *Renewing Tradition: Studies in Texts and Contexts in Honor of James W. Thompson* (ed. Mark W. Hamilton, Thomas H. Olbricht, and Jeffrey Peterson; PTMS 65; Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick, 2007), 45–65. [*Light*, 1:459–477]

[3] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners': Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology* (ed. Jan G. van der Watt; NovTSup 121; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 331–358. [*Light*, 1:431–457]

[4] Abraham J. Malherbe, *"Paulus Senex," ResQ* 36 (1994): 197–207. [*Light*, 1:277–288]

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Here and there in the Pastoral Epistles the author offers an explicit warrant for his directions, a case in point being the appeal to Scripture in 1 Tim 5:18–19. In view of 2 Tim 3:1–17, this appeal to Scripture does not surprise, for there Timothy is portrayed as having been grounded in the Scriptures from early childhood, probably by his mother and grandmother (2 Tim 1:5). The Scriptures are described as having the capacity to make one wise for salvation through faith in Jesus Christ, but in greater detail it is said that inspired Scripture is useful in teaching, reproof, correction, training in righteousness, making the man of God fully fitted out for every good work. This is the kind of activity in which the author himself engages,[5] and which he directs his reader to pursue.[6] As to his own teaching, he writes as an apostle of Christ (1 Tim 1:1; 2 Tim 1:1; Titus 1:1), whose appointment to the task gives authority to his instruction,[7] whether in person or letter (1 Tim 3:14), convinced that what he urges is acceptable to God (1 Tim 2:2; 5:4). What is striking is that only once, in 1 Tim 5:18–19, does he explicitly appeal to Scripture to support his instructions.[8]

The author's directions to Timothy and Titus similarly do not appeal to Scripture, with the exception of the statement in 2 Tim 3:15–17. So it is Timothy, nurtured on the words of faith and traditional teaching, who is to instruct the church in the moral life.[9] Even the seemingly programmatic statement in 2 Tim 3:15–17 is preceded by a command to continue in what Timothy had learned and believed during his infancy and youth, and later from Paul (2 Tim 3:14; cf. 3:10). Scripture is part of what has been transmitted to him. So also the moral directions Titus is to give (Titus 265 2:1–10; 3:1–2) are not undergirded by Scripture but | by intricate christological formulations which are heavily indebted to traditional teaching (Titus 2:11–14; 3:3–7).[10]

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[5] E.g., in 1 Tim 2:1–2, 8–15; 4:7–10; 6:9, 11–12; 2 Tim 2:1–7, 22–23.

[6] E.g., in 1 Tim 4:11–16; 5:1–2, 7, 20; 6:3, 17–21; 2 Tim 2:14–15, 24–26; 3:10–17; 4:1–6; Titus 1:13; 2:1–10; 3:1–2, 8b–11.

[7] E.g., 1 Tim 1:12–17; 2:7; 2 Tim 1:1–14; 3:10–14.

[8] The closest other possible citation is 2 Tim 2:19. Allusions to biblical narrative are made in 1 Tim 4:3–4; 2 Tim 3:8–9, and the influence of the OT on the language of the letters is evident throughout (see Hans Hübner, *Vetus Testamentum in Novo* [3 vols.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997–], 2:583–657). The subject is treated exhaustively in Gerd Häfner, *"Nützlich zur Belehrung" (2 Tim 3, 16): Die Rolle der Schrift in den Pastoralbriefen im Rahmen der Paulusrezeption* (HBS 25; Freiburg: Herder, 2000).

[9] See 1 Tim 4:6; cf. 1 Tim 5:8; 6:20–21; 2 Tim 1:13–14.

[10] See Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners.'"

## 1 Timothy 5:17–19 in Literary and Social Context

This study will lead to a brief examination of 1 Tim 5:17–19. There are different opinions on what constitutes the literary context of 1 Tim 5:17–19. While it is generally agreed that a new section of text begins with v. 17, it is disputed whether the section extends to vv. 19, 20, 22 or 25.[11] The syntax of vv. 17–25 contributes to the lack of certainty. The syntax primarily consists of a string of individual directions in the imperative and of asyndeton broken only once by a connective particle (γάρ in v. 18). Such a style, in which commands unrelated to each other, sometimes gnomic in character, as here, is characteristic of some Graeco-Roman moral discourse.[12] Absent a syntactically tight connection between these verses, attempts have been made to discover whether the contents of the individual verses reveal a theme or themes that witness(es) to a coherence in what appears at first glance to lack cohesion.[13] Given the Pastoral Epistles' indebtedness to the moral philosophers, it is reasonable to read this section of chapter five with an eye open to that tradition of moral instruction.

For the purpose of this essay, it is not necessary to treat the problems of cohesion at length. For the sake of perspective, however, it will be useful to begin by placing 1 Tim 5:17–19 in its literary setting.

The section of the letter that interests us begins in 4:11 with a command to Timothy to charge and teach his hearers and to permit nobody to despise his youth.[14] This initiates a detailed specification | of his duties which concludes the chapter (4:11–16). Chapter five then begins with an introductory directive about how Timothy should treat old and young people of both sexes (vv. 1–2). This is followed by a section (vv. 3–16) which opens with a command to honor "real widows," then discusses the financial support, behavior, and qualifications of these exemplary older women. They are contrasted to young widows, who are described in unflattering terms. The theme of honor similarly introduces the next section, which deals with the

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[11] See the summary of different viewpoints in Ray Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure in the Pastoral Epistles* (JSNTSup 280; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2004), 60–62.

[12] For criticism of shortness and disjointedness of such speech and the failure to be discursive, see Lucian, *Bis acc.* 28. For caution in such an assessment, see Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 299 n. 11.

[13] The most assiduous criticism of coherence is by James D. Miller, *The Pastoral Letters as Composite Documents* (SNTSMS 93; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 85–87, strong opposition to whom is mounted by Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure*, 60–66, who agrees with a large number of commentators that 5:17–25 as a whole deals with elders.

[14] See the extensive discussion by Christopher R. Hutson, "My True Child: The Rhetoric of Youth in the Pastoral Epistles" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1997).

treatment of old men (5:17–22), and the issue of financial support again arises. Honor again surfaces in commands to slaves (6:1–2), which are given after an interjection which deals with Timothy's health (v. 23) and a comment on the conspicuousness of sin (vv. 24–25).

Our passage thus belongs to a larger context of communal instruction about the relationships between generations of both sexes, and between slaves and their masters, with honor being the leitmotiv and financial support of certain old women and men a concern (4:11–6:2). Our interest is primarily in attitudes toward the old. What the author has to say about the relationships between persons of different age is informed by common attitudes of the day, and we shall observe some of those attitudes reflected in the texts leading up to 5:17–19.

Interest in old age in the Graeco-Roman world has grown dramatically during the last decade.[15] Sometimes this interest developed as an offshoot from investigation of the family, the most important unit in ancient society, but it has been abetted by modern society's preoccupation with the growing number of its own elderly, usually seen as posing challenges to 267 the society at large.[16] NT scholars | have begun to turn their attention to the subject generally and to the Pastoral Epistles in particular.[17]

[15] The situation has changed quite significantly since Tim Parkin's assessment in 1997 that the elderly had received very little attention ("Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Elderly Members of the Roman Family," in *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space* [ed. Beryl Rawson and Paul R.C. Weaver; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997], 123–148. The entire article, with fewer references, is reprinted in Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World: A Cultural and Social History* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003]). In addition to the works cited in the footnotes that follow, see esp. Umberto Mattioli, ed., *Senectus: La vecchiaia nel mondo classico* (3 vols.; Bologna: Pàtron, 1995–2007); Hartwin Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar: Eine Geschichte des Alters in der Antike* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002); Karen Cokayne, *Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome* (London: Routledge, 2003); Marcus Sigismund, *Über das Alter: Eine historisch-kritische Analyse der Schriften über das Alter: περὶ γήρως von Musonius, Favorinus und Iuncus* (Prismata 14; Frankfurt: P. Lang, 2003).

[16] See esp. Beryl Rawson, ed., *The Family in Ancient Rome: New Perspectives* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Keith R. Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Susan Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Rawson and Weaver, *The Roman Family in Italy.* For an attempt to place the NT evidence in the Roman context, see Carolyn Osiek and David L. Balch, *Families in the New Testament World: Households and House Churches* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997); more particularly, Margaret Y. MacDonald, "Slavery, Sexuality and House Churches: A Reassessment of Col 3.18–4.1 in Light of New Research on the Roman Family," *NTS* 53 (2007): 94–113.

[17] R. Alastair Campbell, *The Elders: Seniority within Earliest Christianity* (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994); John M.G. Barclay, "There is Neither Old nor Young? Early Christianity and Ancient Ideologies of Age," *NTS* 53 (2007): 225–241. Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:147–53,

## Contempt for Timothy's Youth

Possible intergenerational tension surfaces in 4:12. Before instructing Timothy on how to conduct himself in relation to the elderly in general (5:1–2), and to young men and women, and to two classes of old people in particular (5:3–16, 17–22), the aged writer portrays Timothy as a young man who might be held in contempt because of his youth. No specifically youthful acts or proclivities are mentioned as causes for criticism. The command not to countenance any contempt of his youth comes after a command to charge and teach his hearers (v. 11), and the antithesis that follows, where the emphasis lies, directs him to present himself as a model to believers in his speech, conduct, love, faith, and purity (v. 12), thus rather general qualities. It is possible, then, in the absence of anything more specific, that it is his youthfulness in itself that could evoke disdain, or that the very mention of youth in this context would call forth certain negative characteristics generally associated with youth.

Aristotle held a widespread opinion that the young are impulsive, ambitious, and sensual, but on the whole he was more charitable than most of his successors, ascribing young people's behavior to their lack of life experience. Their errors, he explained, are not intentional; the | young, rather, act without a sense of proportion, doing everything to excess. Yet their hope for a better future makes them courageous and social (*Rhet.* 2.12.1389a2–b16). 268

A contrast had been made since Homer between the rashness of youth and the wisdom of the old,[18] but by the time of the late Roman republic, intergenerational conflict, always present to some degree in both public and private spheres, had grown very sharp.[19] Widespread stereotypes of

discusses old age under the rubric of the psychology of the author of the Pastorals. (See already Gerhard Hoffmann, *Das Johannesevangelium als Alterswerk: Eine psychologische Untersuchung* [NTF 4.1; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1933].) More recently, see Malherbe, *"Paulus Senex"*; and Mona Tokarek LaFosse, "An Anthropological View of Old Age in Early Christian Communities" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Societty of Biblical Literature, Washington, D.C., November 20, 2006).

[18] See J.G.F. Powell, *Cicero, Cato Maior De Senectute* (CCTC 28; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 147; Cicero, *Sen.* 20.

[19] See Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar*, 123–124. See Meyer Reinhold, "The Generation Gap in Antiquity," in *The Conflict of Generations in Ancient Greece and Rome* (ed. Stephen Bertman; Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner, 1976), 15–54, esp. 32–45 (for tension already in Athens, 48–54). See Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 226–228, for commonsensical judgment on the widespread phenomenon, and 406 n. 101 for bibliography. Parkin had earlier called into question attempts to identify certain periods when such conflict was particularly acute ("Out of Sight, Out of Mind," 139–140).

youth existed.[20] It has been claimed that "the term 'youth' was associated with shallowness, foolishness, and ineptitude," that it appears as a derogatory appellation in the second century BC, and that in the Greek New Comedy the young man is "a spineless, shallow, trivial, often roguish figure,"[21] who required harsh treatment from the moral instructor.[22] It is not unusual to encounter thumbnail sketches of youth that drip with contempt,[23] or a suspicion by the young that they are reproved by the old out of contempt. To that they might respond with equal contempt, as old men and women would respond if they were treated contemptuously.[24]

This attitude toward the young leads the author of the Pastorals to 269 address the issue at the outset and to counter it with a command to | Timothy to be an example to the faithful. The advice to Timothy in the Pastorals has recently been described as of a sort that was given to young leaders or, more precisely, to Paul's apostolic delegates.[25] Regardless of what formal role or position Timothy might be thought to have held, he does appear as an exemplary young man in 1 Timothy, which makes the caution about possible contempt for his youth all the more striking. Adding to the incongruity is that the young Timothy will be expected to give instruction on how the aged should be treated; it was normally *the aged* who gave instruction.[26] So, why introduce this striking caution? It may simply be because the author, whether Paul or someone writing in his name, was sensitive to the difficulty caused by Timothy's youth and wanted to get it out of the way before getting to the specific instructions

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[20] See Hutson, "My True Child: The Rhetoric of Youth in the Pastoral Epistles," 145–175, detailing youthful lust, drunkenness and gluttony, inordinate attention to appearance, extravagance in spending as in everything else, ignorance, gullibility, easy exploitability, and idealism.

[21] Reinhold, "The Generation Gap in Antiquity," 50.

[22] See, e.g., John Chrysostom, *Hom. 1 Tim.* 9.2 (PG 62:546): Youth is wild and needs many instructors to make it live purely, who will moderate their treatment of the youth, advising, admonishing young people, instilling fear in them and threatening them, as the occasion arises.

[23] For example, Horace, *Ars* 161–168; Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae* I. pref. 8–9.

[24] The subject of contempt in psychagogy crops up repeatedly in Philodemus, *On Frank Criticism* (introd., trans., and notes by David Konstan, Diskin Clay, Clarence E. Glad, Johan C. Thom, and James Ware; SBLTT 43; Greco-Roman Series 13; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998): The young do not easily accept correction (*Frgs*. 31; 71), and one's speech should be adapted to them (Col. VIa). People in general react negatively when they are treated with contempt (old men: Col. XXIVa. 10–15; women: Col. XXIIIb), and the young are liable to respond with contempt (*Frg*. 87N).

[25] See Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 297 n. 3 for bibliography.

[26] See Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 158–161, 166–168, and further below.

regarding the aged. He does so by advising Timothy to be concerned with his own conduct and development, offering himself as an example, thus to act in keeping with the philosophical tradition that informs the Pastoral Epistles.[27] But there is likely more to it.

According to the genuine Pauline letters, Paul assigned difficult tasks to Timothy. In 1 Thess 3:1–10 and 1 Cor 4:17, one of Timothy's functions was to ensure that Paul's converts continued to look to Paul as their example, which was no easy task in the circumstances in which the mandate was given.[28] It is understandable that Paul expressed relief and joy when Timothy returned with good news from Thessalonica (1 Thess 3:6–10), and that he wrote to the Corinthians to receive Timothy as they would himself, having no contempt for Timothy (1 Cor 16:10–11).

First Timothy 4:12 differs from these passages in that it is Timothy who is addressed rather than the recipients of the letters (who are addressed only indirectly), and that Timothy rather than Paul is to serve as example. Furthermore, only in 1 Tim 4:12 is Timothy's youth | specified as the object of contempt. Neither element is present in a similar admonition in Titus 1:15. Why, then, is the possible contempt for Timothy's youth introduced here? Since the author will convey his instruction about intergenerational relationships in the church, always fraught with potential tension, through young Timothy, Timothy's youth could be a complicating factor. Why that should be the case is not immediately clear. Was Timothy's youth an actual problem in the context reflected in the letter, raised by disaffected or offended members of the church (for example, the false teachers, young widows, the rich) as a challenge to Timothy? Or does it simply reflect a contemporary intergenerational attitude that the author felt obliged to register in discussing how certain old people should be treated in the church? The latter seems the more likely possibility in view of the ensuing discussion.

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We cannot be certain about the actual situation, but we are able to discern how the admonition functions in the text. The author is going to

[27] For beginning with oneself, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.40, cf. 38; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.13; Julian, *Or.* 6.200C–201C.

[28] For the imitation/remembrance theme, see Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 309–311. On the importance of Timothy's report that the Thessalonians "had a good remembrance" of Paul (1 Thess 3:6), see Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 207–208. Paul speaks of Timothy's mission in 1 Cor 4:17 to stir the Corinthians' remembrance of Paul in a context in which Paul claims a unique relation with them as their father in the gospel and their example (vv. 14–17), and in which he threatens them (vv. 18–21)!

discuss the relationships between various generations in the church, and he clears the decks by warning that the young leader not brook contempt of his youth. Having cautioned against a wrong attitude toward Timothy, he will next proceed to the other side of the ledger, to caution Timothy against incorrect treatment of old people.

## "Don't Beat Up on an Old Man": Attitudes Toward the Elderly

The command to Timothy in 1 Tim 5:1 not to strike out at an old man but to exhort him as a father (πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴ ἐπιπλήξῃς ἀλλὰ παρακάλει ὡς πατέρα) introduces the long instruction about responsibilities toward old women and old men and the behavior of slaves (5:3–6:2). The author considers this entire section teaching (διδασκαλία) and exhortation (παράκλησις) (6:3).[29] The command contrasts what should be Timothy's mode of instruction with the contempt he could or did encounter. Rather than retaliate in kind, with ἐπίπληξις, he is to engage in παράκλησις, whose content the author then supplies.[30] | This exhortation is part of the fabric of ancient attitudes toward old people.

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Such attitudes ran the gamut of possibilities, given the diverse nature of the sources reflecting them and the different times they represent.[31] The sources available to us are for the most part art, literature, and philosophy, thus representing the elite of society.[32] But inscriptions, drama, and satire do provide a glimpse of the "kleine Leute."[33] It is the treatment of

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[29] The antecedent to ταῦτα in ταῦτα δίδασκε καὶ παρακάλει is the entire section, 5:3–6:2. Cf. Titus 2:1–15, where v. 15, ταῦτα λάλει καὶ παρακάλει, also after communal instruction, forms an *inclusio* with 2:1.

[30] For non-retaliation, see 1 Thess 5:15 and the commentary in Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 321–322.

[31] See Moses I. Finley, "Introduction," in *Old Age in Greek and Latin Literature* (ed. Thomas M. Falkner and Judith de Luce; Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 10; Tim Parkin, "The Ancient Greek and Roman Worlds," in *The Long History of Old Age* (ed. Pat Thane; London: Thames and Hudson, 2005), 31, 43–44.

[32] See Parkin, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind"; Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar*, 13. Brandt is particularly good at using artistic representations; see Paul Zanker, *The Mask of Socrates: The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity* (Sather Classical Lectures 59; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

[33] On the limited value of inscriptions, see Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar*, 158–159; Jens-Uwe Krause, "Antike," in *Geschichte der Familie* (ed. Andreas Gestrich, Jens-Uwe Krause, and Michael Mitterauer; KTA 376; Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 2003), 23–24; see comments on Aristophanes and Juvenal below. On the satirists, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (2d ed. enlarged; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983; orig. pub., Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 20, 117; and on Juvenal, see Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 80–86.

the subject by philosophers, particularly Hellenistic moral philosophers, that draws most attention and will figure prominently but not exclusively in this discussion.[34]

It has been estimated that in the Roman world 5–10% of the population was over sixty years old, the age generally taken as the minimum to be considered old.[35] Old age may conventionally have been associated with wisdom,[36] but there was a strong strain of negativism toward old age in Greek and Roman literature. The positive attitude toward old age will receive more attention when we turn to 1 Tim 5:17; here we | focus on some negative attitudes, particularly the views of old men, because of the prohibition in 5:1. Such attitudes were expressed by Greek poets, dramatists, and writers of comedy, especially vividly by Aristophanes, who made the old man the butt of his humor.[37]

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Plato formulated and refuted the complaints against old age in his picture of the ideal old man in *The Republic* (328D–330A). Aristotle, on the other hand, described old age in contrast to the character of the young, mercilessly reciting every imaginable complaint, whether physical, psychological, or social, without the charity he extended to the young (*Rhet.* 2.12.1389b).[38] But the idealistic portrayal continued, most extensively by Cicero in his essay *On Old Age* (*De senectute*), which adapted Plato's *Republic*.[39] Cicero systematically took up four reasons why old age

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[34] Under consideration come Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and to a lesser degree, Musonius, Favorinus, and Juncus. On the philosophical traditions, see Georges Minois, *History of Old Age: From Antiquity to the Renaissance* (trans. Sarah H. Tenison; Cambridge, UK: Polity Press/Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 53–68; Powell, *Cicero, Cato Maior De Senectute*, 24–30; Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 60–78.

[35] Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 224 (see esp. 36–56 for a nuanced discussion taking into consideration the value of different kinds of evidence). Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar*, 159, suggests a more precise and lower 4.5–4.6%. Finley, "Introduction," 1–2, is more skeptical, claiming that such calculations were futile because the data were epigraphic, and holds that the demographic situation remained unchanged throughout Greek and Roman history. Ancient writers classified life in divisions ranging from three to ten in number, depending partly on their particular interests; the age of sixty is generally accepted as a convenient rule of thumb (Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 17–26).

[36] Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 44.

[37] Campbell, *Elders*, 80–81. Aristophanes, *Ach.* 676–696 shows how the elders were perceived and unfairly treated; cf. *Nub.* 1321–1332; *Av.* 755–759. See also Thomas K. Hubbard, "Old Men in the Youthful Plays of Aristophanes," in Falkner and de Luce, *Old Age in Greek and Roman Literature*, 90–113.

[38] See also the contrast between the youth and the old man in Horace, *Ars* 161–178.

[39] Cicero, *Sen.* 6–8. See Powell, *Cicero, Cato Maior De Senectute*, 110–120, for discussion in some detail.

appears to be unhappy,[40] and in the process dealt with what were commonly considered characteristics of old age (credulity, forgetfulness, carelessness, slothfulness, inertia, loquacity, moroseness, being hard to please, etc.), and countered them. But the derision of old age continued into the early Empire, finding expression in the most vicious litany of physical and mental deterioration by Juvenal (himself an old man!) (*Sat.* 10.188–239). Old women, too, came in for ridicule, in comedy and satire, but especially in art, where the presentation of the drunken old woman became a part of genre art.[41] The stereotyped "old woman is . . . a disgusting, haggard, shrinking, stinking, toothless, and sex-crazed *fellatrix*. As marginalized members of society, old women were especially set apart" and abused.[42]

273 | The negative attitude toward old men was expressed in abuse, sometimes physical sometimes verbal. A particular kind of abuse was that of fathers by their sons, understandable in the Roman period because of the *patria potestas*, which kept sons subject to their fathers so long as the fathers lived.[43] Aristophanes already describes the tension between an aged father who is treated like a child and beaten by his son.[44] That violence between the generations was not merely dramatic but real is evident from Plato's *Laws*.[45]

Of greater interest to us is verbal abuse in which the language of violence was used figuratively, as it is in the prohibition, μὴ ἐπιπλήξῃς ("do

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[40] "First, that it withdraws us from active pursuit; second, that it makes the body weaker; third, that it deprives us of almost all physical pleasures; and, fourth, that it is not far removed from death" (treated consecutively in Cicero, *Sen.* in 10–20, 27–38, 39–66, 67–85; 21–26, on the loss of memory, may be regarded as "a subsidiary point arising from the topic of the old man in public life" [Powell, *Cicero, Cato Maior De Senectute*, 147]).

[41] For art, see Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar*, 99–100, 109–110.

[42] The quotation is from Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 86; see the references and bibliography in notes 118–126 (pp. 349–350). For the abuse of old women, see Cokayne, *Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome*, 134–152.

[43] See Minois, *History of Old Age*, 82–83; Beryl Rawson, "The Roman Family," in *Family in Ancient Rome*, 16–17; Cokayne, *Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome*, 152–159; Krause, "Antike," 132–138.

[44] Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 736–740, 1354–1357; *Nub.* 1321–1438. Parkin, *Old Age in the Roman World*, 208, makes the apt comment on the former passage: "This is of course a scene from comedy, not a direct depiction of real life, but its 'humor' surely lies at least in part in its underlying reality, that an aged father could be treated in this way by his son." On the latter passage, see Kenneth J. Reckford, "Father-beating in Aristophanes' *Clouds*," in Bertman, *Conflict of Generations in Ancient Greece and Rome*, 89–118, here p. 104.

[45] Plato, *Leg.* 9.879B–880D; cf. Aristotle, *Eth. nic.* 7.6.2.1149b, for striking one's father as running in the family. See the important work on domestic violence by John T. Fitzgerald ("Early Christian Missionary Practice and Pagan Reaction: 1 Peter and Domestic Violence against Slaves and Wives," in Hamilton, Olbricht, and Peterson, *Renewing Tradition*, 24–44).

not beat up on") in 1 Tim 5:1.[46] The primary sense of ἐπιπλήσσειν is "to strike at," and the word takes on the meaning of "to rebuke, reprove" (BAGD, 377 s.v. ἐπιπλήσσω), and "to punish" (MM, 243 s.v. ἐπιπλήσσω). In the moral literature, ἐπιπλήσσειν keeps company with such words as admonition (νουθετεῖν), reproof or rebuke (ἐλέγχειν) of the philosopher or teacher who seeks to correct people, not permitting them to continue living in error (ἁμαρτάνειν). It was received with ill humor.[47]

Writers who strove for precision in defining terms (without always achieving consistency in their definitions) provide insight into how the words were understood. For example, Ps.-Demetrius, in describing the censorious type of letter, says: "The censorious type (ἐπιτιμητικός) is that written with rebuke (μετ' ἐπιπλήξεως) on account of errors | (ἁμαρτήμασι) 274 that have already been committed."[48] The focus on the errors (ἁμαρτήματα) of the recipients of the speech or letter leads to correction (πρὸς διόρθωσιν) and healing (ἴασις), in the process creating fear, which causes them not to sin (Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.8.66.5). Clement, in a veritable lexicon of hortatory terms, summarizes a number of types of speech (νουθέτησις ["admonition"]; ἐπιτίμησις ["censure"]; μέμψις ["blame"]; ἔλεγχος ["reproof" or "rebuke"], etc.), each with an OT example. The effect of heaping up such strings of definitions is to accentuate the harshness of each. In Clement's list, ἐπίπληξις is defined as "rebuking censure" (ἐπιτίμησις ἐπιπληκτική) or "censorious blame" (ψόγος πληκτικός). The example (Isa 30:1) demonstrates to Clement that Isaiah is using stinging fear to turn the people to salvation (πρὸς σωτηρίαν).[49]

It was inappropriate for young people to speak to their elders in this way. Lucian has an old man expect a rash young man to rebuke (ἐπιπλήξειεν) him for having the temerity to speak in public by saying, "Your strength is gone, you are in the clutches of old age" (*Heracles* 7). It was completely unacceptable to moral philosophers of the sort appropriated by the

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[46] The word in either its noun or verb form occurs only here in the NT. The verb appears in textual variants in Matt 12:15–16 and Luke 2:43.

[47] See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 72.9–10; Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.9.82.2 (with ἔλεγχος); 1.10.93.3 (with ἐπιπληκτικός and ψεκτικός); 1.10.94.1 (ἐπιπλήσσειν is also called νουθετεῖν), etc.

[48] Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 6 (Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* [SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988], 34–35). The sample letter that follows dwells on the gravity of the errors that call forth the harsh speech. See also Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 133–134.

[49] The modes of exhortation are given in Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.9.76.1–81.2 (ἐπίπληξις in 78.1). Clement considers this somewhat modulated manner of exhortation a system designed to inspire fear of him (ἡ περὶ τὸν φόβον αὐτοῦ τεχνολογία), that is the source of salvation (81.3).

Pastoral Epistles that children would rebuke their parents, who frequently represent the elderly, in this manner. The ethical handbook of Hierocles, roughly contemporary with the Pastorals, specifies how children should respect their aged parents and calls attention to the parents' gratitude for their children's care:

> Nevertheless, if at any time (the parents) err (παραμαρτάνοντες) . . . we should correct them (ἐπανορθωτέον) them, but not, by Zeus, by rebuking them (οὐ μετ' ἐπιπλήξεως) the way we do subordinates or peers, but by exhorting (ἀλλ' ὡς μετὰ παρακλήσεως) them, and then not as though they had erred (ἁμαρτάνοντας) in ignorance, but as though through inadvertence they had committed an oversight which they certainly would not have done had they been more attentive. For admonitions (νουθετήσεις), especially those which are drawn out, are painful to old people, and their inadvertence should therefore be cured with exhortation and a certain artfulness (μετὰ παρακλήσεως καί τινος φιλοτεχνίας ἴασις τῶν παρορωμένων).[50]

275 | We shall return to the subjects of fear and error when we consider 1 Tim 5:20. For the moment, it suffices to note that the command in 5:1–2 is sensitive to the moralists' preoccupation with proper conduct in relationships between persons of different generations and sexes, with the stress on παράκλησις, a generally more gentle mode of exhortation that took its precise meaning from its context.[51] Here it is mostly didactic (cf. 6:3). Παράκλησις with respect to old women (widows) will be taken up in vv. 3–10, to young women in vv. 11–15, to old men in vv. 17–19, to Timothy in vv. 20–23, and to slaves in 6:1–2.[52] What remains remarkable in light of the tradition that it is the old men who were to teach and the young to obey,[53] is that Timothy, whose youth could be held in contempt, is the one who is to instruct and exhort the church. But he is to do so in the appropriate manner, mindful of his relationship to other members of the family (cf. 3:15, the οἶκος θεοῦ). Plato was more specific, requiring that everyone more than twenty years older than oneself be regarded as a father or mother (*Leg.* 879C).

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[50] Hierocles, *On Duties*, in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.25.53 (4:643, 13–22 W-H). The translation, here modified a little, is from Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 92. See now Ilaria Ramelli, *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts* (WGRW 28; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), translation by David Konstan on p. 85.

[51] See Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 322–324.

[52] The list in Titus 2:1–12 is more inclusive: old men, old women, young women, young men, slaves.

[53] See Plutarch, *An seni* 789E; cf. Campbell, *Elders*, 82–86.

## "Honor Widows Who Are Real Widows"

The didactic exhortation that follows contains no advice on how to relate to young men,[54] and the advice relating to the old of both sexes is to special classes, "real widows" (vv. 3–10, 16) and old men who perform special functions (vv. 17–20). Advice to slaves (6:1–2) is added to round out instruction to the household (as in Titus 2:9–10), and that dealing with young widows (vv. 11–15) is subsidiary to the instructions to "real widows." The author explicitly refers to pagan practice in urging readers of the letter to care for the "real widows" (v. 8).

These widows are to be extended honor in material form, as the text makes clear.[55] Most women could expect to experience widowhood, sometimes repeatedly, during their lives. Women often married | men considerably older than themselves, who were likely to die before them, leaving their widows with the option of remarrying. Of the female population, 25–30% were widows, but one cannot generalize about the length of widowhood, except that it could not be assumed to have been a short transition to remarriage or death for all widows.[56] Legal and social pressure encouraged women of childbearing age to remarry, but the chances of remarrying after the age of thirty declined rapidly. Egyptian census figures show that the majority of unmarried women over thirty were widows, and that the percentage of widows increased dramatically after the age of forty. That the average age of married women has been calculated to have been 32.5 and of widows 52.6, points to a relatively old group of widows. A woman older than sixty, the minimum age for a "real widow" (v. 9), could be regarded as very old.[57]

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Although there was no stigma attached to remarriage, for some widows, even in their youth, the ideal was to remain single, true to their deceased

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[54] The directions in Titus 2:1–10 include the young men, but in the briefest possible manner, τοὺς νεωτέρους ὡσαύτως παρακάλει σωφρονεῖν (v. 6), depending on the rest of the section to provide an idea of what is meant by σωφροσύνη (see Malherbe, "The *Virtus Feminarum* in 1 Timothy 2:9–15," esp. 48–49).

[55] See the discussion below of v. 17 for honoring the elderly in general.

[56] See the splendid work, Jens-Uwe Krause, *Witwen und Waisen im Römischen Reich* (4 vols.; HABES 16–19; Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1994–1995), upon which all subsequent work on the subject, including my comments, depend (here, esp. 1:67–70).

[57] See P.Sakaon 40, 12–13. The figures for unmarried women, a majority of whom would have been widows, for the decades after forty are startling: 40–49, 46.2%; 50–59, 61.9%; 60–69, 70%; 70+, 87.5% (from Krause, *Witwen und Weisen im Römischen Reich*, 1:68).

husbands.[58] Sometimes, these women would spend decades in widowhood, despite Augustan legislation that required widows of childbearing age (under fifty) to remarry, the purpose of marriage being procreation.[59] Such a woman was often praised in literature and on tombstones (in Latin, as *univira* and synonyms; in Greek, as μόνανδρος).[60] A reasonable interpretation of the phrase ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή ("the wife of one husband") in v. 9 is that it refers to a widow who did not remarry.[61]

277 | The author of the Pastorals wants these Christian widows to be honored by having the church take care of their material needs. The entire section, vv. 3–16, deals with the care of widows.[62] The author has a somewhat jaundiced view of younger widows, who do not deserve the church's financial support; they are advised to remarry and lead domestically responsible lives (vv. 11–15; cf. Titus 2:4b-5; 1 Tim 2:15). The older widows, however, have two possible sources of support, their own relatives (vv. 4–8) and the church (vv. 9–10, 16). The explicit reference to pagan practice of caring for widowed relatives (v. 8) invites brief examination of that practice.

First Timothy 5:4 encompasses a number of elements from the contemporary concern with support for aged widows: "But if a widow has children or grandchildren, they are to learn first how to show piety (εὐσεβεῖν) to their own household (τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον) and to repay their forebears (ἀμοιβὰς ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς προγόνοις) for this is acceptable before God (ἀπόδεκτον ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ)."

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[58] But see B. Kötting, "Digamos," *RAC* 3 (1957): 1018, who records a negative attitude toward remarriage.

[59] See Pliny, *Nat.* 7.1.61–62. See Danilo Dalla, "Le fonti giuridiche," in Mattioli, *Senectus: Vecchiaia nel mondo classico*, 2:300. The age of forty, the more normal terminus for bearing children, also came in for discussion. The repeated imperial legislation met with strong resistance: Hermann Funke, "Univira: Ein Beispiel heidnischer Geschichtsapologetik," JAC 8/9 (1965/1966): 183–188.

[60] See Rawson, *Family in Ancient Rome*, 33–34, esp. 52 nn. 90 and 91; Kötting, "Digamos," 1018–1019.

[61] This translation of the Greek phrase is straightforward enough; differences of opinion emerge in interpretation, which appear, for example in English versions of the Bible: "has been married only once" (NRSV); "has been faithful to her husband" (NIV). The second (unlikely) interpretation already appears in patristic exposition (see Theodore of Mopsuestia, 2:161 Swete). Discussions of the meaning here invoke the meaning of the phrase in the lists of the qualifications of a bishop in 1 Tim 3:2 and Titus 1:6, and of deacons in 1 Tim 3:12. These discussions do not always escape ecclesial interests. See Peter Trummer, "Einehe nach den Pastoralbriefen: Zum Verständnis der Termini μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἀνήρ und ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή," *Bib* 51 (1970): 471–484.

[62] For our present purpose it is not necessary to classify the different kinds of widows that may be envisaged by the author. See Jouette M. Bassler, "The Widows' Tale," *JBL* 103 (1984): 23–41.

Care of the elderly was a matter of private rather than public concern; only in the second century AD did legislation require that parents and children support each other.[63] It is unfortunate that almost all our evidence has to do with the upper classes, where the needs of widows were not as dire as one supposes they were of the poor, but even well situated widows could find themselves in precarious circumstances.

Widows could not count on inheriting the estates of their husbands, who rather favored their children and grandchildren, in whom resided their hopes and ambitions for the family. Widows might receive legacies from their husbands, but more normally were dependent for support on their grown children. Widows were most frequently taken into the homes of their sons. The benefit of having children was a common refrain in literature. But the arrangement was not a happy one, for children | frequently refused to meet their responsibility toward their mothers, or did so with ill grace. The following letter from Egypt (second century AD) from one brother to another reflects a not unusual situation: 278

> I hope you are well. I have been told that you are not looking after our dear mother very well. Please, sweetest brother, don't cause her any grief. And if our other brothers talk back to her, you should slap them. For you should act like a father now. I know that you can be kind to her without my writing; please don't be offended by my writing and reprimanding you. We ought to revere (σέβεσθε) as a goddess the mother who has given us birth, especially a mother as good and virtuous as ours. I have written you these things, my brother, because I know the sweetness of our parents. Write and tell me how you are.[64]

Widows, especially among the poorer classes, were forced to support themselves in such occupations as sellers of vegetables or textiles, midwives, and inn-keepers. Working outside the home, in poverty and without the presumed discipline of the male head of a household, they were depicted as alcoholic, lustful, and so forth.[65]

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[63] The survey by Parkin, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind," contains ample references; see Krause, "Antike," 143–148.

[64] The Greek is printed in *Select Papyri* (Hunt and Edgar, LCL), 1:318, 320. This English translation is from Jo-Ann Shelton, *As the Romans Did: A Sourcebook in Roman Social History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 23. For the domestic situation reflected in the letter, see Adolf Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World* (trans. Lionel R.M. Strachan; 4th ed.; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1927; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965) 192–197.

[65] For the topics touched on in this paragraph, see Krause, *Witwen und Waisen im Römischen Reich*, 2:17–29, 82–94, 105–160; more briefly, Krause, "Antike," 143–148; and Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar*, 162–164; see also H.-A. Rupprecht, "Die Sorge für die

There is a difference between the directions in 1 Tim 5 and its larger social context. In v. 16, the care of widows is to be undertaken by a believing woman (τις πιστή). That women, particularly daughters, should support widowed mothers was not unknown, but we do not know much about it because our sources were written by men, whose interest in women's duties was limited.[66] The directions about the support of old widows in 1 Tim 5 stand out even more when it is observed that vv. 16 and 4 form an *inclusio*, and that the intervening section therefore likely deals with female support of widows.[67]

279 | An example of such a woman is found in a Roman inscription from the first century BC in which a man honors his wife, who "was an outstanding example of *pietas*: an unswerving sense of duty, devotion and loyalty to one's family, friends, country and the gods": "... Why speak about your affection toward your relatives, your sense of duty (*pietas*) toward your family (for you cared for my mother as well as you cared for your parents)?"[68]

The expectation that parents be treated with reverence, piety, or devotion (εὐσέβεια, *pietas*), shared by 1 Tim 5:4, the letter from Egypt, and the inscription is common in Greek and Roman literature.[69] The religious

Älteren nach den Papyri," in *The Care of the Elderly in the Ancient Near East* (ed. Marten Stol and Sven P. Vleeming; SHCANE 14; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 223–237; Christian Gnilka, "Altersversorgerung," *RAC* Supplementband 1 (2001): 266–289.

[66] Thus Cokayne, *Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome*, 166–167, who provides some information. Krause, *Witwen und Waisen im Römischen Reich*, 2:29–33, is more extensive. See Herodotus 2.35, contrasting conditions in Athens from those in Egypt, where "sons need not support their parents unless they choose, but daughters must, whether they choose or not."

[67] There is no compelling reason why the subject of μανθανέτωσαν ("let them learn") (v. 4), προνοεῖ ("provide"), ἤρνηται ("denied"), and ἔστιν ("is") (v. 8) should be taken as masculine when ἔχει ("has") in v. 16 unambiguously refers to a woman. Furthermore, the faith or denial of the faith is associated with women in vv. 16 and 12; why should it not in v. 8?

[68] The introduction to the inscription and the translation are both by Shelton (*As the Romans Did*, 292–296, here 294). The inscription is *CIL* 6.1527, 31670 (*ILS* 8393). I owe the reference to John Fitzgerald.

[69] See Cicero, *Nat. d.* 1.116, and the commentary by Arthur S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum: Libri III* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955–1958; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 1:510–511, esp. for Cicero's inconsistency, sometimes making *pietas* represent εὐσέβεια, sometimes ὁσιότης; further, Hendrik Bolkestein, *Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum: Ein Beitrag zum Problem "Moral und Gesellschaft"* (Utrecht: Oosthoek, 1939; repr., Groningen: Bouma, 1967), 292–293; Richard P. Saller, "*Pietas,* Obligation and Authority in the Roman Family," in *Alte Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Festschrift für Karl Christ zum 65. Geburtstag* (ed. Peter Kneissl and Volker Losemann; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988), 393–410; Saller, *Patriarch, Property and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 5; Parkin, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind," 130–139;

dimension, plus the notion that care of parents is a repayment for favors received from them, is illustrated by a number of extracts from philosophers roughly contemporary with 1 Timothy.

Musonius Rufus, in an argument in favor of having many children, says:

> whoever is unjust to his own family sins against the gods of his fathers and against Zeus, guardian of the family, from whom wrongs done to the family are not hidden, and surely one who sins against the gods is impious (ὁ δέ γε περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἁμαρτάνων ἀσεβής).[70]

Similarly, Plutarch (*On Brotherly Love* 479F), citing Plato (*Leg.* 717C), claims that

> | both Nature and the Law, which upholds Nature, have assigned to parents, after gods, first and greatest honour; and there is nothing which men do that is more acceptable to gods (κεχαρισμένον θεοῖς) than with goodwill and zeal to repay to those who bore them and brought them up the favours 'long ago lent to them when they were young.' Nor is there, again, a greater exhibition of an impious nature than neglect of parents or offences against them. (*Frat. amor.* 479F [Helmbold, LCL]) 280

Hierocles uses similar language, but elevates the standing of parents.[71] He specifies in detail the kind of care children are to render their parents. He considers such care a repayment (τὸ ἀμείβεσθαι) for the parents' beneficence to their children (640,13). Parents are their children's greatest benefactors; they are the images of the gods, who meet our needs and guard our homes (641,5–8). Children's care for their parents is repayment (ἀπόδοσις) for what the parents did for the children, but the children's actions are of benefit to themselves, "for what gain is so great to a child as piety (εὐσεβές) and gratitude to his parents?" (641,15–17).

Philo demonstrates his awareness of the philosophical treatment of the subject in *On the Decalogue*. Animals, he says, provide examples of children repaying kindnesses (ἀμοιβαῖς) they received (113–116). Young birds out of piety (τῷ εὐσεβεῖν) repay their debt to their parents (117). When children provide care for their parents, they do not so much give as repay

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Cokayne, *Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome*, 168–170; Mary Rose D'Angelo, "Εὐσέβεια: Roman Imperial Values and the Sexual Politics of 4 Maccabees and the Pastorals," *BibInt* 11 (2003): 139–165.

[70] *Frg.* 15 (96, 29–98, 1 Lutz). See also Musonius, *Epistle to Pacratides* 5 (139, 5–11 Hense).

[71] References here are to Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.25.53 (4:640, 4 – 644, 15 W-H); English translation in Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*, 91. Page and line citations in this paragraph are from Hense's edition.

(οὐ διδόντας μᾶλλον ἢ ἀποδιδόντας). "Piety (εὐσέβεια) and religion (ὁσιότης) are the queens among the virtues." They are absent from people who refuse to support their parents (119).

> For parents are the servants of God for the task of begetting children, and he who dishonours the servant dishonours also the Lord. (120) Some bolder spirits, glorifying the name of parenthood, say that a father and a mother are in fact gods revealed to sight who copy the Uncreated in His work as the Framer of life. He, they say, is the God or Maker of the world, they of those only whom they have begotten, and how can reverence be rendered (εὐσεβεῖσθαι) to the invisible God by those who show irreverence (ἀσεβούντων) to the gods who are near at hand and seen by the eye? (*Decal.* 119–120 [Colson, LCL])

281 | Philo's dependence on writers like Hierocles is clear, but equally clear is that, unlike them, for him parents are God's servants rather than secondary gods.[72]

The substance of the commands in 1 Tim 5:4 are of a piece with this philosophical tradition, and so is the presence of a theological warrant for those commands. Piety and repayment for benefits received are so closely associated with filial responsibility for the author that he need only give his directions in the most succinct manner possible. The theological warrant is equally brief and formulaic ("For this is acceptable before God"), but comes from a different tradition, a Hebraic one via the worship of the church.[73] A similar formula is also used in 1 Tim 2:2–3 as a theological warrant for advice that is thoroughly philosophical in origin. But there the warrant is part of a more extensive theological statement.[74] Yet the function of the warrant is not appreciably different from Plutarch's statement above that nothing is more acceptable to gods than children honoring their parents and repaying them for their care.

## Treating Old Men as Scripture Requires

The probes undertaken so far have yielded evidence that the author of 1 Timothy is interested in relationships between generations within the

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[72] See Isaak Heinemann, *Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung: Kulturvergleichende Untersuchungen zu Philons Darstellung der jüdischen Gesetze* (Breslau: Marcus, 1932; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962), 253–254.

[73] Hans-Werner Bartsch, *Die Anfänge urchristlicher Rechtsbildungen* (*TF* 34; Hamburg-Bergstedt: H. Reich, 1965), 30–33. See Deut 12:25, 28; 13:19; 21:9.

[74] See Malherbe, "The *Virtus Feminarum* in 1 Timothy 2:9–15," 52.

church, and that his treatment of them reflects contemporary discussions of old age. The same interest continues in 1 Tim 5:17–19. Scholars disagree whether 5:17–25 constitutes one unit of text, or whether it is a series of unconnected or at most loosely connected directives. Probably the majority of commentators hold that the entire section, vv. 17–22, deals with elders, and some extend the section to v. 25.[75]

I confine myself here primarily to vv. 17–19, which constitute a unit consisting of two commands, which deal with the treatment of πρεσβύτεροι in the church. The first command, to honor certain elders | with financial support, is undergirded by what is claimed to be quotations from Scripture (vv. 17–18). The second, a warning against accepting casual accusations of an elder, is similarly supported by a quotation of Scripture (v. 19). These two commands are followed by a command to reprove the sinners in public so that the rest might fear (v. 20).

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## Honoring Old Men

The identity of the πρεσβύτεροι is much debated, the majority opinion being that they were a group of leaders who had attained official positions as elders in the church.[76] Support for this view is found in the use of πρεσβύτεροι interchangeably with ἐπίσκοπος ("overseer, bishop") in Titus 1:5, 7; an understanding of προϊστάναι (v. 17) as meaning "to rule" (NRSV) or "to direct" (NIV); and the laying on of hands (v. 22), taken to refer to the ordination or installation of the πρεσβύτεροι to the office of elder.

I think it more likely that πρεσβύτεροι here refers to older men regardless of the relationship between πρεσβύτεροι and ἐπίσκοπος in Titus 1:5, 7. That is clearly the meaning of πρεσβύτερος in 5:1, and the treatment of the elderly has been the subject in the succeeding verses. Why should it change in meaning now? It is natural to read v. 17 as continuing the directive in v. 1, as v. 3 continues v. 2. In both cases, directives regarding

[75] See Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure*, 60–63, for a cataloguing of different positions.

[76] On this assumption, different categories of such officials could then be identified; see I. Howard Marshall, *The Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 610–611; C.K. Barrett, *The Pastoral Epistles* (NCB; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 78–79; and the extensive treatment by John P. Meier ("*Presbyteros* in the Pastoral Epistles," *CBQ* 35 [1973]: 323–345) of possible reconstructions. Joachim Jeremias is the notable exception, holding that all the occurrences of πρεσβύτερος in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 5:1, 17, 19; Titus 1:5) refer to old men (*Die Brief an Timotheus und Titus* [NTD 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963], 36). Barrett thinks that "elders" is not yet technical, but here means "older men" (78). For a critique of Jeremias, see Meier, "*Presbyteros* in the Pastoral Epistles," 343–344.

older women and older men, it is commanded that honor be materially expressed in view of their need (the widows) or the services they render (the older men).[77]

283 | The term προϊστάναι admits of a wide range of meanings, including to apply oneself to something (e.g., Titus 3:8, 14), to show concern or care for someone (e.g., Rom 12:8; 1 Thess 5:12), and to lead or govern, the meaning that is at issue here. The word occurs earlier in 1 Timothy (3:4–5, 12), where it is used of household management, and used interchangeably with ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ("to take care of"), as it does in contemporary ancient literature.[78] The way in which the old men are exercising their care is made clear by the phrase that follows, introduced by μάλιστα ("especially, in particular"),[79] they preach and teach, and for that are doubly worthy of the honor paid them.[80]

In v. 1, the author warned against negative attitudes toward and harsh treatment of old men. The question of how the church is to relate to old men is picked up again in v. 17: They are to be honored for their service in the Christian community. This talk of honoring the elders takes us once more to ancient discussions of old age.

The claim made in the Justinian legal codification (sixth century AD), "in our society old age is always honored,"[81] reflected a long-held moral conviction. Sparta was regarded as exemplary in this regard. Cicero opined that "nowhere else is so much deference paid to age and nowhere else is

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[77] To qualify for support, widows must, among other things, have rendered service in the domestic realm (v. 10). It is not specified what service, if any, they are to render after their enrollment as "real widows," but one could suppose that they, like all other old women, were to instruct younger women in their familial and domestic duties (Titus 2:4–5). The activities of the older men are described as both past and present (προεστῶτες [perfect tense: action initiated in the past, continuing in the present], κοπιῶντες [present tense]).

[78] See Philip H. Towner, *The Letters to Timothy and Titus* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 362. See the discussion in Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 312–314; see Hermann von Lips, *Glaube-Gemeinde-Amt: Zum Verständnis der Ordination in den Pastoralbriefen* (FRLANT 122; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 127, for a useful collection of references to ancient texts. To these may be added Hierocles, *On Duties* in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.28.21; 4.22.24 (5:699, 14; 4:504, 18 W-H); in 4:505, 16–18, προστασία and ἐπιμέλεια are used together.

[79] For an interpretation contrary to this traditional one, see Hong Born Kim, "The Interpretation of μάλιστα in 1 Timothy 5:17," *NovT* 4 (2004): 360–368.

[80] Thus the rendering of Campbell, *Elders*, 203, which cuts, perhaps too easily, through complicated speculations about the meaning of διπλῆ τιμή. For an account of different interpretations, see G. Schölgen, "Die διπλῆ τιμή von 1 Tim 5,17," *ZNW* 80 (1989): 232–239; Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 612–614, lists seven. The phrase should not be taken literally but figuratively, in a superlative sense; thus Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 363–364.

[81] *Digest* 50.6.6 (5) praef. See Dalla, "Le fonti giuridice."

it more honored" (*Sen.* 63),[82] and the Spartan customs were adduced as examples to be followed. According to Xenophon, without reference to Sparta, it was a duty children were taught "by custom and | law" to honor 284 their parents (*Cyr* 8.7.10). Aulus Gellius (second century AD) somewhat nostalgically recalls that

> Among the earliest Romans, as a rule, neither birth nor wealth was more highly honoured than age, but older men were reverenced by their juniors almost like gods and like their own parents, and everywhere and in every kind of honour they were regarded as first and of prior right. From a dinner-party, too, older men were escorted home by younger men, as we read in the records of the past, a custom which, as tradition has it, the Romans took over from the Lacedaemonians, by whom, in accordance with the laws of Lycurgus, greater honour on all occasions was paid to greater age. (*Noct. att.* 2.15.1–2 [Rolfe, LCL])

These texts give the impression that it was old age itself that called for respect. Cicero denies this. No mere words can defend old age, he says,

> Nor can wrinkles and grey hair suddenly seize upon influence; but when the preceding part of life has been nobly spent, old age gathers the fruits of influence at the last. For those very things, that seem light and trivial, are marks of honour—the morning visit, being sought after, being made way for, having people rise at one's approach, being escorted to and from the forum, being asked for advice—civilities most scrupulously observed among us and in every other state in proportion as its morals are good. (*Sen.* 63 [Rolfe, LCL])

Despite his disclaimer, Cicero dwells, not on the quality of a life "nobly spent" that leads to honors, but on proper etiquette as demonstrating honor.

These texts show that moralists expected that old men be honored, but the manner in which honor was to be shown is not particularly useful in helping us to construct the social context for 1 Tim 5:17–20. Plutarch, roughly contemporaneous with the Pastorals, is more reflective and potentially useful to us in his tractate *Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs*.

[82] Respect for the Spartan customs is reflected in the presentation of an anecdote illustrating their superiority. In addition to this passage in Cicero, it appears in Valerius Maximus (*Facta et dicta mem.* 4.5. Ext. 2) and in Plutarch (*Apoph. lac.* 235C). Even old women were honored by the Spartans, much to the disapproval of Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.6.1269b32–1270a16); see Brandt, *Wird auch Silbern mein Haar*, 43–46.

Plutarch argues assiduously that old men should not succumb to the idleness, cowardice, and softness that characterizes the inactive life.[83] He goes to great lengths to shame old men into public life (784A–786A; 788B). What he demands of old men is not

> deeds of hands and feet, but counsel, foresight, and speech ... which contains good sense, prudent thought, and conservatism (ἀσφάλειαν); | and in these the hoary hair and the wrinkles that people make fun of appear as witnesses to a man's experience and strengthen him by aid of persuasiveness and the reputation for character. For youth is meant to obey and old age to rule ... (*An seni* 789DE [Fowler, LCL])

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An old man who is active in speaking and doing (λέγων τι καὶ πράττων) and being honoured (τιμώμενος) is a sight to be revered (σεμνὸν ... θαῦμα) (788A; cf. 791B; 793B); "no one who takes part in public life is without hope of attaining the reverence (αἰδώς) and repute (δόξα) to which old age leads" (787D). There is a "prerogative due to seniority in age (πρεσβεῖον)," admitted to by all, and the honor paid to old age adorns the person who pays the honor more than anything else does (787D).

The old man in public service draws benefits in other ways. The pleasures he derives from doing good and noble works for the community and humanity "bear the soul on high as it acquires greatness and lofty spirit mingled with joy" (786BCD).[84] Such acts result in gratitude, praise, and goodwill, which add to his joy in virtue. He preserves his reputation and maintains his friendship with the people "by his mere readiness to serve and by not failing or growing weary in care and concern (τῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ φροντίδος) for the people" (786F–787B).

Like Plutarch's old man, the old men in 1 Tim 5:17–18 serve their communities by their speaking, Plutarch of course having the larger civic community in mind, the NT text the church. According to 5:1, an old man was not to be treated roughly, but deference was to be shown him appropriate to his age. In v. 17, on the other hand, it is the functions he performs that render him worthy of double honor. As in Plutarch, the concern is for the care of the community, but response to such care is more than a matter of being nice to the old fellows; they are to be doubly honored by being bestowed an honorarium, a command that is supported by an appeal to Scripture (v. 18), which is represented by two citations. The author does

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83 Plutarch, *An seni* 784A. He inveighs against the "domesticity" of such a life; cf. 792B.
84 The allusion is to Plato, *Phaedr.* 246B–248E.

not quote directly from the OT, but derives his texts from Christian traditions which dealt with the subject in which he is interested.

*Scripture Says: The Ox and the Workman*

The first citation is of Deut 25:4, "Do not muzzle an ox while it is threshing," which is used in a slightly different form in 1 Cor 9:9, which | in turn is unlike any OT text.[85] The passage originally dealt with the proper care of animals;[86] Paul uses the threshing ox as one of a series of self-evident examples (the soldier, vinedresser, shepherd [v. 10b], ox [vv. 9–10a], farmer [v. 10b], temple functionaries [v. 13]) of the principle that underlies his claim to financial support. These examples are offered in the form of rhetorical questions, whose force is strengthened by finding further support in the Law of Moses (vv. 8–10; cf. 10:10), which he claims was written for the sake of Christians.[87] 286

Yet, for all the importance attached to the fact that it is Scripture, the ox statement is at heart proverbial in character. A proverb was considered "the wisdom of a people, the wisdom of the world" (Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 232). As to its content, it is on par with the other examples Paul lists.

Paul discovers further support of his argument in a command of the Lord that those who preach the gospel should receive their livelihood from the gospel (v. 14). This saying of the Lord has its closest parallel in Luke 10:7 (par. Matt 10:10), which deals polemically with the support of preachers.[88] That Paul gives only the content and not the wording of the Jesus command probably assumes that the wording was familiar to his readers.[89] In fact, the saying was so proverbial as to be unremarkable in

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[85] The differences, however, are slight, involving slight difference in word order and a variant (κημώσεις for φιμώσεις) of some interest but not importance. See Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (2d ed.; New York: American Bible Society, 1994), 492. Hübner, *Vetus Testamentum in Novo*, 259, considers the possibility that 1 Cor 9:9 is not a citation of Deut 25:4, but an interpretation of it.

[86] See Eduard Lohse, "'Kümmert sich Gott etwa um die Ochsen?' Zu 1 Kor 9,9," *ZNW* 88 (1997): 2–3; Erich Grässer, "Nochmal: 'Kümmert sich Gott um die Ochsen?'," *ZNW* 97 (2006): 275–279.

[87] On Paul's hermeneutical use of the text, see David I. Brewer, "1 Corinthians 9.9–11: A Literal Interpretation of 'Do Not Muzzle the Ox,' " *NTS* 38 (1992): 554–565.

[88] Debate about such support is reflected in the tradition: Luke 10:7 declares the worker worthy of his wage (μισθός), which is also what is in Paul's mind (see 1 Cor 9:17–18). Matthew changed that to τροφῆς (cf. *Did.* 13.1), permitting the worker to receive food, but not pay. See Ulrich Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus* (EKKNT 1/2; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Benziger/Neukirchen, 1990), 2:94–95.

[89] So Johannes Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (KEK; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), 239.

itself; it is the attribution to the Lord that draws attention.[90] It is notewor-
287 thy that a Greek proverb, with minor changes, is also attributed | to Jesus in Acts 20:35, which likewise deals with financial matters, and is cited just after Paul is said to deny that he was avaricious.[91]

First Timothy 5:18 is dependent on 1 Cor 9, but strips it down to the two proverbial citations, which represent a commonsensical workaday ethic. A problem is created by καί ("and"), which connects the two citations, thus including as Scripture also what in the Gospel tradition and 1 Cor 9 is a saying of Jesus: "The workman is worthy of his pay." The question this raises about the author's understanding of Scripture need not detain us; what is more important to him is the principle embodied in the ox citation, which is explained by the proverb about the workman.

The author is writing with traditions known to his readers, and he can therefore be succinct, which is his style. He is furthermore dealing with a subject that was treated polemically in the Gospel tradition and 1 Cor 9, and is himself addressing a contentious situation (vv. 19–20). Intramural circumstances move him to reach beyond the general moral traditions about old men that he has been using to Christian tradition that his readers would recognize and consider applicable to themselves.

*The Evidence of Two or Three Witnesses*

The second directive (v. 19) is not connected syntactically to v. 18, and may therefore also be independent of it so far as content is concerned. However, that the author is still interested in the treatment of a πρεσβύτερος suggests that v. 19 is a continuation of vv. 17–18. But the tone becomes much sharper. Instead of a third person plural imperative (ἀξιούσθωσαν ["let . . . be regarded as worthy"], v. 17), which calls for congregational responsibility in an impersonal manner, a prohibition (μὴ παραδέχου ["Do not accept"], v. 19) and a command (ἔλεγχε ["Reprove"], v. 20) in the second person singular demand action from Timothy.[92] The mood also changes from special honor

90 See Anthony E. Harvey, "'The Workman is Worthy of His Hire': Fortunes of a Proverb in the Early Church," *NovT* 24 (1982): 209–221, for references.

91 See Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971), 594 n. 5, with examples.

92 Παραδέχεσθαι may signify no more than that he acted as a church leader (Raymond F. Collins, *1 & 2 Timothy and Titus: A Commentary* [NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002], 146; Jürgen Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus* [EKKNT 15; Zürich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988], 310–311). There is no justification for the view that as an apostolic delegate he "acts with the authority of the apostle" (Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 367).

paid for service to | proper judicial procedure when a charge is brought against an old man.[93] Although v. 19 could apply to any accusation against any member of the community, in this context it likely refers to an old man who performs the services mentioned in v. 17. Financial (im)propriety may also be in view, but certainty on these matters is not easily achievable.[94] 288

The proper occasion to bring a charge is "on the testimony of two or three witnesses," a combination of Deut 17:6 and 19:15 LXX, which is not identified as Scripture, and therefore presumed to be known. The principle of multiple witnesses was widely observed in Judaism, but Deut 19:15 and its parallels were not cited in support of it.[95] It is cited by Paul in 2 Cor 13:1 and in the judicial procedure outlined in Matt 18:16, and it is from this early Christian tradition that the citation in 1 Timothy 5 is derived.[96]

### *Rebuking the Sinners*

A final comment is in order regarding v. 20, which is sometimes taken to be the conclusion of a unit of text (vv. 17–20).

Timothy is to rebuke (ἔλεγχε, "reprove") publicly those who sin (τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας, v. 20). Most commentators identify these sinners as elders who had been convicted in a proper judicial process, and stress the continuing action expressed by the present participle, indicating that the disciplinary action taken against them did not have the desired effect.[97] But that is not at all obvious. There is no syntactical connection to link v. 20 with the judicial procedure of v. 19. And there is no | syntactical connection between vv. 20, 21, 22, 23, which are a series of independent commands. 289

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[93] I know of no compelling reason why πρεσβύτερος in v. 19 should be understood differently from vv. 1 and 17. So also LaFosse, "An Anthropological View of Old Age in Early Christian Communities," 8.

[94] In support of this surmise is the fact that vv. 3–18 deal with financial matters. It is also noteworthy that the author requires elders/bishops not be lovers of money (1 Tim 3:3) or greedy for gain (Titus 1:7), and that they vigorously oppose heretics, who teach for the sake of gain (Titus 1:9–11).

[95] E.g., *Sanh.* 5; Josephus, *Vita* 256–257; *A.J.* 4.219; See Hendrik van Vliet, *No Single Testimony: A Study on the Adoption of the Law of Deut. 19:15 par. Into the New Testament* (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1958); and the supplement, van Vliet, *Did Greek-Roman-Hellenistic Law Know the Exclusion of the Single Witness?* (Franeker: T. Wever, 1980).

[96] See the lucid treatment of the issue by Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 367–370.

[97] E.g., Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 310–311; Marshall, *The Pastoral Epistles*, 618; Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 370–371. LaFosse, "An Anthropological View of Old Age in Early Christian Communities," 8–9, finding parallels to *1 Clem.* 3.3; 21.6, thinks the reference is to young men who brought false charges against the elderly.

Ἐλέγχειν is indeed used in Matt 18:15 (but of rebuking in private), and the judicial procedure of Deut 19 does result in the fear of the rest (οἱ ἐπίλοιποι ἀκούσαντες φοβηθήσονται) (v. 20). It is a harsh word, and is used in the Pastoral Epistles of speech against heretics (2 Tim 4:2; Titus 1:9, 13). If my contention that πρεσβύτερος here refers to an old man has merit, a further difficulty arises. We noted above that ἔλεγχος is virtually equivalent to ἐπίπληξις, that such speech is aimed at correcting sins (ἁμαρτήματα) by instilling fear (φόβος), and that it was inappropriate for youth to use such speech in addressing their elders. First Timothy 5:1 represents that convention perfectly, and v. 20 would fly in its face if those who are sinning and are to be reproved are old men. On the other hand, the author remains consistent if he thinks that convicting speech addressed to certain members of the congregation will have a salutary effect on other members.

## Conclusion

An awareness of ancient Greek and Latin comments on old age makes us more sensitive to the interest of the Pastoral Epistles in the relationship between different generations in the church. The basic thrust of the author's moral instruction is derived from Hellenistic moral tradition and demands that some old women and men be honored, which means that they are to receive financial assistance from the church because of their need or for their ongoing service.

The author's use of the Hellenistic traditions is quite conventional. He uses them with ease, with conviction that they are pleasing to God (1 Tim 5:4; cf. 2:3), and holds up pagan moral practice to provide incentive for Christian behavior (5:8). When he does differ from these traditions it is only in degree rather than as a different understanding of the moral life. For example, it appears that he envisages a larger role for women to take care of their widowed mothers or grandmothers than was usual in the larger society.

The traditions he uses do open windows on the social reality of his circumstance. But he does not use the traditions available to himself to construct a new, creative moral statement in the way he uses pagan and Christian traditions to construct impressive Christological formulations, as in Titus 2:11–14 and 3:3–7. It is not that he has only a superficial | knowledge of these traditions, but that he does not use them in a theologically creative manner. 290

The author shows even less creativity in using Scripture. He makes no independent use of the OT. He derives two of his citations from Christian tradition and uses them in a leaner form, which makes their proverbial character more prominent. The third citation is in fact not a scriptural text but is also a proverb widely used, not only by Christians. He uses the biblical material, whether identified as such or not, because of its self-evident usefulness and general applicability. There is nothing theological in what he cites; there is only the claim, correct or not, that it is "Scripture," whatever that means to him.

It is difficult to decide to what degree the texts from the Pastorals touched on in this article were addressed to actual situations. On a general level, they do appear to reflect social reality, such as the concern with relationships between the generations and how widows are to be cared for. And the polemical Christian background from which his proverbial examples of the ox and the workman come may suggest that the author is confronting controversies about payment of preachers. But it is not absolutely clear that this is the case, or whether he is giving directives which are generally applicable, including the context in which he was writing.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

# GODLINESS, SELF-SUFFICIENCY, GREED, AND THE ENJOYMENT OF WEALTH: 1 TIMOTHY 6:3–19*

## PART I[1]

This essay deals with the instructions on money in 1 Timothy 6, culminating in 1 Tim 6:17–19, the concluding instruction in 1 Timothy. Although the passage is problematic in a number of ways, treatment of it in its own right has been relatively slim, attention rather being concentrated on how it relates to the rest of chapter 6. While the question of literary relationship is important and will receive some attention, I wish to explore | more extensively than has been done the traditions used in this final exhortation, instruction to the wealthy in the church. 377

Studies of the moral teaching of the Pastoral Epistles (henceforth PE) have tended to concentrate on the influence of popular philosophers on the author. In a number of studies I have attempted to demonstrate that an awareness of philosophical traditions available to the author sheds light on these letters. The philosophy in view is usually Stoicism, but recently Cynicism has also come under consideration.[2] In this article I wish to cast the net more widely, to include other evidence of popular moral teaching of the day in addition to the philosophical, to provide a broader context within which to situate the Pastorals, and more narrowly, the discussion of wealth in 1 Tim 6.

Such a richer description of the moral landscape permits a more nuanced view of the relationship of the PE to their environment than simply one of derivation or influence. At the very least, it makes one aware of the variety of opinions that were held about wealth. A brief canvass of the types of materials used by the PE in their moral teaching will provide perspective for my investigation.

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* Originally published in *NovT* 52 (2010): 376–405.

[1] This is the first of a two-part article on this topic. This article is dedicated to John Fitzgerald and Michael White with gratitude.

[2] Nils Neumann, “Kein Gewinn=Gewinn: Die kynisch geprägte Struktur der Agumentation in 1 Tim 6:3–12,” *NovT* 51 (2009): 127–147.

## Sources for Describing Graeco-Roman Popular Morality

### *Popular Philosophers and Their Teaching*

The Pastoral Epistles are deeply indebted to Hellenistic moral philosophers in matters of style, ethics, and even theology.[3] This is true of the discussion | in chapter 5, where intergenerational relationships are the issue.[4] It is also true of the discussion in chapter 6, as will be demonstrated. But before proceeding to that chapter, a few comments on what is meant by popular moral philosophy are in order.

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To speak of "popular philosophers" or "popular philosophy" does not imply that the philosophers in view or the teaching associated with them was uniformly liked or approved. The diversity in self-perception, motivation and style of speech and demeanor among these philosophers shows that the situation was more complex. This appears, for example, in the way Lucian of Samosata lampoons some philosophers in satires like *The Runaways* and *Philosophies for Sale* on the one hand, and his respectful portrayal of ideal figures in *Demonax* and *Nigrinus* on the other. The differences emerge equally clearly from within the enterprise, as Dio Chrysostom makes clear in autobiographical comments, describing how it came about that he adopted the philosophical way of life and how he

[3] For ethics, see Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 50–51, 72, 83, 91, passim; Benjamin Fiore, *The Pastoral Epistles: First Timothy, Second Timothy, Titus* (SP 12; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 2007), 12–14, and throughout the commentary; Abraham J. Malherbe, "The *Virtus Feminarum* in 1 Timothy 2:9–15," in *Renewing Tradition: Studies in Texts and Contexts in Honor of James W. Thompson* (ed. Mark W. Hamilton, Thomas H. Olbricht, Jeffrey Peterson; PTMS 65; Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick, 2006), 45–65 [*Light*, 1:459–477]; on style, Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," in *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (ed. James M. Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen; BZNW 125; New York: de Gruyter, 2007), 297–317 [*Light*, 1:407–430]; on soteriology, Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners': Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology* (ed. Jan G. van der Watt; NovTSup 121; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 331–358. [*Light*, 1:431–457]; more broadly, Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333. [*Light*, 2:675–749]. For critical reflection on the enterprise represented by such studies, see L. Michael White and John T. Fitzgerald, "*Quod Est Comparandum:* The Problem of Parallels," in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, L. Michael White; NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 13–39.

[4] Abraham J. Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men," in *Scripture and Traditions: Essays on Early Judaism and Christianity in Honor of Carl R. Holladay* (ed. Patrick Gray and Gail R. O'Day; NovTSup 129; Leiden: Brill), 263–290. [*Light*, 1:479–505] For a wider perspective on the Pastoral Epistles, see Malherbe, "*Paulus Senex*," *ResQ* 36 (1994): 197–207. [*Light*, 1:277–288]

was sometimes accepted and at other times rejected by his audiences. Dio spoke mostly in public, accessible to large crowds of listeners, while other philosophers spoke in classrooms, gymnasia, and salons of the rich, thus also physically accessible in more defined settings.[5]

The term "popular" is serviceable to apply to philosophers whose teachings were intellectually accessible as well to a wide swath of society. Their philosophy was not conceptually complex or technical by way of formal argumentation; indeed, they were not interested in sustained or systematic exposition in or for itself.[6] They aimed at the moral formation of people, | to whom they advanced the proposition that human beings can 379 live morally and virtuously only if they live rationally, and the rational life, they held, was the province of philosophy in the sense that it made that life possible and provided details as to what it should be.[7]

The educational level presumed is that of adolescent males, although a philosopher like Musonius Rufus insisted that young women too should study philosophy.[8] The philosophers' interest was in ethics, the intellectual underpinning of which was to a considerable degree provided by Stoicism, whose influence was widespread. It is found, for instance, in the orations

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[5] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13, 32, on which see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 23–29; Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 35–48. A more extensive discussion is found in Johannes Hahn, *Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft: Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der hohen Kaiserzeit* (HABES 7; Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1989).

[6] There were authors who were interested in systematic exposition of doctrine (e. g., Alcinous, *Didaskalikos;* Ps.-Plutarch, *Plac. philos.;* Sextus Empiricus), but they are not in view here. Rather, it is individuals like Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Seneca, and Dio Chrysostom who come in for consideration. Hierocles the Stoic (early 2nd cent. AD) did write an epitome, *On Duties*, which treats social responsibilities, but in a practical, nontechnical manner; see Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*, 85–105, for an English translation; and now, Ilaria Ramelli and David Konstan, *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts* (WGRW 28; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2009).

[7] See Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 7DE. See further, Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners,'" 341–343.

[8] See John M. Cooper, "Theory and Moral Improvement in Epictetus," in *The Philosophy of Epictetus* (ed. Theodore Scaltsas; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 9–19, on Epictetus teaching teenage boys and young men: they were to study the texts of Chrysippus with a view toward their moral development. See Andrew S. Mason, in the introduction to the volume (p. 2): "Undoubtedly one of (Epictetus's) major achievements was to make Stoicism accessible to a wider audience," his concern being not Stoic logic or cosmology, but how to improve our lives.

of the well-educated sophist, Maximus of Tyre, whose intellectual level has recently been described aptly as that of "philosophy made easy."[9]

But, to judge from Lucian's satires, philosophic pretenders from the lower classes would pick up a philosophic term here and there to spice up their harangues as they joined the ranks of the street preachers, who were mostly Cynic.[10]

### *Inscriptions and Popular Morality*

It is difficult to determine how far the influence of moral philosophy extended beyond the circles who either explicitly claimed to be philosophi-
380 cal | or appealed to philosophical traditions. Adolf Deissmann a century ago thought that inscriptions more accurately represented popular thinking than philosophical texts.[11] Later, Martin Dibelius identified many similarities between honorary inscriptions and popular morality, but cautiously stipulated that the relationship had not been explained thoroughly.[12] In recent years, there has been renewed interest in utilizing inscriptions to illuminate the NT in general,[13] and study of the PE has continued to be

[9] Michael B. Trapp, *Maximus of Tyre: The Philosophical Orations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), xvi–xx. Philosophers and sophists inhabited the same larger space and addressed the same public, educated and uneducated, so that their speeches were similar enough for them to feel the need to stress how they differed from each other. See Martin Korenjak, *Publikum und Redner: Ihre Interaktion in der sophistischen Rhetorik der Kaiserzeit* (ZMKA 104; Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000), 53–61, 170–194.

[10] Lucian, *Fug.* 3–5, 10; *Bis acc.* 6–7.

[11] Adolf Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World* (trans. Lionel R.M. Strachan; 4th ed.; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1927; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1965), 308–318. In this regard, religious inscriptions from Lydia and Phrygia are especially significant. See Hans-Josef Klauck, "Die kleinasiatischen Beichtinschriften und das Neuen Testament," in Klauck, *Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum: Neutestamentliche Studien* (WUNT 152; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 57–81; Hermut Loehr, "The Greek Propitiatory Inscriptions and Dedications from Lydia and Phrygia: Present State of Research and Relevance for Early Christian Moral Thought" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, New Orleans, La., November 21, 2009).

[12] Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 50–51, 72.

[13] The work by Edwin Judge and his students at Macquarie University has been especially significant in this regard. The importance of the inscriptions is made evident by *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity*, vols. 1–5 (ed. G.H.R. Horsley), vols. 6–9 (ed. S.R. Llewelyn); vols. 1–7 (1981–1992) published by Macquarie University, vols. 8–9 (1997, 2002) published by Eerdmans; James R. Harrison, *Paul's Language of Grace in Its Graeco-Roman Context* (WUNT 2.172; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 26–40. See also Ceslas Spicq, *Lexique théologique du nouveau testament* (2d ed.; Fribourg: Éditions universitaires de Fribourg/ Paris: Cerf, 1991), 8–9.

enriched by bringing them into the conversation.[14] But determining the value of inscriptions, whether honorific or on tombstones, has to come to terms with certain facts.

To begin with, epigraphic reference to philosophers is very slight,[15] as is epigraphic philosophical propaganda.[16] Coming at the matter from the | 381 philosophers' side, we do know that for a philosopher like Plutarch, "epigraphy can serve as a measure of character and great deeds,"[17] and the virtues celebrated in honorific inscriptions were also held to be virtues by moral philosophers.[18] Furthermore, as Teresa Morgan holds, although tombstones or dedications that exhibit ethical vocabulary were likely to have been erected by wealthy families, and "the range and relative frequency of the virtues enumerated in first- and second-century epitaphs" has not been studied as a whole by anyone, the indications that emerge from Lattimore's study "suggest that virtues celebrated on epitaphs are, on the whole, also those found in popular sayings and stories."[19] Elizabeth Forbis has a similar judgment about the honorific inscriptions she has

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[14] For inscriptions and the Pastorals, see Reggie M. Kidd, *Wealth and Beneficence in the Pastoral Epistles: A "Bourgeois" Form of Early Christianity?* (SBLDS 122; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 12–16, 87–91, commenting on Martin Dibelius's use of inscriptions; see Frederick W. Danker, *Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field* (St. Louis: Clayton, 1982), 28, 46; Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:7.

[15] Matthias Haake, *Der Philosoph in der Stadt: Untersuchungen zur öffentlichen Rede über Philosophen und Philosophie in den hellenistischen Poleis* (Munich: Beck, 2007), sifts the evidence.

[16] The massive inscription (some 100m long and 3m high) by Diogenes of Oenoanda, publicizing Epicurean doctrine, may be significant, but it is generally taken to have been unique. See Diskin Clay, "The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda: New Discoveries 1969–1983," *ANRW* 2.36.4 (1990): 2446–2559; Clay, "The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda," in *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC–200 AD* (ed. Richard Sorabji and Robert W. Sharples; BICS Suppl. 94; London: University of London, 2007), 283–291.

[17] Peter Liddel, "Scholarship and Morality: Plutarch's Use of Inscriptions," in *The Unity of Plutarch's Work: 'Moralia' Themes in the 'Lives,' Features of the 'Lives' in the 'Moralia'* (ed. Anastasios G. Nikolaidis; MS 19; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 125–137, esp. 132–136, "The Morality of Epigraphy" (p. 134: "For Plutarch, epigraphy can serve as a measure of character great deeds").

[18] See esp. Cecile Panagopoulos, "Vocabulaire et mentalité dans les *Moralia* de Plutarque," *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 3 (1977): 197–235 (205–207 on wealth), who compares them with Plutarch. For nuanced commentary on this article, see Edwin A. Judge, "Ethical Terms in St. Paul and the Inscriptions of Ephesus," in Judge, *The First Christians in the Roman World: Augustan and New Testament Essays* (ed. James R. Harrison; WUNT 229; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 368–377. See Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men," 278–281.

[19] Teresa Morgan, *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8, 305. The reference is to Richmond Lattimore, *Themes in Greek*

studied: "With very few exceptions . . . the words chosen to illustrate virtuous behavior in these honorary texts belong to the standard Latin vocabulary for virtue."[20]

It is true that inscriptions must be used with the greatest care in constructing demographic models,[21] but they are a useful bit of evidence when 382 read in conjunction with literary sources.[22] These writings have recently | been called aristocratic, which is taken to mean that they are of little value as descriptions of social realities, pride of place rather belonging to inscriptions.[23] I do not share this judgment, which stands the matter on its head. The two sources should be regarded as complementary, the literary being more extensive and clearly sharing an affinity with the PE, namely the aim of effecting moral behavior. We shall return to this matter below, when discussing the use of wealth.

### *Proverbs and Popular Morality*

Teresa Morgan has described popular morality in the early Roman Empire on the basis of proverbs, gnomes, exemplary stories, and fables, and raised the question of the relationship between popular morality and "high philosophy." Her sources for the latter are Seneca, Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Epictetus as she combines the two.[24] She concludes that the philosophers used popular material to make a case, not simply to illustrate an argument, and that "there is more evidence that high philosophy drew its questions, if not its answers, from popular morality." But, she concludes,

*and Latin Epitaphs* (UISLL 28.1–2; Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1942; repr., 1962).

[20] Elizabeth Forbis, *Municipal Virtues in the Roman Empire: The Evidence of Italian Honorary Inscriptions* (BA 79; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1996), 92.

[21] See the negative assessments of the value of inscriptions for generalizing about mortality rates by Hartwin Brandt, *Wird auch silbern mein Haar: Eine Geschichte des Alters in der Antike* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002), 158–159; Jens-Uwe Krause, "Antike" in *Geschichte der Familie* (ed. Andreas Gestrich, Jens-Uwe Krause, and Michael Mitterauer; KTA 376; Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 2003), 23–24.

[22] See Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men," 279–281, for how the *pietas* of a woman lauded in an inscription (*CIL* 6.1527, 31670 [*ILS* 8393]) for her care for her family is reflective of views expressed in literature.

[23] Harrison, *Paul's Language of Grace*, 26–40.

[24] For Plutarch's use of proverbs and fables, see José Antonio Fernandez Delgado, "On the Problematic Classification of Some Rhetorical Elements in Plutarch," in Nikolaidis, *Unity of Plutarch's Work*, 23–32.

they are "two streams of culture, ultimately rising from many of the same sources."[25]

The matter looks slightly different when the interest is in moral instruction, which is our concern in this essay, rather than theoretical argument. One of the types of material Morgan examines is the proverb. After dealing with philosophers' attempts to define what a proverb is, she is led to the broad statement, "The essential features of proverbs, in the authors I have quoted, seem to be that they are traditional, popular, anonymous and instructive."[26] Proverbs, socially "low in origin," are self-evidently true, and represent common wisdom.[27] These features made proverbs a natural part of the moral philosopher's rhetorical repertoire, particularly in paraenesis.

| In his discussion of that part of philosophy that the Greeks call paraenetic (*paraeneticen*) and the Romans call preceptorial (*praeceptivam*), Seneca (*Ep.* 95.1) makes the case that precepts require no proofs when they are used, for they are self-evidently true and compelling, whether couched in prose or poetry, or in proverbs. Seneca maintains that the capacity to do what is honorable is within us, just waiting to be stimulated by advice (*admonitio*), a proverb or precept sufficing to do that (*Ep.* 94.27–29, 43, 47, illustrating his point by quoting a number of proverbs). Two things combine to make them irrefutable: their intrinsic, self-evident rightness, and the acknowledgment by people generally that they contain wisdom. This is also a major feature of paraenesis.[28] 383

The author of the Pastoral Epistles uses proverbs, understood in the way described by Morgan, in all three letters, which are, for the most part, paraenetic. See, for example, the following: 1 Tim 4:8, "physical training is beneficial for a few things, but godliness (εὐσέβεια) is beneficial for all things," is sometimes thought to be proverbial, originating in Stoic philosophy, where philosophy was praised. Christians substituted εὐσέβεια for philosophy.[29] First Timothy 5:18, "Do not muzzle an ox while he is

[25] Teresa Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 298–299; cf. 14: "Popular morality had more influence on high philosophy than is usually assumed, but . . . any influence the other way was limited." See pp. 285–299 for the comparison.

[26] Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 27.

[27] Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 6, 25–27.

[28] See Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 307–308; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, "The Concept of Paraenesis" in Starr and Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*, 54–59, on Seneca.

[29] Thus Helmut Merkel, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (NTD 9/1; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 37; followed by Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 551, and Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 306; rejected by Martin Brändl, *Der Agon bei Paulus: Herkunft und Profil*

threshing," although a citation of Scripture (Deut 25:4), is proverbial in nature. And "The workman is worthy of his wage," in the same passage, although identified as Scripture, is in fact a word of Jesus derived from the Synoptic tradition and is also a proverb.[30]

Titus 1:12, "Liars ever, men of Crete, nasty brutes that live to eat," is a proverb,[31] as is Titus 1:15, "all things are pure to the pure."[32] Sometimes 384 | the oxymoron in 2 Tim 4:2, "in season and out of season," is referred to as proverbial,[33] but it is in fact derived from the rhetoric of psychagogy.[34] There has been a tendency to identify too freely as proverbial material that seems to ill fit their context and looks to be traditional,[35] which may be due partly to a lack of appreciation of the abruptness of the style of exhortation and partly to the convenient slipperiness of defining a proverb.

It is noteworthy that the proverbs in 1 Tim 5:18, as does the Greek proverb, with minor changes, attributed to Jesus in Acts 20:38, "It is more blessed to give than to receive," also deals with financial matters. And the command in 2 Thess 3:10, "If someone does not want to work, let him not eat," with good reason sounded to Deissmann like "a bit of good old workshop morality."[36] What these passages have in common, other than their proverbial character, is that they deal with financial remuneration for work performed, in two cases, manual labor (Acts 20:38; 2 Thess 3:10). In 1 Tim 5:18 the proverbial statement also derives from the working

*paulinischer Agonmetaphorik* (WUNT 2.222; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 372–375, who sees nothing philosophical behind the statement but rather a sapiential Hellenistic Jewish maxim (*Sentenz*) taken from the criticism of athletes.

[30] The passage is discussed in Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men," 285–287. See Anthony E. Harvey, "'The Workman is Worthy of his Hire': Fortunes of a Proverb in the Early Church," *NovT* 24 (1982): 209–221, for extracanonical parallels.

[31] Translation by Jerome D. Quinn, *The Letter to Titus* (AB 35; New York: Doubleday, 1990), 107, and the discussion of the proverb there (107–109).

[32] See Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 612, and on both Titus 1:12 and 15, and Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 305.

[33] So, Lock, *Pastoral Epistles*, 112, "semi-proverbial"; J.N.D. Kelly, *A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles: I Timothy, II Timothy, Titus* (HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 206, "a proverbial jingle."

[34] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 137–145.

[35] See James D. Miller, *The Pastoral Epistles as Composite Documents* (SNTSMS 93; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8 (1 Tim 4:8), 86–87 (5:24–25), 90 (6:6–10), 101–102 (2 Tim 1:6–7), 107–108 (2:3–6), 115 (2:20–21).

[36] Deissmann, *Light*, 314. For Acts 20:38, see Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971), 594 n. 5.

class, but the application is to financial support of those who labor in the church's service.[37]

The frequency with which proverbs and similar material appear in the PE is worth noting in light of ancient epistolary theory about the appropriate style of a letter. Gregory of Nazianzus, commenting on charm (χάρις), says:

> This we should preserve if, on the one hand, we avoided writing with complete aridity, gracelessness and lack of embellishment, in the unadorned and untrimmed style, as it is called, which allows for no pithy sayings (γνωμῶν), proverbs (παροιμιῶν) or apophthegms (ἀποφθεγμάτων) nor for witticism or enigmas which sweeten discourse. On the other hand we should not make undue use of these devices. Not to use them at all is boorish, to use them too much is cloying.[38] | 385

And Demetrius says about ornament (κάλλος) that a letter may have it

> in the shape of friendly bits of kindly advice (φιλικαὶ φιλοφρονήσεις) mixed with a few good proverbs (παροιμίαι). This last is the only philosophy admissible in it—the proverb being the wisdom of the people, the wisdom of the world. But the man who utters sententious maxims (γνωμολογῶν) and exhortations (προτρεπόμενος) seems to be no longer talking familiarly in a letter but to be speaking *ex cathedra*.[39]

Gregory and Ps.-Demetrius are writing about friendly letters,[40] in which an abundance of gnomes, apophthegms, protrepses, *chreiai* and the like are not appropriate. Proverbs belong to these popular philosophical means of moral instruction.[41] The Pastoral Epistles are not "friendly letters," but partake of the nature of philosophical letters, in which proverbs or proverbial wisdom are at home.

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[37] Note also the proverbial statement in Luke 6:24 (cf. 16:25): the rich already have their consolation; see Plato, *Resp.* 1.329E and the note in LCL.

[38] *Ep.* 51.5; trans. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 61.

[39] Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 232; Roberts, LCL, reprinted in Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 18–19. Quintilian, *Inst.* 8.5.25–34, similarly discusses the use and abuse of *sententiae* in rhetorical ornamentation. (Cf. *Ad Herennium* 4.17.25 on the brevity of their use.)

[40] See Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 58–70, on such letters.

[41] See Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*, 79–85 (philosophers' use of letters), 109–111 (gnomes), 111–114 (*chreiai*), 122–124 (protrepsis), 124–129 (paraenesis). Walter T. Wilson, *Love without Pretense* (WUNT 2.46; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 11–24, discusses gnomic sayings in general and ventures to distinguish between the maxim and the proverb (12–14). See Rollin Ramsaran, *Liberating Words: Paul's Use of Rhetorical Maxims in 1 Corinthians 1–10* (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996), 9–17.

## The Literary Context of 1 Tim 6:17–19

### *Introduction*

Commentators generally agree that there is so close a relationship between 1 Tim 6:17–19 and 1:3–20 that they form an *inclusio* to the whole letter.[42] Jukka Thurén, who has been most influential in arguing for this view, 386 drew | attention to the warnings against false teachers in both sections (1:5–6 and 6:20–21), and claimed that the entire letter is to be seen as a warning against false teachers and their sins, and the commendations of true doctrine.[43]

There is less agreement on the literary structure of 6:2b–21. How the five passages that comprise this section (vv. 2b–5; 6–10; 11–16; 17–19; 20–21) relate to each other is not immediately obvious, nor has agreement been reached on whether there is one theme that pervades the section, and if so, what it is. It has been argued, for example, that the main theme is the opposition to heretics who make commerce of religion,[44] or that the theme is the correct or wrong attitude toward money,[45] or that the section is a conglomeration of material, assembled haphazardly[46] or in the syntactically loose style of paraenesis.[47] It has also been maintained, on the contrary, that the structure of the section is well thought out, formally

[42] E.g., Walter Lock, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (ICC 39; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1924), 67; Jürgen Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus* (EKKNT 15; Zürich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988), 327; I. Howard Marshall, *The Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999); Raymond F. Collins, *I & II Timothy and Titus: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1992), 160. Lorenz Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (3 vols.; HTKNT 11.2.1–3; Freiburg: Herder, 1994), 1:270, lists the parallels as follows: 1:3||6:3; 1:4||6:4; 1:9–10||6:4; 1:6||6:21; 1:18||6:12; 1:18||6:20; 1:17||6:15–16.

[43] Jukka Thurén, "Die Struktur der Schlussparänese 1. Tim. 6,3–21," *ThZ* 26 (1970): 241–253, esp. 242–243.

[44] Adolf Schlatter, *Die Kirche der Griechen im Urteil des Paulus: Eine Auslegung seiner Briefe an Timotheus und Titus* (2d ed.; Stuttgart: Calwer, 1958), 159–175; Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 341; Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe* 1:269–270; Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 326; Ray Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure in the Pastoral Epistles* (JSNTSup 280; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2004), 131; Philip H. Towner, *The Letters to Timothy and Titus* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 391.

[45] Joachim Jeremias, *Die Briefe an Timotheus und Titus* (NTD 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1963), 44; Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 556; more extensively by Kidd, *Wealth and Beneficence in the Pastoral Epistles*, 93–100.

[46] E.g., Adolf Harnack, *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur* (Leipzig: Hinrich, 1897), 1:482; Robert Falconer, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), 158; esp. Miller, *Pastoral Epistles as Composite Documents*, 88–95, who thinks that interpolations have been made.

[47] Esp. Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 91; Norbert Brox, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (5th ed.; RNT; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1989), 212.

and theologically, and that it is the result of a long history of reflection and repetition.[48]

It is not necessary for my present purpose to resolve these issues in detail. It will suffice at the moment to claim in anticipation that the paraenetic nature of vv. 2b–21 must be taken more seriously. When that is done, it will be observed that there is greater coherence in the section than is usually supposed. To do that requires a closer look at the context of vv. 17–19. | 387

### *Advice on Financial Aid to Widows and Old Men; Paraenesis to Timothy and to Slaves, 5:1–6:2a*

The literary context of 6:17–19 consists not only of 6:2b–21, which comes in for discussion most often, but also includes chapter 5 and 6:1–2b. The author thinks of this latter section as teaching and exhortation: ταῦτα δίδασκε καὶ παρακάλει (6:2b), the ταῦτα pointing backwards, to 5:1, παρακάλει. This is in keeping with his use of ταῦτα in paraenetic statements to summarize advice that precedes, and to mark a transition, as it does here.[49]

This block of text for the most part has three groups within the church in view and instructs them about the proper use of money. Directions are given about how the church should honor old women, particularly widows (5:3–16) and old men (5:17–19) by supporting them financially,[50] Christian slaves are similarly commanded to honor their own masters, especially if they are believing brethren, for then the recipients of the slaves' benefaction are beloved believers.[51]

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[48] Thurén, "Der Struktur der Schlussparänese 1. Tim. 6,3–21," esp. 251–253, who holds that the paraenetic scheme in 1 Tim 6 is related to Heb 13, where Deut 31:6–8 [Heb 13:5], but not Deut 30, is cited, and points to the fact that Deut 30:1–20, 1 Tim 6, and Heb 13 are all concluding paraenesis.

[49] Cf. Titus 2:15, ταῦτα καὶ παρακάλει καὶ ἔλεγχε, also reaching back to 2:1, λάλει ἃ πρέπει τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ, thus enclosing the intervening paraenesis about communal relations. The other occurrences are 1 Tim 3:14; 4:6, 11, 15; 5:7, 21; 6:2b, 11; 2 Tim 2:2 (?), 14; Titus 3:8.

[50] See Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men."

[51] For an excellent analysis of the difficulties of the passage, see Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 379–390. My reading of the passage is informed by discussions of the *beneficium* (εὐεργεσία) of friendship, which entertain the possibility of a slave giving a benefit to his master, a possibility for which Seneca argues in *Ben.* 3.17–22; cf. 28.1. That the benefit rendered might be financial is quite possible in urban households of the financial status envisaged in 1 Timothy (Abraham J. Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19," *NovT* 53 (2011): 73–96," Part II, on vv. 17–19) [*Light*, 1:535–557]. A similar financial status may be reflected in Titus 2:10, where νοσφιζόμενος may describe the slave's misuse of his own money.

Between the directions to the church (5:3–19) and the slaves, the author addresses Timothy directly (vv. 20–23), solemnly adjuring him to guard the instruction just given (again the "paraenetic" ταῦτα, v. 21), and urging 388 him to behavior that does not explicitly relate to what precedes.[52] |

*Warnings against Greed, 6:2b–10*

Chapter 6 largely deals with what should be the church's attitude toward money and its use. The discussion is enclosed by two warnings against the heretics (vv. 3, 20–21) and commands to Timothy to teach and guard tradition (vv. 2b, 20). Between these two brackets are instructions to the church in general on εὐσέβεια (vv. 3–5) and αὐτάρκεια (vv. 6–10) as they pertain to money, a charge to Timothy personally (vv. 11–16), and instruction to the rich on how to use their wealth (vv. 17–19).

*On εὐσέβεια and πορισμός, 6:2b–5*

Discussion of a new issue is marked by the transitional ταῦτα δίδασκε καὶ παρακάλει in v. 2b.

Formally, vv. 3–5 is an *inclusio* in which a correct understanding of εὐσέβεια (v. 3) is contrasted with an erroneous one (v. 5). The long enclosed sentence is polemical, directed against the conceit that commerce can be made of εὐσέβεια, a term important in the PE and particularly so in 1 Timothy.[53] Important for our present purpose is that εὐσέβεια is related to the correct teaching, which is not heeded by the heretics (v. 3). That teaching is described as the sound or healthy words of our Lord Jesus Christ (ὑγιαίνουσιν λόγοις τοῖς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ), the genitive being objective, referring to the sound teaching about Jesus. The teaching is further explained to be the teaching that accords with godliness (καὶ τῇ κατ᾽ εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλίᾳ). The person who is not devoted to this teaching is cognitively deficient: he is demented (τετύφωται), understands nothing (μηδὲν ἐπιστάμενος), but is ill, having a morbid craving for disputes and verbal battles (ἀλλὰ νοσῶν περὶ ζητήσεις καὶ λογομαχίας) from which issue the vices of envy, strife, slander, evil suspicions, in sum, the frictional

[52] Commentators differ on how far the directions about the treatment of the old men extends, whether to vv. 19, 20, 22 or 25. See the catalogue of opinions in Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure*, 60–62. I think the advice regarding the old men extends clearly to v. 19, progressively much less clearly beyond that verse.

[53] See 1 Tim 2:2; 3:16; 4:7, 8; 5:4 (εὐσεβέω); 6:3, 5, 6, 11; 2 Tim 3:12 (εὐσεβῶς); 3:5; 2 Tim 2:16 (ἀσέβεια; cf. Titus 2:12); 1 Tim 1:9 (ἀσεβής). For discussions of εὐσέβεια, see the excursuses in Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 135–144; Collins, *I & II Timothy and Titus*, 122–126.

wranglings of people corrupt in mind (διεφθαρμένων ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν) and deprived of the truth, supposing that godliness is a means to financial gain (πορισμός).

This language is derived from contemporary criticisms of philosophers who were accused of teaching out of ignoble motives. That some unscrupulous individuals taught for financial gain was so common a charge that | some serious philosophers rejected financial aid.[54] The accusation 389 appears in Titus 1:11, where the teachers of error are charged with teaching αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν. The author has no qualms about a Christian preacher receiving financial support; in 1 Tim 5:17–18 he thinks the practice is so self-evidently correct that mere statements of proverbial character provide sufficient support for it. What offends in Titus 1:11 is that, like charlatan philosophers, the purpose of teaching is to make money.

Philosophers, too, were concerned about how to secure a livelihood. The term πορισμός (or πόρος) itself was neutral; the issue was the appropriateness of the endeavor to support oneself.[55] First Timothy 6:3–5 is sharper in its criticism of the heretics than Titus 1:11, charging that they demand financial support, not simply because they are greedy, but because they think their πορισμός is a matter of εὐσέβεια. This criticism is different also in another way, namely, that it is the intellectual equipment of the teachers of error that leads them to the erroneous perception that εὐσέβεια justifies their profiteering. Noteworthy about this polemic is the medical terminology used to describe the intellectual incapacity of the errorists that is responsible for their vices detailed in the list in v. 4. The PE are shot through with terms describing the heretics as mentally and morally diseased.[56] Here we are in the midst of popular moral philosophical descriptions of the human condition.[57]

[54] For the charge, see Lucian, *Fug.* 14; for the ideal philosopher's refusal of financial aid, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 31.5; 32.11; Lucian, *Nigr.* 25–26; *Demon.* 8, 63; Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.1–2. On how philosophers were supported, see Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 52–59.

[55] See, e.g., Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 11 (57, 7 [πόρος]; 89, 4 [πορισμός] Hense); Diogenes Laertius 7.188–189 (πορισμός, ποριστέον) is the use in the *topos* on household management, which has left traces in the PE. See, e.g., Philodemus, *Oec.* 23.2, 3–4, 6, 19; cf. 1.10–17 Jensen, and further on the *topos*, see Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed," Part II.

[56] E.g., 1 Tim 4:2 (cauterized); 6:4 (diseased), 5 (rotten in mind); cf. 2 Tim 3:8 (corrupt); 2 Tim 2:19 (gangrenous); Titus 1:15 (defiled). Contrast the association of health or soundness with orthodox teaching (1 Tim 1:10; 2 Tim 4:3; Titus 1:9; 2:1), speech (1 Tim 6:3; 2 Tim 1:13; Titus 2:8), and faith (Titus 1:13; 2:2).

[57] For what follows, see the extensive discussion in Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 121–136, esp. 124–125, for the terms used in 1 Tim 6:3–5. [*Light*, 1:117–134]

The description of passions and vices as diseases had a long history and was widespread. The soul, it was said, could be in a state of war, with its passions and diseases prevailing over its healthy, rational principles (τοὺς 390 | ὑγιαίνοντας λόγους).[58] The soul that is corrupt (ψυχὴ διεφθαρμένη) is so because of ignorance, depravity, insolence, jealousy, grief and countless desires (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.45).

Of interest is a comment by Plutarch (*Cupid. divit.* 524C–E) about the illness of money-grubbers (τῶν ποριζόντων). The person

> who has more than enough and yet hungers (ὀρεγόμενον) for more will find no remedy in gold or silver or horse and sheep and cattle, but in casting out the source of mischief and being purged. For his ailment is not poverty, but insatiability and avarice, arising from the presence in him of a false and unrelenting judgment (κρίσιν φαύλην καὶ ἀλόγιστον); and unless someone removes this, like a tapeworm, from his mind, he will never cease to need superfluities—that is, to want what he does not need. (de Lacy & Einarson, LCL)

The person who is absorbed with getting money (τῷ πορισμῷ προστετηκότα) has a mental disorder (ψυχὴ νόσος).[59]

The remedy for this malady is the philosopher's psychagogic treatment, by which he soothes the inflammation of the soul and cures it of vices by means of education and reason, as he adapts his ministrations in timely fashion to the varying conditions of the moral patient.[60]

Not all philosophers shared this relatively optimistic view of the human condition. The letters falsely attributed to Diogenes the Cynic, for example, are unrelenting in their criticism of their assumed audience. In a parody of the epistolary greeting (ὑγιαίνειν, "Good health to you!"),[61] *Ep.* 28 opens with οἰμώζειν ("A plague on you!"), and from there on things go downwards (cf. the closing, 28.8, οἰμώζειν λέγω). The putative readers are

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[58] Philo, *Abr.* 223; Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 36; Musonius Rufus, *Ep. Pancr.* 2–3 (137–138 Hense).

[59] For the comparison of avarice with disease, see Jan F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (AUU: SGU 11; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976), 241 (esp. a comparison with dropsy; more references are collected in Joseph Seidel, *Vestigia diatribae, qualia reperiuntur in aliquot Plutarchi scriptis moralibus* (Diss., Breslau, 1906), 47–49.

[60] For the philosopher's care, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.43–45; cf. 17.6; 32.16. On psychagogy, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophical Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 81–87; Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 323–324; Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (NovTSup 81; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).

[61] See Lucian, *Laps.* 5; 3 John 2; Hans-Josef Klauck, *Ancient Letters and the New Testament* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006), 19–20, 21–23, 31–32.

accused of knowing nothing, suffering great delusion (τῦφον), never being | at peace, envying each other, deciding nothing by good reason (ὑγιεῖ λόγῳ): "You know nothing . . . but, being made a mockery of by your ignorance and senselessness you have become perverted" (28.2). In *Ep.* 29.5, they are told, "But you are in an advanced state of corruption (διαφθορά). Therefore, cutting, cautery and medication must be employed." The sickness has gripped them for so long and so thoroughly that they no longer see the extent of their evil (19.4). They are so far gone that instead of selecting teachers who would purge them, they

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> have found the kind of people who would defile and corrupt (διαλυμαίνοιντο καὶ διαφθείροιεν) you. For they are not looking for any good they might do you, but rather how they might get a meal, and they are searching for whatever gain they might make (κερδανοῦσι). They remove none of your present troubles but make off with some of your possessions and, in addition, corrupt the standards of your household. (29.3)

The PE adopt this polemical tradition to describe the false teachers. Like the harsh Cynic, they hold out no prospect for improvement or effective psychagogy. Corrupt in mind, the heretics' ἄνοια will be visible to all, they will make no moral progress (οὐ προκόψουσιν ἐπὶ πλεῖον), but will, ironically, only "make progress" to a worse condition (προκόψουσιν ἐπὶ χεῖρον) (2 Tim 3:8–9, 13; cf. 2:16).[62] The Pastorals likewise stress the subversion of households by these money-grubbers (Titus 1:11; cf. 2 Tim 3:6–7).

*Summary.* The philosophical traditions are used exclusively polemically. Despite the charge that the heretics reject the "sound words" and the "teaching that accords with godliness," we are not told anything here about the content of the orthodox teaching or of any heterodox teaching they may have held to (contrast 1 Tim 4:1–3; 2 Tim 2:18). Our author limits himself to stressing, vituperatively, the character defects of the persons he opposes, which are detailed in the vice list (v. 4) and the three participles which describe them in an apparently logical order: corrupt (διεφθαρμένων) in mind, | (therefore) deprived (ἀπεστερημένων) of the truth, (therefore) supposing (νομιζόντων) that godliness is an occasion for personal financial gain.

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[62] For the notion of προκοπή, see the introductory comments by John T. Fitzgerald in *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; New York: Routledge, 2008), 12–16; and Richard A. Wright, "Plutarch on Moral Progress," 136–150, and James Ware, "Moral Progress and Divine Power in Seneca and Paul," 267–283. For the lack of progress and the absence of psychagogy in the Pastorals, see Malherbe, "'In Season, Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 136–145. [*Light*, 1:187–196]

The function of these insults is to heighten the contrast between the morally degraded people who make money by their preaching and the behavior he inculcates in vv. 6–10. At issue is, in the first place, not doctrine, but moral living; the author is a moralist, not primarily a heresiologist. The comments on the heretics serve as a foil for the positive moral instruction that follows in vv. 6–10, as they do in 1 Tim 4:1–7, 8–10 and Titus 1:10–16, 2:1–10.

### *On εὐσέβεια and αὐτάρκεια, on βουλόμενοι πλουτεῖν and φιλαργυρία, 6:6–10*

*Αὐτάρκεια, 6:6–8.* Having so vigorously rejected the heretics' connection of πορισμός and εὐσέβεια, the author goes on to make a contrasting claim which modifies the two: "But there is great profit in godliness when it is accompanied by self-sufficiency (ἔστιν δὲ πορισμὸς μέγας ἡ εὐσέβεια μετὰ αὐταρκείας)" (v. 6).[63] The emphatic claim (note the position of ἔστιν) adds μέγας to πορισμός and μετὰ αὐταρκείας to εὐσέβεια.[64] One might have expected that, having attributed the erroneous view to mental incompetence and deprivation of the truth, appeal would be made to an authoritative source for the claim made about self-sufficiency. Or, reference could be made to God's or Christ's empowerment to live self-sufficiently, as Paul does in 2 Cor 9:8 and Phil 4:11. But the temptation should be resisted to interpret 1 Tim 6:6 in light of those passages, especially of Phil 4:11, where Paul is thought to have "'turned the tables' on the Stoics by declaring that genuine αὐτάρκεια is not *self*-sufficiency but *Christ*-sufficiency."[65] There is nothing like that in 1 Tim 6:6. We have to do with a writer in the tradition of the moralists who approaches the subject in quite another manner.

393 | The style and content of the contrast are characteristically paraenetic. The contrast is the second member of an antithesis (δέ), which is a major feature in paraenesis, where the stress is on the second member, as it is here. The first, negative member, serves to highlight the positive

[63] The revaluation of πορισμός calls to mind that of ὠφέλιμος in 4:8.

[64] According to Frederick E. Brenk, "Old Wineskins Recycled: AUTARKEIA in 1 Timothy 6:5–10," in Brenk, *Relighting the Souls: Studies in Plutarch, in Greek Literature, Religion, and Philosophy, and in the New Testament Background* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1998), 352, this is the first time in extant Greek literature that εὐσέβεια and αὐτάρκεια are linked.

[65] Gordon D. Fee, *1 and 2 Timothy, Titus* (GNC; San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), 102; followed by George W. Knight, *The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 253; Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 695; Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 399.

statement, which is of major interest.[66] The author is mostly interested in self-sufficiency, as is indicated by αὐτάρκεια and ἀρκεσθησόμεθα which enclose the contrasting sentence (v. 8). When godliness is accompanied or qualified by self-sufficiency it issues in great profit. It is natural that self-sufficiency comes up in a discussion of one's means of livelihood as it does also in Musonius Rufus's discussion of the philosopher's means of livelihood, although the word αὐτάρκεια does not occur there (Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 11 [59, 2–12 Hense]). Αὐτάρκεια was a favorite virtue among philosophers, particularly among Stoics and Cynics, but also among Epicureans.[67] It has been thought that there is nothing in vv. 6–8 that could not have been said by a Cynic or Stoic, or that our author speaks of the virtue in much the same way that they did.[68] A brief survey that includes the Epicureans will provide texture to the philosophical context of the Pastorals.

Stoics and Cynics had similar but not identical views of self-sufficiency. Stoics held that the wise man freed himself from those things both within and without that hindered him from attaining happiness and true freedom. He did this by concentrating on those things which were within his control.

> He withdraws into himself and with clarity of mind perceives the divine, universal law, which, when all is said and done, he cannot alter. He gives it his assent and lets fate do with him what it will. In this way, however, he possesses inner freedom and rejoices in the magnificent spectacle of the divine government of the world.[69]

| The Stoic's view of self-sufficiency was inextricably part of the Stoic intellectual enterprise. One could expect that a writer with a Stoic orientation 394

[66] See Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians*, 154–156; Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 303–305 for the nature of antithesis.

[67] See Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.90, after referring to Epicurus's simplicity of life and quoting Ps.-Anacharsis, *Ep.* 5: "Almost all philosophers of every school . . . have been able to show this same spirit." Abraham J. Malherbe, "Paul's Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11)," in *Texts and Contexts: Biblical Texts in Their Textual and Situational Contexts: Essays in Honor of Lars Hartman* (ed. Tord Fornberg and David Hellholm; Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995), 813–826, [*Light*, 1:325–338], discusses how the virtue was practiced by a number of philosophers, including Neopythagoreans.

[68] So Brox, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 209; see Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 84–85; and more recently, Collins, *I & II Timothy and Titus*, 156–157; Fiore, *Pastoral Epistles*, 119.

[69] Rudolf Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1956; repr., Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 138. For the Stoic sage as secure and unassailable in his fortified mind, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 91–119, esp. 101–103 [*Light*, 1:135–166].

would in 1 Tim 6 have contrasted the erroneous view of godliness held by the intellectually wanting heretics to a correct, rational view of godliness linked to self-sufficiency held by intellectually competent persons. But the admonition does not proceed in this way.

Stoics had derived their notion of self-sufficiency from Cynics and intellectualized it. Cynics, in contrast, shunned the circuitous route of doctrine and speculation, choosing rather the practical life of virtue, their so-called "short cut to happiness."[70] Their view of self-sufficiency seemed straightforward to Diogenes Laertius (6.105): "They hold that we should live simply, eating only enough food (αὐτάρκεσι σιτίοις), and wearing a single garment, and they despise wealth, fame and noble birth." To a Cynic like Diogenes of Sinope, "αὐτάρκεια meant, broadly speaking, two things: on the physical plane, contentment with the bare necessities of life; and on the spiritual level, complete detachment from the world and worldly values.... Nothing ... that was to be derived from any source external to himself had any value for him or could affect him in any way."[71] But Cynics differed among themselves to a considerable degree as to the practical implications of this conviction.[72]

The rigorous Demetrius (1st cent. AD) rejected all wealth, regardless of the circumstances under which it would come to him. He would not even accept it with the intention of giving it away, for the luxuries associated 395 with wealth are not worth bestowing on others.[73] Such a radical view | of self-sufficiency would not permit the judicious use of wealth inculcated in 1 Tim 6:17–19.

Cynics of a milder disposition held to a more moderate view of αὐτάρκεια as early as Bion and Crates (4th–3rd cents. BC) and Teles (3rd cent. BC), and later by Musonius Rufus (1st cent. AD). Rather than insist on self-

[70] See Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 6, 13, 16, 21; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 12, 30, 44. Cf. the outsider's criticism: Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 11. See Victor Emeljanow, "A Note on the Cynic Short Cut to Happiness," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 18 (1965): 182–184; R. Bracht Branham, "Introduction," in *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy* (ed. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé; HCS 23; Berkeley: University of California, 1996), 21–27. For their anti-intellectualism, see Diogenes Laertius 6.103–104.

[71] Audrey N.M. Rich, "The Cynic Conception of αὐτάρκεια," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 9 (1956): 23–29, esp. 23.

[72] See Rüdiger Vischer, *Das einfache Leben: Wort- und motivgeschictliche Untersuchungen zu einem Wertbegriff der antiken Literatur* (SAW 11; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), 60–88; Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus* (HB 1.40; Munich: W. Fink, 1979), esp. 155–158, 184–198.

[73] See Seneca, *Ben.* 7.8.3; Margarethe Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Popularphilosophie* (PhAnt 36; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), 20–31.

abnegation, they taught that one should be satisfied with what is available to oneself (ἀρκούμενος τοῖς παροῦσιν, χρῶ τοῖς παροῦσιν), the real necessities being simple food, clothing, and shelter.[74] That seems to be the view of αὐτάρκεια in 1 Tim 6:6–8. Also similar is a popular attitude expressed proverbially, namely, that "Whatever your situation, it is no good 'kicking against the goad.' If one is poor, one can always practice being happy with it, for instance by living 'the life of the jar' (after Diogenes the Cynic). Partly, no doubt, to make the poor feel better about being poor, proverbs strongly associate wealth (especially foreign wealth) with softness, luxury, gluttony and sexual perversion . . ."[75]

Epicureans, too, had a moderate view of self-sufficiency, but theirs was more nuanced.[76] Like other philosophers, Epicurus believed that to live rationally was to live naturally, but they differed on what that meant. Epicurus was known for the simplicity of his life, frequently living on only bread and water,[77] and in reducing the bare necessities to protection from hunger, thirst and cold (*Sent. Vat.* 33). He was similar to the Cynics, as he was also in the conviction that the "greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom" (*Vat. Sat.* 77). "A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without servility to mobs or monarchs" (*Sent. Vat.* 67).

Epicureans differed from rigorous Cynics, for whom αὐτάρκεια meant that they were always to be satisfied with the minimum. Epicureans held | that self-sufficiency was a great good, not so as always to use a little, but so as to be content with little (τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρκούμεθα) if they do not have much (Diogenes Laertius 10.130). Unlike Cynics, who according to them had the easiest way of life, stripping away everything possible, the 396

[74] See Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes*, 65–66, on Crates and Teles (*Frg.* 2 [11, 4–6 Hense]; *Frg.* 4A [38, 10–39, 1; 41, 11–12 Hense]). Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 18a and 18b discuss food, *Frg.* 19 clothing and shelter, on which see Anton C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (rev. ed.; WTS 8; Assen: van Gorcum, 1963), 97–118, and Vischer, *Das einfache Leben*, 65–70.

[75] Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 48. Here, the allusion to the Cynic lifestyle buttresses the common wisdom.

[76] See the discussion of Epicurean attitudes toward wealth by Vischer, *Das einfache Leben*, 71–75; Elizabeth Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," in *Philodemus and the New Testament World* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland; NovTSup 116; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 133–176, esp. 143–161. See further Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed," Part II.

[77] Diogenes Laertius 10.11; Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.89; Seneca, *Ep.* 18.9–11; see Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," 139–140; cf. Epicurus, *Sent. Vat.* 36 (111 Bailey): "Epicurus' life compared to other men's in respect of gentleness and self-sufficiency might be thought a mere legend."

Epicurean view was more complex.[78] The Epicurean does not live on the margin, and he will not beg like the Cynics, nor does he live only for the moment, but makes provision for the future and for a more affluent life than that of the Cynics.[79]

The Epicurean notion of self-sufficiency is associated with their notion of natural wealth, to which I shall turn below, when considering the use of wealth. For the moment, I only note that the ideal Epicurean is never selfish, but shares with others.

> Even when reduced to necessity, a wise person knows better how to give than to receive, for so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency that he has found. (*Sent. Vat.* 44)
>
> A free life cannot acquire many possessions, because this is not easy to do without fawning on the crowd or the powerful, but it possesses all things in continuous lavishness. If by chance it obtains many possessions, it would easily distribute them so as to obtain the good will of neighbors. (*Sent. Vat.* 67)

Here we have to do with a notion of αὐτάρκεια that could accommodate the behavior taught in 1 Tim 6:17–19.

However, the level on which αὐτάρκεια is to be understood in 1 Tim 6:5–6, is not that of high philosophical reflection but of cliché. That appears further to be the case from the way the author clarifies what he means by αὐτάρκεια: οὐδὲν γὰρ εἰσηνέγκαμεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐξενέγκειν τι δυνάμεθα (v. 7). Γάρ is explanatory (BDAG s.v. γάρ 2), "you see," "to make this clearer," and ὅτι is consecutive (BDAG s.v. ὅτι 5.c.), "so that." The elucidation of what is meant by αὐτάρκεια thus reads, "You see, we brought nothing into the world, so we can't carry anything out of it."[80] 397 | Commentators regularly refer to the proverbial character of the statement and provide numerous references to Jewish sapiential and Greek

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[78] See Philodemus, *Oec.* 12.29–38, and Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," 148–149. On their differences from Cynics, see Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed," Part II.

[79] Diogenes Laertius 10.119–120; see Philodemus, *Oec.* 12.5–22.16 on Metrodorus's arguments that Cynic poverty was to be rejected in favor of a more affluent way of life. See Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," 150–152.

[80] See Richard C.H. Lenski, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Colossians, to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to Philemon* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1961), 705, for this understanding of γάρ (also Fiore, *Pastoral Epistles*, 115). For the problems associated with ὅτι, including the text critical ones, see Maarten J.J. Menken, "*Hoti* en 1 Tim 6, 7," *Bib* 58 (1977): 532–551; Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 646–648. Most recent commentaries understand ὅτι as consecutive, e.g., Jerome D. Quinn and William C. Wacker, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy* (ECC; Grand Rapids; Eerdmans, 2000), 506–508; Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 1:280; Collins, *1 & 2 Timothy and Titus*, 154; Fiore, *Pastoral Epistles*, 115.

and Latin texts where the same sentiment is expressed.[81] Whether proverb or merely cliché, it is as ordinary an expression as the modern quip, "You can't take it with you,"[82] and cannot bear the heavy theologizing that is sometimes laid upon it.[83] The function of the cliché is simply to clarify that by αὐτάρκεια is meant a stripped down way of life, the characteristics of which are then stated concretely in v. 8, namely, to make do with the food and covering that are at hand. Here, εὐσέβεια does not qualify or elevate αὐτάρκεια as it does γυμνασία in 4:7–8, but the reverse is the case: αὐτάρκεια, so self-evident in meaning as to be clarified by a cliché, qualifies εὐσέβεια.

*Φιλαργυρία, 6:9–10.* The natural sequence in the discussion (πορισμός–αὐτάρκεια) now continues to wealth (πλουτεῖν) and greed (φιλαργυρία) (vv. 9–10). In contrast (δέ) to those content with the bare necessities of life are people who wish to be rich (οἱ βουλόμενοι πλουτεῖν) and yearn for money (ἡ φιλαργυρία, ἧς τινες ὀρεγόμενοι).[84] In view are people to whom wealth does not come involuntarily or who have a moderate desire for it, but people who single-mindedly pursue it. This makes the connection between wealth and greed | a natural one.[85] Among the stock parts of this negative depiction of wealth are the nature of greed (πλεονεξία, φιλαργυρία, *avaritia*), the craving for money that is associated with it (ὄρεξις, ὀρέγομαι, ζῆλος, *cupiditas*), and the insatiability of that craving.[86] 398

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[81] E.g., Eccl 5:10–20; Job 1:8–10, 21; 41:10–15; Wis 7:6; Philo, *Spec.* 1.295; Ps.-Phocylides, *Sent.* 110; Seneca, *Ep.* 20.13; 102.23–25; *Anth. Graec.* 10.58. See Pieter W. van der Horst, *The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* (SVTP 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill: 1978), 192–193.

[82] Collins, *1 & 2 Timothy and Titus*, 157.

[83] See, for example, Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 1:556: although like the commonplaces of Stoicism, inspiration is drawn from the sages of Israel, connected in some way with the Gospel (Luke 12:22–23; Mark 6:8), and the lesson is drawn that one can't serve God and Mammon; Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 339–340: it is in tension with the world-friendly, anti-ascetic tendency elsewhere in the letter; Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 400: the author opposes the acquisitiveness of the false teachers by placing life on earth in eternal perspective, without devaluing human earthly life, he forces viewing it in temporary terms: "Following from this, an eschatological understanding of human life as beginning in a temporal mode but destined for an eternal mode invites a rethinking of focus that will accord the appropriate value to each stage of life and a balanced approach to material living."

[84] Grammatically, it is the love of money that is strived for, but the condensed construction does not obscure the fact that it is the money that is desired.

[85] See, e.g., Seneca, *Ben.* 7.9 (wealth), 7.10 (avarice), and Horace, *Sat.* 1.1, on which see Hans Herter, "Zur ersten Satire des Horaz," *RhMus* NS 94 (1951): 1–42.

[86] See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17 for πλεονεξία; Seneca, *Ben.* 7.10 and Horace, *Sat.* 1.1 for *avaritia.* For insatiable craving, see Plutarch, *Sept. sap. conv.* 159E (ζῆλος) for the superfluous; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.84 (5:765, 6–7 W-H); 4.31.85 (5:765, 15 W-H); Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 523E (ὄρεξις). Wealth does not deliver us from the craving; φιλαργυρία and πλεονεξία are

Moralists inveighed against the hedonism of spending on what is superfluous, on pleasures, lavishing money on one's appetites (ἐπιθυμίαι).[87] More striking is the detail with which the miseries of being wealthy are described, as by Seneca:

> For one must pay the penalty for all greedy acts; although the greed is enough of a penalty in itself (*nulla enim avaritia sine poena est, quamvis satis sit ipsa poenarum*). What tears and toils does money wring from us! Greed is wretched in that which it craves and wretched in that which it wins! Think besides of the daily worry which afflicts every possessor in proportion to the measure of his gain! The possession of riches means even greater agony of spirit than the acquisition of riches.[88]

Greed causes misery, hardship, toil, danger, blood, death, and destruction.[89] It compels us to make money, but forbids the use of it; lovers of money endure the pain, but do not get the pleasures.[90] It causes anxieties (φροντίδας) and distractions.[91] Palladas complained, "Gold, father of | flatterers, son of pain and care (ὀδύνης καὶ φροντίδας), it is fear (φόβος) to have you and pain (ὀδύνη) not to have you."[92] Greed causes injuries and losses (βλάβας, ζημίας), is destructive (ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ), and many examples can be cited of overpowering disasters that resulted from the folly and wickedness (τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ τῆς πονηρίας) of greed.[93] People destroy (ἀπολύουσι) life and even divine things for money.[94]

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insatiable (Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 524A–E; 526A); cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 119.9, "Money never made a man rich; on the contrary, it always smites man with greater craving for itself (*maiorem sui cupidinem incussit*)"; Teles, *Frg.* 4A (39, 7 – 40, 2 Hense). See further, Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Christianization of a *Topos* (Luke 12:13–34)," *NovT* 38 (1996): 123–135. [*Light*, 1:339–351]

[87] E.g., Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 526E–527D; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.18. Moralists repeatedly describe the dangers of the appetites or desire for more (e.g., Teles, *Frg.* 4A [38, 11; 42, 5–12 Hense]; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.10, 17), for what one does not need, due to a false or unreflective judgment (κρίσιν φαύλην καὶ ἀλόγιστον, Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 524D). When one wishes to make use of wealth, one is corrupted by luxury (ἡδυπάθεια), to protect it by worry (φροντίς), to acquire it by desire (ἐπιθυμία) (Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.90 [5:766, 19–21 W-H]).

[88] Seneca, *Ep.* 115.16 (Gummere, LCL).

[89] Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 8; see Malherbe, "The Christianization of a *Topos*," 127–128.

[90] Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 525B.

[91] Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 527A; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.18; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.84 (5:762, 9; 5:765, 6 W-H).

[92] *Apud Anth. pal.* 9.394; cf. Teles, *Frg.* 4A (38, 9 Hense): To have pain (ὀδυνήσῃ) when one does not have money. See also λυπεῖν in Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.17–18.

[93] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.12. Dire examples of destruction because of greed are adduced in 17.13–15.

[94] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.11.

The warning in 1 Tim 6:9–10 clearly belongs to this critique of wealth, as the following terms from the two verses indicate: ἐπιθυμίας πολλὰς ἀνοήτους καὶ βλαβεράς, ὄλεθρον καὶ ἀπώλειαν, ἡ φιλαργυρία, ἧς τινες ὀρεγόμενοι, ὀδύναις πολλαῖς. The proverb which explains (γάρ) the depiction of people who aspire to wealth (v. 8), "Greed is the root of all evil," appears in slightly different forms throughout ancient literature.[95]

*Summary.* The paraenesis on αὐτάρκεια and φιλαργυρία in vv. 6–10 remains on a popular level, devoid of the kind of reflection associated with the philosophers just cited or referred to. There is no mention of moderation, superfluity or other considerations that would widen the lens on wealth. The focus is tight, on the lust for wealth and the condition of those so afflicted. Justification for the positive statement about αὐτάρκεια (ὅτι in v. 7b) and the warning to those who lust after wealth (γάρ in v. 10a) remains on the level of cliché or proverb. The author does in v. 9 describe the emotional and moral ruin into which the craving for wealth tumbles people, but the support for this depiction is a proverb that enables him to describe the terrible things people do to themselves when they allow their greed to control themselves.

| As in v. 5, the philosophical basis for the condition of the errorists is not exploited in favor of the claim that they were deprived of the truth (ἀπεστερημένων τῆς ἀληθείας), in v. 10 the root (!) cause of their moral quandary is that they were led astray from the faith (ἀπεπλανήθησαν ἀπὸ τῆς πίστεως). But the stress is on the warning in v. 9, which strengthens the paraenetic appeal to be self-sufficient. 400

### *Transition: Paraenesis to Timothy, 6:11–16*

The discussion of wealth, to be concluded in vv. 17–19, is interrupted by a section of text that has appeared so odd in its present location to commentators that some have thought it to be an interpolation or intrusion.[96] There is general agreement that traditional material is used here, especially

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[95] The proverb is attributed to Democritus, Diogenes, and Bion. Greed is variously called the μητρόπολις (Epicurus, *Sent. Vat.* 265; Diogenes Laertius 6.50), μήτηρ (Ps.-Phocylides, *Sent.* 42), ἀρχή (*Sib. Or.* 8:17; Pol. *Phil.* 4.1), αἰτίη (or αἴτιον) (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.6; Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 17.8), κεφάλιον (Apollodorus Comicus 4 [3.280 Kock]), ὁρμητήριον of all evil. See Leo Sternbach, *Gnomologium Vaticanum* (Texte und Kommentare 2; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963), 102–103; Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 60–62; van der Horst, *Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides*, 142–143, for more references.

[96] For example, by Falconer, *Pastoral Epistles*, 158; Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 87; Miller, *Pastoral Letters as Composite Documents*, 91–93.

in the creedal section, vv. 13–16, but different suggestions have been offered as to the origin of the material and the function to which it is put in its present context.[97] It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to treat vv. 11–16 in detail, for my interest is in the attitude toward and the use of wealth in 1 Tim 6. But the following observations will help those topics to be seen in sharper relief and demonstrate that vv. 11–16 do not sit as loosely in its context as is frequently averred.

Verses 11–16 are integral to the chapter, but not as a contrast between true and false preachers, who are sometimes thought to be in view throughout vv. 3–21.[98] Formally, vv. 11–16 are paraenesis strengthened by theologically dense creedal material, as paraenesis in vv. 6–10 is strengthened by warnings, finally couched in a proverb.[99] Intricately constructed theological formulations are also used to support paraenesis in Titus 2:1–14 (11–14) and 3:1–7 (3–7), as is the case in 1 Tim 6:11–16 (13–16).

401 | Paraenetic markers are pronounced at the beginning of the section. The pattern φεῦγε/δίωκε is paraenetic, setting before the hearers or listeners the choices open to them, frequently summarized by vice and virtue lists, often in that order.[100] In v. 11, ταῦτα marks a transition in the paraenesis and refers back to the vices in vv. 6–10, which form a backdrop for the paraenesis to Timothy.[101] It is typical of paraenesis that what is said to Timothy is an antithesis (δέ) of what precedes.[102] Ταῦτα and δέ thus syntactically connect v. 11 to what precedes.

The paraenesis to Timothy is sharpened by the use of σύ, the vocative ὦ ἄνθρωπε θεοῦ, which is derived from the OT,[103] and the 2nd person singular imperatives of the verbs in vv. 11 and 12.[104] The way 2nd person singular

[97] See the summary of the theories catalogued in Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 653–655. Karoline Läger, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* (HThSt 12; Münster: Lit, 1996), 55–63, thinks that it is no longer possible to distinguish the tradition from the redacted form in which it is available to us. But Hanna Stettler, *Die Christologie der Pastoralbriefe* (WUNT 2.105; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 116–126, identifies traditional elements in vv. 13–16.

[98] Thus Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 326–327, who understands the antithesis between vv. 6–10 and vv. 11–16 as one between money grubbing preachers and the preacher who is true to his call and ordination. See also Van Neste, *Cohesion and Structure*, 131.

[99] Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 87 (baptismal paraenesis); Collins, *I & II Timothy and Titus* (classic paraenesis).

[100] On virtue and vice lists in moral literature, see Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*, 138–141. See Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 15, with φεῦγε/δίωκε and vice and virtue lists. Cf. also Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.5.30. For such lists and the call to exercise one's will, see Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 36.4. But also see διώκειν δικαιοσύνην (or δίκαιον) in Deut 16:20; Prov 15:9; Sir 27:8.

[101] For the "paraenetic" ταῦτα, see n. 49 above.

[102] On antithesis in paraenesis, see Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 303–304.

[103] It is used of leaders like Moses and prophets: Deut 33:1; Josh 14:6; 1 Sam 9:6; 2 Kgs 1:9–13; cf. Philo, *Deus* 139.

[104] See the sharpening of the imperatives by σύ in 2 Tim 2:1; 3:14; 4:5; cf. Titus 2:1 (also in antithesis to the preceding verses and introducing paraenesis). Cf. the strengthening of

imperatives function in paraenesis is vividly illustrated in Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.*, the classic example of paraenesis in ancient literature.[105] The purpose of the treatise is to instruct young men in virtue (5). After praising virtue in general terms and stressing the importance of Hipponicus, Demonicus's father, "Isocrates" claims that it is not possible for the mind to be properly disposed in the contest for virtue unless it is filled with noble maxims (καλῶν ἀκουσμάτων), "for, as it is the nature of the body to be developed by appropriate exercises, it is the nature of the soul to be developed by moral precepts" (12). Then follow dozens of 2nd person singular imperatives, whose reference is obviously wider than Demonicus himself; in fact, they include the young men Isocrates had in mind.[106]

| The imperatives function in similar fashion in 1 Tim 6:11–16. They are addressed to Timothy, but are to be understood as applying to the church as well. In 4:14–16, for example, ostensibly personal instructions are given to Timothy, but his conduct is described as exemplary to others, whose salvation he will effect as he heeds the instructions given to himself. In 5:1–2 (cf. 7), commands addressed to him have to do with his personal conduct, but τίμα in 5:3 introduces the community's responsibilities to widows. It is not incongruous, then, that the specification of such laudable personal qualities of Timothy should appear in community paraenesis (cf. 5:20–25). The many commands to Timothy throughout the letter serve in the same way.[107] 402

Grammar thus shows that vv. 11–13 are not so focused on Timothy that we have to do here with a new, discrete text. An examination of the content of v. 11 will demonstrate that it, too, is connected with what precedes. The content of the virtue list in v. 11, consisting of nouns in the singular in contrast to plural vices,[108] sounds formulaic and like development of the Pauline triad πίστις, ἀγάπη and ἐλπίς,[109] and generalized with no bearing

indicatives by σύ: 2 Tim 1:18; 3:10.

105 See the discussions of it in articles in the volume edited by James M. Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context*: Engberg-Pedersen, "The Concept of Paraenesis," 49–50, 52–54; Wiard Popkes, "Paraenesis in the New Testament," 14, 43–44; Diana M. Swancutt, "Paraenesis in Light of Protrepsis," 141–142; Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," 303–305.

106 The imperatives represent such maxims; on the collection of maxims, see Isocrates, *Demon.* 51–52.

107 See 1 Tim 4:7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16: 5:1, 3, 7, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23; 6:3, 11, 12, 20; cf. 2 Tim 1:6, 8, 13, 14; 2:1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 15, 16, 22; 3:1, 6, 14; 4:2, 5, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 21; Titus 2:1, 6, 15; 3:1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15.

108 See Fiore, *Pastoral Epistles*, 160, who points to this feature of the lists in the Pastorals.

109 E.g., 1 Cor 13:13; 1 Thess 1:5; 5:8.

on vv. 4–10.[110] The latter suspicion may be strengthened by the parallel in 2 Tim 2:22, τὰς δὲ νεωτερικὰς ἐπιθυμίας φεῦγε, δίωκε δὲ δικαιοσύνην πίστιν ἀγάπην εἰρήνην, and by Titus 2:12, παιδεύουσα ἡμᾶς, ἵνα ἀρνησάμενοι τὴν ἀσέβειαν καὶ τὰς κοσμικὰς ἐπιθυμίας σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς ζήσωμεν, with the classical cardinal virtues lurking in the background.[111] That δικαιοσύνη stands at the head of the list in two of these passages and is paired with εὐσέβεια (εὐσεβῶς) in one further strengthens the surmise, for the two are paired in honorary inscriptions and epitaphs, which further testify to their popular currency.[112] Whether these inscriptions 403 are witnesses to popular morality on the social level with | which Teresa Morgan is concerned may not be certain, but they do testify to the ubiquity of the pairing of the two qualities. The similarity of these inscriptions to 1 Tim 6:11 has been thought to be purely formal and incidental,[113] but more can be said about the matter.

The combination was widespread in Greek literature, δικαιοσύνη describing one's responsibility to people, εὐσέβεια (or ὁσιότης) one's responsibility to the divine.[114] It also appears in moral instruction of the sort that informed the Pastoral Epistles, where the distinction between the two is not absolute, as for example, in Musonius Rufus, *Ep. Pancr.* 5 (139, 5–7 Hense): "Would you not want (our children) to have given attention to divine and human matters, to be adorned with piety and holiness (εὐσέβεια καὶ ὁσιότητι) toward the gods and with justice and holiness (δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι) toward men?"[115]

Of special interest to 1 Tim 6:11 are those texts that relate δικαιοσύνη alone or with εὐσέβεια to wealth. Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 38 provides a nice counterpoint to the yearning (ὀρεγόμενοι) for wealth (v. 10; see n. 59): "To strive for justice (ὀρέγεσθαι δικαιοσύνης); not wanting more than one's fair share. Δικαιοσύνη is better than wealth in that wealth benefits

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[110] So Burton S. Easton, *The Pastoral Epistles* (New York: Scribner's, 1947), 165, who thinks that its generalized form befits a final summary.

[111] See Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners,'" 340–342.

[112] See Dittenberger, *OGIS* 438; *TAM* 2,2 No. 549, 10–12; *TAM* 2,1 No. 197, 12–13, all these inscriptions also including πίστις. See Anton Vögtle, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament exegetisch, religions- und formgeschichtlich Untersucht* (NTAbh 16.4–5; Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), 91; Deissmann, [*Light*, 317–318. See also *Inschriften griechischer Bildhauer* 251; *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* 4 (1927): 305; Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften*, 493, on which see G.H.R. Horsley, *NewDocs*, 4 (1987): 145.

[113] So Vögtle, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkaktaloge im Neuen Testament*, 174–175.

[114] E.g., Plato, *Euthyphr.* 12E; Philo, *Abr.* 208; *Spec.* 2.63; see Gottlob Schrenk, "δίκη, δικαιοσύνη, κτλ," *TDNT* 2 (1964): 178–225, esp. 182, 193.

[115] On εὐσέβεια of children supporting their parents, see Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men," 278–286.

us only while we live, while justice brings us glory after we are dead." And Theognis 145–148 combines the two: "Choose to dwell with little wealth a pious man (εὐσεβέων) than to be rich with possession ill-gotten. Righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) containeth the sum of all virtue; every righteous man (δίκαιος), Cyrnus, is good."[116] Such passages suggest that the appearance of δικαιοσύνη in v. 11 is not formal or incidental, but that it belongs naturally in a discussion of attitudes toward wealth.

The same thing is true of εὐσέβεια. It is noteworthy that it does not appear in the more formulaic parallel 2 Tim 2:22. The reason it does appear in v. 11 is that the preceding discussion had been introduced by claims about εὐσέβεια and self-sufficiency. The natural way to read εὐσέβεια is in light of vv. 5 and 6.

| The same can be said of πίστις. To be sure, πίστις does appear in the formulaic 2 Tim 2:2 and again in 1 Tim 1:18–19 and 2 Tim 4:6–8, with extended athletic metaphors (in the latter with δικαιοσύνη), all of which may suggest that the author was using what was to him a stock expression regardless of context. Nevertheless, the context of v. 11 suggests something more than a formulaic use here. The emphatic paraenetic charge in v. 12, to fight the good fight of faith (ἀγωνίζου τὸν καλὸν ἀγῶνα τῆς πίστεως) draws attention to πίστις, one of the six qualities to pursue.[117] Why this stress on pursuing faith? In order to distinguish Timothy from the greedy persons who had abandoned the faith (v. 10). The extension of the list of qualities to be pursued with ἀγάπη, ὑπομονή, and πραϋπαθία does the same thing. These qualities are opposite the harsh, precipitous existence of the greedy people described in vv. 6–10. 404

In addition to these paraenetic features which connect vv. 11–16 to what precedes, there are theological elements, beginning in v. 12, that establish a connection with what follows. Timothy is to lay hold of eternal life (ἐπιλαβοῦ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς, v. 12), and the rich are to conduct themselves in such a manner that they might lay hold of real life (ἵνα ἐπιλάβωνται τῆς

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[116] Trans. J.M. Edmonds (LCL).

[117] For the use of the athletic metaphor, particularly in the Greek philosophical tradition, see Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), esp. 16–37 and, more recently and more fully, Uta Poplutz, *Athlet des Evangeliums: Eine motivgeschichtliche Studie zur Wettkampfmetaphorik bei Paulus* (HBS 43; Freiburg: Herder, 2004). Martin Brändl, *Der Agon bei Paulus: Herkunft und Profil paulinischer Agonmetaphorik* (WUNT 2.222; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), argues that Paul, although familiar with the Hellenistic metaphor, was ultimately indebted to the OT and Jewish traditions of the suffering of the just man (see pp. 367–371 on 1 Tim 6:11).

ὄντως ζωῆς, v. 19). God is the source of all life (θεοῦ τοῦ ζῳογονοῦντος τὰ πάντα, v. 13) as he is the supplier of all riches (θεῷ τῷ παρέχοντι ἡμῖν πάντα πλουσίως, v. 17). There is an eschatological scheme in which God works out his purpose (vv. 14–15), and the wealthy are to live, aware that their actions in the present (ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι, v. 17) prepare for their future life (θεμέλιον καλὸν εἰς τὸ μέλλον, v. 19).

### *Summary*

Verses 11–16, far from being an intrusion into the paraenesis of ch. 6, is integral to it. Its grammatical and formal characteristics as well as content show 405 it to be of the same cloth. Where it differs from the paraenesis | earlier in the chapter is that it focuses on Timothy, the man of God. Calling to mind his good confession (vv. 12–13) provides the occasion for a pronouncedly theological foundation for a moral mandate to Timothy (vv. 14–16), and with that, the stage is set for the exhortation to the rich in vv. 17–19.

CHAPTER THIRTY

# GODLINESS, SELF-SUFFICIENCY, GREED, AND THE ENJOYMENT OF WEALTH: 1 TIMOTHY 6:3–19*

## PART II[1]

### Paraenesis to the Wealthy, 6:17–19

#### *Introduction: Wealth in the Church*

Paul Trebilco's assessment that "material possessions and wealth in general was a real issue in the community" is correct, although the evidence is | 74 mixed.[2] There are passages which may assume some wealth but do not necessarily do so (e.g., 2:9; 4:4–5, 12; 6:2). The only unambiguous passage is 6:17–19, and its position at the end of the letter and its programmatic character testify to the importance of the wealthy, but caution must be exercised in making generalizations on that basis. As there is evidence of wealthy people in the community, so is there evidence that the community included individuals of modest economic status (e.g., "real widows" who need financial support [5:3, 5, 16]; teachers with the same need [5:17]; slaves [6:1–2]; people who wanted to be wealthy [6:5, 7–10]).

We cannot with great confidence deduce from the letter that rich people were a dominating presence in the community or that the opponents were from this class, expecting that their economic and social status conferred on them the right to shape the community of faith.[3] It is true that bishops are required to have managerial qualifications (3:1–7), but it is not at all obvious that the rich constituted a domineering presence or that elders and deacons were expected to have resources that enabled them to extend hospitality to visitors more than other members of the community

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[1] For John Fitzgerald and Michael White, with gratitude. This is the second of a two-part article. Part I appeared in *NovT* 52 (2010): 376–405. [*Light*, 1:507–534]

[2] Paul Trebilco, *The Early Christians in Ephesus from Paul to Ignatius* (WUNT 166; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 404–422 (here, 405) sifts the evidence judiciously.

[3] So Reggie M. Kidd, *Wealth and Beneficence in the Pastoral Epistles* (SBLDS 122; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 91, 96–100.

were expected to do.[4] Nor is it clear that the leaders necessarily came from the wealthy.[5] Furthermore, wealth is, after all, something relative, and it is not helpful to speak of excessive wealth when describing the advice in 1 Timothy.[6] For our present purpose, it is not necessary to decide what proportion of the church was wealthy or how wealthy they were, or whether their possessions conferred any special status on them. Rather than making such economic determinations, my interest is in understanding the 75 exhortation in the context of ancient attitudes toward wealth. |

### *The Structure of the Paraenesis*

Despite the elements that this final section of paraenesis shares with the verses that precede it, vv. 17–19 stand formally and substantively apart from them. Coming after the doxology in v. 16c, with no grammatical connective, it is a discrete discussion of wealth and its uses.

17 Τοῖς πλουσίοις ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι παράγγελλε
μὴ ὑψηλοφρονεῖν,
μηδὲ ἠλπικέναι ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδηλότητι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ θεῷ τῷ παρέχοντι ἡμῖν πάντα πλουσίως εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν,
18 ἀγαθοεργεῖν,
πλουτεῖν ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς,
εὐμεταδότους εἶναι, κοινωνικούς,
19 ἀποθησαυρίζοντας ἑαυτοῖς θεμέλιον καλὸν εἰς τὸ μέλλον,
ἵνα ἐπιλάβωνται τῆς ὄντως ζωῆς.

With the rhetorical flourish of extended alliteration, playing on π, the author makes clear what the subject matter of the last, and therefore most important paraenesis in the letter is: πλουσίοις, πλούτου, πλουσίως, πλουτεῖν. The assonance of other words with a π sound (παράγγελλε, ὑψηλοφρονεῖν, παρέχοντι, πάντα, ἀπόλαυσιν) further contributes to the rhetorical force with which the final instruction on wealth is given. The fact that this short

[4] On their domineering presence, see Kidd, *Wealth and Beneficence in the Pastoral Epistles*, 91; on the expectation of bishops and deacons, see Jouette M. Bassler, *1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 111.

[5] A welcome caution by Trebilco, *Early Christians in Ephesus*, 400.

[6] Contra Luke Timothy Johnson, *Letters to Paul's Delegates: 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus* (NTC; Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996), 206: "pervasive and excessive wealth in the Ephesian church appears to underlie many of the specific problems that Timothy must address." For the notion of excessive or superfluous wealth, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 17.18, and for its relevance to Luke 12:13–34, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Christianization of a *Topos* (Luke 12:13–34)," *NovT* 38 (1996): 126–127. [*Light*, 1:339–351] See discussion below, on the use of wealth.

paraenesis differs from the earlier discussions of wealth in chapter 6 has led some scholars to view vv. 17–19 as a foreign body in its present context, but there is no need for such a severe judgment.[7] It is more reasonable to read these verses as directives to persons who have not yet been identified explicitly in the letter as wealthy.

It is in the nature of paraenesis that different aspects of teaching on moral behavior are taken up, so there need be no surprise that this succinctly formed injunction to rich persons in the church is the last paraenetic paragraph in the letter, bringing to a conclusion the progression of instructions in chapter 6 regarding money: πορισμός—αὐτάρκεια—φιλαργυρία—πλοῦτος—ἀπόλαυσις.[8]

| Commentators, almost without fail, point to the similarity of 6:17–19 to Luke 12:16–21 and 16:1–4 and claim that the author knew the advice he gave from the Christian moral tradition.[9] What 6:17–19 shares with this gospel tradition is the notion that doing good works lays the foundation for the future, an idea which is taken to be "ganz unpaulinisch."[10] There are also similarities between the two beyond this theological view, which go back to contemporary discussions of wealth and greed. I have pointed out Luke's indebtedness to such discussions,[11] and now seek to demonstrate that 6:17–19 also shows familiarity with ancient discussions of wealth. 76

The mandate to Timothy consists of theological statements about God as the source of Christian wealth; warnings against pride and trust in the uncertainty of riches; enjoyment as the purpose of riches; the doing of

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7 It is "out of place," according to Peter G. Bush, "A Note on the Structure of 1 Timothy," *NTS* 36 (1990): 152–156, esp. 155; breaks the continuity of the discussion, according to James D. Miller, *The Pastoral Epistles as Composite Documents* (SNTSMS 93; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 93, and Jürgen Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus* (EKKNT 15; Zürich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988), 365.

8 See Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 91, on paraenesis. On its relation to vv. 6–10, Philip H. Towner, *The Letters to Timothy and Titus* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 424, thinks that vv. 17–19 "rounds off," and "fills out somewhat the approved perspective on material wealth stated earlier in principle."

9 So, e.g., Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 91; Joachim Jeremias, *Die Briefe an Timotheus und Titus* (NTD 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), 40; Norbert Brox, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (5th ed.; RNT; Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1989), 220; Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 366–367; I. Howard Marshall, *The Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 669; Peter Dschulnigg, "Warnung vor Reichtum und Ermahnung der Reichen. 1 Tim 6,6–10. 17–19 im Rahmen des Schlussteils 6,3–21," *BZ* 37 (1993): 60–77.

10 Helmut Merkel, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (NTD 9/1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 52. It is curious that commentators do not compare or contrast 6:17–19 with 2 Cor 9:8, which deserves more attention than I can give it here.

11 Malherbe, "The Christianization of a *Topos* (Luke 12:13–34)," 123–135.

good works; and the responsibility to share wealth in the present, thus laying up treasure to secure real life in the future. With the exception of the statement about God, these instructions on the proper attitude toward wealth and its use were, *mutatis mutandis*, as much at home in the moral discourse of the day as the criticisms earlier in 1 Tim 6 were. A rapid survey of these elements will prepare for a closer examination of the mandate in 1 Tim 6:17–19.

### *Warnings to the Wealthy, 6:17*

#### *The Pride of the Wealthy, 6:17a*

The directives to the wealthy begin with two prohibitions. The first warns against pride: μὴ ὑψηλοφρονεῖν, the verb being a *hapax* in the NT. Appearing here for the first time in Greek literature, it is derived from the classical ὑψηλόφρων, as in Plato, *Resp.* 8.550B, ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος, where | it is not used in connection with wealth. It does appear in a variant reading (א C D F G Ψ 33.1739.1881) for ὑψηλὰ φρονεῖν in Rom 11:20 (cf. 12:16, μὴ τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονοῦντες).

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The word means "to be proud," with numerous connotations. Three passages in the Shepherd of Hermas in which a noun form appears demonstrate the semantic field in which it is at home. In Herm. *Sim.* 9.22.1–3, individuals who know nothing but wish to know everything are criticized for this presumption (αὐθάδεια), and it is said that because of this high-mindedness (ὑψηλοφροσύνη) many have become worthless by exalting themselves (ὑψοῦντες ἑαυτούς). In Herm. *Mand.* 8.3, the noun appears in a list of vices which include wealth, and in company with characteristics that, it will be seen, habitually appear in connection with wealth: πολυτελείας πλούτου καὶ καυχήσεως καὶ ὑψηλοφροσύνης καὶ ὑπερηφανίας. The association with haughtiness is also present in Herm. *Sim.* 8.9.1, where it is said of people who had become rich that they put on ὑπερηφανίαν μεγάλην καὶ ὑψηλόφρονες ἐγένοντο.

The association of wealth with pride, haughtiness, pretension, arrogance, hubris, and the like was widespread. Herodotus (1.199) writes of rich women who are proud of their wealth (πλούτῳ ὑπερφρονέουσαι) and are standoffish, and Menander warns that "[e]xcessive luxury becomes somehow overproud (ὑπερήφανον), and wealth strands its possessor and leaves him with a different character and not the man he was before."[12]

[12] *Frg.* 587; trans. F.G. Allinson, LCL. See also Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31.84 (5:762, 8 W-H).

P.Flor. 367, 11 accuses the recipient of the letter, "evidently your pride (γαυρωθείς) in your wealth and the great abundance of your possessions make you look down (ὑπερηφανεῖς) on your friends." And Plutarch speaks of wealth pluming itself (σεμνύνεται) on luxuries, using a term that has been thought to have its closest counterpart in early Christian literature in ὑψηλοφρονεῖν.[13]

Wealth is associated with strings of prideful qualities, such as ἀλαζονεία, θρασύτης, ὑπεροψία, with being conceited (ὑψαυχεῖ) and growing to | insolence (ὕβρις),[14] the latter particularly characteristic of the wealthy, according to Aristotle: 78

> The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent (ὑβρισταί) and arrogant (ὑπερήφανοι), being mentally affected by the acquisition of wealth, for they seem to think that they possess all good things; for wealth is a kind of standard of value of everything else, so that everything seems purchasable by it. They are luxurious (τρυφεροί) and swaggerers (σαλάκωνες), luxurious because of their luxury and the display of their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because all men are accustomed to devote their attention to what they like and admire, and the rich suppose that what they themselves zealously strive for are similarly striven for by others.[15]

*The Uncertainty of Wealth, 6:17b*

The second prohibition, μηδὲ ἠλπικέναι ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδηλότητι, also uses a biblical *hapax* (ἀδηλότης) to describe the uncertainty of riches. The notion that wealth is insecure is widespread in the sapiential tradition (e.g., Job 31:24–26; Ps 62:11; Prov 11:28; Sir 40:13) and appears in Luke 12:16–21, but it is its occurrence in the moral literature that is of special interest.

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[13] Edward N. O'Neil, "De cupiditate divitiarum (Moralia 523C–528B)," in *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (ed. Hans Dieter Betz; SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 358, commenting on *Cupid. divit.* 527C. On p. 310, commenting on 523D, he suggests that ὑψηλοφροσύνη is the closest word in early Christian literature to μεγαλοφροσύνη. See also Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.31a.34 (5:744, 15 W-H), "wealth arrogantly presumed (ἐσεμνύνετο) to correct human needs"; Plutarch, *Comp. Arist. Cat.* 4.4, "If wealth is a thing to be enjoyed (ἀπολαυστόν), why do you brag about (σεμνύνῃ) being satisfied with little?" Cf. the combination with ὑπερηφανία (not with wealth) in Plato, *Gorg.* 511D.

[14] Ps.-Phocylides, *Sent.* 62, on which see Pieter W. van der Horst, *The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* (SVTP 4; Leiden: Brill: 1978), 155. Cf. Solon, *apud* Diogenes Laertius (1.59), "Wealth breeds satiety (κόρος), and satiety insolence (ὕβριν)."

[15] Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.16.1.1391a (trans. J.H. Freese, LCL, modified).

Its appearance in a dialogue in Menander, *Dyskolos* 797–819 (=*Frg.* 128) is particularly noteworthy at this point and in the discussion of the use of wealth below.[16]

*Sostratos.*
Your theme is money, an
Unstable (ἀβεβαίου) substance. If you know that it
Will stay with you forever, guard it and
Don't share with anyone (φύλλατε μηδενὶ . . . μεταδιδούς). But where your title's
Not absolute, and all's on lease from fortune, not
Your own, why grudge a man some share in it,
Father? Fortune might take it all away
From you, hand it to someone else who doesn't
79 | Perhaps deserve it. So, as long as you
Control it, father, you yourself I say,
Should use it generously (χρῆσθαι σε γενναίως), aid everyone (ἐπικουρεῖν πᾶσιν),
And by your acts enrich all whom you can.
Such conduct never dies. If you by chance
Should ever stumble, it will yield to you a like
Repayment. Better far than hidden wealth (πλοῦτος ἀφανής)
Kept buried (κατορύξας) is a visible true friend (ἐμφανὴς φίλος).

*Kallippides.*
Go ahead, good luck
To you. No need for sermons . . .
You may dispose (πόριζε), and give (δίδου), and share (μεταδίδου).
You've quite convinced me.[17]

Menander contrasts two possible attitudes toward wealth: If it were eternally stable, it should be guarded, buried and hidden, shared with no one; on the other hand, the arbitrariness of Fortune dictates that wealth be used in the present to make as many friends as possible, for they will repay. Generosity thus prepares for the future, counting on the principle of reciprocity.

Four centuries later, the uncertainty of wealth repeatedly surfaces in the writings of the Stoic Seneca, Paul's contemporary. For him, wealth is one of the things that delight us but are slippery and uncertain (*lubrica*

[16] Reference to this text is also made by Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:576, and especially by Raymond F. Collins, *I & II Timothy and Titus: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox, 1992), 171–172. See also Lucian, *Nav.* 26–27 and 41 (using ἀβέβαια).
[17] Trans. W.G. Arnott (LCL).

*et incerta*) (*Polyb.* 9.5). We never anticipate any evil before it actually arrives. In our failure to anticipate sudden poverty, it never occurs to us that our wealth rests on a slippery footing (*in lubrico positas*) (*Marc.* 92). Wealth belongs among the Stoic *indifferentia*, but among the desirable (*potiora*) indifferents. Riches bring the wise man joy, but if they slip away (*effluxerint*), they will take away nothing from him but themselves (*Vit. beat.* 22.4–5). Unlike Demetrius the Cynic, whom he admired, Seneca welcomed wealth, honorably acquired, but with the knowledge that it is fickle and likely to fly away (*leves et avolaturas*), and he would not allow it to be a burden either to himself or to any one else (23.4; cf. 21.4).[18] Like Menander, Seneca thought the rich person should share his wealth in the present, where the attention of the Stoic wise man is focused:

> | He rejoices in the present, and puts no faith in the future; for he who leans upon uncertainties can have no sure support. Free, therefore, from the great anxieties that rack the mind, there is nothing which he hopes for or covets, and content with what he has, he does not plunge into what is doubtful.[19] 80

Rather, he will deliberate on how to put his riches to good use, giving it only for just and defensible reasons, to good people or to people whom he would be able to make good (*Vit. beat.* 23.5).[20] That is not easy, especially since nature bids us to do good to all mankind, and that "wherever there is a human being there is the opportunity to render a benefit." Still, one should not give haphazardly, but deliberately, yet without expecting a return: "the status of giving should be that no return ought to be asked, yet that a return is possible" (*Vit. beat.* 24.2–3; cf. *Ben.* 1.2.3–4).[21]

It is axiomatic in such discussions that the recipient of a benefit would reciprocate, "for no duty is more imperative than that of proving one's gratitude" (Cicero, *Off.* 1.47). Nevertheless, "in investing kindnesses we look not to people's outward circumstances, but to their character," which accommodates giving to the poor, whom one does not expect to reciprocate in kind (*Off.* 2.69–71). The principle of reciprocity, the "golden rule,"

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[18] See Gabriele Kuen, *Die Philosophie als "dux vitae": Die Verknüpfung von Gehalt, Intention und Darstellungsweise im philosophischen Senecas am Beispiel des Dialogs "De vita beata"* (WKGLS; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1994), 269–271.

[19] Seneca, *Ben.* 7.2.4 (trans. J.W. Basore, LCL).

[20] See Cicero, *Off.* 1.42–45, for the care with which generosity should be practiced, including consideration of the moral character of the recipients.

[21] Cf. Cicero (Panaetius), *Off.* 1.49: acts of generosity, done on impulse, however benevolent, are not as highly esteemed as those performed with judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration; see Andrew R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1996), 163–164.

extended beyond the philosophers to the common morality reflected in various literary genres, more often in gnomai and exempla than proverbs and fables.[22]

In these passages of Menander, representing popular morality, and of Seneca, a philosophical morality, the argument flows from a criticism of the uncertainty of wealth due to an unknowable future, to urging generous use of one's riches. The exhortation in 1 Tim 6:17–19 progresses in a different manner, but before examining that passage more closely, it will be useful to devote extended attention to what was said in classical antiquity about the use of wealth. That will enable us to read our text in 81 the context of the moral discourse of which it was part. |

### *The Proper Use of Wealth, 6:17c–19*

#### *Acquiring, Preserving, and Using Wealth*

An examination of the various literary genres, especially proverbs and gnomai, that represent popular morality leads Teresa Morgan to the conclusion that the attitude toward wealth was ambiguous. Wealth was thought to be necessary, powerful, and desirable, but people who rejected it were praised; and people were urged to give their wealth away, the best use of it being to give to friends in need. It is good to have pity on those in need without moralizing on it. In a materialistic world, people were told "to rely on themselves and the gods (played) little role in helping human beings."[23]

In this regard, the evidence of honorific inscriptions is of interest, for while sayings and stories, which reflect popular morality, "approve of the rich helping the poor . . . in honorific inscriptions the idea becomes central and definitive of goodness in a way that it is not in our material." Bringing the work of Elizabeth Forbis on Italian honorary inscriptions into the discussion, Morgan notes that the virtues ascribed to benefactors are generally also those felt by the recipients, which "brings honorifics a little closer to sayings and stories in tone: the idea that people of diverse wealth and status may share socially binding virtues has . . . an important place in popular morality."[24] According to Forbis, there are virtues which are

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[22] So Teresa Morgan, *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 167. More extensively, Albrecht Dihle, *Die goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgärethik* (SAW 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962).

[23] Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 119; see also 93, 170.

[24] Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 306.

"associated explicitly or implicitly with financial generosity in honorary inscriptions, but draw attention specifically to the honorand's character rather than his or her benefactions," thus "promoting the idea that generosity derives ultimately from a considerate character and is, therefore, inherent in all good citizens regardless of their economic status."[25]

The literary tradition provides fuller evidence of widespread attitudes toward wealth. Themes that appear in Plato's and Aristotle's discussion of wealth would become widespread in reflection on the subject, frequently in the *topos* on property or household management. In *Euthydemus* 280B–281E, Plato asserted that, with respect to wealth, we would be happy if our possessions benefited us, but that would only occur when we used our | wealth and did so correctly.[26] This presumes that the user has knowledge of the subject.[27] Aristotle (*Eth. nic.* 1.5.8) agreed: "Wealth is only good as being useful, a means to something else (χρήσιμον γὰρ ἄλλου χάριν)." Xenophon (*Cyr.* 8.2.23) continued the claims about happiness and proper use: "I do not consider those the happiest who have the most and keep guard (φυλάττοντας) of the most. . . . But the one who can honestly acquire the most (κτᾶσθαί τε πλεῖστα) and use the most (χρῆσθαι δὲ πλείστοις) to noble ends, him I count most happy." The conviction was expressed in a pun, κτᾶσθαι/χρῆσθαι, κτήματα/χρήματα, which was ubiquitous.[28] 82

It is natural that the topic of wealth and its use loomed large in the *topos* περὶ οἰκονομίας, which encompassed a complex field that maintained an "intimate connection with the . . . household and its contents, both animate and inanimate."[29] Using and guarding were two of the four

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[25] Elizabeth Forbis, *Municipal Virtues in the Roman Empire: The Evidence of Italian Honorary Inscriptions* (BA 79; Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner, 1996), 45.

[26] ὠφελεῖν is the theme of Xenophon, *Oec.* 1, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15; Diogenes Laertius 4.50; cf. Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 527A.

[27] See also Xenophon, *Oec.* 1.8. 10, 12, 14; *Mem.* 4.1.5; Ps.-Plato, *Erx.* 403AB; Ps.-Cebes, *Tab.* 39.4; Horace, *Sat.* 2.3.109; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 3.1.185 (3:131, 13–14 W-H), *Flor.* 3.4.82 (3:238, 6 W-H).

[28] See, for example, Teles, *Frg.* 4A (37, 5–9 Hense); Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 525B; *Comm. not.* 1068A (see note e on p. 725 in LCL for other refs.), and esp. Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 113–115; Joseph Seidel, *Vestigia diatribae, qualia reperiuntur in aliquot Plutarchi scriptis moralibus* (Diss., Breslau, 1906), 56–57; Jan F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (AUU: SGU 11; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976), 245; see also Horace, *Ars* 170; *Carm.* 4.9.45–49. Plutarch's restraint about the good use of money (*Cupid. divit.* 527AB) is overstated by O'Neil, "De cupiditate divitiarum (Moralia 523C–528B)," 356, who sees a contrast between Plutarch and early Christian literature, which stresses the proper use of money.

[29] Voula Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 163–164.

domains into which the practice of property management (οἰκονομία) was traditionally divided: acquisition (κτῆσις), conservation or guarding (φυλακή), orderly arrangement (τάξις or διακόσμησις), and use (χρῆσις).[30] Philodemus the Epicurean modified this, placing the greatest emphasis on the preservation of wealth,[31] but the more general insistence was that property be used.[32]

In *Oec.* 1.7–15, Xenophon argues at some length that it is not the possession of things that makes their owner wealthy, but their proper use. 83 He | goes into detail on the notions of happiness, benefit and profitability, knowledge of the proper use of wealth, and expands the use of the pun κτήματα/χρήματα: Property (κτήματα) is what is profitable to the owner (τὰ ἑκάστῳ ὠφέλημα κτήματα). It is what is profitable that is wealth (τὰ ὠφελοῦντα χρήματα), what is harmful is not wealth (τὰ δὲ βλάπτοντα οὐ χρήματα). So, the same things are wealth (χρήματα) to the person who understands how to use them (ἐπιστάμενος χρῆσθαι), and not wealth to the person who does not understand how to use them (μὴ ἐπιστάμενος οὐ χρήματα). Even money is not wealth (χρήματα) to a person who does not understand how to use it (μὰ ἐπίσταιτο χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ).

*Enjoyment in Using Wealth Properly*

Among the many maxims dealing with wealth in Ps.-Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum*, are five (*Demon.* 27–28), which continue along these lines but add one element that is of significance for 1 Tim 6:17–19:[33]

> Set not your heart (ἀγάπα) on the excessive acquisition (ὑπερβάλλουσαν κτῆσιν) of good things, but on a moderate enjoyment (τὴν μετρίαν ἀπόλαυσιν).
> Despise (καταφρόνει) those who strain after riches, but are not able to use (χρῆσθαι) what they have; they are like a man who acquires (κτήσαιτο) for himself a fine horse but does not know (ἐπιστάμενος) how to ride.[34]
> Try (πειρῶ) to make wealth (πλοῦτον) something you use (χρήματα) as well as you own (κτήματα). It is something of use to those who know how to enjoy it (χρήματα μὲν τοῖς

[30] E.g., Philodemus, *Oec.* 10.31–34.
[31] Philodemus, *Oec.* 10.39–11.3, on which see Tsouna, *Ethics of Philodemus*, 165, 173–176.
[32] For wealth being guarded rather than used, see Xenophon, *Cyr.* 8.2.23; Horace, *Sat.* 2.3.108–110, 151; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.100; John Chrysostom, *De div. et paup.* Hom. 11 (PG 63:644). For buried wealth, see Menander, *Dysk.* 812; Seneca, *Vit. beat.* 24.2.
[33] See Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 93–94. On Ps.-Isocrates, *Ad Demonicum*, see Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed," Part I, p. 401.
[34] See Xenophon, *Oec.* 1.8, for the same analogy.

> ἀπολαύειν ἐπιστάμενοις), but merely possessions (κτήματα)
> to those who are only able to acquire (κτᾶσθαι) it.
> Value (τίμα) your possessions for two reasons, because it makes you able
> to endure a heavy loss and because it enables you to help a friend in need.
> But for your life in general, set not (ἀγάπα) your heart excessively
> (ὑπερβαλλόντως) on your possessions, but do so moderately
> (μετρίως).[35]

These five precepts, in paraenetic style, with no connectives, the first four beginning with an imperative, could be taken as independent maxims with no relationship to each other. However, the first and fifth form an *inclusio*: | ἀγάπα is the first word in the first maxim and the last in the fifth, and each maxim contrasts excessive desire for possessions to moderate enjoyment or use of them. Specificity is provided in the three maxims enclosed by these two brackets, which explain how possessions are to be used. The first and second of these three maxims claim that knowledge is required to use possessions properly and to enjoy them, and the third specifies two kinds of use to which wealth could be put. 84

What is notable for our purpose is the importance of enjoyment in this description of the use of wealth by philosopher and common moralist alike. Self-indulgence in the superfluities that wealth makes possible is roundly condemned,[36] but there is an enjoyment issuing from possessions that is legitimate (ἡ τέρψις ἡ διὰ τὴν κτῆσιν).[37] Avarice is condemned precisely because it compels us to make money (κτᾶσθαι μὲν ἀναγκάζει), but forbids use of it (χρῆσθαι δὲ κωλύει): it arouses desire, but cheats us of the pleasure. Avaricious people endure the pain but do not get the pleasure.[38] On the other hand, "Isocrates" praises Hipponicus because he did not love wealth inordinately, "but, although he enjoyed the good things at his hand (ἀπέλαυε μὲν τῶν παρόντων ἀγαθῶν) as a mortal, yet he cared for his possessions as if he were an immortal" (*Demon.* 9).[39]

35 Trans. G. Norlin (LCL, modified).

36 See, e.g., Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 527A–F.

37 Philodemus, *Oec.* 18.47–19.1; cf. 10.43–11.3, for pleasure associated with arrangement. Different words are used for pleasure or enjoyment. Thucydides, *Hist.* 7.38 uses τέρψις and ἀπόλαυσις interchangeably. Cf. Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 16, τέρψις and ἡδονή; Sir 14:5 and Luke 12:19, εὐφραίνεσθαι.

38 Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 525B; cf. Menander, *Frg.* 628, "I have never envied a very rich man if he gets no pleasure out of what he possesses."

39 Cf. *Anth. pal.* 10.626: "Enjoy your goods (ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυε) as if you are about to die, and use your possessions sparingly as if you are about to live"; also Bacchylides 3.78.

The enjoyment (ἀπόλαυσις/ἀπολαύειν) spoken of in *Demon.* 27–28 is more than the pleasure that accompanies prudent spending. It is closely related to the use of wealth itself: like the proper use, it stands in contrast to excessive acquisition, and like such use, it requires proper knowledge. It is moderate as to its nature, as one's desire for possession should be moderate. So, wealth can be enjoyable, "[b]ut it has to be used, and used well, to be enjoyed."[40] This enjoyment is not self-indulgence, but is rational, deliberate conduct. |

85

*Sharing One's Wealth*

One way in which wealth is used well is to help a friend experiencing ill fortune. This agrees with the commonly held view that wealth was to be shared (μεταδίδοσθαι), especially with friends in need, but not only with them, as Menander advises, and Seneca observes that the wise man uses his wealth for the good. Cicero expresses the commonsense view that the generous use of personal wealth binds the community together (*Off.* 3.63):

> We do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state.[41]

We are born for the sake of others, to help each other (*Off.* 1.22):

> We ought to follow nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man.[42]

Sharing what we have fosters community; the miserly life is anti-social.[43]

Some people only acquire (κτᾶσθαι) money, but neither spend it on themselves nor share it with others (ἄλλοις μεταδίδοντας). In this way they are like a king who places a seal on his possessions so that they cannot be touched.[44] Or, put differently, the miser does not intend to spend or use (χρησόμενον) what he has acquired, but guards his wealth out of circulation and useless (ἀνέξοδον καὶ ἀχρεῖον φυλάττοντα), actually locked up

40 Morgan, *Popular Morality*, 94.
41 Trans. W. Miller (LCL).
42 Trans. W. Miller (LCL).
43 Plutarch, *Cupid. divit.* 525CD; cf 526E, for the profligate son who, while his father is still alive, is generous to his friends (μεταδίδοντες φίλοις), but becomes a stern miser after his father's death.
44 Teles, *Frg.* 4A (37, 7–10 Hense).

in secret and sunless vaults (κατάκλειστον ἔν τισι κρυπτοῖς καὶ ἀφεγγέσι θαλάμοις).[45]

Stingy people could conceivably try to justify their behavior by claiming that they were preserving and laying up (φυλάττουσι καὶ θησαυρίζουσι) their wealth for their children and heirs. Plutarch is incredulous: They | propose this while, still alive, they share nothing (οὐδὲν μεταδιδόασιν) with their children and heirs? Plutarch refuses to allow stringent preservation of wealth to be excused by the prospect of laying up treasure for the future. What the hoarder of wealth in fact bequeaths, Plutarch argues, is not something to be used by his heirs, but the fixation on preservation itself, and the heirs will perpetuate the process—until it is interrupted by an outsider, swindler, or tyrant, or the worst member of the family consumes the property of all (*Cupid. divit.* 526AB). The future is fraught with unintended consequences, with the upshot that, like the advice given by Menander and Seneca, the focus of using one's wealth should be on the present, the reception of a future benefit being a possibility but not a certainty. 86

*The Epicureans*

It is instructive to observe how these considerations of wealth and its use appear in one philosophical school, the Epicureans. Their attitudes differed in some respects from other schools, and on certain points they differed among themselves. Epicureans had a highly nuanced view of wealth, which was more relaxed than the views of the Stoics and Cynics.[46]

As it was for Stoics and Cynics, the self-sufficient life was also the ideal for Epicureans, their intention being to live naturally. But they differed in the way they viewed αὐτάρκεια and wealth.[47] Epicureans thought the Cynic way of life, stripping away everything possible, the easiest, but that the matter was more complex.[48] Unlike Cynics, they would not beg, holding that material resources are needed to live pleasurably, that these are limited and easy to obtain, and that one should not strain to acquire

[45] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.100. For buried wealth, see Menander, *Dysk.* 812; Seneca, *Vit. beat.* 24.2. The parable of the Talents can profitably be examined in the context of these traditions (Matt 25:18, 25, 30: the ἀρχεῖος δοῦλος buries the talent and does not put it to good [profitable] use.)

[46] For what follows, see esp. Elizabeth Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," in *Philodemus and the New Testament World* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland; NovTSup 116; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 133–176, esp. 147–161, to which I am deeply indebted.

[47] See Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed," Part I, pp. 395–396.

[48] Philodemus, *Oec.* 12.29–38.

them.[49] The wealth that is required to live pleasurably is "natural wealth" (ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος), which is limited because nature is satisfied with just a little.[50] In fact, there is very little difference between wealth and poverty, yet it is preferable to be wealthy rather than poor. But having an inclination toward wealth places less stress on wealth as a good, even 87 an | indifferent one, as the Stoics held it to be.[51] If wealth comes his way, the Epicurean will accept it, but he gives careful consideration to how he might earn it.[52]

Epicureans differed among themselves about the acquisition of wealth, but more as a matter of emphasis than principle.[53] And, unlike the Cynics, they did not live only for the present, but provided for the future, and since they could live with the bare necessities, they did not fear the baleful influence of Fortune. This confidence in the future, and that poverty suffices, makes a person share everything (μεταδότας, in Philodemus, *Oec.* 18.2–7; μεταδοτικόν, in 18.34–35). "Even when reduced to necessity, a wise person knows better how to give than to receive; for so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency (αὐταρκείας θησαυρόν) that he has found" (*Sent. Vat.* 44). By distributing what he has obtained, he wins gratitude from his associates (*Sent. Vat.* 67). Attention paid to one's friends is a more profitable acquisition (κτήσεις λυσιτελέστεραι) than lands. They are the most secure treasures (ἀσφαλέστατοι θησαυροί) against Fortune. What one sows in the present enables one to reap bountifully in the future; so, caring for one's friends now entails providing for one's future (προνοεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος).[54]

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[49] Epicurus, *Kyr. Dox.* 15; Diogenes Laertius 10.130.

[50] Sometimes αὐτάρκεια is described as ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος: *Gnom. Vat.* 476 (Socrates); 180 (Diogenes). See Cicero, *Fin.* 2.91 for nature being satisfied with just a little.

[51] See *Sent. Vat.* 25: "When measured by the goal of nature, poverty is great wealth; unbounded wealth is great poverty" (trans. Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," 146); cf. *Frg.* 45 (133 Bailey).

[52] See Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," 161–176; Carlo Natali, "Oikonomia in Hellenistic Political Thought," in *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy* (ed. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 119–126.

[53] See Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," 159–161.

[54] Philodemus, *Oec.* 24.7–25.12; see Diogenes Laertius 10.119–120, 131; Philodemus, *Oec.* 24.7–25.48; Diogenes Laertius 10.120. "He will care for his property and his future" (καὶ κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος).

*Summary*

This canvass has revealed that popular and philosophical attitudes toward wealth were broadly interested in the same topics: the moral value of wealth, its acquisition, and its use. In dealing with these topics, in the case of the philosophers, their basic intellectual presuppositions determined how each of these topics was developed. There was considerable variety in outlook, but also certain commonalities.

In general, people thought that wealth should be put to good use. But there was a range of assessments of it, from that of Demetrius the Cynic, | who thought of wealth as intrinsically worthless, to wealth as a good, even if only an indifferent good, according to the Stoics. Correspondingly, there was a wide variety in the attitudes toward the acquisition of wealth, from contemptuous rejection of it, to begging, working to acquire it, deciding on which were appropriate professions by which to earn a living, planning to preserve it, and providing for one's heirs. 88

The major concern was how to use one's possessions, whether they had been acquired involuntarily or earned through one's own effort. Wealth was not to be morally corrosive, as in being the object of greed, or a cause for the vice of pride, or being allowed to delude one to place one's trust in it despite its being fundamentally uncertain. For wealth to have any worth, it had to be used well, which meant being used intelligently, which would result in non-hedonistic enjoyment. Such use, some reflective philosophers argued, would benefit the donor personally as well as contribute to social cohesion.

Two themes run through most instructions to use one's possessions. One is the uncertainty of the future, which demands moral action in the present. A widely held view was that wealth was to be used to help one's friends. This was not, however, a totally altruistic impulse, as the perennial discussion of the other theme, that of reciprocity, shows. Sometimes, you are straightforwardly told to help others so that you can expect some return from them. At other times, someone more intellectually sophisticated, like Seneca, hesitated to make this case for generosity baldly, and Epicureans, while relativizing wealth, still argued that reciprocal benefits constitute secure treasures against arbitrary Fortune.

Such was the moral environment of the mandate to the wealthy in 1 Tim 6:17–19. With that environment it shares an interest in the major aspects of the discussion of wealth, and like other moral teachers, it approaches them on the basis of its own presuppositions.

*The Mandate to the Wealthy, 6:17–19*

When stripped of the theological statements prepared for in vv. 11–16, vv. 17–19 consists of a series of injunctions to the rich expressed in paraenetic style. The content of the mandate (παράγγελλε) to Timothy is stated succinctly in an antithesis with two infinitives in its first member which warn against the haughtiness of the wealthy (μὴ ὑψηλοφρονεῖν) and trusting in the uncertainty of wealth (μηδὲ ἠλπικέναι ἐπὶ πλούτου ἀδηλότητι). The second, contrasting member of the antithesis, describes the purpose of 89 | the divine gift of wealth as enjoyment (ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν). It is probable that "εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν is an *epexegesis* of πλουσιώς, intended to emphasize the prodigality of the Giver of all good."[55] That would make it the first of a succession of *epexegeses*.

The construction εἰς plus the noun expresses purpose and is equivalent to the infinitive.[56] Since no genitive or accusative follows, εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν might appear to be absolute, with no particular object of the action implied by ἀπόλαυσις in mind. However, it is possible to read ἀγαθοεργεῖν as in apposition to and epexegetic of εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν, πλουτεῖν as epexegetic of ἀγαθοεργεῖν, and εἶναι as epexegetic of ἀγαθοεργεῖν. The infinitives thus describe how wealth is to be enjoyed, namely in the ways it is used:[57] first, simply by doing good, stated in a verbal form (ἀγαθοεργεῖν) that captures the favorite ἀγαθὸν ἔργον of the PE;[58] second, stating the same thing with a similar favorite expression, ἔργα καλά, but explicitly describing the doing of such works as being rich in them (πλουτεῖν ἐν ἔργοις καλοῖς); third, giving specificity to these general directions, to be generous and sharing (εὐμεταδότους, κοινωνικούς). By doing this, they will lay up treasure (ἀποθησαυρίζοντας) for themselves, a good foundation for the future, thus laying hold of real life (τῆς ὄντως ζωῆς).

Like other contemporary discussions of wealth, the author is concerned with how behavior in the present (ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι) has consequences for the future (εἰς τὸ μέλλον). The two prohibitions, not to be proud and not to set one's hope on the uncertainty of wealth, were, as we saw, stock items in the discussions of wealth.

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[55] Frederick Field, *Notes on the Translation of the New Testament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899), 213.

[56] As in 1 Tim 4:3; 2 Tim 2:25; Matt 8:34; 1 Thess 4:17.

[57] For more detail, see below.

[58] For ἀγαθὸν ἔργον, see 1 Tim 2:10; 5:10; 2 Tim 2:21; 3:17; Titus 1:16; 3:1.

John Chrysostom, in commenting on 1 Tim 6:17, evidently recognized that the two prohibitions in the antithesis reflect an awareness of the negative view of riches. Paul, he says, wrote in this way because he knew that nothing produces conceit, madness, and arrogance (τῦφον καὶ ἀπόνοιαν καὶ ἀλαζονείαν) the way wealth does.[59]

It is sometimes thought that 1 Tim 6:17 uses ὑψηλοφρονεῖν to express not so much pride as scorn for "others who have not managed to gain a social position on the basis of their possessions."[60] But there is nothing in | the text that describes the wealthy as insolent or arrogant, nor does it mention the effect that their wealth might have on their relations with others. Indeed, what strikes one, given the company that the pride of the rich normally kept, is precisely that haughtiness, pretension, arrogance, hubris, etc. are *not* associated with ὑψηλοφρονεῖν in 1 Tim 6:17. Instead, our author coins a new word that describes wealthy individuals, self-exalted, and proud of their wealth. The socially responsible action to which they are directed with the infinitives in the second part of the antithesis are in contrast to this self-centeredness. 90

Beyond its uncertainty and its potential for moral corruption, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with wealth; indeed, it is a divine gift, to be used in this aeon to secure what awaits in the future. The rich person's hope or trust should not be in wealth itself, but in God who supplies it.[61] This eschatological scheme, which provides the framework for the practical directions, is applied more fully in the preceding comments to Timothy (vv. 11–16), which set up vv. 17–19.

That block of instruction begins as typical paraenesis: σύ, virtue list, imperatives (φεῦγε/διώκε), to which is added ἐπιλαβοῦ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς. The mandate (παραγγέλλω), given before God who gives life to everything, is to live morally until the ἐπιφάνεια of Christ, which will occur in its proper time, determined by God (ἣν καιροῖς ἰδίοις δείξει). The author of the PE conceives of this present life as lived between two ἐπιφάνειαι, as expressed in Titus 2:11–13: The saving grace of God appeared (ἐπεφάνη), educating us to deny vice and live according to the classical virtues (σωφρόνως καὶ

[59] John Chrysostom, *Hom. 1 Tim.* 6 (PG 62:598).

[60] Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 671; Ceslas Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:576, snobs toward the little people by virtue of the wealth they had attained; so too Jerome D. Quinn and William C. Wacker, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy* (ECC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 552.

[61] See 1 Tim 4:10, ἠλπίκαμεν ἐπὶ θεῷ ζῶντι, the God of creation, and the contrast, ζωὴ ἡ νῦν καὶ ἡ μελλούσῃ; cf. 5:5, ἠλπίκαμεν ἐπὶ θεόν.

δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς . . . ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι), looking toward the blessed hope and ἐπιφάνεια of God.[62]

The same eschatological conviction frames the typical Hellenistic moral instruction in vv. 17–19. Here there is no uncertainty about the future due to the whims of Fortune; rather a prohibition is directed to the rich ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰῶνι not to set their hope on the uncertainty of riches in the present. | 91 Nor is there any interest in how wealth is acquired other than the affirmation that it is God who supplies it, which also makes the question whether it is a good moot. The author is concerned, rather, with the purpose for which wealth is given, which leads him to emphasize how it is to be used, an emphasis he shares with contemporary reflections about wealth.

The purpose for which wealth is provided is enjoyment (εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν). Commentators understand ἀπόλαυσις to mean physical pleasure, according to one, "a strong word denoting almost sensual enjoyment."[63] They read it in light of a Hellenistic Jewish use which sometimes describes the physical enjoyment provided by God in connection with the gifts he provides in creation.[64] Such a reading of 1 Tim 6:17 is then supported by reference to 4:3–5, which shows why this particular word is used: to provide an antithesis to ascetic tendencies based on a negative view of creation held by gnosticizing heretics.[65] But that goes too far, for although not necessarily hedonistic, such full enjoyment would be in strong tension with the self-sufficiency commended in 6:6–8, even if αὐτάρκεια there is understood as it was by moderate Cynics.[66]

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[62] For more extensive discussion, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners': Soteriology in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology* (ed. Jan G. van der Watt; NovTSup 121; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 334–358. [*Light*, 1:431–457]

[63] William D. Mounce, *Pastoral Epistles* (WBC 46; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2000), 366, who then quotes Eccl 5:8–20, which, however, uses εὐφραίνεσθαι (cf. Luke 12:19; Eccl 8:15).

[64] 3 Macc 7:16; Philo, *Mos.* 2.70; *Praem.* 135; Josephus, *A.J.* 1.48; cf. *1 Clem.* 20.10; *2 Clem.* 20.3–4; *Did.* 10.30. The verb is used in 4 Macc 5:9 for enjoyment of what nature provides.

[65] So Spicq, *Lexique théologique du nouveau testament*, 186–187; Anthony T. Hanson, *The Pastoral Epistles* (NCB; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 114; Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 368; Lorenz Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (HTKNT 11.2.1–3; Freiburg: Herder, 1994), 1:305–306; Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 672: "The positive attitude of 4:3f. is echoed; the implication is that the letter has to deal with two opposing tendencies, the asceticism which forbade enjoyment of the good gifts of God and the self-sufficiency which was based on greed for possession."

[66] The suggestion by Johnson (*First and Second Letters to Timothy*, 310), that it is for God's own pleasure that the world is so generously provided, is ingenious, but is not supported by the grammar.

These commentators overlook the fact that the subject here is not enjoyment or pleasure in general, but the purpose for which wealth is given. We have noted the close relation between enjoyment and the proper use of wealth in the moral tradition, and in view of other similarities already pointed to, it is reasonable to understand ἀπόλαυσις here in light of that tradition. The syntax of vv. 17–18 strengthens the case for doing so, especially if my suggestion that the infinitives that follow εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν are epexegetic and describe the uses to which wealth is to be put.[67] What is | striking is that the purpose for the gift of wealth is not the proper use of it, which is attended by enjoyment; rather, the purpose *is* enjoyment, which is explicated by the three infinitives that follow. Whatever the local circumstances, if there were any that were responsible for this inversion, the author wishes the benevolent use of one's wealth to be an expression or means of enjoyment rather than, say, something done out of duty or compulsion.[68] The enjoyment in view is not centered on the self but is other-directed. It shows no interest in the character responsible for generosity, as in the inscriptions, nor does it require a proper intellectual grasp, as is frequent in the moral tradition. The reason for enjoyment is that this is what God intends in providing richly. What is required is not reflection but action. Although the author takes up the same items as contemporary moralists do, he goes his own way as they individually go theirs. 92

That the first explication of enjoyment is the epexegetic ἀγαθοεργεῖν is not surprising, for we have seen that it was expected that the wealthy do good. What is missing here is an interest in the gratitude or other response to generosity, or the leitmotif of Hellenistic morality, reciprocity. Not much should be made of the absence of these features, for this is not an extended disquisition on wealth and its uses but a paraenetic summons to action. Nevertheless, the emphasis on God's generosity rather than the self would have made such considerations inappropriate.

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[67] Collins, *I & II Timothy and Titus*, 171, thinks that the three infinitives describe use; he apparently separates them from enjoyment, although he includes enjoyment as one of four uses (170). Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 426, correctly thinks that the "three infinitive phrases expand the initial command," but understands this to be a "spelling out of the appropriate ways in which the wealthy are to express their trust in God," rather than, more precisely, their enjoyment.

[68] See 2 Cor 9:7–8, which is not brought into the discussion by commentators: One is to give by one's free choice, μὴ ἐκ λύπης ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, for God loves a cheerful giver and is able to let all grace abound to you, so that you may always have all sufficiency (πᾶσαν αὐτάρκειαν) to abound in every good work (πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν).

This is the first time ἀγαθοεργεῖν occurs in Greek literature.[69] The infinitive is epexegetic, describing how wealth is to be enjoyed, by doing good. Constructed to express in verb form what noun and adjective do elsewhere in the PE, the reference is to good works in general. The general sense is explicit in the four places in the Pastorals where πᾶν is used with ἀγαθόν.[70] The enjoyment of wealth consists in a general beneficent use of it. That in | turn is explicated in the infinitival clause that follows, which emphasizes such use by describing it as being rich (πλουτεῖν), thus replicating God's action (πλουσίως), and pointing in the direction of specific deeds by adding ἔργοις καλοῖς.[71] These implied specific acts are then explicitly identified in the last epexegetic infinitival clause, εὐμεταδότους εἶναι κοινωνικούς, the generous behavior encouraged by both philosopher and popular moralist. The enjoyment purposed by God, the provider of all things, is, in the final analysis, the humanitarian and socially responsible behavior held as the ideal by the moral tradition in general and by the PE elsewhere.[72]

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By enjoying wealth in the way intended by God, believers lay up for themselves as treasure a firm foundation for a secure future. In this way, they are unlike Plutarch the Platonist, who thought that hoarding wealth like a treasure does not provide security for the future, for too many unintended consequences would happen. Philodemus the Epicurean was closer to the PE in his view that sharing one's wealth with one's friends was the most secure treasure, but against fickle fortune. For our author, on the contrary, the emphasis is on security in the future. By using wealth in the way determined by God, a firm foundation is now laid for the future, its purpose being to lay hold of eternal life.[73]

Eternal life is secure, for it is part of the divine scheme of salvation. God promised it before time began, and it is what one hopes for (Titus

[69] Cf. ἀγαθουργῶν in Acts 14:17.

[70] 1 Tim 5:10; 2 Tim 2:21; Titus 1:16; 3:1. Cf. also the antithesis, ἀπὸ παντὸς ἔργου πονηροῦ (2 Tim 4:18). One occurrence in the plural, δι' ἔργων ἀγαθῶν (2 Tim 2:10), also refers to good deeds in general.

[71] In three other places in the PE καλὰ ἔργα refers to specific actions (1 Tim 3:1; 5:10; Titus 3:14), in five to moral behavior in general (1 Tim 2:25; Titus 2:7, 14; 3:8). Walter Grundmann (*TDNT* 3 [1965]: 550), followed by Marshall (*Pastoral Epistles*, 227), thinks that the description ultimately derived from Stoicism. But Stoics used ἀγαθός and καλός synonymously. See Philo, *Post.* 133; Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1039C; Diogenes Laertius 7.101.

[72] E.g., the *Gemeindetafel* in Titus 2:2–10 and the theological warrant in 2:11–14 for the behavior inculcated, ending with ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων. See Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners,'" 334.

[73] Cf. Luke 12:33, θησαυρὸν ἀνέκλειπτον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

1:2; 3:7). God, the all- powerful Creator, who sets the times, called believers to eternal life, which they should lay hold of by engaging in a moral contest (1 Tim 6:11–16). The rich are not to set their hope on the uncertainty of wealth, but on God, who provides them with everything to enjoy in a manner that will enable them to lay hold of eternal life (1 Tim 6:17b–18). If one lives as God purposes one to live, there is no uncertainty in the future. | 94

*Summary*

The author writes his mandates on wealth in the briefest possible way, signaling an awareness of the conventional categories used by a wide range of moralists of his day, especially by moral philosophers of different schools. He differs from his contemporaries in significant ways, without engaging in extensive discussion of those categories. Mainly, he differs from them in the way he situates the behavior mandated within an eschatological scheme created and controlled by God, who is also the source of wealth. It therefore goes without saying that wealth is a good; indeed, the purpose of God's beneficence is human enjoyment, understood as the socially responsible use of wealth, which is tantamount to a new, powerful notion of laying up treasure for the secure future.

What emerges is not an author who derives this or that element of his mandates from one or another moralistic source, rather one who has a coherent view of the moral universe that determines the way he arranges conventional categories. He does this succinctly, in paraenetic style, with an antithesis in which the second, major member consists for the most part of a series of infinitives that have an imperatival force.

## Conclusion

The attitude toward money and its use in 1 Tim 6 has much in common with contemporary ideas of philosophers, but also found in dicta or attitudes contained in proverbs, clichés, inscriptions, and drama. Inclusion of these latter, more common sources in this investigation made possible a thicker description of the moral environment of the PE than a narrow concentration on philosophical sources would have afforded. The moral philosophers, as were the PE, were themselves part of this wider moral discourse, and although the philosophers deserve our primary interest, widening our lens allowed us to capture the rich diversity of viewpoints on a subject such as wealth.

An appropriate way to examine the PE's views was not to see them as derivative of one or more "sources," but as belonging to a world of discourse in which the same topics relating to wealth tended to come up, but were developed by philosophers or other moralists in keeping with their own intellectual commitments or proclivities. The PE were no different in 95 this respect. They shared in their own way in moral talk that was | conventional or current, yet without sacrificing their individual theological viewpoint in doing so.

The PE were not only part of the moral ecology in their positive teaching; the invective in 1 Tim 6:3–5 shows how adept the author was in expressing himself with the polemical insults hurled by some contemporary philosophers at their opponents or a populace they thought beyond moral improvement. At the same time, the reasons our author thinks his opponents are in such an unredeemable condition are his own.

An affinity has been thought to exist between the author's view of αὐτάρκεια and those of Stoics and Cynics. This is a simplistic understanding of how the virtue was thought of by these and other philosophers who did not agree in many respects, and it does not do justice to how the notion fits in the context in which it is introduced here. Self-sufficiency is important enough for the author to qualify godliness, but the basis for that assertion is not philosophical or theological, as might be expected, but an observation so self-evidently right that it can be expressed in a proverb or cliché (v. 7). Similarly, the negative depiction of wealth (vv. 9–10) is widespread, found in philosophers, satire, anthologies; and greed, a lust for wealth, is depicted in a proverb in widespread use throughout the ancient world.

The paraenesis to Timothy (vv. 11–16) is a transition to the final exhortation in the letter. It functions as a contrast to the avaricious life just described and, as the most theological section of chapter 6, prepares for the paraenesis to the wealthy.

The mandate to the wealthy in vv. 17–19 shares a commonly held view that wealth is not to be hoarded or allowed to lead its possessors to personal corruption, but that it is to be used for the common good. Viewed in the context of such reflection, the mandate appears to have most in common with philosophical discussions of wealth, whose topics the author knows but puts to his own use by framing them theologically. He also does so elsewhere where he uses moral philosophical tradition. For example, in 1 Tim 2:9–15 he shows that he is thoroughly familiar with the *topos* on σωφροσύνη, particularly with reference to women, that he applies it to

the behavior of Christian women, and supports his directive with biblical tradition.[74] And in Titus 2:11–12, the theological warrant for the conventional | behavior stipulated in 2:2–10, is introduced with reference to the saving which instructs in living σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως καὶ εὐσεβῶς.[75] 96

The difference between these two passages and 1 Tim 6:17–19 is that in the latter, reference to the categories in which wealth was discussed by philosophers (and others) is reduced to tags, a succinctness due to their presence in the paraenetic peroration of the letter. The order in which they are listed and the theological framework that encloses them show them to be more than clichés used to impress.

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74 See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The *Virtus Feminarum* in 1 Timothy 2:9–15," in *Renewing Tradition: Studies in Texts and Contexts in Honor of James W. Thompson* (ed. Mark W. Hamilton, Thomas H. Olbricht, and Jeffrey Peterson; PTMS 65; Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick, 2006). [*Light*, 1:459–477]

75 See Malherbe, "'Christ Jesus Came into the World to Save Sinners,'" 334–348.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

# OVERSEERS AS HOUSEHOLD MANAGERS IN THE PASTORAL EPISTLES*

Forty years ago, David Balch, always the thorough researcher, examined ancient philosophical discussions of household management in his study of the domestic code in 1 Peter.[1] He recently returned to that literature in a study on wealth.[2] Jens Herzer, seeking to describe the ecclesiology of the Pastoral Epistles (henceforth PE), has lately appealed to the same material.[3] It is timely, then, that I offer David some brief remarks on two texts from the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim 3:2–7; Titus 1:6–9) which betray traces of the same literary tradition.

Martin Dibelius found the origin of the listing of virtues in the two passages in lists of virtues of ancient professionals (e.g., a military tactician, a physician, a dancer), which had no explicit relationship to their actions.

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1 David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 21–62. See also, independently, Dieter Lührmann, "Wo man nicht mehr Sklave oder Freier ist. Überlegungen zur Struktur frühchristlicher Gemeinden," *WD* 13 (1975): 53–83; "Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und Antike Ökonomie," *NTS* 27 (1980): 83–97. Karin Lehmeier, a student of Lührmann, treated this material extensively in her learned dissertation, which was published as *Oikos und Oikonomia: Antike Konzepte der Haushaltsführung und der Bau der Gemeinde bei Paulus* (MThSt 92; Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 2006). Lehmeier does not treat the PE. I only became aware of this book while this article was in editorial process and could therefore not benefit from it.

2 David L. Balch, "Philodemus, 'On Wealth' and 'On Household Management': Naturally Wealthy Epicureans Against Poor Cynics," in *Philodemus and the New Testament World* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland; NovTSup 111; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 177–196. See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19, Part I," *NovT* 52 (2010): 376–405; [*Light*, 1:507–534] "Godliness, Self-Sufficiency, Greed and the Enjoyment of Wealth: 1 Timothy 6:3–19, Part II," *NovT* 53 (2011): 73–96, [*Light*, 1:535–557] where attention is drawn to attitudes about the acquisition, preservation, disposition, and use of wealth in discussions of estate management.

3 Jens Herzer, "'A Bishop . . . must manage his own household well' (1 Tim 3:4). Household Management and the Moral Status of Church Leaders in the Pastoral Epistles" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, Boston, Mass., December, 2008); Herzer, "Rearranging the 'House of God': A New Perspective on the Pastoral Epistles," in *Empsychoi Logoi. Religious Innovations in Antiquity: Studies in Honour of Pieter Willem van der Horst* (ed. Alberdina Houtman, Albert de Jong, and Magdalena W. Misset-van de Weg; AJEC 73; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 547–566.

The virtues were attached to the professionals, he thought, in a manner that suggests that a fixed schema or pattern existed. Despite | the sketchiness of Dibelius's proposal, he has been followed, with some modifications, by commentators.[4]

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My offering to David in these few pages is more modest: I neither construct a schema nor describe an ecclesiology. I merely wish to illustrate briefly that 1 Tim 3:2–7 and Titus 1:6–9 share much with widespread ancient descriptions of professional leaders, particularly of household managers. In this I share the conviction of Luke Johnson that, "[t]he concept of 'good management of a household' provides the best access to the particular virtues of the supervisor."[5]

## 1 Timothy 3:2–7

Before proceeding to this text, a couple of matters should be remarked upon.

### *The Language Used*

The qualities of an overseer are introduced in 1 Tim 3:2 with a stock phrase, δεῖ οὖν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνεπίλημπτον εἶναι. The generic singular with δεῖ is also used, for example, in specifying the qualities of a ruler (δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα),[6] and of a dancer, whose qualifications are stated in an inclusive manner (ἀνεπίλημπτον), as the overseer's are here. In general,

> the dancer should be perfect in every point (δεῖ πανταχόθεν ἐπηκριβῶσθαι), so as to be wholly rhythmical (τὸ πᾶν εὔρυθμον), graceful, symmetrical, consistent, unexceptionable, impeccable, not wanting in any way (ἀνεπίλημπτον, μηδαμῶς ἐλλιπές), blent of the highest qualities, keen in his ideas, profound in his culture, and above all, human in his sentiments. (Lucian, *Salt*. 81; trans. A.M. Harmon, LCL)

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[4] See Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles: A Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (trans. Philip Buttolph and Adela Yarbro; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 50–51; see Roland Schwarz, *Bürgerliches Christentum im Neuen Testament? Eine Studie zu Ethik, Amt und Recht in den Pastoralbriefen* (ÖBS 4; Klosterneuburg: Österreichisches Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1983), 95–98; Jürgen Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus* (EKKNT 15; Zurich: Benziger/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988), 15–151; Lorenz Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe* (HTKNT 11.2.1–3; Freiburg: Herder, 1994), 1:111; Philip H. Towner, *The Letters to Timothy and Titus* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2006), 240.

[5] Luke Timothy Johnson, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 35A; New York: Doubleday, 2001), 223.

[6] See Plutarch, *Princ. iner.* 781CD; cf. δεῖ in *Praec. ger. rei publ.* 800A.

The grammatical construction, δεῖ plus accusative generic singular, and a list of seemingly general virtues is similar to 1 Tim 3:2–3 and Titus 1:7. The article being generic, the singular noun should not be | taken to refer to a single bishop.[7] The construction is used extensively in descriptions of what a Stoic sage should be.[8] For example, Epictetus's description of the ideal Cynic in *Diatr.* 3.22 is given in response to a question (1) about what sort of man the Cynic ought to be (ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ τὸν κυνίζοντα), and the proper qualities are then stipulated with δεῖ throughout the rest of the diatribe (e.g., 13, 14, 19, 26, 62, 90, 100). 74

A serious philosophic seeker, Epictetus warns, does not casually, without carefully examining the task and his own capacities to undertake it, say to himself (3), "I must be a manager of this house (ἐμὲ δεῖ οἰκονόμον εἶναι)." Epictetus has in mind the Stoic view of the universe as a household and of the ideal philosopher in his universal mission.[9] The philosopher, here described as the ideal Cynic, but Stoic in conception, unhindered by family or other local entanglements, goes forth as the messenger (ἄγγελος), scout (κατάσκοπος) and herald (κῆρυξ) of the gods (69–70). His duty is to oversee (ἐπισκοπεῖν) all mankind (72, 78). The oversight (ἐπισκοπῇ) of their affairs is his proper concern (97).[10] Despite superficial similarities, there are considerable conceptual differences between the Cynic or Stoic wise man and the Christian overseer. Among these differences is that, in contrast to the philosopher, the Christian overseer's activity is local, his attention directed towards those in his household.

The description of the philosopher as overseer has to do with his function rather than an office. In the Pastoral Epistles too the concern is with function, and it is best to avoid the translation of ἐπίσκοπος as "bishop" in favor of "overseer" or "supervisor," as commentators increasingly do.[11]

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[7] The exegetical decisions reflected in this paper deserve more extended treatment.

[8] E.g., in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.5 (2:67, 21–22 W-H; = *SVF* 3:604); *Ecl.* 2.7.11 (2:114, 5 W-H; = *SVF* 3:601). For the generic article, see also *Ecl.* 2.7.11 (2:114, 16 W-H; = *SVF* 3:605).

[9] See Margarethe Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Vom Kynismus* (PhAnt 34; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 48–50.

[10] For the philosopher as scout (κατάσκοπος), see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 24–25; cf. 1.24.3–10; 3.24.3–10; Diogenes Laertius 6.43; cf. ἐπίσκοπος, ἐπισκοπεῖν, 97; Maximus of Tyre, 15.9CD. See Eduard Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie," *JCPh* Suppl. 19 (1893): 373–475.

[11] E.g., Raymond F. Collins, *I & II Timothy and Titus* (NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 79; Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 239; Oberlinner, *Die Pastoralbriefe*, 1:110.

This lessens the danger of anachronism, reading later ecclesiastical use into 1 Tim 3:1–2.[12]

75 | *The Epistolary Situation Envisaged*

According to 1 Tim 1:2, Timothy was left in Ephesus to oppose heterodox teachers. Much of the letter does that and also exhorts readers to the moral life.[13] The author does not write to introduce a new hierarchy in the community, and there is no indication in the text that the qualities listed in vv. 3–7 qualify men who have yet to assume the office of bishop.[14] Verse 1 should not be interpreted in light of vv. 10 and 13 and Titus 1:5. The function of oversight (ἐπισκοπή) is already being carried out by men who strongly desire (ὀρέγεται, ἐπιθυμεῖ; cf. 1 Pet 5:2) to do so. The virtues enumerated describe the qualities of character and conduct of those who are exercising oversight rather than qualify them for an office yet to be filled.

The qualities of overseers and deacons conclude the first major section of 1 Timothy which ends in 3:14–15. The purpose of the letter up to this point (ταῦτα) is stated as being to inform Timothy about the proper conduct "in God's house (ἐν οἴκῳ θεοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι), which is the church of the living God." The ταῦτα refers to everything antecedent, beginning with 1:3–4, where the proper concern of orthodox teaching is said to be God's household management in faith (οἰκονομίαν θεοῦ τὴν ἐν πίστει) in contrast to heterodox teaching and endless speculation and controversy. The qualities listed in 3:2–7, then, are to be seen from the perspective of a household management which is concerned with the cultivation of moral conduct and adherence to correct doctrine.[15] It is the household of God, ordered and conducting itself accordingly, that is the pillar and support of the truth (3:15).

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[12] BDAG, s.v. ἐπίσκοπος; Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 244.

[13] Jukka Thurén, "Die Struktur der Schlussparänese, 1 Tim 6,3–21," *TZ* 26 (1970): 241–253, argued that the entire letter is directed against false teachers and their sins and commends true doctrine.

[14] Herzer, "Rearranging the 'House of God,'" 558–559.

[15] Οἰκονομία is used extensively with this meaning in the literature on household management, e.g., in Xenophon, *Oec.* 1.1–2; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1.2.1.1253b; Philodemus, *Oec.* 1.6–10 (References to Philodemus's work is to Christian C. Jensen, *Philodemi Περὶ Οἰκονομίας qui dicitur libellus* [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1906]). For three different interpretations, among others, of the meaning here, see I. Howard Marshall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 367; Johnson, *First and Second Letters to Timothy*, 164; Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 113–114. For ταῦτα as referring to everything in the letter up to 3:15–16, see Marshall, *Pastoral Epistles*, 497–498.

| *Qualities of the Overseer* 76

These qualities, listed in a series of adjectives, specify what is meant by the requirement that the overseer be above reproach (ἀνεπίλημπτος), which, if taken by itself would be striking for its absoluteness, as in the description of Lucian's dancer, and a similar one of a teacher in Ps.-Plutarch, *Educ.* 4B.[16] The list is bracketed by explicitly domestic requirements which form an *inclusio*, beginning with the requirement that the overseer had been married only once (v. 2: μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἄνδρα),[17] and ending with the requirement that he care well for his household (vv. 4–5), which contains the clearest traces in this passage of the *topos* on household management. A more general requirement, that he not be a neophyte, is tacked on (v. 6) before the qualities are concluded by requiring that the overseer have a good reputation with outsiders (v. 7), which echoes the call that he be blameless.

The ten qualities listed between the two explicit domestic requirements are general in nature, but closer examination shows that they fit well with descriptions of domestic virtues, particularly but not exclusively of old men. So, νηφάλιος and σώφρων, with which the list begins (v. 2), and σεμνότης, with which it ends (v. 4), describe the old men in Titus 2:2.[18] Orderly (κόσμιος) belongs with | σωφροσύνη in 2:9, describing 77

[16] See also 1 Tim 5:7, where the purpose of teaching moral qualities to widows is to make them ἀνεπίλημπτοι; the purpose clause is then followed by more domestic virtues (vv. 5–10).

[17] On the different interpretations of the phrase, see Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 250–251. The analogous phrase, used of a widow who remained single after her husband's death, may suggest that the reference here is to a widower. See Abraham J. Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men: The Use of Philosophic Traditions and Scripture in 1 Timothy 5," in *Scripture and Traditions: Essays on Early Judaism and Christianity in Honor of Carl R. Holladay* (ed. Patrick Gray and Gail R. O'Day; NovTSup 129; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 296. [*Light*, 1:479–505] This might reflect a commitment by a surviving husband to remain unmarried, his dead wife remaining his wife forever, a *coniunx perpetua*, on which see Susan Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 246. But see also Karen Cokayne, *Experiencing Old Age in Ancient Rome* (London: Routledge, 2003), 208 n. 106, for the difficulties Augustan law and the expectations of society would have caused (131).

[18] See John Chrysostom, *Hom. Tit.*, Hom. 4 (PG 62:681–682), who thinks that these qualities are mentioned to counteract the view (commonly held) that old men are slow, timid, forgetful, insensible, and irritable. For σωφροσύνη of old men, see Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.13.13–14.1390a; *moderatio* in Cicero, *Sen.* 1, 33; for "old men of self-control (*moderati*), who are neither churlish (*difficiles*) nor ungracious (*inhumani*)," see Cicero, *Sen.* 7, "a slightly ponderous but effective equivalent for κόσμιοι καὶ εὔκολοι," Plato, *Resp.* 1.329D, which he follows here (Jonathan G.F. Powell, *Cicero: Cato Maior de Senectute* [CCTC 28; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 11–118). For σεμνότης (*gravitas*), see Cicero, *Sen.* 10, "dignity tempered with courtesy (*comitate condita gravitas*)," on which see Powell, *Cicero Cato Maior de Senectute*, 122; Cokayne, *Experiencing Old Age*, 21: "The majority of the old men

the adornment of the domestically responsible wife;[19] the notion of orderliness, here of the overseer, is also a quality associated with household management.[20] Hospitableness is overtly domestic, and is required in 5:10 of widows more than sixty years of age who are to receive financial aid from the church. Aptness to teach (διδακτικός) is expected of heads of households (see below, on Titus 1:9), and in 1 Tim 5:17 is a function of the old men who exercise care well (οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι), especially those who labor in speaking and teaching (οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ).[21]

Criticism of the elderly shimmers through in v. 3 (πάροινος, πλήκτης), and in the antitheses to ἐπιεικής, ἄμαχος, ἀφιλάργυρος: "... the critics say, old men are morose (*morosi*), troubled (*anxii*), irascible (*iracundi*), churlish (*difficiles*); if we inquire, we'll find that some of them are misers too" (Cicero, *Sen.* 65).[22] But even when old age is not criticized in this manner, the commended behavior of Appius Claudius in ruling his household is striking for its assertiveness:

> Appius, though he was both blind and old, managed four sturdy sons, five daughters, and a great household, and many dependents; for he did not languidly succumb to old age, but kept his mind ever taut, like a well-strung bow. He maintained not mere authority, but absolute command over his household; his slaves feared him, his children revered him, all loved him, and the customs and discipline of his forefathers flourished beneath his roof. For old age is honoured only on condition that it defends itself, maintains its rights, is subservient to no one, and to the last breath rules over its own domain. (Cicero, *Sen.* 37–38; trans. W.A. Falconer, LCL)

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in Roman portraiture appear solemn, which was indicative of the *gravitas* of old age, the dignity to be emulated by the young."

[19] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The *Virtus Feminarum* in 1 Timothy 2:9–15," in *Renewing Tradition: Studies in Texts and Contexts in Honor of James W. Thompson* (ed. Mark Hamilton, Thomas H. Olbricht, and Jeffrey Peterson; PTMS 65; Eugene, Ore.: Pickwick, 2007), 56–57, 60–64. [*Light*, 1:459–477]

[20] Hierocles *apud* Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.22.24 (4:505, 5–19 W-H); cf. the requirement that the οἰκονόμος be skilled in the proper arrangement (κοσμητικός) of possessions in the household (Philodemus, *Oec.* A 3; 10.33, 39; 11.1 [διακόσμησις]; Ps.-Aristotle, *Oec.* 1.6.1344b26–27. See Plutarch, *Cons. ux.* 609E, for Plutarch's grieving wife maintaining order in the household (κατεκόσμησας τὸν οἶκον).

[21] See Mona Tokarek LaFosse, "Age Matters: Age, Aging and Intergenerational Relationships in Early Christian Communities, with a Focus on 1 Timothy 5" (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 2010).

[22] For such criticism and further references, see Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men," 272.

Such an insistence on his prerogatives as *paterfamilias* could easily lead to domestic violence, probably alluded to by πλήκτης and | ἄμαχος(4).[23] In contrast to such belligerence, the overseer should be gentle, irenic, and generous (ἐπιεικής, ἄμαχος, ἀφιλάργυρος) in caring for his own household. These gentle qualities follow immediately the requirement that he be διδακτικός, a connection also made when speaking of Timothy's responsibility to teach all people (2 Tim 2:23–25). 78

*Managing the Household Well*

Vices or virtues like the ones just enumerated were thought to determine whether someone would be a bad or good steward.[24] The virtues in 3:2–3 are qualities of the overseer who manages his own household well (v. 4, τοῦ ἰδίου οἴκου καλῶς προιστάμενον). The change from adjectives to this participial clause draws attention to the major quality of the overseer, his domestic governance. The description of the overseer's domestic responsibility that follows consists of two parts: (1) the requirement that the overseer care for his own household (τοῦ ἰδίου οἴκου προστῆναι οἶδε), specified as having obedient children, and (2) the consequent ability to take care of God's church (ἐκκλησίας θεοῦ ἐπιμελήσεται) (3:4–5).

Traditional discussions of household management held that the function of a good manager was to manage his own household or estate well (εὖ οἰκεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον),[25] and to teach others how to manage theirs.[26] In 1 Tim 3:4–5, the administrative dimension is in view, in Titus 1:9, the didactic. The two word groups used in 1 Timothy (προίστημι and ἐπιμελέομαι) were used extensively in discussions of household management.

It is not possible to distinguish sharply between the two groups of words. For the most part, they were used interchangeably.[27] In both, | there is the notion of managing or caring, with a shading toward a more general caring 79

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[23] On domestic violence in general, see John T. Fitzgerald, "Early Christian Missionary Practice and Pagan Reaction: 1 Peter and Domestic Violence Against Slaves and Wives," in Hamilton et al., *Renewing Tradition: Studies in Texts and Contexts*, 24–44.

[24] Cf. Philodemus, *Oec.* 23.40–24.47, and see Voula Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 164, 184–187.

[25] Xenophon, *Oec.* 1.2; see 1.5 for a distinction between οἶκος and οἰκία, on which see Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus*: *A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 213–214. Philodemus, *Oec.* 1.16–17, offers a critique of Xenophon; see Tsouna, *Ethics of Philodemus*, 169–170.

[26] Philodemus, *Oec.* 3a.6–16.

[27] See, e.g., Plato, *Gorg.* 520A; Philodemus, *Oec.* 20.20, 39; Philo, *Prob.* 45; *Post.* 181; *Virt.* 58, 63.

in προΐστημι and a more specific taking care of something or someone in ἐπιμελέομαι, yet some differences are notable. According to some Stoics, only the wise man could be a head of a household (προστάτης), for only he knows how to raise funds and expend them properly, as in the management (ἐπιμέλεια) of property and the people who work in his fields.[28]

The administrative nature of the activity was also touted by the more latitudinarian Stoic, Hierocles, who held that husband and wife both "take thought for the management (προστασίαν) that is incumbent on them of their household and their servants, and the rearing and care (κηδεμονίαν) of their children, and a concern (ἐπιμέλειαν) for the necessities of life that is neither strained nor slack, but is balanced and attuned."[29] The phrase προιστάναι τοῦ οἴκου appears in 1 Sam 13:17; Prov 23:5; Amos 6:10, and Paul uses προΐστημι of compassionate caring (Rom 12:8, coupled with exhortation, generosity, mercy, love; cf. Rom 16:1–2), and of one particular means of psychagogy (1 Thess 5:12).[30] The meaning in 1 Tim 3:4–5, where it is used of domestic responsibility and in conjunction with ἐπιμελέομαι approximates discussions of household management like that of Hierocles.

In such discussions the person who manages (ὁ οἰκονόμος or ὁ προεστώς) is ultimately responsible for providing proper care (ἐπιμέλεια) for the household or estate,[31] which included the care of parents, wife and children,[32]

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[28] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7a.11d (2:95, 9–33 W-H); see Carlo Natali, "*Oikonomia* in Hellenistic Political Thought," in *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy: Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum* (ed. André Laks and Malcolm Schofield; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 95–128, esp. 115. For administration, see Ceslas Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), 1:443 n. 3. For financial administration, cf. Luke 12:42; 16:1, 8. Michael Wolter, *Das Lukasevangelium* (HNT 5; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), holds that in 12:42 a slave is in charge (464), in 16:1, 8 an appointed freedman (545).

[29] Hierocles, *apud* Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.22a.24 (4:505, 15–20 W-H). The translation is by David Konstan in Ilaria Ramelli, *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts* (SBLWGRW 28; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009), 77. See *Flor.* 4.22.24 (4:504, 19 W-H), for the wife who takes over her husband's part in his absence so that the house is not left without a manager (ἀπροστάτητος οἶκος). For Hierocles's more egalitarian attitude, see *Flor.* 4.28.21–22 (5:697, 11 – 700, 20 W-H), and Ramelli's notes on pp. 128–133 on other moral philosophers on the same subject.

[30] See Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 312–314.

[31] Philodemus, *Oec.* 14.9–15; 21.37–44; Philo, *Prob.* 57; cf. Plutarch, *Comp. Arist. Cat.* 3.2, οἴκου προστάτης ἢ πόλεως.

[32] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 69.2; Xenophon, *Oec.* 7.5; Philo, *Post.* 181; cf. Josephus, *A.J.* 2.236 for the πολλὴ ἐπιμέλεια, which the young Moses received, and see further, Ceslas Spicq, *Lexique théologique du nouveau testament* (2d ed.; Fribourg: Éditions universitaires de Fribourg/Paris: Cerf, 1991), 560.

and, frequently mentioned by the | Epicurean Philodemus, wealth,[33] and farm management.[34] The manager could, however, teach slaves with the proper aptitude new skills.[35] So Joseph the steward (ἐπιτρόπος) had charge of Pharaoh's entire household (συμπάσης τῆς οἰκίας ἡ ἐπιμέλεια).[36] That effective household management prepared one for a similar role in a larger arena was a common conviction, and is frequently documented in commentaries.[37] For Philo, Joseph's appointment as steward prepared him for command of cities, a nation and a large country. 80

> For the future statesman needed first to be trained and practised in household management (οἰκονομίαν); for a house is a city compressed into small dimensions, and household management may be called a kind of state management, just as a city too is a great house and statesmanship the household management of the general public. All this shews clearly that the household manager is identical with the statesman, however much what is under purview of the two may differ in number and size. (Philo, *Ios.* 38–39; trans. F.H. Colson, LCL)

This understanding, that personal qualities demonstrated in the management of a household are required for management in a larger arena, is represented in the rhetorical question in 3:5. The question justifies the requirement in 3:4 that the overseer manage his household well, with dignity, thereby emphasizing why that requirement is important.

### *Why the Qualities Are Listed*

The qualities of the overseer in vv. 2–7 are enumerated to inform Timothy about proper behavior in the household of God, which is the church of the living God (πῶς δεῖ ἐν οἴκῳ θεοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἐκκλησία θεοῦ ζῶντος, 3:15). The overseer's manner | of management, exemplifying his personal virtues, commend those virtues to the people in his charge. These 81

[33] Philodemus, *Oec.* 19.34, 47; cf. 18.23; 20.20; 24.38; A 22–25. See Balch, "Philodemus, "'On Wealth' and 'On Household Management'."

[34] Xenophon, *Oec* 7.41; cf. Philo, *Virt.* 58; *Agr.* 64 for farming, and *Spec.* 1.16 for the sun having the ἐπιμέλεια καὶ προστασία over nature. For political supervision, see Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 1:445–447; Spicq, *Lexique théologique*, 562.

[35] Ps.-Aristotle, *Oec.* 1.5.1344a27–29; Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.4.

[36] Philo, *Ios.* 37.

[37] See, e.g., Dibelius and Conzelmann, *Pastoral Epistles*, 53; Spicq, *Les épîtres pastorales*, 1:436. See also Hermann von Lips, *Glaube-Gemeinde-Amt: Zum Verständnis der Ordination in den Pastoralbriefen* (FRLANT 122; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 127; Abraham J. Malherbe, "*Paulus Senex*," *ResQ* 36 (1994): 197–207, esp. 207 n. 44; [*Light*, 1:277–288] Herzer, "A Bishop Must Manage His Household Well," 6 n. 16.

are virtues one would expect from any moral individual, with the possible exception that he not be a novice, and would meet with the approval of outsiders (v. 7). Elsewhere, Philo shows interest in the psychagogic manner in which Joseph the manager goes about his task, in the style of a responsible teacher or philosopher varying his speech, warning, admonishing or correcting, as is appropriate to the individual circumstance.[38] No such interest, however, is shown in 3:4–5.[39] Nor is there a stress on teaching, as there is in Titus 2:9. The delineation of the overseer's character and actions is adequate for its paraenetic purpose; the modeling of the behavior suffices.[40] "For the frequent seeing, the frequent hearing of (good men) little by little sinks into the heart and acquires the force of precepts" (Seneca, *Ep.* 94.40; trans. R.M. Gummere, LCL). Our author shows interest elsewhere in this feature of paraenesis (1 Tim 4:12; Titus 2:7; cf. 1 Tim 1:16).

One wishes for greater detail about the overseer's management, since that is where the emphasis lies. Luke Johnson points out that only two of the qualities mentioned point to activities, that the bishop be hospitable and apt to teach.[41] Viewed thus, very little can be said about the management in view. The letter does, however, show an interest in administering the church's life: behavior in the home and the church assembly (2:8–15), Timothy's responsibilities as minister (4:11–16), and, especially characteristic of the duties of the οἰκονόμος, the use of financial resources (5:1–16, 17–23; 6:1–2, 3–20).[42] It is the Apostle who directs attention to these matters in his letter, but he writes with a view to his absence, when conduct in the household of God will be | [82] the charge of the overseer (3:15; cf. 5). All these administrative functions are local, and the personal qualities

[38] For psychagogic practice, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 81–94; Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, index, s.v. "psychagogy"; Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (NovTSup 81; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).

[39] For the Pastorals' reticence toward this tradition, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," *JBL* 103 (1984): 235–243; repr., in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 137–145. [*Light*, 1:187–196]

[40] See Seneca, *Ep.* 6.5–6; 52.8; Pliny, *Ep.* 7.1.7; cf. 2.6.6. For this feature of paraenesis, see Malherbe, *Letters to the Thessalonians*, 83. Commentators increasingly recognize the paraenetic function of the list of virtues: e.g., Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 148; Oberlinner, *Pastoralbriefe*, 1:110; Towner, *Letters to Timothy and Titus*, 148.

[41] Johnson, *First and Second Letters to Timothy*, 223.

[42] See nn. 25, 30, and Malherbe, "Godliness, Self-Sufficency, Greed, and the Enjoyment of Wealth."

enumerated are congruent with the values of society, which thus secure a good reputation from outsiders.[43]

### *Summary*

The language of 1 Tim 3:1–7 as to form and content is similar to that of philosophical discussions of household management, which are largely concerned with function rather than office or position. Verses 4 and 5, in the larger context of 1:4 and 3:15, belong to those discussions. The listed qualities of the Christian overseer are widely accepted virtues and also frequently appear in domestic contexts, as they do in 1 Timothy. Those qualities exemplify the manner in which the overseer cares for his household and the church. In the process of doing so, he serves as a model for those in his care. The focus in 3:4–5, the culmination of the qualities, is on administration, and the overseer's qualities characterize him as he administers the details of the Christian community's life and worship.

## Titus 1:5–9

The epistolary situation presumed in Titus differs from that in 1 Timothy. Paul, somewhere on his way to Nicopolis, writes to Titus, who is in Crete, to join him in Nicopolis. Titus is to be replaced by Artemas and Tychicus (3:12). In the meantime, Zenas and Apollos are on their way to Crete and beyond (3:13). Paul had left Titus in Crete, commanding him to set right what remained to be done in the churches by appointing elders, also referred to as overseers, in every city. The emphatic way in which Titus is reminded of his appointment to his task draws attention to the importance of the appointees.[44] In the midst of | the mobility of Paul and his associates, 83

[43] Viewed as local by von Lips, *Glaube-Gemeinde-Amt*, 95–96; Roloff, *Der erste Brief an Timotheus*, 159. Oberlinner, *Pastoralbriefe*, 1:124–126, thinks the perspective is *gesamtkirchlich*, extending beyond the local church to include all churches.

[44] Note the emphatic elements: 1. the prominent position of τούτου χάριν, "this is the reason why," 2. ἀπολείπω was used of the installation of government officials (see Michael Wolter, *Die Pastoralbriefe als Paulustradition* [FRLANT 146; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988], 183–184), 3. the emphatic ἐγώ σοι διεταξάμην. Theodor Zahn (*Introduction to the New Testament* [trans. John M. Trout, William A. Mather, Louis Hodous, Edward S. Worcester, William H. Worrell, and Rowland B. Dodge; 3 vols.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1909; repr., Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1953], 2:45–47) thought Paul was so emphatic because Titus had informed him, perhaps in a letter, that he found it difficult to carry out his charge.

stability in the churches is to be achieved by the elders continuing the teaching and exhorting that Titus in the meantime is to engage in.[45]

*Qualifications of the Elders/Overseers*

What are qualities of character or demeanor exemplified in the process of overseeing the affairs of a church in 1 Tim 3:2–7, here become qualifications for appointment to the role of overseer. The overseer is explicitly called God's household manager (θεοῦ οἰκονόμος, v. 7) and as such must have virtues that qualify him to perform his proper household functions. The virtues listed (Titus 1:6–9a) are similar to the ones in 1 Tim 3, but differ in primarily two respects: the structure of the list of qualifications, and the emphasis on teaching. Both features are due to the primary functions of the overseers/elders specified in this context, namely to exhort with sound teaching (παρακαλεῖν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ) their hearers, and to reprove (ἐλέγχειν) those who contradict them (1:9b). The heretics are to be shut up, for they are unruly, idle talkers and deceivers (ἀνυπότακτοι, ματαιολόγοι καὶ φρεναπάται) who subvert entire households with the erroneous doctrine they peddle for the sake of personal gain.[46]

*The List of Qualifications*

In the face of the danger to domestic stability, the list stresses the domestic nature of the elders'/overseers' qualifications. This is evident in the way the list is structured. The qualifications begin, as in 1 Tim 3:2 (ἀνεπίλημπτος), with the requirement that the elders/overseers be blameless (Titus 1:6, ἀνέγκλητος), which is further specified as having one wife and whose children are not morally dissolute or unruly (ἀνυπότακτα). In contrast to the heretics who are unruly | (ἀνυπότακτα) and destabilize households,[47] the elders/overseers are to have a stable family life. The reason (δεῖ γάρ) for this qualification is then given (v. 7): the overseer must be blameless as God's household manager (τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνέγκλητον εἶναι ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμον), which is further specified in a series of antitheses with five vices and five

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[45] Titus: ἔλεγχε (1:13); λάλει ἃ πρέπει τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ (2:1); παρακάλει (2:6); παρακάλει καὶ ἔλεγχε (2:15). The elders: παρακαλεῖν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ καὶ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐλέγχειν (1:9).

[46] An analogous situation is envisaged in 2 Tim 3:1–7, where Timothy is warned against heretics who are characterized by a list of nineteen(!) vices, who sneak into houses to capture silly little women with intellectual pretensions (cf. 1 Tim 5:13). But whereas Timothy is told to avoid them (v. 5), the elders are to reprove them and shut them up in Titus 1:9, 11.

[47] Cf. 1 Tim 4:3, κωλυόντων γαμεῖν.

virtues. These virtues are similar to those in 1 Tim 3:2–4, and function as they do in being paraenetic, a function enhanced here by the antithetic style.[48] Unlike those virtues, these are explicitly related to the domestic role of the overseer as οἰκονόμος.

In addition to these differences is the way the list ends. Like 1 Tim 3:4, there is a change from adjectives to a participial clause that describes the major function of the qualifications. In 1 Timothy, it is προιστάμενος, which leads to further discussion of church management (προστῆναι . . . οἶδεν). Domestic virtues underlie proper care of the church.

In Titus 1:9, the list begins with a series of adjectives and culminates in a participial clause which has to do with teaching rather than administration: ἀντεχόμενον τοῦ κατὰ τὴν διδαχὴν τοῦ πιστοῦ λόγου ("holding fast to the trustworthy message that conforms to the teaching"). In 1 Tim 3:2, διδακτός describes the capacity to teach in managing a household and is one in a list of such qualities. Here, teaching stands in the culmination of the qualifications of God's manager, and is expanded in two directions. Looking backward, it is the standard (κατά) by which the trustworthy message, to which the manager is devoted, is measured. Looking forward, the purpose (ἵνα) of holding to this teaching is that the household manager have a twofold ability, to exhort with sound teaching (παρακαλεῖν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ) those under his care, and to reprove (ἐλέγχειν) those who oppose him.[49]

That the οἰκονόμος should engage in teaching should not surprise, for philosophers expected the manager to teach members of his | household as well as others. Husbands were responsible for teaching their wives about household management,[50] and slaves too received instruction in how to manage a farm.[51] Furthermore, the good manager's concern stretched beyond the administration of his own household, for he taught

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[48] For antithesis and lists of virtues and vices in paraenesis, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Paraenesis in the Epistle to Titus," in *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (ed. James M. Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen; BZNW 125; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), 303–5. [*Light*, 1:407–430]

[49] Cf. 1 Tim 5:17, οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες πρεσβύτεροι . . . οἱ κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ, where the πρεσβύτεροι, however, are old men rather than the occupiers of an office (thus, Malherbe, "How to Treat Old Women and Old Men," 282; LaFosse, "Age Matters"). For the different ways in which the orthodox and the heretics are to be treated, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 125.

[50] See Antipater *apud* Stobaeus, *Flor*. 4.22.25 (4:510, 3–5 W-H); Xenophon, *Oec.* 2.4–12; 9; cf. Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus*, 267–274.

[51] Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.4.

others how to better manage their own households.[52] Marcus Cato, for one, was judged as no less proficient in the conduct of his own household than of the city. "He not only increased his own substance, but became a recognized teacher of domestic economy (διδάσκαλος οἰκονομίας) and agriculture for others, and compiled many useful precepts on these subjects" (Plutarch, *Comp. Arist. Cato* 3.2; trans. B. Perrin, LCL). The overseer whom Titus is to appoint also engages in teaching, but evidently only of those under his care; his sphere of responsibility is local.

### *Summary*

Titus was directed to appoint elders/overseers in churches without permanent leaders. The qualifications the appointees are to have stress their domestic virtues. As God's household managers, these virtues would make them able to exhort their churches and shut up those who harm the churches by destabilizing entire households. Consequently, the list of qualifications is structured to give prominence to teaching as a qualification of an overseer and an activity in which he is to engage.

## Conclusion

The language, including grammatical structure, used to describe the overseer in 1 Tim 3 and Titus 1 is derived from ancient descriptions of ideal figures, particularly that of the manager of a household. The description in 1 Tim 3 appears in a context in which behavior in the church, the household of the living God, is the subject. The list of virtues characterizing the manager/overseer are qualities he demonstrates as he performs his domestic duties. His main activity, as indicated by the structure of the list, is his administration of the | affairs of the church. In the process of taking care of the church, he demonstrates the moral life he wishes to inculcate.

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The description of the elder/overseer in Titus 1 is derived from the same philosophical traditions, but is put to a different use. Here, the virtues are qualifications to be met by candidates for appointment to overseership. The form of the list shows that here the major qualification is faithfulness to traditional teaching, which enables the overseer to exhort with it and confute opponents who undermine the church by upsetting entire households.

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[52] E.g., Philodemus, *Oec.* 3, 6.

An awareness of how the author appropriates the discussions of household management shows that he has done more than unthinkingly purloin lists from some tradition to attach them to his Christian functionaries. He rather shapes the two lists to the epistolary situations he reflects in the two letters. In 1 Timothy, his interest is in behavior in the church and he concentrates on good administration, one of the two major functions the ancients assigned to a good household manager. In Titus, his interest is in the appointment of overseers who would be able to exhort the faithful and confute gainsayers, so he emphasizes the other major function assigned to a good manager, namely teaching.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

# ETHICS IN CONTEXT: THE THESSALONIANS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS*

First Thessalonians lends itself to what I understand the interest of this conference to be for three reasons: (1) The letter was written soon after Paul's mission activity among the recipients and reflects that activity more clearly than is done in any of his other letters. (2) The letter exhibits a pronounced interest in the recent converts' relationship to the environment which had formed them before they became Christians, thus, in their neighbors and their thinking. (3) The letter is paraenetic in style and largely so in content, so is concerned with the moral formation of Paul's converts.[1] These elements will be treated in the course of this essay.

## The Autobiographical and Historical Narrative

We begin with brief comment on the circumstances of the writing of the letter. The letter consists of five chapters, the first three of which are autobiographical and historical, the last two practical advice, or paraenesis. Without the context of the historical narrative of chapters 1–3, which essentially describes Paul's founding of the church, we cannot appreciate the missionary dimension of Paul's ethical instruction in the letter.

Paul arrived in Thessalonica in the summer of the year 49. He left two or three months later, having spent only this short period founding the church. Finding himself in Athens, he sent Timothy, who had come from Macedonia, back to Thessalonica. He moved on to Corinth in early 50, where Timothy again caught up with him with news about the church in Thessalonica. He wrote 1 Thessalonians soon after Timothy's arrival.

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[1] These themes are explored more fully in Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000).

He thus wrote the letter six to eight months after he first set foot in Thessalonica and about four months after he had left the city.[2]

The letter confirms this reconstruction. It reflects a young church, is positive and intent on strengthening the recent converts. He uses passionate language, dripping with sentiment and pathos, especially when speaking of his desire to return to them. He recalls his efforts to overcome his enforced separation from them when Satan hindered him, leaving him a desolated orphan until Timothy returned with news that makes him overflow with thanks and joy.

Paul writes in this way, not to defend himself for some reason, as is sometimes thought, but as I have argued in my commentary on the letter, to lay a philophronetic foundation for the practical advice he would give in chapters 4 and 5.[3] He describes a relationship that he claims was extraordinarily close and personal from the first time he came in contact with them. It is only after that bond has been strengthened by calling their short mutual history to mind, that he sets about to fill what was lacking in their faith (3:10), which turns out to be guidance on some aspects of their moral life. The function of this narrative, then, is not apologetic but already paraenetic.

## The Occasion for Writing 1 Thessalonians

I wish to focus on the two brackets to this historical narrative, and turn first to its end, 3:5–7, where Paul recounts the circumstances that led to the writing of the letter.

At the end of his historical narrative, Paul expresses himself in contemporary conventional form when he plaintively remarks on their mutual desire to see each other face to face. This was an epistolographic feature of so-called "letters of friendship." More significant for our immediate purpose is Timothy's good news that Paul's recent converts "always have a good memory of him" (3:6), which amounts to an expression of confidence that they still looked to him for guidance (3:6–7).[4] Paul here uses a convention from the contemporary moral hortatory tradition, which described the ideal relationship between a recent convert to philosophy and his teacher, who had moved on after bringing his recent convert to

[2] Malherbe, *Thessalonians*, 71–78.
[3] Malherbe, *Thessalonians*, 78–81.
[4] Malherbe, *Thessalonians*, 206–208.

conversion. An example is found in Lucian, *Nigrinus* 6–7, where the convert, in this case a certain Nigrinus, is speaking:

> Then, too, I take pleasure In calling his words to mind frequently, and have already made it a regular exercise: even if nobody happens to be at hand, I repeat them to myself two or three times just the same. I am in the same case with lovers. In the absence of the objects of their fancy they think over their actions and their words, and by dallying with these beguile their lovesickness into the belief that they have their sweethearts near; in fact, sometimes they even imagine that they are chatting with them and are pleased with what they formerly heard as if they were just being said, and by applying their minds to the memory of the past give themselves no time to be annoyed by the present. So I too, in the absence of my mistress Philosophy, get no little comfort out of gathering the words that I then heard and turning them over to myself. In short, I fix my gaze on that man as if he were a lighthouse and I were adrift at sea in the dead of night, fancying him by me whenever I do anything and always hearing him repeat his former words. Sometimes, especially when I put pressure on my soul, his face appears to me and the sound of his voice abides in my ears. Truly, as the comedian says, "He left a sting implanted in his hearers."[5]

Associated with this theme of remembrance of the teacher, indeed its presupposition, is that the teacher had become the model or paradigm for the convert. The teacher could call on others to follow his example because he had attained a moral status that authorized him to make demands. By presenting himself as a model, he demonstrated three things: that his moral demands could be achieved, that he showed in concrete terms what was demanded, and that he made a commitment to continue acting in the same way.

Paul uses this convention elsewhere. For example, in 1 Cor 4:14–21, at the end of the introductory section of the letter, before he gives explicit directions on how to behave, he claims a special relationship with his readers: he is their spiritual father, having begotten them through his preaching of the gospel to them, not on the basis of his personal attainment of moral superiority. His fatherhood in the gospel allows him to call on his children to become imitators of him. What that means, he says, Timothy his child will remind them of: "I exhort you therefore, brethren, be imitators of me. For this reason I sent to you Timothy my beloved and faithful child in the Lord, who will remind you of my ways in Christ

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5 Trans. A.M. Harmon (LCL).

Jesus" (1 Cor 4:16–17). Paul remains their paradigm in his absence. What is required is that they continue to remember him.

When Timothy returns to Paul from the Thessalonians and reports that they "always have a good memory" of him, they are already doing what he wants the Corinthians to do (cf. 4:1, 10; 5:11).

We turn to the other bracket of the historical narrative. In 1 Thess 1:5–7, Paul uses the convention in a manner quite different from 1 Corinthians. Here he reminds them of something they already know (vv. 4–5), the circumstances of their conversion:

> For our gospel came to you not in word only, but also with power and the Holy Spirit and with a full conviction, fully in conformity with the kind of persons *we* proved to be among *you* for *your* sake; so *you* on *your* part became imitators of *us* (in Greek: ἐγενήθημεν ἐν ὑμῖν δι᾽ ὑμᾶς. καὶ ὑμεῖς μιμηταὶ ἡμῶν ἐγενήθητε) and the Lord by receiving the word in deep distress and with joy inspired by the Holy Spirit, with the result that *you* (ὑμᾶς) became an example to all the believers in Macedonia and Achaia. For from *you* (ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν) the word of the Lord has sounded forth.

The stress here is on the powerful manner in which the gospel had come to the Thessalonians and brought about the relationship with Paul. Unlike 1 Cor 4:15, where it is Paul, who through the agency of the gospel begets them, thus creating a paternal relationship with his converts, in 1 Thessalonians the stress is otherwise. Here the stress is on the dynamic character of the gospel which brings about the intensely personal relationship between Paul and his converts. What Paul in chapter 1 simply calls "our gospel" (1:5) or "the word of the Lord" that the Thessalonians in their turn preached (1:8), he repeatedly calls "the gospel of God" in chapter 2 (vv. 2, 8, 9), which he had been entrusted with (2:4), and which God had emboldened him to speak (2:2). The Thessalonians had received that message from him for what it truly was, not a human word, but the word of God, which was at work in them, the believers. This is explained (γάρ) by their, on their part, having become imitators of God's churches in Judea when they suffered (2:13–14).

What is striking about Paul's description in 1:5–7 of how his gospel came to them is that the gospel was not separated from the kind of person he was. They became imitators of him and the Lord when they accepted the word with much affliction mixed with joy (1:6). The reference here is likely to the self-giving of Christ who, he says in 5:9–10, died for us so that we might not experience God's wrath but be saved by Christ so that we might live with him.

For his part, Paul reminds his readers in 2:7–9 how he had ministered to them:

> Although we might have made harsh demands on you as apostles of Christ, yet we were gentle in your midst; as a nurse who cares for her own children, so we, having tender affection for you gladly determined to share with you not only the gospel of God but our very selves, because we had come to love you. For you remember, brethren, our labor and toil; working night and day in order not to burden any of you we preached the gospel of God to you.

In this self-presentation in chapters 1 and 2, the gospel comports to the kind of person he showed himself to be. In Paul's life the gospel had become transparent. For our immediate interest, what is notable is that Paul's ethical instruction is not separated from his mission preaching, that is, the initial offering of the gospel. The letter provides no evidence for a two-stage activity, the preaching of the kerygma and, subsequently, doctrinal and ethical instruction. The short time that he spent in Thessalonica founding the church could hardly have accommodated such periodized activities, nor could the social realities of the mission have done so. Paul engaged in manual labor, stitching away at his tents while preaching in a relatively small space in which manufacture and sales were being conducted.[6] He worked out of love for his hearers and to provide them an example of social responsibility (2:8; 4:11; 2 Thess 3:8–9).

Paul worked at the same time that he preached, and there is no evidence of an earlier scholarly generation's surmise that kerygma was followed by moral catechesis. The imperatives with which he later urges his readers to please God (4:1–2) "are not derived from an indicative" but "had been part of Paul's initial preaching in Thessalonica."[7] The frequently repeated observation that several of Paul's letters comprise two sections, the first dealing with theological matters, which served as the basis for the second, devoted to ethics, does not apply to 1 Thessalonians, whose first part is historical/biographical. Paul's and the Thessalonians' lives were from the beginning interwoven by the preaching and receiving of the gospel and teaching on the moral life. Recollecting that earlier association has

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[6] Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980); Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 15–20.

[7] Dieter Lührmann, "The Beginnings of the Church at Thessalonica," in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians* (ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 237–249, esp. 249.

the philophronetic epistolary function of preparing Paul's readers for the directions in the second part of the letter.

The letter reflects Paul's concerns about his converts' faith, his uncertainty about their social relations, whether they fully understood the reasons for his moral demands, whether they questioned the adequacy of their knowledge, and whether they were doing the right things or were making sufficient progress in their new walk. These are perennial problems experienced by recent converts to philosophy or religion, and the Thessalonians were no exception. It is no wonder that Paul writes that it was out of his own need that he sent Timothy to find out precisely what conditions were, and, most importantly, whether they still looked to him, as they initially had done, as their paradigm of gospel behavior. It is no wonder that receipt of the good news that they indeed did so, resulted in Paul's effusive expression of joy and gratitude.

## A Letter to a Community

In the letter that he writes in response to Timothy's good news, Paul focuses on individuals as part of a larger community, which he describes in kinship terms. The letter is addressed "to the ἐκκλησία of the Thessalonians, in God their Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." This is the only time that ἐκκλησία is used of the Thessalonians, and that in an unusual way, circumscribed as "in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ" (1:1). To be "in God" is unusual for Paul, and it is likely that "in" is to be understood instrumentally, as it is in 2:2, "we were emboldened by (ἐν) our God to speak to you." Read thus, the church is created by God the Father, "Father" being a designation of God as Creator, as in the creedal formulation in 1 Cor 8:6, "But for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things, and for whom we exist, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist." "Father" was used as early as Plato to describe the Creator and is Philo's favorite term for the Creator. The God who brought the church into existence is then called "our Father" in two passages which form an *inclusio* to the historical narrative (1:3; 3:11, 13). Thus the community whose origin Paul describes has God the Creator as their Father, before whom they will stand at the Parousia of the Lord Jesus and all his saints.

Despite the kinship language, with which the letter is replete, Paul does not replicate a hierarchical structure. He certainly is not the authoritative *paterfamilias* as in 1 Corinthians, but rather uses images to describe himself that are affective. Rather than claim the perquisites due an apostle, he claims to have been gentle like a wet nurse, a domestic employee

crooning over her charges (2:7). When separated from his recent converts, he felt orphaned, desolate, and lonely (2:17). And when he was with them and ministered to them, he did so like a caring father who gave individual attention to them, conforming to their dispositions or emotional states, sometimes exhorting, at other times consoling, at others charging them to live in a manner worthy of God, who calls them into his kingdom and glory (2:11–12; cf. 4:1–2).

Paul may use the paternal metaphor to describe his responsible psychagogy, but he is never their father, and he nowhere in the letter calls them his children. He rather addresses or describes his converts as ἀδελφοί ("brothers") thirteen times, the highest incidence of the term in all of his letters. The relationship between him and them and among themselves is that of siblings. Brothers constitute the church's gatherings (5:25–27). Remarkably, the moral advice in the letter is given in view of the relationship between the brothers: directions on sexual morality forbid transgressing against and wronging one's brother (4:6); advice on social responsibility is given within the rubric of brotherly love (4:9–12); the consolation after the death of some of them assures them that they will not be separated from each other at the Parousia (4:15; 5:10), and he enjoins them to comfort each other with these words (4:17–18). They should provide the same pastoral care to each other that he has given them, giving attention to each other one on one (5:11), treating each other in ways appropriate to each person's disposition and emotional state as he had done (5:12–16; cf. 2:11–12).

The kinship language that Christians used of themselves did not escape the notice of their pagan neighbors. It drew the attention of Lucian of Samosata, who described Christian alacrity in aiding people in need and cuttingly offered a reason for their behavior:

> their first lawgiver persuaded them that they are all brothers of one another after they have transgressed once and for all by denying the Greek gods and by worshipping that crucified sophist himself and living under his laws. Therefore they despised all things indiscriminately and consider them common property.[8]

By their conversion they became brothers and sisters and adopted a communal life that distinguished them from the rest of society. While Lucian is merely derisive, Caecilius, another pagan, playing on the much vaunted Christian love for each other, was downright vicious:

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[8] Lucian, *Peregr.* 13 (trans. A.M. Harmon, LCL).

> They recognize each other by secret marks and signs; hardly have they met when they love each other, throughout the world uniting in the practice of a veritable religion of lusts. Indiscriminately they call each other brother and sister, thus turning even ordinary fornication into incest by the intervention of these hallowed names. Such a pride does this foolish, deranged superstition take in its wickedness.[9]

To this slashing accusation, the Christian Apologist replies:

> ... it is true that we do love one another—a fact that you deplore—since we do not know how to hate. Hence it is true that we do call one another brother—a fact which rouses your spleen—because we are men of the one and same God the Father, copartners in faith, coheirs in hope.[10]

These pagan criticisms react to the self-conscious way in which Christians attributed a special quality to their fellowship by describing themselves as brothers. Caecilius attributed this to pride. Paul pointedly enhanced the quality of the Christian communal life by emphasizing the implication of what it meant to be brothers. According to 1 Corinthians, which repeatedly comments on relations with non-Christians, he tells his readers not to associate with a brother who is immoral, but allows social mixing with pagans who act in the same way (5:11–13). The presumption is that the Christian brethren live on a higher ethical level than their pagan neighbors. That also means that Christians are not to drag each other before pagan courts for judgment (6:1–2).

The fraternal relationship came into being with their obedience to the gospel, which according to 1 Cor 4:15 was the way Paul begat them. Adolf Harnack, at the beginning of a long chapter in his *Mission and Expansion* entitled "The Gospel of Love and Charity," puts it this way: "The preaching which laid hold of the outer man, detaching him from the world, and uniting him to his God, was also a preaching of solidarity and brotherliness.... The gospel ... is at bottom both individualistic and socialistic."[11] One may question what Harnack means by detachment from the world. After all, in 1 Cor 5:9–10 Paul cautions that refusing to associate with pagans guilty of the behavior he condemns in Christians would mean that they would have to withdraw from the world. What is

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[9] Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 9.2 (trans. Graeme W. Clarke, ACW).

[10] Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 31.18 (trans. Graeme W. Clarke, ACW); cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 39.

[11] Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 1:149.

apt, however, is Harnack's identifications of social as well as individual aspects of conversion.

## Summary

Paul begins the letter with a three-chapter account of his relationship with his recent converts. The purpose of this narrative is to strengthen the bond between them to form the basis for the moral direction that will follow in the final two chapters of the letter, which are usually described as paraenetic. The narrative in fact serves a paraenetic function. Paul uses a style adopted from the moral philosophers of his day in this autobiographical narrative, which culminates in an expression of joy that his converts still hold him as the moral example to whom they look for guidance.

Paul, however, did not develop the relationship with his converts in the way moralists did. His relationship with his readers was effectuated by the gospel, the word of the Lord, which is not described in terms of its content, but totally in terms of its power and effect. Paul's gospel was not separated from the kind of person he showed himself to be. In this section of the letter in which he establishes his bona fides he claims to be their moral instructor.

Paul does not present himself, however, as an authoritative teacher, but as a member of a fellowship of brethren whose Father is the Creator, who brought the church into existence. The conversion of the Thessalonians had both a personal and a social dimension. In a community who called themselves brethren, moral instruction always has a communal dimension. The behavior of Christians was later criticized by their opponents because of the exceptionalism they thought inherent in Christians' description of themselves as brethren. The view of the little group of manual laborers in northern Greece of themselves as the family of God had implications for relationships within the fellowship and with society at large. Before examining two texts in which Paul addresses these issues, we need to give attention to the larger intellectual context of moral instruction.

## Religion and Ethics

Paul uses elements of the Hellenistic moral tradition to describe his ministry in chapter 2. His psychagogic techniques are derived from that same tradition, and so as, we shall see, is some of the language in which he couches the content of his moral directives in the letter. It has been demonstrated

recently that Hellenistic Jewish moral instruction did not differ materially from that of the world in which it lived. Early Christians, too, shared this moral instruction; the Church Fathers acknowledged the similarity of Christian teaching to that of the moral philosophers. For example, Musonius Rufus, Paul's Stoic contemporary, was widely respected among Christians and quoted extensively by Clement of Alexandria, who in fact is our main source for Musonius's lectures; and Seneca, another Stoic contemporary, was referred to by Tertullian as "frequently our own." Celsus, the arch opponent of Christians, charged that they shared their system of morals with the philosophers and that there was nothing particularly new or impressive in it, with which Origen agreed. Twentieth-century scholarship has demonstrated that NT writers, especially those of the Pauline tradition, similarly belong to the philosophical landscape in matters of style, self-description, and content. Of course, they differed in significant ways from the philosophers as the latter differed among themselves.

The most significant difference was their orientation to the moral life. For the philosopher, morality becomes possible when a person commits himself to live rationally, when he comes to his senses, expressed by Epictetus as turning to himself (ἐπιστρέφειν ἐφ᾽ αὑτόν).[12] Paul uses the same word in describing the Thessalonians' conversion, which has moral implications and provides the theological framework of the moral exhortation of the letter: "...how you turned (ἐπεστρέψατε) to God from idols to serve the living and true God, and to wait for his son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead, Jesus who delivers us from the wrath to come" (1:9–10). For Epictetus, the moral life is pursued as part of an intellectual enterprise; for Paul, it is a religious service undertaken as one turns to God, the eschatological judge, from whose judgment his son will deliver the convert (cf. 5:9–10). This recollection of their conversion comes after the intensely religious description of Paul's encounter with the Thessalonians and their ensuing relationship brought about by the gospel of God. Viewed in its cultural context, this religious introduction to a letter, which is essentially ethical instruction, is remarkable for the connection between religion and morality.

This connection, viewed as axiomatic by Jews and Christians, was not acknowledged as a matter of course by pagans, those people Paul describes as worshipers of idols, from among whom his recent coverts

[12] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.23.16.

came. He has them in mind when he writes the letter. The issue requires further attention.

It has been debated whether pagan religion had an essential connection with ethics. That the debate has continued for some time proves that such a connection is not abundantly clear nor obvious. There is much to commend what Edwin Judge has to say on the matter. He begins an article on the notion of religion with a provocative sentence: "There was no understanding of 'religion' in the ancient world of Greece and Rome. No conception as we now hold existed then."[13] He points out that our vocabulary of "religion" does not derive from the Greeks, but that much of it (e.g., "religion", "superstition", "piety", and "cult") comes from Latin, and that none of these terms is concerned with what we call "religion." Judge then describes the distinctiveness of a modern "religion":

> It has (a) an articulate view of the world as a whole, (b) a coherent set rules for life, and (c) a communal identity that marks it off from other such complexes: "creed", "commitment" and "community", "belief", "behavior," and "belonging." None of these items featured in the so-called "religion" of Graeco-Roman antiquity. One's daily sacrifice did not commit one to any doctrine or pattern of behaviour, nor define any communal life other than the general one. Each of these concerns lay rather with philosophy.[14]

Lately, attention has been drawn to inscriptions from western Asia Minor that reveal a closer connection. Petitioners erected steles on which they confessed to a powerful god that they had sinned and been punished for their wicked deeds. The sins enumerated and repented of, such as perjury, dishonesty in business practices, adultery, and theft, are also condemned by Jews and Christians. I do not yet know enough about these inscriptions despite the excellent guidance I have received from Hans-Josef Klauck,[15] Walter Ameling,[16] and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr[17] to form a responsible

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[13] Edwin A. Judge, *Jerusalem and Athens: Cultural Transformation in Late Antiquity* (WUNT 265; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 264.

[14] Judge, *Jerusalem and Athens*, 266.

[15] Hans-Josef Klauck, "Die kleinasiatischen Beichtinschriften und das Neue Testament," in Klauck, *Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum* (WUNT 152: Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 152.

[16] Walter Ameling, "Paränese und Ethik in den kleinasiatischen Beichtinschfriften," in *Neues Testament und hellenistisch-jüdische Alltagskultur: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen* (ed. Roland Deines, Jens Herzer, and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 241–249.

[17] Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr, "Judisches, jesuanisches und paganes Ethos im frühen Christentum," in Deines et al., *Neues Testament und hellenistisch-jüdisches Alltagskultur*, 251–274.

judgment about the inscriptions. But eighty years ago A.D. Nock commented on the few of them available to him that they were from the second century onwards to the fifth and that the religious elements in them were Lydian, not Greek.[18] Since then, a few earlier ones, one from the middle of the first century AD have come to light, but the bulk of them are later and come from a relatively limited geographical area. Prudence suggests that the inscriptions require closer study before generalizations are ventured.

## Judaism and Christianity

What is more important than such modern interpretations of the evidence are explicit comments by Jewish and Christian writers, particularly the apologetic ones, on the matter. After all, it is their writings that we seek to understand, writings whose aim it was to articulate a Jewish or Christian self-understanding to a pagan world.

On the Jewish side, the *Letter of Aristeas* may serve as an example. The work describes a banquet scene during which the translation of the Septuagint is celebrated. The Jewish wise men who had done the translation are asked essentially moral philosophical questions, such as about gentleness, justice, courage, piety, to which they respond, always with a reference to God, who is described at the beginning of the scene as "Almighty God, the Creator of all good things." The king, who sponsored the translation, compliments them, as, for example, in 200–201:

> When all had expressed approval and signified it by applause, the king said to the philosophers, of whom not a few were present, "I think the virtue of these men is extraordinary and their understanding very great, for having questions of this sort addressed to them they have given proper replies on the spur of the moment, all of them making God the starting-point of their reasoning." And the philosopher Menedemus of Eretria said, "True, Your Majesty; for inasmuch as all things are governed by providence, and these men are right in holding that man is a creature of God, it follows that all power and beauty of discourse have their starting-point from God."[19]

The Jewish apologist neatly combines the claims that Jewish moral teaching is philosophical and located in the teaching of God. There is an inextri-

[18] Arthur Darby Nock, *Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 20–22.
[19] *Let. Aris*. 200–201, trans. Moses Hadas.

cable relationship between morality and religion, and therein lies Jewish exceptionalism.

Similar claims are made by the Christian Apologists, such as Athenagoras, who claimed that Christian doctrines, taught by God (θεοδίδακτοι), who is in charge of human affairs, instruct Christians to love their enemies.[20] Their God is the Creator, who oversees history and will judge human actions.[21]

What the Apologists argue explicitly is implicit in Paul's reminder in 1 Thess 1:9–10 that the Thessalonians had turned to God from idols. The goal of their conversion is specified in two complementary infinitives: to serve (δουλεύειν) the Creator with total allegiance, which implies a moral, sanctified life (see Rom 6:16–23), and to await (ἀναμένειν) his son from heaven, who will deliver them from eschatological judgment. These two implications become pronounced in Paul's ethical instruction in the letter.

## Mission

It has been suggested that the similarity in content between pagan and Christian moral teaching may have been a factor in Christian mission. A.D. Nock thought that the moral standard due to philosophy or religion made the task of the Christian missionary easier. Not many people, however, were able to live up to them, while Christianity provided motives for good conduct (fear of God, devotion to Jesus, love of fellow Christians), and claimed great power to satisfy its requirements.[22]

Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr is less certain that the similarities aided Christian mission. While he thinks that the confessional inscriptions from western Asia Minor witness to a religiously determined ethics, to a sense of the pervading daily presence of the god, he does not believe that this would have been of positive value for Christian mission. The presence of a god who requires confession of sins and acceptance of punishment in order to avoid further divine sanctions would be onerous rather than comforting. People familiar with a god so involved in their daily life were unlikely to have warmed to the idea of a divine presence that ordered the details of their relationships with each other.[23]

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[20] Athenagoras, *Leg*. 11–12.

[21] Cf. Aristides, *Apol*. 15; Theophilus, *Autol*. 3.15.

[22] Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 215–216, 218, 220.

[23] Niebuhr, "Jüdisches," 272–274.

Walter Ameling, on the other hand, thinks that Christianity was not morally distinct from those pagans and that the Christian moral teaching was therefore the attraction. The similarities include a concern for forgiveness of sins and a proclamation of the greatness of God, which means that there was a fertile ground for mission preaching.[24]

In what follows, we shall see that the content of Paul's ethical instruction had much in common with his environment. But whether that similarity was an attracting element is another matter. Such consideration is absent from his description of the Thessalonians' conversion in 1:5–7.

## Introducing Paraenesis: 4:1–2

In 4:1–2 Paul introduces the last two chapters, usually thought to be the paraenetic section. While he was with them, he had spoken to please God (ἀρέσκοντες . . . θεῷ, 2:4); he had acted pastorally (παρακαλοῦντες, παραμυθούμενοι, μαρτυρόμενοι) to the end that they conduct themselves worthily of God (εἰς τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀξίως θεοῦ, 2:12).

Now, by letter he continues in the same vein. He beseeches and exhorts (ἐρωτῶμεν καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν). They are to continue in the conduct in which he had instructed them, which they were in fact doing. To follow the teaching they had received from him is to please God (ἀρέσκειν θεῷ). Paul uses conventional paraenetic markers to introduce this section of the letter (λοιπὸν οὖν, ἐρωτῶμεν . . . καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν, καθὼς καὶ περιπατεῖτε, ἵνα περισσεύητε μᾶλλον, οἴδατε γὰρ τίνας παραγγελίας ἐδώκαμεν).

He addresses his readers, however, as ἀδελφοί, and gives ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ the gentle appeal (ἐρωτῶμεν καὶ παρακαλοῦμεν) as he originally had given it διὰ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ. What formally and stylistically is a Hellenistic paraenetic letter becomes a Christian pastoral letter, and the ethical instruction is given pastorally.

What is significant for us is that the ethical instruction that follows is a continuation of Paul's pastoral care that he exercised from the beginning of the congregation's existence. They remembered what he had taught them and were putting it into practice, and from that perspective, there was no need to provide a new content to his teaching. What, then, is the point of what follows? Paul provides a clarification at the beginning of the first section of paraenesis.

[24] Ameling, "Paränese und Ethik," 246–248.

## On Sexual Morality: 4:3–8

The text is enclosed by two brackets, each making a statement about ἁγιασμός (vv. 3, 7), which also appears in connection with the major subject of the section, namely marriage (v. 4). The γάρ in the introductory statement, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ is explanatory, which has the sense expressed in the paraphrase, "Well, to be explicit, God's will is this," which is then identified as sanctification, ἁγιασμός, which is in apposition to θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ. Thus the behavior in which the Thessalonians had been instructed, in which they were still engaged and were pleasing God, is their sanctification, which is the real subject of vv. 3–8, and is what Paul stresses.

K.-W. Niebuhr suggested that Jewish and Christian identity was not found in the content of their moral teaching, but in their claim that it was the will of God,[25] to which W. Ameling objected that that idea would have meant little to pagans, who would have been astonished by the similarity to the ethics they had been taught by popular philosophy or religion.[26] They are both correct with respect to 1 Thess 4:3–8: The content of the teaching is not unique, and the notion of the will of God, in which the readers had been instructed, was not clear to them, hence the need for Paul to provide the clarification.

Ἁγιασμός here is a noun describing action (cf. 2 Thess 2:13), not a condition (contrast ἁγιωσύνη, 3:13): The action is that of Paul's readers (cf. v. 7 for God's action), which is specified in a series of infinitives marking a progression in thought. The first is a general prohibition against sexual immorality (ἀπέχεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας), to the Jewish mind, a vice characteristic of pagans, frequently associated with idolatry (Wis 14:12; cf. Rom 1:24, 26). It is natural that Paul would begin in this way in writing to readers who not too long before had turned from idols to serve a living and true God (1:9). He would have had to make the connection between morality and religion very early in his instruction.

The second infinitive, "that each of you learn (εἰδέναι) to acquire (κτᾶσθαι) his own wife," defines the positive side of sanctification. The most likely meaning, I think, is that individuals should enter marriage in holiness and honor (ἐν ἁγιασμῷ καὶ τιμῇ). The single preposition (ἐν) with

[25] Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr, *Gesetz und Paränese: Katechismusartige Weisungsreihen in der frühjüdischen Literatur* (WUNT 2.28; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987), 70–72.

[26] Ameling, "Paränese und Ethik," 246–248.

the two infinitives combines them, but ἁγιασμός, given the context, predominates. That is what stands out, not that they act in honor.

Musonius Rufus, Paul's contemporary, thought that sexual relations outside marriage were dishonorable,[27] and others thought that one could marry for dishonorable reasons; even within marriage, sensual pleasure was said to be short, in contrast to honor, kindness, and affection.[28] What distinguishes Paul is that the marriage relationship is defined from a religious perspective, as sanctification, which is what would have been new to his Gentile converts.

Paul's positive statement on marriage as sanctification is accentuated by a negative antithesis, "not in lustful passion like the pagans do who do not know God." Paul's language, πάθος ἐπιθυμίας ("lustful passion") is derived from his Stoic contemporaries, who defined this emotion as an irrational or intemperate movement of the soul, a craving opposed to reason. This one should discipline or train, according to Musonius, rather than indulge in extramarital sex[29] or hit on someone else's wife.[30]

While the actual behavior Paul inculcates, not to be lustful, is shared with his pagan contemporary, the cause of the behavior to be rejected is ascribed differently. Paul does not attribute it to a psychological deficiency, a lack of discipline properly exercised by reason, but interprets the condition theologically, as due to ignorance of God. This is Jewish moral tradition (Wis 14:12, 22–27) that Paul also uses in Rom 1:18–32. The thought is clarified by 1 Pet 1:14–16: "As obedient children, do not be conformed to the passions of your former ignorance (ταῖς πρότερον ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ ὑμῶν ἐπιθυμίαις), but as he who called you is holy, be holy yourselves in all your conduct; since it is written, 'You shall be holy, for I am holy.'" The sanctified life is a consequence of having turned from idols to serve a living and true God (1:9). Paul had subsequently taught his converts to live lives worthy of God who calls them into his kingdom and glory (2:12). The sanctified life, specified in the way Paul does in 4:3–8, is what is implied.

What would be striking to the Thessalonians' neighbors is not the prohibition against sexual immorality, but that the immoral action in view is against a "brother." Paul is not here concerned with sexual behavior vis-à-vis the larger society but that within the community of ἀδελφοί, the family created by God the Father. Timothy probably informed Paul of a

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[27] Musonius Rufus, *Frg*. 12.
[28] Musonius Rufus, *Frg*. 13; Plutarch, [*Amat. narr.*] 754; cf. Ps.-Arist., *Oecon*. 3.23–25.
[29] Musonius Rufus, *Frg*. 12.
[30] Musonius Rufus, *Frg*. 7.

particular circumstance in the congregation that called for his instruction on the subject.

The reason for his demand, he says, is that God is an avenger of all these things. The moralists also held that the gods punished the covetous and watched over marriage.[31] Paul's thought is derived from the OT and Jewish tradition. More immediately, Paul's reference is to what he himself had told them and charged them. They had accepted from Paul the expectation of a coming judgment (1:10), and he had charged them during his ministry with them to conduct themselves in a manner worthy of God who calls them into his kingdom and glory (2:12). He now relates that call explicitly to this particular moral behavior: "For God did not call us to impurity but in sanctification." The person who rejects this charge rejects no human but God, who gives his Holy Spirit to them (v. 8), and the section ends with the threat that to reject his directions is to reject God who bestows his Holy Spirit.

What is remarkable about this passage on sexual morality is how little is said specifically about behavior: do not be sexually immoral, marry, do not commit adultery. That was hardly new to the morally reflective person. What does stand out is how saturated the passage is with theological warrants for Paul's advice: sanctification, which is God's will; knowledge of God; God as eschatological judge; God's call in sanctification; and God's gift of the Holy Spirit. This makes Paul's directive more than the promotion of marriage as an anodyne against sexual immorality, as he does in 1 Cor 7:1–2, 9. Writing to recent converts from paganism, he goes to great length to characterize the Christian life as more than obedience to the precepts of a revered teacher. Paul was no ordinary teacher, but spoke, through the Lord Jesus, the will of God, which was that their lives be sanctified. That conception was the great challenge to them.

## On Brotherly Love and Self-Sufficiency: 4:9–12

From sexual morality within the church, Paul turns to a new subject, love within the Christian community and Christians' relationship to outsiders. What was expressed in 3:12 as a prayer, "May the Lord cause you to increase and abound in love for one another and for all," is now treated as a moral obligation imposed by God. The style of the instruction is pure paraenesis:

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[31] Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 14.

you do not need me to write to you, you are taught by God to do what I have to tell you, you are in fact already doing it, just do so more and more, just as I instructed you.

This earliest teaching on Christian social ethics is extraordinarily dense with contemporary social and political terminology: φιλαδελφία, to be ambitious, to be quietistic, to mind one's own affairs, to have the right attitude toward those not of one's own group (the outsiders), and to be self-sufficient. A rapid overview will sketch the context of Paul's instructions and sharpen the point he seems to be making.

Paul begins his instruction in kinship terms, "Concerning love of the brethren." Φιλαδελφία, used by pagans for love of blood relations, is used by Paul for love between Christians. The analogous relationship between non-Christians was described by them as φιλία, friendship, a virtue of the utmost importance in antiquity. While the virtue was celebrated by everyone, a variety of opinions were held about it. A recognition of some of them affords an idea of the moral discussions which formed the environment within which Paul wrote.

Philosophers differed among themselves on how they conceived of the origin of friendship. Some, like the Stoics, thought that we have an innate capacity for friendship, while the Epicureans were accused of having a purely utilitarian view, namely, that we develop friendships so that we will have people who will want to meet our future needs. In tension with both was the virtue of self-sufficiency, which everyone aspired to. How could one reconcile self-sufficiency with the endless discussions of how to give and receive gifts? The answer was found in concentrating on the character and motive of the giver rather than the receiver.

By casting the issue as one between brothers, Paul makes it part of the theme of sibling relationship, which has run through the letter up to this point. The Thessalonians had heard Paul speaking God's word to them (2:2, 4, 8, 9), and they accepted what he said as God's word (2:13). Part of that divine teaching had been that they were to love each other. Paul coins the word θεοδίδακτοι to express that notion. It stands in stark contrast to some philosophers' claim that they were "self-taught" or "untaught." For Paul, the loving relationship between members of the Christian family is not an inborn capacity and therefore subject to a consideration of the donor's character or motive; nor does he consider securing a guarantee of reciprocal generosity. It is, simply, a divine mandate to love.

Once more, a generally accepted virtue is made a religious command. That would have stood out for the Thessalonians, both the Christians and their pagan neighbors. So too would have been that Paul directs

that love be extended to the Christian family, not the larger society. In 3:12, all people are to be recipients of the Thessalonian Christians' love, but here Paul is concerned with a particular issue in the church, which emerges in v. 11.

Paul's exhortation continues with an eye-catching oxymoron: "make it your ambition (φιλοτιμεῖσθε) to live a quiet life (ἡσυχάζειν) and mind your own affairs (πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια)." Φιλοτιμεῖσθαι, "to love or seek after honor or glory," described the effort of the ambitious man who became involved in public affairs. In a society driven by an intense desire for recognition, to refuse to do so, as the Epicureans did, evoked severe criticism. Epicureans withdrew from political and social involvement and organized themselves into conventicles of friends, much to the chagrin of Plutarch, who held that the responsible person should enter public life and contribute to the body politic.

Paul's oxymoron draws attention to ἡσυχάζειν and πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια, which describe a kind of quietism quite popular in the first century, not only among Epicureans. It had a venerable history. Plato in the fourth century BC said, "'to do one's own business (τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν) and not be a busybody (πολυπραγμονεῖν) is justice (δικαιοσύνη),' is a saying that we have heard from many and have often repeated ourselves."[32] The philosopher lives quietly and tends to his own affairs (λαβὼν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν),[33] but so also are craftsmen to do. The state is well run when craftsmen work at their trades, each person doing his own work and tending to his own affairs (τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν),[34] when the cobbler does his work and the carpenter his.[35] Such language became widespread by the early Empire.[36]

Paul explains how they are to love each other in two steps, each introduced by an explicative καί: καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια, "that is, that you be ambitious to live quietly and do your own thing." That in turn is explained with another clause introduced by καί: καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν, "that is, that you work with your own hands." When reminding his readers earlier in the letter of his ministry with them, he had referred to his own manual labor as a demonstration of his love for them (2:8–9; cf. 2 Cor 11:11). Paul now asserts that the Thessalonians'

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32 Plato, *Resp.* 4.433AB.
33 Plato, *Resp.* 6.496CD; cf. *Gorg.* 526C.
34 Plato, *Charm.* 161E–162B.
35 Plato, *Resp.* 4.443CD.
36 E.g., Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* 60.27; Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 24–26.

love for each other cannot be separated from their work, and he refers to that earlier instruction.

It was difficult for the elite to escape criticism when they withdrew from productive public lives; it was impossible for the working classes to do so. Lucian excoriates manual laborers who abandoned their trades upon supposedly converting to philosophy.[37] Idle Christians would have stood out in the crowded quarters where they lived and plied their trade. The elite looked down on manual labor, but thought it appropriate for the lower ranks of society, where Christians' critics placed them, and where the Thessalonians belonged. Lucian thought of Christians as susceptible to being taken advantage of by unscrupulous new converts like Peregrinus, and his view of them was not unique.

Paul shows a positive attitude toward non-Christians in the letter. He prays that the Lord make the Thessalonians increase and abound in love to each other and to all people (3:12). The Christians are not to retaliate, but to pursue what is good to all people (5:15). Paul may refer to non-Christians as "outsiders," but that does not mean that there was no social interaction between Christians and non-Christians. The situation in Thessalonica was probably no different from that in Corinth, where Christians and "outsiders" had social intercourse with each other even when the Christian brothers were held to a higher standard of morality (1 Cor 5:9–13). Some were still married to pagans, and Paul did not wish such marriages to be dissolved (1 Cor 7:12–16). He was sensitive to Christian etiquette when invited to dinner by a pagan neighbor (1 Cor 10:27–29), and to pagan reaction to a Christian worship service (1 Cor 14:23–25).

Paul wants the Thessalonians to act becomingly (εὐσχημόνως) to the outsiders (v. 12). What that means in this context is that they be self-sufficient and not sponge off each other, which would likely have met with pagan opprobrium like that of Lucian. As the pagan discussions of friendship included a consideration of self-sufficiency, so does Paul's treatment of brotherly love. He probably writes on the subject because Timothy had informed him that Paul's recent converts needed instruction on the matter. He had made much of their sibling relationship. It would have been natural if some of them had applied some of the conventions of friendship to brotherly love, one being that friends have all things in common. Whether they did so or not, the behavior attributed to them in 2 Thess 3:6–15

[37] Lucian, *Fug*. 14; *Bis. acc*. 6; *Vit. auct*. 11.

is congruent with such an understanding. In response, Paul refers to the paradigmatic character of his own practice.

Paul's reminder of his manual labor in 2:9 has the same function and he recalls it in 4:11. Paul worked in order to show his love and not burden anyone. Speaking for God, he taught that working to support himself was the correct way to show brotherly love. That is also his argument in 4:9–12. What is remarkable, however, especially in light of the immediately preceding verses, is the dearth of theological language and the fullness of social and political terminology.

Why does Paul write in this way? We can infer something from what he says later about how his readers were to admonish each other. Admonition is the harshest speech among the many that Paul mentions in the letter. It literally means to instill sense (νουθετεῖν) in someone and teach him what should and should not be done. It was associated with frank speech (παρρησία), included reproof and rebuke, and was not undertaken lightly. In 5:15, Paul commands the Thessalonians to admonish οἱ ἄτακτοι, which has traditionally been translated as "the idle." The ἄτακτοι in the church were idle, but if Paul simply wanted to identify them by their indolence, he could have used more common words such as ἀργοί or ἄπρακτοι. Ἄτακτος literally means "disorderly," and refers to someone who does not submit to accepted norms of behavior, such as those he had detailed in 4:9–12.

Paul must have heard from Timothy that there were some Thessalonians who did not work, which he describes as ἀταξία. Their disorderliness took the form of idleness, which caused a strain in the social fabric. From 2 Thess 3:6–15 it is clear that they disregarded his command and example of working to support himself in order not to burden them. They were not working but were busybodies (μηδὲν ἐργαζομένους ἀλλὰ περιεργαζομένους, 2 Thess 3:11), they were acting in direct opposition to the dictates of Plato and the moral philosophers. Paul does not want them to rock the social boat, and to make the point he describes the situation in conventional political terms, confining his peculiarly Christian comments to making his directive a divine teaching on brotherly love.

## Conclusion

Paul prefaces his paraenesis (chs. 4 and 5) by reminding his readers of how he had brought them to conversion and sought to maintain contact with them (chs. 1–3). The close personal relationship between them was brought about by the powerful message that he spoke, empowered by God to do so.

Paul's, or better, God's gospel, was transparent in his life; the two could not be separated. Paul's behavior in their midst from the very beginning, as the dynamic word worked its way in them, demonstrated the ethical demands of the new religious commitment they were making.

God created a family for himself through the gospel that Paul preached. Within that family, Paul writes as a brother to his Thessalonian siblings, not as an authoritative father. Paul's ethical instruction was intracommunal yet not without an extracommunal reference. The kinship language they used to describe their relationship to one another, and the love they demonstrated in practical terms to each other would draw the jaundiced eye of their pagan despisers.

Nevertheless, the content of Paul's ethical teaching did not differ very much from the ethical norms of those critics. Paul's converts would already have known what he taught originally, and by the time he wrote the letter, they had the advantage of in addition having Paul's teaching and example, in accordance with which Paul says they were already living, so that he really had no need to write.

Why does he then write anyway? The reason he writes is to explicate the theological rationale for Christian conduct. Before they converted, the Thessalonians would not have related religion and morality. Paul came on the scene, brought them to conversion, and remained their moral paradigm. But Paul (and Timothy) thought that they still inadequately viewed their moral life as a religious life. Paul sets out to correct that shortcoming. He consistently presents himself as having spoken for God, and in the letter presents his ethical teaching as part of the divine scheme. But there are differences in the degree to which he plays on the theological them in dealing with sexual and social ethics.



VOLUME 2

# PART TWO

# PHILOSOPHICA

CHAPTER ONE

# PSEUDO-HERACLITUS, *EPISTLE* 4: THE DIVINIZATION OF THE WISE MAN*

More than a century ago, during a period which showed active interest in the pseudepigraphic letters which date from the early Empire, Jacob Bernays drew scholarly attention to the letters attributed to Heraclitus of Ephesus.[1] His conclusions, that all nine of the letters were not written by the same person, and that all, with the possible exception of *Ep*. 3, come from the first century AD, have in general been accepted by all scholars since.[2] His argument, however, that *Epp*. 4 and 7 (which come from the same author) and 9 in their present form are Christian, or, more probably, Jewish, in authorship, has found little support among serious scholars of the letters.[3] Until recently, the letters had been neglected,[4] but the discovery of a papyrus version of *Ep*. 7 which is longer than that previously known,[5] and

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* Originally published in JAC 21 (1978): 42–64.

[1] Jacob Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe: Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religionsgeschichtlichen Litteratur* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1869). Earlier in the century the epistles had been published by Jean F. Boissonade, *Eunapii Sardiani vitas sophistarum et fragmenta historiarum* (2 vols.; Amsterdam: P. den Hengst, 1822), 1:424–430, and Anton Westermann, *Heracliti Epistolae quae feruntur* (Leipzig: E. Edelmann, 1857), and would later appear in Rudolf Hercher, ed., *Epistolographi Graeci* (Paris: A.F. Didot, 1873; repr., Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1965), and Ingram Bywater, *Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877). On letters and letter writing in antiquity, see Johannes Sykutris, "Epistolographie," PWSup 5:186–220, and Klaus Thraede, *Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik* (ZMKA 48; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1970).

[2] See Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), 22–26, for a survey of the history of scholarship.

[3] *Epp*. 4 and 7, however, are still included by Albert-Marie Denis in his collection of fragments of Hellenistic Jewish authors, *Fragmenta pseudepigraphorum quae supersunt graeca* (PVTG 3; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 157–160, although he is aware of the problems; see his *Introduction aux pseudépigraphes grecs d'Ancien Testament* (SVTP 1; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), 220–222.

[4] Note the brevity of the bibliography in Euangelos N. Roussos, *Heraklit-Bibliographie* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 88–89.

[5] Victor Martin, "Un recueil de diatribes cyniques. Pap. Genev. inv. 271," *MH* 16 (1959): 77–115. See also Pénélope Photiadès, "Les diatribes cyniques du papyrus de Genève 271, leurs traductions et elaborations successives" *MH* 16 (1959): 116–139; Johannes T. Kakridis, "Zum Kynikerpapyrus (Pap. Genev. inv. 271)," *MH* 17 (1960): 34–36; Kakridis, "Weiteres zum Kynikerpapyrus (Pap. Genev. inv. 271)," *ParPass* 16 (1961): 383–386; Rudolf Kassel, "Der siebente pseudoheraklitische Brief auf Pergament und Papyrus," *ZPE* 14 (1974): 128–132.

the publication of new critical editions of the letters by Leonardo Tarán[6] and Harold W. Attridge[7] have again drawn attention to them.

### The Integrity of the Letter

The present essay is concerned with *Ep.* 4, which is easily summarized. Heraclitus ostensibly writes the letter to Hermodorus in reply to an accusation made by Euthycles and the Ephesians that he was guilty of impiety, specifically, that he had made himself a god. He answers that he is judged impious because his views of the gods are different from those of his accusers. Euthycles in his ignorance had attacked a man preeminent in wisdom. Heraclitus challenges his opponents to teach him what God is, so that they might be believed when they speak of impiety, and then he attacks the popular cult that they represent. God is not locked up in temples, 43 nor is he made out of stone by men's | hands and put on a pedestal. On the contrary, the whole ordered universe is his temple. Heraclitus then introduces Heracles into the argument. Heraclitus had specifically been accused of inscribing his own name on an altar, thus making himself into a god. He answers that he had not written "Heraclitus" but "Heracles the Ephesian," thus wishing to make the god their fellow citizen. They cannot, therefore, because of their own stupidity, their inability to understand what was written, accuse him of being impious. He then offers an interpretation of Heracles in justification of himself. Heracles had been born a man, but his virtue and his successful completion of his Labors had made him a god. Heraclitus claims that, despite his opponents' denial, he too is good. He too has succeeded in completing many, indeed, the most difficult Labors. His adversaries were human vices and he had overcome them, thus crowning himself victor and doing so, not at the behest of Eurystheus, but of himself. Yet his opponents continue to insult his wisdom and attribute their shortcomings and accusations to him. Were they to be reborn five hundred years hence, they should find Heraclitus still alive, but no trace of their own name. He will always be remembered because of his training. He too will have Hebe to wife, not the Hebe of Heracles, but another.

[6] Rodolfo Mondolfo and Leonardo Tarán, *Eraclito. Testimonianze e imitazioni* (BStS 59; Florence: La nuovo Italia, 1972), who does not follow the long version of *Ep.* 7.

[7] Harold W. Attridge, *First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus* (HTS 29; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1976), who regards the long version of *Ep.* 7 as the more original. His bibliographical survey (pp. 89–92), which traces the history of scholarship on *Epp.* 4 and 7, is a "maximum" one, and serves to illustrate their neglect.

Virtue is the mother of many daughters. She gave one in marriage to Homer and another to Hesiod, and gives the renown that derives from training to every individual who is good. Heraclitus is indeed pious; it is he alone who knows God. For them to insist on making altars is to make stones witnesses to God, whereas it is the sun, moon, earth, night, day, and the seasons which are his witnesses.

Despite their rejection of Bernays's view of its Jewish authorship, those writers who have dealt with the letter have allowed their treatments of it to be determined by his theory. Bernays argued that the iconoclasm at the beginning (11ff.) and end (45ff.) of the letter could not have been written by a pagan philosopher, but shows biblical influence.[8] The remaining part of the letter, however, could not be attributed to a Jew or Christian, for neither would needlessly have become entangled in mythology and described every virtuous hero as the consort of Hebe, have glorified Heracles, have described Heraclitus as divine, or have described παιδεία as the ultimate goal of the sage. This constitutes the major part of the letter which was written in the first century AD.

The first interpolation, according to Bernays, begins with ποῦ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; (11) and ends with πεποικιλμένος (17). The interpolation thus leaves the question τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός; (10) hanging, while the author delivers himself of an attack on the popular cult that is striking for its detail.[9] Bernays knows that Stoics did aim attacks at temples, but claims that they only wanted to show that temples were unnecessary and that, in any case, the tone of these attacks had moderated, so that by the first century no Stoic would have been as severe in his condemnation as our author is.

The second interpolation is thought to begin in 45, at the point where the original author had concluded his discussion of virtue and training with the words παιδείας κλέος. An abrupt change in subject matter is evident. The sentences that follow have to do with Heraclitus's knowledge of God, a subject from which the author had already turned in 10. Furthermore, since the question that had been thrown up there, τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός; had not been answered, it is not clear how the conclusion that is reached, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβής, | ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; (45–46), is justified. 44
Bernays concludes that the lack of logical progression suggests that this is

8 Attridge, *First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus*, 26–45. References to the letters of Heraclitus are to the lines of Tarán's edition.

9 Ναός (11), ἐν σκότει (12), λίθινος (13), ἐκ κρημνῶν γεννᾶται (14), βάσις (16), ἐξαρκῆ (15; Tarán reads ἐξ ἀρχῆς), περίβολος (16), and the conclusion ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ναός ἐστι (16–17).

an appendix that comes from a reader of the Bible who, without regard to context, added it at the end of the letter, the easiest place to contrast biblical natural theology to the pagan veneration of altars.

Despite its inadequacies, which have often been commented upon, Bernays's work is still valuable, not least of all for his attention to the letter as a whole. Three detailed treatments of the letter have followed his, all of which deny his theory of interpolations, but only one of which treats the letter in its entirety.

Eduard Norden took issue with Bernays's statement that a Jew or Christian could not have written the "original" letter.[10] Concentrating on that part of the letter which Bernays had regarded as the major part, he adduced evidence from Philo and early Christian literature to argue that that material, too, could have come from the pen of a Jew or a Christian. While he based his argument on Bernays's view of the Jewish-Christian character of the letter, he did not, however, give attention to the latter's concern with the problems he perceived in the logical progression of the letter. Although Norden was later to change his mind, he did not do so as a result of detailed study by himself or anyone else.[11]

Attridge focuses on Bernays's so-called interpolations and disputes the claim that the intensity of the polemic of the first and the natural theology of the second set them apart from contemporary philosophical discussions of temples and religious images.[12] Noting parallels to the polemic

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[10] Eduard Norden, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (*JCPh* Supplementband 19.2; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1892), 367–462, esp. 386–392.

[11] In *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede* (Berlin/Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1913), 30, Norden withdrew his suggestion that the entire letter could have been written by a Christian on the grounds that the first century is too early for a Christian writing of this sort, and in the Nachtrag published in 1923 (389–390), he expresses himself as convinced by the surmise of Otto Stählin, "Die hellenistisch-jüdische Litteratur," in *Wilhelm von Christ's Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (ed. Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin; 2 vols.; 6th ed.; HAW 7.2; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1920–1924; repr., 1959–1961), 1:624, that the letter is a Cynic-Stoic diatribe. Stählin himself had appealed to Paul Wendland's claim ("Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe," in Wendland and Otto Kern, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion* [Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895], 39–40), that *Ep.* 7 need not be attributed to a Jewish-Christian author, but could just as well be the work of a representative of the Cynic-Stoic diatribe, and extended the claim to include *Ep.* 4. Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1907), XXII, had earlier rejected Bernays's and Norden's view, and Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 35, 67, 165, 173–174 passim, had simply regarded the letters as Cynic.

[12] Attridge, *First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus*, 13–23.

in Cynic, Platonic, and especially Stoic sources,[13] he attempts to demonstrate that our author "knew and utilized the critique of the public cult often made by Cynic and Stoic moralists and ... did so, as did some of them, from a purely religious point of view."[14] He does not attempt to relate these sections to the rest of the letter, nor does he address himself to Norden's original argument that the entire letter could be Jewish or Christian.

Tarán is the only scholar since Bernays to have dealt with the entire letter. In his introduction to, and commentary on, the letter,[15] he aligns himself with the prevailing view that the letter is a diatribe against the popular cult. He holds that Bernays was wrong in affirming that the author does not answer the question τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός; (10), since he clearly goes on to suggest that the whole world is divine or at least testifies to a divine author. This cosmic religion was a *topos* accepted by the Stoics. Furthermore, | the divinization of which Heraclitus speaks is that of the Stoic sage, the divine condition attained by means of virtue. The interpretation of Heracles, too, is Cynic-Stoic, as is the view that the wise man's fame is a product of his virtue, although it may be based upon a Heraclitean motif. 45

The history of research has demonstrated that there are no specifically Jewish or Christian elements in the letter. The many parallels from pagan philosophers that have been brought into the discussion have had the cumulative effect of removing the basis from Bernays's theory, and there is no need to contribute further to overkill by adding still more. Yet the matter cannot be regarded as completely settled until the argument of the entire letter is set in its context within the Cynicism of the first century. It is in this respect that treatments of the letter are particularly unsatisfactory. While they claim to prove that the letter is Cynic or, with less precision, Cynic-Stoic, the material they use to argue their points is almost exclusively Stoic.[16] This is a methodological error frequently made

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[13] The major passages have been collected by Bodo H.W. von Borries, *Quid veteres philosophi de idolatria senserint* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1918), and have been discussed by Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, XX–XXIV, and "Der Bilderstreit des heidnischen Altertums," *AR* 19 (1919): 286–315, to which should be added, Léonard Ramoroson, "Contre les 'Temples fait de mains de homme,'" *RevPhil* 43 (1969): 217–238.

[14] Attridge, *First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus*, 23.

[15] Tarán, *Eraclito*, 288–292, 318–322.

[16] Attridge, for example, although he is aware of different religious attitudes, and is not able to find Cynic texts to support his argument, draws his support primarily from Seneca and Ps.-Aristotle, *Mund.*

in the study of Cynicism, particularly by students of early Christianity, that has contributed to a lack of clarity about the differences that existed among Cynics and between Cynics and Stoics.[17] An awareness of these differences prevents us from conflating Cynic and Stoic attitudes toward religion, and from identifying their perceptions of the ideal wise man. Our letter is concerned with both subjects, and if it is to be understood in its own right, we shall have to give more critical attention to the philosophical context in which it was written than has heretofore been done.

We must begin with the observation that the letter is an answer to the accusation that Cynicism, here represented by Heraclitus, is impious because of its divinization of the sage. Thus the focus is not primarily on natural theology and the popular cult, a viewpoint that has been influenced by Bernays's concentration on those aspects in the letter.[18] The author answers the accusation ostensibly brought against him by first rejecting the popular conception of the gods and then utilizing the figure of Heracles to demonstrate how man is made into a god. This comparison of Heraclitus to Heracles reveals the Cynic's self-understanding and is the real answer to the charge of impiety. In order to understand the logic of the author's argument, one must first inquire into Cynic attitudes toward religion and the way in which those attitudes are similar to and different from that of the Stoics.

## Stoic and Cynic Theology

The religious character of Stoicism is so well known as not to require extensive discussion. Given the rational character of Stoicism, it could be expected that Stoics | would be opposed to popular religion. Instead, they effected a *rapprochement* with it. They made popular piety rational

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[17] Cf. Zeph Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics," *HSCP* 63 (1958): 179–191, esp. 184–185, for the opinion that those who approach the Stoics and Cynics through works of the Roman period "often miss, in the syncretistic language of Seneca, Demetrius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, the real antagonism between orthodox representatives of the two schools." One should, perhaps, be less sanguine about speaking of "orthodox" Cynics. For completely uncritical use of the sources in attempts to illuminate the New Testament, see Dieter Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief: Studien zur religiösen Propaganda in der Spätantike* (WMANT 11; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964), 32ff., 110–111, 187ff., 193ff., and Walter Schmithals, *The Office of Apostle in the Early Church* (trans. John E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1969), 111. For some of the differences, see Malherbe, "Cynics," *IDBSup* (1976): 201–203.

[18] For example, Tarán, *Eraclito*, 289; Attridge, *First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus*, 7.

and entered into covenant with it, so that since the time of Posidonius, at least, Stoicism's doctrine of the συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων provided a conceptual framework for much of popular demonology, divinization, dreams, magic, and astrology.[19] While it may be said that Stoicism saved superstition and buried the ancient belief in the gods by removing their personalities and making them only powers behind the phenomena, the practical proclamation of the Stoics took place in a religiously more personal manner than the theory would lead one to expect. It presented one, immortal god whose foreknowledge aimed at the care and benefit of the individual.[20] A warm religious strain is found in the preaching of the Stoics after Posidonius, especially in Musonius, Epictetus, and Dio Chrysostom,[21] and their natural theology found widespread use in the defense and explanation of religious images and temples.[22] They insisted, however, that it was only the Stoic wise man who was able, through his knowledge, to build temples and engage in the cult.[23] The sage, again through his knowledge and the attainment of virtue, associates with the gods and rises to their level as he lives in keeping with the divine scheme of things.[24]

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[19] See Paul Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judentum und Christentum* (4th ed.; HNT 2; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), 40–41, 87–88, 110–115; Johannes Geffcken, *Religiöse Strömungen im 1. Jahrhundert n. Chr.* (SASW 7; Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1922), 17ff., 28 ff.; Eduard Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (3 vols. in 6; 5th ed.; Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1922), 3.1:318–355; Johannes Stelzenberger, *Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa: Eine moralgeschichtliche Studie* (Munich: Max Hueber, 1933; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1989), 59–60; Martin P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; HAW 5.2; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1961), 2:257–268; Ludwig Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism* (Martin Classical Lectures, vol. 21; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for Oberlin College, 1966), 80ff.

[20] Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, 2:267.

[21] See Kurt Deissner, "Das Idealbild des stoischen Weisen" (GUR 24; Greifswald: L. Bamberg, 1930): 1–15, esp. 8. The religious element, however, can be overstressed, especially when Stoicism is compared with Christianity. Michel Spanneut, "Epiktet," *RAC* 5 (1962): 611–616, does so. For a criticism of this tendency, see Adolf F. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa: Untersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophie* (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1890; repr., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F. Frommann, 1968), 10–11; Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, 2:398.

[22] For the influence of Posidonius, see Geffcken, "Der Bilderstreit des heidnischen Altertums," 295ff. See also Martin Dibelius, *Paul on the Areopagus: Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* (New York: Scribner's, 1956), 26–77; Bertil Gärtner, *The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation* (trans. Carolyn Hannay-King; ASNU 21; Uppsala: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1955); Hildebrecht Hommel, "Neue Forschungen zur Areopagrede Acta 17," *ZNW* 46 (1955): 145–178; Wolfgang Nauck, "Die Tradition und Komposition der Areopagrede," *ZTK* 53 (1956): 11–52.

[23] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.119 (*SVF* 3:606; cf. 604–605, 607–610).

[24] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.119; Seneca, *Ep.* 31.9–11; and see Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 135–137.

Divergent views have been held about the Cynics' attitude toward religion. Bernays represents one viewpoint.[25] He attempted to make the Cynics forerunners of Christianity, describing them as being conscious of a union with God and having a feeling of power that sprang from it. Also regarding Cynicism as religious are those students of Christian origins who have allowed their view of the sect and its picture of the sage to be influenced by Epictetus's description of the ideal Cynic.[26]

In contrast, Theodor Gomperz, rejecting Bernays's view, presented the view held by the majority of specialists. Unlike the Stoics, he argued, Cynics maintained a negative attitude toward the religion of the people. Their ethical system, he claimed, derived neither increase of content nor reinforcement of motive from religion. While one may, perhaps, with reservation speak of their theology, they lacked religion. Their entire ethic was built on nature, and religion had nothing to do with it.

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> The Deity was to them a | colourless abstraction, not unlike the 'First Cause' of the English Deists. They saw in the 'Supreme Being' no Father caring for his children, no Judge punishing sin; at the most a wise and purposeful Governor of the world. That the Cynic felt himself bound by any but the weakest of personal relations to the Godhead, there is not a trace of evidence to show.[27]

Gomperz distinguished two phases in the Cynics' attitude toward popular religion. The earliest founders are said to have showed a venomous scorn for popular religion, but to have dwelt on the myths in order to extract profound meaning from them through an exegesis that showed greater audacity than mere polemics would have done. Their successors, however, showed no taste for such exegesis, but were still more assiduous in their attacks on popular beliefs, using parody (Crates and Bion) and satire (Menippus

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[25] Jacob Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1879). For a recent presentation, see Helmut Rahn, "Die Frömmigkeit der Kyniker," *Paideuma* 7 (1960): 280–292, who stresses the presentations of Cynicism by Julian and Themistius, which are certainly influenced by Stoicism.

[26] See esp. Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, 88–89; Karl H. Rengstorf, "Ἀπόστολος," *TDNT* 1 (1964): 407–445, esp. 408–413; Kurt Deissner, "Das Sendungsbewußtsein der Urchristenheit," *ZST* 7 (1930): 772–790; Hans Windisch, *Paulus und Christus: Ein biblisch-religionsgeschichtlicher Vergleich* (UNT 24; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1934), 51ff.

[27] Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (trans. Laurie Magnus and George G. Berry; 4 vols.; New York: Scribner's, 1901–1912), 2 (1908): 164; see Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 2.1:328; Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian, 1956), 363ff.; Wilhelm Capelle, *Epiktet, Teles und Musonius: Wege zu glückseligem Leben* (BAW Griechische Reihe. Stoa und Stoiker 3; Zurich: Artemis, 1948), 15, 212–213.

and Meleager) to criticize religion. The high point of their opposition was reached in the more systematic polemic of Oenomaus of Gadara in the second century AD.[28]

Gustav A. Gerhard adopted a mediating position, claiming that two contrasting strains can be identified, both of which had their roots in the earliest Cynics.[29] The one had a positive view toward religion and an accompanying "hedonism" or more moderate view of mankind, while the other, in contrast, was skeptical of religion, and rigoristic or misanthropic. The epistles of Heraclitus were regarded by Gerhard as major sources of the latter. André Oltramare, without reference to Gerhard, attempted a similar classification, but only of Cynics under the Empire, identifying one "school" which was ascetic and mystical, and another which was skeptical of religion and misanthropic.[30]

Almost all generalizations about Cynicism run into difficulty, and those of Gomperz and Gerhard are no exceptions. As a general statement, the former's perception of the matter would appear to be correct. That Cynics were strict monotheists who scorned popular religion is certain.[31] The religious elements that can be identified in the pictures of Cynicism provided us by Stoic writers from the early Empire are to be attributed to those authors themselves and not to their Cynic heroes.[32] Yet one has to come to terms with the fact that the same century that saw Oenomaus also

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[28] Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 2:165. Plutarch's Cynic, Didymus Planetiades, was another Cynic who opposed oracles, but not on the same grounds as Oenomaus. Cf. Plutarch, *Def. orac*. 413AB, and see Rudolf Hirzel, *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch* (2 vols.; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1895), 2:191 n. 3.

[29] Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 79–83, 165–176. In "Zur Legende vom Kyniker Diogenes," *AR* 15 (1912): 394ff., Gerhard persists in his schematization, but shows an awareness of the difficulties in finding sources to support his theory for the earlier period.

[30] André Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne: Libraire Payot, 1926), 41. Oltramare's general imprecision with respect to the Cynic letters, which he quotes to support his analysis, fosters the suspicion that he has adopted Gerhard's view of the matter without understanding it completely.

[31] On Cynic atheists, see Walther Abernetty, *De Plutarchi qui fertur de superstitione libello* (Königsberg: Hartung, 1911), 88–89; Charly Clerc, *Les théories relatives au culte des images chez les auteurs grecs du IIe siècle après J.-C.* (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1915), 118–123.

[32] Friedrich Überweg and Karl Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (12th ed.; Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1926), 503–504; Capelle, *Epiktet, Teles und Musonius*, 18, 20ff. On the peculiarity of the religious element in Epictetus, see Renato Laurenti, "Il 'filosofo ideale' secondo Epitteto," *GM* 17 (1962): 501–513, esp. 503ff. On the Stoicism in Seneca's account of Demetrius, see Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 3.1:796, who simply regards the religious aspects as elements Demetrius shared with the Stoics, and Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D.* (London: Methuen & Co., 1937), 127, who inclines to the belief that the religious coloring, which is confined to only one passage, is due to Seneca rather than Demetrius. See also n. 21 above.

saw Peregrinus. Although Peregrinus is surely an exception so far as his "mysticism" is concerned, he nevertheless thought of himself as a Cynic 48 and even disputed the matter with Demonax.[33] Difficulties | are also created for Gerhard's theory by Demonax who, with Oenomaus, represents the skeptical side of Cynicism in the second century,[34] but is known for his graciousness and kindness.[35] It would seem that on this, as on other matters, the only reasonable conclusion one may reach is that Cynicism was characterized by a rich diversity of viewpoint that defies easy systematization. For our immediate purpose it is not necessary to delineate Cynic attitudes toward religion throughout the entire history of the sect. It will suffice to identify the attitudes held during the first two centuries AD, the period during which our letter was written. Cynic interpretations of certain of their mythological heroes and their founders enable us to do so in a manner useful for our immediate interest.

Whether Antisthenes or Diogenes was the founder of Cynicism was already debated in antiquity, but it is clear that Antisthenes did exert a strong influence on the Cynics.[36] The doxographic tradition consistently portrays him as a strict monotheist who held that, while according to convention (κατὰ νόμον) there are many gods, by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) there is but one.[37] According to him the divine resembles no other being, and there is no likeness by which it may be known.[38] He therefore refused to

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[33] On the Neopythagoreanism of Peregrinus, see Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 178ff. For the dispute on who was truly Cynic, see Lucian, *Demon.* 21, and David L. Tiede, *The Charismatic Figure as Miracle Worker* (SBLDS 1; Missoula, Mont.: Society of Biblical Literature, 1972), 84ff. The uniqueness of Peregrinus is modified by the fact that his followers also thought of themselves as Cynics, but one is hardly justified in making the extrapolation Georgi (*Die Gegner*, 196) does. For Lucian's awareness of the differences among Cynics, see Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, 2:321, 330–331, and Rudolf W.O. Helm, "Lucian und die Philosophenschulen," *NJahrb* 9 (1902): 188–213, 263–278, 351–369, esp. 364 n. 2; Marcel Caster, *Lucien et la pensée religieuse de son temps* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1937; repr., New York: Garland, 1987), 71.

[34] See Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 178. On his attitude toward religion, see Lucian, *Demon.* 23, 27, 34, 37.

[35] Lucian, *Demon.* 14–18, 35, 40–41. See K. Funk, "Untersuchungen über die Lucianische *Vita Demonactis*," *Phil* Supplementband 10 (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1905–1907), 559–674, esp. 595ff.

[36] Cf. Julian, *Or.* 6.187C. For an account of the modern debate, see Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 5–21.

[37] Philodemus, *Piet.* 7 (= Antisthenes, *Frg.* 40A Caizzi). Cf. also *Frgs.* 39BCDE (Caizzi), and see Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (trans. Edward S. Robinson; Gifford Lectures, 1936; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), 193 nn. 9–10, for the tradition.

[38] Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.14.108.4 (=Antisthenes, *Frg.* 40A Caizzi). See also *Frgs.* 40BCD (Caizzi).

contribute to the support of the Mother of the Gods.[39] It is, he said, philosophy that enables one to live with the gods,[40] and those who would be immortal must live piously and justly.[41] Although Antisthenes still showed an interest in dialectic, his major focus was on ethics. He stressed the attainment of virtue, which he conceived as a matter of deeds, and which can be learned.[42] Odysseus was to him the exemplar of the proto-Cynic.[43] These statements may not quite comprise "the sum of Cynic theology so far as known to us," as Gomperz affirmed,[44] but they do represent what appears to have been basic. We are able to elaborate on it by briefly examining various interpretations of Diogenes.

Diogenes, like Antisthenes, is consistently portrayed in the doxographic tradition as hostile to the popular religion.[45] He is not only suspected of atheism,[46] but as one bit of evidence suggests, it was not thought incongruous to attribute the same iconoclastic actions to him as to Diagoras, the legendary atheist.[47] Julian avers that both Oenomaus | and certain Cynics in his own day justified their negative attitude toward the gods by appealing to the example of Diogenes.[48] Such an attitude could, of course, be described as atheism without necessarily implying a denial of divine 49

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39 Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 7.75.3 (=Antisthenes, *Frg.* 161 Caizzi).

40 Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.31.76 (2:215, 1–3 W-H; = Antisthenes, *Frg.* 173 Caizzi). Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie," 379ff., insists that the divinization of the sage is not originally Stoic, but is already found in Antisthenes.

41 Diogenes Laertius 6.5 (= Antisthenes, *Frg.* 75 Caizzi).

42 Diogenes Laertius, 6.11 (= Antisthenes, *Frg.* 70 Caizzi).

43 See Antisthenes, *Frg.* 15 (Caizzi), and the discussions by Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, 95–102, and William B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1954), 96–100.

44 Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 2:164.

45 See Cicero, *Nat. d.* 3.83, 88; Tertullian, *Nat.* 2.2; *Apol.* 14. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 80–81, and "Zur Legende vom Kyniker Diogenes," 395–396, sees this as characteristic of the Roman period.

46 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.42; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.91.

47 The destruction of a wooden image of Heracles is attributed to Diogenes in Karl Buresch, *Klaros: Untersuchungen zum Orakelwesen des späteren Altertums* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1889), 119 n. 70. Similar actions are attributed by Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 2.24.4 (GCS 17–21) to Diagoras, and by Epicurus (see *Gnom. Vat.* 276 Sternbach) to Euripides.

48 Julian, *Or.* 6.186BC, 199AB; *Or.* 7.210C, 211AD, 238Aff. It is difficult to know what Oenomaus really thought of Diogenes since he does not mention him in the fragments that have been preserved by Eusebius. Attridge's statement, that Oenomaus did not "attempt to criticize religious practices from a theological basis" (*First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus*, 17), is hard to understand in light of Oenomaus's arguments on the basis of free will against the Stoic view of providence. See David Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque. Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles* (RTHP 3/19; Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1945), 127–134.

existence.[49] Statements from Cynic tradition indicate that Diogenes was indeed thought to have believed in the divine. His well-known syllogism (that all things belong to the gods, that wise men are friends of the gods and that friends have all things in common, and that all things therefore belong to the wise) illustrates this, as do his statements that all things are full of the divine presence,[50] and that good men are images of the gods.[51] He is also said by Cynic tradition to have imitated the life of the gods.[52] It is thus clear that Diogenes was generally regarded as hostile to the popular cult, but that Cynic tradition nevertheless presented him as living with an awareness of the divine. Greater clarity can be attained on exactly how the latter was perceived by examining the way Cynic sources considered Odysseus to have been a model for Diogenes.

The general feeling toward Odysseus was not as favorable as that of Antisthenes, but Latin writers, under the influence of the Stoics, praised him.[53] Epictetus provides us with significant evidence of the Stoic view. For him Odysseus serves as an example of the person who follows the role the divine assigned him.[54] Although Odysseus is said to trust in his own might, the statement is interpreted in a Stoic manner to refer to his judgments about the things under our control and those not, and his life is still advanced as an example of the way God governs the universe and shows his care for men.[55] In presenting him as an example of someone who did not yearn for things outside his own control, Epictetus introduces Heracles as a predecessor to Odysseus who, in a Stoic manner, in his wanderings was constantly aware of Zeus as his own father, καὶ ἐκάλει καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν ἃ ἔπραττεν.[56] To the interlocutor's objection that

[49] See Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 170, "It does not follow from Oenomaus's arguments that the gods do not exist."

[50] Diogenes Laertius 6.37; cf. 72. Cf. Ps.-Crates, *Epp*. 26 (213 Hercher), 27 (213–214 Hercher).

[51] Diogenes Laertius 6.51.

[52] Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 6.31. The opinion of Hans von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898; repr. as 2d ed., 2004), 260ff., that *Orations* 6, 8, 9 and 10 come from Dio's exilic period and contain genuine Cynic tradition, is generally accepted.

[53] See Stanford, *Ulysses Theme*, 99, 124ff.; Wilhelm Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca* (Fribourg: Gutenburg, 1952), 122. Cf. Lucian, *Par*. 10, who chides Odysseus for not being a better Stoic.

[54] Epictetus, *Frg*. 11; cf. *Diatr*. 1.12.3.

[55] Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.26.33–34; cf. 28.

[56] Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.24.13–21. Cf. Dio Chrysostom's interpretation of his encounter with the prophetess of Elis, who recounts to him the story of Heracles at the crossroads: He came to her οὐκ ἄνευ θείας τύχης (*Or*. 1.55); cf. οὐκ ἄνευ θείας τε βουλήσεως καὶ τύχης (*Or*. 1.57), and μετὰ τύχης τε ἀγαθῆς καὶ δαίμονος ὁμοίου καὶ προνοίας (*Or*. 1.42). Τύχη here means

Odysseus, however, yearned for his wife and wept, Epictetus replies that one cannot believe everything Homer says, for if Odysseus had wept and wailed he could not have been a good man.[57]

| Cynics did compare Diogenes with Odysseus,[58] but they rejected the Stoic Odysseus whose every action was determined by divine forethought and direction. The Cynic who wrote Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 19 (211–212 Hercher) is explicit and severe in his comments on Odysseus.[59] Odysseus, he demands, should not be called the father of Cynicism simply because he once put on the garb of a Cynic. It is not the cloak that makes one a Cynic, but the Cynic who gives meaning to the cloak, something that the weak, effeminate Odysseus did not do. He succumbed to the soft life, πράττων δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε ἄνευ θεοῦ καὶ τύχης.[60] Rather, it is Diogenes who should be called the father of Cynicism. He wore the Cynic garb throughout his entire life, was superior to toil as well as pleasure, had confidence in himself (τὸν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ θαρροῦντα), and was courageous in his practice of virtue, to which he also brought many men. Thus, what distinguishes the Cynic represented in this letter from the Stoic is a rejection of the power of τύχη[61] and a stress on the actual life of virtue rather than on a life supported by intricate doctrine.[62] 50

Such a rejection of Odysseus as a Cynic prototype appears to have been too radical for two of the authors who wrote letters under the name of

both divine will and providence, and is clearly Stoic. See Louis François, *Essai sur Dion Chrysostome. Philosophe et moraliste cynique et stoïcien* (Paris: Delagrave, 1921), 77–80, and Peter Tzaneteas, "The Symbolic Heracles in Dio Chrysostom's Orations 'On Kingship'" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilm, 1975), 122–128.

[57] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 13.4, for the wailing Odysseus. Maximus of Tyre, *Oration* 38.7 (446, 16ff. Hobein) also insists that Odysseus was good by divine allotment, for the exercises that made him good were assigned to him.

[58] Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 9.9, who may have been influenced by Antisthenes, and see Wilhelm Capelle, "De cynicorum epistulis" (Ph.D. diss., Göttingen, 1896), 23; Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie," 393–395.

[59] On the latter, see Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie," 394–395; Capelle, "De cynicorum epistulis," 23–24, 52–53. Michelina Martorana, *Ulisse nella letteratura latina* (Palermo: R. Sandron, 1926), 75–80, suggests that Horace, *Sat*. 2.5, may be a similar symptom of late Cynic rejection of Antisthenes's conception of Odysseus as the proto-Cynic.

[60] See n. 56 above.

[61] The Cynic entrusts nothing to τύχη, and it has no control over him. See Diogenes Laertius 6.105 (cf. 63), and Stobaeus, *Ecl*. 2.8.21 (2:157, 7–9 W-H); *Flor*. 4.44.71 (5:976, 3–6 W-H).

[62] The longer version of Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep*. 7 (XIV 51ff. Martin; 78, 13ff. Attridge) lambastes Homer and criticizes his Odysseus for being passive rather than active. See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 2.1:303–314, on Cynic virtue. For a comparison of Cynicism and Stoicism, see François, *Essai sur Dion Chrysostome*, 118–204, and John M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 54–80.

Diogenes, and who sought to rehabilitate Odysseus. The writer of *Ep.* 7 (236–237 Hercher) re-elevates Odysseus to the position of a Cynic forebear, and a rapid reading of the text may create the impression that he "is determined to give the Cynic the appearance of semi-divine sanction."[63] A close examination, however, leads to qualification of such an assessment of the letter. Its theme is that Diogenes's self-sufficiency and garb demonstrate his freedom from popular opinion (ἐλεύθερος δόξης) to which all men are enslaved.[64] He is called κύων ὁ οὐρανοῦ because he conforms himself to heaven, *οὐ κατὰ δόξαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἐλεύθερος ὑπὸ τὸν Δία, εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνατεθεικὼς τἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν πλησίον*. It is his freedom from δόξα that is equivalent to being free under God. His clothing, like that of Odysseus, that wisest of the Greeks, is an invention of the gods, and he lives πρὸς θεῶν. This is basically Antisthenic, and thoroughly Cynic. The contrast between δόξα and *φύσις* in this context is certainly Cynic,[65] and his statements that to live *κατὰ φύσιν* is to be free from popular opinion, free under God and in the presence of the gods, are to be understood in light of such statements as that of Dio Chrysostom, who says that in his self-sufficiency and natural way of life Diogenes imitated the life of the gods,[66] and of Ps.-Heraclitus, that the gods are his fellow citizens and 51 that he dwells with them through virtue.[67] Thus, even when Odysseus | is reclaimed, and the Cynic's relationship to the divine is reasserted, there is no relapse into Stoicism, but it is done on the basis of the Cynic's virtue, which is seen as a matter of will and deeds, a conviction ascribed in the tradition to Antisthenes, who was regarded as a Cynic.[68]

The thirty-fourth letter ascribed to Diogenes probably "derived from letter 7 and is an attempt at greater sophistication."[69] The letter is a defense of the Cynic life and garb. Diogenes is made to claim that he had

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[63] Victor E. Emeljanow, "The Letters of Diogenes" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1968; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1980), 33, who does, however, correctly surmise that the letter probably reflects genuine Antisthenic theory. See further, Capelle, "De cynicorum epistulis," 21–25.

[64] Cf. Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 9 (46–47), *μόνη πονηρία δουλαγωγεῖ, μόνη ἐλευθεροῖ ἀρετή*.

[65] Cf. Julian, *Or.* 6.193D. That it is thoroughly Cynic does not mean, of course, that it is exclusively Cynic.

[66] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 6.31. Cf. Julian, *Or.* 6.192A: Cynic ἀπάθεια is equivalent to becoming a god; Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 12.20; P.Genev. 271, col. I, 14–15 (83 Martin).

[67] Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 9 (24–25 Tarán).

[68] Note that there is no mention of Diogenes's supposed relations with Apollo, as there is in non-Cynic sources. Cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.20–21 for a possible hint at a concern reflected by Maximus of Tyre. *Or.* 36.5 (420, 5–6 Hobein), ἐλευθερωθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, and Julian, *Or.* 6.191AB, 199AB; *Or.* 7.211A, 212A.

[69] Emeljanow, "Letters of Diogenes," 41.

not learned these lessons from Antisthenes first, but from the gods and heroes, and from Homer and the tragic poets. This is not a minimizing of Antisthenes,[70] but rather an assertion that what Antisthenes taught had already been anticipated by Homer and the poets. The letter thus makes explicit what is implicit in *Ep.* 7. Hera, Telephus, and Odysseus are offered as examples of the Cynic life, but while they followed it out of diverse motives, Diogenes lives the way he does simply to attain happiness, ἵνα ... ἕλω δὲ τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας ... περιέλθω δὲ ἐλεύθερος ὑπὸ τὸν Δία πατέρα ἐπὶ ὅλης γῆς. Once again, the annihilation of δόξα is tantamount to being free under God, and there is nothing specifically mystical or Stoic in the idea.[71]

In sum, there are certain features that Stoics and Cynics shared in their attitudes toward religion. Both held to a belief in the divine, and both related the life of the sage to the divine. Both spoke of the divine nature of the sage, in connection with which his virtue is of central importance. Certain basic differences in their views on these matters, however, have also emerged. Stoicism had a theology which regarded the divine as exercising control over man and the world. The wise man brings himself into harmony with the divine design as he determines what it is. The means by which he does so is Stoic logic and physics, which provide the basis for his ethics. When he thus attains virtue he in a sense shares the divine life and is able to direct the cult, which is intelligible as a part of the divine scheme.

Cynic theology, on the contrary, had no room for either the popular or the public cult, and generally appears not to have had room for personal religion. Cynic individualism rejected outside claims, even those considered to be part of a divine scheme. Rather, the stress was on the individual's own will which was all-important in his pursuit of virtue. In this endeavor it was the practical life, unencumbered by theoretical baggage, that demonstrated the virtue through which the sage could be said to live with the gods.

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70 As argued by Emeljanow, "Letters of Diogenes," 65.

71 The temptation to see the description of Zeus as πατὴρ ἐπὶ ὅλης γῆς as Stoic (cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.16) should be resisted for at least two reasons. First, the description of God as father was not confined to Stoics; cf. Gottlob Schrenk, "πατήρ," *TDNT* 5 (1968): 945–1014, esp. 954–956. Second, it is precisely the Stoic elements attached to the concept that are absent (removed?) from our text.

### The Polemic of the Epistle

One should not lose sight of the fact that the letter is a defense against the charge that the Cynic Heraclitus is guilty of ἀσέβεια (3–4),[72] more particularly, that he had made himself into a god by inscribing an altar with 52 his own name (5–6). We thus have to do | with the relationship between a negative Cynic attitude toward popular religion and a Cynic understanding of the sage as divine. The author was familiar with some of the Heraclitean traditions,[73] and it is not difficult to see why he would write under the name of the dour Ephesian. Heraclitus was represented in the doxographic tradition as a Stoic,[74] but also, and more to the point for our purpose, as a Cynic of the misanthropic type.[75] This tradition attributed to him the statement, ἄνθρωποι θεοί, θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι,[76] claimed that he was an atheist,[77] that he opposed the mysteries[78] and sacrifices,[79] and refused to worship religious images.[80] An awareness of this picture of Heraclitus aids in clarifying the progression of the argument in our letter.

The response to the charge against Heraclitus is both negative and positive, that is, it consists of a polemic against his opponents' ignorance of the nature of God and of an argument in which he implicitly justifies his own divinization on the basis of his virtue. The charge that he had made himself into a god leads naturally to the affirmation by Heraclitus that he has a different view of the gods from his opponents (7–8). Vituperatively he challenges them to teach him what God is. Contrary to Bernays, the author does not leave the challenge hanging, nor is Tarán entirely satisfying in saying that the challenge is answered with a *topos* on cosmic religion.

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[72] The theme of piety/impiety runs through most parts of the letter; cf. lines 5, 6–7, 10, 12, 20, 45–46, and see below.

[73] See esp. the commentaries of Bernays and Tarán.

[74] On the Stoic Heraclitus, see Cora E. Lutz, "Democritus and Heraclitus," *CJ* 49 (1954): 309–314; Stewart, "Democritus and the Cynics," 185ff.; Miroslav Marcovich, "Herakleitos," PWSup 10:316.

[75] See Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 165–166, 171ff.; Marcovich, "Herakleitos," 317, 320.

[76] Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 3.2.2.1 (GCS 236.26; *FVS* 62). For other references, see Miroslav Marcovich, *Heraclitus: Greek Text with Short Commentary* (Merida, Venezuela: Los Andes University Press, 1967), 236–241, and for a discussion of the texts, see Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 39–40.

[77] Justin, *1 Apol.* 46; *2 Apol.* 8. Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 36, thinks that Justin was dependent on our letter for this view.

[78] Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 2.22.1–2 (GCS 16.21–17.1; *FVS* 14); see Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 133ff.

[79] Cf. Buresch, *Klaros*, 118–120 (Nos. 67–69, 74).

[80] Origen, *Cels.* 7.62 (GCS 213.3–4; *FVS* 5).

Two considerations help us to see how our author is proceeding in the first part of his response, in which he polemicizes against their ignorance of the nature of God (11–17).

First, it is important to do justice to the polemical element in this section of the letter. The author's opponents are accused of ἀπαιδευσία (4), ἀσέβεια (6–7), and blindness (8–9), and it is as ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι that they are challenged to teach him what God is (9–10). We are here dealing with polemic in the misanthropic Cynic style, and should hardly expect calm exposition of Cynic theology. The first, polemical response, should be seen as beginning with the ironic imperatival challenge, ὦ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, διδάξατε πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ἵνα ἀσεβεῖν λέγοντες πιστεύησθε (9ff.), and continuing with the taunt, ποῦ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; (11).[81] The polemical function of this section is obviously to attribute their accusation of impiety to their ignorance of God's nature. The attack on temples and the cult of images, ending with the statement that the whole world is God's temple, is part of this polemic, and there is nothing of the mysticism in it that is characteristic of the cosmic religion that had been influenced by Stoicism.[82] Bernays was correct in drawing attention to the severe tone of this polemic, but he erred in thinking that such | severity could only be thought of as coming from a Jew or a Christian.[83] Cynics, as we have seen, continued their attacks on the popular cult with great enthusiasm. But the attack on the popular cult should also be seen in its relation to the total response to τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός; In first attacking erroneous views, the author appears to be following a theory of argumentation, also later followed by Christians, that false opinions should be eradicated before the truth can be established.[84] Seen in this way, the polemic is more than a tirade, but functions as part of the argument. 53

A second consideration also suggests that this polemical section is not unrelated to the question about the divine nature. According to Celsus, Heraclitus had said that men worship images because they do not know

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[81] For the taunting force of ποῦ, cf. 1 Cor 15:55; 2 Pet 3:4; Ps.-Plutarch, *Cons. Apoll.* 110D; Marcus Aurelius 10.31; 12.27.

[82] Attridge, *First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus*, 13, 22, is correct in identifying this section as polemical, and in admitting that there is little that could be described as especially mystical in the letter.

[83] Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, XX–XXI, differs from Bernays in that he argues that the tone of the polemic against images did not moderate with the passage of time, but grew stronger.

[84] See Philo of Larissa, *apud* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.2 (2:39, 19 – 42, 6 W-H); Albinus, *Intr.* 6 (150, 12–13 Hermann); Theon, *Progymn.* 12 (2.121, 12 – 128, 21 Spengel); Athenagoras, *Res.* 1 (48.1–49.24 Schwartz); Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Paneg.* 93–99 (19–20 Koetschau).

the nature of gods and heroes.[85] Our author may very well have known such a Heraclitean tradition in which ignorance of the divine nature was advanced as the cause of the worship of images.[86] His response to those who accuse him, a man preeminent in wisdom, that they are ignorant of the true nature of God and worship images, is perfectly intelligible in light of the tradition.

After his polemical attack on the popular cult and the ignorance responsible for its maintenance, Heraclitus returns to the putative reason for charging him with impiety, his inscription on the altar. As a transition to his positive argument, he makes use of the tradition of Heraclitus's obscurity of expression,[87] and claims that he had written "Heracles" and not "Heraclitus," and that the fault lay with the ignorant readers of the inscription (18–19). Again the issue, as Heraclitus sees it, is that their ignorance is responsible for their accusation of impiety (οὐκ ἐμὴ ἀσέβεια τὸ ὑμῶν ἀπαίδευτον), but now he challenges them with the second imperatival sentence in the letter, μανθάνετε σοφίην καὶ συνίετε (20–21). The wisdom that he is about to teach them represents his positive argument. The argument is positive in that it represents reasons for the Cynic viewpoint that is being defended, and not because there is no polemic in it. Piety/impiety is again explicitly mentioned only in 45–46, but the entire argument, dealing as it does with the knowledge that makes piety possible, is in fact an answer to the accusation of impiety.

Heracles, he says, had been born a man, but had been made into a god by his virtue and his successful completion of his Labors.[88] The reason for introducing Heracles into the discussion is clear from the conclusion that Heraclitus draws: ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, οὐ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθός εἰμί; (26). By comparing himself favorably with Heracles, the Cynic author is able to make the point, without stating it explicitly, that he has been made divine just as Heracles had been. He is fully aware that this audacious claim would be rejected, so he immediately adds ἥμαρτον ἐρόμενος ὑμᾶς· καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὰ ἐναντία ἀποκρίναισθε, ὅμως ἀγαθός εἰμι (26–27), and emphatically

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[85] See n. 80 above.

[86] Tarán, *Eraclito*, 291, has suggested that the tradition represented by Celsus formed the point of departure for the attack on the cult, but that Stoic influence is observable.

[87] For the obscurity of Heraclitus, which had become a rhetorical example of ἀμφιβολία, see Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 42–44, and Tarán, *Eraclito*, 321.

[88] The argument in response to the question τί ἐστι ὁ θεός; ends with the consideration of Heraclitus's "immortality" in men's memory (35–45). This sequence is reminiscent of Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 14, where, in response to the question, τὶ δὲ θεοί; Heraclitus answers, ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι. On Heraclitus as himself divine, see Epictetus, *Ench.* 15.

(καὶ ἔμοιγε) proceeds to detail | the reasons for his confident assertion. 54
Here we are at the heart of the issue with which the letter is concerned, the divinization of the confident Cynic.

### The Divinization of Heracles

In view of the tendency to conflate the Stoic and Cynic views of the ideal philosopher,[89] it is advisable, before proceeding to a closer examination of Heraclitus's treatment of Heracles, to attain some perspective on their views on the attainability of the ideal, and to trace those features of the interpretation of Heracles that will allow Heraclitus's argument to emerge more clearly.

The Cynics who preceded Zeno held that there was a profound distinction between the wise and the fools, the wise holding virtue as the only thing of value, vice as the only thing to be rejected, and that everything else was insignificant to the wise man. Diogenes and Crates held that it was possible to attain wisdom, and that once attained it could not be lost. The wise man would not be governed by opinion or convention, but solely by reason, which would lead him to virtue and away from vice. A life governed thus by reason is free and natural. What "nature" is they did not explain, nor why it is good to live κατὰ φύσιν. Their stress was on the independent way of life, and they did not attempt to undergird it with logical or physical theories which might support it or make it more intelligible.[90]

The Stoics, on the other hand, exhibited reticence in their statements on whether the ideal could be realized. Zeno did not claim to be the ideal wise man, nor did Chrysippus, who did not think that his teachers had attained to the ideal either,[91] and while Panaetius did make use of the figure of the ideal sage in his instruction, he did so only sparingly and it remained in the background of his teaching.[92] Opponents of the Stoics seized on the ambiguity that there is a profound difference between the

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[89] See n. 26 above.

[90] Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 54, 62–63. See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 2.1:315–316.

[91] See Rudolf Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften* (2 vols. in 3; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1882), 2.1:271ff.; Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca*, 94–105; Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955–1959), 1:157; Josiah B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (PhAnt 17; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 172–176.

[92] Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca*, 98–105.

wise and the fool, but that, for all practical purposes, the wise man is non-existent, and that there are only fools in the world.[93] By moderating the distinction between the wise and foolish, the Stoics could and did respond to such criticisms and relate to the problems of practical life. But their moderation was not entirely due to the adverse criticism of non-Stoics or to the practical difficulties the distinction posed for them. The hypothesis of Stoic ethics, which stressed the theory of universal convictions and practice according to nature, made the incongruity of the unattainability of the ideal the more striking.[94] Hence, in keeping with their scientific method, they developed their theory of indifferent things.

Between absolute good and evil they now classified those things which are indifferent (ἀδιάφορα), but which can be distinguished in a threefold manner: those which are in accord with nature and are preferred (προηγμένα), those which are contrary to nature and to be avoided (ἀποπροηγμένα), and those which are truly ἀδιάφορα. With this scheme it was possible to admit of men who were advancing (προκόπτοντες) to
55 wisdom, | who did not perform the perfect actions (τὰ κατορθώματα) of the wise man, but did perform actions appropriate (τὰ καθήκοντα) to their human character, and thus in accord with nature.[95]

The sharp distinction between the ideal sage and the fool was thus retained: ὁ σπουδαῖος κατορθοῖ.[96] (Οἱ φαῦλοι) οὐ δύνανται κατορθοῦν.[97] But a new class of men, οἱ προκόπτοντες, were introduced, who in the popular sense were wise, the masters of philosophy.[98] His προκοπή could bring a person right up to the line that separates the wise and foolish, indeed, he might even have crossed it without being conscious of having done so. In practice, the *proficiens* became almost indistinguishable from the ideal, nevertheless, the Stoics held on to the ideal, which remained the model for their conduct.[99] Under the Empire, when they looked back to their Cynic origins and found in Diogenes the ideal, the question of its realiz-

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[93] Cf. Cicero, *De or*. 3.65; *Amic*. 18; Plutarch, *Comm. not*. 1026B; Sextus Empiricus, *Math*. 7.432; Horace, *Sat*. 1.3; *Ep*. 1.1.106ff.; Lucian, *Vit. auct*. 20, and Dill, *Roman Society*, 313–314.

[94] See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 3.1:261ff.

[95] See Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 97–111. See Adolf Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1894), 96ff.

[96] Clement of Alexandria, *Strom*. 6.12.98.2 (*SVF* 3:110).

[97] Plutarch, *Stoic. rep*. 1037C (*SVF* 3:520).

[98] See Edwyn R. Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 70ff.

[99] See Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 1:153–158. For the use of the ideal figure, especially of Cato, see Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca*, 115ff., and Winfried Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung* (DAWB, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft 37; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962), 95ff.

ability again rose with intensity, and they affirmed, with some hesitation, that it could be realized, but that the number of those who had done so was exceedingly small.[100] Such a person, Seneca says, appears perhaps like the Phoenix, only once in five hundred years.[101] Still, he insisted that it was possible to become wise,[102] even though he himself was not, but was only a *proficiens*.[103] When he does refer to his own life as an example to be followed, he does so as a *proficiens*, and not as the ideal philosopher, and he does so sparingly.[104] Yet there is authority implied in offering oneself as an example,[105] and his friend Lucilius did look to Seneca as his model,[106] so that in practice the line between the *proficiens* and the ideal was blurred.[107]

The Cynics, in contrast, retained the sharp distinction between the wise and the foolish, and confidently assumed that it was possible to attain wisdom by living a rational, natural life. Practice, not theory, was important to them, and "in practice, for the Cynic, the man who makes his own decisions about his life is the wise man."[108] Free of the intricacies of Stoic logic, Cynics continued to hold this conviction. Thus, while the Stoics, ironically, took over from the Cynics the absolute distinction between the wise and foolish, only to define the ideal in such a way as to make it virtually unattainable, the Cynics remained more confident of its fulfillment. For them the ideal was no abstract possibility, but had been realized by Socrates, Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates, | who had demonstrated how 56

100 See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 3.1:258ff.; Deissner, "Das Idealbild des stoischen Weisen," 3–4, 7ff.

101 Seneca, *Ep*. 42.1. On denying that the Stoic wise man is a phantom, see *Const. sap*. 7.1; Philo, *Prob*. 62–63, evidently in response to a frequent charge; cf. Cicero, *Amic*. 18; Plutarch, *Stoic. rep*. 1041F (*SVF* 3:545), quoting Chrysippus(!).

102 Seneca, *Ep*. 24.3; *Ira* 2.10.6.

103 Seneca, *Clem*. 1.6.3; *Ira* 2.28.1. On his advance, see *Epp*. 27.1; 108.3, and Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 171.

104 Cf. Seneca, *Epp*. 8.3; 32.1. But see Tacitus, *Ann*. 15.62, who records Seneca's statement, just before his death, that he was leaving his friends his sole and fairest possession, the image of his life.

105 See Hadot, *Seneca*, 174ff. For the function of Seneca's comments on himself in his letters, see Hildegard Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae morales* (SSKPG 18; Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), II. Teil.

106 Cf. Seneca, *Ep*. 83.1.

107 Epictetus also saw himself as not having attained the ideal state. Cf. *Diatr*. 2.8.25–26; 4.1.151–152; 8.43. See Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet*, 19–20, 107, and esp. 144ff.; Deissner, "Das Idealbild des stoischen Weisen," 4, 7. From the passages in Epictetus that Georgi, *Die Gegner*, 32ff., 192ff., refers to, it cannot be inferred that Epictetus saw himself as embodying the ideal. Epictetus describes the ideal, but does not claim to have attained it.

108 Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, 63.

a philosopher should live, and whose examples they could confidently follow.[109] To be sure, they, too, complained that there was a dearth of true philosophers, but when they did so, it was not in reflection on the unattainability of the ideal or on the nature of the προκοπή towards the ideal, but rather to distinguish themselves from the false philosophers,[110] or berate their listeners for the ill treatment they accorded philosophers, which they took to be responsible for the comparative lack of true philosophers.[111] Thus, with the Cynics, unlike the Stoics, the difficulty of representing the ideal served to express their confidence rather than their diffidence.

As will appear, the author of our letter expresses such self-confidence by comparing himself with Heracles, the proto-Cynic. "Everyone, it seems, used the symbol of Heracles to illustrate his own values, so that eventually Heracles came to mean many things to many people."[112] The significance of the comments that Heraclitus makes about Heracles becomes clearer when they are seen in the context of the various interpretations of that paradigm of virtue.[113]

A development in the interpretation of Heracles is already observable in pre-Cynic literature. In Sophocles and Euripides he is a tragic figure whose sufferings are imposed on him by fate.[114] But the sophist Herodorus attempted to bring Heracles into harmony with the individualistic ethics of his time by means of allegorization, so that the three apples of the fable, for instance, became three virtues, the absence of anger, love of money, and love of pleasure. With the club of his hardy soul and the skin τοῦ θρασυτάτου σώφρονος λογισμοῦ ἐνίκησε τὸν γήινον τῆς φαυλῆς ἐπιθυμίας

[109] See Rahn, "Die Frömmigkeit der Kyniker," 284.

[110] Cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 29.3 (244 Hercher); Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 34.30. The antithetical form in which the ideal is frequently described serves to make this distinction sharply. Cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 4 (236 Hercher); Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 32.11; 42.1–2; 77/78.37–38; Lucian, *Demon*. 4.8; Julian, *Or*. 6.200BCD, and see Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thessalonians ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217. [*Light*, 1:53–67]

[111] For example, Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 32.19.

[112] Tzaneteas, "Symbolic Heracles," 98.

[113] For the interpretation of Heracles, in addition to Tzaneteas, see Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, 22–73, to whom I am indebted for much of what follows. See also Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (10 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Oxford, 1939), 6:564–576; Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca*, 122–125. For the influence of the figure on Christianity, see Marcel Simon, *Hercule et le christianisme* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1955), and for possible influence on Judaism, Marc Philonenko, "Juda et Héraklès," *RHPR* 50 (1970): 61–62.

[114] See Euripides, *Herc. fur*. 1357, νῦν δ᾽ ὡς ἔοικε, τῇ τύχῃ δουλευτέον; cf. 19ff.; Sophocles, *Trach*. 1264ff., 1278.

ἀγῶνα.[115] This triad of virtues and the theme of the victory over the passions would become standard Cynic fare. A further ethical rationalization of Heracles took place in Prodicus's allegory, where it is clearly no longer a matter of a fate imposed from without, but a choice determined from within.[116] Furthermore, the motivation of Heracles's action was seen to be the development and completion of his own virtue.

In early Cynicism less use was made of Heracles than had been the case in drama, but traces of Heracles interpretations are found in the extant Cynic fragments. "The myth of Heracles ... offered a multitude of possibilities for a philosophic sect which in its concentration on the individual loses and gradually deliberately rejects supra-individual points of view and connections ... a sect which is distinctly non-intellectual and at the same time emotional, attaches great importance to will and is inspired by a strong sense of mission."[117] From Diogenes Laertius 6.105 it would appear that Antisthenes wrote an allegorical interpretation of Heracles along purely individualistic lines in | which he affirmed that virtue can be taught and that the wise man is an ethical superman bent on his own perfection, and separated by a wide chasm from the masses.[118] Diogenes Laertius 6.70–71, an account of Cynic propaganda, may reflect Diogenes's interpretation of Heracles. It contains an attack on intellectual culture. Man is to follow the Cynic way to happiness, "which is characterized not by intellectual deliberations, but by decision, effective training and strength—in other words, a way of life which gives chief emphasis to the will."[119]

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In contrast to these scattered references to him by the early Cynics, Heracles became a major figure for the Cynics under the Empire. Dio Chrysostom makes extensive use of Heracles. It is noteworthy that most of the references to Heracles appear in those of his works which reflect his exile, that is, in his orations which were written after he had become acquainted with the Cynic way of life and with Cynic literature.[120] Dio is

[115] *FGH* 31 F 14. For the individualism of the ethics, see Albrecht Dihle, "Ethik," *RAC* 6 (1966): 752ff.

[116] Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.21ff.

[117] Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, 34.

[118] See Antisthenes, *Frgs.* 22–28 (Caizzi) and the discussion there, pp. 94–97. For a criticism of Höistad's interpretation, see Tzaneteas, "Symbolic Heracles," 87–95.

[119] Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, 43–44. Tzaneteas, "Symbolic Heracles," 144–155, criticizes Höistad's interpretation of the passage.

[120] See n. 52 above. Tzaneteas, "Symbolic Heracles," 116–201, in opposition to Höistad, argues convincingly that *Or.* 1 is Stoic and not Cynic.

important for our purpose because he reveals what features of Heracles's life were of special interest to Cynics during this period. In *Or*. 8.28ff. he levels a polemic against the popular conception of Heracles, which appears to have been that of Greek drama, in which Heracles suffers against his will. Dio has Diogenes liken himself to Heracles. Diogenes claims that his ἀγών is like that of Heracles, against the vices (27).[121] Only now that Heracles is dead, do people honor him, saying that he has Hebe to wife (28). They also say that Eurystheus had him in his power and ordered (ἐπιτάττειν) him about (29). Diogenes counters that Heracles was independent in performing his Labors (30–33), and in this was not seeking to please Eurystheus (34). We see here a Cynic rejection of the popular view that Heracles did not exercise his own free will.[122] As he appears here in Dio, Heracles is simply the ideal Cynic figure who does not allow men to govern his movements. There is no theological statement made about the relationship between his own will and the decrees of fate, but the passage does show us the kind of popular interpretation of Heracles that the Cynics, who looked to him as their prototype, felt impelled to correct, and reveals the direction in which their own interpretation would go. The same concern is also reflected in Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 8, where the Cynic who looks to Heracles as his model is said to fight against pleasures, οὐ κελευστός, ἀλλὰ ἑκούσιος, and is represented by Philo, who in *Quod omn. prob. lib.* 101–102, in proving that Heracles had indeed been free, even when he was put up for sale, quotes a fragment from Euripides(!) in which Heracles is told, τάσσειν δέ, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπιτάσσεσθαι θέλοις.[123]

Elsewhere, in *Or*. 4, Dio rationalizes Heracles's divine character.[124] He explains (28–31) that παιδεία is of two kinds, the one divine, the other human. Most people have | the human in mind when they speak of edu-

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[121] On this ἀγών, see Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967); Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80, esp. 74ff.; [*Light*, 1:41–51] Hermann Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus," *Hermes* 98 (1970): 459–471.

[122] It may be significant that Dio describes the freedom with which Heracles roams the world, but does not explicitly mention his free will. If the stories of Diogenes in *Orations* 6, 8, 9, and 10 are veiled autobiographical statements about Dio in his Cynic period, as is likely, then this hesitancy may be due to his own view of the matter, which was influenced by Stoicism, rather than to his Cynic sources. For his view of his own choice, which is made in the context of providence, see *Or*. 32.12, and cf. Eugen Wilmes, "Beiträge zur Alexandrinerrede (Or. 32) des Dion Chrysostomos" (Ph.D. diss., Bonn, Rheinische-Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1970), 8ff.

[123] *TGF* 690 (Nauck; 2d ed.). Cf. also Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn*. 13.

[124] See Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, 153–154, 164ff. The attempt by Tzaneteas to disprove Höistad's contention that *Or*. 4 contains Cynic material fails.

cation, but it is the divine education, which is also called ἀνδρεία and μεγαλοφροσύνη, which is the truly important kind. Men of old called those persons "sons of Zeus" who received this ἀγαθὴ παιδεία and were τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνδρείους, πεπαιδευμένους ὡς Ἡρακλέα (31). When one has such a disciple of Zeus (τοῦ Διὸς ὁμιλητής) for a teacher, one has no need of sophistries or discussions (38). If such a person should die, he will be guaranteed renown, just as Heracles was considered the son of Zeus διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν (*Or*. 2.78), for people praise and call "divine" and "august" every virtue (*Or*. 69.1). Thus Dio represents Heracles as the Cynic whose manly behavior in his παιδεία effects his ἀρετή, and for that reason assures him of immortality.

Epictetus, representing a Stoic interpretation, made a personal-religious use of the figure of Heracles. In *Diatr*. 2.16.44–46, in a paraenetic conclusion to the diatribe, he urges his listeners to commit themselves to the divine purpose (cf. 42), and refers to the example of Heracles. If Heracles had remained at home, he would have been Eurystheus and not Heracles.[125] In his wanderings he had no dearer friend than God; that is what he was believed to be and is, a son of God. It was in obedience to God that he performed his Labors. Epictetus then calls on his listeners to cast from themselves all vices, which they can only do by looking to God alone, being devoted to him alone, and consecrated to his commands.[126] This religious element in Epictetus distinguishes him from the Cynic treatments of Heracles and from Dio.

We do, however, find in Epictetus the Cynic concern for independence reflected in his view of the superiority of Heracles over Eurystheus, yet what is characteristic of him is his stress on the divine mandate of Heracles.[127] Whereas both Dio and Epictetus reflect the Cynic desire not to make their hero subject to Eurystheus, that is, to declare the independence of the Cynic from the control of man, it is only in Epictetus's outlook that, in a tractate dealing with πρόνοια, Heracles could be advanced as an example of the fact that everything in the universe has a purpose: his hardships were serviceable as a means of revealing (δεῖξαι) and exercising

[125] For the superiority of Heracles over Eurystheus, see also Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.26.31–32.

[126] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.24.14–16, and see Tzaneteas, "Symbolic Heracles," 127–128.

[127] Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, 61ff., does not sufficiently distinguish between Dio's and Epictetus's use of Heracles. His interest in the Cynic traditions causes him to overlook the Stoic features in Epictetus's portrayal of Heracles. Tzaneteas is more aware of the problem. See nn. 120 and 124 above.

(γυμνάσαι) him (*Diatr*. 1.6.36).[128] Epictetus does not view the hardships of Heracles in the Cynic manner. For the Cynics they represented his παιδεία which leads to ἀρετή and to his becoming a son of God. For Epictetus, Heracles is a son of God because he obeys Zeus who controls the universe by his providence, and as such he is exercised to show what and who he is. According to Epictetus that is the case with all Cynics: αἱ περιστάσεις εἰσιν αἱ τοὺς ἄνδρας δεικνύουσιν, and God is the trainer who exercises man thus to exhibit him.[129]

## The Divinization of Heraclitus

In the context of such treatments of Heracles our author's use of the figure takes on added significance. One is immediately struck by the self-confidence with which he uses | Heracles to make claims for himself. He can do so, because in the Cynic manner he regards Heracles as a man who had been made a god by his successful completion of his Labors. Although he does not go so far as to call himself a god, he does, in fact, make claims for himself which, if accepted, would make him equal to, or even superior to, Heracles.[130] From his statement that it was Heracles's virtue and noble works, after he had completed his Labors, that had made him a god, he draws the rhetorical conclusion, ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, οὐ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθός εἰμι; (26). It is clearly the Cynic idea, that the πόνοι lead to virtue, that is responsible for his drawing this conclusion.[131] This is the way he answers the charge against himself, and the Cynic line of his argument is obvious. There is no lack of logical progression once it is recognized that we have to do with a Cynic. The objection that he anticipates to this confident Cynic asseveration sounds Stoic, for the latter held that the wise man

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[128] Γυμνάζειν is important for Epictetus as a description of the function of hardships. See *Diatr*. 3.22.56ff.; 26.31–32. For δεικνύειν, see *Diatr*. 1.24.8; 2.1.38–39.

[129] Epictetus, *Diatr*. 1.24.1.

[130] The Cynics' reverence for Heracles did not mean that his position as proto-Cynic or as the ideal was unassailable. Cf. Julian, *Or*. 6.187C; Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 13 (618 Hercher), and on the latter, see Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Phaidon von Elis," *Hermes* 14 (1879): 187–193, and Ronald F. Hock, "Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic," *GRBS* 17 (1976): 41–53.

[131] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.2, where Antisthenes, using the example of Heracles, is said to have taught that ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε, and Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 31.16, who lists Heracles with other heroes οἱ πόνους μεγάλους πονήσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρετῆς. See Tiede, *Charismatic Figure*, 76–77. Cf. Cornutus, *Nat. d*. 31, and Macrobius, *Sat*. 1.20.6 for non-Cynic allegorization of the idea, and see Simon, *Hercule et le christianisme*, 82ff.

alone is good,[132] and indeed, the language in which Heraclitus goes on to detail the reasons for his confidence suggests the strong possibility that he is consciously distinguishing himself from the Stoics. At the very least, it expresses a self-confidence that is Cynic rather than Stoic.

The author's response to the charge shows that he is familiar with Heracles traditions which stressed his independence. He, too, had successfully fulfilled (κατώρθωνται) his Labors, had fought the ἀγών against the vices and conquered (νενίκηκα) them (28–32), and has crowned himself victor, doing so, not at the behest of Eurystheus but of his own (καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστεφάνωμαι ἐμαυτῷ ἐπιτάττων, οὐχ ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέως, 32–33).[133] It is clear that he applies to himself precisely those elements of the myth that Cynics stressed in defense of Heracles's independence. None of the religious feeling of Epictetus is present, nor of the Stoic concern to bring the vocation of the sage into harmony with providence. Here we have a superb example of the Cynic who has rejected all supra-individual points of view and attaches greatest value to his own will.

The difference between this self-understanding and that of the Stoics becomes more pronounced when it is observed that the Stoic's ἀγών was conceived as a continuous one in which οἱ προκόπτοντες were engaged.[134] Our author, however, by using the perfect tense makes the claim that he has already attained what Stoics only strive for. His use of κατώρθωνται in this context must be regarded as particularly significant in light of the Stoic tenet that only the ideal wise man, that virtually unattainable figure, could perform the κατορθώματα while those who were still advancing toward the ideal only performed the καθήκοντα.[135] Heraclitus has no qualms about making his claim, which he shares with other Cynics, for example, the writer of Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 27 (241 Hercher), ἀξιελέητοί γε μὴν οἱ μὴ νοοῦντες, ἃ δοκοῦσιν ἀσκεῖν, ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μόνου κατορθοῦσθαι.[136]

| The contrast with Stoicism becomes even more marked when it is considered that opponents of the Stoics charged them with teaching that both the ἁμαρτήματα and the κατορθώματα take place καθ' εἱμαρμένην and 60

132 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.100 (*SVF* 3:83; cf. 578, 599).

133 On the Cynic crowning himself, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 9.10–13; cf. Lucian, *Demon*. 11.

134 Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.25; *Ench*. 51.

135 See n. 95 above.

136 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.71, οὐδέν γε μὴν ἔλεγε τὸ παράπαν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χωρὶς ἀσκήσεως κατορθοῦσθαι, δυνατὴν δὲ ταύτην πᾶν ἐκνικῆσαι.

κατὰ φύσιν.[137] Nothing could be further from the viewpoint of Heraclitus. He thinks that it is out of willfulness that they slander wisdom and attribute their ἁμαρτήματα and accusations to him (34–35, cf. 21–22).

From his upbraiding of his audience's ἀπαιδευσία it might be expected that Heraclitus would stress his own παιδεία. Indeed, he does, and the παιδεία he has in mind is that of Heracles. He shows us how he conceives of παιδεία when he associates his opponents' ἀπαιδευσία with their taking delight in their wicked works (22), and when he opposes their sins and accusations to his own σοφία (34–35). It is the παιδεία of the practical, moral, Cynic life, and not of intellectual sophistication. It is because of this training that he will continue to live in men's memory (37–38). Ἀρετή, which he has attained in his life, ensures that he will have Hebe to wife (41ff.). While Epictetus also stresses the need of παιδεία to learn how to live συμφώνως τῇ φύσει (*Diatr*. 1.2.6), for him it involves an application of Stoic logic. Heraclitus shows no interest in such a conception of παιδεία; for him actually living the Cynic life represents the proper παιδεία. By it he attains virtue, which ensures him of παιδείας κλέος, the renown that derives from his training.

The formulation παιδείας κλέος again reflects at once an awareness of Stoicism and a distancing from it.[138] Cynics regarded δόξα or εὐδοξία an evil and ἀδοξία a good.[139] The Cynic's quality of life, they held, was not to be judged by popular opinion, which was directed only at externals. Thus δόξα appears frequently with other externals as something to be despised.[140] The Cynic attitude toward popular opinion thus expresses their conviction of their superiority over the mass of men. Nevertheless, the Cynic could accept proper δόξα, as Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 6 (613 Hercher), reveals: he does not strive for πολιτικὴ δόξα but only to be wise and just. What he

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137 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Fat*. 34 (205, 24 Bruns; *SVF* 2:1002), whose view of the Stoics, however, may not be fair. See Anthony A. Long, *Problems in Stoicism* (London: Athlone, 1971), 173–199. For the sense in which φύσις is used here, see Plutarch, *Stoic. rep*. 1050AB (*SVF* 2:937).

138 It is possible, as Tarán, *Eraclito*, 322, suggests, that the author knew a Heraclitean tradition in which the phrase κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν appears. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom*. 5.59.5 (GCS 366, 11–12; *FVS* 29), and for a discussion of the entire passage, see Marcovich, *Heraclitus*, 505–508. Be that as it may, the meaning of the phrase for our author must be determined in light of the context and the philosophical tradition in which it appears.

139 See Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 87ff.

140 See Diogenes Laertius 6.105; Ps.-Crates, *Epp*. 8 (209 Hercher), 16 (211 Hercher); Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 20 (624 Hercher).

really strives for is ἡ ἐξ ἀρετῆς δόξα which is destroyed by flattery.[141] This is close to what Heraclitus is saying.

Heraclitus, however, is not simply concerned with δόξα but with the κλέος that virtue will grant him for his παιδεία. Κλέος as a description of the renown that one will receive after death comes from the Stoic discussion of renown, and Heraclitus's statement must be seen in light of that discussion. The long Stoic debate on the proper evaluation of δόξα is primarily preserved in Latin writers, and Seneca's *Ep*. 102 is a major source for our understanding of the issues involved.[142] In a context in which he is considering the immortality of the soul, Seneca takes up the Stoic teaching that the renown, *claritas*, that | falls to one's lot after one's death, is a good. 61 In his argument he distinguishes between *gloria* (δόξα), which depends on the judgments of the masses, and the *claritas* of a good man that he receives after his death from other good men because he had been good (17). A Plato-scholion shows that *claritas* here translates κλέος.[143] Among later Stoics, εὐδοξία and δόξα came to be viewed more positively than had been the case with Diogenes and Chrysippus.[144] We note especially that Panaetius held glory after death to be the lasting image of our virtues, following and immortalizing our great deeds.[145] The greatest inheritance that we can leave our children is the reputation for virtue which follows virtue like a shadow.[146] Virtue is imperishable and lives on independent of the corporate existence of its bearer.[147] It may be suppressed now by our contemporaries; we should therefore rather keep in view the generations which will come after our death, for they will cherish and celebrate us.[148]

In the tradition of such discussions Seneca answers objections to this particular Stoic view. His third and major defense has a philosophical

141 The emendation suggested by Johannes Sykutris, *Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker* (SGKA 18.2; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1933; repr., New York: Johnson, 1968), 33 n. 2, does not materially affect the sense of the passage. See δόξα ὀρθή, Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 32 (633 Hercher); δόξα ἡ προσήκουσα, Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 34 (634 Hercher), and cf. *vera gloria*, Cicero, *Tusc*. 3.3; *Off*. 2.43.

142 On this letter, see A.D. Leeman, "The Epistolary Form of Sen. Ep. 102," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 4 (1951): 175–181, and esp. "Seneca and Posidonius: A Philosophical Commentary on Sen. Ep. 102,3–19," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 5 (1952): 57–79. See also Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 1:272, 315.

143 Ad Plato, *Leg*. 1.625A (297 Greene; *SVF* 3:161), καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πλατωνίζοντες κλέος φασὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν σπουδαίων γινόμενον δικαίως, δόξαν δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσπούδων δόκησιν.

144 Cf. Cicero, *Off*. 1.99; *Fin*. 3.57 (*SVF* 3:159).

145 *Apud* Cicero, *Off*. 1.121; 2.43.

146 *Apud* Cicero, *Tusc*. 1.109.

147 Seneca, *Ep*. 74.22.

148 Seneca, *Ep*. 79.17.

foundation that also suggests his other arguments. The objection (10) that he answers is that *claritas* is a good of the person who gives the praise rather than of the person who receives it. The objection is in accord with the Stoic dictum that praising rightly is a virtuous act. Seneca, in response, claims that being praised is one's own good, "because I am naturally born to love all men, and I rejoice in having done good deeds and congratulate myself on having found men who express their ideas of my virtue with gratitude" (18). Praise is also a good to those who receive it, "for it is applied by means of virtue; and every act of virtue is good. My friends could not have found this blessing if I had not been a man such as I am" (19).

Seneca's argument is based on the Posidonian conception of the κοινωνία and συμπάθεια between men. *Epistle* 109.10–11 clarifies his line of reasoning: there is a kind of mutual friendship between all virtues. Therefore, the renown that a good man will receive from other good men after his death is a good to himself. It should be noted that Seneca is concerned with the renown that will be received from good men after his death. It is with them that the good man has affinity. How technically philosophical this discussion is, even for Seneca, appears from his description of it as quibbles, engaged in by dealers in subtleties (20).

Heraclitus's use of κλέος may not unreasonably be regarded as deliberate, and as suggested by such Stoic discussions. One should beware, however, of making him too technical a philosopher. But his use of Stoic terminology with a Cynic twist does show that he knows Stoicism.[149] His view of his renown is similar to that of the Stoics in that it, too, is something to be expected after his death, and that it is his virtue that will ensure it. But the differences are equally pronounced. Unlike the Stoic tradition, here there is no uncertainty as to how his renown may be a good, or whether it will come only | from good men. Nor is there any interest in the subtleties of Stoic argument. Heraclitus simply *is* a good man, as he demonstrated when he perfectly completed his Labors, and he *shall* receive renown for his παιδεία, which is conceived of in the tradition of Heracles. We are again confronted by the self-confident Cynic who, self-assured by his own moral accomplishment, breaks through the intricacies of Stoic physics and logic to claim as attained what the Stoics held out

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[149] If the same author wrote *Ep*. 7, and if the longer version of that letter were part of the original, neither of which is absolutely certain, we would have further proof of his antipathy toward Stoicism, for in Cynic fashion it is there denied that an ideal city is a human possibility, as was held by the Stoics, and the Cynic doctrine of the return to nature is elaborated. See Photiadès, "Les diatribes cyniques du papyrus de Genève 271," 137.

as a possibility. By speaking of his παιδείας κλέος rather than ἡ ἐξ ἀρετῆς ἀληθινὴ δόξα as Ps.-Socrates did, he intones his superiority, not only over mankind in general, but especially over the Stoic theoreticians.

Heraclitus concludes the letter by contrasting his piety and singular knowledge of God to his opponents' impiety and ignorance. They make God's existence dependent on the erection of altars, so that stones are witnesses to him. In fact, God's works, such as the sun, night and day, the seasons, the fruitful earth, the moon, are his witnesses. Bernays had found the transition from παιδείας κλέος to ἆρ᾽ οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβής, Εὐθύκλεις, ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; (45–46) and the positive statement of natural theology that follows too abrupt, and had argued that the section is a Jewish interpolation or addition.[150] Attridge, on the other hand, without addressing the question of the logical progression that Bernays had raised, argued that, although there is little that could be described as especially mystical in the letter, what the letter does say "is, however, quite comprehensible in an environment where the type of teleological argument represented in the *De mundo* and the type of cosmic piety seen in Seneca are common."[151] Tarán would seem to share Attridge's viewpoint.[152] There is more compelling evidence, however, that demonstrates that Heraclitus here, as elsewhere in the letter, is Cynic and not Stoic in his thinking, and that, when the conclusion of the letter is seen in this light, the logical progression becomes clearer.

The transition to the conclusion does not at all appear abrupt when we recall that Heraclitus's positive argument for his divinization and renown represented for him the wisdom and virtue that are the ground of piety. Having argued that so confidently and strenuously, the rhetorical ἆρ᾽ οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβής, ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; is not only intelligible in its present place, but is the natural conclusion to the argument. But, while its connection with what precedes is clear, the connection with what follows is less so. The temptation, however, to regard this conclusion as a positive statement of a natural theology with Stoic overtones should be resisted, particularly since the absolute claim, ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεόν, once again distinguishes Heraclitus from his Stoic contemporaries. Such a unique knowledge of things divine belonged, according to them, to the elusive ideal wise man

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150 Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 28–29.
151 Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 23.
152 Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe*, 291–292.

alone.[153] Given the Cynic character of the claim, therefore, clarification of its connection with what follows should come from Cynic sources.

The same themes that are found in this part of the letter also appear in two other letters ascribed to Heraclitus, and in the Cynic dialogue between Alexander and Dandamis preserved by P.Genev. 271: the determination of the sage's relationship to the divine by virtue, his piety and knowledge, his concern with altars and knowledge of God's works, specifically the sun.

In *Ep.* 9 the author deals with the world citizenship of the Cynic. He argues that citizenship should be based on virtue (9–10), but that virtue 63 makes one a citizen of the | world, which is the country of all men, in which the law is God, καὶ ὁ παραβαίνων ἃ χρὴ ἀσεβήσει.[154] There is a sharp contrast between the Cynic and the masses: ἐμοὶ δὲ πολῖται θεοί, θεοῖς ξυνοικῶν δι' ἀρετῆς οἶδα ἥλιον ὁπόσος ἐστί, πονηροὶ δὲ οὐδ' ὅτι εἰσίν (24–25). It is his virtue that is the basis for both his association with the gods and his knowledge of the universe. Nature itself brings judgment on the rapacious lives of the multitude (29–33).[155] How can they act piously toward a statue after they had acted impiously toward nature? (37–38). The Cynic, in contrast, imitates nature (55). The possibility of doing so is open to all, for God has made it possible for all to know nature, and to be citizens of the world. Even slaves are able to see the sun's light (60–63). This does not mean that the Cynic notion of cosmopolitanism contained any idea of the brotherhood of all men. All men in fact do not realize the possibility that is held out. It is only the ideal wise man who perceives the true state of things, and that ultra-individualism sets him apart from other men.[156] Here, then, the virtuous Cynic, the associate of the gods, polemicizes against impious men who do not know nature or the gods, and who demonstrate their impiety by honoring statues. This is the same line of argument that is found in Heraclitus's conclusion.

A similar confidence is expressed in Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 5, in which the sage says that by living κατὰ φύσιν he will cure himself of his maladies:

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[153] Note the frequency with which μόνος is used in connection with ὁ σοφός, *SVF* 4:131 (index), and see nn. 23 and 24 above.

[154] Following Attridge's text, which omits μή before χρή.

[155] For the use of animal behavior in Cynics' defense of their view of φύσις, see Ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 5ff.

[156] On the isolation and feeling of superiority of the Cynic world citizen, see Harold C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 101–112; for Stoic cosmopolitanism, Baldry, *Unity of Mankind*, 151–166, 177–194, and Gregory R. Stanton, "The Cosmopolitan Ideas of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius," *Phron* 13 (1968): 183–195.

ἐγὼ εἰ οἶδα κόσμου φύσιν, οἶδα καὶ ἀνθρώπου, οἶδα νόσους, οἶδα ὑγίειαν. ἰάσομαι ἐμαυτόν, μιμήσομαι θεόν, ὃς κόσμου ἀμετρίας ἐπανισοῖ ἡλίῳ ἐπιτάττων (8–11). By living according to nature he will be a fellow citizen of the gods, and will not erect altars for someone else, but others will erect altars for him (17–19).

The dialogue between Alexander and Dandamis contains an exhortation to follow the Cynic's life of self-sufficiency: τοῦτο παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθε σοφόν (8–9).[157] The Cynic is confident of his knowledge: ζητεῖς (ὃ ἐγ)ὼ οἶδα σοφόν (26). That knowledge consists of understanding nature, which supplies him with his needs, and includes a knowledge of God's activity: ἃ θε(ὸς ποι)εῖ ἐ(πίστα)μαι (28–29). God is his friend, therefore τούτου τοῖς ἔργοις ὁμειλῶ (14–15), and he delights in his knowledge of the natural phenomena (ὅτι ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἔργω)ν (ἐμὲ σύμμαχον) πεποίηκεν (35–36).

Seen in this perspective, the conclusion of the letter is thoroughly Cynic. The confident claim of being pious and of knowing God is still part of Heraclitus's answer to the charge that had been brought against him. That claim, in good Cynic fashion, is undergirded by reference to the works of God, the elements of creation, which reference serves a polemical function. To view it solely as a positive statement of natural theology is not to do justice to that function.

## Conclusions

The following conclusions may reasonably be drawn from this investigation:

1. There is no major difficulty in the logical progression of the letter. The argument is consistent, both in the philosophical traditions that are utilized, as well as in the | function to which those traditions are put. There is, therefore, no justification for considering any part or parts of the letter as Jewish or Christian interpolations. 64
2. There is nothing in the letter that is specifically Stoic. Material that has parallels in Stoic sources is used in a polemical and non-Stoic manner. Furthermore, the self-understanding of the writer is expressed in a manner to suggest the strong possibility that he wished to distinguish himself from the Stoic ideal.

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157 References are to the lines in column I of Martin's edition (see n. 5 above). Cf. Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 4 (20–21), μανθάνετε σοφίην.

3. The letter is Cynic. The author's use of philosophical traditions demonstrates that, as does the self-confidence with which he speaks of the divinization of the sage. While that self-confidence must be modified somewhat by the fact that he does not make his claims in his own name, but under that of Heraclitus, there can be little doubt that he held the divinization of the wise man out as a live possibility to the man who would live virtuously. The letter thus provides valuable evidence, not of Jewish or Christian appropriation of contemporary philosophical propaganda, but of that propaganda itself.

CHAPTER TWO

# SELF-DEFINITION AMONG THE CYNICS*

The Cynics and the Cynicism of the first century AD are known to us for the most part through Stoic interpreters, and the temptation is great, on the basis of Seneca's account of Demetrius, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Dio Chrysostom, to draw a picture of Cynicism that obscures the differences between Stoicism and Cynicism and among the Cynics themselves. In the second century, the diversity among the Cynics emerges more clearly as such personalities as Oenomaus of Gadara, Demonax, and Peregrinus Proteus appear on the scene. Unfortunately, only fragments of Oenomaus's writings have been preserved, and only a few comments, mostly negative, are made about him by Julian. We are largely but not wholly dependent on Lucian's interpretations of Demonax and Peregrinus for information about them. It is therefore fortunate that in the Cynic epistles we do have primary sources for the sect in the Empire. These neglected writings are more than the school exercises they have been thought to be, and enable us to determine the points at issue among the Cynics themselves.[1]

## The Definition of Cynicism

Diogenes Laertius already experienced difficulty in describing common Cynic doctrine, and records that some considered it, not a philosophical school (αἵρεσις), but a way of life (Diogenes Laertius 6.103).[2] He seems | to 12

* This article, which appeared in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 11–24, is an abbreviated version of an earlier essay titled "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," which appeared in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Volume 3: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Ben F. Meyer and Edward P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 46–59, 192–197. The 1989 version of the article omits the discussion of Epicurean self-definition in the earlier essay. The context for the 1982 article was a symposium on self-definition in the Graeco-Roman world held in June, 1980, at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario.

[1] The texts are readily available in Rudolf Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* (SGB 47; Paris: A.F. Didot, 1873; repr., Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1965). For introduction, text, and translation of the most important letters, see Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles: Study Edition* (SBLSBS 12; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977).

[2] See also Diogenes Laertius 1.19–20 for Hippobotus's refusal to list the Cynics as a philosophical school. For αἵρεσις as a school of thought, see John Glucker, *Antiochus*

incline to the view that it is a philosophical school, but notes that Cynics dispensed with logic and physics, and confined themselves to ethics. Cynics have generally been perceived as having an aversion to encyclopedic learning and placing no premium on education in the pursuit of virtue. As a distinctively antisocial sect, they attached greatest importance to a way of life that gives chief emphasis to personal decision.[3] Yet this generalization holds only partly. While it is true that in the Hellenistic period Cynicism did not require adherence to an organized system of doctrine, the major figures known to us, in contrast to the charlatans Lucian describes, were by no means anti-intellectual. Oenomaus reflects a knowledge of philosophical arguments about free will and providence,[4] Demonax is said to have been eclectic although in dress he was a Cynic,[5] Peregrinus is thought to have been influenced by Neopythagoreanism,[6] and the Socratic epistles betray at least an openness to philosophy and its possible contribution to one's progress toward virtue.[7]

Cynics differed among themselves in their philosophical eclecticism as they did in other matters, but a personal preference for or use in debate of one system does not appear to have been a major issue in determining who was a Cynic. What made a Cynic was his dress and conduct, self-sufficiency, harsh behavior toward what appeared as excesses, and a practical ethical idealism, but not a detailed arrangement of a system resting on Socratic-Antisthenic principles. The result was that Cynicism

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*and the Late Academy* (Hyp 56; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 166–192. On Diogenes's passion for classification, see Jørgen Mejer, *Diogenes Laertius and His Hellenistic Background* (HermesE 40; Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1978), 52. Julian, who also describes it as a way of life (*Or*. 6.181D, 201A), nevertheless insists that it is a form of philosophy, a gift of the gods, but that it should be studied from the Cynics' deeds rather than their writings (*Or*. 6.182C–189B).

[3] See, e.g., Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 34 and passim.

[4] See Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D.* (London: Methuen, 1937; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967; 2d ed., London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998), 169. David Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque. Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles* (RTHP 3/19; Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1945), 127–134.

[5] Lucian, *Demon*. 5, 62; but cf. *Demon*. 14.

[6] See Friedrich Überweg and Karl Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (12th ed.; Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1926), 512; Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 180. Hazel M. Hornsby, "The Cynicism of Peregrinus Proteus," *Herm* 23.48 (1933): 65–84, discusses the evidence and is skeptical of Neopythagorean influence on Peregrinus.

[7] Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 25. In *Ep*. 18.2 and *Ep*. 20 there is a positive evaluation of Socrates's λόγοι, in contrast to Lucian, *Vit. auct*. 11, where education and doctrine are regarded as superfluous. Cf. Julian, *Or*. 6.189AB: "For Diogenes deeds sufficed."

was compatible with views that shared its ethical demands even if they were at cross purposes with its fundamentally different teaching in other matters.[8] The resulting diversity makes an attempt at a detailed definition of Cynicism difficult, especially if it is based on the idealized presentations of Epictetus, Lucian, Maximus of Tyre, and Julian.[9] Epictetus's description has often been taken to represent the true | Cynic without due allowance being made for his Stoicizing or for the fact that he is presenting an ideal.[10] 13

Although these accounts do contain genuine Cynic material and viewpoints, it is preferable to identify features that Cynics themselves considered central and to proceed from there. Among other sources, the Cynic epistles represent such information and must be introduced into the discussion. In view of the interest of this symposium, some major features

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[8] Überweg and Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, 659.

[9] Epictetus, *Diatr*. 3.22; see Margarethe Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Vom Kynismus* (PhAnt 34; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978); Lucian, *Demonax*; K. Funk, "Untersuchungen über die Lucianische *Vita Demonactis*," *Phil* Supplementband 10 (1905–1907): 561–674; Maximus of Tyre, *Oration* 36; Julian, *Or*. 6, esp. 200C–202C.

[10] This has been the case particularly with New Testament scholars who, impressed by Epictetus's view of the ideal Cynic as a messenger of God, have used his interpretation of Cynicism to illustrate the Christian apostolate and other Christian and pagan emissaries. See, e.g., Karl H. Rengstorf, "ἀποστέλλω (πέμπω), ἐξαποστέλλω, ἀπόστολος, ψευδαπόστολος, ἀποστολή," *TDNT* 1 (1964): 398–447, esp. 409–413, who qualifies the usefulness of Epictetus's description by saying, "in so far as Epictetus describes for us the reality and not merely the ideal of the true Cynic" (409). Walter Schmithals, *The Office of Apostle in the Early Church* (trans. John E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1969), 111, impatiently dismisses any other possible descriptions of religious emissaries in Hellenism and confines himself to Epictetus's description of the "Cynic-Stoic" sage as the preeminent source for a figure close to the Christian apostle. Dieter Georgi, *The Opponents of Paul in Second Corinthians: A Study of Religious Propaganda in Late Antiquity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), e.g., 28–29, 156–157, is similarly dependent on Epictetus and combines Epictetus's picture of Cynicism with that of other types of religious propagandists to construct a θεῖος ἀνήρ figure on which Paul's Corinthian opponents are claimed to have modeled themselves. These scholars have not done justice to the Stoic elements in Epictetus's description, nor have they sufficiently recognized that he is describing an ideal Cynic. As to Epictetus's Stoicism in *Diatr*. 3.22, the debate among specialists has not been whether it dominates that diatribe, but whether it reveals Epictetus as a follower of early Stoicism, as Adolf Bonhöffer, *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1894), had argued, or whether the influence of Musonius and the evidence of Seneca for contemporary Stoicism should not be taken into consideration, as Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Von Kynismus*, does. Billerbeck, however, is more successful in distinguishing between Stoicism and Cynicism in Epictetus than between the varieties of Cynicism in the early Empire. Furthermore, Epictetus describes an ideal Cynic—from a Stoic point of view. Stoics were not at all sanguine about attaining the ideal. Epictetus himself claimed not to have done so, and his description is given to correct the popular misconception of Cynics for young men who may be considering entering that way of life. On the attainment of the ideal, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 42–64, esp. 54–56. [*Light*, 2:601–634]

of Cynic diversity in the second century AD will be touched on, and an attempt will be made to determine whether one form of Cynicism came to predominate in the third. Here, special attention will be given to the Cynic letters attributed to Socrates and his disciples.

The letters under consideration come from two authors, the former writing in the name of Socrates, probably in the first century AD (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp*. 1–7), the latter writing in the names of members of the Socratic circle in the third century (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp*. 8–27; 29–34). The letters may have originated in a school, but their value for the history of Cynicism is considerable. In addition to their propagandistic aim, they represent divergent Cynic views projected onto the Socratics to create an impression of Socrates and his disciples discussing issues important to Cynics.[11] The author of the Socratic letters, with | the earlier collection before him, is embarrassed by the public fussing of Cynics among themselves,[12] and it is characteristic of his corpus that attempts are made to modify a radical Cynic individualism and attempt a *rapprochement* between the protagonists.

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Lucian (*Demon*. 21) records an illustrative encounter between Demonax and Peregrinus. Peregrinus rebukes Demonax for his levity and jesting with people, and accuses him of not acting in the Cynic manner. Demonax replies that Peregrinus is not behaving in a humane manner.[13] Lucian's biased interpretation of the lives of the two does not obscure the

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[11] On the composition and dating of the corpus I follow Johannes Sykutris, "Sokratikerbriefe," PWSup 5 (1931): 981–987; and Sykutris, *Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker* (SGKA 18.2; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1933; repr., New York: Johnson, 1968). See also Liselotte Köhler, *Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker* (*Phil* Supplementband 20.2 [1928]). On the appeal to Socrates by the Stoics and the Cynics in the early Empire, see Klaus Döring, *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum* (HermesE 42; Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1979), esp. 114–126 on the Socratic epistles. For the school setting of the letters, see Köhler, "Die Briefe des Sokrates," 4–5, and Wilhelm Obens, "Qua aetate Socratis et Socraticorum epistulae quae dicuntur scriptae sunt" (Ph.D. diss., Münster, 1912), 6. For their propagandistic aim, see Eduard Norden, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie," *JCPh* Suppl. 19.2 (1892): 367–462, esp. 393, and Otto Schering, "Symbola ad Socratis et Socraticorum epistulas explicandas" (Ph.D. diss., Greifswald, 1917), 32. I am indebted to Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986), 101–126, for much of what follows.

[12] Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 23.3. Cf. Lucian, *Pisc*. 44; for Lucian's awareness of the diversity among the Cynics, see Rudolf W.O. Helm, "Lucian und die Philosophenschulen," *NJahrb* 9.1 (1902): 188–213, 263–278, 351–369, esp. 364 n. 2; Marcel Caster, *Lucien et la pensée religieuse de son temps* (CEA; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1937; repr., New York: Garland, 1987), 71.

[13] For the Cynic as bestial and inhumane, see Lucian, *Vit. auct*. 10–11; Julian, *Or*. 7.209A.

fact that both were Cynics, and that the argument between them involves the manner of life that can justifiably be called Cynic. Reflected here is a divergence into two types of Cynicism: an austere, rigorous one, and a milder, so-called hedonistic strain.[14] Despite Lucian's caricature of him, Peregrinus emerges as a Cynic of the austere type who modeled himself on Heracles. In his austerity he was not unlike Oenomaus.[15] Demonax, in contrast, was everybody's friend (*Demon.* 10; cf. 8 and 63) and, while he adopted Diogenes's dress and way of life, he did not alter the details of his life for the effect it might have on the crowds.[16] He revered Socrates, except for his irony, and admired Diogenes, | but loved Aristippus (*Demon.* 6, 62). Lucian's stress on Demonax's culture and mildness does not hide the fact that he was not loved by the masses (*Demon.* 11), and that his "witty remarks" in 12–62 are reminiscent of Diogenes's apophthegms preserved in Diogenes Laertius *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6.24–69. Demonax defended Cynic παρρησία (*Demon.* 50), and even praised Thersites as a Cynic mob-orator (*Demon.* 61). While retaining Cynicism's simplicity of life and dress and its indifference to presumed virtues and vices, Demonax rejected its hostility to education and culture, excessive asceticism, and shamelessness.[17]

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What can be detected in Lucian finds elaboration in the Cynic epistles, where attempts at self-definition utilize as models early Cynics and heroes from Greek myth, appropriately interpreted to reflect a particular writer's proclivities. Certain letters attributed to Crates and Diogenes represent austere Cynicism. In obvious polemic against hedonistic Cynicism, Pseudo-Crates affirms that Cynic philosophy is Diogenean and the Cynic someone

[14] For the types, see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 65–72, 165–168; and Gerhard, "Zur Legende vom Kyniker Diogenes," *AR* 15 (1912): 388–408. For a different interpretation, see Ragnar Höistad, "Cynicism," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (ed. Philip P. Wiener; New York: Scribner's, 1973), 1:631–632; and Jan F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (AUU: SGU 11; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976), 64–67.

[15] Despite their eclectic tendencies, Peregrinus's disciples also considered themselves Cynics (cf. Lucian, *Peregr.* 2–4, 24, 26, 29, 36–37, 43), and he was remembered by others as an austere Cynic (Aulus Gellius, *Noct. att.* 8.3; 12.11; Philostratus, *Vit. soph.* 2.563). For Oenomaus's severity, see Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 5.21, 213C; 5.23, 215D; 5.29, 224C–225A; 5.33, 228D; 6.6, 254D; 6.7, 261B, and Julian's criticism of his inhumane, bestial life (*Or.* 7.209AB).

[16] Lucian, *Demon.* 5–6. Lucian's οὐ παραχαράττων τὰ εἰς τὴν δίαιταν ("not altering the details of his life") may be an allusion to the Cynic παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα ("to alter the coinage"); cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.20, 71.

[17] Überweg and Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, 511.

who toils according to it, taking a short cut in doing philosophy by avoiding the circuitous route of doctrine. He wears the Cynic garb which is viewed as the weapon of the gods (Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 16).[18] The Cynic takes up this armament as a deliberate act to demonstrate that the simplicity of the soul finds expression in his deeds, in which he wars against appearances.[19] In contrast to Odysseus, who is made to represent the hedonistic Cynic, Diogenes is portrayed as consistent in his commitment to the Cynic life: austere, self-sufficient, self-confident, trusting in reason, and brave in his practice of virtue.[20] This brand of Cynicism does not simply consist in indifference to all things, but in the robust endurance of what others out of softness or opinion cannot endure.[21] The Cynic shamelessness is part of this rejection of opinions and conventions, and is the mark of the doggish philosopher.[22] The situation in which men find themselves requires, not philosophers like Plato and Aristippus, who in the doxographic tradition represent hedonistic Cynicism, but a harsh taskmaster who can bring the masses to reality.[23] | 16

The issues between the two types are sharpened in six of the Socratic letters in which Simon the shoemaker (and Antisthenes) and Aristippus speak for them (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 9–13). The topic discussed is whether the Cynic could associate with a tyrant. Antisthenes asserts that the Cynic should strive for self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια), and that he cannot associate with tyrants or the masses, for they are ignorant of it (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 8). With biting irony the hedonist Aristippus replies that he was a steward

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[18] See Victor Emeljanow, "A Note on the Cynic Short Cut to Happiness," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 18 (1965): 182–184.

[19] Cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 7, 15, 27, 34, 36. For extended discussion, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 143–173. [*Light*, 1:135–166]

[20] Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 19. For Cynic interpretations of Odysseus, see Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4," 50–51.

[21] Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 29; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 27; Lucian, *Peregr.* 27.

[22] Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 42, 44. On Cynic ἀναίδεια, see Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 144–145. Heinz Schulz-Falkenthal, "Kyniker—Zur inhaltlichen Deutung des Names," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg* 26.2 (1977): 41–49, and Isaj M. Nachov, "Der Mensch in der Philosophie der Kyniker," in *Der Mensch als Maß der Dinge: Studien zum griechischen Menschenbild in der Zeit der Blüte und Krise der Polis* (ed. Reimar Müller; VZAGAAW 8; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), 361–398, overstress the social and political motivations for Cynic conduct.

[23] Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 29, 32. For Plato in the Cynic tradition, see Alice S. Riginos, *Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* (CSCT 3; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 111–118, who does not, however, discuss the way in which the Plato anecdotes function in the debate under review. For Aristippus as representing the hedonistic Cynic, see Ronald F. Hock, "Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic," *GRBS* 17 (1976): 48–52.

of the teaching of Socrates in Dionysius's court (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 9), and that his position there had resulted in his saving certain Locrian youths (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 10, 11). Simon denies that a life of luxury is Socratic; his cobbling is done to make possible his admonition of foolish men, and his austerity is of value in the pursuit of σωφροσύνη. He takes umbrage at Aristippus's jesting about his way of life (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 12). Aristippus responds in conciliatory fashion. He is not ridiculing the humble life, for there is wisdom in it. But Simon would also have opportunity to practice his craft, and on a larger scale, in Syracuse. Aristippus assures Simon that he is his friend, in contrast to the harsh, bestial Cynics (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 13).

The mild Cynic, therefore, defends his behavior by arguing that it benefits others and is more human. What is to be found in Lucian's description of Demonax thus also appears here. It is the rigorous Cynics who explicitly discuss 'Cynicism' in their self-definition, and they do so in terms of their manner of life. The mild Cynic is more conciliatory, although this should not be overstated, and defends his behavior by pointing to its usefulness in influencing a larger audience.[24]

## The Human Condition

Something more, however, than a difference in method used to attain an end seems to have been at the basis of Cynics' self-conceptions. They shared the view that man has to be reformed by being taught to unlearn his vices (Diogenes Laertius 6.7–8). Unlike vice, which enters the soul spontaneously, they held that virtue was acquired by practice (Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 12), and happiness consists in living according to nature (Diogenes Laertius 6.71; Julian, *Or.* 6.193D). Virtue could be taught, and, once acquired, could not be lost (Diogenes Laertius 6.10, 105). What Cynics called for was a decision to improve oneself, to make a deliberate choice to change from one's previous condition (Diogenes Laertius 6.56). Yet they differed in their assessments of the degree to which the | human condition had been 17 corrupted and, consequently, on the methods that were to be applied to effect the desired change.

The rigoristic Cynics had an extremely pessimistic view of mankind, which earned them the charge of misanthropy.[25] This view is especially,

[24] Cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 46, for the rigorist's insistence that his way of life, too, is beneficial as a demonstration of self-sufficiency.

[25] See Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 67–72, 166–167, 170–176.

but not exclusively, represented by most of the letters attributed to Crates, Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Hippocrates.[26] Most people, they held, are totally deluded, puffed up in their evil, and completely bereft of reason and self-control. Having sunk to the level of beasts in their ignorance and conduct, nature itself hates them, and takes vengeance on them by punishing them.[27] In contrast, the true Cynic, the epitome of virtue, knows nature and imitates it.[28] Whereas nature punishes them in deed, the Cynic does so in his speech (Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28.5). It is by virtue alone that their souls can be purified of its diseases, and it is the Cynic who is the physician able to bring about their cure.[29] Their putrid condition requires no gentle treatment, but rather the cautery and surgery of scathing Cynic παρρησία.[30] It is not that the Cynic wishes to be morbid; their wickedness made him sullen and excised his gentleness (Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 5.3; 7.2–3).

The worse the human condition, the greater is the virtue of the Cynic perceived to be. Not everyone is capable of Cynic virtue, and most people, complaining about Cynic indifference, flee the Cynic regimen when they see how hard it is.[31] The Cynic alone has brought moral practice to perfection,[32] and, when people prove to be beyond cure, he withdraws from them.[33] He separates from the bestial crowd who know neither nature, reason, or truth, and associates only with those who understand the word of a Cynic (Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28.8). He may explain, in self-defense, that it is men's vice, and not themselves, that he hates (Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 7.2),

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[26] The charlatans Lucian criticizes frequently affected the style of those Cynics, but for different reasons. They made up for the lack of content in their speeches by railing at the crowds (*Vit. auct.* 10–11) who, being simple people, admired them for their abusiveness (*Peregr.* 18), delighted in their "therapy," and thought them to be superior persons by virtue of their belligerence (*Fug.* 12; *Symp.* 12–19).

[27] Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 28, 29. See also Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 2, 4, 5, 7, 9; Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 17.

[28] Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 5.1; 9.3, 6.

[29] Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 27, 49; Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 11.7.

[30] E.g., Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 27, 28, 29. On the medical imagery, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980), 19–35. [*Light*, 1:117–134]

[31] Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 21; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 21, 41.

[32] Cf. Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 27; Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 4.3; cf. Diogenes Laertius 6.71.

[33] Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 2, 4, 7, 9; Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 24. He would prefer, however, to live with men in order to provide for them an example to follow. Cf. Ps.-Crates, *Epp.* 20; 35.2.

but his | hatred for them and for association with them is nevertheless at times stated explicitly.[34] 18

This contempt for the masses raises the question of the harsh Cynic's motivation for speaking to them at all. It has been claimed that, despite the Cynic's consciousness of his superior virtue and his contempt for the masses, in reality he "was influenced by altruistic motives in a far higher degree than his ethics required him to be."[35] The Cynic, filled with philanthropy, according to this view, recognized his goal to be to benefit people.[36] His concern for others did not originate in a sense of duty, but stemmed from a real sympathy with human suffering and the unnatural bondage in which men find themselves. Having freed himself from evils, he was conscious of having a mission to free others.[37]

This is not, however, the self-portrait of the harsh Cynic who hardly stresses his philanthropy, and whose altruism, such as it is, is not a major characteristic. As its proponents acknowledge, this view of Cynic philanthropy seems at odds with Cynic individualism. Julian, whose understanding of Cynicism appears to be correct in this respect, provides us with some clarity on the matter. The Cynics' reproof of others, he says, was not their chief end and aim; rather,

> their main concern was how they might themselves attain to happiness and ... they occupied themselves with other men only in so far as they comprehended that man is by nature a social and political animal; and so they aided their fellow-citizens, not only by practising but by preaching as well (*Or.* 6.201C).

The Cynic must therefore begin with himself, expelling all desires and passions and undertaking to live by intelligence and reason alone.[38] Julian

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[34] Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 28.2. Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 24 is more ambiguous: "Plato" is convinced that Timon was not a misanthrope. On Timon remembered as a misanthrope, see Franz Bertram, "Die Timonlegende. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Misanthropentypus in der antiken Literatur" (Ph.D. diss., Ruprecht-Karls-Universität zu Heidelberg, 1906; Greifswald: J. Abel, 1906), 33 n. 1, 38, 44–54.

[35] Theodor Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy* (trans. Laurie Magnus and George G. Berry; 4 vols; New York: Scribner's, 1901–1912), 2 (1908): 163. See John L. Moles, "'Honestius Quam Ambitiosius'? An Exploration of the Cynic's Attitude to Moral Corruption in His Fellow Men," *JHS* 103 (1983): 103–123, who still stresses the φιλανθρωπία of the Cynics.

[36] Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 32–33; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 2:166. For a more nuanced treatment, see Höistad, *Cynic Hero*.

[37] Julius Kaerst, *Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters* (2 vols.; Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1901–1909), 2.1:118–120.

[38] Julian, *Or.* 6.201D. Cf. Julian, *Or.* 6.188B, 189AB, 192A, 198D; *Or.* 7.214BC.

is aware that many Cynics failed in this, and allowed themselves to be influenced by the masses (*Or*. 6.197B–D). The Cynic must free himself from popular opinion, but that does not mean

> that we ought to be shameless before all men and to do what we ought not; but all that we refrain from and all that we do let us not do or refrain from, merely | because it seems to the multitude somehow honourable or base, but because it is forbidden by reason and the god within us, that is the mind. (*Or*. 6.196D)

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Julian wishes to retain the Cynic's individualism, and warns against his simply defining himself over against the multitude.

## The Superiority of the Austere Cynic

The harsh, austere Cynics stress their radical individualism, but cannot withstand the temptation to do so by defining themselves in opposition to the multitudes whom they hold in such contempt. At the risk of overstating the matter, it is important to note that their comments on themselves are made when they lambaste the multitude who are beyond the hope of cure, or when they compare themselves with the Cynics of milder mien who hold out some hope for society, whom they accuse of pandering to the crowd. What we meet here is not philanthropy or altruism; rather, the concern with the multitudes serves to highlight the superiority of the Cynic who has committed himself without reservation to the life of Diogenes. That sense of superiority emerges from everything that this type of Cynic does or says.

To begin with, all men are evil, and hate the Cynic (Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp*. 2; 7.10). Although their folly causes him hardships, and they maltreat him, and he cannot avoid them, still his virtue remains untouched (Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 35). He is superior to them because he has chosen the difficult, Diogenean, way to happiness.[39] It is hard to find a real Cynic (Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 29.4). One must be born to that life, otherwise one fears it and despairs of it (Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 21; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp*. 12, 41). But the Cynic is superior in his moral exercise, is more simple in his life, and more patient in hardship (Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 27). It is, in the first instance, what he is, as exemplified in his deeds rather than his words, that is important. Thus, the Cynic dress, which he invests with great importance, sets him

[39] Ps.-Crates, *Epp*. 6, 13, 15, 16; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp*. 30, 37.

off from other people by freeing him from popular opinion (Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp*. 7, 34) and effectively separating him from undesirable people (Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 23).

The Cynic's superiority is also demonstrated in his begging. He begs to sustain himself, but he does so for the right reasons and in the right manner, which set him further apart. Begging is not disgraceful, for it is to satisfy a need arising from voluntary poverty (Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 17). By surrendering his private property and thus being freed from evil (Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 7), he shows himself superior to the values of popular opinion (Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 9). Furthermore, he is not really begging, but only demanding | what belongs to him, for, since all things belong to God, friends have all things in common, and he is a friend of God, all things belong to him (Ps.-Crates, *Epp*. 26, 27; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 10.2). Nor is he indiscriminate in his begging, for vice must not support virtue. Thus, he begs only from people who are worthy of him and his teaching (Ps.-Crates, *Epp*. 2, 19, 22, 36; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep*. 38.3–4). 20

The Cynic's offensive public acts are demonstrations of his deliberateness in choice and, rather than his being blamed for them, he should be recognized as the more worthy of trust because of them (Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp*. 42, 44). His goal is to live quietly and not to participate fully in society (Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 5). He may be ridiculed, yet he does not care what people think of him. The benefit that people will receive from him will not come to them because he had sought them out or tried to please them, but because they had observed the example he presented them in his life (Ps.-Crates, *Ep*. 20).[40]

## The Mild Cynic

In comparison with the misanthropic Cynics, those of a milder disposition showed less pride. Their comparative tolerance did not place them on the same level with people they exhorted; nevertheless, they were decidedly more modest in the claims they made for themselves.[41] The Cynics of the Socratic epistles are not as preoccupied with nature or as pessimistic in

[40] On the pride of the misanthropic Cynic, see Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 67–72.

[41] Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 65–66, is unconvincing in his assertion that the use of the first person plural in Teles points to such an identification. Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 23.2, "We do not have such great wisdom, but only enough not to harm people in our association with them," is a *captatio benevolentiae*.

their view of the human condition, yet they are certain that they know human nature, what people's shortcomings are, what is best for them, and that the greatest emphasis is to be placed on virtue (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp*. 5; 6.3, 5). These Cynics do not describe themselves, as Lucian does Demonax (*Demon*. 10), as everybody's friend, but their behavior does reflect a more positive attitude. While their self-sufficiency and rejection of popular values makes them different from the majority (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 6.2–4), on the ground that the "hedonistic" life does not affect their φρόνησις (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 6.5) they reject the misanthropists' claim that the only appropriate life for the sage is the austere one, and that he cannot associate with the ignorant masses (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 8).

In their various social roles these Cynics differ radically from the anti-social Cynics. Unlike Peregrinus, for example, they have no desire to upset 21 | the social order. A Cynic of this sort will accept no political office or military appointment, for it is beyond his powers to rule men. But he does remain in the city in the capacity that he does have, that of a counsellor who constantly points out what is profitable for it (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 1.1, 10–12).[42] He seeks only that fame which comes from being prudent and just (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 6.2), and remains constant in his endurance and contempt for riches (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 5). He is fully aware of the injustice in the state (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 7) and meets with opposition (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 5), but Socrates is his exemplar, not only of the treatment that the sage may receive at the hands of unjust men (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp*. 14, 16), but also of the benefits that can accrue from his life and death (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 17). This Cynic therefore does not despair of improving society, and consequently justifies his involvement by the potential benefit he might render. Like Demonax, he is mild in the exercise of his παρρησία, accommodating himself to his audience, and distancing himself from the anti-social Cynics.[43]

Living as a resident Cynic rather than an independent, wandering preacher required special justification, which "Socrates" provides in Ps.-Socrates, *Epistles* 1 and 6.[44] It is clear that these letters are responding to charges of harsh Cynics that it is out of mercenary motives that the resident

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[42] The letters of recommendation on behalf of political officials (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp*. 3, 4) are designed to illustrate his support of good men.

[43] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217, esp. 210–214 [*Light*, 1:53–67] and Malherbe, "Medical Imagery."

[44] For the criticism of resident philosophers in the context of harsh wandering preachers, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 32.8–11; see also Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse,'" 205–206.

Cynic confines himself to esoteric teaching in lecture halls. In response, "Socrates" denies that he is unapproachable or mercenary, and offers a number of reasons for his decision to remain in the city. First, he has done so because God had commanded him to remain (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.2, 7). He knows that this argument may be unacceptable to many Cynics, and therefore uses the Socratic tradition to bolster it (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.8–9).[45] Furthermore, he claims to meet the needs of his country in the capacity in which he can render some benefit (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.5–6), unlike ignorant men who arrogate to themselves power that they do not have, who act disgracefully, are insulted, and then end in the wilderness (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.10–11.). He is self-sufficient, and does not beg from the masses (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.2; 6.1), for he has ample resources in his friends.[46]

The Socratic epistles differ from other Cynic sources of the period in their emphasis on the circle of "friends."[47] Besides the financial assistance | these friends render each other, they are pictured as being in constant contact with each other, either in person,[48] or by means of letters, which are surrogates for their authors' physical presence (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 18.1), and in which the philosophical discussion is continued.[49] The Socratics are made to represent differing Cynic positions, but their supposed contact with each other presents a picture of a school hammering out its differences in an attempt to come to some kind of harmony. 22

As the major representative of the milder Cynicism advocated in the letters, Aristippus illustrates their irenic tendency. As already noted, he commends Simon. He is further on good terms with Xenophon and other Socratics (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 18), and the enmity between him and Plato is played down as jesting, and a reconciliation is hinted at (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 23.3). By selective use of the anecdotal tradition, rivalries are further played down and a harmonious picture is sketched. For example, although the tradition often records the austere Diogenes's criticisms of Plato, Diogenes does not appear in these letters, and even the less frequently

[45] For the Cynic's divine commission, cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.9, on which see John L. Moles, "The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom," *JHS* 98 (1978): 79–100, esp. 98–99. See also *Or.* 32.12, on which see Eugen Wilmes, "Beiträge zur Alexandrinerrede (Or. 32) des Dion Chrysostomos" (Ph.D. diss., Bonn, 1970), 8–17.

[46] See Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 1.2–3; 2; 4; 6.8; 15.2; 19; 21; 22.1; 27.3–4; 28.2; 30.1–2.

[47] See Obens, "Qua aetate Socratis," 11–13, for a catalogue of references to the theme.

[48] E.g., Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 9.4; 14.5–6; 22.1.

[49] Cf. Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 12; 27.5. For the seriousness with which the various types of literature are viewed, see *Epp.* 15.2–3; 18.2; 22.2. The literary catalogues are rejected, *memorabilia* are acceptable, but letters are preferred.

attested opposition between Antisthenes and Plato is omitted, with Antisthenes left to rebuke only Aristippus.[50] The differences among members of the Academy after Plato's death are attributed to personal judgment and disposition (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 14.2–3), and concern is expressed for the preservation and organization of the institution (Ps.-Socrates, *Epp.* 32, 33), yet the letters do not provide evidence for the institutionalization of Cynicism. The effort to bring Cynics into conversation with each other itself draws attention to their diversity, and there is no evidence that the authors are witnesses to organized Cynic schools. But there is at least an attempt made to mute their differences. The major confrontation that remains is between the harsh and the hedonistic Cynics, but attempts are made to ameliorate it.

## The Cynics and Religion

No convincing generalization can be made about the Cynics' attitude toward religion. Modern opinions range from what is perhaps the classic one, that the Cynics were rationalists who had no patience with the supernatural or popular religion,[51] to one that describes them as conscious of a union with | God which empowered them.[52] A mediating view is that two strains can be identified, a positive one accompanied by a moderate view of mankind, and a skeptical one associated with rigorism.[53] The latter view, while it may find support in Oenomaus, runs aground on the fact that Demonax, known for his mildness, was decidedly cool toward religion,[54] and that Peregrinus, the major example of Cynic "mysticism," was known for his harshness.[55] Nevertheless, the Cynic epistles that reflect Cynicism of the austere type do tend toward a skeptical view,[56] and the Socratic epistles, while they do not make much of religion, do evidence a

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[50] See Riginos, *Platonica*, 111–117, 148–149, for Diogenes, and 98–100 for Antisthenes.

[51] Represented by Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, 2:164; Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian); Wilhelm Capelle, *Epiktet, Teles, und Musonius: Wege zu glückseligem Leben* (BAW; Zürich: Artemis, 1948), 15, 212–213.

[52] Represented by Jacob Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin: W. Herz, 1879); Helmut Rahn, "Die Frömmigkeit der Kyniker," *Paideuma* 7 (1960): 280–292, who is dependent on Julian and Themistius.

[53] Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 79–83, 165–176, and Gerhard, "Zur Legende," 394.

[54] See Lucian, *Demon.* 11, 23, 27, 34, 47; cf. Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 178.

[55] For his harshness, see Lucian, *Demon.* 21; *Peregr.* 17–19.

[56] See Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4," 45–51, which does not, however, do justice to the evidence of the Socratic epistles.

more positive attitude toward it. Thus, in the latter, Socrates offers a cock to Asclepius (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 14.9), Xenophon builds a temple (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 19), Socrates models himself upon God (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 6.4)[57] and is divinely commissioned (Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 1.2, 7). Still, religion is not at the center of the discussion and, as we have noted, where it does appear to justify Cynic behavior, it does so in a polemical context and is appealed to with the recognition that it may carry no weight with other Cynics.[58]

## Conclusion

The considerable diversity of second-century Cynicism is still evident in the third, although the author of the Socratic epistles does attempt to play it down. Diogenes Laertius, who may have been more interested in biography than doxography, nevertheless notes that some Cynics still preferred the austere regimen of Diogenes.[59]

The evidence from Julian in the century that followed is more difficult to assess. His own austerity, susceptibility to religious mysticism, constant seeking for divine guidance, and the polemical nature of his addresses on the Cynics color his views to an inordinate degree.[60] Some facts, however, do emerge. The Cynics he opposes scorned religion, and Julian uses the | occasion to excoriate Oenomaus and present an interpretation of Diogenes as divinely guided, which may reflect his own predilections, but which is also part of the tradition.[61] Julian's own preference is evident when he complains that they ridiculed Diogenes for his austerity,[62] but demands that they exercise their παρρησία with charm and grace.[63] Julian

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[57] Note also Ps.-Socrates, *Ep*. 34.3. For the modesty with which the assertion is made, see Julian, *Or*. 7.235CD.

[58] For a similar apologetic use of the Pythia, see Julian *Or*. 7.211D–212A; also see Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus* (HB 1.40; Munich: W. Fink, 1979), 77–81.

[59] Diogenes Laertius 6.104. See Mejer, *Diogenes Laertius*, 3–4, 6.

[60] On his personality, see Glen W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 13–20, and on his attacks on the pseudo-Cynics, see William J. Malley, *Hellenism and Christianity* (AnGr 210, SFB B.68; Rome: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1978), 144–155.

[61] Julian, *Or*. 6.199A; *Or*. 7.209ABC, 210D–211B. (See nn. 10, 45, and 58 above for the divine commission.)

[62] Julian, *Or*. 6.181A, 202D.

[63] Julian, *Or*. 6.201BC. The characteristics of Julian's models, Diogenes and Crates, differ from those of the letters attributed to them, and have much in common with Lucian's description of Demonax.

could not tolerate Cynic criticism of his administration, which he viewed as a subversion of the institutions of society.[64] Nonetheless, his tirade against Heracleius reveals that Cynics did attempt to present themselves at his court, and that they therefore were not antisocial in the manner of "Heraclitus" or "Diogenes."[65] Through Julian's invective glimpses are caught of rationalistic Cynics of the milder sort.

The fifth century knew Sallustius the Cynic, a man with whom Julian might have been better pleased. He was austere in his way of life and, although not much is known of his religious outlook, he evidently shared Peregrinus's mysticism and practiced divination.[66] In sum, Cynicism, which was essentially a way of life requiring no adherence to a canonical system of doctrine, continued to adapt itself to different viewpoints, and consequently retained the diversity which characterized it from early in its history.

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64 Julian, *Or.* 7.210C.
65 Julian, *Or.* 7.224C–226D.
66 On Sallustius, see Karl Praechter, "Salustios," PW 2d series, 1B (1920): 1967–1970.

CHAPTER THREE

# HERACLES*

## Heracles in Non-Christian Literature[1]

### *Greek and Roman Literature*

#### *Allegorization*

*Heracles as Philosophical Ideal.* The idealization of Heracles, already carried out in early Greek literature,[2] reached a new stage with the Sophists

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* Originally published in German as "Herakles," *RAC* 14 (1988): 559–583 (translated from English into German by Ursula Maiburg).

[1] Only those features of the theme are treated that have relevance for the interest of this lexicon. The focus is therefore on Heracles in the Graeco-Roman period, the major ancient sources being Diodorus Siculus 4.7–53 and Ps.- Apollodorus 2.4.5–5.7. On matters not taken up here, reference may be made to other treatments, in particular, the general surveys of the Heracles theme in literature (Karl Galinsky, *The Herakles Theme: The Adaptations of the Hero in Literature from Homer to the Twentieth Century* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1972]; Bernd Effe, "Held und Literatur: Der Funktionswandel des Herakles-Mythos in der griechischen Literatur," *Poetica* 12 [1980]: 145–166) and in early Christianity (Marcel Simon, *Hercule et le christianisme* [Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1955]), the name and etymology (Johannes Zwicker, "Herakles," PW 8.1 [1912]: 516–528), myth (Carl Robert, *Die griechische Heldensage: Die Nationalheroen* [repr., Berlin: Weidmann, 1967], 422–675; Friedrich Prinz, "Herakles," PWSup 14 [1974]: 137–196; Otto Gruppe, PWSup 3 [1918]: 1015–1090), cult and cult places (Gruppe, 910–1015; Lewis R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults and | Ideas of Immortality* 560 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921] 95–174), tragedy (Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Euripides: Herakles* [2d ed.; Berlin: Weidmann, 1895]), art (Gruppe, 1110–1116; Frank Brommer, *Herakles: Die zwölf (kanonischen) Taten des Helden in antiker Kunst und Literatur* [5th ed.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986]; Brommer, *Herakles II: Die unkanonischen Taten des Helden* [Darmstadt: Wissenshaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984]; Brommer, *Vasenlisten zur griechischen Heldensage* [3d ed.; Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1973]; Brommer, *Heracles: The Twelve Labors of the Hero in Art and Literature* [New Rochelle, N.Y.: A.D. Caratzas, 1986]; Josef Fink, "Herakles: Held und Heiland," *AuA* 9 [1960]: 73–87), and Heracles in Rome (Ferdinand Haug, "Hercules," PW 8.1 [1912]: 550–612; Jean Bayet, *Les origines de l'Hercule romain* [Paris: E. de Boccard, 1926]; Kurt Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* [Munich: Beck, 1960]: 213–221; Maria Jaczynowska, "Le culte de l'Hercule romain au temps du Haut-Empire," *ANRW* 2.17.2 [1981]: 631–661).

For further bibliography, see John Daniel Cooke, "Euhemerism: A Mediaeval Interpretation of Classical Paganism," *Spec* 2 (1927): 396–410; Franco Gaeta, "L'avventura di Ercolo," *Rinascimento* 5 (1954): 227–260; Jean Pépin, "Le théologie tripartite de Varron," *REAug* 2 (1956): 265–294.

[2] Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 1–80.

of the fourth century.[3] Herodorus brought Heracles into harmony with the individualism of his time by interpreting the three apples of the Hesperides (Sophocles, *Trach.* 1099–1100; Euripides, *Herc. fur.* 394–397) as virtues, his club as philosophy, the lion's skin as reason, and the dragon which he killed as desire (*FGH* 31 F 14). Prodicus further rationalized Heracles in his allegory of the crossroads (Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.21–34),[4] making Heracles no longer the tragic figure controlled by necessity (Euripides, *Herc. fur.* 1357; Sophocles, *Trach.* 1264–1278), but the exemplar of free choice that he would become for Cynics as well as others.[5] The interpretation of Heracles as non-intellectual, exercising his will in his striving for his own perfection, was continued by Antisthenes (*Frg.* 22–28, Diogenes Laertius 6.105).[6] Under the Empire, Heracles became a major figure for the Cynics.[7] Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 8.25–35), in the person of Diogenes, polemicizes against the popular view, still that of drama, that Heracles suffered against his will, by explaining that his ἀγών was against the vices,[8] and that he did so, not to please Eurystheus, but himself (cf. Lucian *Vit. auct.* 8; *Cyn.* 13). By 561 making himself pure and gentle, Heracles tamed and | civilized the earth (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 5.22–23),[9] and is σωτήρ because he shows people how to conquer themselves as well as the tyrants who oppose them (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.84). The stress remained on the Cynic's ἄσκησις, πόνος, ἐλευθερία, and ἀρετή, as exemplified by Heracles, who represented the ideal for their own lives (Diogenes Laertius 6.70–71).[10] It was because of his virtue that he was considered son of Zeus (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 2.78; 69.1), and among Cynics was παράδειγμα τὸ μέγιστον of their way of life (Julian, 6.187C).

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[3] Ragnar Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: C. Bloms, 1948), 22–73.

[4] Wolfgang Schultz, "Herakles am Scheideweg," *Phil* 68 (1909): 488–499; Johannes Alpers, *Hercules in bivio* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1912).

[5] Höistad, *Cynic Hero*, 31–33; Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 101–106.

[6] For fragments and commentary, see Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, ed., *Antisthenis fragmenta* (Milan: Cisalpino, 1966).

[7] Otto Edert, *Über Senecas Herakles und den Herakles auf dem Oeta* (Kiel: Fiencke, 1909), 29–59.

[8] Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967); Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80, esp. 74–76 [*Light*, 1:41–51].

[9] Léon Lacroix, "Héraclès, héros voyageur et civilisateur," *BCLAB* (Series 5) 60 (1974): 34–60.

[10] Peter Tzaneteas, "The Symbolic Heracles in Dio Chrysostom's Orations 'On Kingship'" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilm, 1975), 86–98.

Among Stoics, Heracles remained a moral hero,[11] but they made personal-religious use of him. Epictetus (*Diatr*. 2.16.42–46), in contrast to the free-willed Cynic Heracles, stresses his obedience as son to God while performing his Labors (cf. *Diatr*. 3.24.14–16). Furthermore, Heracles illustrates beneficence, thus playing a social rather than individualistic role (Seneca, *Ben*. 1.13.3), and is employed by Dio Chrysostom in his orations to Trajan (*Or*. 1–4) to illustrate his ideal of kingship.[12] The social dimension is pronounced with respect to his apotheosis. Because of their *beneficia* to mankind, persons like Heracles were granted divine status after their death (Cicero, *Nat. d*. 2.62; cf. *Off*. 3.25; *Fin*. 2.118). During his life Heracles built the road by which he traveled to the gods (Cicero, *Tusc*. 1.32), having earned his apotheosis in service to people and the state (Cicero, *Rep*. 6.16). More than in *Herc. fur*., in *Herc. Ot*. Seneca stresses that it is by his virtues that Heracles would overcome death and be borne to the stars (*Herc. Ot*. 1942–1943, 1971, 1977–1980).[13] Whether the story of the double night of his begetting be true or not, or whether Jupiter or Amphitryon were his father, is irrelevant to Seneca, for Heracles has deserved to be Jupiter's | son (*Herc. Ot*. 1497–1506; cf. 147, 1697). 562

*Heracles in Cosmology*. Heracles was introduced into cosmological and astrological speculation at least as early as Herodorus, who did so in a manner related to Pythagoreanism.[14] He also found a place in Orphism, in which he was equated with Chronos (Damascius, *Princ*. 123 = *Frg*. 54),[15] and in which the Nemean lion took on cosmic significance (*FGH* 31 F 4) and the Twelve Labors may have represented the victorious march of the sun through the twelve signs of the zodiac (*Orphic Hymn* 12.11–16; Eusebius, *Praep. ev*. 3.11.25).[16] The representation of Heracles as god of the sun and time, however, was not confined to Orphism, and the latter may be more particularly Stoic,[17] with the Labors corresponding to the total divine activity in the course of the Great Year that leads up to the conflagration. Heracles for the Stoics was the divine reason that permeates

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[11] Wilhelm Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca* (Diss., Fribourg, 1951), 122–125.

[12] Wilhelm Derichs, "Herakles: Vorbild des Herrschers in der Antike" (Diss., Cologne, 1950); Pierre Hadot, "Fürstenspiegel," *RAC* 8 (1972): 597–600; Tzaneteas, "Symbolic Heracles," 116–201.

[13] Josef Kroll, *Gott und Hölle* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1932), 398–447; Max Mühl, "Die Herakles-Himmelfahrt," *RhMus* 101 (1958): 106–134; Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 167–184.

[14] Marcel Détienne. "Héraclès, héros pythagoricien," *RHR* 158 (1960): 19–53.

[15] Martin L. West, *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 190–194.

[16] Christian A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968) 1:485; Gruppe, "Herakles," PWSup, 1104.

[17] West, *Orphic Poems*, 193–194.

the universe and will finally return to the primal fire (Seneca, *Ben.* 4.7.1; 8.1). The idea may have derived from Cleanthes, but finds its place in the detailed allegorization of Cornutus (*Nat. d.* 31).[18]

*Depreciation of Heracles*

The popularity and complexity of the Heracles legend are reflected in the ancient supposition that there were a multiplicity of Heracleses, Varro counting as many as forty-three (*Serv. Aen.* 8.564; cf. Diodorus Siculus 3.16.42; Tacitus, *Ann.* 2.60),[19] and in the proverb ἄλλος οὗτος Ἡρακλῆς.[20] But in this, as in other matters, he was also depreciated (Cicero, *Nat. d.* 3.42).[21] In his comic role Heracles was well known, and continued to be used in polemic and ridicule.[22] Heracles the libertine (Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 12.512E–513A) or the effeminate at the court of Omphale (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.94) was still a stock figure. Even Seneca equivocates about his 563 *descensus ad inferos* (*Herc. fur.* 249–253),[23] and among Cynics, | although his spirit is regarded as mightier than Tyche (Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 26), he is poked fun at (Lucian, *Dial. mort.* 16; cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 14; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 6), and it is debated whether he should be regarded as the proto-Cynic (Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 34; Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 9.4; 13.1) or not (Julian 6.187CD).[24] A Cynic, with great self-confidence, could make claims that would make himself superior to Heracles (Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 4).[25]

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[18] Wilfred L. Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity* (London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1944), 39; Simon, *Hercule*, 95–105.

[19] Gruppe, "Herakles," PWSup, 1108–1109.

[20] Ernst L. von Leutsch and Friedrich W. Schneidewin, *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum* (orig. pub. 1883–1910; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961), 1:190–191.

[21] On this subject, see the commentary in Arthur S. Pease's edition of Cicero's *De natura deorum* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955–1958; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968).

[22] Radislav Hosek, "Herakles auf der Bühne der alte attischen Komödie," in *GERAS: Studies Presented to George Thomson on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday* (ed. Ladislav Varcl and Ronald F. Willetts; AUC Philosophica et historica 1, Graecolatina Prasgensia 2; Prague: Charles University, 1963), 118–127; Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 81–100.

[23] Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 171.

[24] See Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Phaidon von Elis," *Hermes* 14 (1882): 187–193; see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Kleine Schriften* (5 vols. in 6; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962–1971), 3:41–47.

[25] Abraham J. Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 42–64. [*Light*, 2:601–634]

*Euhemerism*

The popular, especially Stoic, views of Heracles's divinization because of his *beneficia* were subjected to Euhemeristic criticism.[26] Diodorus Siculus systematically debunks his Labors (1.19.1–4.21; 4.21.3–4), making Heracles simply a man, with nothing especially ennobling about him.[27] Diodorus knows of a number of Heracleses (3.74.4–5). The son of Alcmene imitated the exploits of the ancient Heracles of myth, and because of their ignorance of the facts, the majority of men identified him with that earlier Heracles (5.76). Lucian reflects similar criticism: Heracles's Labors were the result of Eurystheus's philanthropy (*Jupp. trag.* 21), and Heracles did everything by the Fates, but himself remained the rustic boor (32). Lucian is also aware of moral criticism of apotheosized individuals (*Deor. conc.* 4; cf. 6), which would disqualify Heracles. Philosophic opponents of the Stoics attacked their Heracles. The academic Cotta rejects the Stoic view (Cicero, *Nat. d.* 1.119),[28] and considers the story of Heracles's ascension ludicrous (3.41). Ignoring the Stoic allegorization that the passions are wild beasts (Dio Chysostom, *Or.* 5.22–23), Lucretius debunks Heracles when he compares him with Epicurus (5.22–54). It is Epicurus who purifies the mind of bestial vices and tames it, and is therefore to be numbered among the gods.[29] Lucretius therefore uses Euhemerus in both ways, to debunk Heracles and deify Epicurus. Apuleius similarly compares a Cynic with Heracles (*Flor.* 4.22).

*Heracles in Latin Literature*

No one knows how the cult of Heracles went from Greece to Rome.[30] | Here Heracles was primarily a god of merchants, who may have been involved in the spread of the cult.[31] The cult of Heracles at the Ara Maxima near the Circus Maximus was regarded as having been founded by Evander (Strabo, 5.3.2; Livy 1.7.12; Plutarch, *Quaest. rom.* 285E) or by Heracles himself

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[26] Emmanuel Des Essarts, *L'Hercule grec* (Paris: E. Thorin, 1871), 185–200.
[27] Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 129–130.
[28] See also Pease, *De natura deorum*, 1:516–517.
[29] Erich Ackermann, *Lukrez und der Mythos* (PMTKA 13; Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1979), 182–190.
[30] Werner Eisenhut, "Hercules," *KlPauly* 2 (1967): 1054–1057; J.A. Böhm, "Hercules," PW 8.1 (1912): 550–612.
[31] Bayet, *Les origines*.

(Ovid, *Fast.* 1.581; Propertius, 4.9.67; Livy 9.34.18).[32] While the Roman Heracles cult differs from the Greek in some ways—for example, the absence of Heracles in athletic contests—other cult practices, such as crowning with laurel (Macrobius, *Sat.* 3.12.2) and the exclusion of women (3.6.17) exhibit its Greek character.[33] Characteristic of the Roman cult was the understanding of Heracles as a god of exceptionally good fortune, to whom one tenth of unexpected profits (Horace, *Sat.* 2.6.10–13; Plautus, *Pers.* 2.10) and war booty (*CIL* $1^2$ 615; 626) was offered.[34] Heracles—next to Apollo the only god who was called *sanctus* in pre-Augustan times (*CIL* $1^2$ 632)—was a popular god, in whose cult-feasts the common people took part. He satisfied personal religious needs that the state religion did not fulfill. Since he had overcome all the difficulties that mortals face, he was called *invictus* and considered to be a helper in times of need.

Latin literature treated Heracles with great seriousness.[35] His early popularity is evident in the comedies of Plautus, in which "*mehercle*" is a stock expression and the deeds of Heracles are frequently used as metaphors (*Pers.* 1–5; *Bacch.* 155),[36] as well as in the way he is rated in *Amphitryo*, where he is already being compared with Scipio. Heracles plays no comic role on the Roman stage; the humor with which he is portrayed by Propertius and Ovid, and in Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*, springs more from opposition to Augustus and literary parody than mockery of Heracles him- 565 self. Virgil likens | Aeneas to Heracles and makes of him a second Heracles. This appears already in the prooemium to the *Aeneid*, influenced by *Iliad* 18.119; in the description of the deeds of Aeneas as Labors (1.241, 272–274; 4.233);[37] and in Book 6, where the Heracles theme is linked to Augustus, who is expected to surpass both Aeneas and his archetype Heracles. Even earlier Heracles had been associated with famous people—the ancestry of the Fabian clan, for example, was believed to be from Heracles (Plutarch, *Fab.* 1.2), a story that perhaps dates from Verrius Flaccus (Paul./Fest. s.v. Fovi [77 Lindsay]) and appears again in Ovid (*Pont.* 3.3.99–100;

[32] Hermann Schnepf, "Das Herculesabenteuer in Virgils Aeneis 8:184–185," *Gym.* 66 (1959): 250–268.

[33] Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte*, 213–221.

[34] Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte*, 215–216.

[35] See Schnepf, "Herculesabenteuer"; M. Alain Piot, "Hercule chez les poètes du premier siècle après Jésus-Christ," *REL* 43 (1965): 342–358; Galinksy, *Herakles Theme*, 126–184.

[36] Charles Knapp, "References to Literature in Plautus and Terence," *AJP* 40 (1919): 247–250; Walter E. Forehand, "The Literary Use of Metaphor in Plautus and Terence" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1968).

[37] See Patrick McGushin, "Virgil and the Spirit of Endurance," *AJP* 85 (1964): 225–253, esp. 236.

*Fast.* 2.237),[38] Silius Italicus (6.627–636; cf. 2.3; 7.35, 44; 8.217), and Juvenal (8.14). The Romans had used the example of Heracles in the deification of Romulus (Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.28; cf. Livy 1.7.15) and associated the apotheosis of Heracles with the belief that one's good deeds can lead to one's deification (Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.32; Ovid, *Pont.* 4.8.63). Thus Virgil's association of Augustus and Heracles could be used in the deification of Augustus (cf. Horace, *Carm.* 3.3.9–12; 3.14)[39] and repel the claims of Pompey and Antony to be successors of Heracles (cf. Appian, *Bell. civ.* 3.16). Not all poets took seriously Augustan symbols as those of Heracles. In the story of Heracles and Cacus, Propertius (4.9) suppresses those elements that could have significance for Rome and Augustus, and makes Heracles into a stock character of Roman elegy and comedy, namely the rejected lover.[40] He explains Heracles's self-immolation at Oeta as out of his yearning for Hebe (1.13.23–24) and portrays in sentimental terms particularly his enslavement by Omphale (3.11.17–20; cf. Catullus 55.13, Plautus, *Pers.* 1.5, Terence, *Eun.* 1026–1027). Ovid (*Metam.* 9.29–30, 115–117, 235–238) brings Heracles back to human proportion with mild humor and, like Propertius, keeps alive through the means of parody the theme of Heracles as an unscrupulous philanderer, in contrast to the Cynic-Stoic ideal of *virtus* and *gravitas*. The post-Virgilian epics, however, continued to depict Heracles as an ideal of *virtus*. Lucan (1.45–63) identifies Nero with Heracles by imitating Seneca's account of | the apotheosis of Heracles (cf. Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1564–1575, 1581, 1989–1991).[41] Silius Italicus is more explicit: The hero of the Punica is Scipio, who, however, is understood as successor to Heracles in accordance with a Stoic picture (15.18–128; 17.645–654).[42] 566

*The Imperial Heracles*

Heracles served as a representation of apotheosis in sepulchral art.[43] As a noble benefactor, he was closely tied to the emperors early on, but only

[38] See Franz Bömer's commentary: *Die Fasten* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1957); E. Groag et al., "Fabius," PW 6.2 (1909): 1739–1888.

[39] Schnepf, "Herculesabenteuer," 257–260.

[40] William S. Anderson, "*Hercules exclusus*: Propertius, IV, 9," *AJP* 85 (1964): 1–12.

[41] Lynette Thompson, "Lucan's apotheosis of Nero," *CP* 59 (1964): 147–153.

[42] Andrew R. Anderson, "Heracles and His Successors," *HSCP* 39 (1928): 31–37; Edward L. Bassett, "Hercules and the Hero of the Punica," in *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* (ed. Luitpold Wallach; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), 258–273.

[43] Henning Wrede, *Consecratio in formam deorum: Vergöttlichte Privatpersonen in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Mainz: Von Zabern, 1981).

gradually found a place in official circles. Some emperors (Caligula: Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 59.26; Nero: Suetonius, *Nero* 21.53) shamelessly demanded it (Domitian: Martial, *Epgr*. 9.64–65, 101),[44] but others (Vespasian: Suetonius, *Vesp*. 12.2) ridiculed it.[45] Seneca lets the amusing Heracles play an ambiguous role in Claudius's awful but unsuccessful effort at apotheosis (*Apocol.* 5.7, 9).[46] In official circles during the first century Heracles lost out to Romulus, who furnished the theme and rite of apotheosis by a celestial migration rather than immolation. Trajan brought a change in imperial attitude toward Heracles.[47] Because of the philosophical understanding of Heracles's divinization as a result of his philanthropy, Trajan granted him a privileged place, which he retained under Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius.[48] The final triumph of Hercules Romanus occurred under Commodus, whose deification came about by his association with Heracles.[49]

In the third century he had to compete with Sol Invictus, but he finally triumphed under Diocletian and his system of the tetrarchy. Diocletian placed himself under the protection of Jupiter and made | Heracles the protector of Maximian. Thus he introduced a coherent imperial theology[50] which, within two decades after the abdication of Diocletian, would cause Jupiter to disappear from imperial coinage and monuments.[51] Various explanations have been offered for this dramatic ascendancy of Heracles. Mattingly suggests that, in order to win over Christians, Diocletian presented them with an equivalent of their own supreme god whose son is a benefactor to man.[52] Simon, who traces what might be called a Heracleology, which had developed earlier and was thriving in the fourth century, thinks that Diocletian built his theological system on it to dif-

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[44] Franz Sauter, *Der römische Kaiserkult bei Martial und Statius* (TBAW 21; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1934), 78–85.

[45] Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 136–141.

[46] See Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 181–182; G. Binder, "Hercules und Claudius: Eine Szene in Seneca's Apocolocyntosis auf dem Hintergrund der Aeneis," *RhMus* 117 (1974): 288–317.

[47] See discussion above under "Heracles as Philosophical Ideal."

[48] Jaczynowska, "Le culte de l'Hercule," 634–641.

[49] Jean Gagé, "La mystique imperial et l'épreuve des 'jeux': Commode-Hercule et l'anthropologie héracléenne," *ANRW* 2.17.2 (1981): 662–683.

[50] See William Seston, "Diocletianus," *RAC* 3 (1957): 1041–1043; Sabine G. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (TCH 1; Berkeley: University of California, 1981), 24–26, 31–32, 169–172; for Heracles on the Arch of Gelarius, see Hans P. Laubscher, *Der Reliefschmuck des Galeriusbogens in Thessaloniki* (AF 1; Berlin: Mann, 1975).

[51] J. Rufus Fears, "The Cult of Jupiter and Roman Imperial Ideology," *ANRW* 2.17.1 (1981): 118–119.

[52] Harold B. Mattingly, "Jovius and Herculius," *HTR* 45 (1952): 131–134.

ferentiate it from Christianity, with which it shared some aspects.[53] More probable is the suggestion that Diocletian's theology may have attempted to explain the complex form of monarchy that had two Augusti of equal rank, but with one enjoying superior authority.[54] Heracles remained popular—in Ephesus, Apollonius of Tyana was venerated as Hercules Alexicacus. Later, Heracles played a role in the attempts to revive paganism. Julian presents him as a counterpart to Christ (7.219B–222A),[55] and standards with pictures of him were carried into the fateful battle at the Frigidus between Eugenius and Theodosius.[56] In 401, Augustine could say that Heracles, who had once been called a god, no longer existed in Rome (*Serm.* 24.6).[57] Indeed Claudian's praise of Florentius as a second Heracles (*Rapt. Pros.* 2 pref. 29–52; cf. Augustine, *Ep.* 50), like his benevolent comparison of Stilicho with Heracles (*Stil.* 1.143–147), is | 568 an exaggeration.

## *Jewish Literature*

Heracles appears only rarely in Judaism, and for the most part is associated with Phoenician syncretism. Cleodemus Malchus incorporated him into the progeny of Abraham (Josephus, *A.J.* 1.239–241; Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 9.20.2–4).[58] The Heracles in mind may have been the Tyrian one, who was identified in Phoenician circles with Melkart (Herodotus, 2.43–44; 2 Macc 4:19–20; Josephus, *A.J.* 8.146; Philo Byblos [Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 1.10.27]).[59] Also associated with Phoenicia are the claims of the historians Philostratus and Megasthenes that Nebuchadnezzar surpassed Heracles in his bravery and deeds (Josephus, *A.J.* 10.227; *C. Ap.* 1.144), and an account by Menander

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[53] Simon, *Hercule*, 127–165.

[54] John H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 240–243.

[55] William J. Malley, "Hellenism and Christianity: The Conflict between Hellenic and Christian Wisdom in the *Contra Galilaeos* of Julian the Apostate and the *Contra Julianum* of St. Cyril of Alexandria" (Diss., Gregorian University, Rome, 1978), 196–210.

[56] Herbert Bloch, "A New Document of the Last Pagan Revival in the West, 393–394 AD," *HTR* 38 (1945): 235–239.

[57] But see Josef Fink, "Herakles als Christusbild an der Via Latina," *RivAC* 56 (1980): 138–141.

[58] Albert-Marie Denis, "Héraclès et ses cousins de Judée: Le syncrétisme d'un historien juif hellénique," in *Hommages à Marie Delcourt* (Brussels: Latomus, 1970), 168–178; Carl R. Holladay, *Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors: Volume 1: Historians* (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983), 245–259.

[59] Martin Hengel, *Judentum und Hellenismus* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), 130–137; Javier Teixidor, "L'interprétation phénicienne d'Héraclès et d'Apollon," *RHR* 200 (1983): 243–255.

of Ephesus of the building of the temple of Heracles at Tyre (Josephus, *C. Ap*. 1.116–118). To a lesser degree the philosophical Heracles also appears. Ps.-Heraclitus *Ep*. 4, in which Heracles is compared unfavorably with the author, is not Jewish, as was argued by Jacob Bernays,[60] but is Cynic.[61] Traits of Heracles have been found in *T. Jud*. 2:2–7,[62] and Philo makes overt use of him.[63] Philo polemicizes against Caligula, who, in his aspiration to divinity had taken up the insignia of demigods like Heracles, but whose actions were completely opposite to their beneficent deeds (*Legat*. 78–79, 81, 90–93). Philo's positive assessment of Heracles is also evident in *Prob*. 99–104, where Heracles is the free σπουδαῖος, superior to Eurystheus (120).

## Heracles in Christian Literature

### *New Testament*

#### *General*

Heracles is not mentioned in the NT, but after some analogies and similarities between Seneca's presentations of Heracles and Jesus had been 569 pointed out,[64] | Friedrich Pfister, not confining himself to Seneca, argued that the similarities were too striking to be accidental, but that the oldest Gospel, which was known to the Synoptists in different forms, depended on a Cynic-Stoic Heracles biography.[65] Arnold Toynbee similarly held that the parallels between the two figures were too close to be coincidental, and in an elaborate reconstruction suggested that the story of Jesus on the one hand, and those of certain pagan historical heroes on the other, may have derived some of the common factors from the Heracles legend through separate channels of the stream of "folk-memory."[66] The influence is also thought to have gone in the other direction. Léon Herrmann points

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[60] Jacob Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe* (Berlin: Hertz, 1869); see Albert-Marie Denis, *Fragmenta pseudepigraphorum quae supersunt graeca* (PVTG 3; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), 157–160.

[61] Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus."

[62] Marc Philonenko, "Juda et Héraclès," *RHPR* 50 (1970): 61–62.

[63] Cf. Klaus Thraede, "Euhemerismus," *RAC* 6 (1966): 882–883.

[64] Emil Ackermann, "De Senecae Hercule Oetaeo," *Phil* Suppl. 10 (1907): 323–429; Ackermann, "Der leidende Herkules des Seneca," *RhMus* 67 (1912): 424–471; Theodor Birt, *Aus dem Leben der Antike* (3d ed.; Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1922), 175.

[65] Friedrich Pfister, "Herakles und Christus," *AR* 34 (1937): 42–60.

[66] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (6 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 6:465–476, esp. 475.

to the differences between the NT views of Jesus and Seneca's depiction of Heracles in *Herc. Ot.* 1131–1996, and claims that they represent Seneca's reaction to the Christian tradition. He regards Cornutus, *Nat. d.* 31, as an explicit reproach of Seneca's *Herc. Ot.* and a denial of the Christian belief in the resurrection.[67]

*The Life of Jesus*

Parallels do exist between the accounts of the birth and youth of the two figures. Of both it is said that they had been born of virgins (Luke 1:26; Apollodorus 2.4.7–8), that their fathers for a time did not have sexual intercourse with their mothers (Matt 1:24–25; Apollodorus 2.4.8), that they were both called Son of God (Luke 3:23; 4:22; Ovid, *Metam.* 15.49), and that, although not much is known of the youth of either, danger attended both.[68] While in broad outline and stated thus, similarities do exist, they are trivial, the differences outweigh them, and the supposed *Urevangelium*, which would explain their presence in the Gospels, remains a highly hypothetical document.[69] As Jesus was tempted to reject his call, so, it is said, was Heracles.[70] Before beginning their public activity, both were tempted in desolate places (Matt 4:1–11; Luke 4:1–13; Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.21–34; Cicero, *Off.* 1.118; according to Matt 4:8 and Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.64 on a high mountain), after which they became famous (Luke 4:14–15; Diodorus Siculus 4.10.6). The choice of Heracles | at the crossroads has its counterpart in the Two Ways material in Jewish and Christian literature (*Did.* 1.6; *Barn.* 18.21), and its influence can be discerned here,[71] but the differences in detail suggest that the similarities are natural constituents of accounts of the choices and their consequences, sometimes pointed out by a supernatural being, made by notable persons.[72] As to their adult activity, they both receive a divine commission (Luke 4:43; Diodorus Siculus 4.10.7), leave their families and homes to travel widely (Mark 3:31–35; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.16.44), adopt a life of suffering (Mark 8:31 par.; Euripides, *Herc. fur.* 1250; Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 2.11 [341F–342E]), instruct their followers to pray 570

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[67] Léon Herrmann, *Sénèque et les premiers chrétiens* (CollLat 167; Brussels: Latomus, 1979) 75–79, 88–90.
[68] Pfister, "Herakles und Christus," 46–47.
[69] Herbert J. Rose, "Herakles and the Gospels," *HTR* 31 (1938): 113–142, esp. 46–47.
[70] Pfister, "Herakles und Christus," 48.
[71] Pfister, "Herakles und Christus," 48; Carl Schneider, *Geistesgeschichte des antiken Christentums* (2 vols.; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1954) 1:53, 57.
[72] Rose, "Herakles and the Gospels," 119–120.

to God (Matt 6:10 γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.16.42 χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς; cf. 1.6.32), and are tempted to thwart the divine purpose for themselves (Luke 22:39–46; Diodorus Siculus 4.11.1).[73] These similarities are real but general, and require no interdependence of the traditions on which the accounts are based.[74] Most of the elements that the lives of Heracles and Jesus share have been claimed to be oriental and much older than Cynic and Stoic philosophy and the Heracles biography.[75] That Jesus performed miracles by divine power (Mark 10:27 par.) and walked on water (Mark 6:48 par.) find their counterparts in Julian's similar claims for Heracles (*Or.* 7.219D), but are due to Julian's transferring of those elements from Jesus to Heracles.[76] Jesus's acceptance of the designation of king (John 18:37) may remind one of Heracles's reference to himself as lord and king (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.49).[77] But Jesus differs from Heracles in that he displays no remarkable physical strength, is celibate, does not travel beyond his own country, and is frugal in his diet.

Many of the events attending the passion, resurrection, and ascension 571 of Jesus have been thought to have their counterparts | in the portrayal of Heracles.[78] Both are concerned not to leave their disciples orphans (John 14:18; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.14),[79] and both comfort their mothers (John 19:26; Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1497–1512). Their betrayers hang themselves (Matt 27:5; Apollodorus 2.7.7; cf. Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1027, 1462; Diodorus Siculus 4.38.2). Before their deaths they express fear (Mark 14:33–34 par.; Seneca, *Herc. fur.* 1265–1278), and at the moment of his death Jesus says τετέλεσται (John 19:30) and Heracles had earlier said *peractum est* (Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1476), and both commit their spirits to the Father (Luke 23:46; Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1703–1704). The miraculous events frequently said to attend the death of great men, including the unusual opening of the underworld (Matt 27:51–53), are also found in the death scenes of both (Mark 15; Matt 27; Luke 23; Diodorus Siculus 4.38.4; Apollodorus 2.7.7; Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1131–1150, 1595–1606), and after his death Jesus appears to Mary Magdalene

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[73] Pfister, "Herakles und Christus," 49–51.

[74] Rose, "Herakles and the Gospels," 120–121; Simon, *Hercule*, 53–54.

[75] Franz Dornseiff, *Antike und Alter Orient: Interpretationen* (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1956), 357.

[76] Rose, "Herakles and the Gospels," 121; Simon, *Hercule*, 54–55; but see Fink, "Herakles als Christusbild," 139–140.

[77] See Horst Kusch, "Diogenes von Sinope," *RAC* 3 (1957): 1068.

[78] Emil Ackermann, "Der leidende Herkules," 456.

[79] Knox, *Some Hellenistic Elements*, 79: "The saying was probably derived from a common source; cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 116a, which came to the evangelist via Jewish mission propaganda."

and the other Mary (Matt 28:9; John 20:11–18) as Heracles does to Alcmene (Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1963–1982).

Despite the assertion[80] that Jesus's *descensus ad inferos* (1 Pet 3:19; 4:6) is an appropriation of an oriental redemption-mythology also reflected in the myth of Heracles, its immediate source appears to be Jewish apocalyptic.[81] There is, however, a resemblance between the Lukan accounts (Luke 24:51; Acts 1:9) of Jesus's ascension in a cloud and that of Heracles (Seneca, *Herc. Ot.* 1977, 1988; Apollodorus 2.7.7).[82] The view that Luke was influenced by accounts of ascensions like that of Heracles[83] has been rejected,[84] and greater precision has been sought to distinguish between different types of ascension accounts and Luke's or his sources' | indebtedness to them.[85] 572

## *Christology*

The Christology of such passages as Rom 1:3–4, Phil 2:6–11, Col 1:15–20, and Heb 2:10–18 has an affinity with the descriptions of popular Hellenistic cult figures, most prominent of whom was Heracles.[86] But these figures had no pre-existence, nor did salvation come by Heracles's death.[87] It is only with diffidence that the suggestion has been made that the Stoic view of Heracles as the universal Logos may have influenced John 1:1–3.[88] A close connection, however, has been perceived between Heb 1:3 and what Cornutus (*Nat. d.* 31) says of Heracles as Logos,[89] Hebrews using ῥῆμα

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[80] Francis W. Beare, *The First Epistle of Peter* (2d ed.; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), 145; cf. Simon, *Hercule*, 112–115.

[81] Leonhard Goppelt, *Der erste Petrusbrief* (8th ed.; KEK 12.1; Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1978), 250–254.

[82] See Rose, "Herakles and the Gospels," 124; Martin Hengel, *The Atonement: The Origins of the Doctrine in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 4.

[83] Pfister, "Herakles und Christus," 55; Pfister, *Der Reliquienkult im Altertum* (2 vols.; RVV 5; Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1909–1912), 2:480–489; Carl Clemen, *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments* (2d ed; Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1924; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973), 259.

[84] Kroll, *Gott und Hölle*, 445; Karl Prümm, *Der christliche Glaube* (2 vols.; Leipzig: J. Hegner, 1935) 2:55–76.

[85] Gerhard Lohfink, *Die Himmelfahrt Jesu* (SANT 26; Munich: Kösel, 1971).

[86] Wilfred L. Knox, "The 'Divine Hero' Christology in the New Testament," *HTR* 41 (1948): 229–249; Herbert Braun, *Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967), 255–265; Hans Dieter Betz, "Gottmensch II," *RAC* 12 (1983): 296–305.

[87] Martin Hengel, *Der Sohn Gottes: Die Entstehung der Christologie und die jüdisch-hellenistische Religionsgeschichte* (2d ed.; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1977), 42 n. 54.

[88] Simon, *Hercule*, 94–98.

[89] Simon, *Hercule*, 98–99, 106–107, with reference to Hans Windisch, *Der Hebräerbrief* (2d ed.; HNT 14; Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1931), 12–13.

in order to retain the revelatory function of Christ. Such influence would have come via Hellenistic Jewish speculation.[90] On the other hand, the description of Heracles as σωτήρ (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.84) and ἀρχηγός (Dio Chrysostom 33.47) has been thought to have had possible influence on the vocabulary of Heb 2:10—ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς σωτηρίας, cf. 12:2[91]—or have influenced the theology of the letter.[92] Acts 5:31, God's exaltation of Jesus (cf. 3:15), has led to the speculation that the language entered Christianity either with Hellenists of the Stephen circle who explained Jesus in terms derived from Hellenistic views of saviors represented by the myth of Heracles,[93] or with Paul, since Heracles was worshipped at Tarsus as Heracles Sandan (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 33.47).[94] However, Paul does not call Christ ἀρχηγός, nor is there any evidence that he remained in Tarsus beyond his early youth.[95] 573 | The concept σωτήρ was widespread and justifies the suspicion that it was one of the forms that made Jesus intelligible to the pagan world without thereby assuming a mechanical borrowing from any one source or tradition.[96]

*Paul*

Paul was familiar with Cynic traditions, including those in which Heracles appears.[97] His statement in 1 Cor 15:32, ἐθηριομάχησα ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, followed by the traditional summary definition of the hedonistic life and a quotation from Menander, is derived from Cynic descriptions of Heracles the θηριομάχος (cf. Lucian, *Lex.* 19) who had overcome the beasts of pleasure

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[90] See Ceslas Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux* (2 vols.; 3d ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1953) 2:6–11; Carsten Colpe, "Gottessohn," *RAC* 12 (1983): 50–51.

[91] Spicq, *Hébreux*, 2:39.

[92] Contra Paul-Gerhard Müller, Χριστὸς ἀρχηγός: *Der religionsgeschichtliche und theologische Hintergrund einer neutestamentlichen Christusprädikation* (EHS 23.28; Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1973).

[93] Walter Grundmann, "Das Problem des hellenistischen Christentums innerhalb der Jerusalemer Urgemeinde," *ZNW* 38 (1939): 45–73; Hengel, *Atonement*, 40 n. 51: at best, analogies.

[94] Toynbee, *Study of History*, 6:477–478; Hans Böhlig, *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im augusteischen Zeitalter mit Berücksichtigung der paulinischen Schriften* (FRLANT 19; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1913), 49–51, 57 n. 3.

[95] Willem C. van Unnik, *Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth* (trans. George Ogg; London: Epworth, 1962).

[96] Paul Wendland, "Σωτήρ," *ZNW* 5 (1904): 335–353, esp. 350; Werner Foerster and Georg Fohrer, "σωτήρ," *TWNT* 7 (1964): 1004–1022.

[97] Hermann Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus," *Hermes* 98 (1970): 459–471; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 143–173. [*Light*, 1:135–166]

(Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.11–26).[98] The *peristasis* catalogues with which Paul describes his ministry (1 Cor 4:10–13; 2 Cor 4:8–9, 6:4–5, 11:23–29) are part of a tradition which also summarizes the Labors of Heracles.[99] If in 1 Cor 13:3 Paul has immolation rather than martyrdom in mind,[100] Heracles was the best-known example.[101]

## *Church Fathers*

### *General*

The Church Fathers' extensive use of Heracles was based partly on their knowledge of classical and later literature. It is not certain that they knew Apollodorus, as has been suggested,[102] but they did make extensive use of polemical traditions.[103] Their knowledge was not only literary. Clement of Alexandria (*Protr.* 4.47.8; 57.2) knew details about statues of Heracles, and Augustine (*Ep.* 50), after the troubles of the fourth century, mentions Christians who had been burned in front of one.[104] Christian refusal to respect pagan temples and gods would bring them into confrontation with the Heracles cult (Arnobius, *Adv. gent.* 6.3). It was to be expected that the Christian defense against the charge of atheism would refer to Diagoras's | burning of Heracles's statue (Athenagoras, *Leg.* 4.1; Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 2.24.4).[105] In the fourth century, the confrontations with the Heracles cult became more intense.[106] Some Christians were familiar with contemporary discussion of Heracles and his cult: Arnobius (*Adv. gent.* 3.39) knew of the disagreement among pagans as to whether Heracles was among the novensiles and that there was a multiplicity of Heracleses (Arnobius, *Adv. gent.* 1.36; 4.15; cf. Augustine, *Civ.* 18.12), and

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98 Malherbe, "Beasts at Ephesus."

99 Robert Hodgson, "Paul the Apostle and First Century Tribulation Lists," *ZNW* 74 (1983): 59–80; John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

100 Johannes Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (9th ed.; KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1910), 314–315.

101 Karl L. Schmidt, "καίω," *TWNT* 3 (1938): 468–469.

102 Friedrich Zucker, *Spuren von Apollodorus Περὶ θεῶν bei christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten fünf Jahrhunderte* (Nuremberg: Stich, 1904).

103 Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907), 225–226.

104 CSEL 34:143.

105 See *Gnom. Vat.* 276 Sternbach; Marek Winiarczyk, *Diagorae Melii et Theodori Cyrenaei reliquiae* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1981), 10–11.

106 See the discussion above under "The Imperial Heracles."

Lactantius knew the etiology of the rites in honor of Heracles in Rhodes in which the hero was reviled and cursed (*Inst.* 1.21.7–8). That Heracles and his cult were not remote from Christian life would appear from Jerome's caution that Christians were not to swear by Heracles (*Epist.* 2.13.8) and the fact that the Council of Ariminum deposed Eleusis because he had appointed to the diaconate a priest of Heracles at Tyre (Socrates Scholasticus, *Hist. eccl.* 2.42 [PG 67:352a]; cf. Sozomen, *Hist. eccl.* 4.24.10).

### *Positive Evaluation of Heracles*

While the majority of early Christian references to Heracles are critical and appear in polemic and apologetic, there is also a positive appropriation of him. Clement of Rome does not mention Heracles, but his description of Paul as κῆρυξ, teaching of justice in east and west (*1 Clem.* 5.6–7), recalls descriptions of Heracles.[107] Justin (*1 Apol.* 21.2) knows that stories like that of Heracles were written for the advantage and encouragement of the educated, and he adduces the example of Heracles, who chose the way of virtue at the crossroads (*2 Apol.* 11; cf. Basil, [*Hom.* 22] *Leg. lib. gent.* 5 [23–26 Wilson]) perhaps to underline the Christian preparedness to accept martyrdom by a pagan example,[108] but his use also reflects the polemic between the Cynics, who held the *telos* of philosophy to be ἀδιαφορία (Justin's τὰ δοκοῦντα), and Middle Platonists, who held it to be εὐδαιμονία (*2 Apol.* 11.6).[109] | Heracles is also advanced as an example of people who can change (Origen, *Cels.* 3.66), and Boethius (*Cons.* 4.7.13.33) advises his readers to follow the path of Heracles, who by his Labors earned heaven.[110] Even Tatian (*Or.* 3.2) could refer to him as good and just, and Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 1.24.158.3) notes that Heracles is considered the type of ruler who is purely rational and divine. Heracles is compared with Samson (Eusebius, *Chron. Pref.* [GCS Eusebius 7.11.13–14]; cf. *Praep. ev.* 10.9.7; Filaster, *Divers. heres. lib.* 8.2), and because of his strength Samson is thought to be

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[107] Louis Sanders, *L'hellénisme de Saint Clement de Rome et le paulinisme* (StHell 2; Leuven: Bibliotheca universitatis, 1943), 13–34; Theofried Baumeister, *Die Anfänge der Theologie des Martyriums* (MBTh 45; Münster: Aschendorff, 1980), 237–238, 243–244. See Gregory of Nazianzus's praise of Maximus in *Or.* 25; though cf. *De vita sua* 2.1.11, 974–975 (100 Jungck); cf. J. Coman, "Hellénisme et christianisme dans le *25e* discours de s. Grégoire de Naz.," StPatr 14 = TU 117 (1976): 290–301.

[108] Simon, *Hercule*, 67–68.

[109] Carl Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," *ZNW* 44 (1952–1953): 157–195, esp. 179–180.

[110] Johannes Geffcken, *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1929), 222.

Heracles (Augustine, *Civ*. 18.19). In the same vein, Nebuchadnezzar is thought to have been stronger than Heracles (Eusebius, *Chron*. [GCS Eusebius 5.20.1–3; cf. 23.23]; in *Praep. ev*. 9.41.1 the statement is attributed to Abydenus [*Frg*. 9 (FHG 4.283)]). He is mentioned favorably for stopping human sacrifice (Lactantius, *Inst*. 1.21.8; Eusebius, *Praep. ev*. 4.16.18), and Eusebius (*Praep. ev*. 15.4.16) with approval quotes Atticus (*Frg*. 2 des Places), τὰ Ἡράκλεια καὶ θεῖα δόγματα, against Aristotle, on the power, nobility and permanence of virtue. However mythical the fictions of the poets may be, Augustine thinks they still represent a likeness of truth and depict the behavior of the demons in a way that is not in all respects inaccurate, and he cites Heracles's weeping for Pallas as a case in point (*Civ*. 3.11). As compared to Plato he considers Heracles and Romulus superior to other gods (*Civ*. 2.14).

*Allegorization of Heracles*

Allegorization provided a special way in which Heracles could be appropriated by Christians. Nevertheless, skepticism is also expressed toward it. Origen (*Cels*. 3.23) requires that allegories that explain away the licentiousness of figures like Heracles be examined one by one to determine whether they are worthy of reverence. Eusebius (*Praep. ev*. 3.11.25), quoting Porphyry (*Simulacr. Frg*. 8; *Frg*. 13.3–9 Bidez), rejects the allegorical interpretation of Heracles as the sun (*Praep. ev*. 3.13.15–18). But allegorization of Heracles was used non-polemically. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom*. 5.14.103; cf. Eusebius, *Praep. ev*. 13.13.30) understood Heracles's Twelve Labors as the twelve signs of the zodiac through which the soul obtains its release from this world (contrast Methodius of Olympus, *Symp*. 8.14.215, who mentions Heracles | casually in describing the zodiac in his attack on pagan astrology). 576 In arguing that Greek philosophy was derived from the barbarians (βάρβαρα φιλοσοφία),[111] Clement also says that Herodorus (*FGH* 31 F 13) records that Heracles receiving the pillars of the universe from Atlas the Phrygian means that he received by instruction the knowledge of the heavenly bodies (*Strom*. 1.15.73). Athenagoras, on the other hand, rejects the allegorization of Heracles which is present in Orphic cosmogony (*Leg*. 18.4–5)[112] in which Heracles's body is described as serpent-like (*Leg*. 20.2–3):[113] Heracles cannot be a god because he had a beginning. This is contrary to Athenagoras's

[111] See Klaus Thraede, "Erfinder II," *RAC* 5 (1962): 1247–1259.
[112] Geffcken, *Apologeten*, 198–199; West, *Orphic Poems*, 179–182, 190–194.
[113] Rein Ferwerda, "Le serpent, le noeud d'Hercule et le caducée d'Hermès," *Numen* 20 (1973): 104–115.

principle, derived from Plato, *Tim.* 27D (cf. *Leg.* 19.2), that what has an origin in time has no existence,[114] which forms the basis of his rejection of allegorization, and functions in his euhemeristic interpretation. Refuge was also taken in allegorization in positive doctrinal formulation. Thus Stoic allegorization is applied in Ps.-Clement, *Hom.* 6.16, where Heracles is the symbol of the true philosophical reason which wanders throughout the world taming the hearts of men, his Labors having a hidden reference to virtue. The most extensive allegorization is found in Justin the Gnostic (Hippolytus, *Haer.* 5.25–26; cf. 10.15), whose cosmogony is an allegorical interpretation of Herodotus's description (5.8–10) of Heracles.[115] Here the allegorization is not moralistic, follows no Stoic or Platonic tradition, but is purely gnostic,[116] but may have been influenced by an Egyptian interpretation of Isis.[117]

*Heracles in Polemic*

Heracles was a favorite target of Christian polemic. His Labors were regarded as not unique (Tertullian, *Nat.* 2.14), and he was especially subjected to moral criticism. Prudentius (*Hamartig.* 401–405) regards Cynicism, which wields the club of Heracles, as one | of the major vices. Lactantius (*Inst.* 1.9; cf. 1.18.2–3), on the other hand, uses Cynic-Stoic criteria in evaluating him: if Heracles had conquered the passions, he might have been exemplary, but as it is, he was a mere athlete (cf. Lucretius 5.22–54). Using the old polemical tradition, it is pointed out that the poets themselves recount the stories unworthy of a god (Arnobius, *Adv. gent.* 4.35; cf. 25; Lactantius, *Inst.* 1.9.8). He is, on the contrary, an example of men's opinion that the gods enjoy the same pleasures they do (Augustine, *Civ.* 6.7), but the drunk, mad, murdering Heracles cannot be a god (Aristides 10.9; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 29.1).[118] Nor did he attain divinity through his ascension, for immortality is not attained by bloodshed or physical prowess (Lactantius, *Inst.* 1.18.4–17). Heracles, himself begotten by immoral Zeus during his three or nine nights with Alcmene (τριέσπερος: Ps.-Justin, *Or. ad Graec.* 3; nine nights: Clement

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[114] Abraham J. Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers," in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann; 2 vols.; Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 1:214–225, esp. 214–218. [*Light*, 2:849–865]

[115] Simon, *Hercule*, 88–95.

[116] Ernst Haenchen, "Das Buch Baruch: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der christlichen Gnosis," *ZTK* 50 (1953): 123–158.

[117] Roelof van den Broek, "The Shape of Eden according to Justin the Gnostic," *VC* 27 (1973) 35–45.

[118] Geffcken, *Apologeten*, 70–71.

of Alexandria, *Protr*. 2.33.3–4, followed by Arnobius, *Adv. gent*. 4.26, perhaps confusing it with Zeus's nine nights with Mnemosyne), is a prime example of licentiousness. His sexual exploits in general are condemned (Ps.-Justin, *Or. ad Graec*. 3; Clement of Alexandria, *Protr*. 2.33.4; 35.1; Tertullian, *Nat*. 2.10.14; Eusebius, *Laud. Const*. 7.4; Athanasius, *C. gent*. 12; Theodoret, *Cur*. 8.15–17 [SC 57.2.315–316]), but in particular his debasement and enslavement by Omphale and his effeminacy were regarded as offensive (Origen, *Cels*. 7.53–55; Prudentius, *Peristeph*. 10.239–240). Heracles the scytalosagittipelliger ("Club-shaft-and-hide-bearer") is proof that change is not always an improvement (Tertullian, *Pall*. 4.3).[119] His homosexual love for Hylas is mentioned repeatedly (Clement of Alexandria, *Protr*. 2.33.5; Arnobius, *Adv. gent*. 4.26; Firmicus Maternus, *Math*. 12.2; Prudentius, *C. Symm*. 1.116; contrast Theocritus, *Id*. 13) as is his showing himself a worthy son by sleeping with the fifty daughters of Thestius in one night (Pausanias, 9.27.7) and begetting fifty sons, thus performing his thirteenth Labor (Tatian, *Or*. 21; Clement of Alexandria, *Protr*. 2.33.3–4; Thestius and Thespius confused by Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or*. 4.122 [PG 35:661b]; Theodoret, *Or*. 8.16 [SC 57.2.315]). Ridicule was heaped on him beyond his sexual exploits. His pedigree | was thought 578 an example of futile mythological genealogies (Theophilus, *Autol*. 2.7; cf. Theocritus, *Id*. 17.20–33).[120] His labor in the Augean stables, not as proverbial as sometimes thought,[121] and already sanitized by Theocritus (*Id*. 25), showed to the polemicists how undignified and absurd the portrayals of the pagan gods were (Minucius Felix 23.5; Ps.-Justin, *Or. ad Graec*. 2).

The ridicule was also extended to those who reverenced him (Origen, *Cels*. 8.41–42; Prudentius, *Perist*. 10.281–285). Heracles is advanced as an example of idolatrous worship (Prudentius, *Apoth*. 458; Maximus of Turin, *Serm*. 48.4 [CCSL 23.189]) in competition with other gods and goddesses (Prudentius, *Perist*. 10.212–215). The criticism again is moral. Julian's admiration for the licentious Heracles whose lust led to the pyre is opposed (Gregory of Nazianzus, *Or*. 4.70; cf. Theodoret, *Cur*. 8.17–18 [SC 57.2.316]), those who worship Heracles are accused of lust (Lactantius, *Inst*. 5.10.16), and it is noted that homage is even extended to immoral persons (Faula, Caca) associated with Heracles (Lactantius, *Inst*. 1.20.5, 36).

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[119] Aloïs Gerlo, trans., *De Pallio* (2 vols.; Wetteren: Uitgeverij De Meester, 1940), 2:116. Tertullian derived the word from a comic poet.

[120] William W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization* (3d ed.; New York: Meridian, 1961), 51.

[121] Brommer, *Heracles: The Twelve Labors*, 28–29; Galinsky, *Herakles Theme*, 122.

*The Life of Jesus*

It is to be expected that comparisons would be made between Heracles and Jesus. In intra-Christian debate, Tertullian argues that if Marcion should insist that Jesus had both human and divine fathers, he would make Christ the Heracles of fable (*Marc.* 4.10.7). Most of the comparisons appear in the dialogue between Christians and non-Christians, and are frequently brought up by the latter. Justin, responding to Trypho's comparison of the virgin birth to pagan myths and to Trypho's challenge to prove his assertions from Scripture, refers to Ps 18:5 LXX, and claims that the prophecy had been imitated by the devil when Heracles was described as strong, traveling over the world, born of Zeus and Alcmene, and ascended to heaven (*Dial.* 67.2; 69.3; cf. *1 Apol.* 54.9).[122] Athanasius (*Inc.* 49), for his part, also referring to the ministry of Jesus, claims that the Word who banished illness, demons and death from man, was far superior to Heracles, who fought only with 579 men equal to himself, and killed wild beasts by trickery | (cf. Dio Cassius 56.36.4). The comparisons concentrate on the death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus. On the attack, Arnobius asks why pagans should object to the crucifixion if they accept the immolation of Heracles (*Adv. gent.* 1.41). Theophilus raises the same questions with reference to the resurrection (*Autol.* 1.13). Celsus carried the argument from the other side, claiming that Christian wonders are designed to convince the simple and that Christ's resurrection does not differ from pagan stories of persons like Heracles who had gone to and returned from Hades, to which Origen responds by stressing the public nature of Christ's death (*Cels.* 2.55; cf. 2.70). Celsus here rejects the pagan accounts, while in Origen, *Cels.* 3.22–23 he seems to accept them.[123] Again, in *Cels.* 3.42, he offers the challenge, if Christ became a god by putting off the flesh, why deny the possibility to Asclepius, Dionysus, and Heracles, to which Origen replies with the moral argument. A further stage in the argument is reached in Augustine, *Civ.* 22.4, where Augustine opposes wise and learned men who, quoting Cicero, *Rep.* 3.28.40, said that Heracles and Romulus were changed from men to gods, but that their bodies had not changed. While Justin (*1 Apol.* 21) finds analogies to the death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus in such stories as the immolation of

[122] See Thraede, "Erfinder II," 1247.

[123] Carl Andresen, *Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (AKG 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955), 48–49; Harold Remus, *Pagan-Christian Conflict over Miracle in the Second Century* (PatMS 10; Cambridge, Mass.: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1983), 124.

Heracles, they fail his moral test (cf. Eusebius, *Theoph.* 3.61 [GCS Eusebius 3.157]). Heracles's apotheosis through his immolation is absurd (Minucius Felix 22.7; Firmicus Maternus, *Err.* 7.6; cf. 12.8). Tertullian, in opposing the Stoics, rejects Heracles's apotheosis on the basis of his merits. In fact, Heracles, in remorse for his many murders, considered himself deserving of death by burning, but people later raised him to the sky (*Nat.* 2.14).

*Euhemeristic Interpretation of Heracles*

The euhemeristic interpretation, already appearing in the comparison of Heracles and Jesus, occupies a prominent place in the sustained attack on the hero. These comments on Heracles must be seen in the | larger context 580 of Euhemerism in early Christianity. The priority-*topos*[124] is used: Moses is older than Heracles, and pagans are dependent on him (Tatian, *Or.* 41.1–2),[125] and elaborate chronologies are drawn up to detail that dependence (Julius Africanus, *Chron. Frg.* 13.7 [PG 10:77c]; Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 10.9.9; 10.19; 11.28 [Tatian]; 12.16–19 [Clement of Alexandria]; 12.27–28; Theodoret, *Cur.* 2.47–48 [SC 57.1.152–153]). The argument also fits in Clement's use of the "barbarians" *topos* (*Strom.* 1.16.73).[126] More particularly euhemeristic is the accusation that men had been deified (cf. *Mart. Apollon.* 22 [97.11–12 Musurillo]; Eusebius, *Laud. Const.* 13.4; *Theoph.* 2.12 [GCS Eusebius 3.83]). Athenagoras (*Leg.* 26–30) argues that the gods had a beginning in time, which precludes their being gods (see discussion above under "Allegorization of Heracles"), and, working with a catalogue of apotheosized persons (cf. Cicero, *Nat. d.* 2.62, 3.39, and commentary by Pease),[127] opposes Heracles's being called a god because of his strength (*Leg.* 30.1; cf. Commodianus, *Instr.* 15), and adduces the usual moral criticisms.[128] The same criticisms are found elsewhere (Theophilus, *Autol.* 1.9; Clement of Alexandria, *Protr.* 2.30.6; cf. 26.7; Firmicus Maternus, *Err.* 12.8; Cassiodorus, *Hist. eccl.* 7.2.32 [CSEL 71:382–383]). Arnobius (*Adv. gent.* 2.70, 74), responding to the charge of the newness of Christianity, with less philosophical adeptness counters that Heracles too had a beginning in time, and demands that, if pagans regard persons like him as gods because of their deeds, how much more can Christians regard Christ as

124 See Thraede, "Erfinder II," 1247–1259.

125 Martin Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie* (FKDG 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960), 36; see Thraede, "Erfinder II," 1249.

126 See Thraede, "Erfinder II," 1257–1259.

127 Geffcken, *Apologeten*, 225–226.

128 Jacobus W. Schippers, *De ontwikkeling der euhemeristische godencritiek in de christlijke latijnse literatuur* (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1952), 38–44; see Thraede, "Euhemerismus," 886.

divine because of what he has done? (*Adv. gent.* 1.38).[129] Lactantius, with no conception of a philosophical Heracles (cf. *Inst.* 1.9), and making extensive use of Cicero (*Inst.* 1.15), in the tradition of Tertullian levels a similar but heavier attack on Heracles and Jupiter because of the attachment of the dynasties of Maximian and Diocletian to them (see discussion above under "The Imperial Heracles").[130] | Augustine (*Civ.* 4.27), with reference to Varro's tripartite theology (cf. Theodoret, *Cur.* 3.23–24 [SC 57.1.176),[131] charges that Scaevola and Varro already had regarded such doctrines as that Heracles had been a man to be harmful to the masses.

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Celsus knew such Christian euhemeristic interpretation and turned the argument against them (Origen, *Cels.* 3.22; cf. 3.42; 7.53).[132] It was also introduced into the discussion of martyrdom. Justin had done so in his polemic with Crescens (see discussion above under "Positive Evaluations of Heracles"). Theodoret, although he in *Cur.* 3 made extensive use of the arsenal of arguments against the pagan gods, uses Euhemerism positively in *Cur.* 8 to argue for the cult of the martyrs: if pagans can venerate their heroes after their death, why cannot the Christians theirs? Had he known the arguments of someone like Celsus (Origen, *Cels.* 3.22), he might have been more circumspect.[133] Augustine (*Civ.* 22.10) is much more careful to distinguish between the pagan gods and the martyrs, who are not claimed to be gods, but are worthy of the honors shown them.

### *Heracles in the Catacombs on the Via Latina*

Important for the Heracles theme is the small catacomb on the Via Latina in Rome, discovered in 1955.[134] One of the chambers of the catacomb contains

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[129] Louis J. Swift, "Arnobius and Lactantius: Two Views of the Pagan Poets," *TAPA* 96 (1965): 439–448.

[130] Pierre Monat, "La polémique de Lactance contre Hercule: Tradition orientale et culture occidentale," *Hommages à Lucien Lerat* (ed. Hélène Walter; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1984), 575–583; James Stevenson, "Aspects of the relations between Lactantius and the classics," StPatr 4 = TU 79 (1961): 497–503.

[131] Burkhart Cardauns, *Varros logistoricus über die Götterverehrung* (Würzburg: K. Triltsch, 1960), 53–58; Godo Lieberg, "Die theologia tripertita in Forschung und Bezeugung," *ANRW* 1.4 (1974): 63–115.

[132] See discussion above under "The Life of Jesus"; also Andresen, *Logos und Nomos*, 363–365; Harry Y. Gamble, "Euhemerism and Christology in Origen: 'Contra Celsum' III 22–43,'" *VC* 33 (1979): 12–29; see Thraede, "Euhemerismus," 885–886.

[133] Pierre Canivet, *Histoire d' une enterprise apologétique au V^e^ siècle* (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1958), 107–109.

[134] Antonio Ferrua, *Le pitture della nuova catacomba di via Latina* (MAC 2.8; Vatican City: Pontificio Istituto di archeologia cristiana, 1960).

six pictures from the life of Heracles in which his rescue of Alcestis is an important ingredient.[135] The pictures of Heracles are confined to the one chamber, and are not mixed with biblical scenes which appear extensively in the other chambers. Of the latter, of special interest is the representation of Samson in the type of the heraclean battle with the Nemean lion.[136] The | catacomb is generally dated to the period between Constantine and Theodosius,[137] thus the period of Heracles's imperial ascendancy and the sustained Christian attack on him. The ownership, and consequently the interpretation of its paintings, is still debated. Three major possibilities have been suggested: 582

1. The catacomb was part of a commercial enterprise with chambers sold to pagans as well as Christians, thus explaining the absence of Christian elements in the Heracles paintings.[138]
2. The catacomb belonged to a religiously divided family, the majority of whom were Christians.[139]
3. The catacomb belonged to a Christian family.[140]

On the assumption of either (2) or (3), the question is whether the Heracles pictures are to be interpreted allegorically, Heracles's achievement being regarded as prototypes of those of Christ,[141] or whether they are simply to be regarded as decoration. The former option has been chosen by most writers. The Christian adoption of the Heracles themes has been interpreted, against the general cultural and intellectual background rather than a particular heracleology, as an effort to express hopes with respect

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[135] Josef Fink, *Bildfrömmigkeit und Bekenntnis: Das Alte Testament, Herakles und die Herrlichkeit Christi an der Via Latina in Rom* (BAKG 12; Cologne: Böhlau, 1978), 94–98.

[136] Fink, "Herakles: Held und Heiland," 86; Lieselotte Kötzsche-Breitenbruch, *Die neue Katakombe an der Via Latina in Rom* (JAC Suppl. vol. 4; Münster: Aschendorff, 1976), 90.

[137] Kötzsche-Breitenbruch, *Die neue Katakombe*, 13–14.

[138] Friedrich W. Deichmann, "Zur Frage der Gesamtschau der frühchristlichen und frühbyzantinschen Kunst," *ByzZ* 63 (1970): 51–52.

[139] Ferrua, *Le pitture*; see Theodor Klauser, review of Ferrua, JAC 5 (1962): 182; Marcel Simon, "Remarques sur le catacombe de la Via Latina," in *Mullus: Festschrift Theodor Klauser* (JAC Suppl. vol. 1; ed. Alfred Stuiber and Alfred Hermann; Münster: Aschendorff, 1964), 333–334.

[140] Walter N. Schumacher, "Reparatio vitae: Zum Programm der neuen Katakombe an der Via Latina zu Rom," *RQ* 66 (1971): 148–153; Erwin R. Goodenough, "Catacomb Art," *JBL* 81 (1962): 113–142.

[141] Hesitant: Jocelyn M.C. Toynbee, *Death and Burial in the Roman World* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1971), 244; Kötzsche-Breitenbruch, 11–12.

to death and resurrection.[142] Simon, on the other hand, sees the Via Latina as vindication of his understanding of Heracles as a rival of Christ (see discussion above under "The Life of Jesus"). For him Alcestis in the paintings represents resurrection, and Heracles as he was venerated by the faithful is the savior god who triumphs over evil forces, even death itself. Nevertheless, Simon does not think that Heracles has here already been integrated into Christian ideology; one should rather speak of parallelism than Christianization.[143] Yet the Via Latina does witness to a liberalism unexpected during the period.[144] Fink agrees with Simon, but goes on to 583 claim that the Via Latina is evidence of Christian adoption | of Heracles.[145]

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142 Schumacher, "Reparatio vitae," 148–153.

143 Simon, "Remarques," 330–335.

144 Marcel Simon, *La civilisation de l'antiquité et Ie christianisme* (CGC; Paris: Arthaud, 1972), 370–371.

145 Fink, "Herakles als Christusbild," 133–146; against this view, see Josef Engemann, "Altes und Neues zu Beispielen heidnischer und christlicher Katakombenbilder im spätantiken Rom," JAC 26 (1983): 149–151.

CHAPTER FOUR

# HELLENISTIC MORALISTS AND THE NEW TESTAMENT*

## Introduction

The affinity between Christian ethical teaching and that of the Hellenistic moralists was recognized by the early church. Justin Martyr's conviction, that whatever had been correctly said by all men belonged to Christians,[1] was shared by many of the church fathers. Some of them were heavily indebted to Hellenistic moral teaching, especially to that of the Stoics,[2] without making | explicit reference to their sources, while others openly acknowledged their debt. Such influence can already be observed in some of 268

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* Originally published in *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333. When the published article appeared, I attached the following letter dated November, 1992, to the offprint that I sent to friends and colleagues: "As some of you know, the manuscript of this article was submitted to *ANRW* twenty years ago, and it is therefore with some misgivings that I send you this offprint."

"When I wrote the piece in 1972, I offered a *Forschungsbericht* and indicated some topics that might be pursued. In the intervening years some of those suggestions were taken up, frequently by my students, and I have continued my own work. The result is that, as I repeatedly reworked the manuscript for (imminent!) publication, the article assumed too much the character of a report of my and my students' work, and that I regret. Experts in redaction criticism will be able to identify additions and modifications that I have made from time to time. Were I to write such an article today, it might very well take a different shape. I simply had neither the inclination nor time, at the end, to recast the entire report. I thought of withdrawing it and writing a small book on the subject, but finally relented since the article has been referred to so often and I still regularly receive inquiries about its publication."

"Despite these reservations I hope that the article may still be of some value and interest."

I have resisted the temptation to update the article for this edition and have confined myself to making the absolutely minimum bibliographical additions.

[1] *2 Apol.* 13.4.

[2] See Friedrich Überweg and Karl Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie, I. Die Philosophie des Altertums* (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1926), 503; Martin P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion, II.* HAW 5.2.2 (2d ed.; Munich: Beck, 1961), 399ff.; Michel Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères de l'église, de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie* (PatSor 1; Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957); Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* (2 vols.; SHCT 34–35; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), esp. vol. 2. For broader dependence, see John Whittaker, "Christianity and Morality in the Roman Empire," *VC* 33 (1979): 209–225.

the Apostolic Fathers, e.g., Clement of Rome[3] and the Shepherd of Hermas,[4] but the moralists are first explicitly mentioned by the Apologists, and the use of their works increases from then on.

Of the philosophers of the Cynic and Stoic types, Musonius Rufus was held in high repute by Christians as he was by pagans.[5] Justin regarded him as one of the philosophers whose moral teaching was admirable,[6] Origen placed him in the company of Heracles, Odysseus, and Socrates,[7] and Clement of Alexandria used his works in Books 2 and 3 of his *Paedagogus*.[8] Musonius's student Epictetus also enjoyed wide circulation in the early church, although his influence in the second and third centuries appears to have been rather slight.[9] He is not mentioned by Justin

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[3] See Louis Sanders, *L'hellénisme de Saint Clément de Rome et le paulinisme* (StHell 2; Leuven: Studia Hellenistica in Bibliotheca Universitatis, 1943), and the discussion of the possible influence of Stoicism on ch. 20 of his letter to Corinth in Willem C. van Unnik, "Is 1 Clement 20 Purely Stoic?," *VC* 4 (1950): 181–189 (repr. in *Sparsa Collecta: The Collected Essays of W.C. van Unnik* [3 vols.; NovTSup 29–31; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973–1983], 3:52–58); Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, Band I* (2d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1959), 406; Johannes J. Thierry, "Note sur τὰ ἐλάχιστα τῶν ζώων au chapitre XX de la 1ª Clementis," *VC* 14 (1960): 235–244.

[4] See Martin Dibelius, *Der Hirt des Hermas* (HNT 4; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1923), especially his commentary on the *Mandates*.

[5] Rudolf Hirzel, *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch* (2 vols.; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1895), 2:239, called him "the Roman Socrates." For a sketch of his life, see Cora E. Lutz, *Musonius Rufus: "The Roman Socrates"* (YCS 10; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 3ff.

[6] *2 Apol.* 8.1.

[7] Origen, *Cels.* 3.66. For Heracles in Christian writings, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Herakles," *RAC* 14 (1988): 559–583, esp. 567–583. [*Light*, 2:651–674]

[8] Paul Wendland, *Quaestiones Musonianae: De Musonio Stoico Clementis Alexandrini aliorumque auctore* (Berlin: Meyer & Mueller, 1886), claimed that Clement took large blocks of material word for word from a book by Musonius which Lucius had also used in the publication of his notes on Musonius's diatribes. In *Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895), Wendland gave up this theory, but still held that other authors, e.g., Epictetus, Plutarch, and Tertullian, did borrow from a more complete set of notes by Lucius than those preserved by Stobaeus. Although Wendland's views have been criticized, e.g., by Otto Hense, *C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1905), Vff., Clement's dependence on Musonius is generally accepted. See Henri-Irénée Marrou, "Diatribe (B)," *RAC* 3 (1957): 997–1009, esp. 1001–1002, and Michel Spanneut, "Epiktet," *RAC* 5 (1962): 599–681, esp. 633–634. For a recent discussion, see Anton C. van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe* (rev. ed.; WTS 8; Assen: van Gorcum, 1963), 19ff. (= *Musonius Rufus en de griekse diatribe* [Amsterdam: H. J. Paris, 1948], 20ff.). On Clement's debt to Stoic ethics, see Henry Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition. Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 41–43, 58–63, and especially Max Pohlenz, *Klemens von Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum* (*NAWG*; Philologisch-historische Klasse NS 5.1.5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1943).

[9] See Spanneut, "Epiktet," 599–681. The *Enchiridion* circulated in two Christian recensions. See Migne, PG 79:1255–1316, for that ascribed to Nilus, and Heinrich Schenkl, *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriani digestae* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1916), for the evidence of Christian use in general; also see Michel Spanneut, "Image de l'homme dans un commentaire chrétien

or Clement, but traces of his | influence can probably be found in their writings.[10] The first Christian to mention him by name is Origen, who claims that while Plato benefits the educated, Epictetus benefits all people who want to live a better life.[11] 269

Christian moral teaching was similar not only to that of Stoicism.[12] As did their pagan contemporaries, Christians borrowed extensively from whatever school happened to meet their immediate needs.[13] Celsus could, not without cause, throw it up to the Christians that their system of morals was shared by the philosophers, and that there was nothing especially

inédit du *Manuel* d'Épictète," in *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought: Studia Gerardo Verbeke ab amicis et collegis dicata* (ed. Fernand Bossier; SFLPL A.1; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1976), 213–230.

[10] See Spanneut, "Epiktet," 633–634. Also instructive, for a later period, is the high regard in which Synesius held Dio Chrysostom, another student of Musonius. See Synesius, *Dio* (*Synesios von Kyrene. Ein Kommentar zu seinem "Dion"* [ed. Kurt Treu; TUGAL 71; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958]), on which see Jay Bregman, *Synesius of Cyrene, Philosopher-Bishop* (TCH 3; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), esp. 127–133, 138–139.

[11] Origen, *Cels.* 6.2. Epictetus did not exert a real influence on Origen. The influence, such as it was, can be traced to Alexandria, where Epictetus seems to have had a large following. See also Uwe Kuehneweg, "Die griechischen Apologeten und die Ethik," *VC* 42 (1988): 112–120.

[12] See, for example, Henry Chadwick, *The Sentences of Sextus: A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics* (TS 2d series, 5; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), for a Christianization of Neopythagorean ethics. See further David L. Balch, "Neopythagorean Moralists and the New Testament Household Codes," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 380–411; Balch, "Household Ethical Codes in Peripatetic, Neopythagorean and Early Christian Moralists" in *SBL Seminar Papers, 1977* (ed. Paul J. Achtemeier; *SBLSP* 11; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), 397–404; Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLMS 26; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981). More remote, but still relevant, is Wolfgang Fauth, "Pythagoras, Jesus von Nazareth und der Helios-Apollon des Julianus Apostata," *ZNW* 78 (1987): 26–48. Konrat Ziegler, "Plutarchos von Chaironeia," PW 21 (1951): 948, stresses the usefulness of the Middle Platonist Plutarch's writings to Christians. The first Christian to study Plutarch carefully, and who took the title of one of his own works, Στρωματεῖς, from him, is Clement of Alexandria, who does not, however, mention him as a source.

[13] For the character of this "philosophical Koine" and its interest in ethics, see Paul Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zum Judentum und Christentum* (ed. Heinrich Dörrie; 4th ed.; HNT 2; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), ch. 5; Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (2 vols.; 6th ed.; HAW 7.2; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1920–1924; repr., 1959–1961), 1:50–108; Ludwig Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms* (8th ed.; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1910), ch. 3: "Die Philosophie als Erzieherin zur Sittlichkeit"; Albrecht Dihle, "Ethik," *RAC* 6 (1966): 646–796, esp. 661ff.; Anton-Herman Chroust, "The Meaning of Philosophy in the Hellenistic Roman World," *The Thomist* 17 (1954): 196–253; Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1888), 139–170; Karl Prümm, *Religionsgeschichtliches Handbuch für den Raum der altchristlichen Umwelt: Hellenistisch-römische Geistesströmungen und Kulte mit Beachtung des Eigenlebens der Provinzen* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1943; repr., Rome: Päpstliches Bibleinstitut, 1954), 193ff.

impressive or new about it, a charge with which Christians could not completely disagree.[14] The respect with which the moral philosophers were viewed is well illustrated by the growing Christianization of Seneca in the early church. Whereas Tertullian referred to him as *Seneca saepe noster*,[15] two hundred years later Jerome dropped the qualifying adverb and called him *noster Seneca*.[16] In the | intervening period a collection of fourteen letters purporting to have passed between Paul and Seneca had come into existence.[17] These spurious writings reflect the tacit assumption that Paul and Seneca have much in common,[18] and they may have been written either to recommend Seneca to Christians or Christianity to readers of Seneca.[19]

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Given this recognized affinity of early Christian morality to its Hellenistic antecedents, the writings of the NT could also be expected to betray such influence. A considerable amount of work has been done to clarify the relationship between the NT (especially the Pauline letters and the Epistle of James) and the moral philosophers. I shall attempt to point out in this essay that much still remains to be done. I shall identify some of

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[14] Origen, *Cels*. 1.4. See Chadwick, *Sentences of Sextus*, 161.

[15] Tertullian, *An.* 20.

[16] Jerome, *Jov*. 1.49.

[17] For a still excellent discussion, see Joseph B. Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians* (4th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1878), 270–333. See also Alfons Kurfess, "The Apocryphal Correspondence Between Seneca and Paul," in *New Testament Apocrypha* (ed. Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher; English translation edited by Robert McL. Wilson; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963–1966), 2:133–141 (= *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen in deutscher Übersetzung* [ed. E. Hennecke and W. Schneemelcher; 2 vols.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (P. Siebeck), 1959–1964], 2:84–89); Karlhans Abel, "Seneca: Leben und Leistung," *ANRW* 2.32.2 (1985): 653–775, esp. 701–702. See also Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Seneca' on Paul as Letter Writer" in *The Future of Early Christianity: Essays in Honor of Helmut Koester* (ed. Birger A. Pearson, A. Thomas Kraabel, George W. E. Nickelsburg, and Norman R. Petersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 414–421. [*Light*, 2:903–911]

[18] For a judicious treatment of the two, see Jan N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (NovTSup 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961).

[19] Thus Lightfoot, *Philippians*, 329, who sees as supporting evidence for this view the fact that in several manuscripts these letters precede the genuine works of Seneca. For an argument against the view that Seneca was viewed as a Christian in the Middle Ages, see Arnaldo Momigliano, "Note sulla legenda del cristianesimo di Seneca," *RSIt* 62 (1950): 333–338; repr. in *Primo Contributo alla storia degli studi classici* (vol. 1; SeL 47; Rome: Edizioni di Storia e letteratura, 1955), 21–26. On the letters, see Laura Bocciolini Palagi, *Il carteggio apocrifo di Seneca e san Paolo. Introduzione, testo, commento* (Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Colombaria" Studi 46; Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1978), and the discussion by Aldo Moda, "Seneca e il Cristianesimo: a proposito di tre libri recenti," *Hen* 5 (1983): 93–109.

the main lines of investigation in the history of research,[20] and in a few cases will point to new directions in which future research might go.

## | The "Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti" and the Problem of Parallels

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During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, great interest was shown in post-Aristotelian philosophy.[21] This was evidenced by the critical editions of important Hellenistic authors as well as by many special studies that were published during the period.[22] It was also a period in which classicists were actively engaged in the study of the literary sources of early Christianity.[23] This collaboration was

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[20] I am not aware of any single *Forschungsbericht* that covers the entire range of subjects touched upon here. Of still inestimable value is Wendland's *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, ch. 5, "Die philosopische Propaganda und die Diatribe." The articles by Rudolf Bultmann on *Paulusforschung* in *TRu* NS 1 (1929): 26–59; 6 (1934): 229–245; 8 (1936): 1–22, contain much of interest, as does Martin Dibelius, "Zur Formgeschichte des Neuen Testaments (außerhalb der Evangelien)," *TRu* NS 3 (1931): 207–242. See also Béda Rigaux, *Saint Paul et ses lettres. État de la question* (StudNeot Subsidia 2; Paris: Desclée, 1962) (= Rigaux, *The Letters of St. Paul: Modern Studies* [ed. and trans. Stephen Yonick; Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1968; repr., 2001]), as well as more recent works on NT ethics, especially Wolfgang Schrage, *Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese: Ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Ethik* (Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1961), and James E. Crouch, *The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafel* (FRLANT 109; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972). For a comprehensive treatment, see Dihle, "Ethik," 646–796, and for more detailed treatment of particular subjects and figures see the articles in *RAC*. For broader surveys, see Edwin A. Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," JAC 15 (1972): 19–36, and Frederick F. Bruce, "The New Testament and Classical Studies," *NTS* 22 (1976): 229–242. On literary relations, see Klaus Berger, "Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament," *ANRW* 2.25.2 (1984): 1031–1432, 1831–1885. Material of literary interest discussed in the present article is treated in David E. Aune, ed., *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres* (SBLSBS 21; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988). Aune, *The New Testament in Its Literary Environment* (LEC 8; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), also contains much of interest.

[21] Karl Praechter, "Griechische Philosophie," in *Die Altertumswissenschaft im letzten Vierteljahrhundert: Eine Übersicht über ihre Entwicklung in der Zeit von 1875–1900 im Verein mit mehreren Fachgenossen* (ed. Wilhelm Kroll; Leipzig: O.R. Reisland, 1905), 84–128.

[22] For a bibliography of some of the major publications, see Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, 75, and passim.

[23] One should also take note of the work done on Hellenistic Jewish authors. For bibliography before 1900, see Emil Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (4 vols.; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, vol. 1, 5th ed., 1920; vol. 2, 4th ed., 1907; vol. 3, 4th ed., 1909; vol. 4, 4th ed., 1911) (= *A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ* [5 vols.; 2d rev. ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1885–1890; new revised ed.; 4 vols.; ed. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, Matthew Black, Pamela Vermes, and Martin Goodman; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1973–1987]). For the period since 1900, see Gerhard Delling, *Bibliographie*

welcomed by *neotestamentici* even when they thought that their own work was not always judged graciously or fairly.[24] They were increasingly convinced that a knowledge of Hellenistic popular philosophy was necessary for a proper understanding of the NT. Thus Carl F.G. Heinrici, especially in his commentaries on 1 and 2 Corinthians, had stressed the Greek character 272 | of much that is in Paul's letters, and had adduced material from the popular philosophers to illustrate them.[25] Johannes Weiss insisted that the NT scholar should know Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Lucian, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero intimately, and should read the NT with von Arnim's collection of Stoic texts in hand.[26] It was in this climate that younger scholars did the major work that has determined the view of the relationship between the New Testament and the moralists ever since.[27]

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*zur jüdisch-hellenistischen und intertestamentarischen Literatur 1900–1970* (ed. Malwine Maser; 2d ed.; TUGAL 106; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975), and Nikolaus Walter, "Jüdisch-hellenistische Literatur vor Philon von Alexandrien (unter Ausschluß der Historiker)," *ANRW* 2.20.1 (1987): 67–120; Robert Doran, "The Jewish Hellenistic Historians Before Josephus," *ANRW* 2.20.1 (1987): 246–297, among others. Of great potential use to persons interested in the NT is Pieter W. van der Horst, *The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* (SVTP 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978).

[24] See Johannes Weiss, *Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1908), 3–4, for a sharp comment on the disdain with which classicists viewed the work of NT scholars. Eduard Norden, in the "Nachträge" to *Die antike Kunstprosa* (2 vols.; Berlin: Teubner, 1915), 2:3, apologizes to Carl F. G. Heinrici for the discourteous comments he had made in his first edition on the latter's commentary on 2 Corinthians. See also Hans Lietzmann, "Die klassische Philologie und das Neue Testament," *NJarhb* 21 (1905): 7–21, esp. 20; Hans Dieter Betz, "Hellenismus," *TRE* 15 (1986): 22–23; Hildebrecht Hommel, "Herrenworte im Lichte sokratischer Überlieferung," *ZNW* 57 (1966): 3–4 (= Hommel, *Sebasmata. Studien zur antiken Religionsgeschichte und zum frühen Christentum* [2 vols.; WUNT 31–32; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (P. Siebeck), 1983–1984], 2:53).

[25] See Ernst von Dobschütz's description of Heinrici's life (with bibliography) in the introduction to the latter's posthumously published *Die Hermes-Mystik und das Neue Testament* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1918), VII–XVII.

[26] Weiss, *Aufgaben*, 4, 11, 55.

[27] It is perhaps natural that in the nineteenth century attempts were made to prove that Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius were familiar with Christian doctrine and were influenced by it. Wendland's judgment (*Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, 95–96), that existing similarities were due to their common appropriation of popular Stoic thought, has also been that of subsequent scholarship. For a detailed treatment of the problem as it relates to the possible interdependence between Epictetus and the NT, see Adolf F. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament* (RVV 10; Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1911; repr., 1964), and his discussion with Rudolf Bultmann ("Das religiöse Moment in der ethischen Unterweisung des Epiktet und das Neue Testament," *ZNW* 13 [1912]: 97–110, 177–191) in his article "Epiktet und das Neue Testament," *ZNW* 13 (1912): 281–292. See further, Max Pohlenz, "Paulus und die Stoa," *ZNW* 48 (1949): 69–104. For the problem in broader perspective, see Léon Herrmann, *Chrestos. Témoignages païens et juifs sur le christianisme du première siècle* (CollLat 109; Brussels: Latomus, 1970), and Herbert Braun, "Die Indifferenz

Heinrici, around 1910, organized a group of young scholars to bring out a "new Wettstein."[28] The reference was to the eighteenth century work of Johann J. Wettstein, which has been best known for the extensive linguistic and other parallels in Greek and Latin literature which he collected in his edition of the NT.[29] It was optimistically thought by Heinrici's immediate successors in the project that with the aid of a large staff of collaborators the literature roughly contemporary with the NT could quickly be combed in the interest of composing a "Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti."[30] The project languished from time to time, but was revitalized two decades ago. Members of the project at that time were less sanguine about | completing it in the immediate future. Work then proceeded in a more systematic manner with the aim "to investigate everything that has been preserved from Greek and Roman antiquity as to its significance for the proper understanding of the NT."[31] Work on the Hellenistic Jewish texts was carried out under direction of Gerhard Delling of Halle until his recent death, while Willem Cornelis van Unnik of Utrecht until his death in 1978 was the director of work being done on pagan authors. An American branch of the latter section under the energetic leadership of Hans Dieter Betz was active, first at the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity at Claremont, California, and then at Chicago. 273

Since the project does include work on some of the moral philosophers, a brief report on the pagan philosophers is in order. The work has been carried out in a number of ways. All collaborators who worked systematically through selected authors were to forward their cards on which

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gegenüber der Welt bei Paulus und bei Epiktet," in Braun, *Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt* (2d ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1967), 159–167. Léon Herrmann, *Sénèque et les premiers chrétiens* (CollLat 167; Brussels: Latomus, 1979), 75–79, 88, 90, considers it possible that Seneca reacted to Christian teachings.

[28] For the organizational details, see von Dobschütz, "Der Plan eines neuen Wettstein," *ZNW* 21 (1922): 146–148. For the most recent account of the project, see Willem C. van Unnik, "Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti," *JBL* 83 (1964): 17–33 (= van Unnik, *Sparsa Collecta*, 2 [1980]: 194–214). The present survey is superseded by Pieter W. van der Horst, "Corpus Hellenisticum," *ABD* 1 (1992): 1157–1161.

[29] Η ΚΑΙΝΗ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ (2 vols.; Amsterdam: Ex officina Dommeriana, 1751–1752); repr. facsimile ed. *Novum Testamentum Graecum* (2 vols.; Graz: Akademische Druck und Verlatsanstalt, 1962).

[30] See Ernst von Dobschütz, Self-portrayal in *Die Religionswissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* (ed. Erich Stange; 5 vols.; Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1925–1929), 4 (1928): 30–62 (1–32), esp. 49 (19).

[31] Van Unnik, "Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti," 23 (= *Sparsa Collecta*, 2 [1980]: 202).

parallels were noted to the master file in Utrecht, from which the final reference work would be compiled. The American branch has so far primarily concentrated on Plutarch's *Pythian Dialogues* and his ethical writings,[32] and has contributed three volumes to the recently established series, "Studia ad Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti,"[33] in which studies on Apollonius of Tyana by Gert Petzke[34] of Mainz, Dio Chrysostom by Gerard Mussies[35] of Utrecht, and Aelius Aristides by Pieter W. van der Horst[36] of Utrecht have appeared. With earlier monographs on Plutarch[37] and Lucian,[38] the works on Seneca and Epictetus,[39] and a preliminary study on Musonius,[40] most of the major authors have now been treated in one 274 way or another. A major area still requiring attention is | Cynicism, but a beginning has been made and further work, not formally related to the project, has been planned.[41]

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[32] See Hans Dieter Betz, "Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti," *Bulletin of the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity*, No. 6 (Claremont, Calif., February, 1973): 5–7, who also lists Apuleius, Artemidorus, and the "Corpus Hermeticum" as corpora of primary interest. In addition, a new project on the "Papyri Graecae Magicae" has been undertaken. The first major volume to appear is Hans Dieter Betz, ed., *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, including the Demotic Spells: Volume 1: Texts* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). See also William C. Grese, *Corpus Hermeticum XIII and Early Christian Literature* (SCHNT 5; Leiden: Brill, 1979).

[33] Hans Dieter Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature* (SCHNT 3; Leiden: Brill, 1975); Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978).

[34] Gerd Petzke, *Die Traditionen über Apollonius von Tyana und das Neue Testament* (SCHNT 1; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970).

[35] Gerard Mussies, *Dio Chrysostom and the New Testament* (SCHNT 2; Leiden: Brill, 1972).

[36] Pieter W. van der Horst, *Aelius Aristides and the New Testament* (SCHNT 6; Leiden: Brill, 1980).

[37] Helge Almqvist, *Plutarch und das Neue Testament: Ein Beitrag zum Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti* (ASNU 15; Uppsala: Appelbergs Boktryckeri, 1946).

[38] Hans Dieter Betz, *Lukian von Samosata und das Neue Testament; religionsgeschichtliche und paränetische Parallelen: Ein Beitrag zum Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti* (TUGAL 76 [5th series, vol. 21]; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961).

[39] See nn. 18 and 27 above.

[40] Pieter W. van der Horst, "Musonius Rufus and the New Testament," *NovT* 16 (1974): 306–315; see van der Horst, "Hierocles the Stoic and the New Testament," *NovT* 17 (1975): 156–160, and van der Horst, "Macrobius and the New Testament," *NovT* 15 (1973): 220–232.

[41] Important Cynic sources have recently been made more readily available: Harold W. Attridge, *First-Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus* (HTS 29; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1976); Edward N. O'Neil, *Teles* (*The Cynic Teacher*) (SBLTT 11; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977); Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* (SBLSBS 12; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977); Jan F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (AUU: SGU 11; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976); Léonce Paquet, *Les cyniques grecs. Fragments et témoignages* (ColPhil 4; Ottawa: Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1975); John T. Fitzgerald and L. Michael White,

Work of the sort so far described appears to have slowed, and the organized future of the project is not clear. Nor is it clear what form the new Wettstein might take. In the meantime, however, Georg Strecker has undertaken a project at Göttingen to rework the old Wettstein and make it more usable by printing selected texts from that work in German translation with important Greek and Latin words and phrases in parentheses. The use of the best modern texts and translations and brief introductory comments will make this work accessible to a wider range of readers. For the time being, however, the "old Wettstein" will continue to be the handiest collection of parallels available.[42]

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*The Tabula of Cebes* (SBLTT 24; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983). For recent brief studies, see Hermann Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus," *Hermes* 98 (1970): 459–471, and Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989], 79–89); [*Light*, 1:41–51] Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thessalonians ii," *NovT* 12 (1970): 203–217 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 35–48); [*Light*, 1:53–67] Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles" in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers: A Volume in Honor of Stuart Dickson Currie* (ed. W. Eugene March; San Antonio, Tex.: Trinity University Press, 1980) (= *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 121–136). [*Light*, 1:117–134] Malherbe's students have continued to show the importance of Cynicism and the other philosophies for the illumination of the NT, e.g., Ronald F. Hock, "Paul's Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class," *JBL* 97 (1978): 555–564; Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980); Hock, "Cynics," *ABD* 1 (1992): 1221–1226; Benjamin Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986); John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988); Luke Timothy Johnson, "2 Timothy and the Polemic against False Teachers: A Re-examination," *JRelS* 6/7 (1978/1979): 1–26; Johnson, "James 3:13–4:10 and the Topos *Peri Phthonou*," *NovT* 25 (1983): 327–347. See also the recent work by Francis G. Downing, "Cynics and Christians," *NTS* 30 (1984): 582–593; Downing, "The Social Contexts of Jesus the Teacher," *NTS* 33 (1987): 439–451. See further, n. 332 below.

42 Wettstein's collection, of course, was not the only one of its kind. He himself made use of other *Spicilegia* and *Observationes* which had been and were being published by his predecessors and contemporaries. The usefulness of his collection over others from the period lies in its extensiveness and, since its reprinting in 1962, its availability. But the scholar can still profitably consult other works of the genre, e.g., Georg W. Kirchmaier, *Παραλληλισμός Novi Foederis et Polybii* (Wittenberg: Schroeder, 1725); Caspar F. Munthe, *Observationes philologicae in sacros Novi Testamenti libros, ex Diodoro Siculo collectae* (Leipzig: Peltius, 1755); Christoph F. Loesner, *Observationes ad Novum Testamentum e Philone Alexandrino* (Leipzig: Boehmium, 1777); Johann T. Krebs, *Observationes in Novum Testamentum e Flavio Iosepho* (Leipzig: Wendler, 1755); Georgius Raphel, *Annotationes in sacram scripturam, historicae in vetus, philologicae in novum testamentum, ex Xenophonte, Polybio, Arriano et Herodoto collectae* (2 vols.; Utrecht: Langerak, 1747); Wilhelm F. Hezel, *Novi foederis volumina sacra virorum clarissimorum opera ac studio, e scriptoribus graecis illustrata* (Halle: Gebauer, 1788). For further information on this type of investigation, see Jan Ros, *De Studie van het Bijbelgrieksch van Hugo Grotius tot Adolf Deissmann* (Nijmegen/Utrecht: Dekker & van de Vegt, 1940), 47–55; Emilio Springhetti, *Introductio Historica-*

275 | Although work on the project is thus progressing, it is taking place with certain methodological problems still unresolved. Considerable diversity characterizes the contributions which have been published. Some consist of little more than a brief introduction to the author or work treated and a listing of parallels. Some of these list the parallels in canonical order while others follow the order of the pagan author's work. Again, others gather together statements by a pagan author on particular topics and list brief references to NT passages, while yet others engage in longer comparisons of select topics. Diversity of approach is unavoidable, and a certain amount is indeed desirable. Different authors, corpora of material, problems or themes may well require different approaches if the enterprise is to avoid being superficial or mechanical. More serious attention, however, needs to be given at this time to the misuse to which a potentially useful tool could be put, and to guard, if possible, already in its preparation, against such future misuse. Contributors as well as readers would do well to learn from both the successes and failures of Strack-Billerbeck's *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*.

A major problem attending the use of such tools as the "Corpus Hellenisticum" is the focus on "parallels."[43] The problem is not confined to this project; indeed, modern electronic technology as much as anything else demands that more concerted attention be given to what constitutes a parallel and how parallels are to be used in the attempt to situate the NT more securely in its cultural context. The Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, now available on CD-ROM, provides almost instant access to verbal parallels in almost any ancient Greek author or selected group of authors. PHI CAT is in process of doing the same for Latin writers, and the Harvard Perseus project is making | Liddell-Scott, among other useful tools, available 276

*Grammatica in Graecitatem Novi Testamenti* (Rome: Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1966), 30–46. I am grateful to Professor Henk J. de Jonge for reference to these two works. For the context which gave rise to the *annotationes* and *observationes* literature, see de Jonge, *De bestudering van het Nieuwe Testament aan de Noordnederlandse universiteiten en het Remonstrants Seminarie van 1575 tot 1700* (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandse Uitgevers Maatschapij, 1980), 29–55 [= Verhandel. der Koninkl. Nederl. Akad. v. Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterk., Nieuwe Reeks, deel 106]; an abridged version appears in de Jonge, "The Study of the New Testament in the Dutch Universities, 1575–1700," *History of Universities* 1 (1981): 113–129.

[43] Biblical scholars once more have been cautioned recently to maintain perspective in this type of enterprise. See Samuel Sandmel, "Parallelomania," *JBL* 81 (1962): 1–13. For an awareness of the problems by someone actively engaged in the study of parallels, see Martin Dibelius, Self-portrayal in *Die Religionswissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* 5 (1929): 1–37, esp. 13, and van der Horst, *Aelius Aristides and the New Testament*, VII–IX.

on disk.[44] By using these tools imaginatively, for example, by focusing on semantic fields, the researcher can quite easily identify masses of "parallels" to phenomena in the NT.

Parallels so collected may very well be used in the ways parallels from Hellenistic moral philosophical material have been used in the past. These ways range from the rather superficial use of some concept or description from the philosophers to illuminate a NT term, for example, the apostle,[45] or the subject of freedom,[46] through the citing of parallels in commentaries on books of the NT without allowing the exposition of those books to be substantially influenced by the parallels,[47] or a similar use in treatments of such subjects as NT ethics.[48]

Such uncritical use of parallels is particularly unfortunate in light of the fact that the moral philosophers have frequently been approached with conceptions of eclecticism and syncretism which have not always contributed to precision. Quite often, scholars have operated on the supposition that we have to do with philosophic teachers who gathered whatever they thought potentially useful and stuffed it in their own grab-bags of teachings. The philosophers did so, it is assumed, without recognizing conceptual differences between their own views and those of the people from whom they borrowed. It is further often thought that they did not modify or adapt what they borrowed to their situations. The philosophers in fact did not use materials they derived from others in so undiscriminating a manner,[49] and the supposition that they did has led to the obscuration

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[44] The most useful source of information about development in computer-related resources for biblical and ancillary studies is Robert A. Kraft's column, "Offline," which appears regularly in *Religious Studies News*.

[45] Karl H. Rengstorff, "ἀπόστολος," *TWNT* 1 (1933): 408–412.

[46] Most recently by Samuel Vollenweider, *Freiheit als neue Schöpfung: Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT 147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), esp. 23–104.

[47] E.g., Johannes Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910); Hans Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (11th ed.; KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969); Hans Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (KEK 6; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924). Ceslas P. Spicq, *Saint Paul. Les épîtres pastorales* (2 vols.; 4th ed.; *EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1969), is a mine of information, but the material collected is not adequately brought into the interpretation of the letters.

[48] E.g., Herbert Preisker, *Das Ethos des Urchristentums* (2d ed.; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1949; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 27–30, 105–111; Morton Scott Enslin, *The Ethics of Paul* (New York: Abingdon, 1957). For a much more creative use, see Wayne A. Meeks, *The Moral World of the First Christians* (LEC 6; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 40–64.

[49] On the use of compilations of teachings, which one might expect to be used superficially, see Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 117–120.

or loss of the nuances and contours of much moral teaching.[50] The problem has been accentuated when | the philosophical materials have been approached from the Christian side with an agenda set by a NT interest, thus offering a Christian organizing principle for "parallels" found in the pagan materials.

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That philosophy in the early Empire was particularly interested in ethics, and that philosophers shared much moral instruction with each other, is of course true. But the agreement has been overdone in recent literature, especially when, as can be expected, a pagan parallel is discovered by using indices, lexica or some other aid which allows one to zero in on some word or phrase from the outside, so to speak, rather than discovering it from within by reading the philosophers themselves. When one reads the philosophers with the intention of respecting the coherence and integrity of each author's thought, one will find that the philosophers differed among themselves on many matters. It is ironic, in an age when we have become so aware of the diversity represented in the NT, that we fail to notice that not only did a Platonist like Plutarch inveigh sharply against Epicureans and Stoics alike, but that his own Platonism was of a particular brand. So, too, Stoics differed from Cynics, and Cynics differed among themselves on such matters as whether they might beg from people (and, if so, from whom), whether they should associate with political rulers, whether the harsh, ascetic life was the only one to lead, whether all people were in the direst moral condition, whether harsh speech was the only appropriate remedy, and so on.[51]

It is precisely when we begin to see how the philosophers engaged each other on those issues which were also of interest to the writers of the NT that they become of greater value to us as we seek to place the NT in its cultural context. Jan N. Sevenster's comparison of the thought of Paul and Seneca, for example, may have come out differently if the net had been cast more widely. Sevenster is not content with concentrating on isolated details, but compares Seneca's and Paul's thoughts on God,

[50] For the disparaging label "eclectic" unjustly applied to philosophers accused of being "indiscriminate assemblers of other thinkers' doctrines," see John M. Dillon and Anthony A. Long, eds., *The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), vii.

[51] For an attempt to detail some of the most important differences among the Cynics, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Volume 3: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. Ben F. Meyer and Edward P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 46–59, 192–197 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 11–24. [*Light*, 2:635–650]

man, social relations, eschatology, etc. The prospects for such an approach would appear to be promising, particularly since Sevenster understands that great care should be taken when drawing parallels, and that if the true significance of apparent parallels is to be determined, the words of both authors should be read in their respective contexts. Having done so, Sevenster's conclusion is that "there is a profound and lasting contrast between Paul and Seneca," that Paul uses phrases that are reminiscent of Seneca, but makes them "instrumental to the particular purpose of his own preachings," while Seneca, when he appears to echo Paul, "pursues his own particular line of thought," and that "superficial resemblances are precisely what, on closer examination, reveal the underlying difference [between the two] most clearly."[52]

| Perhaps Sevenster was too disposed to find those differences, but that is understandable in light of the claims that had been made about the similarities between Paul and Seneca. Nevertheless, the comparison would have been richer had it taken into consideration other Stoics, and, indeed, other contemporary philosophers who treated the same subjects. Then we would have moved from parallels to comparative texts, and discovered that there is no substitute for reading the texts themselves, and, of as great importance, a wide range of texts. What would have been discovered was a diversity of viewpoint in which Seneca and Paul shared. Sevenster, the seasoned scholar, does, however, alert us to think more carefully about the nature of parallels, and, indeed, about the desire to find them—or not to find them.[53] I shall return to the matter later in this survey, when I discuss the description of the wise man. 278

## Epistolary Paraenesis

The study of paraenesis in the NT has benefited much from an awareness of its affinity to the teaching of the moral philosophers. The "Handbuch zum Neuen Testament," edited by Hans Lietzmann, has as its major purpose the gathering of "das weitschichtige Material ... das aus den zeitgenössischen Quellen zum sprachlichen und sachlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testamentes beigebracht werden konnte."[54] In the treatment of the

[52] Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca*, 240.

[53] On the problem of parallels, see further van der Horst, "Corpus Hellenisticum."

[54] Hans Lietzmann, Self-portrayal in *Die Religionswissenschaft der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* 2 (1926): 77–117 (1–41), esp. 100 (24). Some illustrative texts have been collected in Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*.

paraenetic sections of the Pauline letters the importance of the moralists was early shown in the commentaries in the series by Lietzmann himself[55] and by Martin Dibelius.[56] The latter, especially, has influenced the understanding of the nature of paraenesis as held by most NT scholars.[57]

> Unter Paränese verstehen wir dabei einen Text, der Mahnungen allgemein sittlichen Inhalts aneinanderreiht. Gewöhnlich richten sich die Sprüche an eine bestimmte (wenn auch vielleicht fingierte) Adresse oder haben mindestens die | Form des Befehls oder Aufrufs; das unterscheidet sie von dem Gnomologium, der bloßen Sentenzen-Sammlung.[58]

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Dibelius gave special attention to the formal characteristics of paraenesis, and this concern, combined with an interest in the origin of paraenetic material, has dominated the investigation ever since.[59]

The insights gained from Dibelius and his successors are valuable, but their interest in form and origin has led to too narrow an understanding of paraenesis. If the investigation is to proceed significantly, a broader

[55] Hans Lietzmann, *An die Römer* (HNT 8; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1906; 4th ed. 1933); *An die Korinther I/II* (HNT 9; ed. Werner G. Kümmel; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1907; 5th ed. 1969).

[56] Martin Dibelius, *An die Thessalonicher I/II, An die Philipper* (HNT 11; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1911; 3d ed. 1937); *An die Kolosser, Epheser, An Philemon* (HNT 12; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1912; 3d ed. 1927); *Die Brief des Apostels Paulus: An Timotheus I/II, An Titus* (ed. Hans Conzelmann; HNT 3; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1913; 3d ed. 1953).

[57] This influence was exerted through his students, as well as through his own continuing work, especially *Der Brief des Jakobus* (ed. Heinrich Greeven; KEK 15; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1921/1957); *Der Hirt des Hermas* (see n. 4 above); *Geschichte der urchristlichen Literatur 2: Apostolisches und Nachapostolisches* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1926), 65–76; *From Tradition to Gospel* (New York: Scribner, 1935), 238ff.

[58] Dibelius, *Der Brief des Jakobus*, 4. In addition to the early work by Paul Wendland, *Anaximenes von Lampsakos* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1905), 81ff., and Rudolf Vetschera, *Zur griechischen Paränese* (Programm des Staatsgymnasiums zu Smichow 1911/1912; Prague: Rohlicek & Sievers, 1912), see Josef Kroll, *Theognis-Interpretationen* (*Phil* Suppl. 29; Leipzig: Dieterich, 1936), 60, 99; David G. Bradley, “The Origin of the Hortatory Materials in the Letters of Paul,” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1947). The most useful summary of the older literature is by Victor Paul Furnish, “Paul’s Exhortations in the Context of His Letters and Thought,” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1960), 6–72.

[59] Vetschera, *Zur griechischen Paränese*, 5, had already warned against defining paraenesis too completely in terms of formal characteristics. The work of Robert J. Karris, “The Function and *Sitz im Leben* of the Paraenetic Elements in the Pastoral Epistles” (Th.D. diss., Harvard University, 1971), is a welcome exception. See, at greater length, Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*, and Fiore, “Parenesis and Protreptic,” *ABD* 5 (1992): 162–165. The view of paraenesis presented here informs Leo G. Perdue, “Paraenesis and the Epistle of James,” *ZNW* 72 (1981): 242–246; Darryl W. Palmer, “Thanksgiving, Self-Defence, and Exhortation in 1 Thessalonians 1–3,” *Colloq* 14 (1981): 23–31.

approach must be adopted. In particular, a fresh look should be taken at the characteristics of paraenesis, especially those features that may take us beyond a concern with the form and origin of *topoi*, virtue and vice lists, diatribe, lists of duties of members of a household, and the like. Given the fact that the paraenetic sections of the NT which have an affinity with the paraenesis of the moral philosophers are found mostly, but not exclusively, in the epistles, the tradition of pagan epistolary paraenesis should particularly be brought into the discussion more than it has been in the past.[60] Such an approach to Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians provides an example of how an awareness of the characteristics of paraenesis may contribute to a firmer grasp of the nature and the intention of the letter as a whole.

It is generally agreed that a major function of 1 Thessalonians is paraenetic. This is clear from the fact that chapters 4 and 5, generally agreed as constituting the paraenetic section of the letter, make up almost one half of the letter. The paraenetic intent of the letter becomes an even more prominent feature, should one accept the claims, based on form criticism, that the whole point of the letter is found in 4:1–2 and 4:10b–12 and that 4:1–5:11 is the | body of the letter,[61] and that all Pauline thanksgivings, in this case 1:2–3:13, have either explicitly or implicitly a paraenetic function.[62] I wish here to supplement insights derived from form criticism by considering the character of 1 Thessalonians as a paraenetic letter.[63] 280

Before examining 1 Thessalonians in greater detail it is necessary to identify certain features of paraenesis. Paraenesis is avowedly traditional and unoriginal. Thus in his paraenetic discourse to Nicocles, Isocrates says:

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[60] Furnish, "Paul's Exhortations," 34–36, does point to the paraenetic letter, but does not treat the subject at any length. See, now, Stanley K. Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity* (LEC 5; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 94–106. The interpretation of 1 Thessalonians offered here informs Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000). See now James M. Starr and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, eds., *Early Christian Paraenesis in Context* (BZNW 125; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004).

[61] Carl J. Bjerkelund, *Parakalô: Form, Funktion und Sinn der parakalô-Sätze in den paulinischen Briefen* (trans. Karin Kvideland; BTN 1; Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967). For recent form critical study of the letter, see Hendrikus Boers, "The Form Critical Study of Paul's Letters: 1 Thessalonians as a Case Study," *NTS* 22 (1976): 140–158.

[62] Paul Schubert, *Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings* (BZNW 20; Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1939).

[63] The following is basically a paper, "I Thessalonians as a Paraenetic Letter," presented to the Seminar on Paul's Letters at the SBL Annual Meeting in Los Angeles, 1972. Although never published, it was widely used and cited as in the public domain.

> And do not be surprised that in what I have said there are many things you know as well as I (ἃ καὶ σὺ γιγνώσκεις). This is not from inadvertence on my part, for I have realized all along that among so great a multitude both of mankind in general and of their rulers there are some who have uttered one or another of these precepts, some who have heard them, some who have observed other people put them into practice, and some who are carrying them out in their own lives. But the truth is that in these discourses it is not possible to say what is paradoxical or incredible or outside the circle of accepted belief; but, rather, we should regard that man as the most accomplished in this field who can collect the greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of all the rest and present them in the best form.[64]

Paraenetic precepts are also generally applicable, so that it has been questioned whether precepts do in fact have anything to do with the actual situation to which they are addressed.[65]

Objections were raised in antiquity to the paraenetic practice of addressing precepts to someone who already knew what was being advised. Aristo the Stoic held paraenesis and exhortation to be the business of nurses and | pedagogues.[66] According to him, *praecepta dare scienti supervacuum est.*[67] Seneca countered that to point out the obvious is not superfluous, but does a great deal of good, "for we sometimes know facts without paying attention to them (*scimus nec adtendimus*). Advice (*admonitio*) is not teaching; it merely engages the attention and arouses us, and concentrates the memory (*memoriam continet*), and keeps it from losing grip."[68] To illustrate his point Seneca, lapsing into paraenetic style, gives three examples of how paraenesis concentrates the memory:

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> You all know (*scitis*) that bribery has been going on and everyone knows that you know (*et hoc vos scire omnes sciunt*). You know (*scis*) that friendship should be scrupulously honored, and yet you do not hold it in honor

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[64] Isocrates, *Nic.* 40–41; cf. 52. See also Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 3.25–26; 13.14–15; 17.1–2. For the use of florilegia in the genre, see Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 51–52; Seneca, *Ep.* 84.3ff., 10–11.

[65] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 94.35 (*praecepta generalia*). The view represented by Dibelius, that paraenesis does not reflect the situation addressed, may be due to his one-sided emphasis on certain aspects of the form of paraenesis. For a recent discussion of this feature, see Schrage, *Einzelgebote*, esp. 37ff., 117ff. We cannot pursue the subject here. It should be noted, however, that Seneca, although he has a high regard for traditional wisdom, nevertheless realizes that the task of selection, adaptation, and application always remains (cf. *Epp.* 84; 64.7ff.; *Marc.* 2.1); see Ilsetraut Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (QSGP 13; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 179ff. For a discussion, especially as it touches Paul's letter to the Romans, see Karl P. Donfried, ed., *The Romans Debate* (2d ed.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991).

[66] *Apud* Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 1.12.

[67] *Apud* Seneca, *Ep.* 94.11.

[68] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.25.

> (*sed non facis*). You know (*scis*) that a man does wrong in requiring chastity of his wife while he himself is intriguing with the wives of other men; you know (*scis*) that, as your wife should have no dealings with a lover, neither should you yourself with a mistress; and yet you do not act accordingly (*et non facis*).[69]

Given this human failure to act on the basis of what one knows, one "must continually be brought to remember (*subinde ad memoriam reducendus es*) these facts."[70] There is thus an awareness in paraenesis that the hearers or readers already know what is being inculcated, and that repetition of what is already known is to serve as a jog to the memory.[71] In the example from Seneca, remembrance is stirred by the use of the second person of *scire*.

When the situation calls for a less admonitory tone, and the speaker or writer is more sensitive to his relationship with his audience, the audience's knowledge of the subject at hand is referred to in another way, for example, by Isocrates, *Philip* 105:

> I might go on and endeavour to speak at great length (πλείω λέγειν) on how you could carry on the war so as to triumph most quickly over the power of the King; but as things are, I fear that I might lay myself open to criticism if, having had no part in a soldier's life, I should now venture to advise (παραινεῖν) you, whose achievements in war are without parallel in number and magnitude. Therefore, on this subject I think I need say no more (περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖν πλείω λέγειν).

| The implication is that since Philip already knows how to conduct warfare he should continue doing so in the same manner as he had in the past. 282

Further characteristics of paraenesis of particular interest to 1 Thessalonians conveniently appear together in Ps.-Isocrates, *Demonicus*. After some introductory remarks on friendship (1–3), the nature of the discourse—it is παραίνεσις (4–5)—and a short encomium on virtue (6–7), "Isocrates" suggests that it is easy to learn from Heracles and Theseus (8). He then continues in 9–11:

> Nay, if you will but recall also your father's principles, you will have from your own house a noble illustration of what I am telling you (ἀναμνησθεὶς

[69] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.25–26.

[70] Seneca, *Ep.* 94.26. Cf. *Ep.* 94.21 (*praecepta*) *memoriam renovant.*

[71] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 17.2: "Since I observe that it is not our ignorance of the difference between good and evil that hurts us, so much as it is our failure to heed the dictates of reason on these matters and to be true to our personal opinions, I consider it most salutary to remind men of this without ceasing, and to appeal to their reason to give heed (μεγάλην ὠφέλειαν ἡγοῦμαι τὸ συνεχῶς ἀναμιμνήσκειν καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου παρακαλεῖν πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι) and in their acts to observe what is right and proper." Cf. also Isocrates, *Nic.* 12.

> οἰκεῖον . . . παράδειγμα). For he did not (οὐ) belittle virtue nor (οὐδέ) pass his life in indolence; on the contrary (ἀλλά), he trained his body by toil, and by his spirit withstood dangers. Nor (οὐδέ) did he love wealth inordinately; but (ἀλλ'), although he enjoyed the good things at his hand as became a mortal, yet he cared for his possessions as if he had been immortal. Neither (οὐδέ) did he order his existence sordidly, but (ἀλλά) was a lover of beauty, munificent in his manner of life, and generous to his friends; and he prized more those who were devoted to him than those who were his kin by blood; for he considered that in the matter of companionship nature is a much better guide than convention, character than kinship, and freedom of choice than compulsion. But all time would fail us if we should try to recount all his activities. On another occasion I shall set them forth in detail; for the present, however, I have produced a sample (δεῖγμα) of the nature of Hipponicus, after whom you should pattern your life as an example (πρὸς ὃν δεῖ ζῆν σ' ὥσπερ πρὸς παράδειγμα), regarding his conduct as your law, and striving to imitate and emulate (μιμητήν . . . ζηλωτήν . . . γιγνόμενον) your father's virtue.

The use of παράδειγμα in exhortation has been well detailed.[72] Moralists held that nothing is more beneficial than *bonorum virorum conversatio*.[73] To be a true follower one must imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) his model, be his μιμητής or ζηλωτής.[74] The moralist therefore reminds (ὑπομιμνήσκειν) his hearers of outstanding figures, taking care to describe the qualities of the virtuous men.[75] This call to remembrance is in fact a call to conduct oneself as a μιμητής of | the model. The favorite models were, of course, kings[76] and sages,[77] especially Socrates.[78] It is possible that the original context of

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[72] E.g., Karl Alewell, "Über das rhetorische παράδειγμα: Theorie, Beispielsammlungen, Verwendung in der römischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit" (Diss., Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 1913; Leipzig: Hoffmann, 1913), esp. 87ff.

[73] Seneca, *Epp*. 94.40–41; 25.6; 52.8. See esp. Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*.

[74] Actual association is not required to be a μαθητής, ζηλωτής, μιμητής of someone; cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 55.3ff. On the practice of modeling oneself after someone, see Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 175ff.; Paul Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954), 121, 156, 260ff.; Kurt Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (HAW 5.4; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1960), 340ff.

[75] Marcus Aurelius 11.26; Seneca, *Ep*. 95.72; Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 85AB.

[76] E.g., Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 36.

[77] E.g., Lucian, *Demon.* 2–3; *Nigr.* 26. See Diskin Clay, "Lucian of Samosata: Four Philosophical Lives (Nigrinus, Demonax, Peregrinus, Alexander Pseudomantis)," in *ANRW* 2.36.5 (1992): 3406–3450, esp. 3420ff.

[78] E.g., Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.3; 6.3. See Konrad Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen Dialogs* (TBAW 40; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1959), 155, 224ff.; Klaus Döring, *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der*

paraenesis was the advice given by a father to his son,[79] and the οἰκεῖον παράδειγμα became a standard feature in paraenesis.[80] The sage also exhorts his listeners as a father, and addresses them as his children.[81]

One last feature that is noteworthy is the way in which the model is used. The purpose of the παραίνεσις which "Isocrates" will give is to advise young men what they should aspire to (ὀρέγεσθαι) and what they should abstain from (ἀπέχεσθαι) (5).[82] This advice is then given in antithetical form (οὐ … ἀλλά, οὐδέ … ἀλλά) and describes the model Demonicus is to follow, that is, that he is reminded of.[83]

The ancient handbooks which provided instruction in letter-writing came from the schools of rhetoric.[84] The instructions that have come

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*kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie und im frühen Christentum* (HermesE 42; Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1979).

[79] Kroll, *Theognis-Interpretationen*, 99.

[80] See Joachim Dalfen, "Formgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Selbstbetrachtungen Marc Aurels" (Inaug. Diss., Munich, 1967), 6–7, 35, 61ff., 134ff. Cf. Pliny, *Ep*. 8.13: Genialis is fortunate to have his father to emulate.

[81] E.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.82. Furnish, "Paul's Exhortations," 53ff., lists a number of examples where such words as παῖς, τέκνον, and νήπιος are used in paraenetic address, e.g., Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 4C; cf. 8F, 9EF; Ps.-Isocrates, *Demon.* 44; Marcus Aurelius 11.18.4. See also Pedro Gutierrez, *La paternité spirituelle selon Saint Paul* (*EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1968), 51–54, whose treatment, however, is too brief.

[82] This is, in fact, a shorthand description of paraenesis. See Seneca, *Epp*. 94.48; 95.13 (*facienda et vitanda*); 94.50 (*hoc vitabis, hoc facies*).

[83] This is in keeping with the rhetorical rules for the use of historical examples. See, e.g., Trypho, *Trop.* 3.200, 21 (Spengel) παράδειγμά ἐστι τοῦ προγεγονότος πράγματος παρένθεσις καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὑποκειμένων πρὸς παραίνεσιν προτροπῆς ἢ ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκεν. For other examples, see Alewell, "Über das rhetorische παράδειγμα," 24ff. For the remembrance of the παράδειγμα, see Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.6; Apsines 1.380, 9 (Spengel); Rufus 1.469, 15ff. (Spengel).

[84] On rhetoric and epistolography, see Hermann W.G. Peter, *Der Brief in der römischen Literatur* (ASGW.PH 20.3 [Leipzig: Teubner, 1901; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1965]), 14–15, 18ff.; August Brinkmann, "Der älteste Briefsteller," *RhMus* 64 (1909): 310–317; Hugo Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 9. Griechische Briefsteller," *RhMus* 64 (1909): 284–309, esp. 289; Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 1:301 n. 8; 2:781, 825 (with bibliography); Horst Rüdiger, *Briefe des Altertums* (2d ed.; Zurich: Artemis, 1965), 15ff. According to Theon, *Progymn.* 10 (2:115, 22 Spengel), letter-writing was one of the exercises in προσωποποιία. For the place of epistolography in ancient rhetoric, together with the texts (and translation) dealing with epistolary theory, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Ancient Epistolary Theorists," *Ohio Journal of Religious Studies* 5 (1977), 3–77 (which appeared in a new edition as *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* [SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988]; references are to this edition). But see George A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (HistRhet 3; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 70–73, for the view that letter writing was on the fringes of formal education and that instruction in it might have been given by experienced civil servants. See also Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, 32–35.

284 down | to us under the names of Demetrius[85] and Libanius or Proclus[86] belong to rhetoricians who were concerned with the proper style of letters. The collections of sample letters which they provide are not model letters so much as they are samples of various styles. They provide a guide to the tone in which one was to write letters.[87] The samples also indicate that the intention of the writer was to be made clear, in keeping with rhetorical practice, by adopting in the letter a style appropriate to that intention. Hence a paraenetic letter would be written in a style appropriate to and characteristic of paraenesis.

By the first century AD the paraenetic letter was established as a form of hortatory address.[88] As could be expected from teachers of rhetoric, exhortation was analyzed and classified, and Demetrius gives us examples of the admonitory (νουθετητικός) and advisory (συμβουλευτικός) types.[89] Demetrius does not call the samples paraenetic, but some rhetoricians did.[90] In any case, Libanius knows of a παραινετικὴ ἐπιστολή in which "we exhort (παραινοῦμεν) someone, advising (προτρέποντες) him to pursue (ὁρμῆσαι) something, or to abstain (ἀφέξεσθαι) from something." He then gives the sample letter:

> ζηλωτὴς ἀεί, βέλτιστε, γίνου τῶν ἐναρέτων ἀνδρῶν· κρεῖττον γάρ ἐστι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ζηλοῦντα καλῶς ἀκούειν ἢ φαύλοις ἑπόμενον ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσιν.[91]

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[85] Valentinus Weichert, ed., *Demetrii et Libanii qui feruntur τύποι ἐπιστολικοί et ἐπιστολιμαῖοι χαρακτῆρες* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910); Rudolf Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* (SGB 47; Paris: A.F. Didot, 1873; repr., Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1065), 1–6. Brinkmann, "Der älteste Briefsteller," dates the work in the period from the second century BC to mid-first century AD; Heikki Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (STAT Series B 102.2; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 1956), 54ff., followed by Klaus Thraede, *Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik* (ZMKA 48; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1970), 26, thinks a date in the second or third century AD to be more likely. See Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 2–5.

[86] Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci*, 6–13; Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists,* 30–41, 66–81. The present form is probably to be dated in the 4th or 5th century AD, although the material on which it is based is much older. See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 56.

[87] Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 62.

[88] Thus already Furnish, "Paul's Exhortations," 34–35.

[89] Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci*, p. 3, Nos. 7 and 11 = Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 7 and 11 in Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists,* 34–35 and 36–37.

[90] E.g., Ps.-Libanius, ἐπιστολιμαῖοι χαρακτῆρες 1, p. 15, 8 Weichert; Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 68, lines 3–4 (on the paraenetic letter): ταύτην (i.e., παραινετικήν) δέ τινες καὶ συμβουλευτικὴν εἶπον οὐκ εὖ, παραίνεσις γὰρ συμβουλῆς διαφέρει.

[91] Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci*, p. 8, No. 1 = Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 52 in Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists,* 74, lines 11–13.

The emulation of virtuous men stated in antithesis to following bad men belongs, as we have seen, to paraenetic style.

| Some of the letters of Seneca, Cicero, and Pliny are paraenetic in nature and exhibit the characteristics of paraenesis which we have identified.[92] 285

In his letters to Lucilius, Seneca frequently refers to models of conduct. *Epistula* 52.8 illustrates the antithetic way in which the model is used:

> Let us choose ... from among the living, not (*non*) men who pour forth their words with the greatest glibness, turning out commonplaces (*communes locos*) ... but (*sed*) men who teach us by their lives, men who tell us what we ought to do (*quid faciendum sit*) and then prove it by their practice, who show us what we should avoid (*quid vitandum sit*), and then are never caught doing that which they have ordered us to avoid.[93]

Seneca's letters also contain many references to his own circumstances and conduct. Their ability to convince proceeds from the authoritative person of Seneca the teacher, who is conscious of the truth of what he writes.[94] He wishes his letters to be exactly what his conversation would be if he were with Lucilius.[95] His letters are only a substitute,

> for the living voice and the intimacy of a common life will help you more than the written word. You must go to the scene of the action, first, because men put more faith in their eyes than in their ears, and second, because the way is long if one follows precepts (*praecepta*), but short and helpful if one follows examples (*exempla*).[96]

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[92] For papyrus letters classified according to the types given in the handbooks, see Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 61–62; Brinkmann, "Der älteste Briefsteller," 313–314; Weichert, *Demetrii et Libanii*, XIX–XX; Bror H. Olsson, *Papyrusbriefe aus der frühesten Römerzeit* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1925), 7–10. From *Fam.* 2.4.1; 4.3.1; 6.10, it would appear that Cicero knew of the different types, but whether he was indebted to the handbooks for the classification is a moot point. See Koskenniemi, "Cicero über die Briefarten," in *Commentationes in honorem Edwin Linkomies*, *Arctos: Acta Philologica Fennica* NS 1 (Helsinki: Octava, 1954): 97–102. See also Hadot, *Seneca*, 168 n. 32. For examples of some different types, see Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*.

[93] According to Seneca, *Ep.* 11.8–9, the advice to choose a model originated with Epicurus.

[94] See Winfried Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung* (DAWB, Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft 37; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962), 69–70. Cf. Seneca, *Vit. beat.* 3.2.

[95] Seneca, *Epp.* 75.1ff.; 40.1.

[96] Seneca, *Ep.* 6.5–6. Wilhelm Ganss, *Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca* (Diss., Freiburg, 1952), 94ff., discusses the question raised in antiquity as to whether in fact there had been any ideal wise man. He points out that Seneca did believe that the ideal could be realized. On the question of the attainability of the ideal, see further Abraham J. Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 42–64, esp. 54–56 [*Light*, 2:601–634], and the basic study by Ulrich Knoche, *Der Philosoph Seneca* (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1933), 14ff. This questioning may explain the relative scarcity

286 | Yet more is implied in referring to oneself as an example to be followed. Thus Pliny concludes a letter in which he had been describing his conduct:

> I mention this, not only to enforce my advice by example (*ut te non sine exemplo monerem*), but also that this letter may be a sort of pledge binding me to persevere in the same abstinence in the future.[97]

The paraenetic function of remembrance also appears in the letters.[98] After extolling the value of personal examples, Seneca exclaims in *Ep*. 11.9:

> Happy is the man who can make others better, not merely when he is in their company, but even when he is in their thoughts! And happy also is he who can so revere a man as to calm and regulate himself by calling him to mind (*ad memoriam*)! One who can so revere another, will soon be himself worthy of reverence.[99]

These letters further reflect the awareness, common in paraenesis, that what is being inculcated is not new, and that no extended treatment of a subject is necessary—reminder suffices. Thus, for example, in Seneca, *Ep*. 13.15:[100]

> I am exhorting you far too long, since what you need is reminding rather than exhortation.[101] The path to which I am leading you is not different from

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with which philosophers present themselves as models to be emulated. Seneca does so on occasion (cf. *Ep*. 8.3), and it appears that Lucilius regarded Seneca as a model (cf. *Ep*. 83.1ff.; cf. also *Ben*. 5.19.8, and see Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, 26, 35–36). For the function of Seneca's comments on himself in his letters, see Hildegard Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae Morales* (SSKPG 18; Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), II. Teil, and Hadot, *Seneca*, 174ff.

[97] Pliny, *Ep*. 7.1.7. See Adrian N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny: A Historical and Social Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 42. Cf. also *Ep*. 2.6.6, and for Pliny's use of examples, see Hans-Peter Bütler, *Die geistige Welt des jüngeren Plinius: Studien zur Thematik seiner Briefe* (BKAW NS 2.38; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1970), 88ff.

[98] It is striking how often the themes of forgetting and remembering occur in the sample letters of the handbooks. Koskenniemi, "Cicero über die Briefarten," 37, describing the philophronetic aim of the letter, points out that according to Aristotle τὸ συζῆν is necessary for φιλία. When that is lacking, friendship is forgotten (cf. *Eth. nic*. 8.5.1157b20; 8.9.1159b31; cf. *Pol*. 3.5.1280b38; also *Eth. nic*. 8.5.1157b10). The friendly letter is an attempt to overcome this danger by keeping remembrance alive. There is, nevertheless, a special, paraenetic function of remembrance.

[99] Cf. also Cicero, *Fam*. 2.1.2.

[100] Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, 71, referring to the words with which the letter begins, *multum tibi esse animi scio*, says "Gleichzeitig zeigen uns diese Worte schon, daß wir es hier wieder mit einem paränetischen Brief zu tun haben werden." For other examples, see *Epp*. 8.10; 99.32.

[101] See Pliny, *Ep*. 8.14.1, quoted below.

> that on which your nature leads you; you were born to such conduct as I describe.[102] Hence there is all the more reason why you should increase and beautify (*auge et exorna*) the good that is in you.

Cicero expresses this awareness by saying that there is no need for writing on the subject: *ego neque de meo studio, neque de nonnullorum iniuria scribendum mihi esse arbitror* (*Fam.* 1.4.3); similarly, *quoniam mihi nullum scribendi argumentum relictum est … in hanc sententiam scriberem plura, nisi te tua sponte satis incitatum esse confiderem* (*Fam.* 2.4.2). Statements | such as these usually appear at the end of a letter.[103] It is also to be noted that their use by no means completely rules out the giving of advice.[104] These examples seem to indicate that it is the close relationship between the writer and the recipient as much as the traditional character of paraenesis that makes extended comment superfluous. Because of the philophronetic character of the letter a short note suffices.[105] The writer can assume that his friend already knows what he should be doing. 287

Coupled with that assumption is the advice that the recipients are to act in keeping with the knowledge that they already have, for example, Pliny, *Ep.* 8.24.1:

> The love I bear you obliges me to give you, not indeed a precept (for you are far from needing a preceptor), but a reminder *ut, quae scis, teneas et observes aut scias melius.*

The conviction that the readers are already acting in keeping with what they know gives rise to the exhortation that they continue to do so.[106] This is sometimes expressed in the following manner, e.g., by Seneca, *Ep.* 25.4, "But do you yourself show me (*te praesta*), as indeed you are doing (*ut facis*), that you are stout-hearted,"[107] and by Ignatius, *To Polycarp* 1.2, πάντων

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[102] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.25.1–6, "What is there left to discuss? Has not Zeus given you directions?"

[103] But sometimes they also come at the beginning (cf. Pliny, *Ep.* 8.24.1) or are scattered throughout the body (cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 24.6, 9, 11, 15; Cicero, *Quint. fratr.* 1.1.18, 36).

[104] Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 47.21. After a long discussion of the relationship between master and slave, Seneca concludes the letter: "I do not wish to delay you longer; for you need no exhortation."

[105] Cf. Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 231, φιλοφρόνησις γάρ τις βούλεται εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστολὴ σύντομος. But the rule is not absolute: in Cicero it is precisely his *benevolentia* (*Fam.* 6.3.1; 4.4) and his *amicitia* (*Fam.* 7.1.6) that are on occasion responsible for the length of his letters. In general, need seems to have determined the length of letters. See Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 154–155.

[106] Cf. Seneca, *Epp.* 1.1; 5.1; 13.15; 24.16; Cicero, *Quint. frat.* 1.1.8.

[107] Cf. Cicero, *Fam.* 6.10b.4: *Quod quidem si facis, magnum fructum studiorum optimorum capis, in quibus te semper scio esse versatum; idque ut facias, etiam te hortor.*

ἀνέχου ἐν ἀγάπῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ ποιεῖς.[108] The imperative is also used without the adverbial phrase, but with other indications that the desired action is already taking place, for example, Seneca, *Ep.* 1.1–2, *ita fac . . ., fac, ergo, mi Lucili, quod facere te scribis.*

Against this background I now turn to consider 1 Thessalonians. Commentators disagree on whether Paul's main intention in writing the letter is fulfilled in the autobiographical chapters 1–3, in which the reassured Paul expresses joy over the Thessalonians, or in the paraenetic section, chapters 4 and 5. Based on the assumption that the two sections stand apart as to their content and intention, either option has been elected 288 on the basis of the formal | structure of the letter and sometimes on an understanding of paraenesis as consisting of *topoi* from traditional wisdom which stand by themselves and have nothing to do with the historical or literary contexts in which they appear. The studies by Schubert and Bjerkelund on the form of 1 Thessalonians provide a convenient basis for examining the letter as a paraenetic letter.

Schubert notes that at first glance the first thanksgiving period (1:2ff.) appears to turn into a digression on Paul's relationship with the Thessalonians.[109] In fact, however, he points out that it does not. The theme of the first part of the "digression" is clearly announced in 1:3 and is developed in 1:6–10, while the theme of the second is stated in 1:5b, a "topic" sentence, and is developed in 2:1–12. From the point of view of form, function, and content the "digressions" are legitimate and constitutive elements of the Pauline thanksgiving. Schubert is impressed by the unity given to 1:5–2:14ff. by the ten occurrences of forms of γίνεσθαι, five in the first person plural, and five in the second person plural. This antithetical style, which he describes as an epistolary and not a literary or rhetorical style, exhibits Paul's interest in this section in his relationship with the Thessalonians. This antithesis actually characterizes the thanksgiving from beginning to end, i.e., from 1:2 to 3:13. The second thanksgiving, 2:13, is not an independent or complete thanksgiving, and its continuation in 2:13–16 is peculiar as to its form and content.[110] The third thanksgiving,

[108] For other paraenetic elements in Ign. *Pol.* 1.2, see Dalfen, "Formgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Selbstbetrachtungen Marc Aurels," 49. Similar expressions in Ignatius appear in *Eph.* 4.1 (ὅπερ καὶ ποιεῖτε), 8.1 (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐξαπατᾶσθε), *Rom.* 2.1 (ὥσπερ καὶ ἀρέσκετε), *Trall.* 2.2 (ὥσπερ ποιεῖτε). These passages were already pointed to by Nils A. Dahl, "Anamnesis," *ST* 1 (1947): 75 n. 4.1.

[109] Schubert, *Form and Function*, 16–20, for the form and content of the first thanksgiving.

[110] Schubert, *Form and Function*, 23, for the second and third thanksgivings.

3:9–10, or rather the second repetition of the thanksgiving construction, achieves a climactic effect through its fuller language. The prayer in 3:11–13 is explained as reflecting Paul's highly developed sense of form: It serves as a needed double climax to the long drawn out thanksgiving.

Schubert thinks that the function of the thanksgiving in 1 Thessalonians is somewhat different from the usual function it performs in letters, which is to introduce the body of the letter, and to indicate the occasion for the letter it introduces.[111] The only structural peculiarity in 1 Thessalonians is its length, and its function cannot be radically different. Yet, in 1 Thessalonians the indication has grown into the full development of its contents. He thus concludes that the thanksgiving constitutes the main body of the letter. It contains all the primary information Paul wished to convey. Nothing else in the letter equals in importance the extensive and personal description of Paul's constant anxiety and longing desire for the Thessalonian church. According to this understanding, 4:1–5:22, which is "exhortation," constitutes the conclusion of the letter.

Bjerkelund,[112] addressing himself especially to a partitioning theory of the Thessalonian correspondence proposed by Schmithals,[113] explains the | structure of 1 Thessalonians in accordance with an εὐχαριστῶ-παρακαλῶ formula that he has isolated. He builds on Schubert's identification of the thanksgiving period that begins in 1:2 and ends with the climax in 3:11–13, but disagrees with the claim that this constitutes the body of the letter. Bjerkelund sees the main stress of the letter as lying in the summons to perfection (παρακαλοῦμεν ... περισσεύητε μᾶλλον) in 4:1–2 (cf. παρακαλοῦμεν ... περισσεύειν μᾶλλον, 4:10b), which introduces the body of the letter, viz., 4:1–5:11. The thanksgiving serves as introduction. The summons to perfection presupposes that the Thessalonians know how they should conduct themselves, and they are already doing so. The occasion for writing was the coming of Timothy with the good report of the Thessalonians' positive attitude toward Paul. Paul now expresses his joy and

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[111] Schubert, *Form and Function*, 24–27. See Peter T. O'Brien, *Introductory Thanksgivings in the Letters of Paul* (NovTSup 49; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), 141–166, who builds on Schubert, but stresses that the paraenetic and didactic functions of the thanksgiving period should not be overlooked.

[112] Bjerkelund, *Parakalô*, 125–138.

[113] Walter Schmithals, "Die Thessalonicherbriefe als Briefkompositionen," in *Zeit und Geschichte: Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 80. Geburtstag* (ed. Erich Dinkler; Tübingen: Mohr, 1964), 295–315, further developed in Schmithals, "The Historical Situation of the Thessalonian Epistles," in *Paul and the Gnostics* (trans. John E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon 1972), 123–218 (= Schmithals, *Paulus und die Gnostiker* [Hamburg-Bergstedt: Reich, 1965], 89–158).

urges them on to perfection. Bjerkelund finds analogies for the structure of the letter, in which exhortation is preceded by remembrance of a good relationship in the past, especially in royal correspondence.

These insights into the structure and intention of the letter, derived from form critical considerations, can be supplemented and in some respects corrected when the letter is seen as a paraenetic letter. To Schubert's claim that the epistolary antithetic style in which forms of γίνεσθαι occur shows Paul's interest in stressing the close relationship which had been established between himself and the Thessalonians, one can add the ἀδιαλείπτως μνημονεύοντες of 1:3, which does not refer to Paul's prayer, but to his constant remembrance of the Thessalonians and their reception of the gospel. This no doubt exhibits the philophronetic character of the letter.[114]

The καθὼς οἴδατε in 1:5 now serves to remind the Thessalonians of Paul's ministry to them.[115] The first of a number of occurrences of οἴδατε in the section (2:1, 2, 5, 11), it further unites the section as a reminder of Paul's ministry (cf. μνημονεύετε, 2:9).[116] The function of this remembrance, effected by οἴδατε, is not simply philophronetic, but more precisely paraenetic. It is as μιμηταί of Paul that the Thessalonians are called to remember, and this theme continues throughout the whole section. Paul is not at all conveying primary information as Schubert claims.[117] As μιμηταί they already know the qualities he exhibited | and which they should emulate. In paraenetic style it suffices to remind them, a function performed by οἴδατε.[118] The use of μιμητής here and in 2:14 differs from all other NT occurrences in that Paul does not call his readers to become his emulators, but addresses them as people who had already become his followers in

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[114] See n. 98 above.

[115] Thus also Dahl, "Anamnesis," 74.

[116] Cf. also the combination in Acts 20:31–34, μνημονεύοντες . . . αὐτοὶ γινώσκετε. Johannes Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* (trans. Frank Clarke; Richmond: John Knox, 1959), 126–127 (= Munck, *Paulus und die Heilsgeschichte* [Aarhus: Universiteitsforlaget, 1954], 119–120), draws attention to statements in Paul introduced by εἰδότες (or οἴδαμεν) which are dogmatic propositions or at least crystallized traditional material. The paraenetic nature of some of the passages he refers to escaped him.

[117] Also seen by Hans von Campenhausen, *Die Begründung kirchlicher Entscheidungen beim Apostel Paulus* (SHAW, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 1957; 2. Abhandlungen; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1957), 8–9 (= von Campenhausen, *Aus der Frühzeit des Christentums. Studien zur Kirchengeschichte des ersten und zweiten Jahrhunderts* [Tübingen: Mohr, 1963], 34–35).

[118] Cf. Seneca's *scis, scitis*, n. 69 above.

the matters at hand.[119] This again expresses Paul's satisfaction with them: they already exemplify to a degree the qualities they should have.[120]

Paul's description of himself is therefore not to be viewed as a personal defense.[121] In keeping with his paraenetic intent, he reminds his μιμηταί of the qualities they should imitate in their model, and he does so in the antithetical style used by philosopher-preachers to describe themselves,[122] a style that is appropriate to the paraenetic use of historical examples:[123] οὐ . . . ἀλλά (2:1–2), οὐκ . . . οὐδέ . . . οὐδέ . . . ἀλλά . . ., οὐχ . . . ἀλλά (2:3–4), . . . οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . ἀλλά . . ., οὐ . . . ἀλλά (2:5–8). Viewed from the paraenetic perspective of the letter, it is significant that the two metaphors Paul uses to describe his work are those of father and nurse.[124]

If this view, that 1:5b–2:12 is basically a paraenetic reminder of the μιμηταί, is correct, it would be preferable to speak of the problematic section 2:13–16 as a continuation of the thanksgiving or as marking a progression in the thanksgiving. It again refers to the Thessalonians' reception of the gospel and of its ongoing effect, and of their being μιμηταί, the latter theme having been carried forward throughout the preceding section by the oft repeated οἴδατε and by μνημονεύετε. But this time the readers are described as imitators of the churches in Judea who had suffered at the hands of the Jews.[125] Not too much should be made of this shift from

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119 See Hans Dieter Betz, *Nachfolge und Nachahmung Jesu Christi im Neuen Testament* (BHT 37; Tübingen: Mohr, 1967), 143–144.

120 Cf. 1 Thess 1:7–8, they have themselves already become a τύπος to others, their faith is known everywhere. For ὥστε μὴ χρείαν ἔχειν ἡμᾶς λαλεῖν τι, see nn. 138, 139 below.

121 This is argued at great length by Schmithals, "Die Thessalonicherbriefe als Briefkompositionen," and forms the basis for James E. Frame, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians* (ICC 38; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1912).

122 See Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse,'" and see further, below, for Dio Chrysostom's description of the ideal philosopher.

123 See n. 83 above.

124 See nn. 66 and 81 above. For this paraenetic form elsewhere in Paul, see 1 Cor 4:14–17. For the significance of these images in Paul's psychagogy, see the discussion below in the section "Ancient Psychagogy."

125 At this point I am unpersuaded by the formal arguments made by Birger A. Pearson, "1 Thessalonians 2:13–16: A Deutero-Pauline Interpolation," *HTR* 64 (1971): 79–94, esp. 88ff., in support of his hypothesis that an interpolator used words and phrases from 1:2ff. to provide a putative "Pauline" framework of a new message. That 2:13–16 is an interpolation is the minority position. Recent commentators who hold the view that the passage was an original part of Paul's argument include Willi Marxsen, *Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher* (Zürcher Bibelkommentare 11,1; Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1979), 47–51; Karl P. Donfried, "Paul and Judaism: 1 Thessalonians 2:13–16 as a Test Case," *Int* 38 (1984): 242–253; Raymond F. Collins, *Studies on the First Letter to the Thessalonians* (BETL 66; Leuven: University Press, 1984), 96–135; Traugott Holtz, *Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher* (EKKNT 13;

291 Paul to the Judean | churches as the model emulated. All kinds of models are referred to in paraenetic letters. Furthermore, it should be noted that in 2:15 Paul includes himself with those who had been persecuted by the Jews. Thus, even though he adduces a new historical example which his readers emulated, he himself remains in the picture. Although not as clearly as in the preceding section, the paraenetic element is present, even if only implicitly, in this section, the polemical digression notwithstanding. Digressions are, after all, frequent in paraenesis.[126]

Robert W. Funk has described 2:17–3:13 as an apostolic *parousia,* i.e., a more or less discrete section in which Paul "(a) implies that the letter is an anticipatory surrogate for his presence, ... (b) commends the emissary who is to represent him in the meantime; and (c) speaks of an impending visit or a visit for which he prays." Funk recognizes that *philophronesis*, *parousia*, and *homilia* are basic motifs in the conception and form of the Greek letter, but sees Paul as according a greater significance to his presence.[127] Here I want only to draw attention to the pronounced philophronetic character of this section. Its similarity to the sample letter of friendship provided by Demetrius (Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci*, pp. 1–2 = Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 1 in Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 32–33) is striking:

> Εἰ καὶ πολύ σου διάστημα τυγχάνω κεχωρισμένος, τῷ σώματι μόνον πάσχω τοῦτο. οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέποτε δυνατὸν ἐπιλαθέσθαι με σοῦ οὐδὲ τῆς γεγονυίας ἡμῖν ἐκ παίδων ἀνεγκλήτου συναναστροφῆς. εἰδὼς δὲ ἐμαυτὸν τὰ πρὸς σὲ γνησίως διακείμενον καὶ πάνυ τὸ σοὶ συμφέρον ἀπροφασίστως ὑπηρετήσαντα τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπείληφα καὶ σὲ περὶ ἐμοῦ γνώμην ἔχοντα κατὰ μηδὲν ἀντερεῖν πρός με. καλῶς οὖν ποιήσεις πυκνότερον ἐπισκοπῶν τοὺς ἐν οἴκῳ μή τινος ἔχωσι χρείαν καὶ συμπαριστάμενος ἐν οἷς ἂν δέωνται καὶ γράφων ἡμῖν περὶ ὧν ἂν αἱρῇ.
>
> Even though I have been separated from you for a long time, I suffer this in body only. For I can never forget you or the impeccable way we were raised together from childhood up. Knowing that I myself am genuinely concerned about your affairs, and that I have worked unstintingly for what

Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukichener Verlag, 1986), 96–113; and esp. Tjitze Baarda, "Maar de toorn is over hen gekomen," in *Paulus en de andere joden* (ed. Tjitze Baarda, Hans Jansen, S.J. Noorda, and J.S. Vos; Delft: Meinema, 1984), 15–74.

[126] See Burton S. Easton, "James: Introduction," in *Interpreter's Bible* (ed. George A. Buttrick et al.; 12 vols.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1957), 12:11. However, confidence in such an understanding of the section must be limited until polemical digressions in epistolary paraenesis have been examined in greater detail.

[127] Robert W. Funk, "The Apostolic 'Parousia': Form and Significance," in *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox* (ed. William R. Farmer, C.F.D. Moule, and Richard R. Niebuhr; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 249–268, esp. 250, 266.

> is most advantageous to you, I have assumed that you, too, have the same opinion of me, and will refuse me in nothing. You will do well, therefore, to give close attention to the members of my household lest they need anything, to assist them in whatever they might need, and to write us about whatever you should choose.

| Klaus Thraede has directed attention to 2:17, which reminds him of the τύπος φιλικός.[128] He thinks that Paul owes the expression ἀπορφανισθέντες … προσώπῳ οὐ καρδίᾳ to the παρών/ἀπών epistolary convention, but that he did not simply use the formula; as the paraphrase of ἀπορφανισθέντες for the colorless ἀποντές indicates, he tailored it to his own needs.[129] The longing to see them, again expressed in 3:6 (ἐπιποθοῦντες) and 3:10 (δεόμενοι εἰς τὸ ἰδεῖν ὑμῶν τὸ πρόσωπον) is yet another example of the *Brieftopik*,[130] as is ἔχετε μνείαν ἡμῶν ἀγαθήν in 3:6. 292

That the section is so strongly philophronetic does not mean that it is not paraenetic. It does largely deal with the historical circumstances of the letter, but in 3:3–4, immediately after mentioning Timothy's mission εἰς τὸ στηρίξαι ὑμᾶς καὶ παρακαλέσαι, the familiar paraenetic οἴδατε occurs twice. Furthermore, friendship and paraenesis are closely related. Thus Isocrates's *Demonicus* opens with remarks on friendship, and Cicero sees the various aspects of paraenesis as flourishing best among friends.[131] Seneca's paraenetic letters were written to his friend Lucilius, and friendship formed the basis of his advice to him.[132] Paul's use of the philophronetic style in this section is perfectly good paraenetic form.

First Thessalonians 1–3 thus exhibits the characteristics of a paraenetic letter. The description of the readers as μιμηταί, the theme of remembrance of what is already known, expressed by οἴδατε and μνημονεύετε, the description of Paul himself in antithetical style, the theme of *philophronesis*, all contribute to this conclusion. Seen thus, it is not correct to see the functions of chapters 1–3 and 4–5 as being different, the intention of the former being the imparting of information or the making of an apology, and the latter being purely paraenetic. As is the case with Seneca,

128 Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 95ff.

129 Elpidius W. Pax, "Konvertitenprobleme im ersten Thessalonicherbrief," *BibLeb* 13 (1972): 24–37, esp. 33, thinks the language of 1 Thessalonians is influenced by the Jewish *Konvertitensprache*. See also Pax, "Beobachtungen zur Konvertitensprache im ersten Thessalonicherbrief," *SBFLA* 21 (1971): 220–262.

130 See also the examples expressing πόθος in Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 174–175.

131 Cf. Cicero, *Off.* 1.58.

132 See Hadot, *Seneca*, 164–176.

Paul's *Selbstzeugnis* in the first part of the letter itself fulfills a paraenetic function.

Given the general acceptance of chapters 4 and 5 as paraenesis,[133] it remains only briefly to point to certain features in them that may be illuminated by this investigation. As in the first three chapters, Paul also here reminds the Thessalonians, but whereas the reminders earlier were generally of the manner of Paul's conduct,[134] here they are of specific teachings that the Thessalonians had received from him and therefore knew.[135] Compared to Seneca's *scis*, *scitis*, Paul's οἴδατε, especially when linked with καθὼς καὶ περιπατεῖτε (4:1), | etc. reflects a much more positive relationship with his readers than that presupposed in the examples given by Seneca.[136] These reminders link the paraenesis to the period described in chapters 1 and 2. The example Paul set provided a basis for his exhortation. The Thessalonians are in fact to imitate Paul, even if that is not explicitly stated in the last two chapters of the letter.[137]

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Paul's statements περί ... οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε γράφειν ὑμῖν in 4:9 and περί ... οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε ὑμῖν γράφεσθαι in 5:1,[138] function in the same way as Cicero's *neque de ... neque de ... scribendum mihi esse arbitror*.[139] There is no need for writing on a subject on which the readers are already well informed. These statements do at least two things: (1) They express confidence in the recipients, and (2) they do remind them of the major points of moral instruction that they should have in mind.

Finally, the conviction (?) that they are already doing what they are being exhorted to (καθὼς καὶ περιπατεῖτε, 4:1; καὶ γὰρ ποιεῖτε, 4:10; καθὼς καὶ ποιεῖτε, 5:11) finds its counterpart in Seneca's *ut facis* and Ignatius's

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133 For treatment and full bibliography, see Otto Merk, *Handeln als Glauben: Die Motivierungen der Paulinischen Ethik* (MThSt 5; Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1968), 45–58.

134 See, however, 1 Thess 3:3–4.

135 Cf. 1 Thess 4:1–2, 6, 11; 5:2.

136 See nn. 68–70 above.

137 Cf. 1 Thess 2:9 with 4:11. Second Thessalonians 3:7–9 understands the practice in this way: δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς ... ἐργαζόμενοι ... ἵνα ἑαυτοὺς τύπον δῶμεν ὑμῖν εἰς τὸ μιμεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. Whether 2 Thessalonians was written by Paul or not is unimportant at this point; it understands 1 Thessalonians correctly in this respect, even if the theological aspects of Paul's practice are not present. Cf. also Acts 20:31–34.

138 1 Thess 1:8, ὥστε μὴ χρείαν ἔχειν ἡμᾶς λαλεῖν should also be included here. For λαλεῖν as equaling γράφειν, see Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 223–224, 232, and Seneca, *Ep.* 67.2. For the idea, cf. Isocrates, *Phil.* 105, οὐδὲν οἶμαι δεῖν πλείω λέγειν.

139 For similar constructions, see 2 Cor 9:1: περισσόν μοί ἐστιν τὸ γράφειν ὑμῖν; *Diogn.* 2.10: περισσὸν ἡγοῦμαι καὶ τὸ πλείω λέγειν, and Ludwig Mitteis and Ulrich Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (2 vols. in 3 parts; Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1912), No. 238 in vol. 1, part 2, p. 277, lines 4–5: περισσὸν ἡγοῦμαι διεξωδέστερον ὑμῖν γράφειν.

ὥσπερ καὶ ποιεῖς,[140] while the περισσεύειν μᾶλλον· (4:1–2; cf. 10b) that Bjerkelund has shown to be important, has its counterpart, to some degree at least, in Seneca's *auge et exorna*.[141]

Should this attempt to see 1 Thessalonians as a paraenetic letter be convincing, it suggests that an examination of paraenesis from a broader perspective than has heretofore been the practice, may reap significant results elsewhere in the study of the NT.

## Description of the Wise Man

The value of the moralists to illuminate the NT can further be illustrated by comparing statements from them with those in Paul where he describes his own work as a preacher. To illustrate, I begin with Paul's | description of his ministry in Thessalonica in 1 Thess 2. Since Paul here presents himself as a model to be followed, one might expect the passage to reveal something of his self-understanding as preacher and teacher. That there are similarities in this passage to statements describing Cynics has long been recognized. Dibelius argued that the tone of the chapter, which on the surface appears to be an apology, is to be explained by the situations in which Paul found himself as a wandering preacher.[142] Without being forced by particular circumstances in Thessalonica, Paul found it necessary to distinguish himself from other preachers of his day. To illustrate his point, Dibelius brought into the discussion descriptions of wandering Cynics.[143] He has been followed in this,[144] but a more extensive comparison can be made than has been done heretofore.[145] In particular, attention should be given

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[140] See nn. 107–108 above.

[141] See nn. 100ff. above.

[142] Martin Dibelius, *An die Thessalonicher I/II. An die Philipper* (3d ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1937), 7–11.

[143] Lucian, *Peregr.* 13.16; *Dial. mort.* 10.8, 9; *Pisc.* 31; Aelius Aristides, *Pro quat.* (2:401 Dindorf); Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 38; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.13.

[144] E.g., by Günther Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason in Paul," in Bornkamm, *Early Christian Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 45 n. 22 (= Bornkamm, *Studien zu Antike und Urchristentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze, II* [Munich: Kaiser, 1963], 130 n. 22).

[145] This is not to claim that such comparisons have not been made. That the material is relevant, is well known. See Kurt Deissner, "Das Sendungsbewußtsein der Urchristenheit" *ZST* 7 (1930): 772–790; Deissner, *Das Idealbild des stoischen Weisen: Rede anläßlich der Reichsgründungsfeier der Universität Greifswald am 18. Januar 1930* (GUR 24; Greifswald: Bamberg, 1930), and the review by J. Haussleiter in *DLZ* 36 (1930): 1688–1691; Karl H. Rengstorf, "Ἀπόστολος," *TWNT* 1 (1933): 408–412; Walter Schmithals, *The Office of the Apostle in the Early Church* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1969), 111–114 (= Schmithals, *Das kirchliche Apostelamt* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961], 100–103). It is fair to say,

to the differences among pagan popular philosophers, for it is precisely when that is done that their statements about themselves take on added significance, and that Paul's appropriation of their language becomes clear. In the absence of a detailed description of the similarities and contrasts between moral philosophers, I shall concentrate here on one passage that systematically describes the different kinds of philosopher-preachers, and then compare it with 1 Thess 2.[146]

295 | In *Oration* 32.8–11 Dio Chrysostom first describes four types of philosophers whom he criticizes and then describes the ideal philosopher. Dio had been invited to deliver the address, and there is no need to assume that he is having to defend himself against specific charges that he was a charlatan.[147] Yet he is aware of the suspicion of the crowd, and he sets out to make clear what kind of preacher he in fact is.[148]

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however, that these studies give an inadequate picture of the situation. They tend to be based on Epictetus (and, in the case of Deissner, on Seneca) and do not sufficiently recognize the diversity of viewpoints held by moral philosophers. In more recent studies this pernicious tendency toward harmonization has increased, especially in the construction of a picture of the so-called θεῖος ἀνήρ: Hans Windisch, *Paulus und Christus: Ein biblisch-religionsgeschichtlicher Vergleich* (UNT 24; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1934); Ludwig Bieler, *Θεῖος Ἀνήρ: Das Bild des 'göttlichen Menschen' in Spätantike und Frühchristentum* (2 vols.; Vienna: Höfels, 1935–1936; repr., 2 vols. in 1, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967); Betz, *Lukian von Samosata und das Neue Testament*, 100–143; Dieter Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief: Studien zur religiösen Propaganda in der Spätantike* (WMANT 11; Neukirchen–Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964). A welcome testing on the methodological level of the hypothesis has been begun by David L. Tiede, *The Charismatic Figure as Miracle Worker* (SBLDS 1; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1972), and carried forward by Carl R. Holladay, Theios Aner *in Hellenistic Judaism: A Critique of the Use of This Category in New Testament Christology* (SBLDS 40; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977).

[146] For a more complete treatment, see Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse.'"

[147] See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12; 33 and 35, in the proemia of which he also speaks of his relationship to his audience. On these discourses, see Hans F.A. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898; repr. as 2d ed., 2004), 438–439, 460ff., and Winfried Elliger, *Dion Chrysostomos: Sämtliche Reden* (Zürich: Artemis, 1967), XVI. Wilhelm Weber, "Eine Gerichtsverhandlung vor Kaiser Traian," *Hermes* 50 (1915): 78–79, dates *Or.* 32 during the period AD 108–112. For a modification of what is presented here, see Paolo Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: Un intellettuale greco nell' impero romano* (Messina/Florence: G. D'Anna, 1978), 150–152.

[148] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12.1, 8–9, 15; 13.11; 34.1–3; 35.2, 5–6, and see Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 301ff., for the reactions of different classes of people to philosophers. Given the situation described by such writers as Lucian, the suspicion was justified. See Rudolf W.O. Helm, "Lucian und die Philosophenschulen," *NJahrb* 9 (1902): 351–369; Christopher P. Jones, *Culture and Society in Lucian* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 24–32; Clay, "Lucian of Samosata: Four Philosophical Lives"; Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, "Kaiserlicher Skeptizismus in platonischem Gewand: Lukians 'Hermotimos,'" in *ANRW* 2.36.5 (1992): 3451–3482.

Dio first mentions the resident philosophers (32.8), some of whom do not appear in public at all, perhaps because they despair of improving the masses,[149] while others confine themselves to lecture halls, addressing only men who are likely to agree with them.[150] From what he says elsewhere, it appears that he considers them useless (ἀνωφελεῖς) and unwilling to enter the ἀγών of life.[151] The next type he mentions is the so-called Cynics (32.9) who play to the crowd. They are the sort satirized by Lucian. They deceive (πλανᾶν, ἀπατᾶν) by their flattery (κολακεύειν, θωπεύειν).[152] Such behavior called forth the derision commonly directed at the Cynics, charging them that they were only concerned for their own δόξα, ἡδονή, and χρήματα, and that they would | use any means that would gratify their appetites.[153] 296 The third type Dio takes to task is those philosophers who put on rhetorical displays by making epideictic speeches for their own profit rather than to benefit their hearers (32.10).[154]

Before describing his ideal, Dio upbraids men of yet another type. They are the ones who do speak with παρρησία, that boldness of speech with which the philosopher lays bare the shortcomings of his hearers in order

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[149] For the type, see von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, 445ff.; Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 335–336, 338–339; Nock, *Conversion*, 178–179, 296; Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian, 1956), 289–333; Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca*, 15ff.

[150] For this type, see von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, 446ff.; Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 339.

[151] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 32.20–24. On ὠφέλεια as motivation of the Cynics, see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 33–34, 36, 39. On the ἀγών, see Victor C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (NovTSup 16; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), esp. 16–37, and Malherbe, "Beasts at Ephesus," 74ff.

[152] Ἀπάτη is the more common of the two terms used among the Cynics, but they are also used interchangeably (cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 4.33, 35). Christopher P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 37, 171 n. 12, suggests that ἀπάτη means "diversion." For πλάνη, see also Wilhelm Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos* (StPP 6; Leipzig: E. Avenarius, 1906), 36; Euripides, *Rhadam. Frg*. 659 (566 Nauck), and Hippocrates's description of certain philosophers as ἐξαπάται, *Vict.* 24.8 (6:496 Littré). On deceit and flattery, cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 48.10 and Otto Ribbeck, *Kolax: Eine ethologische Studie* (ASGW.PH 9.1; Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1883).

[153] For the reproach they brought on philosophy, see Lucian, *Fug*. 21; *Pisc*. 34; Julian, *Or*. 7.225A–F. On achieving no good because of a softened message, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 33.10, 15. On the joining of φιλόδοξος, φιλήδονος, and φιλοχρήματος, see Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 58ff., 87–88.

[154] Among them were the κιθαρῳδοὶ Κυνικοί, a breed Dio considered a peculiarly Alexandrian phenomenon (cf. *Or*. 32.62, 68). On this assessment of the rhetoricians, see *Or*. 2.18; 4.35ff.; 12.10; 33.1–6, 23; 35.1, 9–10. For this type, see Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 345ff.

eventually to improve them,[155] but they do so ἐνδεῶς, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐμπλῆσαι τὰς ἀκοὰς ὑμῶν οὐδ᾽ ὥστε διατελέσαι λέγοντες, ἀλλὰ ἓν ἢ δύο ῥήματα εἰπόντες, καὶ λοιδορήσαντες μᾶλλον ἢ διδάξαντες ὑμᾶς, κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀπίασιν (32.11). This type of speaker, who confused λοιδορία with παρρησία, was a common sight in Imperial times, and figured in the discussion of how a philosopher's outspokenness should be tempered.[156] As humane a person as Dio held that the philosopher should be harsh when the situation demanded,[157] but he adapted his teaching to his hearers' condition and needs, giving individual attention to them, always with the aim of benefiting them.[158] They might scorn him, ὁ δὲ οὐκ ὀργίζεται πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐδ᾽ ἔχει χαλεπῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν, οἶμαι, καὶ πατρὸς εὐνούστερος ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ φίλων.[159] Charlatans also were abusive, but for different reasons,[160] and frequently 297 departed posthaste before they were attacked for | having aroused the ὕβρις of the mob.[161] Some Cynics with a pessimistic view of mankind thought that people could only be improved through the most abusive

[155] On παρρησία, see Heinrich Schlier, "παρρησία," *TWNT* 5 (1954): 869–884, and esp. Erik Peterson, "Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von παρρησία" in *Reinhold Seeberg Festschrift* (ed. Wilhelm Koepp; Leipzig: Deichert, 1929), 283–297. See also David Fredrickson, "Paul's Bold Speech in the Argument of 2 Corinthians 2:12–7:16" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1991).

[156] For the harshness of the Cynics, see esp. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 67ff., 165ff.; Gerhard, "Zur Legende vom Kyniker Diogenes," *AR* 15 (1912): 388–408. The type led to Timon the misanthrope being remembered as a Cynic. See Franz Bertram, *Die Timonlegende: Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Misanthropentypus in der antiken Literatur* (Greifswald: J. Abel, 1906), 33 n. 1, 38, 40ff. On the harsh Cynics, see Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles"; and on the diversity of the Cynics, Malherbe, "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," 46–59, 192–197.

[157] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.19ff., 27, 33; 33.7, 11ff.

[158] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38. On giving individual attention, see n. 184.

[159] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.42.

[160] They hoped in this way to secure the admiration of the masses; cf. Lucian, *Vit. auct.* 10–11; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.22.28ff.; 3.22.50–51; 4.8.34. See also Aelius Aristides (2:401 Dindorf), οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ τὴν μὲν ἀναισχυντίαν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζοντες, τὸ δ᾽ ἀπεχθάνεσθαι παρρησιάζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ λαμβάνειν φιλανθρωπεύεσθαι, and on this often cited passage, see Jacob Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin: Hertz, 1879), 38, 100ff.; Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 306ff.; and esp. Eduard Norden, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Jahrbuch für classische Philologie Suppl. 19.2; Leipzig: Teubner, 1893), 404ff., and André Boulanger, *Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d'Asie au $2^{e}$ siècle de notre ère* (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 126; Paris: E. de Boccard, 1923), 249ff. See further, Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles."

[161] For the threat of the mob, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.20, 24, 29, 74; 34.6; *Gnom. Vat.* 352; Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 45.

scolding.[162] A reaction set in against the harshness of such preaching,[163] and stress came to be placed on the need for gentleness. On occasion the harshness of a certain kind of παρρησία (frequently described by βάρος and cognates),[164] is contrasted to gentle speech like that of a nurse who knows her charges.[165]

After thus describing the different kinds of philosophers, Dio describes the ideal in negative antithetical formulations designed to distinguish himself from them (32.11–12):

> But to find a man who with purity and without guile speaks with a philosopher's boldness (καθαρῶς καὶ ἀδόλως παρρησιαζόμενον), not for the sake of glory (μήτε δόξης χάριν), not making false pretensions for the sake of gain (μήτ' ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ), but (ἀλλ') who stands ready out of good will and concern for his fellowman, if need be, to submit to ridicule and the uproar of the mob—to find such a man is not easy, but rather the good fortune of a very lucky city, so great is the dearth of noble, independent souls, and such the abundance of flatterers (κολάκων), charlatans and sophists. In my own case I feel that I have chosen that role, not of my own volition, but by (οὐκ ἀπ' ... ἀλλ' ὑπό) the will of some deity. For when divine providence is at work for men, the gods provide, not only good counselors who need no urging, but also words that are appropriate and profitable to the listener.

Paul's description of his own ministry in 1 Thess 2 has marked similarities both as to its form and content to Dio's description of the ideal philosopher. Paul claims that his sojourn in Thessalonica had not been empty (εἴσοδος ... οὐ κενή). On the contrary (ἀλλά), despite having experienced violence (ὑβρισθέντες) in Philippi, he spoke boldly in God (ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα ἐν τῷ θεῷ) in a great struggle (ἐν πολλῷ ἀγῶνι) to the Thessalonians (2:1–2). He did not | speak out of error (οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης), was not motivated by impurity (οὐκ ἐξ ἀκαθαρσίας), did not speak with guile (οὐδὲ ἐν δόλῳ), but (ἀλλά) spoke as he had been entrusted by God to speak, not (οὐ) to please men, but (ἀλλά) God. He did not at any time flatter (οὔτε γάρ ποτε ἐν λόγῳ κολακείας), or use a cloak for greed (ἐν προφάσει πλεονεξίας), nor seek glory 298

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162 Their low view of mankind appears most clearly in some of the Cynic letters, e.g., Ps.-Heraclitus, *Epp.* 2, 4, 5; Ps.-Diogenes, *Epp.* 27, 28; Ps.-Hippocrates, *Epp.* 17, 28. On these letters, see Rudolf W.O. Helm, *Lucian and Menipp* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1906; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), 90–91; Wendland, *Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*, 38–39; Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 67–68, 156ff., 165ff., 170ff.; Hippocrates, *Pseudepigraphic Writings* (ed., trans. Wesley D. Smith; SAM 2; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 20–32.

163 Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 39ff.

164 E.g., Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 4.3 (p. 43, 17ff. Hobein); Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 59C; 72A.

165 See Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 69BC, and cf. Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 4.6 (p. 46, 18–20 Hobein); Ps.-Diogenes, *Ep.* 29.4–5; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.73ff., 33.10.

(οὔτε . . . δόξαν) from anyone, though as an apostle he could have made his weight felt (δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει εἶναι). Yet he was gentle as a nurse with her own children (ἀλλὰ ἐγενήθημεν ἤπιοι ἐν μέσῳ ὑμῶν, ὡς ἐὰν τροφὸς θάλπῃ τὰ ἑαυτῆς τέκνα, 2:3–7). He was prepared to share with them not only (οὐ μόνον) his message, but (ἀλλά) himself (2:8). As a father with his children he worked with each one individually (ἕνα ἕκαστον ὑμῶν ὡς πατὴρ τέκνα ἑαυτοῦ, 2:11). They received his message, not (οὐ) as a message of men, but (ἀλλά) as what it really is, a message from God (2:13).

These striking similarities between Dio and Paul lend support to Dibelius's view that Paul is not here defending himself against specific charges that had been made against him in Thessalonica. But we must go further than that. Just as Dio is saying something positive about himself against the background of the false philosophers, so is Paul. As I have attempted to show, he is presenting himself as a model to be emulated, and he does so in terms remarkably similar to those with which Dio describes himself. This suggests that what must still be done is to compare the self-understanding of Paul and Dio (and other philosophers who use the same kind of language to describe themselves). Pointing to the similarities on the surface, as has been done here, will not suffice. More attention must still be paid, in this case, to both Dio and Paul.[166]

It is especially in his Corinthian correspondence that Paul describes himself or his own ministry in terms derived from his philosophic counterparts. I draw attention here to ways in which Paul describes himself in these letters.

An important literary device used in describing the understanding or self-understanding of the ideal sage is the catalogue of vicissitudes, the so-called *peristasis* catalogue. John T. Fitzgerald has recently studied the nature of such lists and the ways they functioned in the philosophical literature and in Paul's Corinthian correspondence (e.g., 1 Cor 4:7–13; 2 Cor 4:7–12; 6:3–10).[167] By detailing the wise man's hardships, the moral

[166] The greatest caution should be exercised not to assume that Dio and Paul understood the terms they used in the same manner. Cynics did not always use the terms in the same way among themselves. For the sophistication with which Paul used such traditions, particularly in polemic and apologetic, see Hans Dieter Betz, *Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition: Eine exegetische Untersuchung zu seiner "Apologie" 2 Korinther 10–13* (BHT 45; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972); Abraham J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 143–173 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 91–119). [*Light*, 1:135–166]

[167] Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*. See also Martin Ebner, *Leidenslisten und Apostelbrief: Untersuchungen zu Form, Motivik und Funktion der Peristasenkataloge bei Paulus* (FB 56; Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1991).

philosophers established him as a reliable guide for people in their moral development. The lists in which they did so functioned in various ways, which Fitzgerald also finds, *mutatis mutandis*, in Paul. They show the sage's experiences as part of a divine scheme | in which the divine exhibits him as a model; his acquisition of virtue in face of the hardships he endures is the result of his own effort rather than a matter of luck; and his hardships distinguish him from people who only pretend to be philosophers, and from his opponents. Throughout, there is a concern with power, whether derived from philosophy, the sage's own mind, or the divine, which justifies the wise man's praise of himself. Paul's lists of hardships, according to Fitzgerald, "take us to the center of Paul's understanding of God and his own self-understanding, yet anchor him in the culture and conventions of his time."[168] 299

This is an appropriate place to return to the matter of parallels. A methodological advance in Fitzgerald's work is that a phenomenon in one Christian author's work is not superficially compared with what are thought to be the philosophic parallels,[169] or with one philosopher, as Sevenster did with Paul and Seneca. To have done either would, on the one hand, have attenuated the differences between the philosophers, and, on the other, focused too narrowly on only one person who may or may not have been significant to the context in which Paul lived. Furthermore, either approach tends to lead to recording "parallels" without really discovering how the persons under consideration engaged the issues of interest to themselves; in this instance, how they understood themselves and their philosophic task. And, when we remain on the level of parallels, any correspondence found between the two entities compared tends to be limited to words or turns of phrase, and is explained in terms of derivation, usually the Christian deriving a particular item from pagans, but then radically changing it. The reasons for stressing these differences in usage or meaning are various, ranging from theological presupposition through narrowness of education which makes a world other than the one we are expert in look strange to us, to the simple fact that although some things may sound the same, they sometimes actually do mean something quite different to different writers.[170]

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[168] Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*, 207.

[169] As is done by Deissner, "Das Sendungsbewußtsein der Urchristenheit," 772–790, still the most useful discussion.

[170] See, e.g., Luke Timothy Johnson, "Taciturnity and True Religion: Jas. 1,26–27," in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 329–339.

The problems associated with hunting for parallels is accentuated when we speak of someone, say Paul, and his "background."[171] The next step is then to think of Paul as taking things from his "background" and adapting them to his own circumstances or purposes. It is potentially fruitful, and certainly more realistic, to place Paul in the context of discussions about the | matters in which we are interested. The point is that in doing so we would focus on more than certain words, and would discover that the philosophers agreed with each other on some matters and disagreed on others, just as Paul agreed with some of them on some matters and disagreed on others. Sevenster's discovery of the differences between Paul's and Seneca's views therefore does not surprise; it is exactly what one would expect. But the differences would likely have been ameliorated, had Sevenster brought other contemporaries or near-contemporaries to Paul and Seneca into the comparison. As it is, dissimilarity as the decisive criterion in comparison does not enrich our understanding of Paul.

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An approach of the sort I suggest is made easier when an identifiable tradition is used by people who share a basic, self-orienting goal, for example, a commitment to help people better themselves, but who differ in their own self-understandings and the consequences thereof for the ways in which they go about their shared task. I have attempted to follow this approach in examining Paul's use of military metaphor in 2 Cor 10:1–6 in light of a tradition that goes back to Antisthenes.[172]

Antisthenes used military imagery in two ways: of the rational faculties which are the wise man's fortifications, and, as exemplified in Odysseus, who was the prototype of people who wished to benefit others, of the philosopher's simple garb as his only weapons. The former became popular with the Stoics, who described the self-sufficient philosopher as secure within the fortifications of his reason. Cynics used the latter, of the philosopher's dress, to express their self-understanding, and in doing so showed how they differed among themselves. Rigoristic Cynics hostile to

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[171] See James M. Robinson, "From 'Background' to 'Trajectories,'" in *Trajectories through Early Christianity* (ed. James M. Robinson and Helmut Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 8–19 (= Robinson and Koester, eds. *Entwicklungslinien durch die Welt des frühen Christentums* [Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1971], 8–19). Although his indictment that the world through which early Christianity moved has erroneously been conceptualized as strangely immobile or static does not fairly describe the classical scholarship with which I am familiar, his argument on "background" is to the point.

[172] Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," 143–173. See already Betz, *Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition*. According to Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus," 459–471, Paul had already in 1 Cor 9:24–27 made use of Antisthenes.

the Antisthenic tradition claimed that their simple dress was the weapon of the gods with which they drove away those who would corrupt them and distinguished themselves from their opponents. Cynics of moderate bent, on the other hand, identified with Odysseus, clad in rags and suffering humiliation, in order to save people. For both types of Cynic, the humble dress was a symbol for their disposition and demeanor.

In 2 Cor 10:3–6 Paul uses the Antisthenic tradition in a way that shows his familiarity with the way in which the philosophers used it to express their self-understanding. He describes his opponents in the language of the lofty Stoic, and shares with the mild Cynic the value he attaches to his own humble demeanor and manner of life, but then he describes that demeanor as God's weapon, an image he derived from the rigoristic Cynics. Clearly, Paul is not facilely using images he had picked up. The way he uses the images shows that he understood them to deal with one's self-understanding, an issue of | paramount importance in the conflict between himself and his Corinthian adversaries. 301

Why does Paul use these particular images only here? Probably because it was his opponents who had introduced the imagery when they described him as weak, lowly, and vacillating, a preacher like Odysseus who constantly looked to God for help. So, it was not only the Stoics and Cynics, but also Paul's opponents who constituted the context of his self-defense. Such a situation cannot be grasped adequately by operating simply with a notion of parallels. What we have to do with, rather, is a situation in which a rich diversity of proclaimers were about, who were called upon to explain and defend themselves.[173] Paul was part of that scene; he had to address the questions his behavior raised, and he did so creatively in terms that belonged to the discussion.

## Ancient Psychagogy

The constant attention philosophers devoted to their followers' intellectual, spiritual, and moral growth resulted in a well developed system of care known as psychagogy.[174] This system included what today is meant

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[173] It is the merit of Dieter Georgi's work, *Die Gegner*, that it has firmly lodged the point that Paul had to compete with many other preachers. The precision with which the attempt is made to differentiate between the Christian preachers is absent from his treatment of Paul's contemporaries.

[174] What follows is treated in detail in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987). See also

by spiritual exercises, psychotherapy, and psychological and pastoral counseling.[175] Epicurus, especially, stressed the need for this kind of care, and a major source for our knowledge of it is a speech on the subject by the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon, preserved by his student Philodemus (first cent. BC).[176] By the first | century AD, however, elements of the system were widely used, for example by the Stoics Epictetus, Seneca, and Dio Chrysostom, and by the Platonist Plutarch.[177]

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Conversion to philosophy required a radical reorientation entailing social, intellectual, and moral transformation or readjustment which often resulted in confusion, bewilderment, and sometimes depression.[178] Philosophic teachers therefore took great pains to analyze the conditions of their followers in order to treat them appropriately and effectively.[179] Such analysis took into consideration not only the strain in social relationships brought about by commitment to a new way of life,[180] but also the psychological traits of different persons.[181] From incisive analysis could

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Malherbe, "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church," *NTS* 36 (1990): 375–391; [*Light*, 1:229–245] Stanley K. Stowers, "Paul on the Use and Abuse of Reason," in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians*, 253–286; Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (NovTSup 81; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).

[175] Still basic is Rabbow, *Seelenführung*. See also Hadot, *Seneca*; E. des Places, "Direction spirituelle, I. Dans l'antiquité classique," *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 3 (1957): 1002–1008; Heinz G. Ingenkamp, *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele* (Hyp. 34; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971); Pierre Hadot, *Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1981), 13–70, esp. for bibliography; Robert J. Newman, "*Cotidie meditare.* Theory and Practice of the *meditatio* in Imperial Stoicism," *ANRW* 2.36.3 (1989): 1473–1517; Thomas Bonhoeffer, *Ursprung und Wesen der christlichen Seelsorge* (BEvT 95; Munich: C. Kaiser, 1985), esp. 53–85.

[176] Alexander Olivieri, *Philodemi Περὶ Παρρησίας Libellis* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914), on which see Norman W. De Witt, "Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups," *CP* 31 (1936): 205–211; Marcello Gigante, "Philodème. Sur la liberté de parole," *Actes du VIII$^{e}$: Congrès, Assoc. Guillaume Budé* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1969), 196–217; Mark T. Riley, "The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates," *Phoenix* 34 (1980): 55–68, esp. 63–66; see Tiziano Dorandi, "Filodemo: gli orientamenti della ricerca attuale," *ANRW* 2.36.4 (1990): 2328–2368, esp. 2348, and Elizabeth Asmis, "Philodemus' Epicureanism," *ANRW* 2.36.4 (1990): 2369–2406, esp. 2393–2394. The most recent extensive discussion is by Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*. See now David Konstan et al., eds., *Philodemus, On Frank Criticism: Introduction, Translation, and Notes* (SBLTT 43; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998).

[177] See Benjamin L. Hijmans, *ΑΣΚΗΣΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* (WTS 2; Assen: van Gorcum, 1959); Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78; Hadot, *Seneca*; Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.*; *Adul. amic.*; *Virt. prof.*

[178] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 36–43.

[179] For Epicurus, see Seneca, *Epp.* 52.3; cf. 94.50–52; 95.36; Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.32; see Hadot, *Seneca*, 155ff.

[180] E.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.22.18–19; Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 77EF, 78A–C; Philodemus, *Lib.* 22a.

[181] See Philodemus, *Lib.* 2, 7–8, 10, 38, 59, 86. It is important to create in the listeners a disposition to be benefited: 13, 66, 79, Ia.

proceed effective παρρησία, a proper understanding of which recognized that both the teacher and the disciple had responsibilities.[182] Basic to the enterprise was a relationship of respect and trust: The teacher demonstrated his goal of benefiting or helping his listeners by exemplifying the principles he taught and providing them a measure of security; the students respected their teacher and emulated him.[183]

Within this relationship the philosopher's speech is highly nuanced. He will be careful to select the right moment to speak, whether publicly or privately, to groups or individuals, mostly preferring to take someone aside.[184] His instruction will always be adapted to the conditions of those he wishes to benefit, and will thus vary. On one occasion he may persuade and exhort, on another abuse and reproach, on yet another comfort, always adapting his speech just as a physician does his cure to the disease.[185]

| It is to be expected that the writings of the NT, which to a considerable degree aim at the moral formation of individuals as well as communities, would reflect an awareness of these practices. This material has not sufficiently been brought into the social description of the founding and formation of the earliest Christian communities,[186] but a beginning has been made. 303

It is ironic, in view of their modern designation as the "Pastoral Epistles," and their frequent utilization of traditions from the moral philosophers, that the letters bearing the names of Timothy and Titus as addressees offer advice that flies in the face of ideal psychagogy. For example, in 2 Tim 4:2,

182 E.g., Philodemus, *Lib.* 8, 18, 36, 41, 44, 61, 67; Plutarch, *Virt. prof.* 80B–F, 84E.

183 Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 11; Seneca, *Epp.* 6.5–6; 11.8–10; 25.5–6; 52.8–10; 94.55–59; Lucian, *Nigr.* 6–7, and on the whole subject, see Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*.

184 Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.38; Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.* 43E–44A; *Adul. amic.* 70D–71D; Apollonius of Tyana, *Ep.* 10; Philo, *Decal.* 36–39, and see Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 272–279; Hadot, *Seneca*, 64–66.

185 See Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," and esp. Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," *JBL* 103 (1984): 235–243 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 137–145). Also useful are Marcello Gigante, "Philosophia medicans in Filodemo," *Cronache Ercolanesi* 5 (1975): 56–61; Martha Nussbaum, "Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle," in *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 31–74.

186 The most thorough treatment is by Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); see also Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Rockwell Lectures at Rice University; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977; 2d ed. enlarged, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983).

the reader is commanded, ἐπίστηθι εὐκαίρως ἀκαίρως, which rejects the traditional advice to determine the right καιρός to speak and to adapt one's speech to the circumstances and conditions addressed.[187] Furthermore, in these letters there is no room for private instruction; exhortation is to take place in public for all to hear.[188] The situation reflected is one in which an established church is being subverted by interlopers who have found entrance into private homes. To counter this strategy, the author describes the heretics as beyond cure, and, implicitly, as virtually beyond the methods of care used with people who can still be corrected.

The situation is quite different with respect to 1 Thessalonians, which was written within a matter of months after Paul had founded the church. The letter reveals that in his founding and nurturing of a church, Paul followed the methods of the moral philosophers. Like converts to philosophy, the Thessalonian Christians also assumed their new way of life with mixed emotions (1 Thess 1:6), suffered grief (4:13) and distress (3:3), redefined their social relationships (4:3–12), and were in need of further instruction (3:10). Paul had presented himself as a model to be imitated (1:6, cf. 2 Thess 3:7–10). In his pastoral work he had been as gentle as a nurse (2:7), and, like a father, had given attention to his converts individually (ἕνα ἕκαστον ὑμῶν, 2:11) and varied his speech to include exhortation, encouragement, and firm direction (παρακαλοῦντες ὑμᾶς καὶ παραμυθούμενοι καὶ μαρτυρόμενοι, 2:11). In keeping with the long tradition of consolation literature, he had alerted them to the difficulties they would experience (3:1–5).[189]

Separated from the Thessalonians, Paul had sent Timothy to strengthen them (3:1–5) and, it would appear, determine whether they still remembered | him as their model in the faith (3:6). Timothy's report that they did remember him became the occasion for writing a letter in the paraenetic style. Given the condition of the converts, however, the paraenetic elements in the letter serve a pastoral function: the philophronesis in the letter binds Paul closer to the Thessalonians, who may have felt abandoned by him; the repeated references to what they already know and do, instill self-confidence in new converts who were prone to be disheartened by the slow progress they were making in the new life.[190] In writing this

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[187] See the discussion in Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2."

[188] See 1 Tim 4:12–15; 5:19–21, 24–25; 2 Tim 2:2; Titus 2:7–8.

[189] Cf. Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.24.103–104; Seneca, *Epp*. 24.15; 91.4; see Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, 160–171; Hadot, *Seneca*, 59–61; Vollenweider, *Freiheit als neue Schöpfung*, 51–53.

[190] Addressed esp. by Plutarch, *Virt. prof.*

first Christian pastoral letter, Paul was creating something new,[191] but in Epicurus he had a predecessor and in Seneca a contemporary who used letters as means by which to engage in pastoral care.[192]

Paul also directs the Thessalonians to undertake pastoral care of each other, and in doing so again makes use of the philosophic psychagogic traditions. As he had given attention to individuals, so they are to exhort and edify one another εἷς τὸν ἕνα (5:11). He then specifies how this is to take place by first turning to the responsibilities of the listeners to respect those who have their benefit at heart (5:12–13). Then he advises the leaders to adapt their speech to the conditions of the persons they seek to help: νουθετεῖτε τοὺς ἀτάκτους, παραμυθεῖσθε τοὺς ὀλιγοψύχους, ἀντέχεσθε τῶν ἀσθενῶν, μακροθυμεῖτε πρὸς πάντας (5:14). Governing the entire situation is the advice to be at peace with each other (5:13) and not to retaliate (5:14).[193]

The psychagogic tradition became increasingly important to Christians in later centuries as more structure was given to the spiritual life by developing devotional and spiritual exercises. The initial attempts that have been made to bring the psychagogic tradition to bear on NT practice justify the expectation that this literature may throw in much sharper relief the NT writers' concern with pastoral practice.

## The *Haustafeln*

Much work has been done by NT scholars on the lists of duties of members of a household which frequently appear in paraenetic | literature such as the diatribe, but not only in literature of that type.[194] At the turn of the 305

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[191] Stressed esp. by Helmut Koester, "1 Thessalonians—An Experiment in Christian Writing," in *Continuity and Discontinuity in Church History: Essays Presented to George Huntston Williams on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday* (ed. F. Forrester Church and Timothy George; SHCT 19; Leiden: Brill, 1979), 33–44.

[192] See Wolfgang Schmid, "Epikur," *RAC* 5 (1962): 681–819, esp. 743 (= *Ausgewählte philologische Schriften* [ed. Hartmut Erbse und Jochem Küppers; Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1984], 202–203); Philipp Vielhauer, *Geschichte der urchristlichen Literatur* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), 61–62; Hadot, *Seneca*; Giancarlo Mazzoli, "Le 'Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium' di Seneca. Valore letterario e filosofico," *ANRW* 2.36.3 (1989): 1823–1877.

[193] On non-retaliation, see Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 10; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.54; 4.1.127; *Ench.* 42; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 77/78.42; Plutarch, *Adul. amic.* 72EF.

[194] For additional information to that provided here, see David L. Balch, "Household Codes," in Aune, *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament*, 25–50; Peter Fiedler, "Haustafel," *RAC* 13 (1986): 1063–1073.

century, Karl Praechter[195] proved that excerpts preserved by Stobaeus and attributed by him to a certain "Hierocles," came from an ethical handbook dealing with duties, written by a first- or second-century Stoic by that name, rather than from Hierocles the Neoplatonist, as had previously been thought.[196] Under the lemmata τίνα τρόπον θεοῖς χρηστέον,[197] πῶς πατρίδι χρηστέον,[198] πῶς χρηστέον τοῖς γονεῦσιν,[199] περὶ φιλαδελφίας,[200] πῶς συγγενέσι χρηστέον,[201] ὁ οἰκονομικός,[202] περὶ γάμου (καὶ παιδοποιίας)[203] Stobaeus collects excerpts from the handbook which appears to have been known widely.[204] Hierocles, according to Praechter, was not a thinker of great depth but rather belonged to the Stoic popular philosophers. Similar, but much briefer listings of duties are found frequently in other pagan[205] and Jewish[206] authors, and appear to have been part of general moral instruction.

Such lists of duties are also used in the NT[207] and in other early Christian literature.[208] Dibelius, making use of the work of Praechter and Wendland,[209] demonstrated the similarity of these Christian codes to the

[195] Karl Praechter, *Hierokles der Stoiker* (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1901).

[196] It is possible that he is the Stoic whom Aulus Gellius refers to as *vir sanctus et gravis* (*Noct. att.* 9.5.8); see Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 1:359.

[197] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 1.3.53–54 (1:63, 6–7 W-H); 2.9.7 (2:181, 8–9 W-H).

[198] Stobaeus, *Flor.* 3.39.34–36 (3:730, 17 W-H).

[199] Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.25.53 (4:640, 4 W-H).

[200] Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.27.20 (4:660, 15 W-H).

[201] Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.27.23 (4:671, 3 W-H).

[202] Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.28.21 (5:696, 21 W-H).

[203] Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.22.21–24 (4:502, 1 W-H); 24.14 (4:603, 9 W-H).

[204] A papyrus of a considerable section of another work by Hierocles, his Ἠθικὴ Στοιχείωσις, was published by Hans F.A. von Arnim, *Hierokles ethische Elementarlehre* (*Papyrus 9780*) (BK 4; Berlin: Weidmann, 1906), who suggested that it was the introductory chapter to the handbook on duties. Praechter, however, points out that the excerpts from the handbook seem to be addressed to a wide circle and therefore avoid technical philosophical discussion in the strict sense, whereas the Ἠθικὴ Στοιχείωσις had a more philosophically sophisticated audience in view. See Überweg and Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 499. Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 1:358, follows von Arnim. Now also see Margherita Isnardi Parente, "Ierocle stoico: Oikeiosis e doveri sociali," *ANRW* 2.36.3 (1989): 2201–2226. An English translation is available in Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation*, 85–104. See the new edition by Ilaria Ramelli, *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts* (trans. David Konstan; WGRW 28; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2009).

[205] E.g., Cicero, *Off.* 1.17.58; 3.15.63; Horace, *Ars* 312–316; Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 7DE; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.91.

[206] E.g., Ps.-Phocylides, *Sent.* 175–230; Philo, *Post.* 181; *Deus* 17, 19; *Plant.* 17.

[207] E.g., Eph 5:22–6:9; Col 3:18–4:1; Titus 2:1–10; 1 Peter 2:13–3:7.

[208] E.g., 1 *Clem.* 1.3, 21.6ff.; Pol. *Phil.* 4.2ff.

[209] Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, 86ff.

pagan and Hellenistic Jewish lists.[210] He argued that the Christian lists were | superficially Christianized examples of the same form. His student, Karl Weidinger, developed his teacher's view further, bringing into the discussion more material from Hellenistic philosophers, and stressing the Stoic background to the lists.[211] According to Dibelius and Weidinger, these *Haustafeln*[212] were adopted and modified by Christians as their expectation of the Parousia waned and they found it necessary to come to terms with the world. Their views on the *Haustafeln* are widely accepted among NT scholars,[213] although there are some significant exceptions.[214] It is fair to say that the interest in the origin and form of the *Haustafel* has until recently dominated the investigation,[215] and that the general view has been that the *Haustafeln* are of a casual nature and not directly related to the situations to which they are addressed. The last word has not yet been written on either the origin of the form or the manner in which the *Haustafeln* are appropriated by the NT writers. A beginning has nevertheless been made to extend the investigation beyond the sources identified

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[210] Martin Dibelius, *An die Kolosser, Epheser, an Philemon* (HNT 12; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1912; 3d ed. 1937). See the excursus following commentary on Col 4:1.

[211] Karl Weidinger, *Die Haustafeln: Ein Stück urchristlicher Paränese* (UNT 14; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1928).

[212] This term, perhaps originated by Luther, has become a technical term for the lists. See Weidinger, *Haustafeln*, 1–2.

[213] E.g., Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser* (5th ed.; Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1965), 250ff., who claims that the scheme underlying the *Haustafel* corresponds to catechetical traditions of early Christianity which in turn are related to the Stoic and Hellenistic Jewish schemes of duties. See also Eduard Lohse, *Die Briefe an die Kolosser und an Philemon* (KEK 9.2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 220ff.; Karl H. Schelkle, *Die Petrusbriefe. Der Judasbrief. Auslegung* (HTKNT 13.2; Freiburg: Herder, 1961), 98ff.; J.N.D. Kelly, *A Commentary on the Epistles of Peter and of Jude* (BNTC; London: A. & C. Black, 1969), 107ff.; Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (2 vols.; New York: Scribner, 1951–1955), 1:118 (= Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* [5th ed.; Tübingen: Mohr, 1965], 120–121).

[214] For a survey of interpretations which see the *Haustafeln* as Jewish or Christian creations, see James E. Crouch, *The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafel* (FRLANT 109; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972). Crouch himself stresses the Hellenistic Jewish background as the origin of the material from which the Christian *Haustafeln* were constructed. For an argument in favor of the Old Testament as the ultimate but not proximate source, see David Schroeder, "Die Haustafeln des Neuen Testaments. Ihre Herkunft und ihr theologischer Sinn" (Ph.D. diss., Universität Hamburg, 1959), and Schroeder, "Lists, Ethical," *IDBSup* (1976): 546–547.

[215] Exceptions are Karris, "The Function and *Sitz im Leben* of the Paraenetic Elements in the Pastoral Epistles," and Crouch, *The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafel*. The latter submits a thesis that a tension between enthusiastic and nomistic tendencies in the early church provided the context within which the Christian *Haustafeln* were drawn up from material already present in Hellenistic Judaism. Seen thus, the *Haustafel* would be the expression of the nomistic tendency of Pauline Christianity.

by Dibelius and his followers. During the last twenty years three scholars, independently of each other, have brought new texts into the discussion and raised new questions about their function. These scholars argue that the NT codes ultimately derive from the discussion about household management, especially as outlined by Aristotle in *Pol.* 1.2.1–23.1253b–1255b. Dieter Lührmann brought into the discussion, in addition to Aristotle, 307 passages from Xenophon, *Oeconomica*; | the Ps.-Aristotelian, *Oeconomica*; Philodemus, *Oeconomica*; and Seneca (*Ep.* 94.1–3),[216] to which Klaus Thraede added the Neopythagorean literature.[217] David Balch canvassed more widely, and demonstrated the importance of Plato, the Middle Platonists, and, above all, Arius Didymus.[218]

This effort to locate the *Haustafeln* more securely in ancient political and social philosophy has been accompanied by a desire to discover the function or functions to which the material was put. Lührmann, arguing that the codes were latently political, situated them in the social and institutional development of early Christianity.[219] Thraede made a more precise specification by claiming that the *Haustafeln,* although they are anti-egalitarian, nevertheless support a humanitarian view of authority.[220] The function of the *Haustafeln* has also been regarded as apologetic, and here 1 Pet 2:11–3:12 has been the subject of debate.

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[216] Dieter Lührmann, "Wo man nicht mehr Sklave oder Freier ist. Überlegungen zur Struktur frühchristlicher Gemeinden," *WD* 13 (1975): 53–83; Lührmann, "Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und antike Ökonomie," *NTS* 27 (1980): 83–97.

[217] Klaus Thraede, "Ärger mit der Freiheit: Die Bedeutung von Frauen," in "*Freunde in Christus werden . . .": Die Beziehung von Mann und Frau als Frage an Theologie und Kirche* (ed. Gerta Scharffenorth and Klaus Thraede; Gelnhausen/Berlin: Burckhardthaus-Verlag, 1977), 31–182; Thraede, "Zum historischen Hintergrund der 'Haustafeln' des NT," in *Pietas: Festschrift für Bernhard Kötting* (ed. Ernst Dassmann and Karl S. Frank; JAC Ergänzungsband 8; Münster: Aschendorff, 1980), 359–368. For the Pythagorean material, in addition to Iamblichus, *VP* 45–50, see Friedrich Wilhelm, "Die oeconomica der Neopythagoreer Bryson, Kallikratides, Periktione, Phintys," *RhMus* 70 (1915): 161–223. The texts are conveniently gathered in Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* (AAAbo, Series A: Humaniora 30,1; Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1965). On Wilhelm's argument, see Thesleff, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period* (AAAbo, Series A: Humaniora 24,3; Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1961), 57–97.

[218] Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive*; also see Balch, "Household Ethical Codes" (*SBL Seminar Papers, 1977*), 397–404. The relevant text from Arius Didymus is found in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.7.26 (2:147, 26 – 152, 25 W-H), an English translation of which appears in Balch, "Household Codes" (Aune, *Greco-Roman Literature*), 41–44.

[219] See also Karl-Heinz Bieritz and Christoph Kaehler, "Haus," *TRE* 14 (1985): 478–492.

[220] See also Karlheinz Müller, "Die Haustafel des Kolosserbriefes und das antike Frauenthema: Eine kritische Rückschau auf alte Ergebnisse," in *Die Frau im Urchristentum* (ed. Josef Blank, Gerhard Dautzenberg, Helmut Merklein, and Karlheinz Müller; QD 95; Freiburg: Herder, 1983), 263–319.

W.C. van Unnik has shown that the language of Jewish proselytism is used frequently in 1 Peter.[221] Whether his thesis, that the letter was written to Christians who had been God-fearers[222] before their conversion to Christianity, | be accepted or not, he has demonstrated that the Hellenistic Jewish writings, and especially their statements relating to proselytes, contribute to the clarification of the letter. One of the functions that the *Haustafel* performs in that literature helps us better to understand its use in 1 Peter, and that is what I wish to explore here. As we shall see, the texts which are most relevant to 1 Peter deal with the relationship between Jews and pagans. On the one hand, they deal with proselytism and the problems raised by it, and on the other with apologies for the Jewish way of life. In order to move beyond the merely literary or formal level, it will be necessary to take note of some characteristic statements made of proselytism and proselytes which reflect the tension of the social situation in which Jews found themselves. 308

In a number of passages Philo expresses his concern that special consideration should be given to the proselyte who had been wrenched from his past associations. The proselyte is said to have turned his kinsfolk into mortal enemies by leaving the myths so highly honored by his parents, grandparents, ancestors, and blood relations.[223] Proselytes have left their country, their kinsfolk and their friends for the sake of virtue and religion.[224] It is clear that Philo recognizes the disruptive social effect

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[221] Willem C. van Unnik, "De verlossing I Petrus 1:18–19 en het probleem van den eersten Petrusbrief," *Mededelingen der Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen: Afdeeling Letterkunde* (Nieuwe Reeks 5/1; Amsterdam, 1942), 1–106 (= van Unnik, "The Redemption in 1 Peter 1:18–19 and the Problem of the First Epistle of Peter," in van Unnik, *Sparsa Collecta*, 2 [1980]: 3–82).

[222] The φοβούμενοι τὸν θεόν or σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν were the non-Jews who observed the so-called Noachian laws which were regarded as binding on all people, but who did not become proselytes. For a discussion, with bibliography of older works, see Karl G. Kuhn, "προσήλυτος," *TWNT* 6 (1959): 740ff. For more recent discussions, see Kazimierz Romaniuk, "Die 'Gottesfürchtigen' im NT," *Aeg* 44 (1964): 66–91; Baruch Lifshitz, "Du nouveau sur les 'Sympathisants,'" *JSJ* 1 (1970): 77–84. It has recently been argued by A. Thomas Kraabel ("The God-Fearers—A Literary and Theological Invention," *BAR* 12 [1986]: 46–53, 64) that the God-Fearers are a creation of Luke and did not exist as a group associated with the synagogue. For contrary opinions, see Robert F. Tannenbaum, "Jews and God-Fearers in the Holy City of Aphrodite," *BAR* 12 (1986): 54–57; Louis H. Feldman, "The Omnipresence of the God-Fearers," *BAR* 12 (1986): 58–64, 66–69. For the important evidence from Aphrodisias, see Joyce Reynolds and Robert Tannenbaum, *Jews and God-Fearers at Aphrodisias: Greek Inscriptions with Commentary* (Cambridge Philological Society Suppl. 12; Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1987).

[223] Philo, *Spec.* 4.178.

[224] Philo, *Spec.* 1.52.

conversion to Judaism had, and it is to be expected that pagan observers would comment on this feature of Judaism.[225] Indeed, Tacitus in describing the Jews, says of the proselytes: *Transgressi in morem eorum idem usurpant, nec quicquam prius imbuuntur quam contemnere deos, exuere patriam, parentes liberos fratres vilia habere.*[226] Proselytism thus upset precisely those social relationships with which the *Haustafeln* have to do. It can be expected that in their defenses against such charges Jewish writers would have had to deal with the accusation that Judaism was inimical to social calm and harmony.

309 | Philo does so to a degree in a passage in which the *Haustafel* is made to function apologetically.[227] The passage is contained in his *Hypothetica*, two fragments of which are preserved by Eusebius.[228] The title of the work suggests that it was ethical or hortatory in nature, and the character of the preserved passages supports this,[229] but there are also indications that it

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[225] For a summary of the calumnies made against the Jews, see Jean Juster, *Les Juifs dans l'empire romaine* (2 vols.; Paris: P. Geuthner, 1914), 1:45ff.; Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1976–1984).

[226] Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.5. For a somewhat similar criticism of another minority group characterized by a high exclusiveness, viz., the Epicureans, see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.7.20–21.

[227] Josephus, in the second book of his *Contra Apionem* refutes the charges of Apollonius Molon, Lysimachus, Apion and others, that Jews were antisocial, among other things (cf. *C. Ap.* 2.145ff.). Josephus's defense (ἀπολογία, *C. Ap.* 2.147), stressing the Jewish ὁμόνοια (cf. *C. Ap.* 2.179, 283–284, 294) and συμφωνία (cf. *C. Ap.* 2.170, 181), contains (*C. Ap.* 2.189, 199, 205–206, 209) what Weidinger, *Haustafeln*, 26–27, lists as a *Haustafel,* and which illustrates to him the fact that the *Haustafel* functioned in Hellenistic Judaism in proselyte propaganda. According to Martin Hengel, "Die Ursprünge der christlichen Mission," *NTS* 18 (1971): 27 n. 44, *C. Ap.* 2.184–219 is a proselyte catechism. That this listing of precepts and prohibitions can be called a *Haustafel* is to be doubted, and Schroeder, "Die Haustafeln des Neuen Testaments," 70, is probably correct in his refusal to accept it as such. What the section does that is of interest to us, is to demonstrate, on the one hand, the need of Jews to affirm that Judaism was not socially irresponsible, and on the other, the Jewish claim that their order was due to their obedience to divine will. On *C. Ap.* 2.145–296 as following the pattern of an encomium outlined by Menander of Laodicea, see David L. Balch, "Josephus, *Against Apion* 2.145–296," *SBL Seminar Papers, 1975* (ed. George MacRae; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1975), 187–192.

[228] Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 8.6–7, 355C–361B.

[229] As Jacob Bernays, "Philon's Hypothetika und die Verwünschungen des Buzyges in Athen," in *Monatsbericht der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (October, 1876), 589–609 (= Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* [2 vols.; Berlin: Hertz, 1885], 1:262–82), has shown, ὑποθήκη refers to suggestions as to moral conduct. Cf. Isocrates, *Ad Nic.* 3; Philo of Larissa, *apud* Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.38 (2:258, 17–18 W-H); Diogenes Laertius 1.2; Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 14.27, 782A; Musonius Rufus (p. 91, 16 Hense). See further, Hadot, *Seneca*, 10ff. For further discussion of the work, see Bacchisio R. Motzo, "Le Ὑποθετικά di Filone," *AAST* 47 (1912), 556–573; Gregory E. Sterling, "Philo and the Logic of Apologetics: An Analysis of the Hypothetica," *SBL Seminar Papers, 1990* (ed. David J. Lull; *SBLSP* 29; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1990), 412–430.

had an apologetic intention.[230] The combination of ethics and apologetics was due to the conviction that Jewish morality was superior to that of non-Jews. Consequently, ethics figured prominently in both Jewish religious propaganda as well as apologetics.[231] In the "Hypothetica" Philo gives an epitome of the Jewish πολιτεία which stresses the clarity of the Jewish laws, and boasts that Jews succeed in keeping them. The reason for their success, Philo claims, is the weekly synagogal instruction they receive in their laws. The result is that,

> | whomsoever of them you accost and interrogate about the national customs, he can tell you readily and easily; and each seems qualified to impart a knowledge of the laws, husband to wife, and father to children, and master to servants.[232] 310

What we have here is clearly a reference to an apologetic use of the *Haustafel*. It would be too much to say that Philo directly addresses himself to the kind of charge made by Tacitus, although it cannot be doubted that he of all Hellenistic Jews must have been aware of such charges. What does emerge from the passage is a presentation of Judaism that sees its life in society as its defense against charges that it is antisocial.[233] The *Haustafel*

[230] In *Praep. ev.* 8.5, 355B, where he first mentions the 'Hypothetica' and introduces the first fragment, Eusebius says Ὑποθετικῶν, ἔνθα τὸν ὑπὲρ Ἰουδαίων, ὡς πρὸς κατηγόρους αὐτῶν, ποιούμενος λόγον, ταῦτά φησιν (cf. also 6, 360B). Whether the *Hypothetica* is identical to the *Apologia pro Judaeis* from which Eusebius quotes in 8.11 is uncertain. See further, Isaak Heinemann, *Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung: Kulturvergleichende Untersuchungen zu Philons Darstellung der jüdischen Gesetze* (Chapters 1–3 originally published in Festschrift zum 75 jährigen Bestehen des Jüdischen-theologischen Seminars Fränckelscher Stiftung Bd. 1, 1929. Chapters 4–5 originally published in Jahresbericht 1929 of Jüdisch-theologisches Seminar Fränckelscher Stiftung; Breslau: Marcus, 1932; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1962), 352ff.

[231] See Peter Dalbert, *Die Theologie der hellenistisch-jüdischen Missionsliteratur unter Ausschluß von Philo und Josephus* (*TF* 4; Hamburg-Volksdorf: H. Reich, 1954), 23; Karl Axenfeld, "Die jüdische Propaganda als Vorläuferin und Wegbereiterin der urchristlichen Mission," in *Missionswissenschaftliche Studien. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag des Herrn Prof. D. Dr. Gustav Warneck* (ed. Karl Axenfeld and Gustav Warneck; Berlin: Warneck, 1904), 1–80.

[232] Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 8.7, 360B. Cf. 358A; 359B for other references to the relationships between members of the household.

[233] This line of argument continues in early Christian apologetic. See Aristides, *Apol.* 15; *Diogn.* 5–6; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 11, and see Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907), 86ff., 92ff.; Henri I. Marrou, *À Diognète* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951), 143ff.; Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 1:205ff. (= Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des*

is one way in which that life is described. This use of the *Haustafel* throws new light on its significance in 1 Peter.

First Peter was most probably written in Rome during the reign of Domitian.[234] The addressees were experiencing πειρασμοί (1:6; 4:12) which were, most likely "spasmodic, unofficial, and social rather than legal in character."[235] They are described as being spoken against (2:12), reviled (3:9), troubled (3:14), abused (4:4) and reproached (4:14). The letter, exhorting them to continue in the Christian ἀναστροφή, contains long sentences of paraenesis.[236] A theological basis for specific moral instruction is given in chapters 1 and 2, and concludes with the statement that God's choosing of Christians as his peculiar people took place ὅπως τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐξαγγείλητε τοῦ ἐκ σκότους ὑμᾶς καλέσαντος εἰς τὸ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοῦ φῶς (2:9). That proclamation is evidently to take place through the way of life to which they are exhorted in the *Haustafel* that follows.

The *Haustafel* is introduced in 2:12 in a manner which shows that the way of life it espouses has both a missionary as well as an apologetic value:

311 | τὴν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἔχοντες καλήν, ἵνα ἐν ᾧ καταλαλοῦσιν ὑμῶν ὡς κακαποιῶν, ἐκ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἐποπτεύοντες δοξάσωσιν τὸν θεὸν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς.

Then follows a list of duties treating the responsibilities of Christians toward governmental authorities (2:13–17), of slaves to their masters (2:18–25), of wives to their husbands (3:1–6), of husbands to their wives (3:7), and finally, of all Christians to each other (3:8–9). The *Haustafel* is then closed with a quotation of Ps 34:13–17 which at once supports the immediately preceding exhortation and prepares for the one that follows.[237] The missionary

*Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* [2 vols.; 4th ed.; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1924], 1:226ff.).

[234] See Werner G. Kümmel, *Introduction to the New Testament* (17th ed.; Paul Feine, Johannes Behm, and Werner G. Kümmel, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*; trans. Howard C. Kee; Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), 416ff., and for another discussion, Kelly, *Commentary on the Epistles of Peter and of Jude*, 1ff. See also Edouard Cothenet, "La Première de Pierre. Bilan de 35 ans de recherches," *ANRW* 2.25.5 (1988): 3685–3712, and Marion L. Soards, "1 Peter, 2 Peter, and Jude as Evidence for a Petrine School," *ANRW* 2.25.5 (1988): 3827–3849.

[235] Edward G. Selwyn, *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (2d ed.; London: Macmillan, 1947), 52. Thus also Peter Lippert, *Leben als Zeugnis: Die werbende Kraft christlicher Lebensführung nach dem Kirchenverständnis neutestamentlicher Briefe* (SBM 4; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1968), 61ff., who has much to say that is to the point.

[236] See Eduard Lohse, "Paränese und Kerygma im 1. Petrusbrief," *ZNW* 45 (1954): 68–89.

[237] The fact that the longest exhortations are addressed to slaves and women does not itself necessarily imply that the churches in view had a preponderance of those two

and apologetic motives also appear in the detailed advice given in the *Haustafel.* Christians are told to be subject to the governing authorities, for it is the will of God ἀγαθοποιοῦντες φιμοῦν τὴν τῶν ἀφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἀγνωσίαν (2:15).[238] The missionary motive appears clearly in 3:1–2, where Christian wives are told to be subject to their unbelieving husbands so that διὰ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν ἀναστροφῆς ἄνευ λόγου κερδηθήσονται, ἐποπτεύσαντες τὴν ἐν φόβῳ ἁγνὴν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν.[239] First Peter is obviously sensitive to the relationship between Christians and society, and by means of the *Haustafel* seeks to clarify what that relationship should be.[240] The suggestion therefore lies close to hand that an investigation of the function of *Haustafeln* which are used in contexts reflecting missionary or apologetic interests may help us to move beyond mere literary study of the codes. Such an approach may enable us to see more sharply precisely what the points at issue were between the early church and society, and how they were addressed.[241] David L. Balch has pursued this line | of investigation. 312

groups in their membership. Christianity had a reputation as a domestic troublemaker. See Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, 1:393–98 (= *Mission und Ausbreitung*, 1:405–409) and, more recently, Eric R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine* (Wiles Lectures, 1963; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 115ff. Since slaves and women would cause peculiar and persistent problems in religiously divided households, it is to be expected that special attention would be given them in a situation where the Christian community was already under attack. For the problem of women converted to other cults, see Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, 1:506ff.

[238] See Willem C. van Unnik, "The Teaching of Good Works in 1 Peter," *NTS* 1 (1954): 92–110 (= van Unnik, *Sparsa Collecta* 2 [1980]: 83–105). Cf. 1 Pet 3:15: Christians are to be ἕτοιμοι ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι ὑμᾶς λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος, where the defense in mind may be verbal, but not exclusively so, as ἀναστροφή in 3:16 shows. Cf. 1 Pet 3:16 with Philo, n. 230 above.

[239] See David Daube, "κερδαίνω as a Missionary Term," *HTR* 40 (1947): 109–120.

[240] For the Christian awareness of pagan reaction to the church, see Willem C. van Unnik, "Die Rücksicht auf die Reaktion der Nicht-Christen als Motiv in der altchristlichen Paränese," in *Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche: Festschrift für Joachim Jeremias* (ed. Walther Eltester; BZNW 26; Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1964), 221–233 (= van Unnik, *Sparsa Collecta* 2 [1980]: 307–322).

[241] More attention should also be given to the *Haustafel* in *1 Clem.* 21.6–8. *First Clement*, roughly contemporary with 1 Peter, was also written in Rome, and its use of the *Haustafel* should be studied in light of Willem C. van Unnik's determination that as to its literary genre, *1 Clement* is a συμβουλευτικὸς λόγος περὶ ὁμονοίας. See van Unnik, "Studies over de zogenaamde eerste brief van Clemens. I. Het litteraire genre," in *Mededelingen der Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen: Afdeeling Letterkunde* (Nieuwe Reeks 33/4; Amsterdam, 1970), 149–204. What makes the *Haustafel* in *1 Clement* of special interest is the fact that it is immediately followed by a quotation of Ps 34:11–17, which may suggest a tradition from which 1 Peter also derived his *Haustafel.* For the view that Ps 34:11–22 represented the outline of a catechism for proselytes supposedly used by Jewish missionaries, see Gottlieb

An examination of two encomia in Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Josephus revealed the apologetic function of domestic codes,[242] and Balch succeeded in locating the codes in the Romans' relations with foreign cults whom they suspected of sedition. He finds the same apologetic function in several of the NT codes, and particularly in 1 Peter, where, he argues, the code promotes Christian integration into Greco-Roman society. In this, he has been opposed by John H. Elliott, who emphasizes the apocalyptic dualism of the letter and concludes that the author seeks the termination, rather than integration, of previous associations.[243] Elliott's argument reminds one that the theological significance of the codes can be slighted.[244]

It is true to say, however, that social and political questions have dominated the discussion; witness the summary by Balch:

> First, do the codes represent partisanship for one philosophic option among many in Greco-Roman society for ordering household relationships (Thraede)? Or do they represent the church's apologetic response to Greco-Roman social, political pressure to conform to a relatively uniform, hierarchical, patriarchal Roman "constitution" (Balch)? Second, are they to be described as an "advance" (*Fortschritt*) over alternatives available in Jewish and Neopythagorean circles (Thraede, Mueller)? Or do they deprive women of prominent leadership roles formerly held in Pauline Christianity so that the codes function to patriarchalize church office and to marginalize influential women (Schüssler Fiorenza)? Third, is there no critique of Roman society in these codes (Thraede, Mueller, Schüssler Fiorenza)? Or do 1 Pet and Col correct key Hellenistic values about justice and piety (Balch)? Fourth, does the code in 1 Peter encourage Christians to terminate familial, social and religious ties with pagans (Elliott)? Or does it function to encourage adaptation | of Greco-Roman values (I would employ the sociological category of "selective acculturation") over against social patterns in the early

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Klein, *Der älteste christliche Katechismus und die jüdische Propaganda-Literatur* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1909).

[242] David L. Balch, "Two Apologetic Encomia: Dionysius on Rome and Josephus on the Jews," *JSJ* 13 (1982): 102–122.

[243] John H. Elliott, *A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981). The debate between Balch and Elliott is contained in Charles H. Talbert, ed., *Perspectives on 1 Peter* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1986), 61–101.

[244] See Nils A. Dahl, "Neutestamentliche Ansätze zur Lehre von den zwei Regimenten," in *Reich Gottes und Welt* (ed. Heinz H. Schrey; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), 21ff. (= *LR* 15 [1965]: 441–462). Wolfgang Schrage, "Zur Ethik der neutestamentlichen Haustafeln," *NTS* 21 (1974): 1–22, is an excellent discussion which partially redresses the balance.

Jesus movement and in Pauline Christianity (Lührmann, Balch, Schüssler-Fiorenza)?[245]

These are questions which have also risen with some insistence in and about Western society during the last quarter of a century, and the answers given have sometimes reflected the preoccupations of modern rather than ancient society; nevertheless, the discussion has been richer and more satisfying than early generations' concentration on questions of form and origin.

## The Diatribe

Also around the turn of the century, concurrently with the publication of critical editions of the moralists' works, the diatribe became the object of intense study.[246] Attention was given to the diatribe, not only as it appears in the writings of pagan philosophers, but also as to its use by Hellenistic Jewish authors, especially Philo.[247] The intensity with which the subject was pursued, and the claims that were made for its importance, resulted in the charge that some researchers were guilty of a "diatribe mania" and

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[245] Balch, "Household Codes" (Aune, *Greco-Roman Literature*), 35–36. See also his bibliographic discussion, and now, Marlis Gielen, *Tradition und Theologie neutestamentlicher Haustafelethik: Ein Beitrag zur Frage einer christlichen Auseinandersetzung mit gesellschaftlichen Normen* (AM.T 75; Frankfurt: A. Hain, 1990).

[246] This account is now superseded by those of Stanley K. Stowers, "The Diatribe," in Aune, *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament*; Stowers, "Diatribe," *ABD* 2 (1992): 190–193. As in so many other matters, in this too, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff had anticipated later investigation. See his *Antigonos von Karystos*, (PU 4; Berlin: Weidmann, 1881; repr., 1965), Excurs 3: "Der kynische Prediger Teles." For a summary of the results of the work done at this time, see Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie, I. Die Philosophie des Altertums*, 100, and Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, ch. 5: "Die philosophische Propaganda und die Diatribe." For later discussions and bibliography, see Überweg and Praechter, *Grundriß*, 35*, 130*ff.; Schmid–Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 1:55–56. For a more recent general discussion, see Wilhelm Capelle and Henri I. Marrou, "Diatribe," *RAC* 3 (1957): 990–1008. A more detailed treatment is André Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne: Libraire Payot, 1926) (on which see the review by R. Philippson in *Gn* 3 [1927]: 728). For the relationship to satire, see E.G. Schmidt, "Diatribe und Satire," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift d. Univ. Rostock, Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe* 15 (1966): 507–515.

[247] See Paul Wendland, *Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*. On 4 Maccabees, see Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (2 vols.; 3d ed.; Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1915/1918), 1:416–418, who is followed by Moses Hadas, *The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees* (New York: Harper, 1953). For Wisdom of Solomon, see James M. Reese, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences* (AnBib 41; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1970), who is too imprecise in his designation of what is diatribal.

314 in cautions that the | importance of the diatribe not be overestimated.[248] It could be expected that students of the NT would avail themselves of the newly gained insights of classicists into this form of moral teaching. Heinrici had already shown its importance for elucidating Paul's style in some of his letters.[249] He was followed by Weiss, who called for a more intensive treatment of the influence of the diatribe, not only on Paul, but also on the Epistle of James.[250] His student, Rudolf Bultmann, took up the task in his dissertation, which was devoted to a comparison of Paul's style of preaching to the Cynic-Stoic diatribe.[251] Since the majority of NT scholars still depend on Bultmann for their knowledge of the diatribe, it is appropriate to take note of his understanding of the diatribe and of what he considers to be the results of his investigation.[252]

Bultmann states that he builds on the work that had previously been done on the diatribe, and he therefore does not need to write a history of the diatribe. He has only to sketch a picture of the *Gattung*. He concentrates on Epictetus and Teles as sources for the diatribe, for they represent

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[248] Thus Tadeusz Sinko, "About the So-called Cynic-Stoic Diatribe" (in Polish), *Eos* 21 (1916): 21–63 (a German summary appears in *PhWS* 39 [1917]: 630–631). See also Arthur Darby Nock, *Sallustius, Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), xxviiff.; Marrou, "Diatribe," 1007; Schmidt, "Diatribe und Satire," 507–508.

[249] Especially in his commentaries on *1 Corinthians* and *2 Corinthians*. See also Carl F.G. Heinrici, *Der litterarische Charakter der neutestamentlichen Schriften* (Leipzig: Dürr, 1908), 11ff.

[250] Johannes Weiss, *Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart*, 11ff. Weiss's commentary, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (9th ed.; KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), reflects his interest in the diatribe. James H. Ropes, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle of James* (ICC 41; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1916), showed that James adopts the diatribal style. See already Johannes Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1909), 45, and Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament*, 90ff. Ropes was followed by Dibelius, *Der Brief des Jakobus*, who pushed the classification further. See also Albert Wifstrand, "Stylistic Problems in the Epistles of James and Peter," *ST* 1 (1948): 170–182. For the use of examples (Abraham and Rahab) within the diatribal section, Jas 2:14–26, see Roy Bowen Ward, "The Works of Abraham," *HTR* 61 (1968): 283–290.

[251] Rudolf Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* (FRLANT 13; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910; repr., 1984). The enduring value of the book is recognized by Hans Hübner in his *Geleitwort* to the 1984 reprint. Also see Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, "Le livre VI de Diogène Laërce. Analyse de sa structure et réflexions méthodologiques," in *ANRW* 2.36.6 (1992): 3880–4048, esp. 4025–4039.

[252] See, for example, the dissertation by Bultmann's student, Hartwig Thyen, *Der Stil der jüdisch-hellenistischen Homilie* (FRLANT NS 47; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955). Thyen argues, *inter alia,* that Paul, in his dependence on diatribal style, is a child of the Hellenistic synagogue. He does not carry the investigation of the diatribe further than Bultmann. His identification of certain writings as synagogue homilies is at best question-begging.

to him most clearly the nature of the diatribe. He places great stress on the fact that the diatribe in its written form represents the oral preaching of the moralists. For this reason, he discounts the importance of Seneca's letters which are literary compositions, consciously written, and which may say nothing of Seneca's preaching style. He affirms that Paul's letters, on the other hand, are actual or real letters which reflect his preaching style. Bultmann does recognize that | the literary *Gattung* of the letter 315 has impressed itself on Paul's letters, but does not deal at length with the problems that this may raise for his study.[253] He also recognizes that there are Jewish elements in Paul's letters, but does not take them into consideration because the preliminary work on which he would have to depend had not yet been done. He admits, therefore, that his work is a contribution to only one half of the problem.

Having thus set the limits for his investigation, Bultmann divides his work between the style of the diatribe and the style of Paul in light of the diatribe. He discusses each under five categories: (1) dialogical character, (2) rhetorical character, (3) constituent parts and arrangement, (4) method of argumentation, and (5) tone and mood. He concludes that Paul is dependent on the Hellenistic diatribe, especially in those sections of his letters which seem to reflect his preaching. Furthermore, "Verwandtschaft in den Ausdrucksformen wird stets eine gewisse Verwandtschaft im Geist einschließen."[254] Yet, in the final analysis, the differences are greater than the similarities, for Paul reaches his conclusions not by intellectual means but through intuition and experience.

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[253] In his view of the Pauline letters as "real" letters, Bultmann shows the influence of Adolf Deissmann who, on the basis of his study of the papyrus letters, drew a distinction between "true letters" and "epistles." See Deissmann's *Bible Studies* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1901) (= *Bibelstudien* [Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1895]); *Light from the Ancient East* (2d ed.; New York: Doran, 1927), 148–241 (= *Licht vom Osten* [4th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1923], 116–213); *Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History* (2d ed.; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1926), 8–11 (= *Paulus* [Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1911], 4–7). Deissmann insisted that Paul's letters belonged to the former category. The distinction is still accepted by most NT scholars. For a considerably different view, see Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*. Given the rhetorical features of the diatribe, it is important to note the increasing attention being given to the NT letters, esp. those of Paul, as rhetorical products. For the relation of letter writing to rhetoric, see Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, Introduction, p. 8 n. 10.

[254] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 109. On the similarities to and differences from Epictetus, see Bultmann, "Das religiöse Moment in der ethischen Unterweisung des Epiktet und das Neue Testament," *ZNW* 13 (1912): 97–110, 177–191, and the reply in the same volume, 281–292, by Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament*.

Bultmann's is in many respects an excellent analysis of some major characteristics of the diatribe. It is abundantly clear that, especially in Paul's letters, these characteristics do appear. One may compare, for example, 1 Cor 7:27,

> δέδεσαι γυναικί; μὴ ζήτει λύσιν·
> λέλυσαι ἀπὸ γυναικός; μὴ ζήτει γυναῖκα.

with Teles, *Frg.* 2 (10.6ff. Hense)

> γέρων γέγονας· μὴ ζήτει τὰ τοῦ νέου.
> ἀσθενὴς πάλιν· μὴ ζήτει τὰ τοῦ ἰσχυροῦ
> ...
> ἄπορος πάλιν γέγονας· μὴ ζήτει τὴν τοῦ εὐπόρου δίαιταν.[255]

316 | The diatribal style, complete with a quotation from Menander (!), is also evident in 1 Cor 15:29–34,

> ἐπεὶ τί ποιήσουσιν οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν; εἰ ὅλως νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, τί καὶ βαπτίζονται ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν; τί καὶ ἡμεῖς κινδυνεύομεν πᾶσαν ὥραν; καθ' ἡμέραν ἀποθνῄσκω, νὴ τὴν ὑμετέραν καύχησιν, ἀδελφοί, ἣν ἔχω ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν. εἰ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐθηριομάχησα ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, τί μοι τὸ ὄφελος; εἰ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, φάγωμεν καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκομεν. μὴ πλανᾶσθε· φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρηστὰ ὁμιλίαι κακαί. ἐκνήψατε δικαίως καὶ μὴ ἁμαρτάνετε, ἀγνωσίαν γὰρ θεοῦ τίνες ἔχουσιν· πρὸς ἐντροπὴν ὑμῖν λαλῶ.[256]

Of a different nature, showing his indebtedness to both Hellenistic and Jewish backgrounds, is Rom 3:1–6a,

> Τί οὖν τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου ἢ τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς; πολὺ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. πρῶτον μὲν [γὰρ] ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ. τί γάρ; εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες, μὴ ἡ ἀπιστία αὐτῶν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ καταργήσει; μὴ γένοιτο· γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής, πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης, καθὼς γέγραπται· ὅπως ἂν δικαιωθῇς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου καὶ νικήσεις ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαί σε. εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην συνίστησιν, τί ἐροῦμεν; μὴ ἄδικος ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν; κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω. μὴ γένοιτο.

Bultmann's work, although it was generally well received, did not pass without criticism. Adolf F. Bonhöffer was most pointed in his rejection of Bultmann's thesis that Paul was dependent on the Cynic-Stoic diatribe,

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[255] Pointed to by Weiss, *Die Aufgaben der neutestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart*, 12–13, who also lists Philo, *Ios.* 143–144.

[256] On the diatribal style and the Cynic-Stoic tradition behind ἐθηριομάχησα, see Malherbe, "Beasts at Ephesus," 71–80. Also relevant is Funke, "Antisthenes bei Paulus," 459–471.

but, probably because his comments are hidden in a footnote in a book seldom read, they have not received much attention.[257] He raises three major objections.

First, he finds fault with Bultmann's selection of Epictetus as the major representative of the diatribe. Bultmann would have done well to use Teles, Musonius[258] or Plutarch,[259] whose works are considered to be far more | 317 representative of the diatribe in the first century. Bonhöffer considers Epictetus's discourses, as to their style, to be peculiar and original to himself.[260] In this judgment Bonhöffer would seem to have the support of Wendland, who was the first to distinguish between an older form of the diatribe and that from the Hellenistic-Roman period.[261] The earlier diatribe made use of all the devices usually associated with the genre with the aims, not only of bringing the audience to its moral senses, but also to entertain it. Epictetus, Bonhöffer and Wendland agree, represents this type of diatribe and not that which was current in his own day. The later diatribe is calmer in tone and is more didactic, with its subject matter better arranged and treated more systematically. According to Wendland this type of diatribe is found in Musonius, Dio Chrysostom, much of the Neopythagorean literature, the letters of Seneca, and the pseudonymous letters bearing the names of Heraclitus, Hippocrates, and the Cynics.

This valid criticism involves more than the proper placing of Epictetus and Paul in the history of the diatribe. It has far-reaching implications for

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[257] Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament*, 179 n. 1. Prümm, *Religionsgeschichtliches Handbuch*, 150, refers to Bonhöffer with approval. Marie-Joseph Lagrange, *Saint Paul, Épitre aux Romains* (*EBib* 11a; Paris: Gabalda, 1950), LVII, is extreme in his correction of Bultmann, when he says of Paul: "Tout ce qui reste chez lui de ce procédé essentiel de la diatribe, c'est l'objection prêtée à un auditeur fictif." For a more positive comment, see Pohlenz, "Paulus und die Stoa," 81 n. 30.

[258] On Musonius and the diatribe, see van Geytenbeek, *Musonius Rufus*.

[259] On Plutarch and the diatribe, see Joseph Seidel, "Vestigia diatribae, qualia reperiuntur in aliquot Plutarchi Scriptis Moralibus" (Diss., Breslau, 1906); Walther Abernetty, "De Plutarchi qui fertur de superstitione libello" (Diss., Königsberg, 1911), 95–100; Howard A. Moellering, *Plutarch on Superstition: Plutarch's De superstition: Its place in the changing meaning of deisidaimonia and in the context of his theological writings* (rev. ed.; Boston: Christopher, 1963), 24ff.; David E. Aune, "De esu carnium orationes I and II (Moralia 993A–999B)," in Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 301–316.

[260] Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament*, cf. also 92 n. 1. On Epictetus's peculiar use of the diatribe, see also Wilhelm Capelle, *Epiktet, Teles und Musonius: Wege zu glückseligem Leben* (BAW: Griechische Reihe [Stoa und Stoiker] 3; Zürich: Artemis, 1948), 67–68.

[261] See Wendland, *Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*, 3ff., and Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, 75ff. See also Capelle and Marrou, "Diatribe," 990ff. The precise nature of the distinctions claimed by Wendland have not been examined closely.

the degree and manner in which the diatribe can be used to illustrate or understand Paul's letters. Bultmann is open to the first criticism precisely because of his stress on the *Gattung*. It is generally agreed today that the diatribe is not a literary *Gattung*, even if the term "diatribe" continues to be used for the sake of convenience.[262] But even if one should grant the legitimacy of Bultmann's definition of his task, it still remains questionable whether a realistic picture can be obtained without giving serious attention to the way in which diatribal and epistolary elements combine, both in pagan letters as well as those of Paul. It is therefore particularly unfortunate that Bultmann (understandably) worked with a narrow conception of the nature of Paul's letters, and rejected Seneca out of hand.[263] 318 In light of recent work on ancient epistolography,[264] | and especially on the letters of Seneca in which the two forms are mixed,[265] it is to be hoped that the subject will be reopened for further investigation.

Wendland's view of the historical development of the diatribe, on which Bultmann depended, has been called into question. It is not unreasonable to expect that a correlation might exist between the various styles of the diatribe and the social settings in which they were delivered.[266] Stanley K. Stowers, accordingly, has argued that the differences are not to be explained by the evolution of a literary genre, but by the adaptation of different authors to their own circumstances.[267] In particular, he stresses the school setting in which most practitioners of the style worked, and

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[262] For the denial that it is a *Gattung,* see Capelle and Marrou, "Diatribe," 992; Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, 19; Schmidt, "Diatribe und Satire," 508; Helmut Rahn, *Morphologie der antiken Literatur: Eine Einführung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), 156. For a summary of the discussion, see Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae Morales*, 47 n. 79.

[263] As I have attempted to demonstrate above in the discussion of 1 Thessalonians as a paraenetic letter, a narrow form critical approach to Paul's letters which relies solely on informal papyrus letters as models of Hellenistic epistolography overlooks the contribution that can be made by enlarging one's perspective.

[264] Esp. Thraede, *Grundzüge*, who extends the discussion to include so-called literary letters; also John L. White, "New Testament Epistolary Literature in the Framework of Ancient Epistolography," *ANRW* 2.25.2 (1984): 1730–1756, and Stowers, *Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity*.

[265] Esp. Cancik, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae Morales*, 46ff. On the mixed form of Seneca's letters, see also Ernst Bickel, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (2d ed.; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1961), 172, 386–387; Gregor Maurach, *Der Bau von Senecas epistulae morales* (BKAW NS 2.30; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1970), 198; Karlhans Abel, "Seneca: Leben und Leistung," *ANRW* 2.32.2 (1985): 653–775, esp. 745–746, and Mazzoli, "Le 'Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium' di Seneca," 1823–1877, esp. 1846ff.

[266] Malherbe, *Social Aspects*, 50 n. 55.

[267] Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981).

thus denies that the diatribe is preeminently characteristic of the street preachers of the day. Paul's use of the style, according to Stowers, should be seen in similar terms: it does not reflect Paul's preaching style, but the scholastic way in which he instructed his churches. Bultmann's concentration on Epictetus, and his consequently narrow understanding of the diatribe, limit what the diatribe, more broadly understood, may contribute to our understanding, not only of Paul's style, but of the way in which he argues. In many respects Paul's letters are more like the later diatribe. This is especially true of Romans, which is replete with diatribal stylistic elements and is also the best example of a systematic exposition of Paul's teaching. It is natural, given Bultmann's base, that his discussion of Paul's *Argumentationsweise* as compared with that of the diatribe occupies less than two pages. He worked with the disadvantage that much of the preliminary work on which he would have had to depend had not been done. We are more fortunate today; beginnings of the sort required by him have now been made in the study of both pagan[268] and Jewish[269] material.

Paul's letter to the Romans is a natural place to begin a new investigation of his use of the diatribe. Bultmann, and since him commentators on the letter, have frequently pointed to many formal diatribal elements in the letter, and now Stowers has shown how those elements help to carry the argument | forward, and how they fit in with what has been considered to be non-diatribal. For example, the diatribal elements in 3:1–6a quoted above are quite clear, but so is the quotation of Ps 115:2 and 50:6 in v. 4. Bultmann's treatment of quotations in the diatribe and Paul is quite brief,[270] and it is not to be wondered at, therefore, that most commentators on the passage are content to limit themselves to recording the fact that τί οὖν; μὴ γένοιτο and τί ἐροῦμεν; appear frequently in the diatribe. Heinrici pointed to the fact that in Rom 9–11 the rabbinic method of Scriptural interpretation is combined with the diatribe,[271] and the same may be true elsewhere in the letter where OT quotations are central to an

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[268] See esp. Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*.

[269] See Günter Mayer, "Exegese II (Judentum)," *RAC* 6 (1966): 1194–1211. It is especially significant that recent studies have shown Jewish and Hellenistic methods of interpretation not to be unrelated. See David Daube, "Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric," *HUCA* 22 (1949): 239–264; Henry A. Fischel, "Studies in Cynicism and the Ancient Near East: The Transformation of a Chria," in *Religions in Antiquity. Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough* (ed. Jacob Neusner; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), 372–411.

[270] Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 42ff., 94ff.

[271] Heinrici, *Der litterarische Charakter der neutestamentlichen Schriften*, 68.

argument that is being conducted in a diatribal manner.[272] By examining the way citations function in the more didactic and systematic diatribes, Paul's procedure here may become clearer.

In a 1987 dissertation more wide ranging than those of Bultmann or Stowers, Thomas A. Schmeller differs from both.[273] He corrects Bultmann by attributing to oral speech only those parts of Paul's letters which reflect themes of missionary preaching, and he takes issue with Stowers on whether the diatribe is to be seen as the exclusive property of philosophic teachers. In any case, the Paul that emerges from Schmeller's work is an adept stylist who consciously and deliberately adopted diatribal elements in such a way that they became part of his argumentation. In this, Schmeller and Stowers agree, despite their many differences.

All this having been said, one should nevertheless be careful not to overreact against Bultmann. While he was too dependent on Epictetus for his comparative material and generalized on that narrow base, the similarities he adduced cannot be denied. Indeed, the similarities between Paul and Epictetus are sometimes far greater and more significant than Bultmann realized. Thus, for example, the "diatribal" μὴ γένοιτο is used in remarkably similar ways by Paul and Epictetus, but is either not characteristic of or is not used at all by Bion, Teles, Musonius, Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom or Maximus of Tyre. At issue is the way in which μὴ γένοιτο functions as part of a larger form, for example, τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; . . . μὴ γένοιτο, used to further an argument. Epictetus frequently uses μὴ γένοιτο in this manner (*Diatr.* 3.7.2–4; cf. 1.2.35; 1.10.7; 2.23.23); Paul always does (e.g., Rom 3:1–6; 6:1–3, 15–16; 7:7, 13; 9:14). That Paul is more consistent in the way the phrase functions in his reasoned argument calls into question Bultmann's claim that Paul felt less need than Epictetus did to confirm his propositions intellectually.[274]

320 | Bonhöffer's second criticism is that Bultmann attributes much to the diatribe that is not peculiarly diatribal, but rather belongs to prose style.[275] In his third criticism he finds himself unable to agree that the diatribe became part of Paul's means of expression because he so frequently heard the discourses of the popular philosophers. What similarities do exist are

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272 E.g., Rom 4:1–12; 7:7–25; cf. Gal 2:15–17.

273 Thomas Schmeller, *Paulus und die "Diatribe": Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation* (NTAbh NS 19; Münster: Aschendorff, 1987).

274 See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Μὴ γένοιτο in the Diatribe and Paul," *HTR* 73 (1980): 231–240 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 25–33). [*Light*, 1:107–115]

275 See also Marrou, "Diatribe," 1007.

explained as being due to the fact that both Paul and Epictetus were original, creative men with an extraordinary gift for speech, and that it would be an error to look to dependency as the way to explain these similarities.[276] While one may generally agree with this criticism, it does not do justice to the similarities in details. More important than questions of derivation or dependency is that of function. Comparative study of forms used in diatribal style precedes the examination of the functions to which they are put, but does not substitute for it. This is where further work on the diatribe may profitably be done.

## The *Topoi*

One type of material that appears frequently in moral propaganda and is also found in the NT is the *topos*, the stock treatment of subjects of interest to the moralist.[277] The titles of Seneca's essays, Plutarch's | *Moralia*, 321 the diatribes of Musonius, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, and the subject

[276] See also Bonhöffer, *Epiktet und das Neue Testament*, 145. Marrou, "Diatribe," 1001–1002, further argues, "vor allem haben die Kunstmittel der Diatribe einen so elementaren, so einfachen, so natürlichen Charakter, daß sie ständig durch irgendeinen Autor zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt der Literaturgeschichte von neuem erfunden sein können."

[277] See Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, 87; Überweg and Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 26*–27*; Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, 14, 17, 21, 23, 41; Marrou, "Diatribe," 1004. Hermann Throm, *Die Thesis* (RhSt 17; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1932), index, s.v. "*topos*." The term *topos* is used with considerable ambiguity (see Ernst R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* [New York: Princeton University Press, 1953], 70–71) (= Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* [8th ed.; Bern: Francke, 1973], 79). With reference to rhetoric, it described common topics or intellectual themes by which an author makes his argument plausible; it also described clichés, in many different kinds of literature, esp. on moral subjects such as courage, friendship, etc. In NT scholarship (see James I.H. MacDonald, *Kerygma and Didache: The Articulation and Structure of the Earliest Christian Message* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980], 70ff.) it is most frequently used of clichés (e.g., Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979], 220–237, on Gal 4:12–20). David G. Bradley, "The *Topos* as a Form in the Pauline Paraenesis," *JBL* 72 (1953): 238–246, esp. 240, describes it as a "treatment in independent form of the topic of a proper thought or action, or of a virtue or a vice," thus as slightly more than a cliché. His particular understanding of a *topos* as not closely related to the context to which it is addressed is criticized by John C. Brunt, "More on the *Topos* as a New Testament Form," *JBL* 104 (1985): 495–500. See also Terence Y. Mullins, "Topos as a New Testament Form," *JBL* 99 (1980): 541–547. For a very useful discussion, especially of some of the functions (e.g., consolation, protrepsis, apology) to which a *topos* may be put, see Hermann Wankel, "Alle Menschen müssen sterben: Variationen eines Topos der griechischen Literatur," *Hermes* 111 (1983): 129–154. I use the term of traditional, fairly systematic treatments of moral topics which use clichés, maxims, short definitions, etc. See also Dieter Breuer and Helmut Schanze, eds., *Topik: Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Diskussion* (KI 99; Munich: W. Fink, 1981), esp. 17–53.

headings under which Stobaeus collects his material, make it sufficiently clear what subjects were discussed with some regularity.[278] This is another area that calls for investigation.

The *topos* περὶ οἰκονομίας has already come under consideration in the treatment of the *Haustafeln.*

The *topoi* περὶ φιλαδελφίας and περὶ ἡσυχίας illuminate 1 Thess 4:9–12. Here Paul exhorts his readers to φιλαδελφία and urges them φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ἡσυχάζειν καὶ πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν ὑμῶν, καθὼς ὑμῖν παρηγγείλαμεν, ἵνα περιπατῆτε εὐσχημόνως πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω καὶ μηδενὸς χρείαν ἔχητε (4:11–12). Commentators on the passage usually mention that φιλία or φιλανθρωπία is a great virtue among pagan philosophers, and refer to the virtual absence of the terms in the NT, where φιλαδελφία and ἀγάπη are substituted for them.[279] In light of the immense amount of work that has been done on the theme of friendship in antiquity,[280] one can wish that it had been related to this passage at greater length than has been the case. It should be noted that in this passage φιλαδελφία appears in context with ἡσυχάζειν and πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια, and that the advice is given with a view toward the church's relationship to the society at large. Attention has frequently been drawn to the parallels to πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια in Plato,[281] but it has not sufficiently been recognized that the discussion of ἡσυχία was a commonplace in the first century AD,[282] when the temptation to retire from public life was especially great.[283] An examination of this passage in

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[278] See the listing in Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine*, 301–306, of themes that appear with some regularity, and Paquet, *Les cyniques grecs*, 303–304.

[279] Φιλανθρωπία: Acts 28:2; Titus 3:4; φιλία: Jas 4:4. For a discussion of the possible reasons for the Christian avoidance of the terms for friends and friendship, see Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, 1:419–421; Jan N. Sevenster, "Waarom spreekt Paulus nooit van vrienden en vriendscap?" *NedTT* 9 (1954/1955): 356–363; Gustav Stählin, "φίλος κτλ," *TWNT* 9 (1970): 160, 5ff.

[280] For a collection of the major sources, and for an outline of the *topos,* see Gottfried Bohnenblust, "Beiträge zum Topos Περὶ Φιλίας" (Diss., Bern, 1905; Berlin: Schade, 1905). For more recent discussions, with the most important bibliography, see Kurt Treu, "Freundschaft," *RAC* 8 (1972): 418–434; Ulrich Luck, "φιλανθρωπία," *TWNT* 9 (1970): 107ff., and Stählin, "φίλος κτλ," 112ff.; Dihle, "Ethik," 658–659; Jean-Claude Fraisse, *Philia. La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique* (Paris: Vrin, 1974).

[281] Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 6.496D; 4.433A; Dio Cassius 60.27.4. Note the influence of *Resp.* 6.496Cff. (and also *Ep.* 7.325E and *Phaed.* 89D) in Socratici, *Ep.*42, which also speaks of retirement from the crowd, although the word ἡσυχία is not used. See Johannes Sykutris, *Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker* (SGKA 18.2; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1933; repr., New York: Johnson, 1968), 78–79.

[282] See the material collected by Friedrich Wilhelm, "Plutarchos ΠΕΡΙ ΗΣΥΧΙΑΣ," *RhMus* 73 (1924): 466–482.

[283] See the excellent discussion, with copious notes and bibliography, by Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire*

1 Thessalonians in light of the way the *topoi* on φιλανθρωπία and ἡσυχία are | combined in discussions of the relationship between a minority group and the larger society may particularly help to clarify Paul's meaning. 322

To withdraw from public affairs and mind one's own business was, in Paul's day, a political ideal for some, but it was also widely criticized by others as socially and politically irresponsible.[284] It is therefore not immediately clear how Paul could expect that the quietism he inculcated would meet with the larger society's approval. A further complication is added by the fact that Paul speaks on the economic and not the political level, and that manual labor was generally looked down on by those of more favored status. The matter becomes clearer when we remember the Cynic elements in 1 Thessalonians and note that Lucian criticized converts to Cynicism for abandoning their trades.[285] Such people, who were frequently manual laborers like the Thessalonians, were often accused of becoming busybodies who meddled in other people's affairs.[286] Paul evidently thinks the Thessalonians are in danger of lapsing into the same behavior, and therefore gives advice that would distance them from the socially irresponsible Cynics. But, in doing so, he had to be careful lest he appear to be recommending an equally unacceptable way of life. The themes of friendship and retirement were not confined to any particular school;[287] however, they were associated in a special way with the Epicureans. Their living in ἡσυχία was a dogma of that school, and may have been one of the attractions Epicureanism offered.[288] The Epicurean

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966; repr., London: Routledge, 1992), ch. 2. See also André-Jean Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks* (Sather Classical Lectures 26; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), ch. 4.

[284] Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1043A–1044B; cf. Seneca, *Epp.* 14.8; 56; 68; 73. What follows is treated at greater length in Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 95–107.

[285] Lucian, *Fug.* 17; *Vit. auct.* 11.

[286] Cf. Lucian, *Icar.* 31; for defenses against the charge, see Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.95–97; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 80.1; cf. 31.2–3; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 15.9.

[287] For a good example of the combination of the two themes in a treatment of the philosopher's desire to withdraw, see Ps.-Chion, *Ep.* 16, and the commentary by Ingemar Düring, *Chion of Heraclea: A Novel in Letters* (Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers, 1951), 102ff. The unknown author of the letters cannot conveniently be placed in any one school, even if he does claim to have been a friend of Plato.

[288] See Festugière, *Personal Religion*, 50. For the security it was thought to offer, see Epicurus, *Kyriai Doxai* 14: Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τινὶ ἐξοριστικῇ [ἐξερειστικῇ Usener] καὶ εὐπορία εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια (see Diogenes Laertius 10.143). See further Wolfgang Schmid, "Epikur," *RAC* 5 (1962): 727ff. (= *Ausgewählte philologische Schriften*, 189ff.); and Harold C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 147ff.

neither took part in public affairs, nor was he concerned with the approval of outsiders. It was sufficient that he have the bond of friendship which bound him to other disciples of Epicurus. A well-known description by Festugière is overly romantic, yet contains elements of truth.

> Sheltered from the world and the buffetings of Fortune, this little group had the feeling that they had reached harbour. They nestled down together under the protection of the Sage whose words were received as oracles. There was no more need to doubt or to re-examine their problems; Epicurus had resolved them once for all. It was enough to believe, to obey, to love one another ... Since they had no care left but to strive to understand better what the Master had said, friendship was | not only, as it had been in other schools, a stimulus in the course of research; it became the primary pursuit of the elect.[289]

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This friendship provided the basis on which the community arranged its means of support.[290] Sharing a widely held prejudice, Epicureans do not seem to have viewed manual labor highly as a source of income.[291]

The Epicureans were, of course, violently opposed. Plutarch, the "apostle of φιλανθρωπία," as Rudolf Hirzel called him,[292] brings together many

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289 André-Jean Festugière, *Epicurus and His Gods* (trans. C.W. Chilton; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956; orig. pub. *Épicure et ses dieux* [MR 19; Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1946]), 41–42; Schmid, "Epikur," 723ff. For a sketch of the Epicurean community as reconstructed from Philodemus's *De libertate dicendi*, see De Witt, "Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups"; see also Kurt von Fritz's review of Norman W. De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* (see n. 299), in *CP* 50 (1955): 262–266. For an excellent treatment of Epicureans, see Bernard Frischer, *The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

290 See, for example, *Sent. Vat.* 39, Οὔθ᾽ ὁ τὴν χρείαν ἐπιζητῶν διὰ παντὸς φίλος, οὔθ᾽ ὁ μηδέποτε συνάπτων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ καπηλεύει τῇ χάριτι τὴν ἀμοιβήν, ὁ δὲ ἀποκόπτει τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν. Cf. also 23 and 34. On the support of Epicurus himself by his followers, see the passages collected by Rolf Westman, *Plutarch gegen Kolotes: Seine Schrift Adversus Colotem als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle* (APF 7; Helsingfors: Finnische Literaturgesellschaft, 1955), 226, and the discussion by Norman W. De Witt, "The Epicurean Doctrine of Gratitude," *AJP* 57 (1937): 320–328.

291 See Philodemus, *Oec.* col. 22.18ff. (Jensen), and the discussion in Festugière, *Personal Religion*, 55–56, where the attitude toward manual labor is contrasted with that of Musonius, Τίς ὁ φιλοσόφῳ προσήκων πόρος (57ff. Hense). I am not implying, of course, that there was anything unique in the Epicureans' low esteem of manual labor. It is Musonius who has the striking attitude here. For the issue as to whether a philosopher should engage in such work, see Socratici, *Epp.* 12 and 13, and the discussion in Sykutris, *Die Briefe des Sokrates und der Sokratiker*, 51ff. This question, as background to Paul's practice of working with his hands to support himself while preaching, has been investigated by Hock, *Social Context of Paul's Ministry*.

292 Rudolf Hirzel, *Plutarch* (DEA 4; Leipzig: Dieterich [T. Weicher], 1912), 25.

of the arguments and insults that were thrown at them.[293] At one point he briefly summarizes the reputation they have "among all mankind": They are guilty of ἀφιλία, ἀπραξία, ἀθεότης, ἡδυπάθεια, ὀλιγωρία.[294] Elsewhere they are accused of setting up as honorable a life that is ἀνέξοδος, ἀπολίτευτος, ἀφιλάνθρωπος, ἀνενθουσίαστος.[295] The Epicureans, in their flight from society, had obviously not succeeded in not giving offense, and attacks like that of Plutarch prove the wisdom of Seneca's advice that withdrawal from society should take place without ostentation, for *quae quis fugit, damnat*.[296]

Christianity was also a minority group, but it showed a more positive concern πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω than did the Epicureans.[297] That is also clear from | 324 1 Thess 4:9–12, in which Paul wants to prevent the church from becoming isolationistic in its life and attitude. It may be significant that Christians were frequently lumped together with Epicureans,[298] and indeed, from the standpoint of an outsider they were in many respects similar.[299] However, whether or not Paul was afraid that Christians might consciously be treated in the same way as the Epicureans were is not the point. What does seem likely is that he was aware of the temptations that faced a group like his Thessalonian church,[300] and that he used the *topoi* appropriate to the situation to guard against them.

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293 Especially in the three treatises against the Epicureans, *Suav. viv.*; *Adv. Col.*; *Lat. viv.*, does he criticize their ἡσυχία. See in general, Jackson P. Hershbell, "Plutarch and Epicureanism," *ANRW* 2.36.5 (1992): 3353–3383.

294 Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* 1100BC. Cf. also *Lat. viv.* 1129D; 1130E.

295 Plutarch, *Lat. viv.* 1098D.

296 Seneca, *Ep.* 14.8.

297 Cf., for example, 1 Cor 5:12; Col 4:5; 1 Tim 3:7, and see van Unnik, "Die Rücksicht auf die Reaktion der Nicht-Christen als Motiv in der altchristlichen Paränese," 221–233 (= van Unnik, *Sparsa Collecta* 2 [1980]: 307–322).

298 See Adelaide D. Simpson, "Epicureans, Christians, Atheists in the Second Century," *TAPA* 72 (1941): 372–381, and Richard P. Jungkuntz, "Fathers, Heretics and Epicureans," *JEH* 17 (1966): 3–10.

299 Norman W. De Witt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), 336–337, and especially De Witt, *St. Paul and Epicurus* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1954), greatly exaggerates the similarities that do exist. See also A.R. Neumann, "Epikuros," PWSup 11 (1968): 648. On Tertullian's demand, *Apol.* 38–39, that Christians be allowed to exist as other sects, e.g., the Epicureans, see Robert L. Wilken, "Collegia, Philosophical Schools, and Theology," in *The Catacombs and the Colosseum: The Roman Empire as the Setting of Primitive Christianity* (ed. Stephen Benko and John J. O'Rourke; Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson, 1971), 268–291.

300 The tendency not to work was not the result of the Thessalonians' expectation of the imminent *parousia,* as is often alleged. Paul worked to support himself during the short period that he was with them while first establishing the church (1 Thess 2:9), thus before they would have departed from his eschatological teaching. Second Thessalonians 3:7–8

The *topos* περὶ φιλίας has recently been shown to be useful for understanding other passages in the NT. Hans Dieter Betz has adduced elements from it in his commentary on Gal 4:12–20,[301] and Peter Marshall has used it to elucidate the points at issue between Paul and the Corinthians. Marshall analyzes the conflict between them in light of the conventions pertaining to friendship and enmity in Greco-Roman society.[302] Marshall argues that Paul's refusal of an offer of friendship in the form of aid from certain people of rank among members of the Corinthian church was interpreted by them | as a hostile act and grounds for enmity. These Corinthians and rival apostles became friends by mutual recommendation. They also became joint enemies of Paul, whom they denigrated by following certain conventional themes of invective. This approach, which moves well beyond the listing of "parallels," and uses *topoi* to construct a real world in which people lived, points in the direction of future research.

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These comments are intended to be suggestive only, and to argue that a more detailed study of the *topoi* might very well cast new light on passages which have traditionally been seen primarily from a theological perspective. In order to attain greater certainty, more attention would have to be given to the constituent parts of the *topoi* in both groups of literature in order to determine whether the same complexes of ideas occur in each. The elimination or modification by the NT writers of standard parts of a *topos* would be especially significant. Equally important is the need to determine the function to which the *topos* is put by a writer.

understands his working as his giving them an example to follow (see n. 137). He must have anticipated the problem. Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, 1:174 n. 2 (= *Mission und Ausbreitung*, 1:198 n. 1), draws attention to Ps.-Clement, *de virgin*. 1.2, which "contains a sharp warning to the *otiosi,* or lazy folks, who chatter about religion instead of attending to their business." Paul might have suspected that the Thessalonians harbored this tendency. Cf. 2 Thess 3:11, μηδὲν ἐργαζομένους ἀλλὰ περιεργαζομένους.

[301] See Betz, *Galatians*, 220–237.

[302] Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987). The same method is followed by Ken L. Berry, "The Function of Friendship Language in Paul's Letter to the Philippians," in an unpublished study at Yale University, 1996, who examines Paul's use of the *topos* to cement the relationship between himself and the Philippians as well as relationships within the Philippian community. Similarly, David E. Fredrickson, "Paul's Bold Speech," argues that Paul's presentation of himself as a παρρησιαστής in this section of 2 Corinthians is paradigmatic, and that he offers himself as a model of someone who brings about reconciliation. For other studies on *topoi,* see Johnson, "James 3:13–4:10 and the Topos *Peri Phthonou*"; O. Larry Yarbrough, *Not Like the Gentiles: Marriage Rules in the Letters of Paul* (SBLDS 80; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985) (περὶ γάμου).

## Varia

Other types of material can only be mentioned. Some of them, such as the catalogues of virtues and vices, have been the object of intensive research.[303] Recently, Benjamin Fiore has more closely examined the way such lists | 326 were used to fill out the personal examples, which were applied in exhortation, particularly in the Pastoral Epistles.[304] He was followed by Lewis R. Donelson, who identified paraenetic, apologetic, polemical, and paideutic

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[303] The lists appear in pagan, Jewish, and Christian authors, e.g., Dio Chrysostom's orations on kingship, *Or.* 1.26, 82; 3.33; Philo, *Virt.* 180ff.; Romans 1:28–32; Gal 5:19–21. Ernst von Dobschütz, *Die urchristlichen Gemeinden. Sittengeschichtliche Bilder* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1902), 277–284, 'Zur Terminologie des Sittlichen,' pointed to the lists in early Christian literature, and suggested that their background was twofold, viz., Greek (Orphic) and Jewish (OT). Lietzmann, in an excursus to Rom 1:28–31 in his commentary on Romans (*An die Römer*, HNT 8, 34–36), drew attention to the Cynic-Stoic and Hellenistic Jewish use of such lists. As usual, the cogency of his views impressed subsequent scholars. The first extensive treatment of the subject was that of Anton Vögtle, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament: Exegetisch, religions-und formgeschichtlich untersucht* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), who was primarily concerned with the form and derivation of the catalogues. Siegfried Wibbing, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte* (BZNW 25; Berlin: A. Töppelmann, 1959), sought to relate the lists to a Jewish tradition, while Ehrhard Kamlah, *Die Form der katalogischen Paränese im Neuen Testament* (WUNT 7; Tübingen: Mohr, 1964), argued for an Iranian background. For a criticism of Wibbing and Kamlah, see Hans Conzelmann, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (11th ed.; KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), 123 n. 74, who insists that Christians took over the catalogues from Judaism, whose source in turn had been the Greek philosophers. Whereas these studies were primarily concerned with the origin, form, and content of the lists, Karris, "The Function and *Sitz im Leben* of the Paraenetic Elements in the Pastoral Epistles," deals with their function in the Pastoral Epistles. He stresses the use of lists of vices in the criticism of philosophers and sophists. Although he finds a pre-history of such criticism already in Greek Comedy, he claims that a sharp rise in such criticism took place after AD 70. His major point is that the use of lists of vices in the Pastoral Epistles should be seen against this background: they are used to demonstrate that the teaching of the religious opponents in view in the letters is false because they do not practise what they preach. This is a traditional polemical function of the lists, and their use in the Pastoral Epistles does not therefore enable us to determine from them the contours of the heresy that is being opposed in the letters. See also Karris's article, "The Background and Significance of the Polemic of the Pastoral Epistles," *JBL* 92 (1973): 549–564, and Eduard Schweizer, "Gottesgerechtigkeit und Lasterkataloge bei Paulus (inkl. Kol. und Eph.)," in *Rechtfertigung: Festschrift für Ernst Käsemann zum 70. Geburtstag* (ed. Johannes Friedrich, Wolfgang Pöhlmann, and Peter Stuhlmacher; Tübingen: Mohr/Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 461–477. Luke Timothy Johnson, "2 Timothy and the Polemic against False Teachers," argues against Karris that the function of the polemic in the Pastorals is to serve as an antitype to the picture of the ideal teacher put forward in the letters. See further, John T. Fitzgerald, "Virtue/Vice Lists," *ABD* 6 (1992): 857–859.

[304] Fiore, *Function of Personal Example*.

functions in the Pastorals,[305] to which could be added the use of lists as qualifications for office (e.g., 1 Tim 3:2–7).

It is the way such lists were examined as part of personal examples that has been most interesting. Fiore's is the first thorough study devoted to personal example in the NT. He finds particularly illuminating the use of examples in the pagan instruction of young officials in moral exhortation. Of special significance is his bringing the pseudo-Socratic letters into the discussion. He observes that these Cynic letters, as also the Pastoral Epistles, are to be understood as extended instances of personal examples of a group's putative founder, which are used in the exhortation and discipline of a community. Donelson's more broadly conceived study of pseudepigraphy and ethical argument in the Pastoral Epistles also makes use of the Socratic epistles, gives attention to personal example in the Pastorals, and in some respects approximates Fiore's conclusions. Fiore's and Donelson's work are two major illustrations of how newly available texts, in this case the Cynic letters, have been brought into the discussion and contributed new insights.

The *peristasis* catalogues have likewise received considerable attention,[306] 327 and have already come under discussion above. The gnomologies | and the *sententia* literature have suffered relative neglect,[307] which is all the

[305] Lewis R. Donelson, *Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral Epistles* (HUT 22; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1986; pb ed., 2006), 171–176.

[306] The περιστάσεις endured by the sage are a stock subject among the philosophers, e.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 1.24; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 9.9, 32.21; Musonius Rufus, *Frg.* 26.13ff. (Hense); Seneca, *Ep.* 13.1ff. Paul's description of his own hardships are sometimes very similiar. To 2 Cor 6:3ff., cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.15ff., and see Ragnar Höistad, "Eine hellenistische Parallele zu 2. Kor. 6,3ff." in *Alberto Debrunner, sexagenario sacrum* (ConBNT 9; Uppsala: Seminarium Neotestamenticum, 1944), 22–23. To 2 Cor 4:8–9, cf. Plutarch, *Stoic. abs.* 1057E, and see Anton Fridrichsen, "Zum Thema 'Paulus und die Stoa': Ein stoische Stilparallele zu 2 Kor. 4,8f.," ConBNT 9 (1944), 27ff. See further Bultmann, *Der Stil*, 19 –20; Anton Fridrichsen, "Zum Stil des paulinischen Peristasenkatalogs 2 Cor 11,23ff.," *SO* 7 (1928): 25–29, and Fridrichsen, "Peristasenkatalog und Res Gestae. Nachtrag zu 2 Cor 11:23ff.," *SO* 8 (1928): 78–82; Betz, *Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition*, 98ff.; Wolfgang Schrage, "Leid, Kreuz und Eschaton: Die Peristasenkataloge als Merkmale paulinischer theologia crucis und Eschatologie," *EvT* 34 (1974): 141–174; Robert Hodgson, "Paul the Apostle and First Century Tribulation Lists," *ZNW* 74 (1983): 59–80. The most thorough treatments are those by Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*, and Martin Ebner, *Leidenslisten und Apostelbrief*.

[307] For the importance of the gnomologies among the moralists, see Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, 87, 95; Vetschera, *Zur griechischen Paränese*; for the most recent bibliography, see van der Horst, *Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides*, 263–280. Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma* (trans. Neil Buchanan, James Millar, E.B. Speirs, and William M'Gilchrist; 7 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1894–1899; repr., 7 vols. in 4; New York: Dover Publications, 1961), 1:154 n. 2 (= *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* [4th ed.; 3 vols.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1909; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980]),

more surprising, given the fact that early Christians found them such convenient collections to Christianize with only slight alteration, but the situation has begun to change.[308] The moral philosophers have also been brought into | discussions of early Christian polemic,[309] apologetic,[310] and the parables,[311] although the surface has hardly been scratched. 328

1:173 n. 2, already called for an investigation of the gnomologies in conjunction with Jewish and Christian works on moral instruction. The status of the non-investigation so far as the NT is concerned, is reflected in the fact that Henry Chadwick could give less than one column to the NT in his article on "Florilegium," in *RAC* 7 (1969): 1131–1160, esp. 1143 (commenting only on the quotations in 1 Cor 15:33 and Acts 17:28, and not on Titus 1:12). The gnomologies represent a type of material used in rudimentary moral instruction. That is also the level of instruction presumed by most of the material that has been demonstrated in this essay to be relevant. One may expect that an examination of the nature suggested by Harnack will reap positive results. The same is also true of proverbs, which represent the lowest common denominator of moral philosophy. See Arnold Ehrhardt, "Greek Proverbs in the Gospel," *HTR* 46 (1953): 59–78 (= Ehrhardt, *The Framework of the New Testament Stories* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964], 44–63); and Malherbe, *Social Aspects*, 41–44. For the proverb σκληρόν σοι πρὸς κέντρα λακτίζειν (Acts 26:14), which appears in Euripides and elsewhere, see Conzelmann, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (HNT 7; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1963), 139; Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind*, 20ff. For the question whether Luke knew Euripides, especially the *Bacchae*, see the discussion in the literature cited by Pieter W. van der Horst, "Drohung und Mord Schnaubend (Acta ix,1)," *NovT* 12 (1970): 265 n. 2, and the fuller treatments by Eckhard Plümacher, *Lukas als hellenistischer Schriftsteller: Studien zur Apostelgeschichte* (SUNT 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 28–29, and Robert Renehan, "Classical Greek Quotations in the New Testament," in *The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in Honor of the Very Reverend Georges Vasilievich Florovsky* (ed. David Neiman and Margaret Schatkin; Rome: Pontificium Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1973), 17–45. See also Haiim B. Rosén, "Motifs and *Topoi* from the New Comedy in the New Testament," *AncSoc* 3 (1972): 245–257. The moralists recognized that the poets represented the thought and feeling of people generally. See Dio Chrysostom, *Or*. 7.97–98, 101; cf. 2.5. On the authority of quotations from the poets in works of philosophers, see Quintilian, *Inst*. 5.11.39, and further on the subject, Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, 25–26, 83ff.

[308] See Carl Andresen, "Antike und Christentum," *TRE* 3 (1978): 57–58. The texts have been made readily available, e.g., Henry Chadwick, ed., *The Sentences of Sextus: A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959); Richard A. Edwards and Robert A. Wild, eds., *The Sentences of Sextus* (SBLTT 22; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), but they have not been used to any great extent. For the most recent interest in gnomes, see the quite different studies by Walter T. Wilson, *Love Without Pretense: Romans 12.9–21 and Hellenistic-Jewish Wisdom Literature* (WUNT 2.46; Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), and Ian H. Henderson, "Gnomic Quatrains in the Synoptics: An Experiment in Genre Definition," *NTS* 37 (1991): 481–498.

[309] Jerome H. Neyrey, "The Form and Background of the Polemic in 2 Peter" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1977); Neyrey, "The Form and Background of the Polemic in 2 Peter," *JBL* 99 (1980): 407–431.

[310] Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Not in a Corner': Early Christian Apologetic in Acts 26:26," *SecCent* 5 (1986): 193–210 (= Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 147–163). [*Light*, 1:209–227]

[311] Ronald F. Hock, "Lazarus and Micyllus: Greco-Roman Backgrounds to Luke 16:19–31," *JBL* 106 (1987): 447–463.

I cannot discuss in even the briefest way recent studies of such qualities as humility[312] or conscience,[313] or examine ways in which the philosophers might otherwise have influenced Paul's theology.[314] It remains only to correct the impression that may inadvertently have been created so far, that it is exclusively the Pauline literature that has been examined in light of the moral philosophers. In point of fact, earlier generations debated whether the presentation of Jesus in the Gospels was influenced by interpretations of Heracles, who was a patron saint of the moralists.[315] The Cynics have more recently also found their way into Gospels study, with claims made that Jesus should be seen against the background of Cynicism and that the Q material shows Cynic influence, claims which of course have met with vigorous objection.[316] And the Epistle of James has recently been examined by Luke T. Johnson in a manner that demonstrates that Dibelius has not spoken the last word on that document.[317]

The subject of school rhetoric has again found its place in NT scholarship, particularly through the influence of Hans Dieter Betz,[318] and a systematic collection of the *chreiai* has been started and this material | can now enter the discussion.[319] Nevertheless, the ways in which such

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[312] See Albrecht Dihle, "Demut," *RAC* 3 (1957): 735–778.

[313] See Henry Chadwick, "Gewissen," *RAC* 10 (1978): 1025–1107.

[314] David Seeley, *The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Paul's Concept of Salvation* (JSNTSup 28; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), for example, has argued that Paul's interpretation of the death of Jesus belonged to a world in which the philosophers held that the noble death of someone like Socrates held value for others.

[315] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Herakles," *RAC* 14 (1988): 559–583, esp. 569–572. [*Light*, 2:651–674] David E. Aune, "Heracles and Christ: Heracles Imagery in the Christology of Early Christianity," in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians*, 3–19, is also skeptical about possible influence on the Gospels, but more inclined to a possible relationship to the Christology of Hebrews. See also Harold W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 79–82.

[316] For bibliography and trenchant criticism, see Christopher M. Tuckett, "A Cynic Q?" *Bib* 70 (1989): 349–376. For the type of study that Tuckett criticizes, see Francis G. Downing, *Christ and the Cynics: Jesus and Other Radical Preachers in First Century Tradition* (JSOT Manuals 4; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988), which pulls together much of Downing's earlier work.

[317] Johnson's most recent article is "Taciturnity and True Religion: Jas. 1,26–27."

[318] See Hans Dieter Betz, "The Problem of Rhetoric and Theology according to the Apostle Paul," in *L'Apôtre Paul. Personnalité, style et conception du ministère* (ed. Albert Vanhoye et al.; BETL 73; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1986), 16–48. For recent criticism, see Carl J. Classen, "Paulus und die antike Rhetorik," *ZNW* 82 (1991): 1–33.

[319] Ronald F. Hock and Edward N. O'Neil, *The Chreia in Ancient Rhetoric: Volume 1 The Progymnasmata* (SBLTT 27; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986); Hock, "The Chreia," in Aune, ed., *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament*, 1–23.

rhetoric functioned in disseminating popular philosophy has received no sustained attention from NT scholarship.

Philosophical rhetorical conventions and styles, such as paraenesis, the diatribe, and the use of examples have been studied at some depth and have already come under consideration above. We have observed that Paul, in particular, has emerged as an adept appropriator of such customary means of expression. His creative use of a particular style is quite different from the Pastoral Epistles, which also reflect an awareness of rhetorical conventions but at times deliberately fly in the face of them. For example, a dictum so widespread that it was taken as axiomatic, was that one should be especially careful to select the correct time and circumstance for certain kinds of speech, just as a physician adapts his cure to the condition of a patient at the time the cure is applied. The advice in 2 Tim 4:2, to speak "in season and out of season," in contrast, brooks no such consideration.[320] There may be theological grounds for this difference between Paul and the Pastorals, as there may be for the fact that, although Paul knows the hortatory traditions which employed medical imagery, he avoids using such imagery, while the Pastorals are replete with it, but use it only polemically.[321]

It has become evident by now that a revived interest in the social dimension of early Christianity has been manifested even in the study of the ways in which moral philosophers formulated or expressed their teaching.[322] That interest has also been overt. Stanley K. Stowers has sought to correct some of the misunderstandings of where in a city someone like Paul could be expected to find an audience.[323] Ronald Hock has more firmly placed Paul the manual worker in the context of the ideology and practice of moral philosophers who also worked to support themselves, thus correcting the traditional interpretation which looked to Paul's Jewish background for clarification of | his practice.[324] Edwin A. Judge has 330

[320] See Malherbe, "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," 235–243.

[321] See Malherbe, "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," 121–136; Malherbe, "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church," esp. 377–386.

[322] This interest is reflected in the organization of my book, *Moral Exhortation*, which begins with a consideration of the social settings in which moral instruction took place; throughout it draws attention to the contexts in which certain methods and forms of instruction were used.

[323] Stanley K. Stowers, "Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching: The Circumstances of Paul's Preaching Activity," *NovT* 26 (1984): 59–82. See also Johannes Hahn, *Der Philosoph und die Gesellschaft: Selbstverständnis, öffentliches Auftreten und populäre Erwartungen in der hohen Kaiserzeit* (HABES 7; Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1989).

[324] Hock, *Social Context of Paul's Ministry*.

compared the Pauline churches to "scholastic communities" like those of the "sophists," which would include for him philosophers,[325] and I have examined the methods Paul employed to found and nurture communities with the psychagogy of the moral philosophers.[326] Put succinctly, the interest has shifted from ethics to ethos,[327] without as yet a full appreciation of the long stride that has thus been taken from the individualism of Greek ethics to the communal concerns of the early Christians.[328]

## Conclusion

Even so eclectic a sampling as this reveals that much has been and is being accomplished. Because of the broad shoulders of those giants who still support our work, we have been able to refine some of the questions they raised around the turn of the century and to treat the same issues with finer nuance.

In some respects, unfortunately, we have not gone substantially beyond those pioneers. Johannes Weiss's list of the authors we should know (Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, Lucian, Musonius, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero) has virtually constituted a canon for most scholars. Together with Dio Chrysostom the list represents, more or less, the sources that have been taken to represent Hellenistic moral philosophy during the last seventy-five years.

What strikes one about the list is that Stoics predominate and that the sections of Cicero which have been found of interest are also Stoic. To a degree the same could also be said of Plutarch. This is quite understandable in light of the common view that in the Hellenistic period philosophy had become democratized and was syncretistic in character, with Stoicism its major component.[329] So Plutarch, for example, although he

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[325] Edwin A. Judge, "The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," *JRH* 1 (1960): 4–15, 125–137. See also Meeks, *First Urban Christians*.

[326] Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*; Malherbe, "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church."

[327] This shift is exemplified, for example, by the different concerns of Victor Paul Furnish, *Theology and Ethics in Paul* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1968), on the one hand, and Meeks, *The Moral World of the First Christians*, on the other. See also Leander E. Keck, "On the Ethos of Early Christians," *JAAR* 42 (1974): 435–452.

[328] Walter Willi, *Griechische Popularphilosophie: Ein gemeinverständlicher Vortrag* (Greifswald, 1923), 15–16; Dihle, "Ethik," 652–661; see Andresen, "Antike und Christentum," for a Christian *'Individualethik.'*

[329] See, e.g., Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*, 75–90, and see, more recently, Gérard Verbeke, "Le stoïcisme, une philosophie sans frontière," *ANRW* 1.4 (1973): 3–42.

was a Platonist, was | nevertheless eclectic and had a special fondness for Stoic and Cynic traditions. As it turns out, Plutarch has most in common with those NT writings which are themselves most influenced by the same traditions.[330] While the Stoics have been in preponderance as sources for NT scholars, other schools have not entirely been neglected. In addition to Plutarch, the Peripatetics and Neopythagoreans have begun to make their appearance in the literature. Cynicism has received increased play, and the Epicureans continue to tantalize us. Lucian, of course, remains a major source for the philosophical and religious culture of the period. What seem to have been responsible for the continuing pride of place accorded Stoicism were, partly, the clear affinities of Stoicism with the NT that the early church had acknowledged and modern scholarship has detailed, as well as the notion of a "philosophical Koine" in which Stocism was the most important ingredient.[331] The Stoics' preeminence has also been due to the fact that they have been better served by editors, translators, and publishers who have made tools available which provide easy access to their thought. It is much more difficult, for these and other reasons, to work with the Neopythagoreans, Epicureans or the Peripatetics, as the NT scholarly guild's generally poor knowledge of these philosophers eloquently testifies. The texts are gradually becoming available in more accessible form, sometimes due to the efforts of students of the Christian part of the comparison,[332] and their investigation can now proceed apace, once more of us add Italian to the languages we read in our research.

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It is fair to say that NT scholarship has not followed Weiss's prescription to develop a thorough knowledge of the Latin writers. This is particularly unfortunate, given the fragmentary nature of the sources for our knowledge of Hellenistic philosophy. Cicero is indispensable, and so is Seneca, who is the more valuable for being Paul's contemporary. It has become obvious lately that it is they who offer the most extensive

[330] Thus Edward N. O'Neil in Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 305.

[331] See the bibliographies of Dieter Lührmann and David L. Balch in Malherbe, *Social Aspects* (2d ed., 1983), 116 n. 13.

[332] E.g., Graziano Arrighetti, *Epicurus: Opere* (BCF 41; rev. ed.; Turin: G. Einaudi, 1973); Thesleff, *Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*; Alfons Städele, *Die Briefe des Pythagoras und der Pythagoreer* (BKP 115; Meisenheim: A. Hain, 1980). See also Johan C. Thom, *The Pythagorean Golden Verses: With Introduction and Commentary* (RGRW 123; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), and the excellent collection of texts: *Socraticorum reliquiae* (ed. Gabriele Giannantoni; 4 vols.; ECTSPA 7.1–4; Naples: Bibliopolis/Rome: Ateneo, 1983–1985). See further, n. 41.

discussion of some matters that interest us, and we shall do well to become as familiar with them as we are with Epictetus.[333]

The success that we have enjoyed in examining the philosophers has diverted our eyes from other possible materials that could be of assistance in | placing the NT in its cultural environment. For instance, we have not sufficiently been aware of the forms by which philosophy was vulgarized. Surveys of ethics regularly treat the matter,[334] and introductions to the ethics of the period list as evidence of this vulgarization such materials as Aesop's fables, which have at their core a philosophical precept, usually a moral one.[335] It is refreshing that Valerius Maximus has now been introduced to readers of NT journals.[336]

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If the virtual omission of so much pagan material from our treatment of Hellenistic moral philosophy surprises, it is astonishing that we have paid relatively little attention to Hellenistic Jewish texts in exploring the philosophic moral context of early Christianity.[337] To record this failure is not to share a widely held assumption that the influence of Hellenistic philosophy came to Christianity via Judaism.[338] I think it can be demonstrated, for example, that in many respects Paul had no Jewish antecedents for the way he appropriated elements from the moralists. But that does not mean that the Jewish texts are not important to us. If the relationship between Judaism and Christianity in this respect was not always genealogical, it certainly was at least analogical. The Jewish writings are witnesses of how the religious tradition of which Christianity was part had already appropriated the philosophical traditions in which we are interested, and at the very least they sensitize us to issues which were thought important in such an appropriation.[339]

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[333] Esp. in Malherbe, "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church."

[334] E.g., by Dihle, "Ethik," 661–670; Dihle, *Die goldene Regel: Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgärethik* (SAW 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962); Dihle, "Goldene Regel," *RAC* 11 (1981): 930–940.

[335] See Willi, *Griechische Popularphilosophie*.

[336] Robert Hodgson, "Valerius Maximus and the Social World of the New Testament," *CBQ* 51 (1989): 683–693.

[337] The pioneers in our enterprise were not guilty of the same omission. See, e.g., Wendland, *Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*. See also Thyen, *Der Stil der jüdisch-hellenistischen Homilie*.

[338] E.g., Andresen, "Antike und Christentum," 56–58; and apparently Betz, "Hellenismus," *TRE* 15 (1986): 21.

[339] We can well afford to become intimately acquainted with van der Horst, *Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides*, and Harm W. Hollander and Marinus de Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary* (SVTP 8; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), as vexing as the problems of the *Testaments* are.

For much the same reason, the recent concentration on the canonical Christian texts has been unfortunate. Our neglect of the later Christian writers is radically different from the accomplishment of Martin Dibelius, for example, who contributed so much to our understanding of early Christian paraenesis, not only in his commentary on James, but also in his commentary on the Shepherd of Hermas, particularly on the *Mandates*. One of the difficulties in working with the NT is that explicit references to pagan material are very few, and that at most we have to do with allusions or implicit use of the philosophic traditions. While this is also true of the | Apostolic Fathers, the Apologists, as we have seen, were explicit about their interest in the philosophers, and Clement of Alexandria is a major source for our knowledge of Musonius Rufus. They are of great value to us in pointing to materials some Christians, at least, found congenial, and in identifying certain issues they thought it important to be aware of when shopping around in the moralists. The danger, of course, is that we could easily read those later writers back into the NT, but the hazard of anachronism should not deter us from learning from them. 333

CHAPTER FIVE

# THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT: THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD*

The relationship between early Christianity and its environment has been viewed in a number of ways. From the earliest centuries, some have held that God prepared the world for the gospel, so that "in the fullness of time" (Gal 4:4) humanity was ready to receive redemption. In modern times, the relationship has frequently been thought of as one of influence, with Christianity influenced by its Jewish and pagan antecedents. Thus the "history of religions school" of interpretation in the nineteenth century described a Christianity that was strongly susceptible to such influences, and in the twentieth century scholars continue to give greater precision to the relationship viewed in this way. Another approach is to take note of the ancient world, but to relegate it to "background," which may have the potential to illuminate various aspects of the NT, but seldom does so in practice.

This article assumes that, to paraphrase Alfred, Lord Tennyson's "Ulysses," early Christians, like us, were part of all they had met, and that to understand them as fully as we can, we shall do well to learn as much as possible about their world. In what follows, then, we do not describe the relationship between Christians and their environment theologically, nor explain it in terms of influence or derivation, nor merely sketch a background whose relevance may not be clear. Rather, our interest will touch on some features of everyday life that will help us discern how Christians lived and expressed themselves in their world. Our interest is to illuminate the NT, and that goal will determine what we select for discussion. In taking this approach, we shall have to be on guard against two temptations, sometimes related: to see the ancient world from a Christian perspective and thus really not to understand it in its own terms, and to generalize on the basis of the very limited samplings we shall take.

* Originally published in *The New Interpreter's Bible* (ed. Leander Keck et al.; 12 vols.; Nashville: Abingdon, 1994–1998), 8 (1995): 12–26.

## The Social World

### *Travel and Communication*

One of the first things to strike one about the Roman world is its mobility. Probably not many people travelled as much as the Phrygian merchant whose epitaph claims that he had visited Rome seventy-two times, but travel was not at all unusual, especially for merchants and artisans who followed their business and trade.[1] Travel by sea had become relatively safe | and regular, but since sailing virtually ceased between mid-November and mid-March, the highways carried most of the traffic. The Roman system of highways, originally constructed to serve the needs of the military, brought people to Rome in such numbers that Roman critics became alarmed.[2] The Christian tentmakers Aquila and Priscilla, variously located in Pontus, Rome, Corinth (Acts 18:1–3), Ephesus (Acts 18:18, 26; 1 Cor 16:19), and Rome again (Rom 16:3), fit this picture well, as do the more than two dozen people Paul greets in Rom 16, whom he had evidently known in the eastern Mediterranean, but who at the time of writing had found their way to Rome.

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As other religions spread along the highways, so did Judaism and Christianity.[3] For the most part, in the first century, particularly outside Palestine, Christianity took root in major cities, frequently provincial capitals, on the main routes. Its rapid spread was facilitated by a number of factors. People could communicate in the common (*Koine*) Greek (see Acts 21:37), which had developed with the spread of Greek culture three centuries earlier during Alexander the Great's conquests. Latin was the official language, but local languages and dialects continued to be spoken (see John 19:20; Acts 14:11). The well constructed and drained highways, marked by milestones showing the distance to Rome, made it possible to cover about fifteen miles per day by foot, about twice as far by cart. Maps and guidebooks informed travelers of the sights and accommodations along the way. The latter consisted of inns located at convenient places

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[1] René Cagnat and Georges Lafaye, eds., *Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes* (4 vols.; Paris: Leroux, 1906–1927), 4 (1927): 290–291 (no. 841). See also William M. Ramsay, "Roads and Travel in the New Testament," *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible* 5:375–402; Lionel Casson, *Travel in the Ancient World* (Toronto: Hakkert, 1974).

[2] E.g., Juvenal, *Sat.* 3.62: "The Syrian Orontes has long since poured into the Tiber."

[3] See Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 48–98, for a description of how ancient cults spread.

on the highways, around public squares, and near important buildings in the cities. The conditions in the inns were not of high quality,[4] so, wherever possible, Jews, Christians, and well-off pagans availed themselves of private hospitality (see Acts 21:4–16).

These features associated with mobility affected people's lives and practices. Christians, for example, wrote in Greek, and it is of special importance that letters became a favorite means by which people separated from each other kept in touch as well as gave and received instruction.[5] It is no accident that most of the NT writings are letters or have epistolary features and that letters are found in other writings (e.g., Acts 15:23–29; 23:26–30; Rev 2–3).

Despite the abuse to which it was subject, hospitality remained a virtue among some pagans.[6] Among Christians it became a concrete expression of love for the church (Rom 12:9–13; Heb 13:1–2; 1 Pet 4:7–11; 3 John 6–8). The Christian practice of providing food and lodging to travelers and of "sending" or "speeding" them on their way—i.e., to pay their traveling expenses—invited abuse. Some became freeloaders,[7] while others took advantage of Christian hospitality to spread heresy (see 2 John; cf. 1 John 4:1–3). In order to assist travelers in securing aid while exercising some control, a special type of letter, in which the writer recommended the bearer to friends or associates, had been developed.[8] Some Christians also wrote such letters (e.g., Acts 18:27; Rom 16:1–2), and some churches evidently demanded them of travelers (2 Cor 3:1).

### *Life in the City*

Despite a tendency among the well-to-do to romanticize country life, the vitality of societies was in the cities, and that is where Christianity flourished.[9] To the cities were drawn purveyors of goods, proclaimers of

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4 See Horace, *Sat.* 1.5; *Acts John* 60.

5 E.g., Seneca, *Epistulae morales.*

6 See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 7.

7 *Did.* 11.

8 See, e.g., Cicero, *Fam.* 13.

9 For a dated but still useful description of one city, see Jerome Carocopino, *Daily Life in Ancient Rome* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940); for social attitudes of urban and rural folk, see Ramsay MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations, 50 B.C. to A.D. 284* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); and for a description of urban churches, see Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), and John E. Stambaugh and David L. Balch, *The New Testament in Its Social Environment* (LEC 2; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 59–82.

new divinities holding out promises of salvation, and moral reformers of every stripe. Merchants and artisans tended to settle in their own neighborhoods, so that customers knew where to shop for what (e.g., 1 Cor 10:25, "in the meat market"). As diverse as the propagandists were, so were their methods of recruitment. Devotees of the Egyptian goddess Isis paraded in procession through the streets of Corinth on their way to the sea, but their initiations and other rites were performed in secret.[10] A huckster like Alexander of Abonoteichos founded his own cult by attracting public attention through his colorful behavior and playing on the credulity of the masses.[11] Philosophers taught in their own schools and the salons of the rich or wherever they were invited to speak, and some of the more unscrupulous posted themselves | on street corners or shouted in the marketplace, finding their way to wherever people gathered.[12] The picture that we have, often from writers who decried it, is of an openness to new teaching,[13] a phenomenon well known to Luke (see Acts 17:18–20).

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There is very little evidence that Christians in the first century proclaimed their message in so public a manner. The major exceptions are Paul's preaching in Lystra (Acts 14:8–18) and Athens, but even in the latter instance, after the initial contact in the marketplace, Paul was taken to the relative seclusion of the Areopagus, where he delivered his sermon (Acts 17:17–21). Christianity may at times have been in the public mind, but it was not in the public eye.[14] The book of Acts describes Paul as first preaching in the synagogues and then moving his base of operation to private homes (e.g., Acts 18:4–8; cf. 17:1–6), and we frequently read of churches meeting in individuals' homes (e.g., Rom 16:5, 23; Phlm 2).[15]

Most people in the cities lived in crowded quarters, some in houses on narrow streets, but more in apartments, which concentrated the population and severely limited privacy. In the hot Mediterranean climate, much of life was spent outdoors, making use of such facilities as public baths and sometimes toilets, buying meat from the market (1 Cor 10:25), hot water from the tavern on the corner, having a dispute settled by a block organization, or shopping in the stores along the main roads or surrounding the central

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[10] Apuleius, *Metam.* 11.
[11] Lucian, *Alexander* (*Pseudomantis*).
[12] See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 32.7–11; cf. *Or.* 9.
[13] E.g., Juvenal, *Sat.* 3.58–66, 109–125.
[14] Nock, *Conversion*, 192. See also Stanley K. Stowers, "Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching: The Circumstances of Paul's Preaching Activity," *NovT* 26 (1984): 59–82.
[15] The fact that Paul's preaching in the synagogue is not simply a creation by Luke is indicated by 1 Cor 9:20; 2 Cor 11:24, 26; cf. Rom 1:16.

open square where official business was also transacted. Workers labored in small shops or workrooms, which might be part of houses (Acts 18:2–3; 1 Thess 2:9); organized themselves into guilds; entertained themselves by going out to dinner in a temple restaurant (cf. 1 Cor 8:10) or in private homes (cf. 1 Cor 10:27) or by attending plays, the races, or political speeches. Pressure could easily build up in the crowded neighborhoods, sometimes in response to mere rumor, especially when self-interest was at stake, and might result in stoning (cf. Acts 14:5, 19), something that children learned at play.[16] Then confused mobs would pour out of the alleys and streets into the stadium or forum where demagogues would work on them (cf. Acts 17:5–9; 19:23–41).

### *Social Groups*

An important feature of city life during the early empire was the existence of large numbers of organized groups, formed to serve a variety of purposes.[17] Some of them were professional clubs (*collegia*) or guilds whose aim was not so much to improve the economic status of the craftsmen or tradesmen who organized them as to provide opportunities for social life. On occasion they engaged in political activities, and one of their major responsibilities was to bury their members. Few were completely secular; some were named after particular gods, whose names were carried on their clubhouses—for example, "the hall (*schola*) of the goddess Minerva." Sometimes these facilities were named after a club's patron; it is possible that the hall of Tyrannus, to which Paul moved his activities in Corinth, was such a clubhouse.[18] In organization they resembled their political and social contexts, so that their members enjoyed a sense of order and a certainty of how they might advance in the organization. In addition to these clubs, other organizations, such as schools of various sorts, served similar if not entirely the same purposes; and religious groups, including at times Jewish synagogues, were accommodated politically, and must in any case have looked to outsiders like *collegia*.[19]

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[16] See MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations*, 66.

[17] See Meeks, *First Urban Christians*, 75–84, for the different groups as analogies for the Christian congregations.

[18] See Abraham J. Malherbe, *Social Aspects of Early Christianity* (Rockwell Lectures at Rice University; Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977; 2d ed. enlarged, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 89–90. The NRSV rendering of the Greek *scholē* (σχολή) into "lecture hall" is an interpretation that is almost certainly wrong.

[19] Tertullian (*Apol.* 38–39) would later demand that Christian groups be treated as legal associations. See Robert L. Wilken, "Collegia, Philosophical Schools, and Theology," in *The*

Like the Christians, these groups often met in the homes of patrons (see Rom 16:2, 23), who thereby incurred legal responsibility for them (see Acts 17:5–9).[20] This type of extended household appears to have formed the social context for churches in the first century, and with important consequences. Some social and ethnic diversity was to be found in the pagan associations, but diversity was more common and pronounced in the churches, which therefore had to give serious attention to relations between their members. Such issues as the social stratification | of the church and its accompanying social attitudes (e.g., 1 Cor 11:17–34); the responsibilities of members of a family (e.g., Col 3:18–4:1) and a church (e.g., Titus 2:1–10); and how Christians' social practices and religious observances should or should not influence their relations with each other (e.g., Rom 14:1–15:7) required constant attention.

The more groups looked inward and focused on their peculiar identities, the more they were viewed with suspicion by the larger society. This was so, for instance, in the cases of the Epicureans and the Jews, who were each accused of atheism because they refused to worship the traditional gods, and of misanthropy because they were thought to disdain people who did not belong to their own groups.[21]

Christians met with similar responses. Knowing that they could not escape the society in which they lived (1 Cor 5:9–10; 1 Thess 4:11–12), they were sensitive to how they were to respond to "outsiders" with whom they mixed socially (1 Cor 10:27–29a), who thought their worship sometimes crazy (1 Cor 14:23), who badmouthed them (1 Pet 3:9; 4:3–4, 14), who accused them falsely of crimes (1 Pet 2:12), or who challenged their beliefs (1 Pet 3:13–16), which were thought strange or new (Acts 17:9–21).[22] In the century with which we are primarily concerned, then, the issues touching these groups were mainly social criticism or ostracism.

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*Catacombs and The Colosseum: The Roman Empire as the Setting of Primitive Christianity* (ed. Stephen Benko and John J. O'Rourke; Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson, 1971), 279–286.

[20] For the material and literary evidence of the physical space in which Jews, Mithraists, and Christians met, see L. Michael White, *The Social Origins of Christian Architecture* (2 vols.; Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1993).

[21] For attitudes toward the Jews, see Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (3 vols.; Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1976–1984); for the Epicureans, see Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* (= *Mor.* 1086C–1107C); *Adv. Col.* (= *Mor.* 1107D–1127E); and *Lat. viv.* (= *Mor.* 1128B–1130E). These essays are contained in Plutarch, LCL 14.

[22] See Robert L. Wilken, *The Christians as the Romans Saw Them* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

### *Political Status*

Roman authorities tolerated such groups as long as they were not socially subversive or did not upset the political order. When that did happen, the authorities acted with force, as they had acted against the Bacchanalians two centuries earlier[23] and would act again against the devotees of Isis[24] and the Druids.[25] Of particular interest for our purposes is the Roman governmental attitude toward the Jews, for initially Christians were thought of as Jews (see Acts 18:12–15).[26] The Roman attitude differed from place to place and time to time, but was more positive than the local frictions, especially in Alexandria, than the popular slanders might lead one to expect. The Romans held in high regard the Jewish claim to venerable traditions and customs, and granted the Jews, at various times, such concessions as not requiring them to appear in court and allowing them to meet for worship on the Sabbath and to collect the temple tax.

As Christianity became distinct from Judaism, it constantly had to fend off attacks, for it enjoyed no official recognition. These persecutions, however, were always local and in response to local circumstances until the Emperor Decius (249–251), in order to secure the goodwill of the gods, required everybody in the empire to sacrifice to the ancestral gods.[27] Decius's decree was not aimed specifically at Christians, but its practical effect was that Christianity was legally proscribed by imperial decree. Before Decius's decree, action was taken against Christians because they were charged with committing crimes (cf. 1 Pet 4:15) or causing disorder (cf. Acts 17:6–7; 24:5), accusations that became associated with the name *Christian* even in the absence of proven guilt. But uncertainty about the status of Christians persisted for some time. So, for example, around AD 112, Pliny, the Roman governor of Bithynia, even after attending a trial of a Christian, was still uncertain whether Christians should be punished simply for bearing the name or for the crimes that had evidently come to be associated with that name.[28] It need not surprise us that charges

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[23] Livy 39.8–18.

[24] Tacitus, *Ann.* 2.85.

[25] Tacitus, *Ann.* 14.30.

[26] Cf. Tacitus, *Hist. Frg.* 5.

[27] See Geoffrey E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted?" *Past and Present* 26 (1963): 6–38; and Adrian N. Sherwin-White, "Why Were the Early Christians Persecuted? An Amendment," *Past and Present* 27 (1964): 23–33. These two articles, along with a rejoinder by de Ste. Croix, were published in Moses I. Finley, ed., *Studies in Ancient Society* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1974).

[28] Pliny, *Ep.* 10.96–97.

against Christians were made out of motivations ranging from economic (e.g., Acts 19:23–41) to religious competition (e.g., Acts 13:48–50; 17:4–8). As Tertullian observes, after demanding that Christian churches be allowed the same rights as *collegia*, it was easy to lay blame at their door: "If the Tiber rises as high as the city walls, if the Nile does not send its waters up over the fields, if the heavens give no more rain, if there is an earthquake, if there is famine or pestilence, straightway the cry is, 'Away with the Christians to the lions.' "[29]

More complicated was the veneration thought due the emperors and Christian reaction to it. The Roman attitude had its antecedent in Greek views. The Greeks did not distinguish sharply between the gods and extraordinary human beings, who, because of exceptional endowments and benefits they had | rendered, achieved after death the status of heroes. They were considered semi-divine beings who were worshipped in the locations with which they had been associated in life. The stress on virtue as their divine quality suggested the possibility that by possessing virtue in this life, such a person, particularly a ruler, was worthy of veneration. When such veneration was associated with the ruler of a domain as extensive and rich in diversity as the Roman Empire, complications were created for the ruler's subjects.[30]

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Emperors in the first century differed on how they thought about their own divination and about what veneration they required or permitted. Tiberius (Luke 3:1; 20:20–26) resisted all veneration of himself, but Caligula (Gaius) proposed that Tiberius be deified and demanded that he himself, and later his sister Drusilla (Acts 24:26–27), be worshipped. His successor, Claudius (Acts 11:28; 18:2), refused such worship of himself, and rejected requests from the Alexandrians to appoint priests and establish temples in his honor. Nero, however, deified Claudius after his death and laid personal claim to many honorifics, such as acclamation of himself as god, savior, and lord. By the time of Vespasian and Titus, deification of the imperial family had become a common practice. Domitian, who exercised imperial power to the full in all aspects, insisted that he be treated as divine, and one's failure to do so resulted in punishment.

Throughout this period, more enthusiasm for the imperial cult was shown in the provinces than in Rome. There, prominent officials played

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[29] Tertullian, *Apol.* 40.1.

[30] See Donald L. Jones, "Christianity and the Roman Imperial Cult," *ANRW* 2.23.2 (1980): 1023–1054.

major roles in the cult, so that it is difficult to be sure that participation in the cult was an expression of popular religious sentiment and not mere political expediency, as a way of currying favor with the emperor. Asia was a major center of the imperial cult after Augustus, and under Domitian venerated the emperor in a manner that called forth the description in Rev 13.[31]

### *Education and Literary Culture*

It is not possible to determine the level of literacy in antiquity with certainty, but perhaps half of the population of the Roman Empire could read.[32] Since it was the custom to read out loud, however, even when by oneself (cf. Acts 8:27–30), the written word did not remain a mystery to people who could not read.[33] So the illiterate person could listen as someone read the Epicurean teaching inscribed on a long wall by Diogenes of Oenoanda or hear philosophers preaching on the street corners or declaiming in large public spaces to which they had been officially invited. The theaters further introduced the masses to drama, and professional orators were always ready to speak for a fee on a large stock of topics. The Graeco-Roman world was highly oral, and that exercised a profound influence on education.[34]

Education progressed through three stages. In the first, pupils were given elementary instruction in reading and writing; in the second, they learned more about grammar and, in addition, language and literature; and in the third, which was more diverse, they could specialize according to their professional interests by placing themselves under the tutelage of a philosopher, a physician, or a lawyer. Professional philosophers and rhetoricians competed for the same audiences and scathingly denounced each other, but in the schools pupils received instruction in both rhetoric and philosophy, with rhetoric gradually coming to dominate the

[31] Irenaeus (*Haer.* 5.30.3) dated John's banishment to Patmos, and thus the book of Revelation, to the reign of Domitian.

[32] William V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), the major study in the field, is very conservative in its estimate. Attempts to correct Harris are made by contributors to the collection, J.H. Humphrey, ed., *Literacy in the Roman World* (*Journal of Roman Archaeology* Supplement Series 3; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

[33] See Paul J. Achtemeier, "*Omne verbum sonat*: The New Testament and the Oral Environment of Late Western Antiquity," *JBL* 109 (1990): 3–27.

[34] See Henri I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (New York: New American Library, 1964), for Greece and Rome, and for concentration on the latter, Stanley F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

curriculum. Education made extensive use of handbooks, such as those summarizing philosophers' teachings[35] and collections from dramatists, especially Euripides and Menander, whose works were thought to be morally valuable.[36]

Very little explicit comment is made in the NT about the educational level of Christians. The description of the disciples of Jesus as unschooled and ordinary (Acts 4:13; cf. John 7:15) means that they had not received traditional and formal religious instruction. On the other hand, Paul's development | is described in Acts 22:3 in the traditional three categories, and he is represented as quoting from precisely the kinds of sources that students learned in tertiary education.[37] In 1 Cor 15:33 Paul himself quotes Menander, and in Titus 1:12 Epimenides, representing the same level of literary culture, is quoted. In the final analysis, however, the NT writings themselves constitute the main evidence of the literary culture of their authors. As one would expect, they differ considerably. Paul's letters reveal him as a creative writer knowledgeable of, but not bound by, the literary conventions, rhetorical methods, and philosophical instruction of his day. Matthew and Mark wrote in a Greek that must have struck their Gentile readers as strange, but the Greek of the book of Hebrews is excellent, as is that of those sections in Luke and Acts where the author does not reflect the style of his sources.

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## Philosophy and Philosophers

### *The Philosophical Koine*

Philosophy quickly rose in importance and changed in character in the generations immediately after Aristotle.[38] The conquests of Aristotle's pupil, Alexander the Great, contributed substantially to this development. Greeks, who now increasingly found themselves abroad, separated from their city-states in Greece where traditional religion provided emotional security, were faced with the whims of arbitrary fortune. Traditional religion

[35] See Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 8B.

[36] See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 18.6–7.

[37] See Willem C. van Unnik, *Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth* (trans. George Ogg; London: Epworth, 1962); and Martin Hengel, *The Pre-Christian Paul* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991), 18–39, for Paul; and Malherbe, *Social Aspects*, 29–59, for a broader view. [*Light*, 1:83–106]

[38] See Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), for the most important texts, commentary, and bibliography.

had already come under severe criticism in the fourth century, especially by the dramatists, and philosophy would take its place. This confidence in philosophy was later expressed by Juvenal: "Great indeed is philosophy, conqueror of Fortune, and sacred are the precepts of her book."[39] The Hellenization of the east further generated an interest in Greek philosophy among non-Greeks, many of whom were drawn to Athens, which was still thought of as the intellectual center of the world. They contributed immensely to the new character of philosophy.

Philosophy became more clearly integrated systems of thought that described the universe and people's place in it. Philosophy was commonly divided into three parts: logic, physics, and ethics,[40] which provided a framework for the description of the systems and drew attention to what the different systems shared. The fact that people looked to philosophy for the practical benefits it conferred abetted an eclectic tendency—that is, to choose from different philosophies what appeared true or valuable. This eclecticism, plus the fact that philosophy was taught with the aid of handbooks that provided summaries of philosophical claims, meant that the differences in nuance between the different philosophies, even in apparently similar matters, were lost. The result was the birth of what has been described as a philosophical *koine*. There is an element of truth in this perception that the different philosophies had much in common, but the stress on commonality should not be overdone, for the schools continued to polemicize vehemently against each other, and even members of the same school disagreed about central doctrines.

In addition to being eclectic, philosophy had a strong religious character, the classic example of which is the prayer of Cleanthes the Stoic:

> Lead me, O Mentor of the lofty heavens,
> My Father, withersoever thou shalt wish.
> I shall not falter, but obey with speed.
> And though I would not, I shall go, and suffer,
> In sin and sorrow what I might have done
> in noble virtue. Aye the willing soul
> Fate leads, but the unwilling drags along.[41]

Justin Martyr said that, before his conversion to Christianity, his study of Platonism and contemplation of its ideas furnished his mind with wings,

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[39] Juvenal, *Sat.* 13.22.
[40] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 1.18.
[41] Seneca, *Ep.* 107.11.

and he expected to see God, for that was the end of Platonism.[42] Even Epicurus, erroneously charged with atheism, in urging Menoeceus to study philosophy, says that he must begin by believing "that God is a living being immortal and blessed."[43]

Another important characteristic of philosophy in this period was its interest in the moral life. Philosophers disagreed about how severely the human condition had been corrupted by ignorance and over the human capacity to grow to moral maturity, but, with the exception of 18 the Skeptics,[44] most thought | of philosophy as a moral educator.[45] The kind of philosophy they had in mind was practical and not confined to lecture halls and the salons of the rich or to the imperial court, but could be heard in the public speeches of invited philosophers, and even on the street corners. It was also taught in schools, where the task was "to make philosophy as it were the head and front of all education," for philosophy taught "what is honorable and what is shameful, what is just and what is unjust," and how we are to conduct ourselves in our relationships with the gods and all members of society.[46] Clearly, philosophy has been democratized; furthermore, its interest in what was obviously useful led to a high evaluation of the common coin of moral philosophy.

### *Epicureanism*

The followers of Epicurus organized themselves into groups of friends, including women, who sought to find fulfillment within their conventicles. They claimed to be indifferent to society and its values, including those of education, and to pursue the serenity that comes from abandoning political and social ambition on the one hand, and, on the other, the fear that the gods as they were popularly perceived interfere in human affairs and in the process terrorize people. The Epicureans thought the goal of this withdrawal from society and its values and perceptions to be pleasure, which to them was quite different from the popular view then of pleasure as the pursuit of sensation. Opposition to the Epicureans was vehement and consistent. They were accused of atheism, ignorance, social irresponsibility, and sexual immorality. The very word *epicurean* became an insult,

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[42] Justin, *Dial.* 2.5.

[43] Diogenes Laertius 10.123.

[44] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyr.* 3.235–238.

[45] See Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986).

[46] Ps.-Plutarch, *Lib. ed.* 7DE.

and in a transliterated form became for the rabbis a name for a heretic. Paul, who is brought into contact with Epicureans in Acts 17:18, himself uses anti-Epicurean invective when he describes the Ephesian hedonists as beasts he had fought (1 Cor 15:32).

The same charges were also applied to Christians, and sometimes the two groups were uncritically lumped together by their critics.[47] There were, indeed, striking similarities between them. Both held to the importance of the group for the development of the individual. Epicurus had begun developing procedures whereby members of the group cared for each other in an almost pastoral manner, and those techniques were highly refined by the time Paul established his churches and used the same methods.[48] Just as Epicureans held friendship to be the basis for the common life, so also Christians, who thought of their churches in kinship terms, held "love of the brethren" to provide the framework for social behavior (see Rom 12:10; Heb 13:1; 2 Pet 1:7). Paul was aware of the similarities and was careful to warn his readers not to choose the Epicurean options, for example, to show disdain for society's opinion of the church (1 Thess 4:9–12).[49]

### *Cynicism*

Cynicism originated as a rejection of convention and an insistence on the independence of the wise.[50] More a way of life than a system of thought,[51] Cynicism's stress on individualism was exemplified by Diogenes. Cynics had no time for logic or physics, but concentrated completely on ethics, holding to the goal of living in accord with nature.

Dependent on no one, the Cynic was free and self-sufficient. Because Cynics felt that they had attained moral freedom, they thought it their duty to improve others by speaking frankly about the human condition and impressing on their listeners the need to change their lives by adopting reason rather than convention and its values as their guide. Cynics made a deep impression on their society with their stark way of life and

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[47] E.g., Lucian, *Alex.* 25, 38.

[48] See Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophical Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).

[49] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians*, 95–107, for the philosophical views with which Paul had to contend when instructing recent converts in social ethics.

[50] For a brief introduction to Cynicism, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Cynics," *IDBSup*, 201–203.

[51] Diogenes Laertius 6.103.

their insistence on the profound distinction between vice and virtue. There was a renewal of Cynicism in the first century, and it was so widespread by the second century that Cynics became the favorite target of satirists like Lucian, who delighted in criticizing all humbug.[52] Not bound by any dogma, Cynics soon differed among themselves in many matters, but they retained their stress on the individual and their insistence that the practical life of the Cynic was a shortcut to virtue.[53]

The sharp edge of Cynicism made it a useful foil for satire, but also served a Stoic like Epictetus in his description of the true philosopher, whom he calls "the Cynic."[54] Many similarities have been | identified between Christians and the Cynic depiction in this discourse. For example, like the Christian apostle, Epictetus's Cynic is sent by God as a herald to preach to people and oversee them. The hardships he suffers as a result of his mission show his superiority and remind one of Paul's hardships (e.g., 2 Cor 11:21–28); like Paul (Phil 4:11), the Cynic is self-sufficient or content, and he also speaks with boldness or frank criticism (e.g., 2 Cor 3:12; 7:4). There are sharp differences, however, the major one being that Paul always refers to God, whereas the true Cynic has no reference beyond self. Paul's hardships do not demonstrate his strength but his weakness; the power belongs to God and Christ (2 Cor 12:9–10). Paul is content, not because of his own accomplishments or because he is totally in control of himself, but because of the strength that is given to him (Phil 4:13). If he speaks boldly out of freedom, it is not a freedom attained through reason and self-discipline, but a freedom that comes from the Spirit and the Lord (2 Cor 3:17).

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To the eye of the beholder on the outside, nevertheless, there was much that Christians and Cynics did have in common. It is quite natural that Lucian should bring the Cynic Peregrinus in contact with Christians.[55] On the Christian side, there is a venerable tradition that Justin Martyr and Crescens the Cynic had engaged in public debate and that Justin had won decisively, as a result of which Crescens engineered Justin's arrest and ultimate death. The truth may be somewhat different, but it is significant that it was not thought incongruous to bring together these two

[52] E.g., Lucian, *Fugitivi*.
[53] Diogenes Laertius 6.104.
[54] Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.
[55] Lucian, *Peregr.* 11–13.

men, each wearing the short cloak of the philosopher.[56] The NT does not explicitly mention Cynics, but there is little doubt that some writers, especially Paul, were aware of those Cynic elements that had become part of the common discourse.[57]

### *Stoicism*

Stoicism had become the dominant philosophy by the time Paul is said to have encountered Stoics in Athens (Acts 17:18). Stoicism sprang from Cynicism. Its founder, Zeno, was a disciple of the Cynic Crates, and took from him the basic Cynic tenet that virtue is the only good. Soon, however, Stoics developed a system that differed markedly from Cynicism. They still accepted a sharp distinction between virtue and vice, but introduced a class of indifferent things, which were further divided into things truly indifferent, things indifferent but to be preferred, and things indifferent but to be rejected.

In their ethical speculation, like the Cynics, the Stoics' rule was to live according to nature, but they thought of nature as the physical universe permeated by the divine reason, or Logos. This natural theology had implications for their ethics. Human beings, as part of the universe, shared in this reason. Born with a capacity to think rationally, they were to develop that reason throughout their lives and thus develop the knowledge that would enable them to live morally. As they lived rationally, they would be able to perceive that their individual and social lives would be lived well if they conformed to the ordered cosmos.[58] Such perception required training in logic and physics, which formed the basis for Stoic ethics. The intricate theoretical Stoic system that developed differed conspicuously from the simple Cynicism from which it had originated, but it retained Cynicism's strict moralism and continued to share many of its values and practices.

Some features of Stoic natural theology were present in Hellenistic Judaism, and probably came to Paul from writings like the Wisdom of

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[56] For the tradition, see Justin, *2 Apol.* 3; Tatian, *Or.* 19; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.16; Jerome, *Vir. ill.* 23; see also William H.C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 201–204.

[57] See Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989). For a maximalist interpretation of the evidence, see Francis G. Downing, *Cynics and Christian Origins* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992).

[58] See Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 48.14–16; cf. *1 Clem.* 20.

Solomon, which discusses the making of religious images and the knowledge of God (Wis 13). These same topics also belonged together for the Stoics, as can be seen from Dio Chrysostom.[59] In considering the nature and validity of religious images, Dio argues that such images are an expression of human yearning for the divine and are, therefore, to be viewed positively. In arguing this, he details at some length the various sources of human knowledge, which is at least potentially present in all people at birth and develops as their reason is developed. Paul uses the same Stoic categories in Rom 1, but stands the argument on its head by using Jewish anti-idol polemic (Isa 44; Wis 14).[60] Paul does not think that our knowledge of God develops slowly as we gradually become more rational. Rather, he begins his argument with a theological declaration: "For the wrath | of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them" (Rom 1:18–19 NRSV). Thus it is not human ignorance that is responsible for immorality, but their refusal to retain the knowledge of God and, instead, turning to idols (1:23, 25). Because of their actions, therefore, God gave them up to a depraved mind (1:28; cf. vv. 24, 26). Paul is not concerned with the development of human cognition, as the Stoics were in their natural theology; he uses Stoic natural theology to indict Gentiles (1:20; 2:1) and to so demonstrate their need for the gospel (1:16; cf. 3:9).

Stoic natural theology is also present in Paul's speech in Athens (Acts 17:16–31), but there the attitude is more positive. Religious objects of worship are viewed as testimony to the religiosity of the Athenians (17:22–23). Nevertheless, in good philosophical manner Paul maintains that God does not dwell in handmade temples (17:24, 29),[61] nor does he need anything (17:25).[62] All people yearn and seek for God, yet he is not far from us, for we live in him; as the pagan writers said, we are his offspring (17:27–29).[63] Seneca illustrates the Stoic mood: "God is near you, he is with you, he is within you."[64] Where Stoicism comes to a screeching halt is when Paul announces Christ's resurrection and the judgment of the world (17:31).

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[59] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12.

[60] See Günther Bornkamm, "The Revelation of God's Wrath," in *Early Christian Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 47–70.

[61] Cf. Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* 4.2; Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 477C.

[62] Cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *Mund.* 6.10.398b; Diogenes Laertius 6.104.

[63] Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12.27–28.

[64] Seneca, *Ep.* 41.1.

The Stoic picture of the wise man appealed to many people. The person with the correct perception of reality, Stoics held, is permitted all things, for the wise man "alone is free and bad men are slaves, for freedom is the right (ἐξουσία) to act independently, and slavery is the depravation of independent action."[65] Some of Paul's converts in Corinth, impressed by their own knowledge (e.g., 1 Cor 8:1–3), asserted their right to live as they wished and justified themselves by quoting a Stoic slogan, "Everything is permissible to me" (1 Cor 6:12; 10:23). Paul took great pains to counter their view (1 Cor 6:12–21; 8:1–10:38), but evidently was unsuccessful, for he had to return to the subject in 2 Corinthians, where there are indications that some Corinthians still described themselves in Stoic terms. Stoics, for example, expressed the wise man's intellectual security in military terms. The perfect person, Seneca says, is:

> full of virtues human and divine, can lose nothing. His goods are girt by strong and insurmountable defenses.... The walls which guard the wise man are safe from both flame and assault, they provide no means of entrance, are lofty, impregnable, godlike.[66]

Some of Paul's opponents thought they had such a fortification. Paul countered, however, that such a citadel of intellect, armed against the knowledge of God, is successfully laid under siege with the divine weaponry available to him (2 Cor 10:4–6).

Stoics gave wide currency to techniques of exhortation and instruction that they had not invented but refined. The Cynics were probably the first to develop a style of speech that would come to be known as a diatribe, but Paul's adaptation of the style has most in common with Epictetus.[67] Lists of vices and virtues were not used by Stoics alone, but they contributed significantly to their use to characterize certain types of persons (see Gal 5:19–23).[68] The construction of a pattern according to which responsibilities of various members of a household were specified did not originate with the Stoics, but they did add a cast to some of the lists in the NT (e.g., Col 3:16–4:1).[69]

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[65] Diogenes Laertius 7.121.

[66] Seneca, *Const. sap.* 6.8.

[67] On the diatribe, see Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981); on Paul and Epictetus, see Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 25–33.

[68] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 4.83–96.

[69] See David L. Balch, "Household Codes," in David E. Aune, ed., *Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament* (SBLSBS 21; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 25–50.

*Conclusion*

The philosophies to which attention has been drawn were the most popular in antiquity and have also received the most attention from modern scholarship. Other philosophies have in recent decades begun to attract attention and will help us to understand more fully the intellectual context of early Christianity.

One of these philosophies is Middle Platonism, a form of Platonism that had developed its own peculiar characteristics by the first and second centuries. The writings of second-century Christian authors have already been illuminated as our knowledge of contemporary Platonism has increased, and the | same may happen for some NT writings, Hebrews in particular. In the past, Philo, who was heavily indebted to Platonism, has been appealed to for assistance in clarification of elements in Hebrews that some commentators have thought Platonic, but there is no reason why Middle Platonism, unfiltered through Philo, should not be brought into the discussion.[70] Peripatetics and Neopythagoreans have also proved to be more relevant to our understanding of the social responsibilities itemized in the household codes than had been thought.[71]

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People in antiquity recognized the affinity between the ethical teaching of Christians and their philosophical contemporaries. Justin Martyr claimed that whatever had been correctly said by anybody was Christian property.[72] Christianity's great opponent, Celsus, testified to the same fact when he chided Christians that there was nothing impressive or new about their system of morals.[73] Origen, who responded to Celsus's attacks, was more precise when he judged that, while Plato benefited the educated, Epictetus benefited all people who wanted a better life.[74] What is significant about Origen's statement is the recognition, widely shared by the early church, that Stoic philosophy had some affinities with the moral teaching of the NT, despite their respective differences.[75]

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[70] A beginning has been made by James W. Thompson, *The Beginnings of Christian Philosophy: The Epistle to the Hebrews* (CBQMS 13; Washington, D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1982).

[71] See David L. Balch, "Household Codes," and Balch, "Neopythagorean Moralists and the New Testament Household Codes," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 380–411.

[72] Justin, *2 Apol.* 13.4.

[73] Origen, *Cels.* 1.4.

[74] Origen, *Cels.* 6.2.

[75] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 267–333; [*Light*, 2:675–749] cf. Marcia L. Colish, "Stoicism and the New Testament," *ANRW* 2.26.1 (1992): 334–379.

The NT refers to philosophy only in Col 2:8, which is not a blanket condemnation of philosophy as such, but is probably a reflection of the Colossian heretics' self-description of their much vaunted wisdom as philosophy.[76] We have noticed that Stoic traditions are quoted with approval in Acts 17:27, so the affinity is explicitly recognized also in the NT. It is true that statements in the NT distinguish sharply between pagan and Christian morality (e.g., 1 Cor 6:9–11). It is equally true that the NT frequently urges Christian behavior that would evoke favorable response from pagans, thus assuming at least some agreement with pagan moral standards (e.g., 1 Thess 4:12; 1 Pet 2:12). Often, it is at those points of contact that philosophy is visible.

## Religion

### *Introduction*

It is impossible to speak of religion in the Roman Empire in brief compass without making certain generalizations.[77] When we do so, however, we must be aware of the complexities that existed as well as the factors that contributed to them. Once more, we cannot escape the significance of Alexander the Great. Foreign influences on Greek life predated Alexander's campaigns, but as long as the Greek city-states remained self-contained and gave official status to the traditional views of the gods and the old religious observances, it was unlikely that foreign influence on Greek religion would be significant and widespread. When the citizens of the city-states found themselves far from home and citizens of a society no longer structured according to ancestral beliefs and practices, they had to act as individuals, and did so with major consequences, as we shall see.

It should also be observed that even during the Roman Empire, the spirit of the non-Jewish and non-Christian religion we encounter in the NT was Greek. Some Roman practices continued, and some developed with new vigor, and local practices and traditions continued to have lives of their own, but in general the Greek element predominated in religion as it did in much else of culture in the empire.

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[76] See Peter T. O'Brien, *Colossians, Philemon* (WBC 44; Waco, Tex.: Word, 1982), 198.

[77] See the judicious summary in Everett Ferguson, *Backgrounds of Early Christianity* (3d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 173–177.

A basic assumption of Greek religion had been that the world was governed by a pantheon of gods who ruled with a recognizable sense of justice, and who in general rewarded the good and punished the bad. In the Hellenistic period, the distinct impression arose that something was amiss and some strange power was disturbing the world. This power was arbitrary Tyche (Chance or Fortune), who became a goddess like all the rest, with whom one had to come to terms in order to live securely and happily. Philosophy was only one means by which one could do so.

The Hellenistic age took the concept of power very seriously. Power permeated everything—human beings, animals, stones, plants, metals—giving them potency to do good or ill to people if used effectively. So great was the concentration on power | that under the empire much of religion was directed to divine power rather than to divine personalities. So Aelius Aristides said of the god Serapis:

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> Who he is and what nature he has, Egyptian priests and prophets may be left to say. We shall praise him sufficiently for the moment if we tell of the many and great benefits to men of which he is revealed to be the author. At the same time, his nature can be seen through these very facts. If we have said what he can do and what he gives, we have found who he is and what nature he has.[78]

The celebration of the gods' power frequently took the form of acclamations of the gods and dedications to them that celebrated the gods' deeds and virtues (ἀρεταί, e.g., Acts 19:34).

The emphasis on power rather than personality explains why Roman paganism was not exclusivistic in its attitude toward other gods. One of the main characteristics of Hellenistic religion was its syncretism, a tendency to combine elements of different religions and to identify different deities, the Greek Zeus becoming the Roman Jupiter, for example, or Artemis being identified with Diana.[79]

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[78] Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 8 in Zeph Stewart, ed., *Arthur Darby Nock: Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 1:35. See further on the subject, Robert M. Grant, *Gods and the One God* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 54–57; Martin P. Nilsson, *Greek Piety* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 103–110.

[79] The phenomenon of syncretism has attracted considerable scholarly attention in recent years as greater precision has been sought. See the account of research in Abraham J. Malherbe, "Greco-Roman Religion and Philosophy and the New Testament," in *The New Testament and Its Modern Interpreters* (ed. Eldon Jay Epp and George W. MacRae, S.J.; SBLBMI 3; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 5–6.

### *Superstition*

Historians of Greek religion have frequently described the Hellenistic period as being characterized by superstition, a period when there was "an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase of sensitiveness, a failure of nerve."[80] Superstition, it is thought, grew naturally in a society in which there seemed to be no correlation between people's fortunes and their merits and efforts. This may seem too pejorative a description of an entire period; after all, it is too easy to describe someone else's religion as superstition. The Greeks themselves, however, did give close attention to the phenomenon they called *deisidaimonia* (δεισιδαιμονία), by which they meant "religiosity" (see Acts 17:22, where the adjective *religious* is used) or "superstition," depending on taste. Two philosophers who wrote on the subject help us to understand this feature of Hellenistic religion.

Theophrastus (c. 370–286 BC), in a series of descriptive sketches of various character types, describes the superstitious man. He begins his description with a definition: "Superstitiousness, it is scarcely necessary to say, seems to be a kind of cowardice (δειλία) with respect to the divine."[81] Theophrastus then vividly characterizes the life of someone who is surrounded by supernatural powers with which he must negotiate his well-being. From morning to night, there is hardly a moment when he does not sprinkle himself, eat a bay leaf, anoint himself, throw a stone across the street to break a spell, or utter formulas to protect himself from the surrounding evil. Religious sensitivity has spread to every aspect of his life, and he lives in fear.

Some five hundred years later, someone writing in the name of Plutarch took up the same subject in a short treatise *On Superstition*. The writer claimed that ignorance and blindness in regard to the gods take two forms, atheism and superstition, and that both are due to emotion that unsettles reason. Superstition "is an emotional idea and an assumption productive of fear which utterly humbles and crushes a man, for he thinks that there are gods, but that they are the cause of pain and injury."[82] The Pastoral Epistles criticize this attitude: "God did not give us a spirit of cowardice (δειλία), but rather a spirit of power and of love and of self-discipline" (2 Tim 1:7 NRSV; cf. 3:5). It is out of this fear that people do the strangest

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[80] Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 119, cf. 127.

[81] Theophrastus, *Char.* 16.

[82] Ps.-Plutarch, *Superst.* 165B.

things. For example, the Jews, "fast bound in the toils of superstition as in one great net," refused to defend their city on the Sabbath.[83] The Romans similarly called Christianity a superstition.[84]

### *Magic*

People may have been highly sensitive to the power that dominated their world, but their response was not entirely passive. Through the use of magic they sought to bring that power into the service of their own interests. The difference between magic and religion has been thought to reside in one's attitude toward some superior being, magic seeking to compel that being to act in accord with one's own interests, religion seeking an end by | requesting the power to do what is needed.[85] That, however, is a modern distinction. What is characteristic of magic is that the power of some being is harnessed through the use of certain techniques or formulas known to the magician, for the purpose of good or ill. Magic performed with malevolent purpose was outlawed. The masses were susceptible to the appeal of magic,[86] but so were some aristocrats, including Vespasian himself.[87] The satirists, on the other hand, found in magicians a delicious target.[88] The Romans liked to associate magic with foreigners, Jews included, and the latter, rather than shying away from it, claimed that Jewish magic was superior, since it was derived from the wisdom given to Solomon.[89]

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The conceptual framework that supported magical practices differed from person to person, but they shared the notion that power permeated the universe and that by acting on it at one place, one might effect a result in some other place to which one directed it. The Stoic idea of cosmic sympathy proved useful in rationalizing magic. According to Stoic theory, the universe is an essential unity in which human beings are the microcosm of the universal macrocosm. This fundamental unity explained how certain objects, such as parts of the body, could be used in a magical rite to affect a person. Others thought of a pantheistic spirit that pervades

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[83] Ps.-Plutarch, *Superst.* 169C.

[84] See Pliny, *Ep.* 10.96; Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.44; Suetonius, *Nero* 16; and for discussion, Wilken, *Christians as the Romans Saw Them*, 48–67.

[85] For discussion and a selection of texts, see Georg Luck, *Arcana Mundi: Magic and the Occult in the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Collection of Ancient Texts* (2d ed.; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1–173.

[86] See Lucian, *Alexander* (*Pseudomantis*).

[87] Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.81; Suetonius, *Vesp.* 7.2.

[88] See Lucian, *Philopseudes*.

[89] E.g., Josephus, *A.J.* 8.42–49.

the entire cosmos, which one influences through rites, acclamations, or prayers to do one's bidding. Then there were the numberless *daimones* (δαίμονες), intermediate beings between the human and the divine. Some of them were noble, others malevolent, and they could be summoned through a ritual or the invocation of their names. A particularly forceful demonstration of magical power was exorcism, by which an evil spirit was driven out of a possessed person.[90]

The ancient preoccupation with magic is reflected in its appearance in NT vice lists (e.g., Gal 5:20; Rev 9:21; 21:8; 22:15). The Gospels record charges that Jesus exorcised demons by the power of Satan (e.g., Matt 12:22–32), and it is to be expected that Christians would encounter the same charge. Indeed, the book of Acts shows a special interest in magic.[91] Three major panels in the book's depiction of the spread of the faith begin with the Christian evangelists' encountering opposition from magicians. In Samaria, Simon the magician is acclaimed by everyone with the words, "This man is the power of God that is called Great" (Acts 8:10 NRSV). The true magician even after his conversion, Simon saw the Christians performing wondrous deeds (8:13) and that the Holy Spirit was conferred by the laying on of hands, so he tried to buy that power from the apostles, only to be enjoined to repent (8:17–34). Luke again makes the case that magic is impotent before the gospel when early in the first missionary journey Paul blinds the Jewish magician Elymas (Bar-Jesus) when he attempts to turn the proconsul away from the faith (Acts 13:6–12).

Just as philosophy was associated in the ancient world with Athens, so also magic was associated with Ephesus, and it was there that Paul dramatically beats the magicians, this time "seven sons of a Jewish high priest named Sceva" (Acts 19:11–20). Using the name of Jesus as a formula with which to exorcise, they succeed in doing so, only to be attacked by the evil spirit, thus showing that their magical power was very limited. The result, according to Luke, was that many people were converted, including many magicians, who burned their magical books as proof of their conversion. "So the word of the Lord grew mightily and prevailed" (19:20 NRSV).

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[90] See Lucian, *Philops.* 15–17.

[91] See, in general, David E. Aune, "Magic in Early Christianity," *ANRW* 2.23.2 (1980): 1507–1557; and on Acts, Susan R. Garrett, *The Demise of the Devil: Magic and the Demonic in Luke's Writings* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989).

*Divination*

The human desire to receive direct divine guidance was fulfilled by divination, the prediction by supernatural means of future events and the interpretation of past occurrences. Cicero, our most important source for divination, divided it into two major classes: natural and artificial divination.[92]

Natural divination may involve dreams, which will receive further attention below. Incubation was a special kind of divination that entailed dreaming under controlled conditions and then interpreting the dreams. A particular kind of incubation was iatromancy, sleeping in a health shrine, like that of Asclepius. Extremely important to Greeks was prophecy. It was thought that the prophet became the mouthpiece of a divine power that took | possession of the prophet and spoke through him or her. This possession the Greeks spoke of as inspiration,[93] which required the prophet to create the right disposition before receiving the prophetic spirit. This was achieved when the soul threw "aside the caution that human intelligence lays upon it, and thus often diverts and quenches the spirit."[94] When the prophetic faculty was not properly attuned to the spirit, the consequences could be fatal to the prophet.[95]

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The term *oracle* was applied to this kind of divination and could refer to the response of a god to a question, thus an oracular saying; to the prophet, for example, the oracle at Delphi; or to the shrine where the prophesying took place. The most important shrines were those of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus and that of Apollo at Delphi. Situated at what Greeks thought was the center (or navel) of the earth,[96] the Oracle of Delphi was for some time the supreme authority in religious matters, and, since Delphi was also the central meeting place for citizens from the isolated city-states, it was also socially and politically important. By the time Plutarch wrote, early in the second century, however, prophecy had declined.

Another type of oracle that became important was that associated with the name *Sibyl*. The word was first used of one prophetess, then of many who wandered around Greece, some becoming attached to certain shrines. The proper name became generic and referred to prophecy of

[92] Cicero, *Div.* 1.11, 2.26; see also Luck, *Arcana Mundi*, 285–368, for some ancient texts on divination and for discussion.
[93] Cicero, *Div.* 1.114.
[94] Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 432EF (LCL 5).
[95] Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 438AB (LCL 5); Lucan, *Pharsalia* 5.130–200.
[96] See Strabo, *Geogr.* 9.3.5.

an ecstatic kind. The prophecies were written down in Greek hexameter and collected, but the collection was destroyed when the Roman capitol burned in 83 BC. New collections were made later, partly by Jews and Christians who found this particular oracular tradition convenient for their own propaganda.[97]

In artificial divination, use was made of animate and inanimate objects to predict the future. Of things animate, birds have always been important, indicating by their number, species, and behavior what the future might hold. This type of divination was called augury; that based on the examination of animals' entrails was called haruspicy.[98] In addition to animals, the involuntary movements of humans, such as twitching or sneezing, were viewed as divine communications. Inanimate objects—like incense, flour, egg shells, or parts of animals, especially their shoulder blades—were thought potent when placed on a sacrificial fire. Lots were cast extensively (cf. Acts 1:26), and astrology became a major means by which the future was divined.

The Greeks proposed a rational framework for divination. Cicero speaks in *On Divination* of three ways in which the Stoics made a case for divination. First, they argued that the gods' love for human beings required that they tell in advance what the future would be.[99] Second, the doctrine of fate, with its inexorable succession of cause and effect, lays the future open to the diviner, who is able to see how one thing leads to another.[100] Third, nature itself provides the signs, as it does the stars and other heavenly bodies, whose mysteries are laid bare by astrology.[101] Cicero himself remained skeptical about divination, as did some philosophical schools, like the Epicureans and the Skeptics.[102] So also did satirists, who tended to see this type of thing as peculiarly Oriental, once the Oracle of Delphi had all but fallen silent.[103]

The NT does not show any great interest in divination, but according to Acts 16:16–18, at the beginning of Paul's mission in Europe, in Philippi, he encountered a slave girl with a very special kind of oracular power. Luke's description of her as having, literally, a "python spirit," is just enough to

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[97] See John J. Collins, "Sibylline Oracles (Second Century B.C.E.–First Century A.D.)," *OTP* 1:317–472.

[98] Cicero, *Div.* 1.119–120.

[99] Cicero, *Div.* 1.82.

[100] Cicero, *Div.* 1.125–126.

[101] Cicero, *Div.* 1.129–130.

[102] Cicero, *Div.* 2.150.

[103] See Juvenal, *Sat.* 6.548–591.

let us know that she was thought to be inspired by Apollo, who used such mouthpieces in a way ventriloquists use their props.[104] For the rest, however, Luke polemicizes against divination by treating Paul's action as straightforward exorcism of an evil spirit and accusing her owners of using her for their own mercenary purposes.

### *Dreams*

Tertullian expressed the opinion of many when he said, "It is to dreams that the majority of people owe their knowledge of God."[105] Our major sources for the study of dreams in antiquity are Aelius Aristides and Artemidorus. 25 The fact that they both lived in the second century and hailed | from the same province raises the question of whether they were representative of other places and other times. Aristides, a hypochondriac who in his dream received orders directly from Asclepius, provides us with a picture of someone who seeks the constant companionship of the god. Perhaps the intensity of his preoccupation with dreams was unusual, but the phenomenon itself was not extraordinary.[106] Artemidorus made an extensive collection of dreams and wrote a treatise on their interpretation in which he used a system of classification that had been developing for centuries.[107] In such classifications, a distinction was made between predictive and non-predictive dreams, and each of these was still further classified. While the interpretation of dreams had a venerable history, it also had its critics, among whom were Theophrastus and Cicero, who thought of it as superstition.[108]

It is difficult to classify the dreams in the NT according to the ancient categories; indeed, it is hard to decide how dreams are related to such

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[104] See Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 414E; and further on the type, Eric R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Sather Classical Lectures 25; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951; repr., Boston: Beacon, 1957), 71–72.

[105] Tertullian, *An.* 47.2.

[106] For different assessments, but both of which regard the second century as an important time in pagan religiosity, see André-Jean Festugière, *Personal Religion Among the Greeks* (Sather Classical Lectures 26; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 85–104; Eric R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine* (Wiles Lectures, 1963; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 38–53.

[107] See Charles A. Behr, *Aelius Aristides and the Sacred Tales* (Chicago: Argonaut, 1968), 171–195, on the classification of dreams.

[108] Theophrastus, *Char.* 16; Cicero, *Div.* 2.124–150.

trance visions as those found in Acts 10:10–15.[109] One type of dream, the *chrēmatismos* (χρηματισμός), a dream oracle in which a god or some other significant personage appears to give directions or predict the future, does appear with some frequency (e.g., Matt 1:20–21; 2:12–13, 19, 22; Acts 16:9–10; 18:9; etc.). In all these cases, either the Lord or a divine messenger, whether an angel or a man, appears and without ambiguity tells the dreamer what will happen or what he or she must do. There is, therefore, no need for interpretation; God makes the divine will known clearly. There is none of the inquistiveness or egocentrism that characterizes divination. The dreams in the NT come involuntarily, and they have God at their center and can, therefore, fulfill the apologetic function that they frequently have in the NT narratives.

### *The Mysteries*

The Mysteries were secret cults in which the unititated were not permitted to participate.[110] It is particularly hazardous to generalize about the Mysteries because we still know so little about them. The vow of silence that initiates took was very effective, and reliable literary sources that can inform us about the Mysteries are very few. We are left to make what we can of statues, friezes, inscriptions, paintings, and the like, that represent aspects of one Mystery or another. In the face of the paucity of information, the natural tendency is to emphasize perceived commonalities and to create a composite Mystery of which particular cults are then seen as variants. This is especially tempting when two of the Mysteries about which we know most—that associated with Eleusis and the cult of the Egyptian goddess Isis—are made to supply the major constituents of a protean Mystery cult.[111]

Despite these qualifications, certain things are generally thought to have characterized the Mysteries, in addition to their secrecy. They promised salvation in the world to come, which consists of the liberation from the control of fate, the cosmic powers, and death; a passage through the underworld without fear; and eternal happy communion with the gods. This salvation was guaranteed by a series of activities, beginning with a

[109] See John S. Hanson, "Dreams and Visions in the Graeco-Roman World and Early Christianity," *ANRW* 2.23.2 (1980): 1395–1427.

[110] See Marvin W. Meyer, ed., *The Ancient Mysteries: A Sourcebook* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), for an optimistic account of what can be known about the Mysteries.

[111] For an assessment of twentieth-century scholarship on the Mysteries, see Malherbe, "Greco-Roman Religion and Philosophy," 11–13.

preparatory washing and ending with a principal rite that aimed at the immortalization of the initiate. This was attained when the initiate participated in the fate of the god as it was known through the myth that gave meaning to the cult. The rite itself involved speaking certain phrases, showing things, and performing certain actions. But what all this referred to has remained a mystery. Fellowship meals were also associated with the cults.

New Testament scholars' interest in the Mysteries has waned in recent years, as it has become clear that the Mysteries may not have been as significant a factor in the first century as had been thought, and that the study of the phenomenon is fraught with methodological difficulties.[112] The Mysteries were very important from the second century on, and Christian writers then had to come to terms with them. The Mysteries are an invaluable witness to a certain type of religiosity that shared some things with Christianity. The eleventh book of Apuleius's *The Golden Ass* is one of the few extensive texts we have that provides a glimpse of the initiation into | a Mystery, in this case, that of Isis. Such things as a ritual washing, the language of salvation and rebirth, and the spiritual paternity of Isis's priest, all present in this book, have been thought by some scholars to be similar to Christian baptism and theological language.

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## Conclusion

The study of the first-century Graeco-Roman world can be approached from many different vantage points. The one adopted in this article—viewing that world from the perspective of a Christian interest—is no less valid than others. Christians had to come to terms with the reality of their world, and we have observed how they did so in various circumstances and ways that defy generalization. Sometimes they accommodated themselves to circumstances, and at other times they resisted; sometimes they responded directly and in new ways, and at others they availed themselves of Judaism and its traditions. Always they acted with an awareness that, although they were part of their world, their true identity was to be shaped by the values they had learned through their Christian faith.

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[112] For a thorough assessment of the issues, see Hugo Rahner, "Christian Mystery and the Pagan Mysteries," in Joseph Campbell, ed., *Pagan and Christian Mysteries* (New York: Harper, 1963), 148–178.

# PART THREE

# PATRISTICA

CHAPTER SIX

# APOLOGETIC AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE SECOND CENTURY*

The study of early Christianity has in recent years experienced a renewal of interest in the second-century Apologists.[1] More particularly, there has been a revived concern to understand these men, who were the first Christians to direct their writings to outsiders, in their relation to the philosophical background of their time.[2] The Apologists sought to accomplish their aims by writing as philosophers. The present interest is concerned with the question whether they wrote as philosophers because they *were* philosophers and the issues they discussed *were* for them philosophical ones, or whether they merely appropriated philosophically accepted ideas and terms to express what constituted for them traditional Christian teaching.[3] Earlier interpretation of the Apologists insisted that they were superficial in their understanding of the philosophical terms and concepts that they used and that they used them artificially, merely for the sake of impressing their readers.[4] Recent investigations, however, based on a better knowledge of the philosophy of the second century, and especially of Middle Platonism, have placed a higher evaluation on the Apologists as men who were themselves philosophically formed and who expressed themselves in terms natural to such a background.

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* Originally published in *ResQ* 7 (1963): 19–32.

1 Sorely needed editions are now being prepared by Wolfgang Schmid (Justin, which appeared as *Die erste Apologie Justins Philosoph und Märtyrer* [ed. Karl Bayer; HumC.G 1; Munich: Kösel, 1966]) and Martin Elze (Tatian and Athenagoras) for Verlag Kösel, Munich. (The editors have not been able to locate Elze's edition in searches of electronic bibliographic data bases.)

2 For Stoicism, see Michel Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères de l'église, de Clément de Rome à Clément de Alexandrie* (PatSor 1; Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957). For Middle Platonism, see esp. Carl Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," *ZNW* 44 (1952–1953): 157–195; Andresen, *Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (AKG 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955); Martin Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie* (FKDG 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960); Jean Daniélou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux II^e et III^e siècles* (Paris: Desclée, 1961).

3 Thus, for example, Henry A. Lucks, *The Philosophy of Athenagoras: Its Sources and Value* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1936).

4 E.g., Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907); André-Jean Festugière, "Sur une traduction nouvelle d'Athénagore," *REG* 56 (1943): 367–375.

The ostensible aim of the Apologists was to counter the charges of atheism, cannibalism, and incest brought against Christians. In the Apologies three principal themes are to be discerned: namely, defense against accusations and claims for tolerance, polemic against the ancient cults, and exposition of Christian doctrine. It is now recognized that of these themes, what was really central were polemic and exposition.[5] As earlier researchers had emphasized the | demands of equal rights and polemic in the Apologists, so now there is a tendency to emphasize the polemical, but especially the expository elements in the apologetic writings, and to interpret the Apologies from a purely philosophical standpoint. This new emphasis neglects what has traditionally been regarded as the characteristic apologetic motif, viz., the denial of pagan accusations and the Christian claims for tolerance.

The purpose of this article is to contribute to a proper perspective from which to view the Apologists and their relationship to their philosophical background.[6] By taking note of how philosophy was conceived of in this period and—and in the light of this—how Christians were regarded by pagans and how they responded to the pagan view, we may hope to ground the discussion again in its historical context. Special attention will be given to Athenagoras, the most educated and highly cultured and also the most neglected of the Apologists of the second century.

## Pagan Views of Christianity

Jews and Christians were considered at times to be philosophers by pagans. The Peripatetic writer of the mid-third century BC, Clearchus of Soli, presents Aristotle engaged in a philosophical discussion with a Jew whom he

[5] For the characteristics of apologetic literature, see esp. Aimé Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du IIe siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Hatchette, 1912), 1–18; Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* (3 vols.; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950–1960), 1:186ff.; Daniélou, *Message évangélique*, 11–39. The latter stresses that the Apologies are to be seen as missionary discourses. Luigi Alfonsi, "Motivi tradisionali del giovane Aristotele in Clemento Alessandrino e in Atenagora," *VC* 7 (1953): 129–142, believes that the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle influenced the form and content of Christian apologetic literature. Michele Pellegrino, *Studi su l'antica Apologetica* (SeL 14; Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1947), esp. 45–51, and Vincenzo Monacchino, "Intento pratico e propagandistico dell' Apologetica greca de II secolo," *Greg* 32 (1951): 5–49, 187–222, point out the rhetorical elements in the Apologies and do not believe that they were actually intended for the emperors, to whom they are addressed.

[6] For the general background, see Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), esp. 193–253.

describes as a "perfect Greek, not only in his language, but also in his soul."[7] Although this is only an anecdote, Clearchus must himself have come in contact with such Hellenized Jews.[8] The fiction of the dialogue "was made in order to symbolize an affinity between Aristotle's philosophy and the Jewish religion | which had become a matter of serious interest to Clearchus."[9] 21 But even earlier than Clearchus, Aristotle's successor, Theophrastus, called the Jews "a philosophical race."[10] It is also possible that Hecataeus, a Greek writer who lived in Egypt at the court of the first Ptolemy at Alexandria, regarded the Jews as a philosophical race.[11]

The main reason for Theophrastus's appreciation of the Jewish religion as a highly philosophical wisdom must have been its belief in one God.[12] In the centuries which followed, men like Aristobulus performed as philosophers and prepared the way for Philo and the Christian Apologists.[13]

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[7] In a dialogue preserved in Josephus, *C. Ap.* 1.176–182. See the discussions by Werner Jaeger, "Greeks and Jews" in Jaeger, *Scripta Minora* (2 vols.; SeL 80–81; Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1960), 2:169–83; repr. from "Greeks and Jews: The First Records of Jewish Religion and Civilization," *JR* 18 (1938): 127–143; Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos: Die griechische Medizin und die Schule des Aristoteles* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1938; 2d ed., 1963), esp. the "Excursus: Der älteste griechische Bericht über die Juden," 134–153.

[8] Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle* (trans. Richard Robinson; 2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 116, has shown that at least the scene described by Clearchus is historical. For a different view, see Hans Lewy, "Aristotle and the Jewish Sage according to Clearchus of Soli," *HTR* 31 (1938): 205–235.

[9] See Jaeger, "Greeks and Jews," 2:173: "What is a 'Greek soul' in the eyes of a Peripatetic scholar? Not what modern historical or philological scholarship tries to grasp in Homer, Pindar, or in Periclean Athens. Of course a Greek soul is for him the intellectualized human mind in whose crystal-clear world even a highly gifted and intelligent foreigner could participate and move with ease and grace. Perhaps they could never understand each other in their ultimate motivations, perhaps the intellectual ear of each did not perceive the fine overtones in the language of the other; but enough—they thought they *could* understand each other, and their brave attempts seemed to promise a surprising success." See also Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), 30.

[10] Theophrastus *apud* Porphyry, *Abst.* 2.26, in Augustus Nauck, ed., *Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1886), 155, lines 13–14.

[11] Jaeger, "Greeks and Jews," 2:175. Hecataeus had records of the Egyptians, and Jaeger considers it highly probable that Theophrastus received his information about the Jews from these sources.

[12] See Jaeger, "Greeks and Jews," 2:175. Although Theophrastus does not explicitly mention their monotheism, he probably wished to express the monistic character of their religion by speaking of their conversation on the divine (*to theion*). "For since the pre-Socratic systems this word had always designated a philosophical concept of the one highest being that governs the world, as opposed to the popular belief in a plurality of mythical deities."

[13] On Aristobulus, see Emil Schürer, *A History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C.–A.D. 135)* (New revised ed.; 3 vols. in 4; ed. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, Matthew Black, Pamela Vermes, and Martin Goodman; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1973–1987),

Josephus also speaks of the Jewish sects as "philosophies."[14] Before the beginning of the Christian era the synagogue had become a public institution in which instruction in religion was given. To the Greeks it must have appeared to be a school of philosophy. Particularly the teaching, with its emphasis on monotheism and morals, was to the Greek apprehension purely philosophical doctrine.[15] Hellenistic Jews like Philo described the 22 | activities of the synagogue in the same way: on the Sabbath the Jews lay aside all their usual occupations and devote themselves wholly to philosophy.[16]

Christians were also considered to be philosophers by some of the pagans with whom they came in contact or who heard of their beliefs. Tertullian could complain that the authorities at best treat Christianity as a philosophy.[17] Galen, a contemporary of Athenagoras, seems to regard the Jews and Christians as philosophers,[18] and Aelius Aristides at about the same time mentions the Christians in a context in which he is discussing philosophers.[19]

We should not be surprised at the interpretation of Christianity as a philosophy, for the same reasons that led to the acceptance of Judaism as a philosophy would also be valid for Christianity. The intellectual medium of Greek thought and its categories were indispensable for the discussion of religious matters, "because philosophy by that time had taken on for the Greeks themselves the function of natural theology."[20] When Trypho

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3.1:579–593; Jacob Freudenthal, *Alexander Polyhistor* (Hellenistische Studien 1–2; Breslau: H. Skutsch, 1875), 167ff. Schürer and Freudenthal consider the fragments of Aristobulus contained in Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius to be genuine and date the writings around 160 BC. Another view is that at the earliest he could have been a contemporary of Philo. Thus Hugo Willrich, *Judaica* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1900), 135. See also Peter Dalbert, *Die Theologie der hellenistisch-jüdischen Missionsliteratur unter Ausschluß von Philo und Josephus* (*TF* 4; Hamburg-Volksdorf: H. Reich, 1954), 102ff.

[14] Josephus, *B.J.* 2.119–166, esp. 119; *A.J.* 18.9–25, esp. 9, 11, 23, 25.

[15] See George Foot Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era* (3 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927–1930; repr., 1966–1967), 1:284–85; Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia,* 29ff.; Nock, *Conversion,* 62, 78, 283.

[16] Philo, *Somn.* 2.123–132 (Colson, LCL); on the Therapeutae, see *Contempl.* 2–3 (Colson, LCL). Cf. also Josephus, *A.J.* 18.11.

[17] Tertullian, *Apol.* 46–47 (CSEL 69); cf. *De inscriptionibus*, 9–10.

[18] Galen, *Puls. diff.* 3.3 in *Claudii Galeni opera omnia* (ed. Karl Kühn; 20 vols.; Medicorum Graecorum opera quae exstant 1–20; Leipzig: C. Cnobloch, 1821–1833), 8:656, line 8.

[19] In *Aelius Aristides* (ed. Wilhelm Dindorf; 3 vols.; Leipzig: G. Reimer, 1829), 2:402–403. See Pierre C. de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne. Étude sur la polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe siècle* (Paris: L'Artisan du livre, 1934), 79–87; Ludwig Früchtel, "Aristides Rhetor," *RAC* 1 (1950): 654–656.

[20] Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, 31.

meets the philosopher in Justin's description of his conversion, he says to him, "I see you are a philosopher," and assumes therefore that he must be concerned with God and the theological problem.[21] This is confirmed by the discussion that then follows. Philosophy is here viewed essentially as an intermediary between God and man.[22] "The aim of Platonism," Justin the Platonist can say, "is to see God face to face."[23] Thus the idea of a philosopher as a man interested in God was taken for granted in the second century AD,[24] although in principle it was not new.[25] The end of philosophy was not to construct a system, but to be assimilated to God.[26] Philosophers presented themselves frankly as dealers of salvation. Their lecture rooms became dispensaries | for sick souls,[27] and they regarded themselves as the physicians of sick souls.[28] The philosopher is not merely a psychotherapist, but, as Marcus Aurelius put it, he is also "a kind of priest and minister of the gods."[29] 23

In addition to this religious character of philosophy in our period of interest, it should be remembered that for a Greek a "philosopher" is first and foremost a well-educated man, and never a specialist or expert alone.[30] When Socrates said that he "philosophized," he did not mean that he was engaging in abstract thought, but that he was exhorting and teaching. Plato's philosophy, the concept of which was derived from Socrates's *φιλοσοφεῖν,* was the expression of his life, and his life *was* his philosophy.[31]

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[21] Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 3.

[22] Cf. Maximus of Tyre 5.8 in *Maximi Tyrii Philosophumena* (ed. Hermann Hobein; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910). For the religious nature of philosophy in this period, see Martin P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (2 vols.; HAW 5.2; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1941–1950), 2:285; Marcel Caster, *Lucien et la pensée religieuse de son temps* (CEA; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1937; repr., New York: Garland, 1987), 9ff.; André-Jean Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (*EBib*; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1932), 34–36, 76–77; Eric R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Sather Classical Lectures 25; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951; repr., Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 248.

[23] Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 2.3; cf. Porphyry, *Marc.* 16.

[24] Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, 3.

[25] Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 248; Festugière, *L'idéal religieux,* 74 n. 1.

[26] This ideal was based on Plato, *Theaet.* 176B. See Hubert Merki, *Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa* (Par. 7; Fribourg: Paulusverlag, 1952).

[27] E.g., Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.23.30; Seneca, *Ep.* 48.4; Epicurus, *Ep. ad Menoec*. 122.

[28] E.g., Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.32; 32.16; 33.6–7.

[29] Marcus Aurelius 3.4.3.

[30] Richard Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians* (OCPM; London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 44.

[31] Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* (trans. Gilbert Highet; 3 vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1943–1945), 2:38–39, 83, 86, and esp. 85: "The position of

The Greeks could be quite generous in bestowing the title of philosopher. Thus Aristotle, in his lost dialogue, *On Philosophy,* discussed Greek philosophy and Oriental religious systems like that of the Zoroastrians and the Magi under the common denomination of wisdom, which sometimes designates for him metaphysical knowledge, or the highest principles, or theology.[32] In later antiquity we also see Strabo calling the Brahmans and Sramans[33] and the Pramnae[34] philosophers, and Plutarch calls Alexander a philosopher, not because of his theoretical philosophical activity, but because of what he said, the principles that he taught, and the deeds that he performed.[35]

That Christians were at times regarded as philosophers by no means implies that this was the usual view that outsiders had of them. On the contrary, the earliest pagan references to Christians, viz., those by Pliny,[36] Tacitus,[37] and Suetonius,[38] do not regard them as such. Marcus Aurelius, indeed, to whom Athenagoras addressed his Apology, contrasts the Chris-
24 tian attitude toward death with that of | the Stoic philosopher,[39] and Celsus places the Christians on the same level with the votaries of the popular imported cults.[40] At best, Celsus says, their philosophy is a misunderstanding of Plato.[41]

What was probably the general outsider's view of Christianity at the time of Athenagoras can be seen in Lucian of Samosata's two writings, *Alexander sive pseudomantis* and *De morte Peregrini.* Christians are mentioned only in passing, and the picture that we get of Christianity is only

Plato's philosophy in the history of Greek *thought* is defined by the fact that it is *paideia*, and that it is aimed at finding a large-scale solution to the problem of educating human beings. From another point of view, its position in the history of Greek *paideia* is defined by the fact that it points to philosophy and knowledge as the highest form of education and culture."

32 Jaeger, "Greeks and Jews," 170.
33 Strabo, *Geogr.* 15.1.59.
34 Strabo, *Geogr.* 15.1.70.
35 Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 327E–329A. Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.28: "If a man strives earnestly to be good and honourable, that is nothing but being a philosopher. However, he did not often use that word for it, but merely bade them to seek to be good men" (Cohoon, LCL).
36 Pliny, *Ep.* 10.96–97.
37 Tacitus, *Ann.* 15.44.
38 Suetonius, *Claud.* 25.3; *Nero* 16.3.
39 Marcus Aurelius 11.3.1.
40 Celsus *apud* Origen, *Cels.* 3.16. (All Origen references are to *Origenes Werke* [ed. Paul Koetschau et al.; 12 vols. in 13; GCS 2–3, 6, 10, 22, 29–30, 33, 35, 38, 40, 41; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1899–1955].)
41 Origen, Cels. 6.7, 19.

the superficial impression of an outsider. Jesus is seen as the founder of an Oriental mystery religion, and the whole presentation of Christianity is in general Hellenistic terms. As Hans Dieter Betz has shown, Lucian regarded Christianity as one of the *teletai* from the Orient, and what he considered valid for the latter he presupposed for Christianity.[42] Lucian does mention the Christians together with the Epicureans in *Alex.* 25, but no significance is to be seen in this to the effect that Lucian regards Christians on an equal philosophical footing with the Epicureans. He places them together here because both groups opposed the false philosophers.[43]

When Christians *were* spoken of as philosophers, they were placed in the same category with the Cynics.[44] The ideal Cynic was considered to be a physician of sick souls. Heracles was his hero and Diogenes his great example.[45] The popular field preachers, however, who swarmed across the Empire, who were also called Cynics, and of whom we get a picture (albeit a one-sided one, especially in the works of Lucian and Dio Chrysostom), scandalized the name. They were regarded by philosophers of higher quality as charlatans who brought the name philosopher into disgrace. They called themselves Cynics; they were accused; but they did not live the true Cynic life. They were socially irresponsible and catered to the desires of the crowd.[46]

Christians acted in a manner that made it natural for them to be regarded as Cynics. The debate of Justin, dressed like a Cynic, with Crescens the Cynic, would appear as just another Cynic | wrangling.[47] When Celsus accused the Christians of using the Cynic method of preaching in the marketplaces, Origen did not deny it, but defended the custom.[48] Because Christians followed the same method of preaching as the Cynics  25

[42] Hans Dieter Betz, "Lukian von Samosata und das Christentum," *NovT* 3 (1959): 226–237. See Betz, *Lukian von Samosata und das Neue Testament: Religionsgeschichtliche und paränetische Parallelen* (TU 76; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), esp. 5–13: "Lukians Bemerkungen über die Christen."

[43] Caster, *Lucien*, 349, has shown that it is the tendency of Lucian to have the Epicureans alone unmask the deceit of the false prophets, while the followers of Plato, Chrysippus, and Pythagoras allow themselves to be duped.

[44] See Rudolf W.O. Helm, "Kynismus," PW 12 (1924): 3–24.

[45] See, for example, several of Dio Chrysostom's orations in which Diogenes is the central figure (*Orr.* 6, 8, 9, and 10).

[46] See Jacob Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1879); Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London: Methuen, 1937; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967; 2d ed., London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998); de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, 83ff.

[47] Justin Martyr, *2 Apol.* 3.4–5; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.16.1.

[48] Origen, *Cels.* 3.50C.

and because they could also be regarded as antisocial, it is natural that Aelius Aristides could comment on the Cynics that "they resemble the impious sect in Palestine in their customs. For with the latter a mark of their impiety is that they do not reverence the gods; and so do these philosophers in like manner cut themselves off from the Greeks, and, indeed, from all divine authority."[49]

In the Hellenistic period Cynicism did not involve adherence to any system of doctrine, but was characterized by its view of society and its radical manner of life.[50] Diogenes Laertius could say of them, after having given an account of some early Cynics, "But we will go on to append the doctrines which they held in common—if, that is, we decide that Cynicism is really a philosophy, and not, as some maintain, just a way of life."[51] Pagans were also struck by the Christian manner of life, as is evidenced by the remarks of Lucian and Galen. Lucian, for instance, did not accuse the Christians of living in contradiction to their teaching, a principal grievance of his against the Cynics.[52] What he did find fault with was the credulity with which they accepted their doctrines.

Christians admitted that they accepted their doctrines on the basis of faith, and this πίστις was a common cause for derision. It is hardly true, as Walzer says, that Galen was the first pagan author to place Greek philosophy and Christianity on the same footing.[53] That Christians were regarded as philosophers is clear; however, that they were placed on the same level with the Greek philosophers is not. It is precisely the Christian faith, πίστις, that placed them on a different level from their contemporaries. Walzer himself aptly cites from Lucian's *Hermotimus* to illustrate the different viewpoint of the Greek toward *pistis*:[54] Hermotimus has placed his trust (πιστεύειν) in what his Stoic teacher tells him, for he considers the latter to be in a state of certain knowledge, far above everyone else.[55] Hermotimus's sceptical interlocutor is puzzled at this continued trust and discipleship, for Hermotimus has been an adherent of the Porch for many

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[49] Aelius Aristides, 2:402; see Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 174; Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker*, 100–101; de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, 82ff.

[50] Dudley, *History of Cynicism*, 144.

[51] Diogenes Laertius 6.103.

[52] de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, 105–106.

[53] Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 43; see Nock's review of Walzer's book in *Gn* 23 (1951): 48–52.

[54] Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 52–53.

[55] Lucian, *Hermot.* 7.

years. In the ensuing discussion the interlocutor affirms that πίστις in a certain school-doctrine can only be the starting point. A life of examination of the accepted doctrine must follow.[56] It never occurs to Lucian that one might acquiesce | in faith and abandon examination altogether. This antagonism toward uncritical belief is the background of Galen's criticism of Judaism and Christianity. The fragments of Galen's writings that Walzer examines make this clear. He talks of the "undemonstrated laws" of the school of Moses and Christ.[57] They, he says, accept everything by faith.[58] Most people, among whom are the Christians, are not able to follow any demonstrative argument and therefore have to draw their faith from parables and miracles.[59] Moses is compared with those who practice medicine without any scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), and it is charged that he wrote his books without any demonstration.[60]

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Other pagans describe Christians in similar terms. Celsus charges that Christians take advantage of the gullibility of the uneducated. They do not give or receive a reason for what they believe but use such expressions as, "Do not inquire, only believe!" and "Your faith will save you!"[61] They are like quacks who warn men against the doctor, "See that none of you touches science (ἐπιστήμη); science is a bad thing, knowledge makes men decline from health of soul."[62] Lucian thinks that Christians are naive, not only because they accepted the charlatan Peregrinus, but also because of their acceptance of "that crucified sophist" with an uncritical faith.[63] Within the next century Porphyry worked out in his book *Against the Christians* what Plotinus may have felt about the Christians.[64] The Christians, according to him, require one to follow all their teachings without

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[56] Lucian, *Hermot.* 29–30; 63–64.

[57] Galen, *Puls. diff.* 2.4 (8:579, 15 Kühn); Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 14, 48ff.

[58] The following fragments are extant only in Arabic. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 15, 48ff.

[59] Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 14, 57ff., 89ff.

[60] Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 11, 18.

[61] Celsus *apud* Origen, *Cels.* 1.9 (1:61, 18–19 Koetschau).

[62] Celsus *apud* Origen, *Cels.*, 3.75 (1:267, 22ff. Koetschau). See Nock, *Conversion*, 205; Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 53; Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity* (CL 18; New York: Harper, 1957), 128, 313 n. 2; repr. of *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (ed. Andrew M. Fairbairn; Hibbert Lectures 1888; London: Williams & Norgate, 1890).

[63] Lucian, *Peregr.* 13; see de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, 105–106.

[64] See Adolf Harnack, ed., *Porphyrius, "Gegen die Christen": 15 Bücher, Zeugnisse, Fragmente und Referate* (APAW.PH 1; Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften [G. Reimer], 1916).

investigation; they have an irrational faith.[65] Marcus Aurelius, to whom Athenagoras addressed his Apology, described the Christian attitude toward death as one of "unreasoned resistance" and contrasts it with the philosophers, who die "after reflection and with dignity."[66]

## 27 | The Christian Response

Most of the Apologists called themselves philosophers.[67] Thus Aristides is called a philosopher in the heading to his *Apology*,[68] and Justin describes Christianity as a philosophy.[69] Justin also continued to wear the philosopher's cloak as a Christian,[70] and he entered into a dialectic contest with Crescens the Cynic.[71] Tatian described himself as an advocate of "our barbarian philosophy,"[72] while Miltiades is said by Eusebius[73] to have written an *Apology for Christian Philosophy*. Eusebius also preserves fragments of an Apology by Melito of Sardis addressed to Marcus Aurelius, in which Christianity is clearly called a philosophy.[74] Except for Aristides, all of these Apologists are roughly contemporary with Athenagoras.

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[65] Harnack, *Porphyrius, Frg*. 73; cf. *Frg*. 1; de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, 272; Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 53–54.

[66] Galen, *In semet ipsum* 11.3.2. For a similar Stoic view of Christians, see Epictetus, *Diatr*. 4.7.6 (Oldfather, LCL): "Therefore, if madness can produce this attitude of mind towards the things which have been mentioned, and also habit, as with the Galileans, cannot reason and demonstration teach a man that God has made all things in the universe?" See Eduard Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* (3 vols.; Berlin: J.G. Cotta, 1921–1923), 3:529ff.

[67] See Cecil J. Cadoux, *The Early Church and the World* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1925; repr. 1955), 242–43.

[68] See Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 31ff.

[69] Justin Martyr, *Dial*. 2–7. See Wolfgang Schmid, "Frühe Apologetik und Platonismus: Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation des Prooems von Justins Dialogue," in 'EPMHNEIA: *Festschrift für Otto Regenbogen zum 60. Geburtstag am 14. Februar 1951* (ed. Wolfgang Schadewaldt et al.; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1952), 162–182.

[70] Justin Martyr, *Dial*. 1.2; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl*. 4.11.8.

[71] Justin Martyr, *2 Apol*. 3.4–5; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl*. 4.16.1.

[72] Tatian, *Or*. 31–32, 35, 42.

[73] Eusebius, *Hist. eccl*. 5.17.5; 28.4.

[74] Eusebius, *Hist. eccl*. 4.26.7–8. Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma* (trans. Neil Buchanan, James Millar, E.B. Speirs, and William M'Gilchrist; 7 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1894–1899; repr., 7 vols. in 4; New York: Dover Publications, 1961), 2:190 n. 2, cautions against reading too much into this description of Christianity as a philosophy, and points out that Melito himself wants it to be understood broadly. In addressing the emperor, Melito says, "Thy forefathers held this philosophy in honour with the other cults."

The Apologists differed from each other in their evaluation of pagan philosophy, yet even a man with such antipathy towards Greek philosophy as Tatian called Christianity a philosophy.[75] However, the meaning of this practice in itself should not be overrated, for it is almost exclusively confined to Christian apologetic and polemic.[76] It suited their polemic to call Christianity a philosophy and themselves philosophers. It made it possible to demand from the state the same treatment for themselves that was accorded to the philosophic schools.[77] What is more important—as current studies are making clear—is that for the Apologists who had been philosophers before their conversion it *was a* philosophical problem, and they therefore wrote and acted as philosophers.[78]

Athenagoras presents Christianity as a philosophy, but he nowhere expressly calls Christians philosophers or styles Christianity a philosophy.[79] He is much more subtle or natural in his approach, and | it will become clear that he at least implicitly presented the *Legatio pro Christianis* as a philosophical discourse. From some remarks in his *De Resurrectione*[80] it appears that he delivered that work originally as a lecture to an audience that included pagans and Christians.[81] He was thus probably in the habit of lecturing publicly on Christianity as a philosophy.[82] This does not mean that his exposition of Christian doctrine in his Apology is a purely philosophical discourse without any reference to pagan charges against the Christians. On the contrary, not only does he take up the official

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[75] But see Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie*, 19–27, "Tatians Verhältnis zur Philosophie."

[76] Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 2:254–55.

[77] Cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 46–47.

[78] See nn. 2 and 69 above, and see Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, 28–29.

[79] The closest that he comes to doing this is to point out the agreement between philosophers and Christians on important doctrines, e.g., *Leg.* 6.2; 19.1–3; 24.1 in William R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras:* Legatio *and* De Resurrectione (OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). (Although the original essay in *ResQ* referred to Athenagoras's *Supplicatio pro Christianis*, recent scholarship has adopted the standard title of *Legatio pro Christianis*, which this edition of the essay will employ; despite the change in name, the references to the work remain the same.) See Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 2:188–90.

[80] Athenagoras, *Res.* 1, 23–24 (49, 11ff.; 77, 8ff.; 24, 16ff. Schwartz). See Eduard Schwartz, *Athenagorae libellus pro Christianis. Oratio de resurrection cadaverum* (TU 4.2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1891).

[81] Spencer Mansel, "Athenagoras," *DCB* 1 (1877): 205, thinks that the lecture was later modified or enlarged for publication.

[82] See Cadoux, *The Early Church and the World*, 220.

complaints against the Christians,[83] but he shows an awareness of the pagan views of Christians that we have noticed. It is against the background in which Christians were regarded as irresponsible, antisocial Cynics, as naive people who held an irrational faith, who led unexamined lives, and who rejected scientific knowledge, that Athenagoras wrote his Apology.

Before turning to Athenagoras in particular, we may notice that other Christians were also aware of this attitude towards them and attempted to correct it. Justin, who may have known Galen during his first sojourn in Rome (AD 162–166),[84] observes that Christians differ from certain makers of myths in that they are not only content to affirm, but that they also prove what they affirm.[85] Clement of Alexandria, Galen's younger contemporary, complains that the Greeks revile faith because they consider it empty and barbarous.[86] In searching for Greek analogies to Christian *pistis*, Clement lights on the manner in which the Pythagoreans refer to the unauthenticated sayings of their master:

> Is it not absurd, he argues, that in the case of the Pythagoreans people are satisfied with their statement "He spake" and do not ask for further confirmation or demonstration, whereas those who have a passion for the truth, who believe in a really trustworthy master, God the Savior, are not believed, unless they bring proofs?[87]

29 | This remained a problem to be dealt with throughout the history of the early church.[88] Thus the great theologians tried to build up a new Christian

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[83] See Athenagoras, *Leg.* 3.

[84] See de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, 97. For Galen's view of the Christians, see nn. 53–60 above.

[85] Justin Martyr, *1 Apol.* 53.1.

[86] Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 55; Clement, *Strom.* 2 passim in *Clemens Alexandrinus* (ed. Otto Stählin; 4 vols.; 2d ed.; GCS 12, 15, 17, 39; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1905–1936).

[87] Clement, *Strom.* 2.5.24.3 (*Clemens Alexandrinus*, 2:125, 25ff Stählin). Clement counters that philosophy is only a preparation for the truth. Cf. *Strom.* 7.3.20 (3:14, 20ff. Stählin), and see Eric F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria* (TS NS 3; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 121ff. Faith is not something in which the Christian acquiesces, however. Knowledge is built upon faith and is the demonstration from the things received through faith. See Osborn, *Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria*, 161. Thus Origen also defends Christianity against Celsus's charge by affirming that from the "fortunate (εὐτυχής) faith" of the common people, an "examined faith" is developed; cf. *Cels.* 1.9–11; 3.38; Hal Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus* (AKG 22; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1932), 87–88.

[88] Note, for instance, the chapter headings in Eusebius *Praep. ev.* 1, ch. 3, "That we did not adopt the sentiments of the saving word without examination"; ch. 5, "We did not forsake the superstitious errors of our father without sound reason."

philosophy and to give a demonstration of the new faith, a *demonstratio evangelica*,[89] or they treated the problem at great length in less ambitious discourses.[90]

It is significant that Athenagoras begins his Apology by comparing the treatment that the Christians receive with that of the philosophers. Although he does not describe Christianity explicitly as a philosophy, its general character is set forth in a manner which, he probably hoped, would make clear its philosophical character. Christians, he says, should be treated in the same way as philosophers, for, since no Christian is wicked unless he play false to his profession (*Leg.* 2.3), the blame should rest on the man and not on Christianity, the same as when a man who philosophizes contrary to the law is judged to be evil, but scientific knowledge itself is blameless (ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἀναίτιος [*Leg.* 2.4]).[91] He repeatedly asserts that Christians are in agreement with the philosophers on major points of doctrine,[92] and he presents those doctrines in philosophical terms.[93] With the exception of the resurrection of the body, he leaves out those doctrines that might be objectionable to the pagans, like the incarnation and crucifixion, and presents a very vague doctrine of Christ.[94]

Being aware of the identification of Christians with Cynics, Athenagoras takes care to dispel that view by emphasizing those characteristics of Christianity that would give another view. The Cynics were despised by their contemporaries for playing to the multitudes and allowing 30 their preaching to be determined by the | rabble.[95] The real philosopher

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[89] Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 56.

[90] Cf., e.g., Theodoret, *Graec. affect. cur.* 1.54 in *Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques* (ed. and trans. Pierre Canivet; 2 vols.; SC 57; Paris: Cerf, 1958): "For I heard you saying this, that we do not have any demonstration of the teachings that we present, but that we only command the disciples to believe." Also, Pierre Canivet, *Histoire d'une entreprise apologétique au Ve siècle* (BHEgl; Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1957), Table I, passim.

[91] See n. 62 above, for a pagan charge, to which this is a reply. Also note the parallel statement in Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 34.3: "And furthermore, I hear that at the present moment you have a special grievance against philosophers, and indeed that you uttered curses against them—not as a class, to be sure, but in a few instances, displaying great reserve and moderation in doing so, inasmuch as you refrained from cursing philosophers in general if merely the philosophers in Tarsus were guilty of some blunder. . . . For no one is a philosopher who belongs among the unjust and the wicked" (Cohoon and Crosby, LCL).

[92] Cf. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 5.1; 6.2; 19.1; 24.1.

[93] This has been investigated by the present author in a Harvard doctoral dissertation titled "The *Supplicatio pro Christianis* of Athenagoras and Middle Platonism" (Th.D. diss., Harvard University, 1963).

[94] See Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 2:188–89.

[95] Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Orr.* 32.9; 35.8.

despised the crowds[96] and did not consider the Cynics to be on a much higher level. The true purpose of philosophy was to educate men to a better life.[97] The Cynics, however, brought shame on philosophy, for while they mouthed the vocabulary of the philosophers, they acted in direct contradiction to their teachings.[98]

Athenagoras does not mention the Cynics, but his remarks directed against the identification of Christians with the multitude would reject the view that Christians are like the Cynics in this respect. He insists that Christians stand sharply over against the multitude: The latter have a common and irrational opinion (*Leg.* 11.1).[99] They are the ones who accuse the Christians of atheism, and they do this out of ignorance, for they themselves are without learning and philosophical insight into true science and theology (*Leg.* 13.1) and cannot even distinguish between God and matter (*Leg.* 15.1). Even Plato himself could not convince the multitude (*Leg.* 23.5). Far from currying favor with the crowd, Christians despise the things they value highly (*Leg.* 1.4). Christians are not inconsistent; they live in strict accord with their teaching (*Leg.* 11.12).

Athenagoras everywhere assumes that the wisdom and piety of the Emperors are sufficient to test and approve the Christian teaching.[100] He therefore presents the faith itself as a reasonable doctrine. Far from being an irrational faith, Christian πίστις can be substantiated by reason, by the presentation of rational argumentation (λογισμός).[101] Christians do not only believe, but they also perceive intellectually (νοεῖν) that what they believe is true (*Leg.* 7.1). But, lest their doctrine be considered a purely human reasoning, they also have the prophets to confirm their reasoning (*Leg.* 9.1). The teaching of the prophets is itself philosophical for Athenagoras.[102] Because the Christian doctrine is reasonable, | not only Chris-

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[96] Dio Chrysostom, *Orr.* 67.3; 68.1; 72.7; 78.17.

[97] Cf. Lucian, *Fug.* 5–6.

[98] Lucian, *Fug.* 18ff.

[99] Cf. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 2.1, 4.

[100] Cf. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 2; 7.2; 9.1–2; 17.1; 18.1. In these contexts, in which the readers are described as philosophers, Athenagoras presents Christianity as being philosophical.

[101] Athenagoras, *Leg.* 8.1. For λογισμός with the meaning of "rational faculty," see Festugière, *REG* 54 (1941): 129. This is the most common meaning in the *Legatio* and is used of detailed arguments that are presented to the learned readers as substantiation for the Christian truth (cf. 9.1; 17.1; 18.1).

[102] This appears from a close examination of the activity of the prophets as described in *Leg.* 9: "But the voices of the prophets confirm our rational argumentations (ἡμῶν τοὺς λογισμούς). I expect that you who are most learned and philosophical are not without any intellectual knowledge (ὄντας οὐκ ἀνοήτους) of Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the rest of the prophets, who spoke out in accordance with the movements of their reasonings

tian *pistis*, but also its manner of life, is open to philosophical inquiry. He invites his readers to examine Christians' lives, just as they do those of the philosophers (*Leg.* 2.2, 4; cf. 3.2). Christians live the way they do because they know that nothing will go unexamined (*Leg.* 36.1).

Athenagoras also answers the charge that Christians are opposed to scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and affirms that, on the contrary, it is precisely when ἐπιστήμη is true scientific knowledge that it agrees with Christianity: When Euripides speaks about those things that are unintelligently (ἀνεπιστημόνως) called gods by common opinion (κατὰ κοινὴν πρόληψιν), he expresses doubt about the existence of God; but, when he considers what is intelligible by pure reason (τοῦ κατ' ἐπιστήμην νοητοῦ), he affirms that there is a God and agrees with the Christians (*Leg.* 5.1). A common definition of philosophy at the time was that it is ἐπιστήμη or knowledge of things divine and human.[103] Athenagoras uses the word in this sense.[104] He is thus saying, in effect, that Christianity agrees with true philosophy, an idea that is developed in *Leg.* 7 and which undergirds much of his polemic throughout his Apology.

## Conclusion

In Athenagoras we see a man who was a Christian philosopher who defended Christianity and explained it in philosophical terms. His value for our purpose lies in the fact that, although he is a philosophically cultivated man who does not overtly insist on the acceptance of Christianity

(τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς λογισμῶν), while the Divine Spirit moved them as a flautist might play upon his flute. . . . I leave it to you, since you are possessed of the books themselves, to examine more closely (ἐξετάσαι) the prophecies of these men, in order that you may prepare with fitting reasoning (τοῦ προσήκοντος λογισμοῦ) the charge from us." For a similar use of ἀνοήτος to describe a philosopher, see Alcinous, *Didask.* 25.5 in *Albinos épitomé* (ed. and trans. Pierre Louis; NCTD; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1945). Athenagoras uses ἐξετάζειν only to describe philosophical inquiry. See esp. *Res.* 1 (48, 23 Schwartz); 7 (65, 12–13 Schwartz); 9 (58, 8–9 Schwartz); *Leg.* 23–24. Cf. Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 2.2.

[103] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 1.13; Diogenes Laertius 7.92; Aetius, *Plac.* 1.2 in Hermann Diels, ed., *Doxographi Graeca* (Berlin: Reimer, 1879; repr. de Gruyter, 1929), p. 273, lines 11–13; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 34.3. In Middle Platonism, especially, there was a discussion about the use of ἐπιστήμη in this technical sense. Cf. Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 6, titled Τί ἐπιστήμη; cf. p. 65, 9 Hobein, "Do you think, then, that ἐπιστήμη is anything other than wisdom? Certainly not." Also cf. p. 66, 6ff. Hobein; also the discussion by Justin Martyr, *Dial.* 3.4–5. On wisdom as the knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of things human and divine, see Carl R. Holladay, *Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors: Volume III: Aristobulus* (SBLTT 39 Pseudepigrapha Series 13; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 232–233, n. 144.

[104] Cf. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 2.3–4; 9.1; 13.2.

as a philosophy, there is a continuous thrust in his Apology that stresses the philosophical nature of Christianity in face of the common, unofficial accusations and charges against the Christians. There is not only the traditional and formal apologetic motif of claims of tolerance in the Apology, but there is also a thrust which shows a great awareness of the historical and social situation in which Christians found themselves and which is directed to this situation. Athenagoras is a philosopher, but he is also conscious of the fact that he is a *Christian* philosopher, and he knows what
32 this means in his society. By taking note of the context in | which he wrote and of the situation to which he addressed himself, we must conclude that, although the present approach to the study of the Apologists is of great significance and enables us to appreciate them more than heretofore, it is yet necessary to realize that the Apologies were written to specific situations which determined to a large extent their character. This realization may prevent us from making the Apologists greater philosophers than, in fact, they were.

CHAPTER SEVEN

# TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING THE APOLOGISTS: REVIEW ARTICLE*

The earliest Christian writings were addressed to other members of the faithful. Their purpose was to exhort, to instruct in the faith, and to work out the implications of belief in Christ for the Christian life. The NT writings are of such an intracommunal nature, as are the so-called Apostolic Fathers. The first extant writings to address the pagan world are those of the Apologists of the latter half of the second century. Christians had, of course, always been aware of the special relationship they were to have with the outside world,[1] but that concern did not become explicit as a major creative force in Christian literature before the Greek Apologists. On the surface, the purpose of the Apologies was to defend Christianity against the charges of atheism, cannibalism, and incest brought against Christians. Recent research, however, has demonstrated that the Apologies are far more than mere polemical writings, that they are in fact the earliest attempts to state the Christian faith coherently and systematically to outsiders.[2]

The books reviewed in this article contribute to an understanding of this period. The impression should not be left, however, that the writings of Justin Martyr and those who followed him are the first Christian Apologies. The very earliest Christians had to defend their beliefs and claims, and their apologetic efforts can be discerned in the NT | itself.[3] 216 These defenses influenced the development of Christian theology in its pre-literary period as well as Christian literature itself.[4] It can no longer be questioned, for example, that apologetic motifs can be identified in the

* Originally published in *ResQ* 11 (1968): 215–224.

1 See Willem C. van Unnik, "Die Rücksicht auf die Reaktion der Nicht-Christen als Motiv in der altchristlichen Paränese," in *Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche: Festschrift für Joachim Jeremias* (ed. Walther Eltester; 2d ed.; BZNW 26; Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1964), 221–223.

2 See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Apologetic and Philosophy in the Second Century," *ResQ* 7 (1963): 19–32; [*Light*, 2:781–796] Malherbe, "The Inception of Christian Apologetics," in *Great Events from History: Ancient and Medieval Series* (ed. Frank N. Magill; 3 vols.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Salem Press, 1972), 2:707–711. For an excellent, brief treatment see Heinrich Dörrie, "Apologetik," *LAW*, 219–222.

3 See Everett Ferguson, "Apologetics in the New Testament," *ResQ* 6 (1962): 189–196.

4 See esp. Barnabas Lindars, *New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations* (London: SCM, 1961).

Gospels and Acts.[5] Christianity originated in a Jewish context, and its first *Auseinandersetzung* with outsiders as reflected both within and outside the NT was with Jews. These Apologists aimed at converting their readers. Thus in the first literary Apology directed to Jews, the *Dialogue of Jason and Papiscus*, the Jew in the writing is finally converted.[6] The same call to their readers to be converted to Christ is also briefly made in the conclusions to the later Apologies addressed to pagans by Aristides, Justin, and Theophilus. Yet with Justin Martyr Christian apologetic assumes a different character. *The Preaching of Peter*, an apologetic tract from the earlier half of the century, had already addressed itself to both Jews and pagans, but with Justin Christian apologetic comes of age.[7]

At best the Apologists' accomplishments used to be regarded with benign condescension. It was said of them by a sympathetic writer that "their endowments were in the main slender, their writings had little distinction, and their theology is fairly described as 'tentative, exploratory.' "[8] | 217 The Apologists sought to appropriate what they could from the Greek philosophers. From the battles between the Stoics and Epicureans, and from the Sceptics, they took what suited their polemical purposes. From the Peripatetics, and especially from the Platonists, they incorporated into their own thinking what they considered to be Christian teaching. This seeming lack of originality caused severe criticisms to be leveled at them. Thus it was denied that Justin could properly be called a philosopher,[9] and the culture of Athenagoras was regarded as mediocre.[10]

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[5] See the literature cited by Paul Feine, Johannes Behm, and Werner G. Kümmel, eds., *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (14th ed.; Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1965), 85–86, 102–104. For the concern with syncretism by Luke and (other) early Apologists see Günter Klein, "Der Synkretismus als theologisches Problem in der ältesten christlichen Apologetik," *ZTK* 64 (1967): 40–82.

[6] Justin in his *Dialogue with Trypho* also wishes to convert the Jew.

[7] See Joseph N. Reagan, *The Preaching of Peter: The Beginning of Christian Apologetic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923), who sees already in *The Preaching of Peter* all the elements that would later be worked out by the other Apologists. For an excellent discussion of the characteristics of apologetic and exhortation in the Apologists, see Henri I. Marrou, ed. and trans., *A Diognète* (SC 33; Paris: Cerf, 1951), 93ff.; also Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Apologetic Theology of *The Preaching of Peter*," *ResQ* 13 (1970): 205–223. [*Light*, 2:867–882]

[8] Henry G. Meecham, ed. and trans., *The Epistle to Diognetus* (UMP 305, Theological Series 7; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1949), 48ff. Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 192, claims that their writings were read only by believers or professed students of the movement.

[9] E.g., Erwin R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr* (Jena: Frommann, 1923; repr., Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968).

[10] Thus Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907), and André-Jean Festugière, "Sur une traduction nouvelle d'Athénagore," *REG* 56 (1943): 367–375.

However, as the Platonism of the first and second centuries became better known, a new assessment was made of the Apologists.[11] It was discovered that when they are seen against the background of the interpretation of Plato of their own time rather than being measured against Plato himself they appeared in a better light. When viewed in this way, Justin is seen to have been quite creative and to have had some influence on at least one pagan Platonist, Celsus.[12] Even Tatian, overtly so hostile to Greek learning, can now be appreciated as a thinker in his own right, but as one greatly in debt to what he despised.[13] It can also be demonstrated that Athenagoras's thinking is greatly illuminated when his thought and philosophic method are seen against the philosophical background of his own time.[14] | 218

Readers limited to literature in English are at a disadvantage in attempting to keep abreast of this research in the Apologists. The major contributions have been made in doctoral dissertations written at German universities, and the discussions have continued in not easily accessible European philological and philosophical journals. The books reviewed in this article can only serve as an elementary introduction to the contemporary study of the Apologists.

## The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Medieval Philosophy

In the absence of broadly conceived treatments of the Platonism of this period,[15] *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*

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[11] For a judicious discussion of the subject, see Jan H. Waszink, "Bemerkungen zum Einfluß des Platonismus im frühen Christentum," *VC* 19 (1965): 129–162, and the literature there cited.

[12] See Carl Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," *ZNW* 44 (1953): 157–195; Andresen, *Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (AKG 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955).

[13] For the assertion that Tatian's Apology is really the first systematic presentation of Christianity, see Martin Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie* (FKDG 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960).

[14] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Structure of Athenagoras, *Supplicatio pro Christianis*," *VC* 23 (1969): 1–20, and in this volume employing the now standard title of *Legatio pro Christianis*; [*Light*, 2:807–827] Malherbe, "Athenagoras on Christian Ethics," *JEH* 20 (1969): 1–5; [*Light*, 2:829–835] Malherbe, "The Holy Spirit in Athenagoras," *JTS* NS 20 (1969): 538–542. [*Light*, 2:837–841]

[15] See, however, Reginald E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (CCS 3; Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society 7; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937; repr., Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1971), and Philip Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (2d ed.; The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960), both of which are written for experts in the field.

(ed. Arthur H. Armstrong; London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), will receive a warm welcome. The purpose of the book is to explain the genesis of the Neoplatonism of Plotinus, and this naturally limits its usefulness as a balanced presentation of Hellenistic philosophy in general and of Middle Platonism in particular. However, Armstrong's earlier book on the history of ancient philosophy shows a special interest in Hellenistic philosophy and may serve as an introduction to the book under review.[16] In his introduction the editor speaks to the charge that philosophers of the period lacked originality. He suggests that the close connection between philosophy and religion at this time naturally leads to the view that the attitude to authority led to servile authority-mindedness among pagans as well as Christians. Upon closer investigation, however, he finds that they combined great freedom of speculation with their respect for authority. At very few points do we find mere conformism. What contributed to this freedom were the unhistorical approach to the documents which were regarded as authoritative and the unsystematic character of the documents themselves.

The lack of conformity in the development of Greek philosophy is clear 219 in Philip Merlan's part on "Greek Philosophy | from Plato to Plotinus." Merlan concludes his survey by summarizing the status of Platonism at the end of the second century AD. He claims that at that time there was a variety of Platonisms. Outstanding among them were: (1) the Platonism of Aristotle and the Old Academy, (2) the syncretistic system of Antiochus, which combines the doctrines of Plato with the doctrines of the Stoa, (3) the syncretistic system represented by Albinus and Apuleius, based primarily on the doctrines of Plato's dialogues combined with Aristotelian logic and noetics, and (4) the non-syncretistic system of Plato, represented by Atticus and, to a lesser extent, by Plutarch.

The emphasis on the originality and diversity of Middle Platonism should make one hesitant to rashly presuppose what kind of Platonism might be behind an Apologist's thought. Frequently the formulation of an Apologist's thinking becomes clear only when it is seen against the background of contemporary Platonists' discussions among themselves. As our knowledge of this intracommunal discussion increases, so does our understanding of the Apologists.

[16] Arthur H. Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy* (3d ed.; London: Methuen, 1957).

## Chadwick, Barnard, and Grant

In the Hewett Lectures of 1962, published under the title *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), Henry Chadwick examines the dialogue between these early Christians and the culture of their world. Of interest to our present concern is his study of Justin.

Chadwick believes that the initial syntheses between the Christian Gospel and the ideas of the Hellenistic world were on the side of religion rather than philosophy. This meant that the Christian mission among Gentiles was haunted by Gnosticism virtually from the start. The result of the crisis precipitated by the Gnostics was that many Christians became acutely defensive about anything intellectual. Finally, however, in Chadwick's view, the church rejected the Gnostics because they used reason too little rather than that they used it too much. It is to the credit of Justin Martyr that he was the first to meet the philosophical question.

| Justin is the most optimistic second-century theologian about the harmony of Christianity and Greek philosophy. Towards the pagan cult and religious myth Justin is negative, but for him the gospel and the best elements in Plato and the Stoics are almost identical ways of apprehending the same truth. Justin himself had been a Platonist before his conversion, and his acceptance of the faith did not for him involve a radical rejection of his earlier worldview. He ascribed the philosophers' possession of truth to their having derived it from two sources: They derived what was true either from the writings of Moses, or from the universal Logos or Reason, Christ, who is shared in all rational beings. The latter possibility is of greater importance in understanding his positive attitude towards his intellectual predecessors. 220

In view of Justin's high evaluation of Greek philosophy one might expect him simply to fit as many features of Christianity as he could into an eclectic Platonism that he has taken as his framework. He does not, however, operate in this manner. Chadwick sees Justin as representing the traditional pattern of Christian teaching. Justin saw no necessity to explain away any part of what constituted for him traditional Christianity. Chadwick claims that, although Justin did not set out to give a single, systematic statement of his beliefs, every essential element in the traditional Christian pattern could be expounded on the basis of his statements and allusions. Justin can be demonstrated to be as competent in his exposition of Platonism as his contemporaries, but what is central to his thought is the way in which he uses the biblical doctrine of God and

his relation to the world as a criterion by which to judge Greek philosophy. In Chadwick's words, "Justin does not merely use Greek philosophy. He passes judgment on it."

In his judgment he rejects metaphysical positions he considers incompatible with the Bible. It is on this ground, Chadwick insists, that Justin must be ascribed a measure of genuinely independent status as a thinker. Because the philosophy of his time was eclectic, combining Stoic ethics and Platonic metaphysics, it is a great temptation to think that Justin merely reflects this popular synthesis. What | eclecticism precisely is cannot easily be said. "But if eclecticism merely means a kind of weak intellectual syncretism without any principle of judgment... endeavouring to harmonize differing positions with the prime end of achieving concord rather than discord, then it is clear that Justin does not fit into this category."

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The emphasis on Justin as a traditionalist is also found in Leslie W. Barnard, *Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967). Barnard's book, as the subtitle indicates, is concerned with Justin's life as well as his thought. This interest in both the historical and the intellectual context of Christian apologetic provides a fuller treatment of an Apologist than is usual today, even if the details of Barnard's arguments cannot be accepted.

Barnard thinks that the popular charges of incest, child murder, and cannibalism could not be completely ignored by the Roman authorities and that the Christian Apologies were an attempt to answer them. The Apologists sought to present the Christian way of life as the highest ethical conduct the world had ever seen. Based on Socrates's defense, in which he showed the rationality of his position, they set out to prove that their faith represented what was noblest in Greek philosophy and that it was indeed what the Greeks had been seeking. According to Barnard, Justin was an innovator among the Greek Apologists in that he did not confine himself to answering the objections against Christianity, but that he gave an exposition of the faith which would prove that philosophy and reason are truly to be found in it.

Barnard in three chapters sketches the background he considers important for our understanding of Justin. He thinks that Justin had a good working knowledge of postbiblical Judaism, but that there is surprisingly little in Justin to suggest a close acquaintance with Philo and Hellenistic Judaism. His brief chapter on Justin's Greek philosophical background argues that Middle Platonism was a philosophical transition stage rather than a philosophical system and that in many respects Justin is a better

mirror to the intellectual forces to which he was exposed than any | other Christian writer of the second century. Of greatest importance to us, according to Barnard, is Justin's Christian background. For Justin, it was basic to appeal to the writings of the Old and New Testaments, but the use of these documents presupposes the continuous worshipping life of the church. Justin is thus to be seen as part of the living and preaching church. 222

Barnard does not think that Justin's thought resulted in a closed system. It lacks the clear structure found in later thinkers like Tertullian and Origen. Justin's importance rather lies in the fact that his presentation of Christianity as the true philosophy is one of the most significant Christian affirmations of the second century. His attempt at apologetics meant that henceforth philosophically educated converts could view their earlier nurture in a positive light.

The books by Chadwick and Barnard reflect an awareness of the new research in the Apologists and use it in understanding Justin Martyr. They are more conservative, however, in their estimate of how much the Apologist was actually influenced by Middle Platonism, and this should be kept in mind when they are read as introductions to contemporary study in the Apologists. The same is also true of *The Early Christian Doctrine of God* by Robert M. Grant (Richard Lectures 1965–1966; Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1966). Grant's study does not in the first place concentrate on the Apologists. The purpose of his essay is to trace certain aspects of the doctrine of God in the NT and in early Christian theology and to indicate "some of the bridges between the New Testament and the philosophical language used to interpret it." Grant suggests that the NT ideas find a natural interpretation in early patristic theology and that "the methods of early Christian theology make sense in relation to the philosophy of the time."

Grant is more concerned with the development within the church of certain doctrines than are the other books reviewed here. He does not depend heavily on either the Middle Platonists themselves or on their modern interpreters to elucidate the church's understanding of the theological themes he treats. In a certain way his essay is a | corrective to the impression one may get from current writing on the Apologists that those second-century writers were more Platonic than Christian. To say that Grant does not depend on the Middle Platonists for his understanding, however, does not mean that he does not think them important. A summary paragraph in his discussion of God the Father illustrates his view of the matter: 223

> In relation to the doctrine of God, then, what the early Christian theologians show us is that by continuing along some of the lines marked out in the New Testament and by making more explicit use of philosophical ideas they tried to work out some of the implications of the basic self-revelation of God—in terms adequate for their own times. They began with faith (which they interpreted philosophically too) and used philosophy as a language of interpretation. Because they continued to recognize that God could not be contained in the philosophical terminology, they remained open to fresh insights and new ways of explanation.

It is clear from this where the priority is located for Grant.

## E.R. Dodds

Finally, for perspective we turn to a masterful study by Eric R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine* (Wiles Lectures 1963; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965). Dodds is not primarily interested in Christian theology or even pagan philosophy. He views various aspects of pagan and Christian religious experience with the tools of classical scholarship and modern psychological insight. His observations based on modern psychological theories can be distracting and leave the reader uneasy at times, but the insight they reflect, for example, into the different varieties of mysticism are brilliant and surely justify Dodds's approach in this area of study. Chapters on "Man and the Material World," "Man and the Daemonic World," and "Man and the Divine World" contain information and an understanding of the age which the student of Christian origins will neglect at his own peril.

Of special interest to us is the last chapter on "The Dialogue of Paganism with Christianity." Here Dodds is | less interested in doctrinal disputes than in "those differences of feeling which seem to constitute a psychological dividing line." He notes that the dialogue was conducted on different levels. On the popular level the discussion between pagans and Christians consisted mainly of invective. It was popular feeling that caused many of the local persecutions in the second century. The common slanders of immorality, the political dangers represented by recalcitrant Christians, their social exclusivism, all these factors made it relatively easy to act as though it was always open season on Christians.

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On the learned level, however, Dodds sees the mutual vituperation tempered with a modicum of rational argument. The debate on this level was not between monotheism and polytheism nor between Christian

rigorism and pagan laxity. A learned pagan would have said that what was at issue was the difference between reasoned conviction and blind faith. Dodds shows, however, that pagans did not always choose their philosophy on purely rational grounds. “In fact, while Origen and his successors were endeavouring to supplement authority by reason, pagan philosophy tended increasingly to replace reason by authority—and not only the authority of Plato, but the authority of Orphic poetry, of Hermetic theosophy, of obscure revelations like the *Chaldean Oracles*.”

CHAPTER EIGHT

# THE STRUCTURE OF ATHENAGORAS, *SUPPLICATIO PRO CHRISTIANIS*[*][1]

It is generally held that Athenagoras was well versed in Platonism,[2] and the suggestion has been made that he was the person to whom Boethius dedicated a work entitled *Difficult Sentences in Plato*.[3] Athenagoras's high admiration for Plato and his use of Platonic vocabulary have contributed to this assessment.[4] So also has the discovery that he was dependent on the Pseudo-Plutarchean *De placitis philosophorum*.[5] The evaluation of him as a thinker has been affected by these facts. His dependence on handbooks has led to the claim that he lacked originality,[6] a judgment not wholly counterbalanced by the view that he was indeed a Platonist, but that his Platonism was merely the appropriation of philosophically acceptable ideas and terms to express what constituted for him traditional Christian teaching.[7] It has also conversely been claimed that since Athenagoras does not speak of the sacraments, and no soteriology or elaborate Christology

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* Originally published in *VC* 23 (1969): 1–20.

[1] Although the original essay referred to Athenagoras's *Supplicatio pro Christianis*, recent scholarship has adopted the standard title of *Legatio pro Christianis*, which this edition of the essay will employ; despite the change in name, the references to the work remain the same.

[2] See G. Ludwig Richter, *Philosophisches in der Gottes- und Logoslehre des Apologeten Athenagoras aus Athen* (Meissen: C.E. Klinkicht, 1905), 2–5; Aimé Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du II^e^ siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Hachette, 1912), 182–183; Joseph H. Crehan, *Athenagoras: Embassy for the Christians; The Resurrection of the Dead* (ACW 23; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1956), 7, 15–21.

[3] Theodor Zahn, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons und der altkirchlichen Literatur* (10 vols.; Erlangen: Deichert, 1881–1929), 3 (1884): 60. On Boethius, see Photius, *Bibl.* 154–155.

[4] See the index to Eduard Schwartz, *Athenagorae libellus pro Christianis. Oratio de resurrectione cadaverum* (TU 4.2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1891), 80–143.

[5] Hermann Diels, ed., *Doxographi Graeci* (3d ed.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1958), 4ff. Robert M. Grant, "Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture," *HTR* 42 (1949): 41–51, does not consider Athenagoras's use of the doxography to have been extensive.

[6] E.g., Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907), 239ff.; André-Jean Festugière, "Sur une traduction nouvelle d'Athénagore," *REG* 56 (1943): 367–375; Grant, "Irenaeus and Hellenistic Culture."

[7] Henry A. Lucks, *The Philosophy of Athenagoras: Its Sources and Value* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1936), 33–37.

is found in his writings, he should be seen as being more of a Greek philosopher than as a Christian theologian.[8]

2 Athenagoras was an eclectic thinker, and to determine the nature of | his thought the same method must be applied to the study of his thought that is applied to any other eclectic philosopher.[9] In seeking to determine the nature of his Platonism it must be kept in mind that the Platonism with which Athenagoras was familiar was Middle Platonism and that he cannot therefore realistically be measured against Plato himself.[10] Our increasing knowledge of the Platonism of the early Christian centuries has made significant contributions to our understanding of early Christian thought.[11] The purpose of this study is to take a first step towards placing Athenagoras's *Legatio pro Christianis* in this philosophical context. In particular, the structure of the *Legatio* will be examined for any correspondence it might have to the philosophical literature of his day. The purpose he had for his Apology may be illuminated in this way and may provide the perspective within which his thought should be understood.

## Eclecticism in Athenagoras and Alcinous

The stated purpose of the *Legatio* is to refute the charges of atheism, cannibalism and incest brought against Christians, and the Apology is

[8] Friedrich Schubring, *Die Philosophie des Athenagoras* (WBPKG; Easter 1882; Berlin: Weidmann, 1882), 4; Richter, *Philosophisches in der Gottes- und Logoslehre*, 4 n. 4.

[9] See Johannes H. Loenen, "Albinus' Metaphysics: An Attempt at Rehabilitation; Part 2: The Sources of Albinus' Metaphysics," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 10 (1957): 35–56, for the method by which an eclectic philosopher should be studied.

[10] According to Richter, *Philosophisches in der Gottes- und Logoslehre*, 4 n. 4, this was already recognized by Ernst W. Möller in his *Geschichte der Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche bis auf Origenes mit Specialuntersuchungen über die gnostischen Systeme* (Halle: J. Fricke, 1860; repr., Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967), 130, a work that has not been available for this study.

[11] See Carl Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," *ZNW* 44 (1952/1953): 157–195; Andresen, *Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos wider des Christentum* (AKG 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955); Martin Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie* (FKDG 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960); Henry Chadwick, *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953); Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Jean Daniélou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux II^e et III^e siècles* (BT.HD 2; Tournai: Desclée, 1961); Jan H. Waszink, "Der Platonismus und die altchristliche Gedankenwelt," in *Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne* (ed. William K.C. Guthrie et al.; EnAC 3; Vandoeuvres: Fondation Hardt, 1955), 139–179; Waszink, "Bemerkungen zum Einfluß des Platonismus im frühen Christentum," *VC* 19 (1965): 129–162.

usually outlined accordingly.[12] However, it is well known that Christian apologetic was as interested in giving an exposition of Christian doctrine as it was in defending the faith against pagan charges and in carrying on a polemic against the ancient cults.[13] This is true of the *Legatio*, | in which chapters 4–12 are largely a presentation of Christian doctrine. Christian apologetic assumed many different literary forms.[14] In attempting to arrive at a better understanding of Athenagoras's Platonism, it will be useful to compare the structure of the *Legatio*, and in particular the exposition in chapters 4–12, with the structure of the summary of Plato's philosophy found in a handbook like that of Alcinous, the eclectic Platonist of the second century AD.[15]

3

Alcinous follows a particular tripartite pattern in the arrangement of his handbook. That philosophy has three parts, viz., Physics, Ethics and Dialectic or Logic, was a view commonly held.[16] The origin of this division was frequently ascribed to the Stoics, and to Zeno in particular.[17] But by the second century AD the Middle Platonists affirmed that Plato was the first to arrange philosophical study in this manner,[18] an opinion

[12] *Leg.* 3.1. References to the *Legatio* will be to chapter and section of William R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras*: Legatio *and* De Resurrectione (OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). For customary outlines of the Apology, see Otto Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (5 vols.; Freiburg: Herder, 1903–1932), 1:268–69; Crehan, *Athenagoras*, 11–13.

[13] On the nature of apologetic literature, see especially Daniélou, *Message évangélique*, 11–39; Henri I. Marrou, *A Diognète* (SC 33; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951), 89–118; Heinrich Dörrie, "Apologetik," *LAW*, 219–222.

[14] See the useful discussion by Hermann Jordan, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1911), 211ff.

[15] For a description and history of ancient handbooks on a variety of subjects, see Manfred Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften in der Antike* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960). I am indebted to Professor Waszink for referring me to this work.

[16] Cf., e.g., Diogenes Laertius 1.18.

[17] Diogenes Laertius 7.39ff. Cf. Aetius, *Plac.* 1 *prooem.* 2 (p. 273, 17ff. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*). The order of the division varied. Thus *SVF* 2:16, 29ff.: Logic, Ethics, Physics; *SVF* 2:15: Physics, Ethics, Logic. On this division among the Stoics, see Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (2 vols.; 2d ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955–1959), 1:181; see "Das Grundliegen der Stoa in den drei γένη ihres Systems," in Ulrich Wilckens, *Weisheit und Torheit: Eine exegetisch-religions-geschichtliche Untersuchung zu 1. Kor. 1 und 2* (BHT 26; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959), 227–254; Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch*, 146–149; Philip Merlan, "Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus," in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (ed. Arthur H. Armstrong; London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 14–132, esp. 64–65.

[18] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 3.1. The edition of the *Didaskalikos* (i.e., *Epitome*) used in this study is that of Pierre Louis, *Albinus, Épitomé* (Ph.D. diss., University of Paris, 1945). Note: the *Didaskalikos* is now credited to Alcinous, not Albinus. See also Atticus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 11.3, 509B–510A; Eudorus of Alexandria, according to Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*,

with which Aristocles the Peripatetic also agreed.[19] It is more probable, as Sextus Empiricus says, that the division is only potentially in Plato,[20] and that it was Xenocrates and the Peripatetics who explicitly held to this division, and who were then followed by the Stoics.[21] What is important | for us to note is that, although the tripartite division was thought in the second century to be Stoic, it was equally strongly regarded as being Platonic. The dialogues of Plato were arranged according to this division,[22] and, as in the case of Alcinous, Plato's philosophy was summarized accordingly.[23]

4

Before comparing Athenagoras's *Legatio* with Alcinous's *Didaskalikos* some observations need to be made. First, such a comparison does not imply that Athenagoras was directly dependent on Alcinous, although such dependence was not impossible. The handbook of the Platonist Gaius, which Alcinous reworked,[24] found widespread use among both pagans[25] and Christians.[26] These handbooks made available a knowledge of Plato's thought to every educated man in the second century, although it is not clear that Plato himself was no longer read. Alcinous is used in this study because his is the most convenient systematization of Middle Platonism available to us. It will be necessary, however, to supplement the *Didaskalikos* with material from other Middle Platonists.[27] Second, it

81–82, and on the subject generally, Ludwig Baur, ed., *Dominicus Gundissalinus: De Divisione Philosophiae* (BGPhMA 4.2–3; Münster: Aschendorff, 1903), 316ff.; Friedrich Überweg and Karl Praechter, eds., *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie* (5 vols.; 12th rev. and enl. ed.; Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1923–1928), 1:531.

[19] *Apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 11.3, 510B–511C. Similarly also Cicero, *Acad. post.* 1.5.19, whose source here is probably Antiochus of Ascalon; see Überweg-Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte*, 1:332.

[20] Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 7.16 (Teubner) = *Log.* 1.16 (LCL); cf. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 2:19.

[21] Überweg-Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte*, 1:414ff.; Reginald E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (CCS 3; Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society 7; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937; repr., Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1971), 10–11.

[22] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 3.50ff.

[23] See Überweg-Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte*, 1:541–545; Hal Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus* (AKG 22; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1932), 246–268.

[24] For the so-called "Gaius group," see Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis*, 243ff.

[25] This has been demonstrated by Tadeusz Sinko, *De Apulei et Albini Doctrinae Platonicae Adumbratione* (Cracow: Sumptibus Academiae Litterarum Cracoviensis, 1905).

[26] See Waszink, "Der Platonismus und die altchristliche Gedankenwelt," 149ff., and Baur, *Dominicus Gundissalinus*, 328.

[27] For a sketch of the diversity which characterized Middle Platonism, see Merlan, "Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus," 53–58. A summary of Plato's thought similar to that of Alcinous seems to lie behind other works, including Apuleius's *De Platone et eius dogmate* (see Sinko, *Apulei et Albini*, 131ff.), Diogenes Laertius 3.70ff., many of the discourses of Maximus of Tyre (see Hermann Hobein, *De Maximo Tyrio quaestiones philologae selectae* [Ph.D. diss., Academia Georgia Augusta, Göttingen, 1895], 39ff.), Arius Didymus

should be recognized that the Christian Apologies do not necessarily provide us with the whole theology of their writers.[28] Themes which might give rise to misunderstanding or which do not serve the immediate purpose of an author would be omitted.[29] For this reason we shall at points adduce statements from Athenagoras's *De Resurrectione* for light they may shed on his method of argumentation.[30] | 5

## The Nature of Philosophy and the Philosopher

Alcinous begins his work by discussing the nature of philosophy and the character of the philosopher. He defines philosophy as ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων (*Didask.* 1.1). This definition of philosophy as knowledge of things divine and human was not confined to Middle Platonists.[31] It was in fact taken from the Stoics,[32] but the Platonists had a special interest in the use of the word ἐπιστήμη in this technical sense.[33] According to Alcinous ἐπιστήμη belongs properly to dialectic, for it is the knowledge of the intelligibles (*Didask.* 4.3), and its principle is νόησις (*Didask.* 4.5). For

(see Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*, 76–77), and Sallustius (see Arthur Darby Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1966], xxxviiff.).

[28] See Puech, *Les apologistes grecs*, 15–16; Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* (3 vols.; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950–1960), 1:187–188. For a somewhat different view, of Justin at least, see Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought*, 18–19.

[29] Dörrie, "Apologetik," 219–222; Robert M. Grant, *The Early Christian Doctrine of God* (Richard Lectures 1965–1966; Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 93–94.

[30] It has recently been claimed that Athenagoras did not write the *De resurrectione*: Paul Keseling, "Athenagoras," *RAC* 1 (1950): 881–888; Grant, "Athenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras," *HTR* 47 (1954): 121–129. The reasons advanced for this doubt are not convincing.

[31] See, e.g., Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 9.13 (Teubner) = *Phys.* 1.13 (LCL); Diogenes Laertius 7.92; Aetius, *Plac.* 1.2 (p. 273, 11–13 Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*); Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 69.4. See Carl R. Holladay, *Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors: Volume III: Aristobulus* (SBLTT 39 Pseudepigrapha Series 13; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 232–233 n. 144.

[32] Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," 162 n. 20.

[33] E.g., Maximus of Tyre 6, τί ἐπιστήμη; (cf. p. 65, 9 Hobein): ἀλλό τι ἐπιστήμην σοφίας ἡγεῖ; οὐ μὰ τόν Δία; Justin, *Dial.* 3.4, φιλοσοφία … ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐπίγνωσις. This knowledge of God, who is true being, does not come from sight or hearing since, as Plato says, God is not visible to the eyes, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ νῷ καταληπτόν (*Dial.* 3.7). See the discussion of this passage by Niels Hyldahl, *Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins* (ATDan 9; Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966), 185–190; Wolfgang Schmid, "Frühe Apologetik und Platonismus: Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation des Prooems von Justins Dialogue," in *Hermeneia: Festschrift für Otto Regenbogen zum 60. Geburtstag am 14. Februar 1951* (ed. Wolfgang Schadewaldt and Karl Schefold; Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1952), 163–182, esp. 169ff.

this reason, he says, Plato called dialectic alone ἐπιστήμη, for it alone is able to deal with τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀρχικά (*Didask.* 7.5).

Athenagoras does not give a definition of philosophy as Alcinous does. Yet within the limits set by his apologetic aim he does introduce the terms φιλοσοφία and ἐπιστήμη in a place corresponding to that in Alcinous*'s Didaskalikos.* Christians were frequently charged with being without ἐπιστήμη.[34] Stated in a different way, the charge was that they led an unexamined life in which there was no room for philosophical examination (ἐξετάζειν), but only for faith.[35] In the face of such charges Athenagoras argues that Christians should be treated like the philosophers.[36] Philosophers are not judged on account of ἐπιστήμη. When a philosopher is found guilty of evil he is punished, but his scientific knowledge is | blameless (ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἀναίτιος). He draws down no extra condemnation on his philosophy. Christians should be treated in the same manner—let their life be examined (ὁ … ἐξεταζέσθω βίος, *Leg.* 2.5).[37] Athenagoras in effect claims that Christianity is philosophical, that it is ἐπιστήμη. The understanding of philosophy as ἐπιστήμη is also reflected in *Leg.* 5.1, where he says that when Euripides makes a philosophical statement (δογματίζων) about what is intelligible by pure reason, it is to the effect that there is a God (ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην νοητοῦ ὡς ἔστιν θεός).[38] Thus, philosophy is described as ἐπιστήμη, which has the intelligible as its object.

It is a common feature of introductory treatises that they say something about the character of the learner. Thus Alcinous requires that a correct education and fitting upbringing be united with justice in the philosopher (*Didask.* 1.3–4). Sallustius, also using a handbook, states in addition that the learner should not be bred among popular errors (ἀνόητοι δόξαι),

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[34] Cf. Celsus, *apud* Origen, *Cels.* 3.75, and the discussions by Athur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 205; Richard Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians* (OCPM; London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 53.

[35] Origen, *Cels.* 1.9. See also Lucian, *Peregr.* 13; Porphyry, *Christ.*, *Frg.* 73; Marcus Aurelius 11.3.1. See the discussion in Pierre C. de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne: Étude sur la polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe siècle* (Paris: L'Artisan du livre, 1934), 272; Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, 53–54; Eric R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine* (Wiles Lectures, 1963; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 120ff.

[36] Cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 46–47.

[37] Athenagoras regularly uses ἐξετάζειν to describe philosophical investigation: *Res.* 1.3; 7.4; 9.2 (references to Schoedel's edition); *Leg.* 23.2; 24.1; cf. also Justin, *Dial.* 2.2.

[38] Δογματίζειν was used in Hellenistic philosophy to refer to philosophical statement; see Gerhard Kittel, "δόγμα, δογματίζω," *TWNT* 2:233–235. It is used in *Leg.* 7.2 of philosophers.

implying that the masses could not understand true theology.[39] In a *captatio benevolentiae* Athenagoras expresses the conviction that his readers, trained in philosophy and in all education (*Leg.* 2.3; cf. 6.2), will conduct a philosophical examination of the Christian claim (*Leg.* 2.2), and that they will not be led astray by the common, irrational and uncritical rumor of the masses (*Leg.* 2.6).[40] He has confidence in their justice (*Leg.* 2.2).

## The Divisions of Philosophy

After discussing the nature of philosophy and the philosopher, Alcinous enumerates the divisions and subdivisions of Plato's philosophy which he intends to treat. In the order in which he takes them up in the *Didaskalikos*, they are Dialectic (chs. 4–6), Theoretics (chs. 7–26) and Ethics | (chs. 27–36). 7 Athenagoras also mentions the themes of his treatise, viz., the charges of atheism, Thyestian banquets, and incest (*Leg.* 3), before entering into a defense against the first. The charge of atheism is answered in chapters 4–30, which is made up of two major parts. The first (chs. 4–12) consists of an exposition of Christian doctrine made with an apologetic thrust. The second (chs. 13–30) takes up in greater detail some subsidiary pagan objections to Christianity, and is more polemical in nature. The purpose of comparing these chapters, especially chapters 4–12, with Alcinous's *Didaskalikos* is not to demonstrate the details of Athenagoras's Platonism, but only to show the framework within which he presents his thought.

### *Dialectic*

Alcinous's discussion of Dialectic falls into two sections, the first dealing with his theory of knowledge and the faculty of judgment (*Didask.* 4), and the second dealing with logic (chs. 5–6). He refers to dialectic as θεωρία of the mind which views the intelligibles.[41] It is this philosophic contemplation

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39 Sallustius, *De diis et mundo* 1. See Nock's note, *Sallustius*, xl n. 2.

40 Athenagoras regularly describes his royal readers as philosophers in contexts where he implicitly describes Christian doctrine as being philosophical: *Leg.* 2.1, 6; 9.1, 3; 11.3; 17.1; 18.1. On uncritical pagan acceptance of common hearsay against Christians, see Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought*, 130 n. 49.

41 Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 3.5; 4.6. For θεωρία among Middle Platonists, see Maximus of Tyre 15.9 (p. 194, 1–2 Hobein); Justin, *Dial.* 2.6. On the Platonic θεωρία, see André-Jean Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris: Vrin, 1936), esp. 84ff., 210ff.

that results in scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).[42] Stated in a different way it is the divine who is the object of contemplation,[43] and he is perceived by mind and reason alone.[44] For Middle Platonists, this idea was based on two passages from Plato, *Phaedr.* 247CD,[45] and *Tim.* 27D–28A.[46] It is probable that Alcinous's definition of θεωρία is made | with the former in mind.[47] Man's reason is the instrument of judgment and is both scientific (ἐπιστημονικός) and opinionative (δοξαστικός). Scientific reason is concerned with the intelligibles and possesses a firmness and stability, while opinionative reason possesses only probability (*Didask.* 4.2–3). The principle of scientific knowledge is cogitation (νόησις), an operation of the mind contemplating the first things perceptible by mind (*Didask.* 4.4). Cogitation in turn is twofold. While it was contemplating the intelligibles before the soul's existing in the body, it was called cogitation, but after it existed in the body it was called φυσικὴ ἔννοια (*Didask.* 4.6).

Alcinous's use of the φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι reflects the appropriation of a Stoic concept to a Middle Platonic theory of knowledge. The Stoics used πρόληψις and φυσικὴ ἔννοια in almost the same manner, but distinguished ἔννοια as the higher concept, while πρόληψις was regarded as that concept which develops in a purely natural manner on the basis of experience before the reason is so far perfected that it can consciously begin with

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[42] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 7.5: Dialectic alone can proceed to the first principles, and it alone, therefore, is to be regarded as ἐπιστήμη. See Maximus of Tyre 6.1 (p. 65, 9; p. 66, 12–15 Hobein).

[43] Alcinous, *Didask.* 2.2: ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ θεωρία ἐνέργεια τοῦ νοῦ νοοῦντος τὰ νοητά, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις ψυχῆς λογικῆς ἐνέργεια διὰ σώματος γινομένη. ἡ ψυχὴ δὴ θεωροῦσα μὲν τὸν θεῖον καὶ τὰς νοήσεις τοῦ θείου εὐπαθεῖν τε λέγεται, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα αὐτῆς φρόνησις ὠνόμασται, ὅπερ οὐχ ἕτερον εἴποι ἄν τις εἶναι τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοιώσεως. For Justin philosophy is the science of reality and knowledge of the truth (*Dial.* 3.4), and God is true reality (*Dial.* 3.5; cf. Plutarch, *E Delph.* 391E–393B).

[44] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.4. The formulation is originally Stoic; see Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 170; Gustave Bardy, *Athénagore. Supplique au sujet des chrétiens* (SC 3; Paris: Cerf, 1943), 80 n. 2.

[45] Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," 166; Andresen, *Logos und Nomos*, 157–158, for a discussion of Celsus's use of this passage. In addition, ὑπερκύψαι in Maximus of Tyre 11.10 (p. 141, 11ff. Hobein) ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα ἐλθεῖν δεῖ, καὶ ὑπερκύψαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον, may have been suggested by ἀνακύψασα in *Phaedr.* 249C. It is used by Philo where he reflects on this section of the *Phaedrus: Gig.* 61 (LCL); cf. also *Praem.* 31 (LCL).

[46] The Platonic sources of Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 7.141–142 (Teubner) = *Log.* 1.141–142 (LCL) and Ps.-Justin, *Cohort. graec.* 22.21AB refer to it as the text underlying the idea that God is known by reason alone. Numenius quotes it in his discussion of the knowledge of true being, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 11.10, 526A–D.

[47] Cf. *Phaedr.* 247D, θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ with *Didask.* 2.2, θεωροῦσα ... τὸν θεῖον ... εὐπαθεῖν τε λέγεται.

the education of the conceptions.[48] Influenced perhaps by Antiochus of Ascalon, Platonists tempered the conception of πρόληψις toward the Stoic natural conceptions,[49] and placed a lower evaluation on it than on the ἔννοια. Alcinous holds that, by reasoning on the basis of the φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, the philosopher can judge whether things are one way or another (*Didask.* 4.8). But elsewhere Albinus cautions that, in order to become spectators of things divine and of the gods themselves, and to gain the most beautiful νοῦς, one must first clean out the false opinions from the impressions (τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας τῶν ὑποληψέων). After this cleansing the φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι must be raised to be purified and to be set forth as first principles.[50] The notions are called forth through the Platonic remembrance (*Didask.* 6.6),[51] and it is upon these purified notions that dialectic | 9 is based (*Didask.* 4.7).[52] The first principles are ὕλη, ἰδέα and θεός.[53]

The second part of Alcinous's discussion of Dialectic is concerned with logic, and has as its main task first, the investigation of the essence of anything, and then of its accidents. This is accomplished by division and definition, or by analysis, induction or syllogism (*Didask.* 5.1). Plato, according to Alcinous, was most impressed by definition and division, which showed him the power of dialectic (*Didask.* 6.10). Division (διαίρεσις) has to do with the separation of the accidents (τὰ συμβεβηκότα) into subjects (τὰ ὑποκείμενα), and then again of these subjects into their accidents. It is by means of division, aided by definition, that it is possible to know

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48 See Pohlenz's comments, *Die Stoa*, 1:56ff. and 2:33, on Aetius, *Plac.* 4.11; Chrysippus, *apud* Diogenes Laertius 7.54.

49 Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, 1:58; 2:34; Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," 171–172; Ragnar Holte, "Logos Spermatikos: Christianity and Ancient Philosophy according to St. Justin's Apologies," *ST* 12 (1958): 109–168, esp. 137.

50 Cf. Albinus, *Intr.* 6 (p. 150, 13–23 Hermann). References to Albinus's *Introductio* are from Karl F. Hermann, ed., *Platonis dialogi: Secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi* (6 vols.; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1887–1902). On this method of argument, see Grant, "Athenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras," 124, and Schwartz, *Athenagorae libellus*, 91–92.

51 Alcinous, *Didask.* 25.3; Atticus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.8, 809B; Maximus of Tyre 10, αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις.

52 Alcinous's discussion of opinion is not relevant to the limited interest of this study, and is therefore omitted.

53 Ps.-Plutarch, *Plac. philos.* 1.3.21 (p. 287, 17ff. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*); Ps.-Justin, *Cohort. graec.* 6.7B; Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 5 (p. 86, 9ff. Paul Thomas, ed., *Apulei Platonici Madaurensis*, *De philosophia libri* [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1908]. This volume, one of a large edition of all of Apuleius's works, contains his philosophical works, of which *De Platone et eius dogmate* is one.). For the same trinitary division under a different form, see Aetius, *Plac.* 1.10.2 (p. 309, 14ff. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*), and the discussion in Willy Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus* (PFKP 1; Berlin: Weidmann, 1930; repr. as 2d ed., 1964), 18ff.; André-Jean Festugière, "Le 'Compendium Timaei' de Galien," *REG* 65 (1952): 97–116, esp. 106ff.

thoroughly each thing by itself, and what is according to its essence (*Didask.* 5.2–3).[54] Plato's interest in this dialectical method is illustrated by summarizing the argument of the *Cratylus.* The question considered is whether names exist by nature (φύσει) or by imposition (θέσει). Alcinous concludes that the name of anything is fixed by the nature of the thing. Naming something correctly depends on the correct relationship of the name to the nature of the thing. Through names we teach each other things and distinguish (διακρίνομεν) them. So a name is διδασκαλικόν τι καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας ὄργανον (*Didask.* 6.10).[55] The correct use of names thus pertains to dialectic, and the name-giver would impose or use names well if he were to make the imposition in the presence of the dialectician who knows τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων (*Didask.* 6.11).

Before turning to Athenagoras we may note Numenius's discussion of the name of God (τὸ ὄν).[56] The name of the incorporeal is οὐσία and ὄν. The reason for the name Being is that it has not come into existence, nor will it be destroyed, changed, or moved. Plato said in the *Cratylus* that | names are applied according to a similarity with the things; therefore it is demonstrated that Being is incorporeal, and can be perceived by the mind alone, as Plato says in *Tim.* 27D.

Athenagoras is selective in his exposition of Christian doctrine.[57] He begins his answer to the charge of atheism in *Leg.* 4 by contrasting Christians with Diagoras, the classic example of atheism in the doxographies.[58] What makes Christians unlike Diagoras is that they distinguish between God and matter, for God is unbegotten and invisible (ἀγένητον … καὶ ἀίδιον), contemplated by mind and reason alone (νῷ μόνῳ καὶ λόγῳ θεωρούμενον), while matter is subject to generation and corruption (*Leg.* 4.1). God the Creator is unbegotten, for it is not Being that is subject to becoming, but

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[54] Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 8.5. Clement's discussion of dialectic appears to be based on a handbook from the same tradition as the one used by Alcinous. See Eric F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria* (TS NS 3; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 148ff.; Witt, *Albinus*, 31–39.

[55] See Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 8.5; Origen, *Cels.* 1.24–25; 5.41, 45 on the various philosophical names for God. For Middle Platonic interest in the names of God, see Plutarch, *Is. Os.* 379CD; Maximus of Tyre 2.2 (p. 20, 3ff. Hobein); 9 (p. 28, 6–7 Hobein); 10 (p. 28, 12–13 Hobein).

[56] *Apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 11.10, 526A–D.

[57] Note at the end of the exposition, *Leg.* 12.4: Those who taste honey and whey test whether the whole is good by tasting even a small portion. The proverb that a mere taste of something will reveal the nature of the whole was applied to philosophical systems; cf. Lucian, *Hermot.* 58ff.; Theophilus, *Autol.* 2.12.

[58] Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 169.

non-being (*Leg.* 4.2).[59] As for Numenius, Athenagoras's source for this idea is *Tim.* 27D.[60] In *Leg.* 19.1–2, he quotes this passage and denies real existence to the pagan gods because they have a beginning in time: "Plato, discoursing on the intelligible and sensible, tells that enduring reality, the intelligible, is without beginning, but that which has no reality, the sensible, comes to be and has a beginning and an end." As for Alcinous, so also for Athenagoras, the knowledge of God, who is true being, is characterized as θεωρία which is attained by critical discernment which separates the intelligible from the sensible.[61]

Athenagoras continues his argument by introducing the division of essence and accidents into a discussion of the names of the gods (*Leg.* 5). Poets and philosophers, he says, were never considered atheists for showing scientific interest in God (ἐπιστήσαντες περὶ θεοῦ). Euripides is advanced as a case in point. He was perplexed about those beings who are unscientifically named gods by common intelligence (ἐπὶ μὲν κατὰ | κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἀνεπιστημόνως ὀνομαζομένων διαπορῶν). But when he is considering what is intelligible by pure reason (ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην νοητοῦ), he makes the philosophical affirmation that there is a god (*Leg.* 5.1). Euripides saw no substance underlying (οὐσίας … ὑποκειμένας) those of whom the name of God had been predicated as an accident (συμβέβηκεν), and that the names were not predicated of real subjects (ὑποκειμένων). Where no real substance is the ground of being there is only a name. That the correct application of names for Athenagoras does involve the proper dialectical distinction between what is intelligible and what is sensible appears clearly from *Leg.* 15.1ff., a passage in which the influence of *Tim.* 27CD is evident.[62]

Alcinous required that as a preliminary to the study of the intelligibles the philosopher, in the same way that a physician purifies the body, should first cleanse his mind of the false opinions which arise from the impressions.[63] Athenagoras follows this procedure here. After rejecting

[59] For the description of God as true being, see *Leg*. 15.1; 19.1–3; 23.7ff.

[60] See n. 46 above.

[61] Cf. Athenagoras, *Res.* 25.4: The τέλος of a life of understanding and rational judgment (λογικῆς κρίσεως) is the perpetual and inseparable companionship with those realities to which the natural reason is naturally and primarily adapted, and with the contemplation of the One who gives the contemplation (θεωρία τοῦ δόντος). Cf. *Leg.* 20.4, ἐν θεωρίᾳ γεγονὼς ὑπὸ θεοῦ. On θεωρία as the τέλος of man, see also *Res.* 13.2; 12.2. Plato, *Tim.* 47B, states that philosophy is a gift from the gods.

[62] See n. 56 above, and Ps.-Justin, *Cohort. graec*. 22.21AB.

[63] See n. 50 above.

unphilosophical doubt in *Leg.* 5, he turns in chapters 6 and 7 to the philosophers' treatment of the first principles. His discussion of the ἀρχαί is introduced by a quotation of *Tim.* 28C at the point where he for the first time turns to the doxographies (*Leg.* 6.2). Apuleius in a similar manner paraphrases *Tim.* 28C and then quotes it at the beginning of his discussion of the first principles.[64] Athenagoras claims that when philosophers come to the ἀρχαί they agree on the unity of God (*Leg.* 7.1). However, when they dogmatize further περὶ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ ὕλης καὶ περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ περὶ κόσμου they are at variance with each other (*Leg.* 7.2). Athenagoras thus appears to have four ἀρχαί instead of three.[65] His addition of the κόσμος must be seen in the context of his concern with the relationship between God and the world.[66] | 12

That Athenagoras is familiar with Alcinous's dialectical method can be further illustrated. In *Res.* 1.2, 5, using the example of the physician, he says that attention must be given first to those who are perplexed (ἀπορεῖν) by first arguing in defense of the truth before giving an exposition of the truth. Elsewhere he states that the exposition must proceed on the basis of the φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, which are the first principles (*Res.* 14.1–2). Again, Alcinous affirms that, in order for the doctrines based on the ἀρχαί to be secured, rational argumentation (λογισμός) is required (*Didask.* 35.5; cf. Albinus, *Intr.* 6 [p. 150, 27 Hermann]). To the ἔννοια of the unity of God Athenagoras, too, adds reasoning (λογισμός) to confirm the doctrine (*Leg.* 8.1). Nevertheless, there is a decisive difference between Athenagoras and Alcinous at this point. According to Athenagoras, reasoning does not suffice. The prophets confirm reasoning and keep Christian reasoning from being a merely human enterprise (*Leg.* 9.1). The philosophers and poets,

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[64] Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 1.5 (p. 86, 17ff. Thomas). See Arthur Darby Nock, "The Exegesis of *Timaeus* 28C," *VC* 16 (1962): 79–86. Whereas Plato had said that it was difficult to find God in Hellenistic times he was said to have considered it impossible to find him and to announce him to all. Middle Platonists used the passage within the framework of their theories of knowledge; cf. Justin, *2 Apol.* 10; Celsus, *apud* Origen, *Cels.* 7.42; Andresen, *Logos und Nomos*, 133, 348ff.

[65] Middle Platonists differed among themselves on the number of the ἀρχαί. See Theiler, *Vorbereitung*, 15ff. According to Ps.-Justin, *Cohort. graec.* 7.8AB, whose list of the inconsistencies of Plato is actually a list of subjects on which the Middle Platonists debated among themselves, the universal soul was sometimes added as a fourth ἀρχή.

[66] For this problem in early Christian thought, see Claude Tresmontant, *La métaphysique de christianisme et la naissance de la philosophie chrétienne. Problèmes de la création et de l'anthropologie des origines a Saint Augustin* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1961); George L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London: SPCK, 1952), 25–54; Robert A. Norris, *God and World in Early Christian Theology: A Study in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen* (New York: Seabury, 1965).

on the other hand, proceed on the basis of their own resources and therefore fail to find reality (*Leg.* 7.2).[67]

Athenagoras's use of εἶδος where one might expect ἰδέα as one of the ἀρχαί is deliberate. In Middle Platonism the Ideas were thought of as being in the mind of God,[68] while the Forms were in matter.[69] Athenagoras has a similar view. For him the Logos is the Idea, the thought of the Father (*Leg.* 10.2–4), while the Forms are always connected by him with matter.[70] This distinction is used to polemical advantage: Christians make a distinction between the Forms of matter and God, whereas their opponents do not (*Leg.* 15.4; cf. 22.9).[71]

### *Theoretics*

Theoretics is the second main division of philosophy for Alcinous and | 13 consists of Mathematics (*Didask.* 7), Theology (*Didask.* 8–11), and Physics (*Didask.* 12–26). Athenagoras does not discuss mathematics and it need not concern us here.[72] The relation between the Theological and Physical divisions within Theoretics deserves closer attention. The division between Theology and Physics is not clear-cut in Alcinous. Theology consists of a consideration of the first principles, to which a treatment of qualities is added, while the creation of the world and of man belong to Physics. Yet Alcinous's introduction to Theology in *Didask.* 8.1 actually introduces Physics as well, and the transition to Physics in *Didask.* 12.1 shows the close connection between the two sub-divisions.[73]

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[67] The philosophers are ultimately concerned, not with absolute truth, but only with τὰ εἴδη τῆς ὕλης. This major difference with Alcinous cannot be developed in this article, except to suggest that Atticus's criticism of Aristotle (*apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.13, 815AB) is not completely unlike Athenagoras's treatment of the philosophers in this respect.

[68] See n. 75 below.

[69] Alcinous, *Didask.* 8.2.

[70] Outside of *Leg.* 7.1, the Forms are always referred to as τὰ εἴδη τῆς ὕλης: 15.4; 22.5, 9, 12; 24.2, 5.

[71] See n. 67 above.

[72] Alcinous's treatment of mathematics is very brief. Its introduction at this point shows its relative unimportance in the *Didaskalikos* and illustrates the artificial nature of the three-fold division of philosophy. Alcinous regards the function of mathematics as the sharpening of the soul for investigating true being (7.4). Plato does not call mathematics ἐπιστήμη; dialectic alone can be so designated (7.5).

[73] On the use of θεολογικός for a division of philosophy, see Paul Natorp, "Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik" *PhM* 14 (1887–1888): 58ff.; Ferdinand Kattenbusch, "Die Entstehung einer christlicher Theologie: Zur Geschichte der Ausdruck θεολογία, θεολογεῖν, θεολόγος," *ZTK* 11 (1930): 161–205, esp. 169ff.; André-Jean Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (4 vols.; *EBib* 38; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1949–1954), 2:604. For

The main interest of the Theological division is in the three first principles. According to Alcinous, Plato named matter a recipient of impressions, a universal receptacle, nurse, mother, space and substratum (ὑποκείμενον). Its function is to receive all the Forms, since by itself it is without shape, quality, or form.[74] Kneaded and molded, it receives all the Forms like wax impressions, and is shaped by them (*Didask.* 8.2). Matter does not partake of the nature of the Forms, but is without quality or shape until it receives them (8.3).

The Idea is described succinctly. As regards God, it is his thought; as regards us, it is the first intelligible; as regards matter, it is a standard; as regards the sensible world, it is a pattern (παράδειγμα), and as considered with reference to itself, it is an essence (*Didask.* 9.1). The Ideas are the perfect and eternal thoughts of God,[75] and are the immaterial standards. If the world did not come to be such as it is fortuitously, it did not only 14 come into being out of something (ἔκ τινος), but also by something | (ὑπό τινος) and in accordance with something (πρός τι).[76] The Idea is in fact its pattern (9.3).

Alcinous describes God, the third principle, as *Nous* (*Didask.* 10.1). The *Nous* thinks all things simultaneously and perpetually κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν and is superior to a mind which thinks ἐν δυνάμει. He causes the *nous* of the whole heaven to operate while he himself is unmoved (10.2). He perpetually thinks his own thoughts and this ἐνέργεια is the Idea. The *Nous* is the primary God and is transcendent.[77] He is the Father by being the cause of all things, and by ordering the heavenly mind and the soul of the world with reference to himself and his cogitations. By his own will he has filled all things with himself, having raised up the world soul and turned it to himself. He is the cause of its mind which, having been ordered by the Father, puts in order the whole of nature in this world (10.3). God is

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φυσιολογία, see Johannes Munck, *Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria* (FKGG 2; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933), 90–91.

[74] Cf. Diogenes Laertius 3.69, 76.

[75] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 9.2; Aetius, *Plac.* 1.3.21 (p. 287, 17ff. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci*); Ps.-Justin, *Cohort. graec.* 7.8AB. The origin of this conception has frequently been discussed: R.M. Jones, "The Ideas as Thoughts of God," *CP* 21 (1926): 317–326; Cornelia J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts Selected and Supplied with some Notes and Explanations* (3 vols.; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1950–1959), 3:401; Audrey N.M. Rich, "The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God," *Mnemosyne* (Series 4) 7 (1954): 123–133.

[76] See Festugière, "Le 'compendium Timaei' de Galien," 106–107.

[77] For Middle Platonic descriptions of God's transcendence, see Maximus of Tyre 11.9 (p. 139, 20ff. Hobein), and Jules Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la trinité: Des origines au concile de Nicée* (2 vols.; 6th ed.; Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1927–1928), 2:535–647.

comprehended by mind alone through abstraction, analogy and synthesis (10.4–6). Through these means he is conceived as being without parts, because there was nothing prior to him and a part exists prior to that of which it is a part. Since he does not have parts, he is unmoved with respect to place and alteration, for if he were changed it would be either by himself or by another. This all proves that God is without body, for if he were body he would be a composite of matter and form which is assimilated to the Ideas and partakes of them. This is absurd, for then God would not be simple, nor would he be capable of being ἀρχικός (10.7–8). Alcinous concludes his discussion of the first principles with a short treatment of qualities as being incorporeal.

He next turns to Physics, under which he discusses the creation of the world and the nature of man (*Didask.* 12–26). God created the world while looking to the Idea as a pattern (12.1). He fashioned it from matter which moved with no order or measure (12.2). Alcinous holds that Plato does not mean that there ever was a time when the world was not; he speaks in this manner to indicate that it is always in generation, but that there is a cause more ancient than its generation.[78] Neither does God create the eternal soul of the world; rather he puts it in order. It might | be said that he creates it in this way, as though he raises it from deep sleep and turns it so that it might look at what is intelligible in him and thus receive the forms and shapes (14.3). 15

As a transition to his discussion of the nature of man and his place in the world (*Didask.* 17–26), Alcinous introduces the daemons and the elements with which they are combined. Although he does not treat the subject at great length, he does consider it part of Physics to learn whether there are other gods under God's direction, and whether God has any providential care for the world.[79] There are daemons, who may be called created gods, at each of the elements. They are in charge of all things in the sub-lunar region and on earth (15). Through them God exercises his will over the world (15.2–4). When God had put all things in order, he left the making of animal life to the daemons, except that he directly took

[78] For the debate among Middle Platonists on whether Plato meant that the world had a beginning or not, see Clemens Bäumker, "Die Ewigkeit der Welt bei Plato," *PhM* 23 (1887): 513–529; Witt, *Albinus*, 119ff.; Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis*, 258ff.; Karl Praechter, "Tauros," PW 5A (1934): 39–68, esp. 63ff.; Andresen, *Logos und Nomos*, 277ff.

[79] For Middle Platonic concern with the doctrine of providence, see Ps.-Plutarch, *De Fato*, and the discussion in Phillip de Lacy and Benedict Einarson in Plutarch's *Moralia*, Vol. 7 (LCL; Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1959), 303–309.

part in the creation of man (16). The remainder of the Physical division is devoted to a description of man that has no counterpart in Athenagoras.

In *Leg.* 8–10 Athenagoras treats those subjects which belong to the Theological and Physical divisions of Theoretics in Alcinous's system. At the end of this section he shows that he is conscious of having presented doctrines belonging to a definite division of philosophy. He refers to it as his Theological Part (*Leg.* 10.5). As for Alcinous, so for Athenagoras the Theological part also includes material belonging properly to Physics. Referring to the discussion that he here designates as θεολογικὸν μέρος, he calls ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ ὁ θεολογικὸς λόγος in *Leg.* 13.1. This includes God, the Logos (Idea), and Spirit in their relationship to the world.

In chapter 8 Athenagoras argues for the unity of the Creator ἐξ ἀρχῆς. To prove the oneness of God, he considers it with reference to the space that a second god would occupy.[80] If there were two gods ἐξ ἀρχῆς, they would either have to be in the same place or in different places.[81] He rejects the possibility that they could be in the same place. | That would mean to Athenagoras that they would be like each other, but gods, being uncreated, are unlike each other. He also dismisses the idea that the gods could be complementary parts of each other, like hand, eye, and foot in one body. God is indivisible and not composed of parts (*Leg.* 8.3). The second possibility is also rejected. There is no place for any other god in this universe, for the Creator is above it, controlling it by his providence (*Leg.* 8.4). Nor is there place for him in another universe, for all space is filled by God (*Leg.* 8.6–7). We see thus once more Athenagoras develops his apologetic exposition within the framework represented by Alcinous's *Didaskalikos.*[82] He regards this exposition as λογισμός, rational argumentation (*Leg.* 8.1). Prophecy only confirms this reasoning (*Leg.* 9.1). At the

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[80] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Location of God," *TZ* 26 (1970): 46–52. [*Light*, 2:843–848]

[81] The whole argument of ch. 8 has to do with the τόπος of the gods. ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ (8.1), refers to the place of the gods, and not to their genus, as Paolo Ubaldi, *La supplica per i Cristiani* (SGC 3; Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1920), Bardy, and Crehan understand it. Athenagoras expresses the two alternatives when introducing the problem (ἤτοι ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ ἦσαν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν, 8.1), and then presents them adversatively, ἐν μὲν οὖν ἑνὶ καὶ ταὐτῷ (8.2), and εἰ δὲ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν (8.4). The latter alternative clearly has to do with the location of the gods (ποῦ ὁ ἕτερος ἢ οἱ λοίποι; and the discussion of their τόπος that follows), and suggests that the former also does, as Maran, Otto, and Geffcken affirm. See P. Maran, *Apologia Athenagorae* (PG 6:887–1024; Paris, 1742); J.C.T. Otto, *Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum Saeculi Secundi 7: Athenagoras philosophi Atheniensis* (Jena: Mauke, 1857); and Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten.*

[82] For a recent treatment of Athenagoras's argument, see Grant, *Early Christian Doctrine of God*, 105–110.

beginning of chapter 10 he summarizes his view of God in Platonic terms: God is transcendent and is comprehended by mind and reason alone (*Leg.* 10.1).

God also has a Son who is the Logos of the Father ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ. The Logos is the agent of creation.[83] All things came into existence πρὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ (*Leg.* 10.2), and through him all things have been brought into order and are controlled by God (*Leg.* 10.1). The Logos did not come into existence; God, who is eternal *Nous*, was from the beginning instinct with Logos (*Leg.* 10.3). The Logos came forth to be the Idea and energizing power (ἰδέα καὶ ἐνέργεια) over all the elements of matter which lay like a substratum (ὑποκείμενον) under nature which was without quality (*Leg.* 10.4).[84] The Holy Spirit corresponds[85] to the Logos in this cosmic function.

Athenagoras brings his exposition of Theoretics to an abrupt close, but not before he rounds it out in appropriate fashion:

> Nor does our theological part stop there, but we assert a multitude of angels and | ministers whom God, the maker and artificer of the universe, set in their places by means of his Logos and appointed severally to be in charge of the elements and the heavens and the universe and all it contains and its good order (*Leg.* 10.5). 17

As Alcinous had treated the intermediary powers briefly, so Athenagoras at this point does little more than show his awareness that the daemons should be treated at this point in an exposition such as his. His primary concern here is with the doctrine of the Trinity, which he presents in capsule fashion, following the Middle Platonic outline. Further elaboration of matters introduced here will take place in the more polemical section of the *Legatio*.

### *Ethics*

Alcinous discusses the third major division, Ethics, in *Didask.* 27–36. The end of ethics is the assimilation to God (28.1). This assimilation to God

[83] This is the primary function of the Logos for Athenagoras; see *Leg.* 4.2; 6.2; 10.1. For this aspect of the Logos in patristic theology, see Friedo Ricken, “Die Logoslehre des Eusebios von Caesarea und der Mittelplatonismus,” *TP* 42 (1967): 341–358.

[84] Compare the Middle Platonic description of matter in *Leg*. 15.2, ἡ πανδεχὴς ὕλη ἄνευ τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦ διάκρισιν καὶ σχῆμα καὶ κόσμον οὐκ ἐλάμβανεν, with Alcinous, *Didask.* 8.2.

[85] For this meaning of συνᾴδειν, see Karl Friedrich Bauer, “Die Lehre des Athenagoras von Gottes Einheit und Dreieingkeit” (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig; Bamberg: Handels-Druckerei, 1902), 35 n. 97.

has a practical and theoretical side and it became the apex, not only for ethics, but for the whole system of Middle Platonism.[86] Based primarily on *Theaet.* 176AB, assimilation to God was regarded as the philosopher's flight from earth. It can only take place when man develops himself in the philosophical and intellectual disciplines (38.4).

Athenagoras also takes up Ethics next (*Leg.* 11–12). He claims to be giving a precise account of Christian doctrine so that his readers might know the truth and might not be carried away by common and irrational opinion (*Leg.* 11.1ff.).[87] He is aware that a discussion of ethics at this point in his defense against the charge of atheism might occasion surprise. But the Christian way of life is proof of Christians' belief in God because it is based on doctrines taught by God and not man. Ethical precepts are not derived from dialectical exercises. Christian ethics finds its motive in the knowledge of the Trinity (*Leg.* 12.3). Morality is the following of correct knowledge, and is governed by the expectation of the Judgment (*Leg.* 12.1).

This approach to ethics allows Athenagoras to include it at this point in his epitome to prove the falseness of the charge of atheism. His treatment of ethics is furthest removed from the approach of Alcinous. The formulation ὁμοίωσις θεῷ does not occur in Athenagoras. His basic | method of argument differs from his earlier approach. His earlier exposition, according to himself, was based on reasoning which was then confirmed by Scripture (*Leg.* 9), whereas in the Ethical division Scripture forms the basis of his argument.[88] This change is not merely due to his desire to use the third division of philosophy in his apologetic. His defense against the charges of immorality in chapters 31–36 proceeds in a similar manner, and there atheism is not mentioned. His view of the Christian life allows him to present it in this way as a defense against the charge of atheism. The similarity with Alcinous's work lies in its place within the structure of the exposition and not in its content.

[86] Cf. Albinus, *Intr.* 6 (p. 151, 2ff. Hermann); see Überweg-Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte*, 1:543–544; Hubert Merki, Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: *Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa* (Par. 7; Fribourg: Paulusverlag, 1952).

[87] See n. 40 above.

[88] This is not to imply that Athenagoras is anti- or unphilosophical here. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 183–184, and Ubaldi, *La supplica*, 48, have shown that his polemic against the Sophists is in good philosophical tradition.

### Restatement in the Polemical Section (*Leg.* 13–32)

The polemical part of Athenagoras's defense against the charge of atheism generally follows the same order as that of his exposition in chapters 4–12 and develops some points of that exposition further. He first turns to answer two objections made by the masses who are unlearned and without insight into physical and theological discourse (*Leg.* 13.1ff.). The first, that Christians do not sacrifice to the gods, is easily countered by using popular philosophical arguments.[89] The second, that Christians do not reverence the same gods as the cities do, receives a longer treatment (*Leg.* 14–17). Again using material derived from the philosophical debates, he shows that pagans themselves disagree about their gods (*Leg.* 14).[90] But even if they did agree it would make no difference. The masses are incapable of making the proper distinction between God and matter. Christians, who do distinguish what is created from the uncreated, being from non-being, the intelligible from the sensible, and give each thing its proper name, cannot be expected to follow them (*Leg.* 15). It is the Creator of the world who should be revered, not the world itself (*Leg.* 16). The names of the gods as well as their statues are recent inventions, and they can therefore not be gods (*Leg.* 17). We thus see here a polemic which follows the order of the earlier exposition: summary use of popular philosophical material,[91] insistence on the need for a proper dialectical distinction, and a treatment of the first principles, | viz., God and matter (*Leg.* 15.2), the Forms (*Leg.* 15.4), 19 and the world (*Leg.* 16).

Moving to a different level, Athenagoras considers the possibility that the statues are only images of the gods, and that the operations around the statues are proof of this. This provides for him the opportunity to discuss the theology of the poets (*Leg.* 18–22) and the nature and function of the intermediary powers (*Leg.* 23–30). Since the poets themselves describe the gods' pedigrees, the latter have no real being (*Leg.* 18). The philosophers, and Plato in particular, agree with Christians that enduring reality, the intelligible, is without beginning (*Leg.* 19.1ff.). The so-called theology of the poets is even less credible in its description of these gods' bodies

[89] See Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 186–187.
[90] Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 186–187.
[91] See n. 58 above.

(*Leg.* 20) and their immoral actions (*Leg.* 21).[92] The attempt to arrive at an acceptable theology by allegorizing the myths does not succeed because it does not raise the gods above the material world (*Leg.* 22). Athenagoras thus rejects the poets' theology on dialectical grounds.

But how does one then explain the activity around the statues? Athenagoras's answer develops in great detail what he had outlined in *Leg.* 10.5 of the angels and other spirits. The philosophers, he says, recognized such an order of beings, but did not call them gods (*Leg.* 23). In chapter 10 he had introduced the discussion of the spirits as being, with the Logos and Holy Spirit, part of the Theological division. Here he proceeds accordingly. God created the spirits in order to exercise his providence through them. While God retained the general and creative providence they were given particular providence over parts of the creation (*Leg.* 24). Some of them fell from the tasks to which they had been appointed and became enmeshed in material things. They prevent some men from seeing the truth, for they confine their thinking to matter (*Leg.* 25). It is they who are active around the idols and who are responsible for the popular notions of the gods (*Leg.* 26–27). These beings cannot be called gods. A history of their names and a knowledge of their behavior show that they are not (*Leg.* 28–29). The poets are thus lying or their gods are mortal (*Leg.* 30). The polemic against pagan theology is thus conducted on the basis of dialectical principles first introduced in the exposition, and is developed in the same order as the exposition.

In chapters 31–36 Athenagoras turns to the accusations against Christian ethics. He answers that Christians live a moral life because God is their rule and they believe in the resurrection (*Leg.* 31). It is therefore unthinkable that they should practice incest (*Leg.* 32–33) |. Pagans are the real cannibals (*Leg.* 34). One cannot eat human flesh without having killed someone. Yet Christians do not even attend gladiatorial exhibitions, because they consider them nigh to murder, nor do they countenance abortion for the same reason. Obviously the charge of cannibalism is without foundation (*Leg.* 35). Furthermore, how can anyone who believes in the resurrection, by eating men make himself a tomb for those who will rise again (*Leg.* 36)? Athenagoras not only argues in the same manner he did in chapters 11 and 12. He explicitly refers to his earlier statement that

[92] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers," in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann; 2 vols.; Münster Westf.: Aschendorff, 1970), 1:214–225. [*Light*, 2:849–865]

Christians are taught by God (*Leg.* 32.4). His polemic here is an application to specific charges of the basic argument presented earlier.

## Conclusion

From this comparison of Athenagoras's *Legatio* with Alcinous's *Didaskalikos* it appears that the Apologist intended to present Christian doctrine within the framework provided by a Middle Platonic epitome of Plato's philosophy. Our findings, however, should beware of overstatement. Athenagoras does not in the *Legatio* develop a Christian philosophy in and for itself. His apologetic and polemical interests are constantly evident. The limitations imposed on him by his apologetic purpose and the literary form he employs should therefore also caution against our viewing the *Legatio* as a full exposition of his theology. Furthermore the similarities in structure and expression to his philosophical models do not obscure the essential Christian basis of his thought. He is a Platonist, and his appropriation of the Platonic outline does not seem unduly contrived, given his practical interest. An awareness of this background will contribute to a clearer understanding of his argument. Yet for all that he is still a Christian Platonist.

CHAPTER NINE

# ATHENAGORAS ON CHRISTIAN ETHICS*

At first sight Athenagoras's treatment of Christian ethics in his *Legatio pro Christianis* 11 and 12 appears to be anti-philosophical.[1] According to Athenagoras the Christian way of life is based on doctrines taught by God and not by man. Ethical precepts are not derived from dialectical exercises, but are Christian dogmas which come from God and through Scripture (*Leg.* 11.1ff.).[2] The basis for his discussion of Christian ethics is a conflation of Matt 5:44–45 and Luke 6:27–28 (*Leg.* 11.2). This represents a change in his method of argumentation from his earlier theological discussion (*Leg.* 6–10) where he proceeded on the basis of reasoning (λογισμός) which was then confirmed by Scripture (*Leg.* 9.1–3). Furthermore, for him ethics is motivated by a knowledge of the Trinity (*Leg.* 12.3) and is the following of correct knowledge governed by an expectation of the Judgment (*Leg.* 12.1).[3] However, Geffcken[4] and Ubaldi[5] have shown that Athenagoras uses certain philosophical traditions in this discussion, and that his attack on the Sophists was in good philosophical form.[6] This article will examine

* Originally published in *JEH* 20 (1969): 1–5.

[1] Although the original essay referred to Athenagoras's *Supplicatio pro Christianis*, recent scholarship has adopted the standard title of *Legatio pro Christianis*, which this edition of the essay will employ; despite the change in name, the references to the work remain the same.

[2] References are to the edition of William R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras*: Legatio *and* De Resurrectione (OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

[3] For the importance of the Judgment for Athenagoras, see *Leg.* 31–36, and *Res.* 18ff. The authenticity of the latter work has recently been challenged by Paul Keseling in "Athenagoras," *RAC* 1 (1950): 881–888, and Robert M. Grant, "Athenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras," *HTR* 47 (1954): 121–129. The arguments advanced against its authenticity appear less than cogent. See Eduard Schwartz, ed., *Athenagorae libellus pro Christianis. Oratio de resurrectione cadaverum* (TU 4.2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1891).

[4] Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907), 183–184.

[5] Paolo Ubaldi, *La supplica per i Cristiani* (SGC 3; Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1920), 48.

[6] It should be noted that Athenagoras describes his royal readers as philosophers in *Leg.* 11.3, a habit he regularly follows when he implicitly represents Christian doctrine as being philosophical. Cf. *Leg.* 2.1, 6; 9.1; 10.2; 17.1; 18.1–2.

Athenagoras's method of argument to determine more clearly what philosophical models he did in fact use.[7]

After affirming the divine origin of traditional Christian teaching on ethics, and quoting a passage from the Gospels, Athenagoras states: 2 ἐπιτρέψατε ἐνταῦθα τοῦ λόγου ἐξακούστου μετὰ πολλῆς | κραυγῆς γεγονότος ἐπὶ παρρησίαν ἀναγαγεῖν, ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέων φιλοσόφων ἀπολογούμενον (*Leg.* 11.3). The λόγος "that has been cried out so loudly that nobody could fail to hear it"[8] is the passage from the Gospels commanding Christians to love their enemies. Proceeding on the basis of this statement, Athenagoras wishes to refer it back to παρρησίαν. His use of the construction ἐπὶ παρρησίαν ἀναγαγεῖν may be explained by his desire to contrast Christian behavior with the logic-chopping of the Sophists. Plato used ἀνάγειν ἐπί for referring an argument to its first principle,[9] and in Hellenistic writers the construction was used of dialectical demonstration.[10] Thus with wry irony Athenagoras wishes to reduce the matter to παρρησία which, on this understanding, assumes greater importance than most scholars ascribe to it. Rather than merely referring to his freedom of speech before the emperors,[11] the statement reduces Christian conduct to παρρησία for the emperors *who are philosophers*.[12] The meaning of παρρησία in a philosophical context must be examined to determine its significance for Athenagoras.

Originally a political term for freedom of speech, from Isocrates onwards παρρησία came to be used in a moralistic sense, describing the freedom

[7] Only the main lines of his argument will be traced here. His language betrays his philosophical background throughout. E.g., with the Christians' purification of themselves (*Leg.* 11.3; 12.1–3), compare Xenophon, *Symp.* 1.4.5; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.21.15–16; with the statement that they are escorted through life (*Leg.* 12.3), compare Marcus Aurelius 2.17; with the proverb that tasting even a small portion of whey and honey will suffice to test the whole (*Leg.* 12.4), compare Lucian, *Hermot.* 58ff.

[8] So reads the paraphrase by Leslie W. Barnard, "The Embassy of Athenagoras," *VC* 21 (1967): 88–92, esp. 92. Barnard's criticism of other translations of ἐξακούστου μετὰ πολλῆς κραυγῆς is justified, but it is another matter as to whether his interpretation supports the view that Athenagoras addressed the emperors face to face.

[9] Plato, *Leg.* 1.626D. Aristotle, *An. Pr.* 1.7.29b1–26; 1.32.46b1–47a32 uses ἀνάγειν for reducing a syllogism to one figure.

[10] Cf., e.g., John Philoponus, *In an. post.* 1.2 (vol. 13.3 of *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*; ed. Maximilian Wallies; 23 vols.; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882–1909), p. 29, line 22–p. 30, line 4; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 8.2 in *Clemens Alexandrinus* (ed. Otto Stählin; 4 vols.; GCS 12, 15, 17, 39; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905–1936), 3:81, line 18, passim.

[11] It is regularly understood in this way by translators who do not do justice to ἐπί in the translation.

[12] Cf. Philo, *Flacc.* 4, where παρρησία describes someone who shows his mind by actions as well as speech.

between friends.[13] The moralistic use, especially in connection with φιλία, became common in Hellenistic philosophy, particularly among the Cynics.[14] As in the political sphere it was the free man who had παρρησία, so it was the Cynic, the morally free man, who was conceived to have the right and duty to speak out boldly and to act as an example.[15] His boldness and openness were the consequences of his φιλανθρωπία,[16] his desire to benefit (ὠφελεῖν) men.[17] He, therefore, lived a life open to the public, and would not be initiated into the mysteries.[18] Nor did he see much value in | the dialectical displays of the Sophists; much more to be desired was the life of the ἰδιώτης[19] in which there was no variance between words and works.[20] 3

This Cynic *topos* appears to lie behind Athenagoras's argument. By stressing παρρησία he is not claiming his political right of freedom of speech. Rather, he does so to describe Christian conduct.[21] Christian παρρησία is based on the divine teaching which was made thunderously audible. Herein lies the difference between Christian morality and that of the logic-chopping Sophists, who "persist in delving with evil intent into these mysteries (ἀπόρρητα) for themselves,[22] always desiring to perpetrate

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13 For a development in the meaning of παρρησία, see Heinrich Schlier, "παρρησία," *TDNT* 5 (1967): 871–886; Erik Peterson, "Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von παρρησία," in *Reinhold Seeburg Festschrift* (ed. Wilhelm Koepp; Leipzig: D. Werner Scholl, 1929), 283–297; Willem C. van Unnik, "*Parrhesia* dans les Homélies catéchétiques de Théodore de Mopsueste," in *Mélanges offerts à Mademoiselle Christine Mohrmann* (Utrecht: Spectrum Éditeurs, 1943; repr., 1963, 1968), 12–22; Herbert Hunger, "Philanthropia: Eine griechische Wortprägung auf ihrem Wege von Aischylos bis Theodoros Metochites," *Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse* 100.1 (1963): 1–20 (repr. in Herbert Hunger, *Byzantinische Grundlagenforschung: Gesammelte Aufsätzen* [London: Variorum Reprints, 1973]); Giuseppe Scarpat, *Parrhesia: Storia del termine e delle sue traduzione in Latino* (Brescia: Paideia, 1964).

14 See Jacob Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1879), 101–102.

15 E.g., Lucian, *Demon.* 3; Philo, *Her.* 14; *Spec.* 1.321.

16 See Julius Kaerst, *Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 118ff.

17 See Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 33–34, 36, 39.

18 See especially the case of Demonax in Lucian, *Demon.* 11–12; Diogenes Laertius 6.39; Rudolf W.O. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1906; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967), 71; Scarpat, *Parrhesia*, 64–65.

19 Cf. Lucian, *Men.* 21; Helm, *Lucian und Menipp*, 37–38.

20 The criterion for judging a Cynic was the agreement between his teaching and his life: Lucian, *Hermot.* 18; *Fug.* 15; Plutarch, *Alex. fort.* 328Aff. See K. Funk, "Untersuchungen über die Lucianische *Vita Demonactis*," *Phil* Supplementband 10 (1905–1907): 561–674, esp. 592.

21 See n. 12 above.

22 Accepting Maran's reading ἑαυτοῖς.

some evil, having made the matter an artifice of words (τέχνην λόγων) and not a demonstration of deeds (ἐπίδειξιν ἔργων)" (*Leg.* 11.3). Christian morality, on the other hand, is demonstrated openly[23] even by ἰδιῶται who may not be able to express verbally the benefit (ὠφέλειαν) which comes from their doctrine, but who do so in their deeds.

The logical consequence[24] of the Christians' παρρησία is their φιλανθρωπία,[25] which Athenagoras discusses in *Leg.* 12. Here he adds that Christian ethics is based on the knowledge of God and is governed further by the expectation of the survival of the soul and of the Judgment. When Athenagoras turns to the eschatological motivation for the Christian life, he moves beyond his Cynic models. The Cynic life was lived totally within the perspective of the present.[26] While the παρρησία-φιλανθρωπία *topos* itself is Cynic, Athenagoras's elaboration of φιλανθρωπία as the Christian virtue *par excellence* shows his debt to the Platonists of his day. When he discusses the Judgment, he refers to Minos and Rhadamanthus, the judges of Plato's *Gorgias* (523C–524A). Other Christian writers took the picture of the judges from the literature of the period rather than directly from Plato,[27] and Athenagoras probably does the same. Again, when he discusses the survival of the soul, he quotes Homer, *Il.* 16.672, not directly, but from a tradition which came to him *via* Plato and his followers, and with a disapproval similarly expressed by Plato.[28]

4 | The debt to Platonists is not confined to such incidental matters. Athenagoras's whole argument is largely constructed along lines found in Plutarch's anti-Epicurean writings. One of the charges against the Epicureans was that they were ἀφιλάνθρωποι. This probably implied more about the Epicureans than that they were misanthropists. The gods were frequently described by the Greek philosophers as φιλάνθρωποι[29] who do

[23] Cf. also ἐπιδεικνυμένους and ἐπιδεικνύουσιν (*Leg.* 11.4).

[24] ἆρα τοίνυν; *Leg.* 12.1.

[25] On φιλανθρωπία, see Rudolf Hirzel, *Plutarch* (DEA 4; Leipzig: Dieterich [T. Weicher], 1912), 23–32; Siegfried Lorenz, *De progressu notionis* φιλανθρωπία, (Ph.D. diss., Leipzig, 1914; published, Weiden, Thuringia: Thomas & Hubert, 1914); Hendrik Bolkestein, *Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum* (Utrecht: A.A. Oosthoek, 1939); André-Jean Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (4 vols.; 2d ed.; *EBib* 38; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1944–1954), 2 (1949): 301–309.

[26] On the Cynic attitude toward death and its relation to the Cynic way of life, see Funk, "Untersuchungen," 601ff.

[27] Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 185.

[28] For the tradition, see Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 185.

[29] E.g., Plato, *Euthyphr.* 3D; Plutarch, *Gen. Socr.* 593A; *Comm. not.* 1075E.

good to men and love them.[30] That this beneficence was seen as the essence of God appears most clearly from the frequency with which the statement ἄνθρωπος ὁμοῖον ἔχει θεῷ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν appears.[31] Men can become like God by doing good. It is a short step to the suspicion that atheists do not benefit others, that they are misanthropists. The Epicureans, Plutarch says, "lead a cloistered life estranged from public duty, indifferent to human welfare (ἀφιλάνθρωποι), untouched by any spark of the divine." Their error lies in confining the measure of the soul to this life. Those who are beneficent, on the other hand, lay hold παντὸς αἰῶνος, and serve the public.[32] Plutarch establishes the survival of the soul by the same argument that establishes the providence of God,[33] namely the philanthropy of God.[34] Thus, according to Plutarch, the Epicureans reject the love of God for man and, consequently, God's providence and man's immortality. Plutarch also inveighs against the Epicureans for rejecting the idea of divine punishment. That the subject of divine punishment held great interest to Middle Platonists appears from Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, in which he discusses various problems raised by the Epicureans.[35] As Plutarch defends the ideas of punishment and providence, it is pointed out to him that he is resting his argument on a great hypothesis, the survival of the soul. He admits and then claims that "if the soul survives, we must expect that its due in honor and in punishment is awarded after death rather than before."[36]

Athenagoras argues in a similar manner. Since Christians believe that they will give an account to the Great Judge for the life they lead, they must purify themselves by choosing τὸν μέτριον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητον βίον (*Leg.* 12.1). The bad treatment they receive in this life does not compare with the good they will receive from the Great Judge in the shape τοῦ πρᾴου καὶ φιλανθρώπου καὶ ἐπιεικοῦς βίου (*Leg.* 12.1). But there are some, probably the Epicureans, whose motto is φάγωμεν καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν (1 Cor 15:32; Isa 22:13),[37] who think that

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[30] Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1051E.
[31] See Leo Sternbach, "De gnomologio Vaticano inédito" *WSt* 9 (1887): 199–200.
[32] Plutarch, *Suav. viv.* 1098D. For a different assessment of Epicurus's φιλανθρωπία, see Diogenes Laertius 10.10.
[33] Plutarch, *Sera* 560F. See also Atticus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15, 798C–799B.
[34] Plutarch, *Stoic. rep.* 1051E.
[35] Plutarch, *Sera* 548Cff. Aulus Gellius, *Noct. att.* 7.14.5, also informs us that the reasons for punishment were a topic of concern among Platonists and that Calvisius Taurus had treated the subject in his commentary on Plato's *Gorgias.*
[36] Plutarch, *Sera* 560F.
[37] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus" *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80. [*Light*, 1:41–51]

5 death is a deep sleep and that life is limited to the present existence. | Christians, however, believe in the survival of the soul. They are guided by the knowledge of the Trinity and know that, if they are pure, the future life cannot be described in words. Therefore, they love their enemies, and are φιλανθρωπότατοι (*Leg.* 12.3).

Athenagoras also holds that divine providence, the survival of the soul, and judgment go together. He does not mention providence in this section of the *Legatio.* However, his detailed argument in *Res.* 18.1ff. is based on the hypothesis of the providence of God,[38] and can be assumed to underlie his thinking here. There he argues that the whole man, composed of body and soul, requires justice for his actions. Since it is obvious, however, that justice is not received completely in this life, and it cannot happen after death (when body and soul are separated), the inevitable conclusion is that the body and soul must be reunited by the resurrection to receive judgment. Without referring to them by name, he also here refutes the Epicureans whose motto is φάγωμεν (δὲ) καὶ πίωμεν, αὔριον γὰρ ἀποθνήσκομεν for they hold that the end of life is complete insensibility (*Res.* 19.3).[39] Athenagoras thus argues like Plutarch. The Epicureans are alluded to at the point where judgment is discussed, and the argument for the survival of the soul rests on the providence of God. What distinguishes Athenagoras's argument, of course, is that he finds his solution in the resurrection of the body.

In view of the Platonic nature of his argument here and of the nature of his thought as a whole,[40] it is to be noted that the formulation ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, as a description of the aim of ethics,[41] does not occur in Athenagoras's writings. As conceived by Platonists, assimilation to God was a highly technical enterprise.[42] Athenagoras, however, never loses sight of the practical purpose of his writing, and wants to make room for the common man. It is the demonstration of the Christian life, based on divine teaching, that is important for him. Clement of Alexandria thought

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[38] Athenagoras, *Res.* 18.1ff.; 19.1ff. See Joseph A. Fischer, *Studien zum Todesgedanken in der alten Kirche* (Munich: M. Hueber, 1954), 18: "Athenagoras discards the nihilistic view of death, since continued life after death is for him a requirement of his belief in providence and morality, a basis which he also finds in Plato."

[39] See also Plato, *Apol.* 40C.

[40] See Aimé Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du II^e siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Hachette, 1912), 182–183; Joseph H. Crehan, trans., *Athenagoras: Embassy for the Christians; The Resurrection of the Dead* (ACW 23; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1956), 7, 15–21.

[41] See Hubert Merki, Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: *Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa* (Par. 7; Fribourg: Paulusverlag, 1952).

[42] See, for example, Alcinous, *Didask.* 28.4ff.

that the conflation of Matt 5:44–45 and Luke 6:27–28, upon which Athenagoras based his discussion of ethics, enigmatically taught the ἐξομοίωσις πρὸς θεόν.[43] Julian the Apostate later sought to provide a religious motivation for moral obligations by developing the concept of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ and by relating it to φιλανθρωπία.[44] Athenagoras, however, does not go as far as that in his use of his philosophical models.

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[43] Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 4.14. The idea is developed further in *Strom.* 7.3, where Clement describes the true Gnostic's assimilation to God.

[44] See Jürgen Kabiersch, *Untersuchungen zum Begriff* φιλανθρωπία *bei dem Kaiser Julian* (KPS 21; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1960).

CHAPTER TEN

# THE HOLY SPIRIT IN ATHENAGORAS*

Athenagoras's use of ἀπόρροια to describe the Holy Spirit is one of the earliest occurrences in Christian literature of a term that became very important in later Trinitarian controversies. In his *Legatio pro Christianis* (10.4),[1] after having discussed the activity of the Logos in creation, Athenagoras turns to the Spirit:[2]

> συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα· κύριος γάρ, φησίν, ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ. καίτοι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργοῦν τοῖς ἐκφωνοῦσι προφητικῶς ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἀπόρροιαν εἶναί φαμεν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀπορρέον καὶ ἐπαναφερόμενον ὡς ἀκτῖνα ἡλίου.

Proverbs 8:22, here quoted by Athenagoras, in the LXX speaks of Wisdom. The passage occurs frequently in early Christian literature, where it is sometimes applied to the Logos (e.g., Justin, *Dial.* 61.1–2) and sometimes to Wisdom as an entity distinguished from the Logos (e.g., Irenaeus, *Haer.* 4.20.3).[3] In the second century a systematic shift began to take place to identify Wisdom with the Logos,[4] and Prov 8:22 in *Leg.* 10.4 is usually taken to refer to the Logos.[5]

The description of the Spirit as ἀπόρροια seems to have been inspired by Wis 7:25 which says of Wisdom, the creative agent, ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστιν τῆς

* Originally published in *JTS* NS 20 (1969): 538–542.

[1] Although the original essay referred to Athenagoras's *Supplicatio pro Christianis*, recent scholarship has adopted the standard title of *Legatio pro Christianis*, which this edition of the essay will employ; despite the change in name, the references to the work remain the same. The edition used for this essay is William R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras*: Legatio *and* De Resurrectione (OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

[2] Cf. also *Leg.* 24.2, ἀπόρροια ὡς φῶς ἀπὸ πυρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα.

[3] See Georg Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie* (BHT 21; Tübingen: Mohr, 1956), 27–61.

[4] Hasso Jaeger, "The Patristic Conception of Wisdom in the Light of Biblical and Rabbinical Research," in StPatr 4 (TU 79; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 90–106, esp. 104; see Jules Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la trinité. Des origines au concile de Nicée* (2 vols.; 5th ed.; Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1928), 2:513, 567ff.

[5] See, for examples, the translations by Joseph H. Crehan, trans., *Athenagoras: Embassy for the Christians; The Resurrection of the Dead* (ACW 23; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1956); Cyril C. Richardson, ed. and trans., *Early Christian Fathers* (LCC 1; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953); and Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie*, 34 n. 5.

τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινής. Instead of ἀτμίς, the text underlying the Armenian and Ethiopic versions of the book of Wisdom read ἀκτίς,[6] and this | textual tradition may lie behind Athenagoras's use of the passage. That Athenagoras would refer the Wisdom of Prov 8:22 to the Logos and the Wisdom of Wis 7:25 to the Spirit could lead to the charge that such a bifurcation reflects a weakness in exegesis.[7]

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It is less than certain, however, that Athenagoras does here refer Prov 8:22 to the Logos. Συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ is usually understood as stating that Prov 8:22 "agrees with the previous account," and is thus applied to the Logos. The translation of τῷ λόγῳ as "account" or "opinion" must be questioned. What immediately precedes is a discussion of the Logos, and it is natural to take τῷ λόγῳ as referring to the Logos. Athenagoras is saying that the prophetic Spirit corresponds to the Logos in its creative activity, and quotes Prov 8:22 in support of the Spirit's work in creation. K.F. Bauer, in rejecting the application of Prov 8:22 to the Logos, has also claimed that such an application rests on a misunderstanding of the precise meaning of συνᾴδειν, which describes the correspondence or agreement between corresponding objects, and not between an object and an opinion about it.[8] Furthermore, the force of καίτοι would be neglected if Prov 8:22 were applied to the Logos.

That Athenagoras does not use Prov 8:22 of the Logos does not mean that he never describes the Logos as Wisdom. In *Leg.* 24.1–2, where he again calls the Spirit ἀπόρροια, he calls the Son the Wisdom of the Father. In describing both the Logos and the Spirit as Wisdom, Athenagoras reflects the unsettled use of the Wisdom tradition in the second century. It also shows that his doctrines of the Logos and the Spirit are not worked out on the basis of this tradition. The latter is applied to the Logos or the Spirit as it suits him. The application of Prov 8:22 to the Spirit does strengthen the supposition that ἀπόρροια comes from the Wisdom tradition. Wisdom, to which the predicate πνεῦμα is applied in Wis 1:6,[9] provides the language

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[6] See David S. Margoliouth, "Was the Book of Wisdom written in Hebrew?" *JRAS* NS 22 (1890): 263–297, esp. 285. So also Robert M. Grant, "The Book of Wisdom at Alexandria," in his *After the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967), 72.

[7] Thus, for example, Robert M. Grant, *The Early Christian Doctrine of God* (Richard Lectures 1965–1966; Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 92.

[8] Karl Friedrich Bauer, *Die Lehre des Athenagoras von Gottes Einheit und Dreieinigkeit* (Bamberg: Handels-Druckerei, 1902), 35 n. 7.

[9] See Max Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie* (Oldenburg: F. Schmidt, 1872), 193ff.

with which Athenagoras describes the Spirit, who is said to correspond or agree with the Logos with respect to its cosmic function.

It is striking, however, that the Logos is described by Athenagoras not so much in Wisdom language as in Middle Platonic terms. All things were made through the Word by God, who is νοῦς ἀΐδιος.[10] All things have been made subject to God and His Word, His Son by | intellectual generation and inseparable (νοουμένῳ ἀμερίστῳ).[11] The Son is the Logos of the Father ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, and all things were made through Him and with Him as their standard.[12] The Logos came forth from the Father to be the Idea and Power over all the elements of matter which lay like a substratum under nature which was without quality.[13] 540

Athenagoras associates the Spirit with the Logos in creation and also describes the activity of the Spirit in Platonic terms. In *Leg.* 6.2, after quoting *Tim.* 41A, he says: εἰ τοίνυν οὐκ ἐστιν ἄθεος Πλάτων, ἕνα τὸν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων νοῶν ἀγένητον θεόν, οὐδὲ ἡμεῖς ἄθεοι, ὑφ᾽ οὗ λόγῳ δεδημιούργηται καὶ τῷ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ πνεύματι συνέχεται τὰ πάντα. It has been suggested that πνεύματι συνέχεται τὰ πάντα shows that Athenagoras has a Stoic conception of the Spirit's cosmic function.[14] Such Stoic influence need not have been direct. *Timaeus* 41A occurs in Middle Platonic treatments of the World Soul,[15] a doctrine which had already in Middle Platonism become a mixture of Platonic and Stoic elements, as is illustrated by Atticus.[16] Athenagoras may have acquired this description of the Spirit from Middle Platonic speculation on the World Soul. The Platonic element is again present in *Leg.* 5.3, where Athenagoras says that God's works are held in rein (ἡνιοχεῖται) by

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10 Athenagoras, *Leg.* 10.3; cf. 4.2; 6.3. See Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.3 in *Albinos épitomé* (ed. and trans. Pierre Louis; NCTD; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1945).

11 Athenagoras, *Leg.* 18.2. The source for ἀμέριστος is Plato, *Tim.* 35A, 37A. See Plutarch's discussion of the World Soul for the Middle Platonic concern with the concept, *An. procr.* 1012DE, 1014D, 1022EF, 1023D, etc. Cf. also Alcinous, *Didask.* 14.1–2.

12 Athenagoras, *Leg.* 10.2; cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 9.1ff.

13 Athenagoras, *Leg.* 10.2. Cf. 15.2, ἡ πανδεχὴς ὕλη ... διάκρισιν καὶ σχῆμα καὶ κόσμον οὐκ ἐλάμβανεν. See Alcinous, *Didask.* 8.2–3; Diogenes Laertius 3.69, 76. For the Ideas and creation, see Alcinous, *Didask.* 9.3.

14 Aimé Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du II^e siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Hachette, 1912), 336–337. Cf. Origen, *Cels.* 6.71.

15 Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 15.2; the Platonic source of Hippolytus, *Haer.* 1.19 in Hermann Diels, ed., *Doxographi Graeci* (3d ed.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1958), 568, lines 2ff.; Atticus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.6, 801Df. on *Tim.* 41B.

16 Cf. Atticus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.12, 814B, μία τις ... δύναμις ἔμψυχος διήκουσα διὰ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ πάντα συνδοῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα and the discussions in Jules Baudry, ed., *Atticus. Fragments de son œuvre* (NCTD 3; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1931), 29–30; Friedrich Überweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie* (ed. Karl Praechter et al.; 5 vols.; 12th rev. and enl. ed.; Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1923–1928), 1 (1926): 549.

the Spirit. The use of ἡνιοχεῖσθαι calls to mind the myth of the charioteer in Plato's *Phaedrus* (246AB), from which Athenagoras elsewhere quotes,[17] and which is reflected a number of times in the *Legatio*.[18] This myth, too, figured in Middle Platonic discussions of | the World Soul. According to Atticus, the view that the World Soul orders the universe is based on *Phaedr.* 246BC,[19] and *Phaedr.* 245C occurs in Plutarch's treatment of the same subject.[20]

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This Platonic background suggests that Athenagoras's description of the Spirit as ἀπόρροια may have its roots here. It has recently been shown that ἀπόρροια is not found in the mainstream of Greek philosophy.[21] Yet the points of contact between Athenagoras's doctrines of the Logos and the Spirit and the Middle Platonic discussions of the World Soul strengthen the suspicion that the latter is not irrelevant to our inquiry. Plutarch does in fact describe the World Soul as an ἀπορροή of the divine,[22] and according to Eusebius, Plato calls the intermediary beings the ἀπόρροιαι, of the First Cause.[23] The term ἀπόρροια does not occur in Plato in this sense, but it is possible that Eusebius had *Phaedr.* 245C in mind.[24] It may be significant that the closest contacts Athenagoras has with Platonism on this subject are with Plutarch and Atticus, who were regarded as heretics in

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[17] Plato, *Phaedr.* 246E in *Leg.* 23.9.

[18] E.g., ὑπερκύψαι in *Leg.* 22.12; 25.1 is suggested by ἀνακύψασα of *Phaedr.* 249C. Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 11 (in Hermann Hobein, ed., *Maximi Tyrii Philosophumena* [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910], 141, lines 11–12) uses ὑπερκύψαι in obvious reference to the *Phaedrus.* Cf. also Philo, *Gig.* 13; *Praem.* 5. Οὐράνιον τόπον in *Leg.* 22.12 is inspired by *Phaedr.* 247C, a passage that Celsus claimed the Christians had misunderstood; cf. Origen, *Cels.* 6.19 and Carl Andresen, *Logos und Nomos: Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (AKG 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955), 157ff.

[19] *Apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.12, 814A. See Baudry, *Atticus*, 29.

[20] Plutarch, *An. procr.* 1013C.

[21] Heinrich Dörrie, "Emanation: Ein unphilosophisches Wort im spätantiken Denken," in *Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus: Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger* (ed. Kurt Flasch; Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1965), 119–141. See also Joseph Ratzinger, "Emanation," *RAC* 4 (1959): 1219–1228, esp. 1221–1222. For ἀπόρροια in the Cappadocians, see Marguerite Harl, "A propos d'un passage du *Contre Eunome* de Grégoire de Nysse: ἀπόρροια et les titres du Christ en théologie trinitaire," *RSR* 55 (1967): 218–225.

[22] Plutarch, *Is. Os.* 371B; cf. 372F. See Hans J. Kraemer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Plato und Plotinus* (Amsterdam: P. Schippers, 1964), 93ff. Dörrie, "Emanation," 133–135, correctly shows that Plutarch uses the term frequently but that he does not use it in his major philosophical discussions. Dörrie, however, does not refer to *Is. Os.*

[23] Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 13.15, 694C–696A.

[24] Thus already Edwin H. Gifford, *Eusebii Pamphilii Evangelicae praeparationis libri XV* (4 vols. in 5; New York: H. Frowde, 1903), 4:468.

Platonic circles.[25] Athenagoras's description of the Spirit's cosmic activity appears to utilize this tradition.[26]

Athenagoras thus conceives of the function of the Spirit in creation along the lines of the Middle Platonic World Soul. In this respect the Spirit corresponds to the Logos, with the exception that the Logos is the agent through which God created the world, while through the | Spirit he maintains and controls it. Although the description of the Spirit as an emanation is supported by a reference to the current Wisdom tradition, Athenagoras's conception of the Spirit's cosmic function seems to be more basically influenced by Platonic treatments of the World Soul in which the latter is on occasion referred to as an ἀπόρροια.

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[25] See Dörrie, review of Andresen, *Logos und Nomos* in *Gn* 29 (1957): 188–189; Jan H. Waszink, "Bemerkungen zum Einfluß des Platonismus im frühen Christentum," *VC* 19 (1965): 138ff.

[26] See Friedo Ricken, "Die Logoslehre des Eusebios von Caesarea und der Mittelplatonismus," *TP* 42 (1967): 341–358, who demonstrates the affinities between Eusebius's Logos doctrine and the Middle Platonic World Soul, and Ioannes M. Pfättisch, *Der Einfluß Platos auf die Theologie Justins des Märtyrers: Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung nebst einem Anhang über die Komposition der Apologien Justins* (FChLDG 10.1; Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1910), who probably overemphasizes the influence of Plato's teaching on the World Soul on Justin's Logos doctrine.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

# ATHENAGORAS ON THE LOCATION OF GOD*

Athenagoras of Athens offers his first major exposition of a Christian doctrine in chapter 8 of his *Legatio pro Christianis* (ca. AD 177).[1] Here he claims to be giving a rational argument (λογισμός) for the Christian belief in the unity of God.

## Middle Platonist Influence

Although his debt to other philosophers, especially to the Stoics and to Philo of Alexandria has been pointed out, it has also been admitted that in the finer points, viz., on the place a multiplicity of gods would occupy, the argument is his own.[2] Noting that modern assessments of Athenagoras's effort have for the most part been unfavorable,[3] Robert M. Grant in a suggestive manner has recently reexamined the passage.[4] He finds philosophical models for Athenagoras in Philo, the Stoics, *Corp. herm.* 11, and especially in the Pseudo-Aristotelian *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia*. Against this background, and with assumptions that are both Platonic and Christian, Athenagoras is said to develop his argument on the location of God. Grant suggests that the argument "seems to find a *Sitz im Leben* if at least in part, and perhaps as a whole, it was originally produced as a semiphilosophical reply to Marcion and then was used again in relation to

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* Originally published in *TZ* 26 (1970): 46–52.

[1] Although the original essay referred to Athenagoras's *Supplicatio pro Christianis*, recent scholarship has adopted the standard title of *Legatio pro Christianis*, which this edition of the essay will employ; despite the change in name, the references to the work remain the same. References in this essay are from William R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras*: Legatio *and* De Resurrectione (OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).

[2] Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907), 177–179.

[3] Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 179; Aimé Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du IIe siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Hachette, 1912), 185–186; Cyril C. Richardson, *Early Christian Fathers* (LCC 1; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), 295; Joseph H. Crehan, *Athenagoras: Embassy for the Christians, The Resurrection of the Dead* (ACW 23; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1956), 131.

[4] Robert M. Grant, *The Early Christian Doctrine of God* (Richard Lectures 1965–1966; Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 105–110.

philosophy."[5] As I have elsewhere demonstrated, Athenagoras's exposition of Christian doctrine in chapters 4–12 follows the framework of a *Middle Platonist* epitome of Plato's philosophy like Alcinous's *Didaskalikos*, and his argument on the location of God comes at a point appropriate to such a summary.[6] I here suggest that an examination of | Athenagoras's argument against this background can lead to greater precision in determining his philosophical models and his own use of them.

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The argument of chapter 8 is expository in character rather than polemical. But Athenagoras's polemic in chapters 17–22, where he attacks the existence of the pagan gods, reveals the Platonic understanding of the nature of God that is assumed in his exposition in chapter 8. It is important for Athenagoras that a god should be ἐξ ἀρχῆς and ἀγένητος. So he repeatedly levels the charge at the pagan gods that they did not exist ἐξ ἀρχῆς and therefore cannot be gods.[7] The Christian God alone is ἀγένητος and without beginning. To prove this claim he quotes *Timaeus* 27D in *Leg.* 19.1–2, and frequently formulates his polemic in language derived from this passage in Plato or justified by it.[8]

## Possible Location of Many Gods

To prove God's uniqueness, Athenagoras considers where the location of a multiplicity of gods would be. Two possibilities are open: They were either in the same place, or each of them was separately in his own.[9] The introduction of τόπος at this point in the discussion of the nature of God may very well have been suggested by the fact that it also occurs in a

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[5] Grant, *Early Christian Doctrine of God*, 110.

[6] Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Structure of Athenagoras, *Supplicatio pro Christianis*," *VC* 23 (1969): 1–20. [*Light*, 2:807–827]

[7] E.g., Athenagoras, *Leg.* 17.1ff.; 17.5ff.

[8] The influence of *Tim.* 27CD can be detected in *Leg.* 4.1ff.; 6.2; 10.1; 17.5; 18.3; 19.1ff.; 20.1; 21.5; 24.1–2; 30.4. The argument in chapter 17 on the history of the statues and names of the gods is a polemical application of this principle, and is not in the first place designed, as Geffcken thinks (*Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 193–196), to impress Athenagoras's readers.

[9] As I have pointed out, "The Structure of Athenagoras," 15 n. 77 [*Light*, 2:822 n. 81], the whole argument of chapter 8 deals with the place of the gods, and not their genera, as Ubaldi, Bardy, Crehan, and Grant understand it. Maran and Otto correctly see the argument as dealing with the place of God. See Paolo Ubaldi, *La supplica per i Cristiani* (SGC 3; Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1920); Gustave Bardy, *Athénagore. Supplique au sujet des chrétiens* (SC 3; Paris: Cerf, 1943); Crehan, *Athenagoras*; Grant, *Early Christian Doctrine of God*; P. Maran, *Apologia Athenagorae* (PG 6:887–1024; Paris, 1742); and J.C.T. Otto, *Athenagoras philosophi Atheniensis* (Jena: Mauke, 1857).

corresponding place in a Middle Platonic epitome of Plato's thought. Thus Alcinous, apparently thinking of *Parmenides* 138BC and *Theaetetus* 181D, also mentions τόπος, albeit only incidentally, when he discusses God as | ἀρχικός.[10] Although Alcinous does not give an extended discussion of the subject here, space was a frequent topic of speculation among later Platonists.[11] 48

Athenagoras first denies that more than one god could be in the same place. If they were gods, and therefore ἀγένητοι, they would be unlike each other. Only created things are like their patterns, whereas uncreated things are unlike, οὔτε ἀπό τινος οὔτε πρός τινα γενόμενα (*Leg.* 8.2). The unexpressed conclusion seems to be that objects are alike because they are made after the same pattern. His line of thought here is generally Platonic. The Ideas are described by second-century Platonists as patterns. An Idea is that ἐκ τινός and πρός τι something is created.[12] Athenagoras is familiar with the Middle Platonic view of the Ideas, and in fact describes the Logos, whose primary function for him is that it is the agent of creation,[13] in language borrowed from Middle Platonic descriptions of the Ideas.[14] Furthermore, the view that likeness between objects derives from their common participation in the Ideas may be based on a certain understanding of passages from Plato such as *Parm.* 128A, 132CD. Nevertheless, the combination in this way of the argument of space with the doctrine of Ideas is not found elsewhere.[15]

How τόπος was conceived of by Athenagoras's contemporaries helps to clarify his reasoning. The Stoics defined space as τὸ ἐχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος,[16] or more fully, they held space to be τὸν ὑπὸ ὄντος (viz. σώματος) κατεχόμενον

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10 Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.7 in *Albinos épitomé* (ed. and trans. Pierre Louis; NCTD; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1945), 63. Cf. also 11.1 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 65), where he argues that if qualities were bodies, two or more bodies would be in the same place, which is most absurd. It is now widely recognized that Alcinous was the author of the *Didaskalikos*.

11 Hans Leisegang, *Die Raumtheorie im späteren Platonismus, insbesondere bei Philon und den Neuplatonikern* (Weida: Thomas & Hubert, 1911).

12 E.g., Alcinous, *Didask.* 9.1, 3 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 51, 53). See André-Jean Festugière, "Le 'compendium Timaei' de Galien," *REG* 65 (1952): 97–118, esp. 106–107.

13 Cf. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 4.2; 6.2; 10.1–2.

14 E.g., the Son is the eternal thought of God, the λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο (*Leg.* 10.2). See my article, "The Holy Spirit in Athenagoras," *JTS* 20 (1969): 538–542. [*Light*, 2:837–841]

15 Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 177.

16 Aetius, *Placita* 1.20.1 (Hermann Diels, ed., *Doxographi Graeci* [Berlin: G. Reimer, 1879], 317, lines 34–35).

49 καὶ ἐξισαζόμενον τῷ κατέχοντι αὐτόν.[17] | Middle Platonists appropriated this view, and regarded space as filled with matter in such a way that it could be equated with matter.[18] Space would therefore seem to be something corporeal, as Plutarch indeed held it to be,[19] and as such it would have the capability of receiving the Forms,[20] and so can also be defined as τὸ μεταληπτικὸν τῶν εἰδῶν, ὅπερ εἴρηκε μεταφορικῶς τὴν ὕλην καθάπερ, τινὰ τιθήνην καὶ δεξαμένην.[21] The identification of an object with the space it occupies, and the participation of that space in the Ideas, were thus not unknown conceptions in the school philosophy of Athenagoras's day. He only speaks hypothetically, of course, when he assigns God to a particular place, and he does not of course think of God as corporeal, nor does he work out the exact relationship between God and the space He would occupy. What he does is to use the categories of contemporary philosophical discussion to argue, on the basis of Platonic and Christian assumptions, for the uniqueness of God.

Athenagoras next raises the question whether a multiplicity of gods could be complementary parts (συμπληρωτικὰ μέρη) of each other, and God in this sense be one, while admitting the existence of other divine beings (*Leg.* 8.3). Geffcken has noted the Stoic influence in the metaphor of the members of the body and has suggested that Athenagoras is here polemicizing against the Stoics.[22] This may be so,[23] but it is more likely that the Stoic elements in this argument came to him via his Middle Platonic models which had already assimilated much of Stoicism. Alcinous, for example, in his description of God had affirmed that God is no part of
50 anything, nor a whole possessing any parts, and had elaborated on the | theme. Alcinous's basic argument is that a part is prior to that of which it is a part, which would rule out God's being ἀρχικός.[24] He equally firmly

[17] Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 10.3; cf. *Pyr.* 3.124; Aristotle, *Phys.* 4.4.211a27ff.

[18] See Leisegang, *Die Raumtheorie im späteren Platonismus*; Plutarch, *An. procr.* 1014E; Alcinous, *Didask.* 8.2 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 49).

[19] Plutarch, *An. procr.* 1014BD; 1024C. According to Alcinous, however, matter in itself is only potentially a body. Cf. *Didask.* 8.3 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 51). See also the uncertainty of Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 1.5, on the subject.

[20] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 8.2 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 49), and the Platonic source behind Diogenes Laertius 3.69, 76.

[21] Aetius, *Placita* 1.19.1 (Diels 317, lines 23–26).

[22] Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 178.

[23] Cf. Athenagoras, *Leg.* 22.4. But notice that in 6.3 and in 16.3 it is the Peripatetics who hold that God is a composite being, his body being the ethereal region.

[24] Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.4, 7 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 59, 63). Cf. also Philo, *Post.* 3.

rejects the possibility that God might be corporeal.[25] Athenagoras's reply to the suggestion that God might in some sense be a composite body is not dissimilar to that of Alcinous, and is as firm: ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἀγένητος καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος· οὐκ ἄρα συνεστὼς ἐκ μερῶν (*Leg.* 8.3). As we have seen, that God is ἀγένητος and ἐξ ἀρχῆς is for Athenagoras a Platonic axiom and can be assumed to underlie his thinking here.

## The Exclusive Location of God

The other alternative to the argument is that a second or more gods and the Creator would each be in their own places. Athenagoras then reasons that a second god would be either in this world or in another world. He cannot, however, be in this world, for the God who created it as a closed, spherical entity is above His creation and controls it by His providence (*Leg.* 8.4). Neither is there place for a second god in another world, for the Creator has filled everything (*Leg.* 8.6–7). Even if he should be in another world and its sphere, he is in no way concerned with us, for he does not control this world, nor is he great in power, for he is circumscribed by space (*Leg.* 8.5). Thus, not only does the other god have no place to occupy, neither does he have any function to perform. So, since he neither creates, nor exercises providence, nor has any place, Athenagoras concludes, εἷς οὗτος ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ μόνος ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ κόσμου θεός (*Leg.* 8.8).

Grant has suggested that Athenagoras's description of the world as a sphere may have been influenced by the *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia*, which claims that God is spherical.[26] Such dependence is highly implausible. Athenagoras knows that Aristotle was claimed to have said that God is spherical, and he explicitly rejects the | idea,[27] as he does the view ascribed to Aristotle, that things sublunary were outside God's providence.[28] He could have gotten the description from a Platonic source like Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 1.8, "Hence (Plato says) that there is one world, and in it all things; nor is there a place left in which another world could be … It has been sought by the creating God in behalf of the world, which, 50

[25] Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.8 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 63–64).

[26] Grant, *Early Christian Doctrine of God*, 107–108.

[27] Athenagoras, *Leg.* 6.3, where Athenagoras is dependent for his information on a doxography (cf. 6.2).

[28] Athenagoras, *Leg.* 25. Athenagoras shares the bias of his Middle Platonist contemporaries against Aristotle on these matters. See Carl Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," *ZNW* 44 (1952–1953): 157–195, esp. 161.

like a beautiful and perfect sphere, is the most perfect and beautiful, that it should be in want of nothing, and contain all things by shutting in and restraining them, and be beautiful and wonderful, like and answering to himself."[29] Furthermore, that Platonists were interested in the question whether Providence could exist in more worlds than one, should there be any, is clear from Plutarch.[30] Athenagoras may be dependent, as has been claimed, on Philo for the idea that God has filled the world,[31] but it is also found in Alcinous.[32]

## Conclusion

We conclude, then, that Athenagoras had models for his argument on the place of God in Middle Platonic discussions of space and of God and the world. The topics he uses, if not the way in which he uses them, are, for instance, taken up by Plutarch when he attacks the Stoic view of the universe: the universe as σῶμα, σῶμα and τόπος, the activity of the universe, the universe as a part or a whole, the perfection of the universe, and the universe as cause.[33] | Athenagoras uses his models with presuppositions that are both Platonic and Christian. Statements on the location of God are also made by other second-century Christian Apologists,[34] and the subject may later have become an important enough part of Christian polemic to call forth pagan response,[35] but to Athenagoras belongs the credit to have been the first Christian writer to give prolonged attention to it.

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[29] Apuleius is thinking of *Tim.* 33AB. Other Platonists understood Plato to have been willing to admit to the possibility of five worlds, but personally to have held to one. For the uneasiness with which a plurality of worlds was viewed, see Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 389F, 422A, 430B.

[30] Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 423C, 425E–426E. On Middle Platonic interest in providence, see Ps.-Plutarch, *De fato*, and the discussion by Phillip de Lacy and Benedict Einarson, *Plutarch: Moralia 7* (LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), 303ff.

[31] Philo, *Leg.* 3.4; *Conf.* 136. For Philo's view of τόπος, see Leisegang, *Die Raumtheorie im späteren Platonismus*, 27–46; Gerhard Delling, "πληρόω," *TDNT* 6 (1968): 286–298, esp. 288–289; and Helmut Köster, "τόπος," *TDNT* 8 (1972): 187–208, esp. 201–202.

[32] Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.3 (Louis, *Albinos épitomé*, 59).

[33] Plutarch, *Comm. not.* 1073A–1074A.

[34] Aristides, *Apol.* 1.5; Theophilus, *Autol.* 2.3 (cf. also 2.10). See also *Mart. SS. Iust. et Soc.* 3, and from a later period, Ps.-Justin, *Quaest. Christ. ad Gent.* 5.

[35] Arthur Darby Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), xlii, believes that the assertion of Sallustius (§ 2, page 2, line 14) that the gods are free from limitations of space may possibly be a counter to Christian polemic.

CHAPTER TWELVE

# ATHENAGORAS ON THE POETS AND PHILOSOPHERS*

Athenagoras shows a high regard for the philosophy and culture of the Greeks. Like the other Apologists, however, he is determined to show that, because it relied on human reason alone, Greek philosophy attained to only partial truth.[1] Athenagoras's *Legatio pro Christianis*[2] is an exposition of the Christian faith that is carefully organized along the lines of a Middle Platonic epitome of Plato's philosophy.[3] His thought is frequently illuminated when it is seen against this background,[4] and it is the aim of this essay to examine his assessment of the knowledge of God held by the Greek poets and philosophers from this perspective.

In keeping with a practice of his day, Athenagoras mentions or discusses poets and philosophers in the same context.[5] He attributes their success or failure to attain to a knowledge of God to the degree to which they employed or disregarded the proper dialectic method, which for him is basically a Platonic one.[6] Middle Platonists referred to dialectic as θεωρία

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1 Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* (3 vols.; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950–1960), 1:187, 229.

2 Although the original essay referred to Athenagoras's *Supplicatio pro Christianis*, recent scholarship has adopted the standard title of *Legatio pro Christianis*, which this edition of the essay will employ; despite the change in name, the references to the work remain the same.

3 See Abraham. J. Malherbe, "The Structure of Athenagoras, *Supplicatio pro Christianis*," *VC* 23 (1969): 1–20. [*Light*, 2:807–827]

4 See, for example, Abraham J. Malherbe, "Athenagoras on Christian Ethics," *JEH* 20 (1969): 1–5; [*Light*, 2:829–835] Malherbe, "The Holy Spirit in Athenagoras," *JTS* NS 20 (1969): 538–542; [*Light*, 2:837–841] Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Location of God," *TZ* 26 (1970): 46–52. [*Light*, 2:843–848]

5 E.g., *Leg.* 7.2. (Unless stated otherwise, references are to the *Legatio*, and according to the edition of William R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras*: Legatio *and* De Resurrectione [OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972]). In chapters 17–21 the poets are discussed, and in chapter 22 the philosophers' interpretation of the poets is added. In chapter 23 he again takes up the poets, and in *Leg.* 24.1ff. he forgoes further treatment of the poets on the grounds that they agree with the philosophers. See Cicero, *Nat. d.* 3.91; Plutarch, *Is. Os.* 369B, and Pierre Boyancé, *Le culte des muses chez les philosophes grecs. Études d'histoire et de psychologie religieuses* (BEFAR 141; Paris: E. de Boccard, 1936). For our period in particular, see Robert M. Grant, *The Letter and the Spirit* (New York: Macmillian, 1957), 1–30.

6 See Malherbe, "Structure," 6–12.

of the mind which views the intelligibles,[7] and results in scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη).[8] Stated in a different way, it is the Divine who is the object of contemplation,[9] and He is perceived by mind and reason alone.[10] For Middle Platonists, this idea was based on *Tim.* 27D–28A[11] and *Phaedr.* 274CD.[12] For Athenagoras also, God, who is unbegotten and invisible, is contemplated by mind and reason alone (*Leg.* 4.1).[13] His source for this idea is *Tim.* 27D (cf. *Leg.* 19.1–2), which is the basis for his insistence that a proper dialectical distinction (διαίρεσις) must be made between what is without beginning and what comes into being, what is the object of the intellect and what the object of sense (e.g., *Leg.* 15.1ff.). As we shall see later, *Phaedr.* 247CD also informs his thinking at significant points. | 215

## Euripides, Other Poets, and the Philosophers' Use of Allegory to Interpret Myths

At the beginning of his defense against the charge that Christians are atheists, Athenagoras in the *Legatio* refers to the poets and philosophers (*Leg.* 5.1–3). Using a compendium of quotations from the tragedians, he offers Euripides as an example of the poets and philosophers who had shown scientific interest in God (ἐπιστήσαντες περὶ θεοῦ): Euripides was perplexed about those beings who are unscientifically named gods by common intelligence (ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἀνεπιστημόνως ὀνομαζομένων θεῶν διαπορῶν). When he operated κατὰ κοινὴν πρόληψιν, that is, with those concepts developed in a purely natural manner on the basis

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[7] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 3.5; 4.6 in *Albinos épitomé* (ed. Pierre Louis; NCTD; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1945). Scholars now recognize Alcinous as the author of the *Didaskalikos.* On θεωρία among the Middle Platonists, see Maximus of Tyre 15.9 in *Maximi Tyrii Philosophumena* (ed. Hermann Hobein; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910), 194, lines 1–2; Justin, *Dial.* 2.6.

[8] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 7.5; Maximus of Tyre 6.1 (p. 65, line 9; p. 66, lines 12–15 Hobein).

[9] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 2.2.

[10] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.4.

[11] See Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 7.141–142 in *Sexti Empirici Opera* (ed. Hermann Mutschmann; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1914) = *Log.* 1.141–142 (LCL); Ps.-Justin, *Cohort. graec.* 22.21A–B; Numenius, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 11.10, 526A–D.

[12] See Malherbe, "Structure," 7 n. 42; 8 n. 44. [*Light*, 2:814 nn. 45 and 47]

[13] On θεωρία in Athenagoras, see *Leg.* 20.4ff. It is the τέλος of man; cf. *Res.* 13.2 in Schoedel, *Athenagoras:* Legatio *and* De Resurrectione; see also *Res.* 25.4 and *Res.* 12.5.

of experience, uncertainty resulted.[14] However, when Euripides considered what is intelligible by pure reason (ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην νοητοῦ), he philosophically affirmed (δογματίζων)[15] that there is a god. Athenagoras then elaborates on the former instance by discussing the names of the gods. In observing the gods of common opinion, knowledge of whom came only by report (οὐκ οἶδα πλὴν λόγῳ), Euripides saw that no essence underlay those beings upon whom the name of God had been predicated as an accident (ἐπικατηγορεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα συμβέβηκεν). Nor were the names predicated of real subjects (ὑποκειμένων … πραγμάτων); for if there is no οὐσία as the ground of being, there is nothing more than the mere name.

Exactly how Euripides came to this insight, Athenagoras does not say, except that Euripides made a philosophical affirmation ἐπὶ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην νοητοῦ, and that, intellectually perceiving that things apparent are the vision of the non-evident (ὄψιν[16] τῶν ἀδήλων νοῶν τὰ φαινόμενα, 5.2), the creation pointed him to its creator. From Athenagoras's Middle Platonic understanding of intellection, this would mean that it is Euripides's dialectical distinction that enabled him to arrive at the knowledge that God exists. That the correct application of names does involve rigorous dialectical διαίρεσις is clear from Middle Platonists[17] and from elsewhere in Athenagoras himself (cf. *Leg.* 15.1ff.). Euripides thus provides proof for Athenagoras that a poet, observing correct dialectical method, can attain to the knowledge that God exists.

That a man like Euripides could attain to this knowledge does not mean that Athenagoras has a high regard for the poets of the Greek myths. In *Leg.* 17–22 he attacks the names, and, therefore, the existence of pagan gods and their statues on the basis of his dialectical principle derived from *Tim.* 27D: What has an origin in time can have no true being. In *Leg.* 17.1ff., in introducing his discussion, he states his major charge: The names and statues of the gods came into existence, one might say, only the other day, and therefore they cannot be real gods.[18] The same point

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[14] Malherbe, "Structure," 8–9.

[15] *Leg.* 5.1. For δόγμα used of philosophical doctrines, see Alcinous, *Didask.* 1.1. See Jan H. Waszink, *Tertullian: De Anima* (Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenhoff, 1947), 394.

[16] This emendation by Schwartz of ὄψει in MS A is supported by the statement Sextus Empiricus attributes to the dogmatists: ὄψις γὰρ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα (*Pyr.* 1.138; p. 36, lines 22–24 in *Sexti Empirici Opera* [ed. Hermann Mutschmann; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1912]).

[17] E.g., Alcinous, *Didask.* 6.10.

[18] Cf. *Leg.* 17.5. In chapter 17 Athenagoras, using a handbook on sculpture and painting, is primarily concerned with the origins of the statues and gods he surveys. Johannes

is made repeatedly in chapters 18–21, where he treats of the names of the
216 gods by discussing | the myths. It is Orpheus, Homer, and Hesiod, he says, who gave genealogies and names to the gods (*Leg.* 17.1) Orpheus in particular, is important: "Orpheus was the first to discover their names and give an account of their beginnings and their several actions, and who is usually regarded as theologizing (θεολογεῖν) most accurately" (*Leg.* 18.3). This θεολογία of the poets is incredible to Athenagoras (*Leg.* 20.1). He uses the word θεολογεῖν in chapters 18–20 in the old sense of μυθολογεῖν, always in a bad sense.[19] The myths belong to the ignorant, to the masses who accept them without questioning, and the criterion by which the gods of the poets are rejected is the same as that by which the gods of the masses are rejected.[20] This criterion is stated again in 19.1: How can each of the beings of whom a theology has been given exist, since it did not exist in the beginning? As proof-text, he then quotes *Tim.* 27D. The gods of the myths are thus criticized in a Platonic manner: The myths do not distinguish between God and matter.

In his evaluation of the myths Athenagoras did not stand altogether outside the philosophical tradition of his day.[21] Nevertheless, pagan philosophers did not reject the myths. Philosophers and poets were inextricably connected, for the poets were considered to have been inspired, and it was deemed the duty of the philosopher to interpret the myths for the truth they did contain.[22] The allegorical method of interpretation was thus applied to the myths, by the first century AD especially by the Stoics, although it had a much earlier origin.[23] The Middle Platonists attached

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Geffcken's view (*Zwei griechische Apologeten* [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907], 193–196), that Athenagoras's recounting of the stories about the statues is designed to impress his readers, misses the point. He seeks to prove by what were for him philosophical means, that the statues, having a beginning, consequently have no real being and cannot be gods. The influence of *Tim.* 27CD on his argument is evident throughout this section, e.g., *Leg.* 17.5; 18.3; 19.1ff.; 20.1; 21.5.

[19] On θεολογεῖν, see Paul Natorp, "Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik" *PhM* 24 (1887–1888): 37–65; Appendix 3 in André-Jean Festugière, *La dieu cosmique*, vol. 1 of *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (4 vols.; *EBib* 38; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1949–1954), 598–605; Ferdinand Kattenbusch, "Die Entstehung einer christlichen Theologie: Zur Geschichte der Ausdruck θεολογία, θεολογεῖν, θεολόγος," *ZTK* NS 11 (1930): 161–205.

[20] *Leg.* 21.2; 30.4; 23.8; 15.1ff.

[21] See Grant, *Letter and the Spirit*, 13ff.

[22] See Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity* (ed. Andrew M. Fairbairn; 6th ed.; Hibbert Lectures 1888; London: Williams & Norgate, 1897), 50–85.

[23] See John Tate, "On the History of Allegorism," *CQ* 28 (1934): 105–114; Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Vol. 1: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation* (SGPS 3; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 24–72.

most value to the tradition centered around Orpheus and Pythagoras, and of these Orpheus was the θεολόγος κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν.[24]

In *Leg.* 22 Athenagoras thus takes up the possibility of there being any φυσικὸς λόγος in this poetic vagary.[25] He uses φυσικὸς λόγος in a dialectical sense, as Alcinous does, of man's critical faculty that engages in the contemplation of the intelligibles.[26] Is there any ὄργανον φυσικόν that judges between truth and falsehood in allegory?[27] He describes allegorization as φυσιολογεῖν[28] and θεολογεῖν,[29] both of which terms were currently used in this sense. His criticism of the allegorists is similar to that of the poets themselves. For example, Empedocles's allegorization is regarded as unacceptable because it makes corruptible, unstable, and changing matter equal with the eternal, the unbegotten, and immutable God (*Leg.* 22.3). He also rejects the allegorizing | of the Stoics, charging that they made τὰ εἴδη τῆς ὕλης the body of God, and that when the forms burn up in the Stoic conflagration, the Stoic gods would burn up with them (*Leg.* 22.5). He says of the allegorists: 217

> Twisting upwards and downwards about the forms of matter (τὰ εἴδη τῆς ὕλης), they miss the God who is to be contemplated by reason (τοῦ λόγῳ θεωρητοῦ θεοῦ); they deify the elements and their portions, giving them now one name and now another (*Leg.* 22.9).

He concludes that those who divinize the myths are doing anything but theologizing:[30]

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[24] Grant, *Letter and the Spirit*, 28; Carl Andresen, *Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (AKG 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955), 118–19; Natorp, "Thema und Disposition," 60.

[25] Cf. Cicero, *Nat. d.* 2.64 on Stoic allegorizing: ... *physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas*.

[26] Alcinous, *Didask.* 4.1.

[27] His source here is a polemic against Stoic allegorization that he reworks to suit his own polemical and philosophical interests. For differing judgments on his use of this source, see Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 207ff., and Gustave Bardy, *Athénagore. Supplique au sujet des chrétiens* (SC 3; Paris: Cerf, 1943), 124 n. 6.

[28] *Leg.* 22.4, 8. On the development of the use of φυσιολογεῖν, see esp. Johannes Munck, *Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria* (FKGG 2; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933), 88 n. 3. For a Platonist's view of the task, see esp. the fragment from Plutarch's *De Daedalis Plataeensibus*, extant in Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 3.1, 83C.

[29] *Leg.* 22.10. For θεολογεῖν in this sense, see refs. above in n. 19, and Ps.-Plutarch, *Fato* 568D; Plutarch, *Is. Os.* 367C; Strabo 10.3.23. On Celsus and allegorization, see Grant, *Letter and the Spirit*, 28.

[30] *Leg.* 22.10. Here Athenagoras uses θεολογεῖν with the old nuance of "talking about God." See Kattenbusch, "Entstehung einer christlichen Theologie," 199 n. 1; Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma* (trans. Neil Buchanan, James Millar, E.B. Speirs, and William M'Gilchrist; 7 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1894–1899; repr., 7 vols. in 4; New York: Dover Publications, 1961), 2:202 n. 1.

> They miss the greatness of God, and, not being able to reach upward with their reason (ὑπερκύψαι τῷ λόγῳ . . . οὐ δυνάμενοι), for they do not have sympathy which extends to the heavenly region (οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσιν συμπάθειαν εἰς τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον), they are attached to the forms of matter, and thus fallen, they divinize the changings of the elements. (*Leg.* 22.12)

In this rejection of allegorization, Athenagoras once more uses the language of Platonism. Thus his argument that the Stoics confine God to matter, and that God would therefore be destroyed in the conflagration, is also found in Plutarch's debate with the Stoics.[31] That the contemporary Middle Platonic concern with *Phaedr.* 247CD and *Tim.* 27D is behind his strictures is evident from the phrases ὑπερκύψαι τῷ λόγῳ . . . οὐράνιον τόπον and τοῦ λόγῳ θεωρήτου θεοῦ respectively.

When Athenagoras views the poets and philosophers apart from their allegorization, his judgment of them is more generous. As we have seen, he says that they do perceive intellectually, and when they do so, they agree with Christians on the existence of God.[32] However, he intends a contrast to be seen between the poets' and philosophers' treatment of the gods and the thorough Christian διαίρεσις. The former agree on the unity of God, but some of them think that the gods are spirits while others think of them as material and still others as human creatures (*Leg.* 24.1). Christians, on the other hand, by the application of sound dialectical method examine the essence of God and matter, and consequently perceive the true character of the demonic spirits.

According to *Tim.* 27D, a distinction must be made between being and nonbeing, between what is comprehended by intelligence and reason, and what is conjectured by opinion. According to Athenagoras, such a clear distinction has not been made by the poets and philosophers, and the consequences of their failure to do so are stated in *Leg.* 24.6, where he contrasts the knowledge about the giants held by the poets and the prophets:

> Do not marvel if a partial account of the giants has been told by the poets. Earthly wisdom differs from that of the prophets as a probable (πιθανοῦ) tale does from the truth (ἀλήθεια); the one is earthbound and under the ruler of matter, the other is heavenly (ἐπουρανίου).

The contrast between what is earthly and heavenly may again reflect *Phaedr.* 247C. The standard is whether reason is earthbound, that is,

[31] Cf. Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 426B; *E Delph.* 393E; *Comm. not.* 1074E–1076A.
[32] Cf. *Leg.* 5.1; 6.2; 19.2; 23.2.

concerned with objects of sense, | or heavenly, that is, concerned with the 218
intelligibles. As for Alcinous, the δοξαστικὸς λόγος, dealing with the sensible, is merely πιθανός, while scientific knowledge is firm and sure.[33]

## *Legatio* 7: Athenagoras's Critique of Philosophical Attempts to Know God

The clearest evaluation of the poets and philosophers is given in *Leg.* 7. Although this chapter ostensibly discusses both poets and philosophers, the description of their activity is that of a philosophical enterprise, and may be taken as Athenagoras's view of the philosophers' attempt to know God. This chapter corresponds to the beginning of the Middle Platonic division of Theoretics, which consists primarily of a discussion of the first principles, generally considered to be θεός, ὕλη and ἰδέα.[34] Athenagoras begins by affirming that all poets and philosophers agree that the divine being is one, when they are concerned with the first principles:

> Poets and philosophers fell to this task as to others by conjecture (ἐπέβαλον στοχαστικῶς); each was moved by his own soul in accordance with sympathy to the breath of God (κινηθέντες μὲν κατὰ συμπάθειαν τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πνοῆς) to seek if he might find and know the truth (εὑρεῖν καὶ νοῆσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν); they were able, in fact, only to obtain an approximate knowledge (περινοῆσαι), and not to find true reality (οὐχ εὑρεῖν τὸ ὄν), since they did not consider it worthy to learn from God about God (οὐ παρὰ θεοῦ περὶ θεοῦ ἀξιώσαντες) but each from himself. Thus it is that each of them dogmatized differently about God, matter, the forms (εἰδῶν) and the universe (*Leg.* 7.2).

The term συμπάθεια is Stoic, and describes the harmony of the universe.[35] Posidonius's theory of knowledge was grounded in this sympathy: It was on the basis of man's participation in the divine Logos that he apprehends. Man becomes an intelligent being δι' ἀναπνοῆς of the divine reason.[36] Against this background, it may appear that Athenagoras is reflecting a Stoic theory of natural revelation. But, as we have seen from his criticism of the allegorists in *Leg.* 22.12, the συμπάθεια extends only to matter, and not to reality, and this limitation is expressed with a Platonic bias.[37]

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[33] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 4.3.

[34] See Malherbe, "Structure," 12–17.

[35] See, e.g., *SVF* 2:302, line 34; 156, line 15; 170, line 32; 172, line 39.

[36] Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 7.92–94a, 101–109 (Teubner) = *Log.* 1.92–94A, 101–109 (LCL).

[37] *Leg.* 25.3, κατὰ τὸν τῆς ὕλης λόγον καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα συμπαθείας, does not contradict this. The expression τὰ θεῖα had been usual since the time of Aristotle, at least, to

Moved in accordance with this sympathy, each philosopher seeks (ζητῆσαι),[38] εἰ δυνατὸς εὑρεῖν καὶ νοῆσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Athenagoras's discussion of the philosophers' attempt to find the truth is introduced in *Leg.* 6.2 by his quoting *Tim.* 28C, a passage widely used at the time to support the view that it is difficult, even impossible, to find God and announce Him to all.[39] Middle Platonists in the second century used | it within the framework of their Logos doctrines, thus within their theories of knowledge.[40] Celsus's use of the passage is instructive.[41] He calls Plato "a more effective teacher of the problems of theology," quotes *Tim.* 28C, and then adds:

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> You see how the way of truth is sought (ζητεῖται) by seers and philosophers, and how Plato knew that it is impossible for all men to travel it. Since this is the reason why wise men have discovered it, that we might get some conception of the ineffable First Being which manifests him either by synthesis with other things, or by analytical distinction from them, or by analogy, I would like to teach about that which is otherwise indescribable. But I would be amazed if you were able to follow, as you are completely bound to the flesh and see nothing pure. (Origen, *Cels.* 7.42)

What *Tim.* 28C teaches Celsus is that, since God is ineffable, the search is confined to philosophers who conduct ζήτησις, which had become a Middle Platonic *terminus technicus* for philosophy, especially its dialectical part.[42]

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designate the stars, and it also has this meaning in Albinus, *Intr.* 5, p. 150, line 12 in *Platonis dialogi: Secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi*, vol. 6 (ed. Karl F. Hermann; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1873). The usage is also found in Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 12.58, in which treatise Dio shows Posidonian influence. The surprise of finding the stars referred to as τὰ θεῖα by a Christian may be mitigated by noting Philo's statements that the heavenly beings were not made subject to man, ἅτε θειοτέρας μοίρας ἐπιλαχόντα (*Opif.* 84), and that heaven was made first because it was destined to be the most holy dwelling place of manifest and visible gods (*Opif.* 27).

[38] On ζητεῖν as describing philosophical examination of what is true, see Martin Dibelius, "Paul on the Areopagus," in *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* (ed. Heinrich Greeven; trans. Mary Ling; New York: Scribner's, 1956), 32–33.

[39] See Arthur Darby Nock, "The Exegesis of *Timaeus* 28C," *VC* 16 (1962): 79–86; Pierre Canivet, *Histoire d'une entreprise apologétique au Ve siècle* (BHEgl; Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1957), 190; Jean Daniélou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux IIe et IIIe siècles* (BT.HD 2; Paris: Desclée, 1961), 104ff.

[40] See Andresen, *Logos und Nomos*, 133, 348ff.

[41] *Apud* Origen, *Cels.* 7.42.

[42] See Alcinous, *Didask.* 5.5; Albinus, *Intr.* 3, p. 148, lines 27, 29; and esp. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 8.1 in *Clemens Alexandrinus* (ed. Otto Stählin; 4 vols.; *GCS* 12, 15, 17, 39; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905–1936), 3:80, lines 5ff. For synthesis, analysis, and analogy, see Alcinous, *Didask.* 10.5–6.

Such an approach to finding (εὑρεῖν) and intellectually knowing (νοῆσαι) the truth is pure conjecture (ἐπέβαλον στοχαστικῶς) for Athenagoras.[43] The philosophers are not successful in their aim. On the contrary, they can only attain to an approximate knowledge (περινοῆσαι), and do not find reality (οὐχ εὑρεῖν τὸ ὄν).[44] We have seen that for Athenagoras the poets' and philosophers' knowledge is only partial and πιθανός. The word περινοῆσαι here has the same connotation as ἐκ μέρους, whereas the failure to find true reality leads to a doctrine that is merely περίνοια. Athenagoras thus lays stress on the certainty as well as the completeness of the Christian knowledge in contradistinction to the conjectural and partial knowledge of the philosophers.[45] As we shall see, in the case of Plato this περίνοια is extensive enough to include a knowledge of the Trinity.[46]

The reason for this defective knowledge is that the philosophers did not consider it worthy to learn about God from God, but each from himself. The use of ἀξιώσαντες suggests again a reflection of *Phaedr.* 247C,[47] and this combined with the tone set by *Tim.* 28C once more reveals Athenagoras's pattern of rejecting an unacceptable theory of knowledge in language derived from Middle Platonism. However, the Platonic element in his thought goes beyond linguistic influence. Athenagoras's theory of knowledge is developed within the framework of his view of providence, and to understand his judgments of the philosophers more fully, it is necessary to view his treatment of them within this larger framework.

Providence was a subject of considerable interest to Platonists of the second century.[48] The aim of the doctrine, traces of which appear in

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43 *Leg.* 7.2.

44 *Leg.* 7.2.

45 Aimé Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du IIe siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Hachette, 1912), 180 n. 1, suggests that the meaning of περινοήσας should be looked for in its opposition to εὑρεῖν, and that Athenagoras is therefore not talking about an imperfect notion of God as opposed to a complete knowledge, but is emphasizing Christian certainty. This view fails to do justice to the contrast between the Christian νόησις and the pagan περίνοια. Geffcken's rendering, "ungefähr erkennen," (*Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 176 n. 4) comes closer to Athenagoras's intention. Cf. Ps.-Justin, *Cohort. graec.* 7; Gregory of Nyssa, *Vita Moysi* 2.35, 162, 165, 315.

46 The simple and docile soul, on the other hand, is ἀθεώρητος δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, ἀπερινόητος δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων (*Leg.* 27.2).

47 *Leg.* 25.2, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀξίους, in view of οὐκέτι εἰς τὰ ὑπερουράνια ὑπερκύψαι δυνάμενοι (*Leg.* 25.1), also betrays the influence of *Phaedr.* 247C, τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ἔχει δὲ ὧδε.

48 See the discussion of providence in Phillip de Lacy and Benedict Einarson, eds., introduction to *De Fato* in Plutarch, *Moralia*, Vol. 7 (LCL), 303–309.

220 Alcinous[49] and Apuleius,[50] | was to make the providence of God compatible with the free will of man. A systematic presentation of the doctrine is found in the Ps.-Plutarchean *De Fato*. A polemic against Stoicism is implicit in the treatise, yet Stoic influence is discernible in the argument of the treatise itself.[51] Important for us to note is the threefold division of providence in the document (*Fato* 572F–574A):

1. The highest and primary providence is the intellection or will of the primary god, in conformity with which all things divine came into being in orderly fashion.
2. Secondary providence belongs to secondary gods who move in heaven, and in conformity with it all mortal things came into being in orderly fashion.
3. Tertiary providence belongs to the daemons stationed around the earth as watchers and overseers of men.

Athenagoras presents his view of providence in chapters 24 and 25. The details of his argument are not clear,[52] but what is noteworthy for our present interest is the discovery of Schwartz, that Athenagoras also conceives of providence in a similar, if not identical manner.[53] According to Athenagoras God has the general and creative providence (ἡ παντελικὴ καὶ γενικὴ πρόνοια) over all (*Leg*. 24.3).[54] The particular providential care over

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49 Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 7.1; 26.

50 Cf. Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.* 1.12.

51 De Lacy and Einarson, Plutarch, *Moralia* 7, 304–308. A similar doctrine, probably derived from the *De Fato*, is also found in Nemesius and Chalcidius. For recent discussions, see David Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque. Recherches sur la survivance de l'argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles* (RTHP 3/19; Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1945); Eiliv Skard, "Nemesios," PWSup 7 (1940): 562–566.

52 The investigation into his demonology is a "dornige Angelegenheit," according to Heinrich Wey, *Die Funktionen der bösen Geister bei den griechischen Apologeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts nach Christus* (Winterthur: P.G. Keller, 1957), 37 n. 94. Greater clarity on the subject can be gained by viewing Athenagoras's demonology against the background of the Platonic tradition going back to Xenocrates, and represented in Plutarch, Alcinous, Numenius, and Maximus of Tyre. Such an investigation, however, lies beyond the scope of this essay

53 Eduard Schwartz, ed., *Athenagorae libellus pro Christianis. Oratio de resurrectione cadaverum* (TU 4.2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1891), 127ff., who has been followed by most commentators since. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, 214–219, however, thinks that Athenagoras is artificially combining a Stoic doctrine of providence with a Christian doctrine of demons.

54 Described in another way, it is God's eternal providence that abides equally with us (*Leg*. 25.2) This statement is made to oppose what Athenagoras considers to have been

the world is attributed to angels whom God called into existence for this very purpose (*Leg.* 24.2). It is this particular providence that moves those who are worthy to the truth, and not to opinion (τῆς δ' [sc. προνοίας] ἐπὶ μέρους πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, οὐ πρὸς δόξαν, χωρούσης ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀξίους, *Leg.* 25.2). The rest is governed providentially by the law of reason, according to the common constitution of things (*Leg.* 25.2).

The reason why the philosophers are said not to know or find the truth is because they do not consider it worthy to learn about God from God. In other words, they do not know the truth because they do not submit themselves to God's particular providence whose function it is to move those who are worthy to the truth. As we have seen, the aim of the Middle Platonic scheme of providence used by Athenagoras was to make the providence of God compatible with the free will of man. Athenagoras also affirms the free will of man in this context,[55] thus suggesting that philosophers fall short of the truth by an act of free will.

Athenagoras's criticism of the philosophers has a still sharper edge, when seen against the background of the Middle Platonists' attack on Aristotle. For Middle Platonists, the θεωρία τῶν ἰδεῶν was the heart of philosophy.[56] Atticus therefore understandably | takes Aristotle to task for rejecting Plato's theory of Ideas in a manner not unlike Athenagoras's criticism of the philosophers in general: 221

> For as (Aristotle) was unable to conceive that things of a grand, divine, and transcendent nature require a certain kindred power for their recognition, and trusted to his own meager and petty shrewdness, which was able to make its way through things terrestrial, and discern the truth in them, but was not capable of beholding the plain of absolute truth (τῆς δ' ὄντως ἀληθείας ἐποπτεῦσαι τὸ πεδίον οὐχ οἵα τε ἦν),[57] he made himself the rule and judge of things above him, and denied the existence of any peculiar natures such as Plato affirmed, but dared to call the highest of all realities triflings and chatterings and nonsense.[58]

Aristotle's preoccupation with the earthly things, probably the εἴδη, are contrasted with true reality, the term for which is derived from the *Phaedrus.* In Middle Platonism, the ἰδέαι were conceived of as being in the mind of

Aristotle's view of providence, namely that sublunary things are outside God's providence, a charge also made by Atticus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.5, 799D–800B.

55 *Leg.* 24.4; cf. *Leg.* 25.4.

56 Cf. Justin, *Dial.* 2.6, and n. 8 above.

57 Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 248B.

58 *Apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.13, 815AB; cf. Numenius, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 11.18, 537A.

God,[59] while the εἴδη were in matter.[60] Athenagoras has a similar view. For him the Logos is the ἰδέα, the νοῦς of the Father, while the εἴδη are always connected with matter.[61] In his enumeration of the first principles in *Leg*. 7.2, his use of εἴδη instead of ἰδέαι is therefore to be seen as deliberate. He is thus ironically charging the philosophers with the same charge that Atticus leveled at Aristotle. They are not really concerned with absolute truth, but only with τὰ εἴδη τῆς ὕλης. The result is that each of them teaches different philosophical doctrines about God, matter, the forms and the world, and ultimately, therefore, their views are merely δόξαι ἀνθρωπίναι (*Leg*. 7.3). Here a major departure by Athenagoras from Middle Platonism emerges. According to Alcinous's description of the ἐπιστημονικὸς λόγος, the εἴδη are secondary intelligibles, and are thus the objects of intellection, not opinion.[62] Athenagoras, however, does not distinguish between true and false δόξαι, but emphasizes that δόξα is based on what is sensible. The stress here is thus that the εἴδη are τῆς ὕλης and that consideration of them results only in δόξα.

What makes the difference between the philosophers' and Christians' attempts to find the truth, are the prophets. Christians do perceive intellectually and believe, and they have as witnesses for their knowledge the prophets, whose lips are moved by the Divine Spirit (*Leg*. 7.3). Christians trust in these prophets, whose lips are moved by the Spirit of God as though they were musical instruments (*Leg*. 7.3). Athenagoras elaborates further on the activity of the prophets in chapter 9, after he had given a rational argumentation for the unity of God in chapter 8. He says that Christians are not satisfied with such ἔννοιαι (*Leg*. 9.1) as he had engaged in for then their enterprise could be regarded as something purely human:

> But the voices of the prophets confirm our rational argumentations (πιστοῦσιν ἡμῶν τοὺς λογισμούς). I expect that you who are most learned and philosophical are not without intellectual knowledge (φιλομαθεστάτους καὶ ἐπιστημονεστάτους ὄντας οὐκ ἀνοήτους)[63] of Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the rest of the prophets, who spoke in accordance with the movement of their reasonings (κατ' ἔκστασιν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς | λογισμῶν), while the Divine Spirit moved them as a flautist might play upon his flute (*Leg*. 9.1).

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[59] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 9.1; 10.3.

[60] Alcinous, *Didask.* 8.2.

[61] *Leg*. 10.2–3. Outside of *Leg*. 7.2, the forms are always referred to as τὰ εἴδη τῆς ὕλης: 15.4; 22.5; 22.8ff.; 24.2–3.

[62] Cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 4.

[63] The conjectures by Schwartz (ἀνηκόους) and Geffcken (ἀμυήτους, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, p. 126, line 32) are unnecessary, and, indeed, miss the point.

He then concludes by inviting his readers to philosophically investigate (ἐξετάσαι)[64] the prophets.

Athenagoras contrasts the knowledge of the philosophers, which they attain when moved according to their sympathy with the divine breath (τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πνοῆς, *Leg*. 7.2) with the knowledge of the Christians who have the prophets as witnesses, who are moved to speak by the Divine Spirit (πνεύματι ἐνθέῳ). The contrast is thus between the knowledge from the πνοή and that from the πνεῦμα. Philo, to whom Athenagoras may be indebted at this point, also contrasts πνοή and πνεῦμα in a manner that illustrates what Athenagoras has in mind. Of Moses's account of the creation of man, Philo says:

> He uses the word "breath" (πνοήν), not "spirit" (πνεῦμα), implying a difference between them: for "spirit" is conceived of as denoting strength and vigour and power, while a "breath" is like an air or a peaceful and gentle vapour. The mind that was made after the image and original might be said to partake of spirit, for its reasoning faculty possesses robustness; but the mind that was made out of matter must be said to partake of the light and less substantial air, as of some exhalation.[65]

Athenagoras describes the prophets in general Hellenistic terms, with a special similarity, however, to Philo's view of the prophets.[66] Thus the term ἔνθεον πνεῦμα is Philonic,[67] as is ἔκστασις λογισμοῦ,[68] the latter also occurring in Plutarch.[69] The metaphor of the prophets as musical instruments also occurs in Philo and Plutarch.[70] Athenagoras thus presents his view of the prophets in terms customary among philosophers.

In contrasting the poets and philosophers with the prophets, Athenagoras does not intend to say that the prophets were not philosophical. What Christians receive from the prophets is received by intellectual perception as well as faith (νοοῦμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν, *Leg*. 7.3). Rational

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64 *Leg.* 9.3. Athenagoras regularly uses ἐξετάζειν to describe philosophical investigation, e.g., *Leg*. 23.2; 24.1; *Res.* 1.3; 7.4; 9.2. Cf. also Justin *Dial.* 2.2. Athenagoras always describes his readers as philosophers in contexts where he implicitly describes Christian doctrine as being philosophical; cf., e.g., *Leg*. 2.1; 11.3.

65 Philo, *Leg*. 1.42 (trans. Colson and Whitaker, LCL).

66 See, however, also Dio Chrysostom's description and high evaluation of the prophets', esp. Orpheus's, inspiration (ἐπίπνοια), *Or.* 1.57–58. On prophets and philosophers, further see Richard Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen: Nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen* (3d ed.; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1927), 236ff.

67 Philo, *Decal.* 175–176.

68 Philo, *Contempl.* 40; cf. *Her.* 265–266.

69 Plutarch, *Sol.* 8.

70 Philo, *Spec.* 1.65; Plutarch, *Def. orac.* 436F.

argumentation (λογισμός) is necessary for Athenagoras, but it needs the confirmation of the prophets, who thus provide, in fact, a superior philosophical knowledge. Whereas for Albinus the philosophical δόγματα must be secured τῷ τῆς αἰτίας λογισμῷ, where αἰτία is the same as the ἀρχή or ἔννοια,[71] and Chrysippus confirmed an argument by means of the common notions (πιστοῦσθαι διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν),[72] for Athenagoras these ἔννοιαι are human, and the reasoning that proceeds from them must itself be confirmed by the prophets (πιστοῦσιν ἡμῶν τοὺς λογισμούς, *Leg.* 9.1) | 223

## Conclusion

In summary, we have observed that Athenagoras criticizes the poets and their myths on the basis of his Middle Platonic dialectical criteria. Similarly, the attempts to allegorize the myths are rejected because they confine God to matter. To the philosophers he ascribes some ability to distinguish between the intelligibles and the sensibles, and therefore the ability to perceive noetically. He charges them, however, with being confined to the forms of matter, and criticizes them in this respect in terms borrowed from the *Phaedrus.* He does not follow the Middle Platonic division, however, in which the forms belong to intellection, but emphasizes their material connection, and that what consequently results is only persuasive opinion and partial knowledge. This knowledge is contrasted with the complete and certain Christian knowledge that is confirmed by the prophets and that is itself essentially philosophical. The framework within which this evaluation takes place is provided by a view of providence that is dependent on Middle Platonic speculation on the subject. Within this scheme God's providence and man's free will both have a place. For Athenagoras's theory of knowledge, it provides the ultimate reason for the philosophers' failure to find complete truth. Since truth is found as a result of God's particular providence, and the philosophers reject God as the source of truth, they are limited to mere opinion.

What is said of the philosophers in general cannot be said of Plato, who occupies a place of honor in Athenagoras's esteem. Not only is Athenagoras steeped in Platonic language, but except for a short quotation from Empedocles in chapter 22, Plato is the only philosopher who is quoted *verbatim*, and this always with approval. It has been observed

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[71] Albinus, *Intr.* 6, p. 150, line 27; cf. Alcinous, *Didask.* 25.5.
[72] *SVF* 2:154, line 29.

that Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* form the basis for Athenagoras's dialectical arguments, and it can therefore be expected that Plato himself would stand higher in Athenagoras's estimation than do the other philosophers. That this is indeed so, appears most clearly from chapter 23, where Athenagoras justifies Plato's reason for using myths.

Athenagoras avers that Plato took over Thales's division between the uncreated god, those beings created by him for the good of heaven, and the spirits. Plato, however, would not speak at length about these spirits, but only drew attention to what had been said about them by his predecessors. Plato's reason for doing so, according to Athenagoras, is given in *Tim.* 40DE, which begins, "Concerning the other spiritual beings, to know and to declare their generation is a task too high for ourselves; we must trust those who have told it formerly" (*Leg.* 23.5). To this self-disavowal of Plato, Athenagoras objects, referring to *Ep.* 2, 312E, a passage frequently used in Christian circles to prove that Plato had some idea of the Trinity.[73] One cannot say that Plato, ὁ τὸν ἀίδιον νῷ καὶ λόγῳ καταλαμβανόμενον περινοήσας θεὸν καὶ ἐπισυμβεβηκότα αὐτῷ ἐξειπών, who had an insight into the Trinity, as well as knowing the sensibles, considered it beyond his power to attain to the truth. Athenagoras explains that Plato had two reasons for making this excuse. First, he knew that is was impossible for gods to beget and to be pregnant, since everything that comes into being has an end. Second, much more impossible than this, is it to persuade the masses who accept the myths without scrutiny. | 224

Athenagoras's use of περινοήσας is significant. Even though Plato applied himself to the task of comprehending God νῷ καὶ λόγῳ, and the knowledge of God thus attained extends even to the Trinity, it is still not Christian knowledge. Exactly how Plato falls short Athenagoras does not say. In fact, he does not explicitly state that Plato's knowledge of God is in any way different from his own. Yet, we have seen that what makes the difference for Athenagoras between περίνοια and νόησις was the inspiration of the prophets, and this is probably what determines for him the extent of Plato's knowledge, although he does not express this opinion. However, his respect for Plato is too great to treat him on the same level with the other philosophers. Instead, Plato is made to face the same problem in teaching his philosophy that the Christians do in teaching theirs:

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[73] Cf. Justin, 1 *Apol.* 60.6ff.; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.103.1; 7.9.3; Hippolytus, *Haer.* 6.37.1ff.; see Celsus *apud* Origen, *Cels.* 6.18–19, who accuses the Christians of misunderstanding Plato, and the discussion by Andresen, *Logos und Nomos*, 160, 357–359; Daniélou, *Message évangélique*, 107–108.

It is the unphilosophical nature of the masses that caused Plato to remain silent on some points. By emphasizing the silence of Plato, Athenagoras can therefore hint that Plato knew more than he actually expressed.[74]

When Athenagoras refers to Plato's deference to the crowd, he reflects a view similar to that of Numenius, who, in his book on *The Secrets of Plato*, said that Plato did not speak out about the gods for fear of the masses.[75] Athenagoras's defense of Plato's use of myth also shows an awareness of contemporary discussion on the interpretation of Plato. Among Middle Platonists, a debate was being conducted on whether, according to Plato, the world had a beginning or not. The problem centered on Plato's use of myth in the *Timaeus*—whether he used myths σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν only, and they were therefore not to be taken literally, or whether they were to be taken as literal representations of Plato's thought.[76]

When Athenagoras discussed the myths of the poets, he regarded the myths literally, and rejected them. However, with Plato he is more generous. Plato knew the eternal God who can be known by mind and reason alone, and he detailed God's accidents (ἐπισυμβεβηκότα, *Leg*. 23.7). In other words, he approves of Plato's dialectical approach. But we have seen that for Athenagoras the names of pagan gods are rejected on the basis of dialectic. How then does he approve of Plato's use of the myths and the names of the popular gods? How he solves the problem is seen from his treatment of *Phaedr.* 246E, which he quotes: "Now the great (μέγας) leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things" (*Leg*. 23.9). He explains that Plato, not having any other designation with which to address God, addresses Him τῷ δημώδει ὀνόματι οὐχ ὡς ἰδίῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' εἰς σαφήνειαν. Plato is thus making a concession and is using the myth and name figuratively. Furthermore, Athenagoras is careful to point out that the Zeus Plato is talking about is not the son of Kronos, but the creator of the universe. The name Plato uses applies to this God, and to point out the distinction between the

[74] On Plato's god and the conglomerate, see Eric R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Sather Classical Lectures 25; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951; repr., Boston: Beacon, 1957), 220.

[75] *Apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 13.5, 650D–651A. See Grant, *Letter and the Spirit*, 147. The argument was originally applied to Epicurus; cf. Posidonius, *apud* Cicero, *Nat. d.* 1.123.

[76] Cf. Calvinius Taurus, *apud* Philoponus, *Aet. mund.* 6.8, p. 145, line 23 in *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum* (ed. Hugo Rabe; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1899); cf. also 6.21, p. 187, line 5: σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν. On the other hand, Atticus, *apud* Eusebius, *Praep. ev.* 15.6, p. 801D, insisted that Plato did not speak, δι' αἰνιγμάτων, μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σαφοῦς χρείᾳ.

heavenly and the earthbound Zeus, Plato applies the appellation "Great" (ἐπικατηγορήσας τὸ μέγας, *Leg*. 23.10) to the heavenly Zeus.[77] | 225

Plato's ostensible shortcomings are thus explained by his consideration for the masses, by whom he cannot be understood because they are uncritical and unphilosophical. Plato is thus confronted by the same problem that the Christians are. By explaining Plato's teaching in this manner, Athenagoras not only shows his appreciation for Plato, but by the implicit identification of Christians with Plato, strikes an apologetic note.

77 This distinction is already made by Seneca, *Nat.* 2.45.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

# THE APOLOGETIC THEOLOGY OF THE *PREACHING OF PETER**

It is in the nature of apologetic that it be closely related to kerygma: what is defended is that which has been or is being preached.[1] The investigation into the preaching and apologetic of Hellenistic Judaism has recognized this fact.[2] This connection | may not justify our viewing the second-century Christian Apologies as primarily missionary in character; there are other features that must be taken into consideration.[3] But that there is a relation- 206

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* Originally published in *ResQ* 13 (1970): 205–223.

[1] More precisely, the relationship is between kerygma-creed-apology. Vernon H. Neufeld, *The Earliest Christian Confessions* (NTTS 5; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963), 11, 24, points out that the life situation which produced the creedal formulae has not been adequately considered. For the most part, is has been associated with baptism. He affirms that, although the kerygma is not synonymous with the confession, important associations occur: "It is clear that the essentials of the gospel which the church proclaimed were closely related to the *homologia* to which the Christian community adhered." In practice, the relationship is assumed in NT scholarship. For example, Hans Conzelmann, *An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament* (trans. John Bowden; NTL; London: SCM, 1969), 62ff., in reconstructing the content of early Christian proclamation, proceeds from an analysis of the NT creedal formulae. Oscar Cullmann, *Die ersten christlichen Glaubensbekenntnisse* (trans. Hans Schaffert; ThSt 15; Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1943), 18, and Ethelbert Stauffer, *New Testament Theology* (trans. John Marsh; London: SCM, 1955), 235–236, refer to the context of preaching but do not develop the relationship. Thus also Otto Michel, "ὁμολογέω," *TDNT* 5 (1967): 199–220, esp. 212. More to the point is Willy Rordorf, "La confession de foi et son 'Sitz im Leben' dans l'église ancienne," *NovT* 9 (1967): 225–238, esp. 235ff. On the continuing relationship between preaching and apologetic, see Johannes Weiss, *Earliest Christianity: A History of the Period A.D. 30–150* (ed. with new introduction and bibliography by Frederick C. Grant; 2 vols.; New York: Harper, 1959), 1:237ff.; for the view that the creedal formulae served as the foundation of apologetical documents, see Berthold Altaner, *Patrology* (trans. Hilda C. Graef; 2d ed.; New York: Herder & Herder, 1961), 47.

[2] E.g., Peter Dalbert, *Die Theologie der hellenistischen-jüdischen Missionsliteratur unter Ausschluß von Philo und Josephus* (*TF* 4; Hamburg-Volksdorf: H. Reich, 1954), 8 and passim; Moriz Friedländer, *Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik als Vorgeschichte des Christenthums* (Zürich: C. Schmidt, 1903); Wilhelm Bousset and Hugo Gressmann, *Die Religion des Judentums im späthellenistischen Zeitalter* (4th ed.; HNT 21; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1966), 79ff. Dieter Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief: Studien zur religiösen Propaganda in der Spätantike* (WMANT 11; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964), 52 n. 1, passim, calls for greater precision in the treatment of Jewish apologetic.

[3] It is not completely accurate, as Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* (3 vols.; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950–1960; Utrecht/Antwerp: Spectrum, 1964–1966), 1:186, affirms, that the missionary preaching was displaced in favor of predominantly apologetic exposition. We have to do here with a process of development rather than displacement. For the stress on the missionary character of Christian apologetic, see Jean Daniélou, *Message évangélique*

ship between the two cannot be denied, even if the historical, literary, and theological aspects of that relationship still remain to be demonstrated in detail. In order to understand clearly the development from preaching to apologetic one must go beyond merely pointing out the presence of the same *topoi* in the two types of literature. One must also determine the use to which the *topoi* are put by both. In this way their intentions and theologies can be seen in sharper relief, and the two types can be better understood in their relation to each other. It is the limited purpose of this exploratory essay to point to some theological themes in what is perhaps the earliest extant Christian Apology outside the NT,[4] the *Preaching of Peter*, and to compare them with similar themes in earlier Christian missionary preaching, particularly that of Paul.

## The *Preaching of Peter* and Missionary Preaching in the New Testament

We are dependent for our knowledge of the *Preaching* on Clement of 207 Alexandria, who quotes from it.[5] Attempts have been made to | reconstruct

*et culture hellénistique aux IIe et IIIe siècles* (BT.HD 2; Paris: Desclée, 1961), 11–19. For a brief, general description of apologetic, see Heinrich Dörrie, "Apologetik," *LAW* (Zürich: Artemis, 1965), 219–222. For a bibliography of other assessments of the genre, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Apologetic and Philosophy in the Second Century," *ResQ* 7 (1963): 19–32, esp. 19 n. 5. [*Light*, 2:781–796] For apologetic as in some measure an *expositio fidei*, see Malherbe, "The Structure of Athenagoras, *Supplicatio pro Christianis*," *VC* 23 (1969): 1–20. [*Light*, 2: 807–827] See also Johannes Bernard, *Die apologetische Methode bei Klemens von Alexandrien: Apologetik als Entfaltung der Theologie* (ETS 21; Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1968).

[4] The apologetic motif is, of course, already present in the NT itself. See Barnabas Lindars, *New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations* (London: SCM, 1961), and the literature cited by Paul Feine and Johannes Behm, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament* (ed. Werner G. Kümmel; 14th rev. ed.; Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1965), 85–86, 102–104.

[5] Origen also knew the *Preaching* from Heracleon's quoting of it, but he does not add to the knowledge we gain from Clement. The fragments have been collected and commented on by Ernst von Dobschütz, *Das Kerygma Petri kritisch untersucht* (TU 11.1; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1893). They are also conveniently gathered by Erich Klostermann in *Reste des Petrusevangeliums, der Petrusapokalypse und des Kerygma Petri* (vol. 1 of *Apocrypha*; ed. Erich Klostermann and Adolf Harnack; 2d ed.; KlT 3; Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Weber, 1908; repr., 1921). See also Montague R. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (2d rev. ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 16–19. For the most recent introduction and English translation, see Wilhelm Schneemelcher's treatment in *New Testament Apocrypha* (ed. Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher; English translation edited by Robert McL. Wilson; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963–1966), 2:94–102; also, James K. Elliott, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 20–24. For an extensive bibliography

the *Preaching*, but they must be considered at best as very tentative.[6] The fragments in their present form are disconnected, and the context in which Clement quotes them provides no sure clue as to the original form or content of the *Preaching*.[7] The title, *Kerygma Petrou*, probably intends that the work be regarded as a compendium of the missionary preaching of Peter.[8] It claims that the content is the gospel preached by Peter as the representative of apostolic activity.[9] It is not clear whether the title claims that the *Preaching* was written by Peter himself or whether it merely claims to represent the preaching of Peter. In any case, the *Preaching*'s apparent familiarity with the later NT writings[10] rules out Petrine authorship, and it is generally agreed that the *Preaching* was written by the first quarter of the second century, either in Greece or in Egypt.[11] | 208

In spite of the present fragmentary form of the *Preaching*, the *sensus communis* on some matters pertaining to it is of interest to our present purpose. As to its literary character, it is taken to represent the transition from the most primitive Christian literature to the apologetic writings of the second century.[12] It can be viewed as the forerunner to those

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of modern studies on the *Preaching*, see Maria Grazia Mara, "Il Kerygma Petrou," *SMSR* 38 (1967): 314–342.

[6] See, e.g., J. Armitage Robinson's reconstruction in J. Rendel Harris's *The Apology of Aristides* (TS 1; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1891), 91–94, and the caution expressed over this attempt by Henry G. Meecham, *The Epistle to Diognetus* (UMP 305, Theological Series 7; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1949), 58–59.

[7] Thus Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:94, 96; Otto Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (5 vols.; 2d ed.; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1913–1932), 1:548; Edgar Hennecke, *Handbuch zu den neutestamentlichen Apokryphen* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1904; repr., 1914), 241–242.

[8] See von Dobschütz, *Kerygma Petri*, 15–18. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, 548, regards the *Preaching* as a collection of sermons delivered on different occasions and in different places, later collected on analogy to the canonical Acts.

[9] Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:95. Similarly, Hermann Jordan, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1911), 209: the *Preaching* is a fictitious discourse addressed to an imaginary public, the pagans, and provides a good picture of the missionary preaching of its own time.

[10] Demonstrated by Joseph N. Reagan, *The Preaching of Peter: The Beginning of Christian Apologetic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923).

[11] E.g., von Dobschütz, *Kerygma Petri*, 67 (Egypt, AD 80–140), followed by Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:95; Adolf Hilgenfeld, review of von Dobschütz in *ZWT* 1 (1893): 541 (Greece). Reagan, *Preaching of Peter*, 80, considers it difficult to date the writing after AD 100 and places it in Alexandria.

[12] Adolf Harnack and Erwin Preuschen, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (2 vols. in 4; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1893–1904), 1:25; Harnack, *History of Dogma* (trans. Neil Buchanan, James Millar, E.B. Speirs, and William M'Gilchrist; 7 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1894–1899; repr., 7 vols. in 4; New York: Dover Publications, 1961), 1:220; von Dobschütz, *Kerygma Petri*, 66; Meecham, *Diognetus*, 58.

Apologies,[13] but when it is seen under this perspective justice is usually not done to the hortatory element in it.[14] The elements that the *Preaching* shares with the Apologies are not new, nor are they entirely confined to apologetic. They also appear in missionary preaching. The *Preaching* gives a distinctive expression of these elements of missionary preaching, and it cannot therefore be classified exclusively as an Apology. Neither, however, can it be classified exclusively as missionary preaching. Apologetic theology had its beginnings in Christian preaching of the first century,[15] and the significance of the *Preaching* lies in the fact that in it "is to be seen a middle term in the proclamation tradition between early Christian missionary preaching, as it has left traces for example with Luke in the Acts of the Apostles, on the one hand and Greek apologetic on the other."[16] It is this middle position of the *Preaching* that, despite its present fragmentary state, encourages us to examine it for any theological development it represents beyond the earlier preaching that it presupposes and reflects.[17] | 209

## Early Christian Missionary Preaching in the New Testament

Early Christian missionary preaching can be reconstructed from a number of NT texts.[18] The Gospels no doubt to some degree reflect the church's preaching,[19] but it is especially Acts and the Pauline epistles that provide

[13] E.g., Johannes Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1907), xxxix; Meecham, *Diognetus*.

[14] Reagan, *Preaching of Peter*, 80–81. Henri I. Marrou, *A Diognète* (SC 33; Paris: Cerf, 1951), 95, also stresses the protreptic element, pointing out that the defensive apologetic element in the *Preaching* is not presented in an isolated state but that it is surrounded by exhortation and a profession of positive faith.

[15] See Gerhard Ruhbach, *Altkirchliche Apologeten* (TKTG 1; Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1966), 7, on the relationship between preaching and apologetic in general.

[16] Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:96–97.

[17] The literary relationship between the *Preaching* and later Christian writings need not concern us in this study. Parallels in thought and expression which suggest dependence of one author on another may be explained as being due to the fact that they are conventional. See, e.g., Willem C. van Unnik, "Die Gotteslehre bei Aristides und in gnostischen Schriften," *TZ* 17 (1961): 166–174.

[18] For an attempt to classify the different types of sermons, see Bo Reicke, "A Synopsis of Early Christian Preaching," in *The Root of the Vine* (ed. Anton Fridrichsen; London: Dacre, 1953), 128–160. The preaching of the early church was characterized by considerable diversity. See Ernst Käsemann, "The Canon of the New Testament and the Unity of the Church," in his *Essays on New Testament Themes* (trans. W.J. Montague; SBT 41; London: SCM, 1964), 95–107.

[19] See, e.g., Bertil Gärtner, "The Habakkuk Commentary (DSH) and the Gospel of Matthew," *ST* 8 (1954): 1–24. Also relevant are those form critical studies which consider the preaching of the church as the *Sitz im Leben* of the Gospels.

evidence of major value.[20] Of the speeches in Acts, those in 14:15–18 and 17:16–31 are addressed to Gentiles and are of possible interest to us.[21] However, the former is too brief to be of significant value to us,[22] while the latter is beset with difficulties which at this stage of its investigation make extensive comparison with the *Preaching* of limited value. Furthermore, Lukan theology itself marks an advanced stage of the development to apologetic.[23] In the letters of Paul, 1 Cor 15:3ff. and 1 Thess 1:9–10 are generally regarded as reflecting early | Christian preaching.[24] But it is Rom 1–2 that promises most for our present concern. Although these chapters form part of an intricate theological argument addressed to Christians, they do permit conclusions to be drawn as to the nature and intention of a Pauline missionary sermon.[25] 210

Romans 1–2 utilizes traditions from Hellenistic Jewish propaganda,[26] which in turn had appropriated elements from Greek philosophical

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[20] See C.H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936); Albrecht Oepke, *Die Missionspredigt des Apostels Paulus* (MWF[L] 2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1920); Ulrich Wilckens, *Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte: Form- und traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen* (2d rev. ed.; WMANT 5; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1963).

[21] For recent treatments of the sermons in Acts as a whole, see Eduard Schweizer, "Concerning the Speeches in Acts," in *Studies in Luke-Acts* (ed. Leander E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn; Nashville: Abingdon, 1966), 208–216, and Jacques Dupont, "Les discours missionnaires des Actes des apôtres d'après un ouvrage récent," *RB* 69 (1962): 37–60.

[22] For a recent treatment, see Ernst Lerle, "Die Predigt in Lystra (Acta 14:15–18)," *NTS* 7 (1960/1961): 46–55.

[23] The most extensive study is Bertil E. Gärtner, *The Areopagus Speech and Natural Revelation* (trans. Carolyn Hannay-King; ASNU 21; Uppsala: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1955). For a recent treatment, with good bibliography, see Hans Conzelmann, "The Address of Paul on the Areopagus," in Keck and Martyn, *Studies in Luke-Acts*, 217–230. The difficulties inherent in this speech are illustrated by the diversity of opinion about its literary character: Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten*, xxxii, regards it as an Apology rather than a sermon; Günter Klein, "Der Synkretismus als theologisches Problem in der ältesten christlichen Apologetik," *ZTK* 64 (1967): 40–82, esp. n. 202, finds a striking closeness of Lukan theology to apologetic; Eduard Norden, *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede* (4th ed.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956; orig. pub. Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1913), 5–7, finds considerable similarities between the Areopagus speech and the *Preaching of Peter*.

[24] On 1 Cor 15:3ff., see Conzelmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, 65–69, and the literature there cited. On 1 Thess 1:9–10, see Gerhard Friedrich, "Ein Tauflied hellenistischer Judenchristen: 1 Thess 1:9f.," *TZ* 21 (1965): 502–516; Gerhard Schneider, "Urchristliche Gottesverkündigung in hellenistischer Umwelt," *BZ* 13 (1969): 59–75; Paul-Émile Langevin, "Le Seigneur Jésus selon un texte prépaulinien, 1 Th 1:9–10," *ScEccl* 17 (1965): 263–282, 473–512, and in *Jésus seigneur et l'eschatologie* (STR 21; Paris: Desclée, 1967), 43–106.

[25] See, e.g., Günther Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason in Paul," in Bornkamm, *Early Christian Experience* (trans. Paul L. Hammer; New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 34.

[26] Heinrich Daxer, *Römer 1,18–2,10 im Verhältnis zur spätjüdischen Lehrauffassung* (Naumburg a.d.S.: Lippert, 1914); Emil Weber, *Die Beziehungen von Röm. 1–3 zur Missionspraxis des*

thought.[27] A pattern developed in this philosophically influenced preaching which is reflected in the first two chapters of Romans. Its fixed motifs are: creation (1:20, 25), knowledge of God (1:19–20), worship of God (1:23, 25), repentance (2:4), judgment (2:5–6, 8–9), salvation (2:7, 10).[28] Philosophical terms and expressions unusual for Paul also occur: e.g., τὰ ἀόρατα, νοούμενα καθορᾶται, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης, τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ, τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα (1:20, 23, 28).[29] The philosophical background is still further reflected in | the language and argumentation of Paul's discussion of the wrath of God: φύσις/νόμος in combination, ἑαυτοῖς εἶσιν νόμος (2:14), the Greek motif ἄγραφος νόμος that is doubtlessly behind the discussion in 2:15, and συνείδησις (2:15).[30] Paul does not simply reproduce these terms and motifs with the same meanings they had in Stoicism or Hellenistic Judaism. They serve a completely different function for him. We shall see that the *Preaching of Peter* also appropriates material from this Stoic-Jewish storehouse, and it is particularly instructive for our purpose to compare its use of this material with that of Paul. In doing so we do not assume that it was dependent on Paul for those traditions. Nor do we assume that Paul's missionary sermons always took the form of the argument in Rom 1–2. He was creative enough to vary his approach as the

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*Paulus* (BFCT 9.4; Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1905); Hans Lietzmann, *An die Römer* (2d ed.; HNT 8; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [P. Siebeck], 1919), excursus on 1:25 and on 1:31ff.; and esp. Bornkamm, "Faith and Reason," and "The Revelation of God's Wrath," in *Early Christian Experience*, 47–70. It seems more judicious to describe the Jewish enterprise in terms of propaganda than missionary preaching, but for our interest this distinction is not of utmost importance. Against the view represented by Georgi, *Die Gegner*, that there was widespread missionary activity, see Karl Axenfeld, "Die jüdische Propaganda als Vorläuferin und Wegbereiterin der urchristlichen Mission," in *Missionswissenschaftliche Studien: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag des Herrn Prof. D. Dr. Gustav Warneck* (ed. Karl Axenfeld; Berlin: Martin Warneck, 1904), 1–80, and Karl G. Kuhn, "Das Problem der Mission in die Urchristenheit," *EMZ* 11 (1954): 161–168.

[27] See Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 3ff., 125ff. Dalbert, *Hellenistischen-jüdischen Missionsliteratur*, 124ff; Gärtner, *Areopagus Speech*; and especially Wolfgang Nauck, "Die Tradition und Komposition der Areopagrede: Eine motivgeschichtliche Untersuchung," *ZTK* 53 (1956): 11–52.

[28] Nauck, "Areopagrede," 38.

[29] On the Stoic background of these terms, see Max Pohlenz, "Paulus und die Stoa," *ZNW* 42 (1949): 69–104; Gärtner, *Areopagus Speech*, 105–144.

[30] At this point I am indebted to the perceptive analyses of Bornkamm in the articles cited in nn. 25 and 26 and in "Gesetz und Natur, Röm. 2, 14–16," in Bornkamm, *Studien zu Antike und Christentum* (2d rev. ed.; Munich: Kaiser, 1963), 93–118. Bornkamm does not, however, sufficiently recognize the differences between as well as within the different philosophical traditions, both pagan and Jewish, which he considers to be important. Gärtner, *Areopagus Speech*, has a greater appreciation for the diversity of viewpoints. For the purposes of this general sketch it suffices to take note of the diversity without detailing it. The next three paragraphs draw freely on Bornkamm and Gärtner.

occasion demanded.[31] At the cost of not being able to come to far-reaching conclusions our investigation is limited to Rom 1–2 and the *Preaching*, because their appropriation of a common philosophical tradition provides a control for our study. It will contribute to our understanding of the theology of the *Preaching* and its relationship to Paul's missionary preaching if we first identify the major elements from the philosophical tradition they share and take note of how Paul used and adapted the material taken from it.

## Knowledge of God in Jewish-Stoic Thought

The influence of Stoicism on some Jewish writings, especially the Wisdom of Solomon, has long been recognized.[32] The guiding principle of the Stoic is his λόγος. The origin of his knowledge of | God is in himself: it is out of the awareness that his soul is akin to God that knowledge of God issues from his λόγος. In developing this knowledge through the training of his intellect, the Stoic begins with those concepts innate in man and proceeds to the contemplation of the natural order. What is always basic to this enterprise is the awareness of his kinship to God, that he is part of the νοῦς that pervades the world, and that he is governed by the same law as the whole universe, the common law (ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός), which is right reason (ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος). The Stoic who lives in accord with the natural order is νομιμός. His ability to do so increases in proportion to the development of his λόγος, and his falling short is due to his ἄγνοια. Because man shares in the essence of the divine, his effort to know God will culminate in his knowing himself.[33]

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The aim of the kind of sermon represented by the Wisdom of Solomon is to awaken the knowledge of God and dispel ignorance. Hence the pedagogic and apologetic elements are united in it.[34] Wisdom deals with the possibility of knowing God from his works. Such knowledge is the climax

[31] See Weiss, *Earliest Christianity*, 238ff.

[32] E.g., Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 24ff.

[33] For a brief sketch of the Stoic theory of natural revelation, see Gärtner, *Areopagus Speech*, 105–116.

[34] Bornkamm, "The Revelation of God's Wrath," 54. But see Gärtner's completely different understanding of the intention of Wisdom (*Areopagus Speech*, 97, 127). There is nowhere near the profound nor extended reasoning in this Jewish literature that there is in Stoicism. The difference can be ascribed in part to the Jewish insistence that God has revealed himself, as Gärtner emphasizes, but also in part to the polemical thrust in these writings that presupposes such a revelation.

of a doctrine of wisdom that ascends from the earth. One thus moves from the creation to the creator. In view of their wisdom men should have reached the Lord of the world, but they turned aside and ended in ignorance (ἀγνωσία), because of which they are vain (μάταιοι) (Wis 13:1). Therefore they are not to be pardoned (οὐδ' συγγνωστοί) (Wis 13:8). Natural revelation imparts not only knowledge of God, but also of his will. In the words of Sir 17:7ff., "He set before them knowledge, the νόμος ζωῆς." This knowledge, the law of reason, is in agreement with the Law of Moses. It inspires men to praise and glorify God. When man does not know God, he plunges into ignorance whose main manifestations are idolatry and 213 immoral conduct (e.g., | Wis 14:12). Such behavior is therefore essentially irrational, as is the religion of man that takes shape in this foolishness and vain thinking. It is the subject of a great amount of Jewish as well as pagan criticism, and it is considered to richly deserve the punishment that it receives as both a present and an eschatological reality.[35]

## Knowledge of God and Human Existence in Romans 1–2

In Rom 1–2 there is no question of the possibility of a reasoned knowledge of God, and therefore no discussion of the development of the λόγος or of wisdom. Paul presupposes the reality of a knowledge of God.[36] God revealed it to man (1:19). It is a present reality mediated through natural revelation and the Jewish Law to all men, not only to the wise, and for that reason all men are without excuse (ἀναπολόγητοι) (1:20; 2:1, cf. 2:15). What is revealed is that God is the invisible, eternal, acting, and demanding creator, but Paul does not dwell on the connection between the creation and creator in a manner that seeks to awaken man's reason. Men's thinking was made vain because, although they had this knowledge of God (γνόντες τὸν θεόν . . . ἀλλὰ ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς), they neither glorified him as God nor thanked him (1:21). Rom 1–2 is thus not an apology but an accusation.[37] Paul in this way frees the concepts he takes from contemporary non-Christian philosophy and theology. Rather than the question of the possibility of the knowledge of God, what concerns him is whether that knowledge is

[35] See Erik Sjöberg and Gustav Stählin, "ὀργή," *TDNT* 5 (1967): 382–447; Dalbert, *Hellenistischen-jüdischen Missionsliteratur*, 113, 118ff.

[36] For the sake of a proper perspective, notice should be taken of passages like 1 Cor 15:34 (ἀγνωσίαν γὰρ θεοῦ τινες ἔχουσιν) and Gal 4:8 which do seem to point to a former ignorance of God. See Weiss, *Earliest Christianity*, 237–238.

[37] It begins with an affirmation of God's wrath, 1:18, and 3:9. Cf. 2 Esd 6:17–28.

personal, whether it is acknowledged (1:18, 25, 28). The subject of 1:18ff. is therefore not the disclosure of the divine being but the uncovering of the human condition.[38] That condition is made | evident through the religion 214 of man (1:21, 23). For Paul "glorying" and "giving thanks" mean the acceptance of creaturely existence in subjection to the creator. It is the practical confirmation of the knowledge of God and basically determines the whole man. Paul therefore does not dwell on the irrationality of man-made religion, as his precursors do, in order to bring his readers back to reason. Rather, he uses the reality of the situation to demonstrate the predicament of man in his sinfulness and lostness: man stands under judgment even now, ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ (1:18). The present tense of ἀποκαλύπτεται establishes the eschatological meaning of the discussion. God's wrath is a present reality. So also is the salvation mediated by the gospel, which is God's saving power (1:16), δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται (1:17). He does not eliminate the traditional expectation of a future eschatological judgment (cf. 2:5ff., 16), but his main interest in Rom 1–2 is not to establish a time frame within which the preaching of the gospel is to take place. It is rather to lay bare the existential condition of man to which the gospel is directed. It is significant therefore that the gospel is described here as a δύναμις and not as a report of significant historical events in the redeeming work of Christ.

## Paul and the *Preaching of Peter*

Clement of Alexandria informs us that in the *Preaching of Peter* the Lord is call νόμος and λόγος.[39] There has been no agreement among commentators on what this description meant to the author of the *Preaching*. To some, Jesus is in this way designated as the high point of all religion and ethical understanding without any special reference being made to the Jewish Law.[40] To others νόμος designates Christ as the revealer of the moral law (with an allusion to the Mosaic Law), and λόγος is applied to him as the

[38] Bornkamm, "The Revelation of God's Wrath," 56. Bornkamm overstates the difference between Paul and his philosophical sources. As he himself notes, the Stoic's knowledge of the divine involves a knowledge of himself (53). The difference is between the Stoic's and Paul's views of that knowledge: For the Stoic it concerns the divine nature of man; for Paul, man's sinfulness.

[39] Clement, *Strom.* 1.29.182; 2.15.68; *Ecl.* 58.

[40] E.g., Hennecke, *Handbuch zu den neutestamentlichen Apokryphen*, 246.

Reason of God, the Revealer of truth.[41] This would mark an early stage in the philosophical speculation on the notion of the Word, which would be continued by the Apologists. Others, however, deny this | metaphysical sense of λόγος and consider it to be closer in meaning to the Johannine λόγος than to the philosophical-cosmological meaning it has later in Christian theology.[42]

We do not know in what context the *Preaching* used this description, and we should therefore proceed with caution in any attempt to determine its meaning. There are, however, some things that may be noticed. We have seen that in the philosophical traditions behind Paul λόγος and νόμος do occur together to describe man's innate reason and natural law which, in the Jewish tradition, was considered to be in agreement with the Law of Moses. Given the *Preaching*'s familiarity with these traditions, this understanding of the description must receive more than casual consideration. We furthermore note that Clement refers to this description of the *Preaching* in an argument in which he is affirming that natural law and the taught law are one because they both come from God.[43] Then again, λόγος in a metaphysical sense does occur in another fragment of the *Preaching* in which it is said that there is one God, ὃς ἀρχὴν πάντων ἐποίησεν … ὃς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν λόγῳ δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ. The *Preaching* thus does seem to have been familiar with those *topoi* dealing with natural revelation. It differs from Paul in that it picks up the topic of the λόγος from the philosophical tradition and, by combining it with contemporary Wisdom speculation, gives a metaphysical cast to its Christology.[44] The fact that | Clement does not quote passages from the *Preaching* which more

[41] E.g., Aimé Puech, *Les apologistes grecs du IIe siècle de notre ère* (Paris: Hachette, 1912), 33.

[42] E.g., von Dobschütz, *Kerygma Petri*, 28.

[43] Clement, *Strom.* 1.29.182.

[44] Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.39. It is inadequate to refer the first part of the statement to Gen 1:1 (adducing Clement's claim that "Peter" thus correctly understood Gen 1:1 [*Strom.* 6.7.58]), and the second to Heb 1:3, in this way to escape the metaphysical meaning. The point cannot be argued here except to point out that the first statement probably has Prov 8:22 rather than Gen 1:1 in mind and that this description should thus be seen against the background of cosmological Wisdom speculation as it was used in the second century. The Platonic description of God (see below) which accompanies these statements strengthens this view. For the kind of thinking with which we may have to do here, see Tatian, *Or.* 5.1, and the comments by Martin Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie* (FKDG 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), 64ff. On Prov 8:22 in Christian exegesis, see my article "The Holy Spirit in Athenagoras," *JTS* NS 20 (1969): 538–542. [*Light*, 2:837–841] On Gen 1:1, see Jacobus C.M. van Winden, *In den beginne: Vroeg-Christelijke exegese van de term ἀρχή in Genesis 1:1* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967).

clearly articulate the philosophical points which he is affirming raises the suspicion that this type of philosophical concern was not of major interest to the author of the *Preaching*. It is significant, for example, that the Logos is explicitly described in its creative, but not its revealing, function. This is also a feature of the Logos theologies of those Apologists like Athenagoras who, though they were knowledgeable with respect to the philosophy of their day, did not have the creative genius of a Justin Martyr.[45] Furthermore, given the *Preaching*'s understanding of men's knowledge of God (see below), it is unlikely that the λόγος as revealer occupied a major place in his system, insofar as he had one. He does not use νόμος again in the extant fragments. What is of interest to us at this point, however, is the direction of the author's thought. Whereas Paul's interest in soteriology so dominates his use of his sources that the λόγος has no place in his consideration, the *Preaching* uses it, thus admitting a more speculative turn of thought. Other statements from the *Preaching* preserved by Clement further illustrate this.

The longest extant fragment of the *Preaching* begins by urging its readers to recognize that there is one God, who is the creator.[46] The description of God is given in highly stylized form: εἷς θεός… ὁ ἀόρατος ὃς τὰ πάντα ὁρᾷ, ἀχώρητος ὃς τὰ πάντα χωρεῖ, ἀνεπιδεὴς οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐπιδέεται καὶ δι᾽ ὅν ἐστιν· ἀκατάληπτος, ἀέναος, ἄφθαρτος, ἄποίητος ὃς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν λόγῳ δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ.[47] The philosophical background of this description has long been recognized.[48] It is | derived from late Platonism, which adopted the *via negationis* and opposed the negation of an imperfect affirmation with a perfect one.[49] Paul also uses negatives to describe God,[50] 217

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[45] For the fluidity of speculation on the Logos and Wisdom in the second century, see Georg Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie* (BHT 21; Tübingen: Mohr, 1956), esp. 27–61.

[46] This statement cannot be taken as proving that the *Preaching* is addressed to pagans who are invited to accept the Christian belief in the one God. (For εἷς θεός as *the* Christian confession, see Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 1:155, 180.) For the question of whether early Apologies were in fact written for outsiders, see the literature on the genre cited in n. 3, and Adolfo Omodeo, *Saggi sul cristianesimo antico: Gesù il Nazoreo. Il cristianesimo nel secondo secolo* (Opere 3; Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1958), 587–593. For God as Creator, see Hildebrecht Hommel, *Schöpfer und Erhalter: Studien zum Problem Christentum und Antike* (Berlin: Lettner, 1956).

[47] Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.39; cf. 6.7.58.

[48] E.g., Puech, *Les apologistes grecs*, 32–33.

[49] Michele Pellegrino, *Gli apologeti greci del II secolo: saggio sui rapporti fra il cristianesimo primitivo e la cultura classica* (Rome: Anonima Veritas, 1947), 23–24.

[50] E.g., τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ, ἥ τε ἀΐδιος δύναμις αὐτοῦ καὶ θειότης, (Rom 1:20), τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ (1:23). However, Hans F.A. von Arnim, *SVF*, does not list ἀόρατα in his index.

but his terms come primarily from Stoicism. The tradition reflected by the *Preaching* is Middle Platonic and would exert great influence on later Apologists.[51] Another difference between our author and Paul lies in the degree to which they express themselves in the carefully worked out formulations of the Hellenistic school of philosophy. Of greatest importance for our investigation, however, is the difference between Paul and the *Preaching* on the degree to which they think men know God.

Paul builds his argument on the presupposition that all men have a knowledge of God. He thus implicitly rejects the theme of man's ignorance. Here again the *Preaching* picks up from the philosophic tradition an idea that Paul had rejected. For him the Gentiles are borne along in ignorance and do not know God (ἀγνοίᾳ φερόμενοι καὶ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν θεόν).[52] This ignorance leads them to idolatry, which is described in a highly stylized manner.[53] The Jewish and Pauline view that immorality is the result of idolatry is absent. But what is more significant is that Paul's accusation that all men have demonstrated themselves to be without excuse through their rejection of the knowledge of God and through their subsequent lives finds no real counterpart at this point in the *Preaching*'s argument. The comparatively weak conclusion the author draws is that through their idolatrous worship the Gentiles show their unthankfulness to God since 218 they in practice deny his existence. Even the | Jews do not know God, καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι μόνοι οἰόμενοι τὸν θεὸν γινώσκειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται.[54] They end up worshiping angels and archangels, the months, and the moon.[55] For Paul the Jews' knowledge of God in which they boasted while causing the name of God to be blasphemed, pointed up their arrogance and the fact that they are inexcusable. In this way he says something about their own inadequacy. The closest that the *Preaching* comes to this is to fault the direction of their worship. It does not at this point make the argument really personal.

[51] For Middle Platonic descriptions of God's transcendence by using negatives, see Jules Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la trinité. Des origines au concile de Nicée* (2 vols.; 5th ed.; Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1928), 2:535–647. On the Apologists, see Athenagoras, *Leg.* 10; Tatian, *Or.* 5.1; Aristides, *Apol.* 1.4–5, on which see van Unnik, "Die Gotteslehre," 168.

[52] Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.40.

[53] Idolatry is seen as the corruption of two classes of things that God has given to man: those given for his use (εἰς χρῆσιν, cf. Rom 1:27) and those given for food (εἰς βρῶσιν).

[54] Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.41.

[55] On this anti-Jewishness, see Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 1:177–78, 204–205. and Marrou, *A Diognète*, 111ff.

When speaking of the non-Christians' ignorance of God, the *Preaching* does not mean that they have no knowledge of God at all. It is rather a matter of their not having understood clearly or fully. To all rational souls it has been said from the beginning that, ὅσα ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τις ὑμῶν ἐποίησεν μὴ εἰδὼς σαφῶς τὸν θεὸν ἐὰν ἐπιγνοὺς μετανοήσῃ, πάντα αὐτῷ ἀφεθήσεται τὰ ἁμαρτήματα.[56] Clement explains that the *Preaching* teaches that the Gentiles did not know God κατὰ ἐπίγνωσιν but κατὰ περίφρασιν.[57] The partial nature of the pagan knowledge of God would become a subject of great interest to the later Apologists,[58] but the *Preaching* does not seem to have worked out any theory to accommodate it. What it does is to indicate how Christians have come to be possessors of this knowledge.

As the Apologists later insist, so does the *Preaching* that knowledge of God comes from Scripture and tradition.[59] The *Preaching* claims that the Apostles found in the prophets references to Christ and to his passion, καθὼς ἐγέγραπτο ταῦτα πάντα, ἃ ἔδει αὐτὸν παθεῖν καὶ | μετ' αὐτὸν ἃ ἔσται, 219 and gives a Christological description in creedal form.[60] Upon reading the prophetic statements about Christ they believed in God, and henceforth they say nothing apart from Scripture. The *Preaching* does not here have in mind a simple scheme of prophecy and fulfillment.[61] It elsewhere says that it is through the name of Christ,[62] or again, through Scripture, that is to say, through the Son,[63] that men believe in God. Exactly how he understood the Son to be Scripture we do not know, but what does interest us is the role of the Apostles. It is they who have the insight into Scripture that leads

56 Clement, *Strom.* 6.6.48. The terms used here (ἄγνοια, μετάνοια, ἄφεσις) show that the *Preaching* is closer in its theology to Acts than to Paul; cf. Acts 3:17–19; 5:31; 17:30.

57 Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.39, and again, οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν παντελῆ. It is not certain whether the ὡς ἡμεῖς κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν τελείαν (*Strom.* 6.5.40) is from the *Preaching* or is an addition made by Clement.

58 Cf. Justin, *2 Apol.* 13.5; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 24.5.

59 See especially Damien van den Eynde, *Les normes de l'enseignement Chrétien dans la littérature patristique des trois premiers siècles* (Paris: Gabalda, 1933), 1–103. It is striking that there are no references to the Holy Spirit in the extant fragments of the *Preaching*.

60 Clement, *Strom.* 6.15.128. That the description is a type of creed is argued by Robinson, *Apology of Aristides*, 23–24, 89–90; Reagan, *Preaching of Peter*, 89. Von Dobschütz, *Kerygma Petri*, 62, disagrees with this view.

61 According to Clement the prophecies took place by divine providence, and we may thus have here the beginnings of a scheme of revelation such as the one that Athenagoras would develop, but our information is too slight to draw any conclusions. See my article, "Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers" in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef Jungmann; 2 vols.; Munster Westf.: Aschendorff, 1970), 1:214–25. [*Light*, 2:849–865]

62 Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.43.

63 Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.39, accepting the conjecture of Früchtel, as does Schneemelcher.

to knowledge of God through the Lord. Because they were worthy to be his disciples and the Lord knew that they would be faithful Apostles, after the resurrection he sent them into all the world to preach that there is one God.[64] Their message becomes the tradition that is handed on: μανθάνοντες ἃ παραδίδομεν ὑμῖν, φυλάσσεσθε καινῶς τὸν θεόν.[65] The role of the Apostles and the church is far down the road of *Frühkatholizismus*. There is nothing comparable in Paul's missionary sermon as it is reflected in Rom 1–2.[66] | 220

This self-awareness of the church finds further expression in the *Preaching*'s *heilsgeschichtlich* scheme. The sequence found in Paul and Acts, that salvation should be preached to the Jews first and then to the Gentiles, is elaborated.[67] The emphasis is that all men should hear the gospel. Therefore the disciples are to confine their preaching for the first twelve years to Israel, lest Israel say οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν,[68] and then they are to go into all the world so that mankind as a whole cannot say οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν.[69] As is the case in Acts, when a history of salvation is envisaged, eschatology recedes.[70] For Paul all men have an innate or a taught knowledge of God which they fail to make personal, and for that reason they are ἀναπολόγητοι. God's wrath is a present experience and eschatology is personalized. Paul's use of natural revelation in this way, to establish man's guilt, would continue to be used by the Apologists.[71] For the *Preaching*, on the other hand, men

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64 Clement, *Strom.* 6.6.48. On the Apostles as eyewitnesses and expounders of the Scriptures, see Birger Gerhardsson, *Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity* (trans. Eric J. Sharpe; ASNU 22; Uppsala: Almqvist, 1961).

65 Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.41. When seen in this light, the titles of the writing, Κήρυγμα Πέτρου, takes on added significance. For the language describing tradition used here, see Klaus Wegenast, *Das Verständnis der Tradition bei Paulus und in den Deuteropaulinen* (WMANT 8; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1962).

66 See especially Ernst Käsemann, "Paul and Nascent Catholicism," in *JTC* 3 (1967): 14–27. The *Preaching* is closer to Acts in its view of the church than to Paul. See also Philipp Vielhauer, "On the 'Paulinism' of Acts," in Keck and Martyn, *Studies in Luke-Acts*, 33–49, who states that Luke's distance from Paul is just as clear as his nearness to the Apologists.

67 See Ferdinand Hahn, *Mission in the New Testament* (trans. Frank Clarke; SBT 47; London: SCM, 1965), 117–118.

68 Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.43. On the twelve years in Christian tradition, see Walter Bauer in Hennecke, Schneemelcher, and Wilson, eds., *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:44–45.

69 Clement, *Strom.* 6.6.48.

70 For this feature of Acts, see Hans Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke* (trans. Geoffrey Buswell; London: Faber & Faber, 1960); Erich Grässer, *Das Problem der Parusieverzögerung in den synoptischen Evangelien und in der Apostelgeschichte* (BZNW 22; Berlin: A. Töpelmann, 1957). But to say that eschatology recedes is not to say that it disappears. For a balancing view, see Wilckens, "Interpreting Luke-Acts in a Period of Existentialist Theology," in Keck and Martyn, *Studies in Luke-Acts*, 60–83, and Stephen G. Wilson, "Lukan Eschatology," *NTS* 15 (1970): 330–347.

71 See Gilles Quispel, *Het Getuigenis der Ziel bij Tertullianus* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1952).

are also without excuse but only as a consequence of the church's preaching. It is their opportunity to hear that makes it impossible for them to excuse themselves (οὐκ ἔχοντες ἀπολογίαν),[72] and the aspect of judgment is thus made dependent on the church's activity and not exclusively on the essential human condition. As room is provided for the church's preaching, understandably the eschatological perspective shifts.

Finally, the *Preaching* is the first Christian writing to demonstrate | the 221 church's self-consciousness by dividing humanity into Greeks, Jews, and Christians as three races. Christians are said to worship God as a third race in a new way.[73] The description becomes a commonplace in the Apologists.[74] It does more than place Christians in a chronological relationship with Jews and Gentiles, as the author's emphasis on the Christians' "newness" may lead one to believe. The newness and separateness of Christianity drew the fire of pagans, who described them as the people of a god who, if their claims were true, had bestirred himself remarkably late in human history.[75] The Christian reply was that God's purpose for man and the world was focused in them, that human history was to be judged by them, and not conversely. Their distinctiveness was not cause for shame but for pride. Thus, when the *Preaching* contrasts the newness of the worship of the Christians, the third race, to that of the Greeks and Jews, it does so with pride. In so doing the document again shows its distance from Paul's approach in his missionary sermon. For Paul, knowledge of the creator leads to the guilt of Gentiles and Jews, who encompass all humanity. That knowledge should make man abjectly aware of his need for divine grace. In the *Preaching* there is a different atmosphere. Greeks and Jews are now contrasted with Christians. The former do not know God in their worship; the latter alone do. They are to come to God, not through his grace, but through the transmission of the church's tradition. Whereas Paul had applied the philosophical tradition in such a way as to

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[72] Clement, *Strom.* 6.6.48; cf. 6.5.42. See also *Acts Thom.* 28.

[73] Clement, *Strom.* 6.5.41.

[74] See Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (trans. and ed. James Moffatt; 2 vols.; 2d ed.; London: Williams & Norgate/New York: G.P. Putnam, 1908; vol. 1 repr. under the same title in Harper Torchbooks/The Cloister Library; New York: Harper, 1962), 1:240–265; Karl Prümm, *Christentum als Neuheitserlebnis: Durchblick durch die Christlich-antike Begegnung* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1939).

[75] See Origen, *Cels.* 6.7, 78; Arnobius, *Adv. Gent.* 2.75. The Christians were challenged in this way as early as the *Epistle to Diognetus* (cf. 1.1). On another level, see Suetonius's description of Christianity as a *superstitio nova et malefica* (*Nero* 16). See also Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, 1:266–278; Marrou, *A Diognète*, 202–207.

demonstrate mankind's need of salvation, the *Preaching*'s adaptation of the
222 same tradition has the effect of underlining the church's superiority. |

## Conclusion

In drawing conclusions about the theological shift that marks the transition from missionary preaching to apologetic we must be aware of the danger of generalization. Missionary preaching did not assume only one form, and neither did apologetic. Allowances must be made for the diversity that characterized both. Our study has been confined to only two examples, one from within and one from outside the NT. This selection does not imply that apologetic is a post-NT development. As we have indicated, apologetic is already found in the NT itself. On the basis of this limited sampling the following can at least be ventured:

1. The freshness and immediacy of missionary preaching have given away to the formalism of church tradition. In the *Preaching of Peter* the step has not been taken of going beyond the formal and creedal definitions to give a philosophical and theological exposition of them. A greater interest in the raw material later used in such a systematic exposition is shown than is the case in the missionary preaching, but the speculative interest does not yet predominate. The direction for that later development does, however, appear to be already set.

2. While the missionary preaching of Paul drives to the point that all men are equal in their guilt, the *Preaching of Peter* seems to be in a historical, religious, and social position of coming to terms with its separateness. The church it represents no longer looks inward to preserve its identity. It may still be of only slight political and social significance, but it has begun to look outward with a self-confidence that is more of a challenge than an invitation. There is an air of superiority in its claims: the church alone knows God, and therefore it alone can mediate that knowledge through its tradition and give expression to it in worship. To the extent that the *Preaching of Peter* can be classified as proclamation, it can be said that the church has in effect itself become part of the message.

3. By emphasizing the role of the church in the history of salvation, the
223 *Preaching of Peter* perforce represents a different | eschatological outlook from the missionary preaching. The move from mission proclamation to defense in itself already means that the edge is taken off the eschatological crisis present in the former. It has the effect of lessening the degree to which the message is personalized.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

# JUSTIN AND CRESCENS*

In his autobiographical description (*Dial.* 1–7) Justin Martyr rehearses his philosophical pedigree to establish his credentials as a philosopher. Recent studies have demonstrated that he indeed was conversant with the different philosophical schools of his day, and that he was particularly indebted to the Platonism of the second century.[1] Justin as well as early Christian tradition claim that he continued to wear the short cloak that marked philosophers, especially the Cynics, and that he engaged philosophers in debate as he did Trypho the Jew.[2] One such philosopher was Crescens the Cynic, whom we know only from Christian sources. I offer this contentious discussion of these two contentious men by way of counterpoint to the uncontentious man whom it seeks to honor.

There is considerable difference of opinion on the precise nature of the encounter between Justin and Crescens and on the role the Cynic may have played in Justin's death. A majority of scholars hold that Justin worsted Crescens in a heated debate, as a result of which Crescens successfully plotted Justin's death.[3] Sometimes the debate is thought to have

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[1] See Carl Andresen, "Justin und der mittlere Platonismus," *ZNW* 44 (1952–1953): 157–195. Henry Chadwick, "Justin's Defense of Christianity," *BJRL* 47 (1965): 275–297, esp. 293, thinks "that there is more Platonism to be found in the *Dialogue with Trypho* than in the *Apologies*."

[2] On the cloak, see Justin, *Dial.* 1.2; cf. 9.2; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.11.8; Jerome, *Vir. ill.* 23. Niels Hyldahl, *Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins* (ATDan 9; Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966), 92–112, without sufficient evidence dismisses Justin's statement, and hence the later tradition dependent on it, as part of a larger literary convention Justin uses.

[3] E.g., Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church* (ed. David S. Schaff; 7 vols. in 8; 3d rev. and enl. ed.; New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1882–1910), 2:715; Kirsopp Lake, *Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 127; Jules Lebreton and Jacques Zeiller, *The Emergence of the Church in the Roman World* (vol. 2 of *A History of the Early Church*; trans. Ernest C. Messenger; Collier Catholic Readers; New York: Collier Books, 1962), 92; Frederick J. Foakes-Jackson, *The History of the Christian Church from the Earliest Times to A.D. 461* (8th ed.; Chicago: W.P. Blessing, 1927), 159; Donald R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D.* (London: Methuen, 1937; repr., Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1967; 2d ed., London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998), 174–175; Leslie W. Barnard, *Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

been a public affair,[4] and to have been taken down stenographically.[5] A minority of scholars, on the other hand, think that at most it can only be inferred from the sources that Crescens was successful,[6] and a still smaller group deny that Crescens's intentions were realized.[7] The differences in interpretation are due to the paucity and the tendentiousness of our sources. Crescens is mentioned only by Justin and Tatian, whose accounts form the basis for what Eusebius and Jerome in turn have to say about him.[8] A serious difficulty for any attempt to implicate Crescens in | Justin's death is posed by the fact that Crescens is not mentioned in the account of Justin's martyrdom, the veracity of which is generally accepted.[9] With the exception of Karl Hubik, whose reconstruction will be presented below, the incident between Justin and Crescens has not been analyzed in detail, so far as I am aware, and I propose to examine the most important texts more closely than has been done.

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Hubik's interpretation of Crescens's role is part of his attempt to separate Justin's *First* and *Second Apologies* by almost ten years, in opposition to the view generally held, that the *First Apology* was written between

1967), 5–6; William H.C. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 203; Dieter Berwig, *Mark Aurel und die Christen* (Bonn: Habelt, 1970), 26.

[4] E.g., George T. Purves, *The Testimony of Justin Martyr to Early Christianity* (Princeton Theological Seminary Stone Lectures 1888; London: J. Nisbet, 1888), 14; Foakes-Jackson, *History of the Christian Church*, 159; Beresford J. Kidd, *A History of the Church to A.D. 461* (3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 1:113; Cecil J. Cadoux, *The Early Church and the World: A History of the Christian Attitude to Pagan Society and the State Down to the Time of Constantinus* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1925), 235.

[5] Pierre C. de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne. Étude sur la polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe siècle* (ed. Jacques Zeiller; 10th ed.; Paris: L'Artisan du livre, 1948), 63–64; Karl Hubik, *Die Apologien des hl. Justinus des Philosophen und Märtyrers: Literarhistorische Untersuchungen* (Vienna: Mayer, 1912), 159, 175.

[6] Henry S. Holland, "Justinus Martyr," *DCB* 3:560–87, esp. 562; Purves, *Testimony*, 14 n. 5; Arthur C. McGiffert, in *Eusebius: Church History* (2 vols.; *NPNF*²; New York: The Christian Literature Co., 1890; repr., Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm.B. Eerdmans, 1952), 1:194 n. 13.

[7] Charles Bigg, *The Origins of Christianity* (ed. Thomas B. Strong; Oxford/New York: Clarendon Press, 1909), 172; Eric F. Osborn, *Justin Martyr* (BHT 47; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1973), 9–10.

[8] Justin, *2 Apol.* 3; Tatian, *Or.* 19; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.16; *Chron.* on 165; Jerome, *Vir. ill.* 23.

[9] For the text and translation of the *Acts of Justin and Companions*, see Herbert Musurillo, *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs* (OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), xvii–xx, 42–61, and for discussion, Hippolyte Delehaye, *Les passions des martyrs et les genres littéraires* (2d rev. ed.; SHG 13B; Brussels: Société des Bollandistes, 1966), 87–89. Musurillo, *Acts*, xviii, correctly rejects Jean Bolland's speculation that the *Acts of Justin and Companions* describes the death of another Justin, and that Justin Martyr might have been murdered by Crescens himself.

150 and 155, and that the *Second*, really an appendix to the *First*, was written soon after.[10] Hubik is so speculative and harmonistic in his argument that it is not surprising that his views have not met with approval. A detailed refutation is unnecessary for our present purpose and would require more space and energy than the fantasy is worth. I summarize his reconstruction because it is the lengthiest treatment of Crescens that has been attempted and because it illustrates the extremes to which one can go when harmonization is one's major goal. According to Hubik, Crescens was active in Rome for some time before he succeeded in drawing attention to himself in 153. In that year the Cynic Peregrinus Proteus was so active that he was banished from the city (Lucian, *Peregr.* 18). He was popular with the masses, and as a consequence the stock of all Cynics, including that of Crescens, rose. Peregrinus had been a Christian (*Peregr.* 11–13, 16), and he seems to have retained some elements of Christian teaching. There is no evidence of Cynic opposition to Christians at this time. Justin's *First Apology*, written in 155 or 156, reflects no debates between Justin and the philosophers. It was only from 163 onwards that Crescens and some other Cynics turned against the Christians and carried on public | disputations with them in an effort to persuade them to give up their religious error. In this context Justin embarrassed Crescens in a public debate, which was stenographically recorded, a copy of which may then have made its way into the Emperor's hands. Crescens, however, was successful in turning the popular attitude against the Christians, a situation which was further aggravated by a scathingly anti-Christian address to the Senate by the orator Fronto, who was an advisor to Marcus Aurelius. It is this speech that Justin refutes in his *Second Apology*, which was written after 163. Justin and Crescens then engaged in a number of public debates, and Justin increasingly attacked other philosophers as well. After Fronto's speech, the court philosophers, especially the Stoics, entered the fray. Eventually Justin and six other Christians were arrested, tried before the prefect Rusticus, who was a Stoic and, like Fronto, an advisor to the Emperor, and executed in 166.

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[10] See Adolf Harnack, *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur* (vol. 2.1 of *Geschichte der christlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius*; ed. Harnack and Erwin Preuschen; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1897), 274–284; Otto Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (5 vols.; 2d ed.; Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder, 1913–1932), 1:219–227; Berthold Altaner, *Patrology* (trans. Hilda C. Graef; 2d ed.; New York: Herder & Herder, 1961), 121–122; Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* (3 vols.; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950–1960), 1:198–199.

We begin our investigation with Justin's "*Second Apology*," which was occasioned by a recent outbreak of persecution of Christians. It was doubtlessly written during the reign of Antoninus Pius (*2 Apol.* 2.16), i.e., between 138 and 161, and there is no cogent reason to reject the date generally ascribed to it, around 155. Justin's comments on Crescens come immediately after his account of the trial and condemnation of the Christians by Urbicus, who was prefect of Rome from 144 to 160.[11] Justin *expects* that he, too, would be plotted against and put to the stake either by those who had been active in the persecutions just discussed or by Crescens. As reason for his suspicion about the latter, Justin asserts that he had successfully withstood Crescens's continuing attacks on the Christians. As he had sketched the immoral character of those responsible for the earlier persecution, so now Justin makes Crescens his foil for his description | of the quasi-philosopher who opposes Christianity and might do it harm. Crescens thus appears as part of Justin's defense that charges against Christians come from people who are either immoral or ignorant, and the tendentiousness of his statements should therefore be appreciated. Given their apologetic thrust, they cannot forthwith be taken as historical fact.

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Even if Crescens were plotting against Justin around 150, what is the evidence that he finally succeeded? Justin died around 165, when Rome had as prefect Junius Rusticus and Marcus Aurelius was Emperor. Had Crescens actually plotted Justin's death so assiduously that he finally succeeded in attaining it,[12] one would assume that he was actively hounding Justin during this ten-year period when the Roman officials changed.[13] Since Justin may very well have left Rome and then returned during this period (*Acta SS. Just. soc.* 3), Crescens would have had to resume his Cynic

[11] Harnack, *Chronologie*, 276.

[12] With ξύλῳ ἐμπαγῆναι, "to be fixed to the stake" (*2 Apol.* 3.1), Justin probably has execution in mind, but see McGiffert's translation of Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.16.3 (and his n. 9) for the possibility that he was thinking of being put in the stocks. Thus also Hugh J. Lawlor and John E.L. Oulton, *Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea: The Ecclesiastical History and the Martyrs of Palestine* (2 vols.; London: SPCK, 1927; repr., 1954), 2:123.

[13] The prefect Salvianus Julianus, who had succeeded Urbicus, was in turn succeeded by Rusticus. Marcus Aurelius was co-regent with Antoninus Pius when the Apologies were written (see *1 Apol.* 1.1; *2 Apol.* 2.2, 3, 8), but the latter had died by the time of Justin's execution. Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution*, 189ff., discusses Justin's case in a chapter dealing with the Antonines, 135–165, and not in the one dealing with "the years of crisis, 165–180." In the latter period, imperial policy toward the Christians is thought not to have changed, although Marcus substantially modified procedures. Frend's evidence for the latter comes primarily from the provinces, Asia in particular, which may be the reason why he did not include Justin at this point, but it is not clear why Justin's case should not be seen as reflective of the hardening in attitude.

snapping upon Justin's return and carried through to the end. This is, of course, not impossible, but it is a long way to go on the basis of Justin's apologetic "expectation," especially since Crescens is not mentioned at all in the *Acts* which provides the account of his and six other Christians' trial and martyrdom.

It is also noteworthy that there are differences between the anti-Christian charges that Justin imputes to Crescens and those made during the trial. The charges of atheism and impiety allegedly made by Crescens could, perhaps, be the basis for the first part of Rusticus's examination of Justin, but even that is not certain. The decisive point in the trial, moreover, comes when Rusticus determines that Justin had conducted an illegal society; then he asks whether Justin is a Christian (*Acta SS. Just. soc.* 3).[14] This does not mean that Crescens could not have been responsible for drawing attention to Justin in the first place, but if that were the case it would have | been striking that the *Acts* shows no interest in him whatsoever. 316

The evidence that Crescens even harbored such an intense hatred of Christians and of Justin in particular as to involve him in machinations against them for ten years is very slight. When stripped of its invective Justin's accusation is simply that Crescens publicly accused Christians, and not only Justin himself, of atheism and impiety. That Crescens would have done so is not surprising; it was perfectly good form.[15] It is, however, ironic that the Cynic would accuse Christians of crimes so frequently laid at the door of Cynics themselves.[16] Justin does not say that Crescens was single-minded or passionate in his dislike of Christians. The passion rather resides with Justin himself. He hurls insult upon insult on Crescens: Crescens loves fanfare and ostentation, is not worthy of being called a philosopher, does not know what he is talking about, is driven by a desire to please the deluded mob, is completely depraved, worse than the illiterate, conquered by illiberal and unreasonable opinion and fear, and loves

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14 See Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution*, 189ff.; Berwig, *Mark Aurel*, 28–33. Perhaps the plague that afflicted Rome in 165 provided the occasion for the persecution of Justin and his friends. See Robert M. Grant, *The Sword and the Cross* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 82; Marta Sordi, "I 'nuovi decreti' di Marco Aurelio contro i cristiani," *StRo* 9 (1961): 366–367; Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution*, 189; Berwig, *Mark Aurel*, 30.

15 For a rather full catalogue of slanders, see Minucius Felix, *Oct.* 9, and the excellent notes in Graeme W. Clarke, *The* Octavius *of Marcus Minucius Felix* (ACW 39; New York: Newman, 1974), 212–225.

16 See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Pseudo-Heraclitus, *Epistle* 4: The Divinization of the Wise Man," JAC 21 (1978): 42–64. [*Light*, 2:601–634]

notoriety. This is the typical polemical description of Cynics.[17] That Justin is really slandering all Cynics in the person of Crescens would appear to be the case from the way he concludes his tirade: "But it is impossible for a Cynic, who makes indifference his end, to know any good but indifference."

I should like to argue that Justin is doing more than simply attacking Crescens personally. In addition to using Crescens as a representative of ignorant philosophical opponents of Christianity, he also wants to put some distance between himself and the Cynics in particular. Both Justin's reason for doing so and Crescens's for opposing the Christians may be due to the fact that Cynics and Christians were beginning to be lumped together by the opponents of both.[18] Perhaps Peregrinus, who coincidentally later died in the same | year Justin did, and who was remembered by Christians,[19] may have had something to do with the matter, but we simply do not know when he was in Rome.[20] But Peregrinus's presence in Rome at this time was not required for the casual observer to make the connection. The disputatious Justin in his philosopher's cloak could easily have appeared to have Cynic characteristics.[21] In any case, Crescens would have been no more eager to be associated with Christians than Justin with Cynics, and Justin's comments about his competitor should be seen in that light.

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A close examination of what Justin says reveals that, despite his criticism of Crescens's ignorance, he did not himself seem to know much about Crescens. To prove that Crescens's charges of impiety and atheism were based on ignorance, Justin raises three possibilities: (1) Crescens has not read the teachings of Christ, presumably the Gospels, and therefore does not know[22] what he is talking about, or (2) he has read them without

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[17] Almost all the slanders can be found in Lucian, *De morte Peregrini*. For Crescens's φιλοδοξία, love of fame or notoriety, see *Peregr.* 4, 38, and throughout the tractate. See further Samuel Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (London: Macmillan, 1904; repr., New York: Meridian, 1956), 351ff., for the popular view of the Cynics.

[18] See de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, 63–64, 83; Abraham J. Malherbe, "Apologetic and Philosophy in the Second Century," *ResQ* 7 (1963): 19–32 [*Light*, 2:781–796]; Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution*, 203–204.

[19] Cf. Tatian, *Or.* 25; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 26.4.

[20] Hubik seems to be dependent on Harnack, *Chronologie*, 285–286, for the date when he places Peregrinus in Rome in 153. On the difficulty in dating Peregrinus's movements with any precision, see Kurt von Fritz, "Peregrinus (Proteus)," PW 19.1 (1937): 656–663.

[21] See Frend, *Martyrdom and Persecution*, 204–205, for the similarities.

[22] The English translations of the cognitive terms are generally imprecise. In the first possibility, ἐπίσταμαι is used, in the second and third, συνίημι, and in Justin's conclusion, ἐπίσταμαι.

understanding them, or (3) he has read and understood them but attacks the Christians to prove that he is not one of them. Justin claims that by putting some questions to Crescens he had proved that he in fact knew nothing. But why then does he mention options (2) and (3)? The third, by reflecting the possibility that Christians and Cynics may be identified in the popular mind, strengthens the suspicion that Justin is particularly interested in drawing a line between them. The second may simply be a bit of polemic against philosophers like Celsus and Porphyry later, who would know the Christian writings but were thought not to have understood them in the Christian sense.[23]

The first possibility was the case, according to Justin, but the flow of his argument is not clear. Crescens is said to have accused Christians of impiety and atheism but, rather than refute him on any detail regarding these | charges, Justin introduces a knowledge of the Gospels as a requirement for any discussion of Christianity. From *2 Apol.* 11.2 it would appear that Crescens had also expressed himself on the Christian attitude toward death, and that Justin felt compelled to address that question quite extensively (see chs. 4, 9, 11, 12). But when Crescens is introduced, nothing is said about death. Instead, the teachings of Christ are brought into the discussion, and Crescens's failure to understand them is introduced in a manner that seems superficial. Justin may have had at least two reasons for doing so: the first to be affirmed with some certainty, the second as a distinct possibility. First, the teachings of Christ are the touchstone for Justin, especially in the *Second Apology*, and any argument must take them into consideration. So, in turning from his discussion of the occasion of the writing, which was also introduced with references to the teachings of Christ (*2 Apol.* 2.2), to his own circumstances, he again begins with them, and they reappear repeatedly in the rest of the Apology.[24] What is important to Justin about Crescens is not so much that he presents danger to

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[23] For Celsus's attack on Christianity and Justin's possible influence on him, see Carl Andresen, *Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (AKG 30; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1955), which probably overstates the matter. On Porphyry, see Milton V. Anastos, "Porphyry's Attack on the Bible," in *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* (ed. Luitpold Wallach; Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), 421–450. See also Robert L. Wilken, "Pagan Criticism of Christianity: Greek Religion and Christian Faith," in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition: In Honorem Robert M. Grant* (ed. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken; ThH 53; Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 117–134, and Wilken, "The Christians as the Romans (and Greeks) Saw Them," in *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Vol. 1: The Shaping of Christianity in the Second and Third Centuries* (ed. Edward P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 100–125, 234–236.

[24] See, for example, *2 Apol.* 4.3; 8.4; 10.1; 13.1; 15.3.

Justin's person. Crescens is only one of a number of people who may do Christians in general, and not Justin alone, harm. Furthermore, the comment simply marks the transition from the discussion of the Christian martyrs. Crescens, rather, is important because he represents opponents who should know the teachings of Christ but do not. Justin's second reason quite possibly is to be found in the observation that the section dealing with ignorance of the Scriptures is part of the larger anti-Cynic polemic. It provides specificity to a charge that further forms the base for Justin's continuing argument. The conclusions to be drawn up to this point, then, are that Justin's treatment of Crescens serves primarily apologetic and polemical functions, and that Justin betrays next to nothing in this context of | Crescens's method of attack or, indeed, of its precise content.

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One might have expected to learn more about Crescens since Justin says that he interrogated him. But Justin's description of this interrogation is not without its difficulties nor does it supply much solid information about the conflict. After stating the three possibilities regarding Crescens's knowledge of Christ's teachings, Justin tells his readers:

> In fact, I would have you know that by proposing and asking him certain questions (ἐρωτήσαντα αὐτὸν ἐρωτήσεις τινάς) I learned and proved (μαθεῖν καὶ ἐλέγξαι) that he indeed knows nothing. And (to prove that) I am speaking the truth, I am prepared, if my oral communications (αἱ κοινωνίαι τῶν λόγων) have not been referred to you, to communicate the questions (κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἐρωτήσεων) again in your presence. That would be a royal act (on your part). But if my questions (ἐρωτήσεις) and his answers (ἀποκρίσεις) have been brought to your attention, it is (already) clear to you that he knows nothing of our teaching (2 *Apol.* 3.4–6).

Justin uses the aorist tense in describing his interrogation of Crescens, which means that he refers to one occasion. Justin thus does not leave open the possibility that a series of confrontations had intensified Crescens's dislike for him to the point that he had started plotting Justin's death. The terms that he uses of his interrogation reveal that he did not engage in a debate which spun out the issues. Ἐρώτησις, which he uses, differs from πύσμα, "inquiry," in that no real answer to it except "yes" or "no" is required, while a longer, explanatory response is called for by the latter.[25] Such questions were especially used in the diatribal dialogue in which a fictitious opponent

[25] See Theon, *Progymn.* 5 in (2.97, 26 – 98, 16 Spengel); see also Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft* (2 vols.; Munich: Max Hueber, 1960), 1:379–380, § 767.

was addressed and were a device | particularly common in Cynic speech.[26] 320
It is no wonder, then, that Justin "learned" and "proved" what he set out to, that Crescens was ignorant. The strange use of κοινωνία and κοινωνεῖν point in the same direction. The rhetoricians described *communicatio* or κοινωνία as a fictitious, deliberative asking of advice from the speaker's opponent, when it is therefore more of a challenge than a real question, or of a judge, when it simply serves as a strengthening of one's case.[27] The terms that Justin uses therefore do not describe a debate. In fact, they need not even be taken to refer to a face to face encounter. They could just as well refer to Justin's having, in the Cynic style, lambasted Crescens in his absence. Were it not for his reference to Crescens's answers, Crescens need not even have known of Justin's challenge. But, that he did answer does not prove that he did so in a proper debate. He could just as well have heard of Justin's attack and then responded. Justin does not tell us what Crescens's answers were, only that they revealed his ignorance. That he does not mention Crescens's comments on the Christian view of death may mean either that Crescens did not speak on the subject in response to Justin's challenge or, if he did so, that it did not suit Justin's purpose to mention it here.

In summary, what Justin says about Crescens is to be seen in light of his apologetic method. He does not say that Crescens hounded him personally or that he did so because Justin had shown him up in debate. Crescens rather serves as a representative of the ignorant opponents of Christianity. In addition, Justin uses him to distinguish between Cynics and Christians, and does so by engaging in the usual anti-Cynic slander and concentrating on Crescens's ignorance. What Justin says about his interrogation of Crescens in no way supports the view that it was a personal confrontation, that it was one of a series, or that it was stenographically recorded and | 321
found its way into the Emperor's hands. It more likely was a harangue in the style of the Cynic diatribe.

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[26] See Anaximenes of Lampsacus, *Rhet. Alex.* 4.23.33; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.15, and see Lausberg, *Handbuch*, 1:381, § 771. On the dialogical element in the diatribe, see Stanley K. Stowers, *The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981).

[27] See Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.2.20–21; cf. 9.1.30, and Lausberg, *Handbuch*, 1:384, § 779. The closest parallel to Justin of which I am aware is κοινώνημα λόγων in Philodemus, *Oec.* 15 in Christian C. Jensen, *Philodemi Περὶ Οἰκονομίας qui dicitur libellus* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1906), p. 46, line 13. The text of Philodemus, however, is corrupt at this point, and the argument is unclear. On the possible Cynic allusions in the passage, see Renato Laurenti, *Filodemo e il pensiero economico degli epicurei* (TDSA 39; Milan: Istituto editoriale cisalpino-La goliardica, 1973), 122ff.

Tatian, Justin's disciple, provides more information about Crescens. In *Or.* 19 he instructs his ignorant pagan readers on the proper view of death. They claim, in the Cynic and Stoic manner, to despise death and to practice self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκειαν ἀσκεῖν), but, Tatian retorts, their philosophers are so deficient in their ἄσκησις that they are supported by the Emperor. Then Tatian introduces Crescens, presumably as a philosopher who professed to despise death but was not αὐτάρκης:

> Crescens, who made his nest in the great city, surpassed all men in pederasty and avarice. Yet this man who despised death, so much feared it that he undertook to bring about (περιβαλεῖν πραγματεύσασθαι) Justin's death as he did mine, as though it were an evil (καθάπερ καὶ ἐμὲ ὡς κακῷ)! (He did so) because, by preaching the truth, (Justin) was convicting (συνήλεγχεν) the philosophers of being gluttons and cheats (*Or.* 19.2).

It is significant that Crescens is again introduced when death is discussed, and this time the philosophical context is mentioned, that is, death and self-sufficiency are related as they were by the Cynics.[28] But then Tatian lapses into the standard anti-Cynic polemic.[29] He accuses Crescens of inconsistency between what he says and does,[30] pederasty,[31] and avarice.[32] As for Justin, so for Tatian, Crescens serves an apologetic function, in this instance by representing the inconsistent, immoral philosopher.

Tatian's account of the interchange between Justin and Crescens does not completely agree with Justin's. According to him Justin was in the habit of convicting | (the imperfect tense of συνήλεγχεν) philosophers in general, and not only Crescens, on moral grounds, and Crescens personally felt the bite of Justin's indictment. Tatian thus represents Crescens's action against Justin as a personal matter, and not as a prolonged attack on Christians as impious and atheists, as Justin had presented it. The aorist tense used to describe Crescens's machinations (περιβαλεῖν πραγματεύσασθαι) indicates that Tatian does not have in mind a continuous attack by Crescens on Justin. Thus, according to Justin it is he who responds to Crescens's actions, while according to Tatian it is the other

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28 See, for example, Teles, *Frg.* 2, and see André Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne: Libraire Payot, 1926), 53 (theme 43), and Jan F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentaries* (AUU/SGU 11; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976), 278–288.

29 He frequently does so; cf. *Or.* 2.1; 3.3; 25.1. Hippolytus, *Haer.* 10.10, remarks that Tatian himself practiced a very Cynic manner of life!

30 Lucian, *Fug.* 15; *Peregr.* 19, and see K. Funk, "Untersuchungen über die Lucianische *Vita Demonactis*," *Phil* Suppl. 10 (1907): 592.

31 Cf. Lucian, *Peregr.* 9, and see Gustav A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig/Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1909), 140ff.

32 Cf. Lucian, *Peregr.* 13 and 16, and see Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon*, 60–61.

way around. Tatian says nothing about Justin's interrogation of Crescens, but that death again figures in the discussion strengthens the suspicion that it was more important than either Justin or Tatian saw fit to tell us.

The date of the incident Tatian refers to may be related to the question of when the *Address to the Greeks* was composed.[33] If it was written around 155,[34] the event could be the same one Justin refers to, which occurred more than ten years before his death. If, however, it was written around 165, shortly before[35] or after[36] Justin's death or still later, after Tatian had left Rome,[37] he could conceivably be referring to a later incident which did lead to Justin's death. Yet a later dating by no means requires that the confrontation took place late in Justin's career and led to his death. Tatian does not say that it actually caused Justin's death, as one would expect him to have done, had Crescens succeeded. Nor does he even, like Justin, expect that it would. He simply records Crescens's planning. If the incident were to be invested with as much importance as it has been, the *Address* would have to have been written before, and probably just before, the martyrdom. But a difficulty is then raised by Tatian's inclusion of himself as a victim of Crescens's plotting. If it is to be taken seriously,[38] one would have | to assume that Crescens continued to press his case 323 after Tatian wrote the *Address*, but that Tatian escaped prosecution while remaining in Rome,[39] while the six Christians who were executed with Justin fell victim to Crescens's plotting. As we have seen, however, Tatian does not describe an ongoing attack by Crescens. Furthermore, the dating of the *Address* after Justin's death, probably after Tatian had left Rome, has much to commend it. Tatian's report on Crescens has significant value for dating the *Address* only if it is assumed that Crescens was responsible for Justin's death, but there is no evidence in Justin or Tatian that he was. It is Eusebius who first makes the inference.

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33 For a good discussion of the various viewpoints, see Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, 1:270–272.

34 Harnack, *Chronologie*, 284ff.

35 Martin Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie* (FKDG 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), 44.

36 Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, 1:264, 271; Hubik, *Die Apologien des hl. Justinus*, 256–285.

37 Aimé Puech, *Recherches sur le Discours aux Grecs de Tatien. Suivies d'une traduction française du Discours avec notes* (Université de Paris. Bibliothèque de la Faculté des lettres 17; Paris: Félix Alcan, 1903), 97ff.; Altaner, *Patrology*, 128; Quasten, *Patrology*, 1:221.

38 For the textual problem, see below. It is not impossible that Tatian over interprets in order to stress the closeness of his association with the master.

39 Perhaps he remained in Rome until 172. See the discussion of the evidence by Harnack, *Chronologie*, 287–288.

Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 4.16) bases his conclusions on the two passages from Justin and Tatian, both of which he quotes. From *2 Apol.* 3 he concludes that Justin had frequently refuted Crescens in public discussions, in consequence of which Crescens plotted and secured his death. Justin's expectation has for Eusebius become a prediction (see 16.2, 7). Tatian is then quoted as proof that the prediction had been fulfilled. Eusebius does not, however, include Tatian in Crescens's plots. Instead of Tatian's "and also me, as though it were an evil" (καθάπερ καὶ ἐμὲ ὡς κακῷ), Eusebius reads "as though it were some great evil" (καθάπερ μεγάλῳ κακῷ). It has been suggested that he changed the text either because he did not want to make the heresiarch a martyr, or because he knew that Tatian had not been martyred with Justin, a fact which would not square with the inference he draws.[40] The manuscripts of Tatian, however, are unsettled at this point, and Eusebius may actually be quoting a reading in the manuscript before him.[41] In any case, Eusebius's interpretation of the relationship is unhistorical and not based on a close reading of the texts of either Justin or Tatian that he had at his disposal.

324 | In conclusion, then, Eusebius's inferences, which are shared by the majority of modern scholars, have no basis in the texts from which they are drawn, and no amount of harmonizing will provide one. Justin does not say that Crescens harried him personally, and, although Tatian does, he also indicates that Crescens did so in response to attacks by Justin, and he provides no evidence that Crescens continued to dog Justin's heels. There is no unambiguous evidence in Justin and none at all in Tatian that the two conducted public debates, or that such debates were frequent and stenographically recorded. This is not to deny that Justin and Crescens did oppose each other, only that the popular picture of them going at each other in the marketplace is not supported by the evidence. Nor do we know what subject generated the most heat between them. The hints in Justin and Tatian suggest that it was their respective attitudes toward death, and this would seem to be the most promising avenue to pursue if we are to gain a firmer grasp on what informed Christians and Cynics might have locked horns on.

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[40] Theodor Zahn, *Tatians Diatessaron* (FGNK 1; Erlangen/Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1881), 275–276; Adolf Harnack, *Die Überlieferung der griechischen Apologeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts in der alten Kirche und im Mittelalter* (TUGAL 1.1–2; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1882), 141–142. In his *Chronologie*, 284 n. 2, Harnack abandoned this view.

[41] Hubik, *Die Apologien des hl. Justinus*, 260ff., rejects the readings of the Tatian manuscripts, while Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie*, 46, prefers them. For a discussion of the issues, see McGiffert, *Eusebius: Church History*, 1:194 n. 13.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

# A PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF PAUL*

When Paul is placed in his Greek context, it is generally his thought, vocabulary, and literary style that receive attention. This is to a degree at least also true when attention is given to the early church's interpretation of his letters. This essay, on the other hand, examines the Greek influence that can be perceived in early Christian reflections on the physical appearance of Paul. The artistic representations of Paul are less well known to most students of early Christianity than the literary evidence,[1] chief of which is the curious literary portrait of Paul in the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*, which in some respects agrees with early Christian paintings. There, Onesiphorus sees Paul as "a man small of stature, with a bald head and crooked legs, in a good state of body, with eyebrows meeting and nose somewhat hooked, full of friendliness; for now he appeared like a man, and now he had the face of an angel."[2]

## Paul's Appearance

This description, which in sometimes modified forms proved popular among later writers,[3] does not accord with our view of beauty, and has

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* Originally published in *HTR* 79 (1986): 170–175; subsequently published in *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 165–170.

[1] The artistic material is conveniently gathered by Ernst von Dobschütz, *Der Apostel Paulus: Vol. 2 Seine Stellung in der Kunst* (Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1928); Giuseppe Ricciotti, *Paul the Apostle* (trans. Alba I. Zizzamia; Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953), 151–159.

[2] *Acts Paul Thec.* 3 in *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha* (ed. Max Bonnet and Richard Lipsius; 2 parts in 3 vols.; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1959), 1:237, lines 6–9; repr. of *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha ex triginta antiquis codicibus Graecis* (ed. Konstantin von Tischendorf; Leipzig: Avenarius & Mendelssohn, 1851). The translation is that of Wilhelm Schneemelcher in Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher, eds., *New Testament Apocrypha* (English translation edited by Robert McL. Wilson.; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963–1966), 2:354.

[3] See J. Fürst, "Untersuchungen zur Ephemeris des Diktys von Kreta," *Phil* 61 (1902): 374–440, 593–622, esp. 407–12; von Dobschütz, *Der Apostel Paulus*, 45–46.

171 been regarded as hardly flattering,[4] as "naiv-unheroisch,"[5] and as | representing Paul as quite plain,[6] ugly, and small,[7] "ein Mann von numinoser Hässlichkeit,"[8] and as being "the typical portrait of a Jew."[9] Luther's view is still that of the majority of commentators: "Ego credo Paulum fuisse personam contemptibilem, ein armes, dirs menlein sicut Philippus" ("I believe Paul was a contemptible, poor little man like Philip").[10]

That this description does not appear to us an idealization may suggest that it was indebted to memory of what Paul actually did look like.[11] If Sir William Ramsay's argument, that the *Acts of Paul and Thecla* goes back ultimately to a first-century document, were accepted,[12] the description of Paul may have some claim to historical accuracy. But Ramsay's argument has proved to be unconvincing.[13] It is more likely that, writing in Asia toward the end of the second century, the author of the *Acts* knew the canonical Acts and other NT writings, as well as current legendary tradition, and that he used all of them to construct a work intended for edification.[14] In doing so, he was more concerned with current conceptions of Paul than the Paul of the NT, although he used the NT material freely. Yet there are hints in Paul's letters that he was not an outstandingly

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[4] William M. Ramsay, *The Church in the Roman Empire Before A.D. 170* (Mansfield College Lectures 1892; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1893), 32; Leon Vouaux, *Les Actes de Paul et ses lettres apocryphes. Introduction, textes, traduction et commentaire* (DEOC. Les Apocryphes du Nouveau Testament; Paris: Letouzey & Ané, 1913), 122.

[5] Ernst Dassmann, *Der Stachel im Fleisch: Paulus in der frühchristlichen Literatur bis Irenäus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1979), 279.

[6] Theodor Zahn, "Paulus der Apostel," *RE* 15 (1904): 61–88, esp. 70.

[7] Johannes Geffcken, *Christliche Apokryphen* (RV, Series 1, No. 15; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1908), 27.

[8] Hans Dieter Betz, *Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition: Eine exegetische Untersuchung zu seiner "Apologie" 2 Korinther 10–13* (BHT 45; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), 54.

[9] Wilhelm Michaelis, *Die Apokryphen Schriften zum Neuen Testament* (2d ed.; Bremen: Carl Schünemann, 1958), 313.

[10] Martin Luther, *Werke: Tischreden* (6 vols.; Kritische Gesamtausgabe 2.1–6; Weimar: Herrmann Böhlaus, 1912–1921), 2 (1913): No. 1245.

[11] Von Dobschütz, *Der Apostel Paulus*, 1.

[12] Ramsay, *Church in the Roman Empire*, 381–428.

[13] E.g., Adolf Harnack and Erwin Preuschen, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius* (2 vols. in 4; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1893–1904), 2:1, 505; Adam F. Findlay, *Byways in Early Christian Literature: Studies in the Uncanonical Gospels and Acts* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1923), 335 n. 226; Hennecke and Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:332–33.

[14] Hennecke and Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:348–49; Wilhelm Schneemelcher, "Die Apostelgeschichte des Lukas und die Acta Pauli," in *Apophoreta: Festschrift für Ernst Haenchen zu seinem 70. Geburtstag am 10. Dezember 1964* (ed. Walther Eltester and Franz H. Kettler; BZNW 30; Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1964), 236–250.

robust physical specimen (e.g., 2 Cor 10:10; 13:7–12 [?]; Gal 4:13–16), which do not make the description in the *Acts* incongruous.[15] Furthermore, early portraits of Paul from the catacombs and elsewhere, showing him with a sparsely covered head, have been taken to represent more or less accurate knowledge.[16]

| These efforts to find clues to Paul's physical appearance underscore a peculiarity of the NT: it provides no physical descriptions of its main characters. Such descriptions were common in ancient biographies and in descriptions of so-called divine men, where they tend to appear toward the beginning, as they do in the *Acts*.[17] It is not impossible that the description in the *Acts* contains some historical truth, but on the basis of our present evidence it is impossible to verify that it does. Rather, recognizing that the *Acts* follows one literary convention in providing a description of Paul early in the work, it is worth inquiring whether other conventions cast light on the description itself. Physiognomy had long been a topic of considerable interest before it attained its greatest popularity in the second century AD, and Christians shared this interest.[18] 172

## Descriptions of Heroes

Here I wish only to ascertain, with the help of the manuals on physiognomy and descriptions of honored figures, whether the *Acts* description would have appeared as unflattering to Greeks as it does to us. Of the features mentioned, it is Paul's baldness, bowed legs, meeting eyebrows, hooked

[15] See, e.g., Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (ICC 34; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1915), 283; Adolf Deissmann, *Paul: A Study In Social and Religious History* (trans. Lionel R.M. Strachan; London/New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912; 2d ed., fully revised and enlarged, 1926, reprinted as Harper Torchbooks TB 15; trans. William E. Wilson; New York: Harper, 1957), 55. On the question of Paul's health, see Ricciotti, *Paul the Apostle*, 160–167.

[16] See Giuseppe Wilpert, *Roma Sotterranea: Le pitture delle catacombe romane* (2 vols.; Rome: Desclée, Lefebvre, 1903), 1:106; Ricciotti, *Paul the Apostle*, 159.

[17] See Elizabeth C. Evans, *Physiognomics in the Ancient World* (TAPhS NS 59.5; Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1969), 51–58; Patricia Cox, *Biography in Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy Man* (TCH 5; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 14–15; Richard Reitzenstein, *Hellenistische Wündererzählungen* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1906; repr., 1922; repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 39; Ludwig Bieler, *ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ: Das Bild des "göttlichen Menschen" in Spätantike und Frühchristentum* (2 vols.; Vienna: O. Höfels, 1935–1936; repr. 2 vols. in 1; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), 1:49–50.

[18] See Evans, *Physiognomics*; Jean-Claude Fredouille, *Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1972), 60–62.

nose, and perhaps smallness of stature, that lead to our negative assessment of his appearance. For the rest, his aspect is described in terms so favorable that they may appear to the modern reader designed to balance his negative physical features. The physiognomic literature repeatedly discusses these features. It has been denied that the physiognomic manuals provided the basis of the description,[19] yet they do supplement other material, and to that extent are valuable corroborating sources.

Robert M. Grant has found the basis for the *Acts* description in a passage from Archilochus (*Frg.* 58),[20] which was popular in the second century: "I love not a tall general nor a straddling one, nor one proud of his hair nor one part-shaven; for me a man should be short and bowlegged to behold, set firm on his feet, full of heart."[21] On the | ground that, according to the Pastoral Epistles, the bishop should have such qualities of a general as are detailed by Onasander, and in view of Paul's liking for military metaphors,[22] Grant thinks it natural for an admirer of Paul to have used the well-known language of Archilochus to depict him as a general. Grant is correct in drawing attention to this somewhat similar description, and thus in recognizing the positive element in the description of Paul in the *Acts.* The two features of interest in the passage from Archilochus are the shortness of the general and his bowleggedness. These and other features are also found in descriptions not indebted to Archilochus, and I suggest that these descriptions point to a different source for the description in the *Acts.*

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Three of Paul's features, his small stature, hooked nose, and meeting eyebrows, also appear in Suetonius's description of Augustus:

> His teeth were wide apart, small, and well-kept; his hair was slightly curly and inclining to golden; his eyebrows met. His ears were of moderate size,

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[19] See Bieler, ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ, 1:50 n. 1; Robert M. Grant, "The Description of Paul in the *Acts of Paul and Thecla*," *VC* 36 (1982): 1.

[20] Theodor Bergk, *Poetae lyrici Graeci* (3 vols.; 4th ed.; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1878–1882), 2:398 (No. 58 [33]).

[21] *Elegy and Iambus* (trans. J.M. Edmonds, LCL), 2:127; Grant, "Description of Paul," 1–4. The major testimonies are Galen *In Hippocratis librum de articulus* 3 in *Claudii Galeni opera omnia* (ed. Karl G. Kühn; 20 vols. in 22; Medicorum Graecorum Opera quae exstant 1–20; Leipzig: Knobloch, 1821–1833), 18.1:537, 604; Dio Chrysostom *Or.* 33.17; Erotian, *Frg.* 42 in *Erotiani vocum Hippocraticarum conlectio* (ed. Josef Klein; Leipzig: Dyk, 1865), page 13, lines 19–20 and page 14, lines 1–4; and also *Frg.* 43 in *Erotiani vocum Hippocraticarum collectio, cum fragmentis* (ed. Ernst Nachmanson; CSVU; Uppsala: Appelberg, 1918), page 112, lines 13–15; *Schol. Theocr.* 4.49a in *Scholia in Theocritum vetera* (ed. Carl Wendel; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1914; repr. 1967), page 148, lines 19–21. See Giovanni Tarditi, ed. and trans., *Archiloco* (LGE 2; Rome: Ateneo, 1968), 116.

[22] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983): 143–173. [*Light*, 1:135–166]

> and his nose projected a little at the top and then bent slightly inward. His complexion was between dark and fair. He was short of stature . . . but this was concealed by the fine proportion and symmetry of his figure.[23]

Suetonius used such physiognomic descriptions, which have parallels in the handbooks, to describe his ideal political leaders.[24] Meeting eyebrows were regarded as a sign of beauty,[25] and a person with a hooked nose was thought likely to be royal[26] or magnanimous.[27] Tallness was preferred; nevertheless, since men of normally small height had a smaller area through which the blood flowed, they were thought to be quick.[28] The main things were that one not be excessive in either direction, and, as in the case of Augustus, that one be well proportioned.[29]

## A Description of Heracles

| The same features were also attributed to Heracles, who may be of particular relevance. According to Clement of Alexandria (*Protr.* 2.30), Dicaearchus, a pupil of Aristotle, and Hieronymus of Rhodes described Heracles as follows: "Hieronymus the philosopher sketches his bodily strengths also—small stature, bristling hair, great strength. Dicaearchus adds that he was slim, sinewy, dark, with hooked nose, bright gleaming eyes and long straight hair."[30] Heracles, as are other Greek heroes, is also elsewhere described as small,[31] having a hooked nose,[32] and eyebrows that met.[33] 174

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23 Suetonius, *Aug.* 2.79.2.

24 See Cox, *Biography in Late Antiquity*, 13–15; Evans, *Physiognomics*, 53–54.

25 Cf. Philostratus, *Her.* 33.39 in Ludo de Lannoy, ed., *Flavii Philostrati Heroicus* (Teubner; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1977), page 46, lines 16–17, and on the handbooks see Fürst, "Untersuchungen," 386–388.

26 Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 5.474D; Pollux, *Onom.* 2.73 in Richard Foerster, ed., *Scriptores physiognomonici graeci et latini* (2 vols.; Teubner ; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1893), 2:281, lines 26–27.

27 Cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 6.811a36–37; Anonymous, *Physiogn.* 51 in Jacques André, ed. and trans., *Traité de physiognomonie. Anonyme latin* (Budé; Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1981), 91.

28 Cf. Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 6.813b8–10.

29 See Evans, *Physiognomics*, 10, 53.

30 *Clement of Alexandria* (trans. G.W. Butterworth, LCL), 63. See Geneva Misener, "Iconistic Portraits," *CP* 19 (1924): 97–123, esp. 108.

31 E.g., Pindar, *Isthm.* 4.53*;* cf. Fürst, "Untersuchungen," 409 n. 82; Evans, *Physiognomics*, 44–45, 51.

32 E.g., Plutarch *Ant.* 4.1: "A shapely beard, a broad forehead, and an aquiline nose were thought to show the virile qualities peculiar to the portraits and statues of Heracles" (trans. Perrin, LCL).

33 E.g., Philostratus, *Imag.* 2.15.5.

The closest parallel to the *Acts* description is found in Philostratus *Vit. soph.* 2.552, where a certain Agathion, who was also called Heracles, is described. Philostratus's description is based on a letter of Herodes Atticus, who had been a pupil of Dio Chrysostom.

> He says that his hair grew evenly on his head, his eyebrows were bushy and they met as though they were one, and his eyes gave out a brilliant gleam which betrayed his impulsive temperament; he was hook-nosed, and had a solidly built neck, which was due rather to work than to diet. His chest, too, was well formed and beautifully slim, and his legs were slightly bowed outwards, which made it easy for him to stand firmly planted.[34]

This Agathion-Heracles is usually identified with the Sostratus of Lucian, *Demon.* 1. While Lucian partly described him in Cynic terms, Philostratus adapted his sources and added mystic-religious features, including the heroification of Sostratus.[35] Whether Herodes Atticus had derived the description from Archilochus is unclear. What is important is that we have to do with a description that came to be attributed to Heracles.

## Paul the Christian Heracles

It is clear by now that Paul's hooked nose, bowed legs, and meeting eyebrows were not unflattering features in the context in which the *Acts* was 175 written. Furthermore, Heracles and traditions associated with him | were used extensively in early Christianity,[36] and I suggest that the author of the *Acts* derived his description of Paul from these sources. Two features distinguish Paul from Agathion-Heracles. Agathion was eight feet tall, while Paul is said to have been small of stature. But tallness was not an absolute requirement for beauty, and Heracles himself could be described as small. More puzzling is Paul's baldness, for the physiognomic descriptions drew attention to the hair. Translations of the *Acts* were sensitive to this part of the description.[37] The Armenian gives him curly hair,[38] the Syriac scanty

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[34] Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* (trans. Wilmer C. Wright, LCL), 153.

[35] See Jan F. Kindstrand, "Sostratus-Hercules-Agathion—The Rise of a Legend," *Kungliga Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala: Annales Societatis Litterarum Humaniorum Regiae Upsaliensis* (Årsbok: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1979–1980), 50–79.

[36] See Abraham J. Malherbe, "Herakles," *RAC* 14 (1988): 559–583. [*Light*, 2:651–674] For Paul and Heracles, see Malherbe, "The Beasts at Ephesus," *JBL* 87 (1968): 71–80. [*Light*, 1:41–51]

[37] See also Ps.-Lucian *Philopatr.* 12, which describes Paul as having receding hair; see Fürst, "Untersuchungen," 381, 407–412.

[38] See Frederick C. Conybeare, *The Apology and Acts of Apollonius and other Monuments of Early Christianity* (New York: Macmillan, 1894), 62.

hair,[39] and the Latin a shaven head.[40] Two possible explanations of this odd feature suggest themselves. It is possible that Paul indeed was bald, and that the *Acts* was faithful to memory. The paintings which represent him as thin on top may support such a surmise. On the other hand, baldness may have been suggested by the reference to the shaving of heads in Acts 18:18 and 21:24.

## Conclusion

This short excursion into the strange world of ancient physiognomy may cast some light on how Paul was represented as a hero among the Greeks. It calls for further attention to the description in the interpretation of the *Acts*. The basic assumption of physiognomies was that "dispositions follow bodily characteristics and are not themselves unaffected by bodily impulses."[41] It remains to be determined whether there is such a correlation between the description of Paul's physical appearance and his deeds in the *Acts*.

[39] See William Wright, *Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles* (2 vols.; London: Williams & Norgate, 1871), 2:117.

[40] See the textual variants in Vouaux, *Les Actes*, 150 n. 6.

[41] Ps.-Aristotle, *Physiogn.* 1.805a1–2; cf. Cicero, *Fat.* 10; Evans, *Physiognomics*, 5–6; Cox, *Biography in Late Antiquity*, 13–14.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

# "SENECA" ON PAUL AS LETTER WRITER*

Forced by circumstances to do so, Paul in his correspondence with the Corinthians denied that he spoke with rhetorical finesse but claimed to be a layman in speech (2 Cor 11:6; 1 Cor 2:1–5). Measuring him by their own classicistic canons, most of the church fathers agreed with him. It is true that Augustine, although he thought that Paul was not trained in rhetoric, nevertheless discovered in him an eloquence issuing from inspiration that at times corresponded to classical rules.[1] On the other hand, some writers such as Tatian evidently sought to improve Paul's style by paraphrasing his letters.[2] For the most part, however, those writers who commented on Paul's style were content to describe the rudeness of his speech as earthen vessels (2 Cor 4:7) in which divine knowledge and wisdom were kept and to discover two purposes for it: (1) that it be evident that the power of the Christian message resided in God and not human eloquence,[3] and (2) that rudeness of style was appropriate to and effective with the humble social ranks where the gospel was hospitably received.[4]

In recent years, NT scholars have returned with some vigor | to the examination of Paul's rhetorical strategy in his letters.[5] Interest has also of late been shown in a particular aspect of rhetoric, namely, epistolary 415

* Originally published in *The Future of Early Christianity: Essays in Honor of Helmut Koester* (ed. Birger A. Pearson, A. Thomas Kraabel, George W.E. Nickelsburg, and Norman R. Petersen; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 414–421.

[1] This view is seen especially in his *De doctrina christiana*. See Edwin A. Judge, "Paul's Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice," *ABR* 16 (1968): 38–40.

[2] According to Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 4.29.6, despite the criticism by Tatian himself (*Or.* 26) of pagan linguistic fastidiousness. As further representatives of this tendency one should also include those Atticizing copyists who were obviously unsatisfied with Paul's language.

[3] See, e.g., Origen, *Comm. Jo.* 4.2; *Cels.* 6.2; *Princ.* 4 (*apud Philoc.* 7). For references to patristic discussion of the subject in general, see George E. McCracken, *Arnobius of Sicca: The Case Against the Pagans* (ACW 7; Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1949), 295 n. 280, on *Adv. gent.* 1.58–59; and esp. Graeme W. Clark, *The Octavius of Marcus Minucius Felix* (ACW 39; New York: Newman, 1974), 18–22.

[4] See, e.g., Origen, *Cels.* 6.58–61; cf. 6.1–2; Lactantius, *Inst.* 5.1.15–21; Jerome, *Epist.* 53.10.1.

[5] The leader in this effort has been Hans Dieter Betz. See his survey, "The Problem of Rhetoric and Theology according to the Apostle Paul," in *L'apôtre Paul. Personnalité, style et conception du ministère* (ed. Albert Vanhoye; BETL 73; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1986), 16–48.

theory, and the ways in which it may illuminate Paul's letters for us.[6] The present article represents this latter interest. Writers of rhetorical bent frequently commented on different types of letters and the styles appropriate to them; handbooks containing some theory and sample letters were composed; and instruction in letter writing on this level began at the beginning of tertiary education and perhaps as early as the latter stages of the secondary curriculum.[7] The subject was thus not arcane. This material makes us aware of a different dimension of Paul's letters, as I wish to illustrate by drawing attention to 2 Cor 10:10 and, especially, the apocryphal correspondence between Paul and the Roman philosopher Seneca.

## Paul's Letters to the Corinthians

Paul's correspondence with the Corinthians contains a striking number of references to and comments on his letter writing. Already in 1 Corinthians it is evident that Paul had not been successful in communicating by letter (1 Cor 5:9–11), and he is at pains to state explicitly what his intention in writing is (4:14; 9:15).[8] Perhaps Paul protests too much when he later insists that he only writes what his readers can understand (2 Cor 1:13–14), but his insistence does underline the self-consciousness with which he wrote letters to the Corinthians. He stresses that he would rather see his readers in person (1 Cor 16:5–7; 2 Cor 1:15–16),[9] yet he is ambivalent about visiting them (1 Cor 4:18–21; 2 Cor 1:23). In any event, circumstances, sometimes of his own making, forced him to communicate with them by letter.

416 One such letter, which Paul claims to have written out of his own grief | (2 Cor 2:4), was successful because it made his readers grieve to the point of repenting (2 Cor 7:8–11). This letter was evidently written in the style of the letter of grief described in the epistolary handbooks, in which a writer

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[6] E.g., Hans Dieter Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 14–15, 223, 232–233; Betz, *2 Corinthians 8 and 9* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 129–140; Michael Bünker, *Briefformular und rhetorische Disposition im 1. Korintherbrief* (GTA 28; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984); Frank W. Hughes, *Early Christian Rhetoric and 2 Thessalonians* (JSNTSup 30; Sheffield: JSOT, 1989); Abraham J. Malherbe, *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 68–78; Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 6, 51, 52 n. 20, 56 n. 38, 64 n. 74, 74.

[7] The material is collected and discussed in Abraham J. Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

[8] For a similar reticence about writing, see Demosthenes, *Ep.* 1.3; Isocrates, *Ep.* 1.2; *Phil.* 25–26; and Hughes, *Early Christian Rhetoric*, 19.

[9] Cf. 1 Thess 2:17–18; 3:10. Given Paul's anxiety for his churches (see 2 Cor 11:28), this epistolary cliché nevertheless can be taken to express Paul's genuine feeling.

expressed his sorrow but did so in a manner to show clearly how vexed he was. A sample letter of grief is supplied by Pseudo-Libanius:

> You caused me extremely much grief when you did this thing. For this reason I am very much vexed with you, and bear a grief that is very difficult to assuage. For the grief people cause their friends is exceedingly difficult to heal, and holds in greater insults than those they receive from their enemies.[10]

Letters such as this must have been in the minds of Paul's opponents when they expressed the criticism recorded in 2 Cor 10:10.

The rhetorical background of this verse has received considerable attention,[11] although some notice of the chiastic structure of the criticism would sharpen further discussion. I wish here only to draw attention to one dictum of epistolary theory implicit in the opponents' criticism of Paul that has, so far as I can determine, gone unnoticed. I agree with Peter Marshall that the opponents thought that Paul's painful letter was rhetorically effective but considered his performance in person an abject failure.[12] But this inconsistency in Paul's performance was, according to writers on epistolary theory, a grave stylistic as well as moral shortcoming.

Epistolary theory held that, as one part of a dialogue,[13] or a sort of talk,[14] a letter should bring "real traces, real evidences of an absent friend."[15] One should see the writer's soul in his letters.[16] As to a letter's style, Seneca wrote to Lucilius, "My letters should be just what my conversation would be if you and I were sitting in one another's company or taking walks together."[17] Such consistency was proof of one's integrity and invited confidence in what was said in a letter, which was but a surrogate for one's personal presence.[18]

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[10] Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 90 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 80–81). Cf. § 43 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 72–73).

[11] Particularly Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), 323, 375, 390–393.

[12] Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth*, 390–393.

[13] Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 223 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 16–17); Cicero, *Fam.* 12.30.1, (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 26–27).

[14] Cicero, *Att.* 9.10.1; Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 2; 58 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 66–67 and 74–75); Basil, *Ep.* 163. See Klaus Thraede, *Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik* (ZMKA 48; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1970), 27–38, 47–52, 152–154.

[15] Seneca, *Ep.* 40.1; cf. Cicero, *Fam.* 16.16.2, (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 24–25); Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 227 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 18–19).

[16] Basil, *Ep.* 163; see Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 157–161.

[17] Seneca, *Ep.* 75.1–2 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 28–29); see Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 39–47.

[18] Cicero, *Fam.* 12.30.1; Synesius, *Ep.* 138 in Rudolf Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* (SGB 47; Paris: A.F. Didot, 1873; repr., Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1965), 723–724; see Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 146–149, 164 n. 306.

417 | Seen in this light, the opponents' criticism of Paul does not merely express a negative assessment of his ability as a speaker, although that was important in their list of particulars against him. They could take advantage of Paul's absence (1 Cor 4:18), accuse him of vacillation when his plans changed (2 Cor 1:15–23), and charge him with changing his demeanor when he was not with them (2 Cor 10:1–2). Paul took great care to answer them. What was at issue between them in this battle was not just a suspicion that Paul was a chameleon, but a profound difference in their views of what an apostle should be.[19]

As one part of their strategy, Paul's opponents zeroed in on his letters. His letters were more in line with what they expected of an apostle's style of communication, and, taken by itself, their rhetorical description of his letters could be taken as a compliment. But, implicitly basing their criticism of his oral style on epistolary theory, they charged him with being different when he spoke. Paul understood that at *this* point in the argument their criticism was not, in the first place, of his oral speech as such, but of his inconsistency in expression, for that inconsistency is what he responds to in 10:11 (cf. 13:10).

So, the earliest stylistic comment on Paul's letters judged them favorably as to their rhetorical style; yet, tacitly appealing to one of the rules of epistolary theory, the same persons who showed such generosity toward his letters drew attention to his totally different demeanor in person. Implicit in this accusation of inconsistency was thus a challenge to the integrity of the writer and to confidence in his letters.

## *Epistolae Senecae et Pauli*

The situation is completely different in the *Epistolae Senecae et Pauli*.[20]
418 These fourteen letters, composed in the third or fourth century,[21] probably |

[19] See Malherbe, *Paul and the Popular Philosophers*, 91–119.

[20] The critical text is published in Claude W. Barlow, *Epistolae Senecae ad Paulum et Pauli ad Senecam "quae vocantur"* (PMAAR 10; Rome: American Academy in Rome, 1938); repr. in PL Suppl. 1:673–78. English translations are available in Montague R. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (2d rev. ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 480–484; Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher, eds., *New Testament Apocrypha* (English translation edited by Robert McL. Wilson; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963–1966), 2:133–41; the best translation is that of Barlow, *Epistolae Senecae*, 139–149.

[21] See the discussion by Alfons Kurfess in Hennecke and Schneemelcher, *New Testament Apocrypha*, 2:133–34; and Laura Bocciolini Palagi, *Il carteggio apocrifo di Seneca e San Paolo: introduzione, testo, commento* (ATSLC 46; Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1978), 7–11.

to exalt Paul despite his epistolary style,[22] purport to be a correspondence between Paul and his philosophic contemporary. It is ironic that this Seneca should be represented as a critic of style, for his own style was considered commonplace and devoid of elegance, though not without a certain severity and dignity.[23] Despite these shortcomings, he was not loath to criticize others.[24] It is not impossible that the author of the letters collapsed into one person Seneca the Elder, the writer on rhetoric, and his philosophic son.[25] Be that as it may, the letters have been held in very low esteem for their "meaningless insignificance and insipid, exaggerated flattery."[26] As for our immediate interest, the letters are sometimes adduced with other patristic citations that claim Paul's rhetoric to have been different from that of the world.[27]

We are interested in epistolary theory rather than rhetoric in general, and it is noteworthy how shot through the letters are with epistolary conventions, which suggests a knowledge of epistolary theory. Seneca, for example, is made to express his longing for Paul's presence (*tui praesentiam optavimus*), a very common convention,[28] and he bemoans Paul's continuing absence (*nimio tuo secessu angimur*), which was equally

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Bocciolini Palagi's later book, *Epistolario apocrifo di Seneca e San Paolo* (BP 5; Florence: Nardini, 1985), is an abridged version of the earlier edition. See the review by Aldo Moda, "Seneca e il Cristianesimo," *Hen* 5 (1983): 93–109.

[22] So Martin Dibelius, "Seneca," in *RGG*$^2$ 5 (1931): 431.

[23] Aulus Gellius, *Noct. att.* 12.2.1; Fronto, *Marc. Anton.* in Samuel A. Naber, *M. Cornelii Frontonis et M. Aurelii Imperatoris Epistulae. L. Veri et Antonini Pii et Appiani Epistularum reliquiae.* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1867), 155; or in Charles R. Haines, *The Correspondence of Marcus Cornelius Fronto with Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Lucius Verus, Antoninus Pius, and Various Friends* (2 vols.; 2d rev. ed.; LCL 112–13; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press/London: W. Heinemann, 1982), 2:102.

[24] Quintilian, *Inst.* 10.1.125–131. See further Martin Schanz, Carl Hosius, and Gustav Krüger, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur bis zum Gesetzgebungswerk des Kaisers Justinian* (4 vols. in 5; 4th rev. ed.; HAW 8.2; Munich: C.H. Beck, 1935), 2:715–16; Winfried Trillitzsch, *Seneca im literarischen Urteil der Antike: Darstellung und Sammlung der Zeugnisse* (2 vols.; Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert, 1971), 2:333–38.

[25] So Bocciolini Palagi, *Il carteggio apocrifo*, 100–101.

[26] Jan N. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca* (NovTSup 4; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 13.

[27] Eduard Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa: Vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance* (2 vols.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1898; repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1958), 2:501–2; Judge, "Paul's Boasting," 41–42.

[28] Seneca, *Ep.* 1; cf. *Ep.* 4. See Heikki Koskenniemi, *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr.* (STAT Series B 102.2; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 1956), 38–42, 174–175; Roman Andrzejewski, "Nova et vetera quae in epistulis latinis IV p. Chr. n. saeculo apparent," *Eos* 57 (1967/1968): 245–250; Thraede, *Grundzüge*, index, s.v. πόθος.

common.[29] In addition he sprinkles his letters with epistolary clichés like "I would like you to know this (*hoc scias volo*)."[30]

For his part, Paul also is portrayed as accomplished in the art of letter writing. He gives evidence of his epistolary sophistication by properly expressing his joy upon receiving a letter from Seneca,[31] apologizing 419 for his | delay in replying because he did not have a suitable messenger available,[32] and assuring Seneca that he was not negligent in his choice of the right person to send (*Ep.* 2).[33] And when he says, "As often as I hear your letters, I think that you are present and I imagine nothing else than that you are continually with us" (*Ep.* 4), he is not referring to the practice of reading aloud, but rather reflects the view of the epistolary theorists that letters are a conversation between separated friends whose presence is mediated by a letter.[34] Clearly, the correspondents' comments on Paul's style are made by writers accomplished in letter writing. After Paul in *Ep.* 6 makes some puzzling remarks about the clarity of his letters and the ability of his readers to understand them, Seneca in *Ep.* 7 addresses the issue of Paul's epistolary style and ends up being ambivalent about it. On the one hand, Seneca had explained to Nero that Paul's thoughts were not dependent on the usual education but that their power derived from the gods who speak through the mouths of the guiltless. When Seneca further mentioned a Roman precedent for this, Nero was satisfied. Seneca believes that the Holy Spirit is in Paul and with elevated speech brings to expression his high and revered speech. Seneca would thus seem to agree with the patristic tradition that distinguished between the divine

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29 Seneca, *Ep.* 5. See Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 53–55; Bocciolini Palagi, *Il carteggio apocrifo*, 113–114.

30 Seneca *Ep.* 1; cf. Phil 1:12; Col 2:1. See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 77–79. For such clichés, see Henry A. Steen, "Les clichés épistolaires dans les lettres sur papyrus grecques," *CM* 1 (1938): 119–176.

31 See Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 75–77.

32 Cf. Cicero, *Att.* 6.72; 8.14.2; Pliny, *Ep.* 2.12.6; Symmachus, *Ep.* 1.87; 3.4, 28; and see Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 81–87; Bocciolini Palagi, *Il carteggio apocrifo*, 94–95.

33 Cf. Cicero, *Fam.* 2.1.1; Symmachus, *Ep.* 3.16.

34 Hearing and speaking: Pliny, *Ep.* 3.20.10; see Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 27–38, 71–72; cf. Cicero, *Att.* 8.14.1; 9.10.1; 12.53 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 22–25); *Quint. fratr.* 1.1.45; Seneca, *Ep.* 75.1–2, (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 28–29); see Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 42–47. Presence: Seneca, *Ep.* 40.1 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 28–29); Cicero, *Fam.* 16.16.2 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 24–25); see Koskenniemi, *Studien*, 38–42; Thraede, *Grundzüge*, 39–47. "With us": Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 2 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 66–67): "A letter, then, is a kind of written conversation with someone from whom one is separated, and it fulfills a definite need. One will speak in it as though one were in the company of the absent person."

efficacy of the Christian message and its human means of communication. But then he goes on to express the wish that when Paul expresses such thoughts, a beautiful form of discourse (*cultus sermonis*) not be lacking. In *Ep.* 9 he says that he is sending Paul a book on facility in the use of words (*de verborum copia*), evidently to help remedy what he saw as a problem.[35]

In *Ep.* 13 Seneca returns to his criticism with a specificity that betrays his concern with epistolary theory. He tries to convince Paul that eloquence does not have to obscure the sense of what he has to say. Indeed, Paul writes | allegorically and enigmatically,[36] and Seneca urges him to adorn what he has been granted not with mere ornamentation of words but with a certain refinement. This, Seneca insists, would not debase the thought or weaken the power of the subject matter. Paul should at least have regard for Latinity and the outward form for beautiful words.[37] 420

We have here to do with concerns that exercised epistolary theorists. They commented on allegory and enigmas, and the handbooks included an allegorical type among the letters they discussed, which was to be intelligible only to the persons to whom it was addressed, and an enigmatic letter in which some things were left unsaid.[38] Generally, however, clarity in expression was desired,[39] even though enigmas were thought to help sweeten speech when used in moderation.[40]

Such comments belonged to the larger discussion of the degree of ornamentation allowed to adorn a letter. A writer should be careful not to adopt an excessive loftiness of speech nor to aim too low; the main thing was to write clearly.[41] One should aim at striking a happy balance between a complete lack of embellishment, which avoided enigmas, among other

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35 For *verborum copia*, see Cicero, *De or.* 3.124.7; 3.125.1–2; *Tusc.* 2.29.12; 2.30.1; *Brut.* 216; Quintilian, *Inst.* 12.10.11; Fortunatus, *Ars rhet.* 3.4. It serves to adorn or amplify speech (Cicero, *Or. Brut.* 97). For *De verborum copia* as a title of a book and attempts to identify it with other books of the same title, see Bocciolini Palagi, *Il carteggio apocrifo*, 151–154.

36 For lack of clarity in the scriptures, see Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 6.15.126.1; Origen, *Princ.* 4 (*apud Philoc.* 10), and on Paul, see Origen, *Comm. Rom.* praef. 9 (*apud Philoc.* 9).

37 Ps.-Demetrius, *Char. epist.* 15 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 38–39).

38 Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 41 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 70–71); Seneca, *Ep.* 6, may have such letters in mind.

39 See Philostratus of Lemnos, *De epistulis* (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 42, lines 20–24); Julius Victor, *Ars rhet.* 27 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 62, lines 15–25); Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 49 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 72, lines 19–29).

40 Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep.* 51.5 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 60, line 4).

41 Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 47 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 72–73).

devices, and a self-conscious effort to write beautifully.[42] A particular feature of style that concerned Greek writers was the proper degree to which Atticism might be used in a letter, the decision being that proper epistolary style should be "more Attic than everyday speech, but more ordinary than Atticism."[43] It is such considerations that are brought to bear, *mutatis mutandis*, on Paul's letters.

Paul also is made to refer to current epistolary theory and practice. In the salutations of all (*Ep.* 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) except the last (*Ep.* 14) of his letters to Seneca, Paul changes the usual order of names, so that his name follows that of Seneca (*Senecae Paulus salutem*). Seneca, on the other hand, follows traditional usage (*Seneca Paulo salutem*). In *Ep.* 10, Paul draws attention to his practice and acknowledges that, in view of his status in the church, it is a mistake for his name to appear last; nevertheless, his practice is justified by his desire to be all things to all people (1 Cor 9:22) and his respect for the | Roman Senate. In *Ep.* 12, a letter paralleled in unctuousness only by Paul's concluding letter (*Ep.* 14), Seneca insists that in view of Paul's exalted status, Paul fully deserves to be named first in his letters. A particular convention in letter writing has thus provided the author of the correspondence with an occasion to intone the Roman philosopher's respect for Paul, an insistence so effective that Paul relents and mentions himself first in the last letter!

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A glance at epistolary theory and practice casts a little more light on the author's procedure. In Christian letters from the second century on, the name of the writer appeared quite frequently in the second position, which was viewed as an index to the writer's Christian faith.[44] Thus, Paul reflects his Christian humility. More than Christian practice, however, appears to have been involved in the correspondence between Paul and Seneca. Epistolary theorists differed on whether the traditional usage

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[42] Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep.* 51.5–7 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 60–61, lines 1–15); cf. Ps.-Demetrius, *Eloc.* 232 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 18–19).

[43] Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 46–47 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 72, lines 7–17), quoting Philostratus of Lemnos, *De epistulis* (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 42, lines 9–13), who had gone ahead to warn against covert allusions.

[44] See Ferdinand Ziemann, *De epistularum graecarum formulis solemnibus quaestiones selectae* (DPH 18.4; Halle: Niemeyer, 1911), 268–276. See also Mario Naldini, *Il Cristianesimo in Egitto: Lettere private nei papiri dei secoli II–IV* (STP 3; Florence: Le Monnier, 1988), 21–22; John L. White, *Light from Ancient Letters* (FF; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 195, 198, 200. Francis Xavier J. Exler modifies Ziemann (*The Form of the Ancient Greek Letter: A Study in Greek Epistolography* [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1923], 65–67). Ziemann, *De epistularum graecarum*, 269, draws attention to Mark 9:35; cf. 10:31, 43; Matt 19:30; 20:26; 23:12.

should be tampered with. Thus, Julius Victor permitted the beginnings and endings of letters to reflect contemporary practice which conformed to the degree of one's friendship with one's correspondent, or with his rank.[45] Ps.-Libanius, on the other hand, insisted on the traditional practice.[46] The correspondence between Paul and Seneca is made to reflect this debate on status, with Paul first showing the view represented by Julius Victor, only to be convinced that the traditional usage was, in his case at least, more appropriate. In the process, Paul accepts the higher status accorded him by the Roman philosopher. Epistolary theory and practice have been put to service in the apologetic effort to secure Christianity its proper status in society.

## Conclusion

These texts show that Paul's letters were evaluated quite differently by Christian writers familiar with epistolary theory. Paul's opponents in Corinth thought highly of Paul's epistolary style, only to use it to his detriment in their polemic against him. The author of the *Epistolae Senecae et Pauli*, engaged in an apology designed to place Paul in a more elevated position, made a less straightforward approach. While portraying Paul as an accomplished letter writer, he nevertheless acknowledged that Paul did not measure up to Seneca's standards, but invoked the traditional, theological, patristic argument to blunt the criticism. But by manipulating the epistolary salutation in light of epistolary theory, in the end he attained what he set out to do.

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[45] Julius Victor, *Ars rhet.* 27 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 64, lines 8–9).
[46] Ps.-Libanius, *Char. epist.* 51 (Malherbe, *Ancient Epistolary Theorists*, 74–75).

# PART FOUR

# THEOLOGICA AND MISCELLANEA

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

# A PEOPLE UNDER THE WORD: THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION*

| According to a worthwhile tradition of the British Parliament, a member of that body "declares his interest" at the beginning of any deliberation that may involve his personal interests. I do well to follow it in the context of this conference. My interest is that of *neotestamenticus.* I am the only lecturer in this conference who is at present a professional teacher of the NT; hence the knowledgeable historical descriptions and erudite interpretations of the Believers' Church have left me with the uneasy suspicion that I may only be related tangentially to the main interests of this conference. But, since martyrdom and suffering are part of the free church tradition, perhaps my submission to you in this address will help to prove that I do after all belong. 208

It is necessary to make some preliminary remarks about my understanding of the purpose of this conference and of the task of this paper as a hopeful contribution to its realization.

As I understand it, the purpose of this conference is to determine the identity of the "Believers' Church" by focusing attention on | those aspects of its life and thought which appear to give it an identity of its own. That there is at least preliminary agreement that the Believers' Church has certain identifiable characteristics is illustrated by the fact that such a conference could be structured along the lines it has been. We do at least share a tentative view of what sets us apart from other believers. That we do have certain common denominators is obvious. But, as we have already learned from the earlier speakers this week, we are not exactly sure what communions should be included in this tradition. 209

I conceive it my task to contribute to the ascertaining of the identity of the Believers' Church by discussing its relationship to the Word. To discuss a theology of the Word is an exacting task under any circumstances. For the Christian such discussion involves the nature of revelation and

* Originally published in *The Concept of the Believers' Church: Addresses from the 1967 Louisville Conference* (ed. James Leo Garrett Jr.; Scottdale, Pa.: Herald, 1969), 207–223. The introductory material on pp. 207–208, containing biographical information about the speaker and a response by Prof. Bruce Shelley has been omitted from this edition of the essay. An abridged version of the essay appeared in *Mission* (September, 1967), 16–20.

the source of faith. To relate the theology of the Word to the doctrine of the church is further complicated, since the nature of that relationship is not always clear. Under the best of circumstances it is not easy to be sure whether a particular view of the church determines its theology of the Word or vice versa.

Our immediate task is further complicated by the fact that neither of the two elements with which we are concerned in this paper has been clearly delineated for us. We are concerned to find out more about the identity of the Believers' Church in this conference. Likewise in this paper we are also concerned to explore the theology of the Word that would characterize such a church. From a methodological standpoint one might wish that a theology of the Word had been stated clearly in disciplined theological language for each of the communions represented here. On the basis of these statements one might then proceed to discuss what is generally determinative for or characteristic of a Believers' Church view of the Word. I must confess that I am not aware of such systematic treatments of our present subject. In the absence of such background information on my part our approach must perforce be different.

In any case, I believe that to arrive at a proper view of our identity we must go beyond the merely descriptive task. Mere description may result in our being able to distinguish ourselves as a group with certain identifiable characteristics. If, by using such a descriptive approach, I should succeed in clarifying the view of the Word held by my own communion, or by myself personally, that might possibly be of value as contributing to our identifying one strain in the tradition. It is questionable, however, that such a descriptive effort alone would be capable of reflecting the inner relationship between a particular doctrine of the church and its theology of the Word. | We must also give attention to the theological implications of the basic attitudes we seem to share about the Word. By focusing attention on these as well as on our common view, we shall be able to define our identity more clearly.

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What we do seem to share is the view that Jesus Christ is the Word of God and that the Bible, and the NT in particular, in some sense at least, is related to the Word. I propose that we begin at this point and attempt to work out the implications of this basic statement of faith.

Our discussion will proceed in three stages. An interpretation of the Word will be ventured. Then the nature of the faith that arises in response to the Word will be discussed. Finally, the relationship of the community of faith to the Word will be treated briefly.

## The Nature of the Word

The Christian faith looks to Jesus Christ as the origin and ground of its existence. Faith comes into existence as certain things about him are accepted as divine disclosures. The Gospels record that at the beginning of his ministry Jesus called men to be his disciples and that they left all to follow him (e.g., Matt 4:18–22). The impression conveyed is that it was not in the first instance the content of his teaching that drew men to him. According to the Gospels, Jesus called his disciples before he fully engaged in his ministry—thus before he became known for his teaching. The disciples attached themselves to him because there was something about his person that could not be denied.[1] When his teaching did impress his hearers, they recognized that he was more than a teacher. What he said and taught was grounded in who he was (Mark 1:21–24).

Later, when the church had come into being, the conviction was recorded that, although God had spoken in many and various ways, he had spoken in the fullness of time, in the last days, by his Son (e.g., Gal 4:4; Heb 1:2). God had made known to men in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will in keeping with the purpose he set forth in Christ as the plan for the fullness of time (Eph 1:9–10). In the person and life of Jesus God had revealed himself most completely and finally to men. Jesus was the Word of God (John 1:2), bearing the very stamp of the divine nature (Heb 1:3).

The dramatic character of God's revelation in Christ is reflected in its description as proclamation.[2] The early church remembered Jesus's ministry as one of proclamation. He was remembered as having been sent to proclaim the acceptable day of the Lord, to preach the | kingdom of God (Luke 4:16–22), and to usher it in by his ministry (Matt 12:28). But his ministry was seen as being at once a statement about his person, and the man and his message were not to be separated. In his life there was a finality—divine history was finding fulfillment. The writings in which the early church introduces us to Jesus themselves exhibit this understanding that

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[1] See Ferdinand Hahn, "Die Nachfolge Jesu in vorösterlicher Zeit," in *Die Anfänge der Kirche im Neuen Testament* (ed. Ferdinand Hahn, August Strobel, and Eduard Schweizer; EvFo 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 9ff.

[2] See Hermann Diem, *Dogmatics* (trans. Harold Knight; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959), 141–147; G. Clarke Chapman, Jr., "The Proclamation-History: Hermann Diem and the Historical-Theological Problem," *Int* 18 (1964): 329–345.

God's Word to man was proclamation. Because the evangelists wished to underscore that God's Word in Christ was one of proclamation, they could not present the real significance of Jesus by means of ordinary biography. They created a new literary form through which to express the meaning of Jesus, viz., the Gospel form. The Gospels have no counterpart elsewhere; they are formed by their content and purpose.[3] They are proclamation and were written to proclaim Christ.

The church which saw God revealing himself in Christ and his proclamation continued that proclamation. What it proclaimed as the Word of God was that God had fulfilled his promises in Christ (Acts 13:44). It did not separate Christ from the message about him. The proclamation of the message was the proclamation of Christ. What it proclaimed was the Word of life himself (1 John 1:1ff.). To receive that message meant that one received by faith Christ himself (Eph 4:20–21; Col 2:6) as the content of the Word of the Lord (Acts 16:32–34).

Men responded in different ways to the message of Christ. When the response was in keeping with the character of the message, it gave historical concreteness and clarity to the message (cf. Col 2:6–7). When the response was inadequate or inappropriate, it provided opportunity for elaboration or for more specific application to human life (cf. Eph 4:20–21). Men guided by the divine Spirit applied the Word to life, showing the new value it should have because of Christ. The main characteristic of this application was its Christocentric character. The meaning of Christ for life was detailed. God's revelation had taken place in Jesus, and when man accepted Jesus he became a new creature. His total life received a new orientation. He experienced a veritable metamorphosis (Rom 12:2). As a new creature he saw everything anew (2 Cor 5:16–17). Thus, his moral life was determined by the fact that his body was a member of Christ (1 Cor 6:15). His relationship with others was given a new value because of his relationship with the Lord (Col 3:18–25). Even his attitude toward his enemies was to be different because of the teaching of Jesus (Rom 12:14; cf. Matt 5:44).

The response to the Word was not individualistic, and the continued application was not made to individuals only. A new humanity | was created of believers who had been reformed by Christ. They were united

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[3] See Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher, eds., *New Testament Apocrypha* (English translation edited by Robert McL. Wilson; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963–1966), 1:71–80.

by their life in the Lord and they formed his body, the church of God (Col 1:18). The meaning of God's purpose in Christ was applied consciously and specifically to this community of faith. Its structure (Eph 4:7–16), corporate life (Col 3:12–17), worship (Eph 5:18–20), indeed, all aspects of its existence were seen to have their goal in the person of Christ.

The NT is to be seen as the Word of God in this perspective. It can be described as the Word because it explicates the meaning of Jesus Christ for human life. The NT was written by the first generations of Christians as they were led by their experience in Christ and the Holy Spirit to a truer understanding of their own nature and of the nature of the church. The church understood that it was making God's will known. Jesus had promised that the Spirit would lead his followers to all truth (John 14:25–26), and Christians later affirmed that what they said did indeed reflect the mind of God because it had been revealed to them by God's Spirit (1 Cor 2:6–13).[4]

This astounding self-consciousness of the church of its own role in the revelation of the Word extended further. There was a sense of finality about what had taken place in Christ. God had spoken finally in the last days in Christ (Heb 1:2). The church itself came into being in response to the announcement that Christ had ascended and was inaugurating the last days (Acts 2:17). It was the eschatological community, and it shared in the mysteries that God had reserved for it.[5] Because it had possession of the Spirit and was the community of the last days, it knew things even the prophets could not possibly have known (1 Pet 1:10–12), and it conceived it to be the church's task to make God's will known (Eph 3:7–10).

The importance of the church in the creation of the NT is thus not to be minimized.[6] The church became part of God's revelation by being the response of faith to the Word. It became the historical ground in which the Word was anchored. The form in which the Word was communicated was determined by the conditions and needs of the church's life. But the theological importance of the church *vis-à-vis* the Word extends even beyond this. The church shared in the process of revelation through its

[4] For the theological significance of inspiration beyond its relevance to the NT alone, see David M. Stanley, "The Concept of Biblical Inspiration," *Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America* 13 (1959): 65–89.

[5] See Ernst Käsemann, "Ministry and Community in the New Testament," in Käsemann, *Essays on New Testament Themes* (trans. W.J. Montague; SBT 41; London: SCM, 1964), 63–94.

[6] For a clear presentation of the process, see C.F.D. Moule, *The Birth of the New Testament* (3d ed.; BNTC; London: Adam & Charles Black, 1981).

proclamation and its creativity in giving concrete, literary expression to the Word. The apostolic church marked the transition from the life of Jesus to that expression of faith in him that would become normative with the formation of the canon.[7]

213 The importance of the church is further emphasized by the part | it played in the mediation and preservation of the Word. The church continued to apply to itself that growing body of material that it considered to be in agreement with God's disclosures in Christ and with its understanding of its own nature.[8] In this process the church recognized its own limits. The church saw that it did not originate the Word; it only received and transmitted the Word. It did not interpret the Word independently; the interpretation was from God (2 Pet 1:20–21). Neither did the church envisage an open-ended development of thought which it could continue to comment on or guide. There was something final about what had been given it. The church was, after all, the eschatological community. It had received all knowledge as it awaited the return of Christ (1 Cor 1:4–7). The faith had once for all been delivered to the saints (Jude 3, 5). This sense of the finality of revelation and of the church's own limitation contributed to the formation of the canon of the NT.

The church had always understood itself to be under the authority of Christ. All authority in heaven and on earth had been given to him. As the church taught what it had learned from him, Jesus was thought to authenticate that teaching (Matt 28:19–20). But as the meaning of Christ became expressed in written form, authority was ascribed to these writings also. They were addressed to particular situations with their own problems, yet their particularity did not limit the authority with which they spoke or the demands they made to the churches to which they were first addressed.[9] The writings were concerned to bring the significance of Christ to bear on human life, and such significance, although it was related to particular situations, could not be confined to them. They were soon regarded as having universal application and could be used in churches other than the

[7] The Apostles' unrepeatable function was their grounding of the Christian message in history. For the view that they represented canonicity from the very beginning of the church, see Karl Holl, "Der Kirchenbegriff des Paulus in seinem Verhältnis zu dem der Urgemeinde," in Holl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte* (3 vols.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1928–1932), 2:44–67.

[8] See Moule, *Birth of the New Testament*, 66–67.

[9] See, for example, Wolfgang Schrage, *Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese: Ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Ethik* (Gütersloh: G. Mohn, 1961), 117ff., who discusses the general validity of Pauline ethical instruction.

ones to which they were originally addressed (Col 4:16).[10] The tendency to see universal applicability in the once particularistic writings contributed further to the formation of the canon.

When the church formed the canon of the NT, it was reaching for an authority.[11] Put in another way, when the church gathered the twenty-seven books to constitute the "New Covenant," it invested them with authority for all ages. They had become Scripture. By recognizing the canon, the church affirmed that its creativity in producing Scripture had come to an end. The apostolic church had shared in the revelation of God by virtue of being the historical response to God's disclosure in Christ. The church in its response grounded that revelation in history for all succeeding generations. But just as God's revelation in Christ was a once-for-all event, the church's response to that revelation and its sharing in it had a | once-for-all character. It came to an end with the formation of the canon. 214

The church believed that, although Jesus lived in history and was thus confined historically by time and space, "he is the same yesterday, today and forever" (Heb 13:8) and that he continues to make demands on men which were articulated during his life in terms real to the conditions under which he lived. In a similar manner the canon of Scripture, although it too came about within a particular historical period, and although it too reflects the experiences of the church during a certain period of its history, has a relevance for all time.

Here again, in forming the canon there is implicit a surprising self-consciousness on the part of the church as to its participation in the formation of the Word. In deciding, perhaps intuitively, what was to be included in the NT, the church in fact determined precisely what constituted the

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[10] Adolf Harnack, *Die Briefsammlung des Apostels Paulus und die anderen vorkonstantinischen christlichen Briefsammlungen: Sechs Vorlesungen aus der altkirchlichen Literaturgeschichte* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1926), 7ff., believes that the general value of Paul's letters was immediately recognized by the churches and that this led to their collection in a corpus. On the early church's concern with the problem of particularity and universal validity, see Nils A. Dahl, "The Particularity of the Pauline Epistles as a Problem in the Ancient Church," in *Neotestamentica et Patristica: Eine Freundesgabe, Herrn Professor Dr. Oscar Cullmann zu seinem 60. Geburtstag überreicht* (ed. Willem C. van Unnik; NovTSup 6; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), 261–271; Krister Stendahl, "The Apocalypse of John and the Epistles of Paul in the Muratorian Fragment," in *Current Issues in New Testament Interpretation: Essays in Honor of Otto A. Piper* (ed. William Klassen and Graydon F. Snyder; New York: Harper, 1962), 239–245.

[11] Moule, *Birth of the New Testament*, 235ff.; Adolf Harnack, *The Origin of the New Testament and the Most Important Consequences of the New Creation* (trans. John R. Wilkinson; CTL 45; London: Williams & Norgate, 1925).

once-for-all givenness of the Word for succeeding generations. The performance of such a function could easily be interpreted as the grossest arrogance. The formation of the canon points up the theological and historical importance of the church, just as the writing and transmission of the NT do. It is, after all, to the church's witness and interpretation of Christ that we always return.[12] That witness had now been defined in the canon, and the later church would always return to it. But to think that the church considered its share in providing later generations with the Word haughtily or arrogantly is to misunderstand its view of its relationship to the Word.

The paradox of canonization is that in the process the church recognized its own limitations. The formation of the canon was not only a determination of the limit and extent of the Word. It was also a determination of the limit of the church in the process of revelation. By forming the canon the church placed itself under its authority for all time.[13]

An appreciation of the historical character of biblical religion must take at least these factors into consideration. God's revelation did not take place in Christ without involving the church. His act in Christ was seen to be his act and accepted as such by the church. This acceptance and understanding of Christ then became part of the revelation itself, and the church's part in the process of revelation must be taken seriously. This becomes especially obvious when the significance of the canon is related to the church's role in the canonization of the NT.

Such a view of the Word is not without its problems. It has in recent 215 years been stressed that we always return to the faith of | the early church and that we cannot get back to the historical Jesus.[14] The questioning of even the legitimacy of wanting to find the historical Jesus has at least had the value of stimulating fresh thought on the nature of the Christological and kerygmatic elements in revelation. Even if one takes heart from that element among those engaged in the new quest of the historical Jesus which has a more positive evaluation of the historical Jesus, it can only be done with the realization that there is still a quest going on and that it has

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[12] See Helmut Koester, "One Jesus and Four Primitive Gospels," *HTR* 61 (1968): 203–247.

[13] See Oscar Cullmann, "The Tradition," in *The Early Church: Studies in Early Christian History and Theology* (ed. Angus J.B. Higgins; trans. Higgins and Stanley Godman; London: SCM, 1956), 55–99.

[14] See James M. Robinson, "Kerygma and History in the New Testament," in *The Bible in Modern Scholarship: Papers Read at the 100th Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, December 28–30, 1964* (ed. J. Philip Hyatt; Nashville: Abingdon, 1965), 114ff., for a judicious assessment of the present state of the discussion.

its own peculiarities and problems. To affirm the Christological character of the Word does not mean that the statement is intelligible to all hearers. The Believers' Church is more optimistic about the possibility of knowing about the historical Jesus. It sees itself as aligned with the early church in its desire to relate with the historical Jesus. That church proclaimed and delivered the kerygma, but the kerygma was given meaning by the life which lay behind it. The Gospels are proclamation in their nature, but they do not proclaim only the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus. They also provide information about his life and teaching which were authenticated for the church by his resurrection. The evangelistic and pietistic strains in the Believers' Church have placed great emphasis on the person of Jesus as the focus of God's revelation. The historical nature of the Gospels has seemed so obvious to this tradition that the discussions of the historical Jesus have largely been bypassed. Yet if the Word is to be understood under the Christological aspect, as we have attempted to do in this paper, then attention must be given to the questions raised by the quest of the historical Jesus. The relation between Jesus and the church is of utmost importance to the view presented here.[15]

An awareness of the historical process by which the NT came into being also raises questions with respect to the character of the church, of tradition, and of canon. In view of modern research we cannot assume that a church completely united in theological viewpoint created the canon, after which tradition and heresy developed.[16] An effort to understand the historical complexity of the church that produced the NT discovers that the church was not a static, homogeneous institution, but it constantly grew and developed as it responded to the Word, while giving it new form.[17] During this process it received and handed on traditions which

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[15] Robinson, "Kerygma and History in the New Testament," 118ff.

[16] The revival of interest in Walter Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* (2d ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1963), is indicative of the seriousness with which the diversity of the early church is being investigated. See also Arnold Ehrhardt, "Christianity before the Apostles' Creed," *HTR* 55 (1962): 73–119, esp. 94; Helmut Koester, "GNŌMAI DIAPHOROI: The Origin and Nature of Diversification in the History of Early Christianity," *HTR* 58 (1965): 279–318.

[17] See Robert M. Grant, "'Development' in Early Christian Doctrine: Review Article," *JR* 39 (1959): 120–128; John Knox, *The Early Church and the Coming Great Church* (Hoover Lectures 1955; Nashville: Abingdon, 1955), 129; Reginald H. Fuller, *The New Testament in Current Study* (New York: Scribner's, 1962), 137–138. These Anglican scholars see the development of Christianity in the second century as the natural unfolding of what is already implicit in the apostolic preaching. Consequently, the discovery of *Frühkatholizismus* in the NT causes them no theological embarrassment (see nn. 21, 23, 25).

reflected its diversity.[18] Tradition is not something which only developed after the canon had been formed and which can therefore facilely be dismissed as a later accretion. The phenomenon is already found in the NT itself. It is, perhaps, a necessary consequence of the | historical nature of the church. It demands our efforts to work out the implications of the fact.[19] Whereas the early church is regarded as theologically very important by some free church communions, the diversity which characterized it and the part it played in the formation of the NT are not appreciated in our ranks as they have been elsewhere. We must seek to discover whether and in what manner that developing church and its traditions and diversity can be normative for us. As we do so, we shall not only clarify our own relationship to the Word, but shall also note with interest other communions' views of their relationship to the early church and tradition.

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In a similar way we are very conscious today of the process by which the canon came into existence. The development of the canon cannot satisfactorily be ascribed to "the providence of God" without taking that process and its theological implications seriously. Preoccupation with the canon's historical development is increasingly leading to doubt that it has theological significance for us today.[20] On the one hand, we are told that the writings of the NT are only part of the body of literature produced by the early church and that it should be used in the same way and with the same limitations with which other early Christian literature is used. Its theological value as a norm for Christian thought and conduct is diminished. The other extreme is found in the statement that, since the church

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[18] C.F.D. Moule, "The Influence of Circumstances on the Use of Eschatological Terms," *JTS* 15 (1964): 1–15, ascribes the diversity to the different circumstances to which the message was addressed rather than to a straight-line development. Käsemann, "Ministry and Community in the New Testament," 89, claims that what makes the process questionable theologically is that the development "is associated with, and founded on, not need and historical necessity but a theoretical principle of tradition and legitimate succession; so that, in effect, the Spirit is made to appear as the organ and the rationale of a theory."

[19] For the problem of tradition in the NT, see Klaus Wegenast, *Das Verständnis der Tradition bei Paulus in den Deuteropaulinen* (WMANT 8; Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1962), and Birger Gerhardsson, *Memory and Manuscript: Oral Tradition and Written Transmission in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity* (trans. Eric J. Sharpe; ASNU 22; Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1961). For the theological implications of such material in relation to the problem of heresy in the early church, see Helmut Koester, "Häretiker im Urchristentum als theologisches Problem," in *Zeit und Geschichte: Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 80. Geburtstag* (ed. Erich Dinkler; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1964), 61–76.

[20] This is a Protestant legacy from Ferdinand C. Baur, who dissolved theology in history. For a recent sympathetic treatment of Baur, see Peter C. Hodgson, *The Formation of Historical Theology: A Study of Ferdinand Christian Baur* (MMT; New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

created the canon, it continues to give authority to the canon and interprets and applies the Word with that authority. This view overlooks the truth that the canon is the result of the church's looking for an authority under which to place itself. A determination of the precise theological significance of the canon in light of the critical enterprise is sorely needed, not least of all by the Believers' Church.

The instinct to relate the authority of the canon to the church points, I believe, in the right direction.[21] But the solution is not to place the church over the canon, as has been done in the tradition of Rome, although winds of change can be detected there.[22] Nor is the solution found in the approach of many churches of the Reformation, namely, to place less stress on the significance of the church.[23] The fear of institutions easily leads to a denial of the canon as an important theological datum. The place of the church in the formation of the Word must be recognized, but the limiting character of the canon must equally be stressed.[24] Such an evaluation will lead to a clearer view of the relationship between the Word and the people who live under it. The Believers' Church tradition seems peculiarly suited to make a substantial contribution to the discussion | of this problem today. In this tradition there should not be an intimidating fear of institutions on the one hand, nor an excessive dependence on the institution on the other. 217

One further problem needs to be observed at this point. Even when the canon is taken seriously, the question of how precisely it is to be normative is not settled. Historical study of the NT tends to highlight its particularity. We see with increasing clarity what was meant in the original setting or circumstances, but with lessening certainty do we see what it is to mean to us today. Hermeneutics, as we could expect, has taken on renewed significance. The Believers' Church has not given itself to this problem. It has affirmed that Scripture can readily be understood in such a way as to make salvation possible. The evangelistic thrust of our tradition and the lay character of most free church communions tend to emphasize those

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[21] It occasions no surprise to note that those scholars who detect a nascent Catholicism in the NT and value it low theologically have a corresponding view of canon (see n. 23).

[22] See, for example, David M. Stanley, "Reflections on the Church in the New Testament," *CBQ* 25 (1963): 387–400.

[23] The current discussion of *Frühkatholizismus* in the NT, represented, for example, by the writings of Ernst Käsemann, clearly expresses the relatively low estate in which the church is held.

[24] See Werner G. Kümmel, "Notwendigkeit und Grenze des neutestamentlichen Kanons," *ZTK* 47 (1950): 277–313.

elements which are regarded as self-evident, and this confidence in the *Allgemeinverständlichkeit* of Scripture determines our approach to the NT as a whole. Too frequently what passes for hermeneutics is a method of approach which sees the Bible as a collection of proof texts or propositions which can be systematized according to any principle one might select. Such an approach is oblivious to the character of the NT and therefore does it violence.

What has here been described correctly or incorrectly as a Believers' Church view of the Word demands that a hermeneutic be developed which corresponds to this view. As it was the community of faith, led by the Spirit, which produced the NT, so it is now the community of believers which seeks to apply the NT to itself as it is being guided by the Spirit. The church approaches the interpretation of the Scriptures with an awareness of its own theological importance.[25] As the Word had come into being out of the life of the church, now the Word is again to find its meaning in the life of the church. The church now exercises its creativity, not in producing revelation, but in interpreting it. Yet its interpretation is disciplined by the canonical status of the Word.[26] While the church does justice to the diversity of Scripture and in itself, it does so with a recognition that it must allow the Word to make its demands on the church.

## The Nature of the Faith

We now turn to consider briefly the faith which links the people to the Word. The nature of the Christian faith is determined by | the nature of the Word. As the Word is Christocentric in character, so also is the faith which comes into existence as a response to that Word. In Paul's statement that "faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ" (Rom 10:17 RSV) he makes the very basic affirmation that faith originates as a response to proclamation. He had earlier belabored the point. "But how are men to call upon him in whom they have not believed? And how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without a preacher?" (Rom 10:14 RSV).

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[25] Hans Küng, *The Council in Action: Theological Reflections on the Second Vatican Council* (trans. Cecily Hastings; New York: Sheed & Ward, 1963), 159–195, insists that the whole canon be taken seriously but claims that only the Catholic Church can do justice to the catholicism in the NT.

[26] See Diem, *Dogmatics*, 236.

The glory of Christ, who is the likeness of God, is made known in the gospel. Preaching takes place so that through it God may give the light of the knowledge of his glory in the face of Christ (2 Cor 4:4–6). The content of the preaching is Christological and is clearly presented in the NT.[27] The burden of the message is that in the ministry, death, and resurrection of Christ the age of fulfillment has dawned, that by virtue of his resurrection Jesus has been exalted to the right hand of the Father, whence he pours out the Spirit and where he intercedes for us when we look to him as Lord.

The preaching has its point in the affirmation that Christ died for us. He died that we might live, and the Word is preached so that we may be saved. It speaks to our condition as sinful men. The consequence is that such a message cannot be preached in a neutral manner. It demands a response from man. He can either accept the person and life of Christ as God's way of reconciling man to himself (2 Cor 5:17), or he can reject it. If he appropriates God's action in Christ, he does so by faith. The Word that is preached is a word of faith (Rom 10:8). It demands that man accept Jesus Christ by faith as God's way of disclosing himself. Man's acceptance is in the nature of a response. He does not accomplish this acceptance on the basis of his own resources, nor does he initiate faith. It is a submission to God's will. It is an inner trust and commitment to the Lordship of Christ made as man is moved by the Spirit to confess that Jesus is Lord.

Faith is expressed in confession. Thus, "if you confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved. For man believes with his heart and so is justified, and he confesses with his lips and so is saved" (Rom 10:9–10 RSV). The creed is thus in essence the acceptance of the proclamation. It also has Christ as its content. It says something about Christ and man's relationship to him. In the confession of his Lordship man accepts his own sinful nature and sees his | salvation as coming from God through Christ. In the proclamation man is confronted by God and in the confession of his faith he places himself under God's demands. 219

The Believers' Church insists on this understanding of faith as a response to the proclamation of Christ. It has correctly insisted on the soteriological aspects of the proclamation and of faith. Man stands as sinner before God when he hears the preaching, and he is responsible to God

[27] See, for example, C.H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments* (New York: Harper, 1936).

for his own response. The church is no intermediary in the sense that it determines the content of the faith or the form of the confession. That is already determined by the content of the Word itself. Neither can the faith of the church stand for the faith of those incapable of responding in faith. Proclamation calls for hearing that will result in a confession of faith. It knows nothing of a vicarious faith.

The Believers' Church's insight into faith as a response of responsible men and women does justice to the basic nature of the Word. It must continue to be stated with clarity and conviction. Yet there are other aspects of faith whose implications we must deal with more fully. There is more to faith than laying hold of salvation when hearing God's demands being made in the Word. The response is, after all, a response of persons who have been formed by the context in which they live. For faith to be the response of such persons, it must be related to their experience and must be expressed in terms of their experience. We observe that this was the case in the NT.[28] The proclamation to Jews took place in terms of promise and fulfillment, and the confession of faith was that Jesus was indeed the Christ, the Messiah who had been promised (cf. Acts 13:16–41). To Gentiles, however, who did not operate within the framework of promise and fulfillment, Jesus was presented as the Son of the Creator who had been granted sovereignty over this age and the one to come by virtue of his resurrection and ascension (cf. Eph 1:19ff.).[29] Questions are raised for us here which stem from the historical character of the Word. Is there a basic unity under all the diversity in the NT?[30] Does the diversity of the forms by which the faith is confessed in the Word provide us with equal freedom to determine the form of the confession for our own day? Is what is ultimately determinative only that the Lordship of Christ be accepted by man in terms meaningful to him personally, regardless of the form which the faith is to take?[31] Or is the significance of the canon such that it places a limit on the form in which the faith is expressed?

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[28] E.g., Oscar Cullmann, *The Earliest Christian Confessions* (trans. J.K.S. Reid; London: Lutterworth, 1949); Vernon H. Neufeld, *The Earliest Christian Confessions* (NTTS 5; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1963).

[29] Eduard Schweizer, "Two New Testament Creeds Compared," in Klassen and Snyder, *Current Issues in NT Interpretation*, 166ff.

[30] See Willi Marxsen, *Der "Frühkatholizismus" im Neuen Testament* (BibS[N] 21; Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1958), who sees the variety of the confessions in the NT as being united by the proclamation of Christ.

[31] See Eduard Schweizer, "Variety and Unity in the New Testament Proclamation of Jesus as the Son of God," *ABR* 15 (1967): 1–15.

When creeds with diverse content and form are thought to have developed only after the closing of the canon, no great problem is | posed for the Believers' Church's attitude toward them. But when critical investigation shows that there is a diversity of confessions of faith within the NT itself, the problem becomes more real. In our consideration of this problem we need to affirm that diversity within the NT does not permit the theological significance of the canon to be dissolved into its historical nature. Yet, we need to determine what the implications of this diversity are for the Believers' Church and its position with respect to ecclesiastical creeds.

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Faith is not only subjective in nature. It admits, indeed requires, objective statement beyond the verbal expression of trust in and commitment to Christ. Objective statement of the faith contributes to the clarity and meaning of the response to the Word. But the question arises again as to the degree to which the faith can be described or stated objectively and systematically without lapsing into a creedalism which replaces living proclamation with propositions. Within the Believers' Church the objective, systematic statement of the faith has been accomplished in varying degrees, but this effort has not been endowed with great importance. We do not appear to be troubled so much by the problems that have been posed for systematic theology as a discipline in the period since Troeltsch. Most of us simply lack concern for the enterprise. Perhaps we shall decide that systematic theology is not necessary for a clear apprehension of the Word, perhaps even that it is undesirable. But before we do so, we should investigate whether our understanding of the Word requires or precludes such an endeavor.

Of greater importance to us probably are the questions raised in connection with biblical theology.[32] Need we be concerned with the possibility or need for biblical theology, or should we be satisfied with operating on the level of individual and sometimes diverse biblical doctrines? Is there not an element or principle which underlies these seemingly unrelated doctrines which will allow us to describe the faith as a coherent and meaningful whole? Here again, we must give attention to the demands

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[32] For discussions of the problem, see Krister Stendahl, "Biblical Theology: Contemporary," *IDB* 1:418–432; Stendahl, "Method in the Study of Biblical Theology," in Hyatt, *The Bible in Modern Scholarship*, 196–209; Leander E. Keck, "Problems of New Testament Theology," *NovT* 7 (1964): 217–241; Herbert Braun, "Die Problematik einer Theologie des Neuen Testaments," in Braun, *Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1962), 325–341.

made by both the historical and the theological aspects of the Word, that is, to both the diversity in the NT and its canonicity.

## The Community of Faith

Our whole study so far has been concerned with the relationship between the Word and the church, with special emphasis on the nature of the Word and the faith it calls forth, we now turn more | specifically to the implications of the Word for the church and the life it is to lead.

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The church owes its existence to the Word. It is in response to the proclamation of the Word that man, moved by the Spirit, confesses that Jesus is Lord (1 Cor 12:3), and it is by the same Spirit that he is baptized into the one body (1 Cor 12:13). The church is a community created by faith which comes about in response to the Word. The church continues to owe its existence to the activity of God as he calls men to commit themselves to him in faith. It is indeed a company of the committed, a visible group which is the concrete expression of faith.

When the church is viewed in this manner, we escape the tension, found in so much of Protestantism, between Christology and soteriology on the one hand and ecclesiology on the other. The way is prepared for a much higher doctrine of the church. The Christological nature of the Word is extended to the nature of the church. The church does not exist only to make possible the proclamation of the Word. Its relationship with Christ points up another aspect of its existence. Christ, the content of the Word, is responsible for the existence of the church. When men accept the Word, they accept him. He is still the foundation on which the church is built. There can therefore be no uneasy tension between the institution and the faith. The one is the ground for the other.

The high value of the church is reflected in its understanding of itself. We have noticed the church's self-consciousness as it shared in and mediated the Word in its early years. Today the church must still have a high degree of self-awareness. This self-consciousness must not be an arrogance which boastfully points to the superiority of its members; it must rather be the calm conviction that the church has been redeemed by Christ, a remembrance that will keep the church humble. It must not be a pride which makes the church want to exercise authority; it must rather be a self-consciousness that comes from the church's subjection to the Lord. It must not be an assertion of infallibility; it must rather be the sobering knowledge that apostasy begins within the church.

The value of the church does not reside in itself as an independent institution, but in its relationship to Christ. It is not merely another institution or organization. It is an organism of which Christ is the head (Col 1:18). To say that the church is his body is not only to use metaphorical language (Eph 4:11ff.). The relationship between Christ and the church is an ontological one. When one puts Christ on, one is added to the church, and one's life is lived in the Lord. The | Christological nature of the church 222 does not, however, permit the church to fall into the error of assuming the creative powers of Christ. The early church, which shared in the revelation and mediated it for later generations, had such self-confidence as we are speaking about, but it also appreciated its own limitation. By accepting the canon the church determined to live under its authority.

The Believers' Church has maintained this attitude of respect for the Word. The Word, after all, brings the church into being and it continues to guide the church. Herein lies the church's understanding of its own nature. The Word is normative with respect even to the structure of the church (Eph 4:11ff.), and the church must submit itself in this respect also to the Word. In an age in which so great an interest is shown in the church, this insight is invaluable and must not be abandoned. Modern biblical study has illuminated the different phases of the church's structure in the NT period. This diversity has led to the paradox that in discussions on church unity many Protestant leaders deny that the NT can be the basis for unity today, while Catholics defend its normative character.[33] The Believers' Church renders vivid witness to its appreciation of the Word by its life as a visible body of believers living under the Word. The church's visible form is represented in the NT as being divinely given. The ascended Lord gave as gifts to men the functions or offices which they were to perform (cf. Eph 4:11ff.). But the church's relationship to Christ prevents its structure from becoming either an arrangement to be changed or dispensed with at will. It also prevents the other extreme, that it might become a hierarchical organization which can stand between man and God. All believers stand in an immediate relationship with God in Christ, in whom there is no male or female, bond or free. All stand as equals before God. The structure is given so that all may serve God and each other in mutual

[33] E.g., Ernst Käsemann, "Unity and Diversity in New Testament Ecclesiology," *NovT* 6 (1963): 290–297; Käsemann, "The Canon of the New Testament and the Unity of the Church," in Käsemann, *Essays on New Testament Themes*, 95–107; Raymond E. Brown, "The Unity and Diversity in New Testament Ecclesiology," *NovT* 6 (1963): 298–308.

subjection. When the body functions in this manner, it is built up as it grows into Christ who is its head.

The church's whole endeavor as an ordered society is occupied with and determined by the Word. It is the church which holds forth the Word of life. The church understands that it is God's plan that through it his manifold wisdom should be made known. The church enjoys this privilege because God realized his eternal purpose in Jesus Christ its Lord (Eph 3:10–12). In its proclamation the church invites men to lay hold of the promises of God recorded in his Word. In its worship it shares in the great acts of God proclaimed in his Word through its commemoration of them. In its expectation the church lives in hope for the glory promised by the Word.

223 | Faith finds further objective expression in the life that believers live under the Word. When followers of Christ show entire and true fidelity, they adorn the doctrine of God (Titus 2:10). This life is not determined by the context in which they live or by the situations to which they address themselves. Its content is determined by the Word itself. Having been born anew of the living and abiding Word of God which was preached to them, they live a new life because they have tasted the kindness of the Lord (1 Pet 1:22–2:3). Christ is now their motivation and their standard.

The church knows that it is a redeemed community, because it has been washed and sanctified and justified (1 Cor 6:11). Even a way of life which may have been worthy of praise before baptism now loses its secular character as the Spirit sanctifies it. This special quality of life can be lived only within the church, where the Spirit dwells. The church is concerned to bring to fulfillment that life under the Word. The church does not judge the world by the Word under which it has placed itself. Judgment of outsiders is left to God (1 Cor 5:12–13). The church judges only itself by God's standards. Although the church still lives in the world, it is not of the world. It does not allow the world to break into its life to secularize it and estrange it from the Word. Its life is so dominated by the Word that it becomes a witness to outsiders.

## Conclusion

We may summarize by saying that the Believers' Church sees the Word as being basically the proclamation of Christ which demands a response from man. The stress on the relationship between the church and Christ results in an ecclesiology whose implications must still be drawn. In particular, the

relationship between the church and the historical Jesus and the church's creativity with respect to the writing and the canonization of the NT on the one hand and its interpretation on the other must receive further attention. Such investigation will contribute to a clearer understanding of what it means to be a people under the Word. We may find demands being made upon us which will require the utmost courage of us. As the church originally measured itself by the proclaimed Word, it must now live under the written Word in an age in which the world threatens to break into it. Its survival as the body of Christ depends on its ability to live under the Word in a manner appropriate to the nature of the Word itself.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

# CONTINUITIES IN SCHOLARSHIP: THE WORK OF NILS DAHL*

The scholarship of Nils Alstrup Dahl, Buckingham Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation at Yale, cannot easily be pigeonholed. For one thing, the scope of his work defies neat systematization, and for another, while he would deny it, the erudition he displays in working in as many areas as he does, makes impossible demands on any one person who would dare to offer an assessment of his scholarship. Hence, what follows is simply an attempt to give a highly selective yet representative account of his work.

Professor Dahl is no narrow specialist.[1] He has worked most extensively in the Gospels and the Pauline letters, and is writing an eagerly awaited major commentary on Ephesians. The *Festschrift* recently published in his honor is entitled *God's Christ and His People*, signaling his abiding interest in Christology and ecclesiology, but as the editors of the volume note, his contributions go far beyond these two areas.[2] In addition to his basically exegetical studies, he has engaged in the theological and hermeneutical discussions of the last three decades, made important contributions to textual criticism and the history of the NT canon, explored the history and interpretation of Jewish and Christian Scriptures, closely examined such newly discovered materials in the areas of the history of religions as the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Gnostic writings from Nag Hammadi, and written major book reviews and masterful assessments of the status of research on Acts and on form critical studies of the Pauline letters. He has also found time to serve, with advice and instruction, not only his own and the ecumenical church, but his students and colleagues. His writings, always mercifully free of jargon, have a commonsensical element about them that have made them, for a large part, useful to non-specialists.

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* Originally published in *Reflection* 78 (1980): 8–12.

[1] Some of his essays have been published in three volumes: *The Crucified Messiah, and Other Essays* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1974); *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church: Essays* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1976); and *Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian Mission* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977).

[2] A select bibliography of his writings up to 1974 appears in Jacob Jervell and Wayne A. Meeks, eds., *God's Christ and His People: Studies in Honour of Nils Alstrup Dahl* (Oslo: University of Oslo, 1977), 11–17.

Ever wary of overarching schemes or grand syntheses, Nils Dahl does not represent any school of thought, nor has he attempted to develop a following of his own. He is always eager to learn, even from his students and junior colleagues, whom he fondly credits in his publications for insights he only thinks he received from them. What he provides then is no Dahl school or viewpoint, and certainly no ephemeral glamor or faddishness, but an example of someone who faces "all the historical facts of the case openly and without apologetic manipulations and then (does not) take offense."[3] They learn from him to respect the evidence and to treat it responsibly without allowing an awareness of the importance of methodology to make methodology an end in itself, or to allow oneself to become its captive. The work starts, for Dahl, with that curiosity which underlies all science and leads to continually new treatment of a problem.[4] ("Detect" is a favorite word of his.) His method is basically exegetical, for he is convinced that "exegesis was—then as always—the means whereby contemporary ideas could be connected with sacred texts and traditions."[5]

Since he has not felt compelled to construct a system of his own he has tended to write on particular themes and texts. Yet his work has not been that of a learned dilettante, without any overall coherence or theological interest. It is not satisfactory simply to characterize his work as conservative, as is sometimes done. Such a label means different things to different people. It is more accurate, and certainly more useful, to describe Nils Dahl as someone who is aware of and impressed by continuities. One sees this, first of all, in the manner in which he proceeds in his writings, where problems are invariably taken up with a perspective informed by the history of the discipline, but are then treated in terms of the available evidence. The generalization may also hold that he works with a presupposition of continuities in the materials; for example, a continuity between the historical Jesus and the faith of the early church. It is not unnatural that a generation that had itself experienced crises and discontinuity should also find them in the sources of early Christianity. It is to Nils Dahl's credit that he has not succumbed to the temptation to place the emphasis there.

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[3] For the context from which the quotation is taken, see n. 18 below.

[4] Nils A. Dahl, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," in *The Crucified Messiah*, 62–63; "The Atonement—An Adequate Reward for the Akedah?" in *The Crucified Messiah*, 147.

[5] Nils A. Dahl, "Eschatology and History in Light of the Qumran Texts," in *The Crucified Messiah*, 144.

Professor Dahl's awareness of his indebtedness to the great scholars of former generations further underlines the importance of continuity for him. In conversation and written autobiographical comments he admits that he has been occupied with problems raised by the pioneer scholars at the turn of the century.[6] He recognizes that his usage of such terms as eschatology is old-fashioned, and justifies his practice by the desire not to complicate the discussion with terminology which is burdened by present-day debates.[7] He is impressed by the fact that among active professors he is only one generation removed from the great scholars of the nineteenth century, and he takes satisfaction in having been trained in a tradition of careful exegesis. If he had remained in Oslo rather than come to Yale in 1965, he and his teacher and predecessor, | Lyder Brun, would between them have occupied the chair in NT at that university for eighty years. With profound respect he recalls studying the works of the German radical scholars Johannes Weiss, Schweitzer, Wrede, Heitmueller, Bousset, Gunkel, and Wellhausen, and remembers the impression they made on him because of their honesty and rigorous scholarship. Despite the development that the discipline has undergone in his lifetime, he remains convinced that respect for the texts and the historical realities is the first duty of the NT scholar. 9

Nils Dahl's respect for the giants on whose shoulders he stands has not resulted in a scholarship that finds comfort in anachronism or luxuriates in irrelevance. In 1936 and 1937 he studied under Rudolf Bultmann in Marburg, where he also met his future wife Birgit Rosencrantz, and he held the chair in NT in Oslo during the time that Bultmann dominated the field of NT theology. Dahl's scholarly publications during that time are testimony to his respect for history as well as his refusal to let the past become a refuge from which to view the passing word. His discussion with Bultmann may be taken as an example of his critical method and his theological vantage point.

In 1954 Dahl published a lengthy review of Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament*, which had just recently been completed.[8] Bultmann himself had requested that Dahl write the review and later, although regretting that the reviewer did not feel more sympathy for his existentialist

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6 For his *cursus vitae*, see Jervell and Meeks, *God's Christ and His People*, 9–10, and for some autobiographical reflections, Dahl, *The Crucified Messiah*, 7–9.

7 Dahl, "Eschatology and History in Light of the Qumran Texts," 129, 131.

8 Nils A. Dahl, "Rudolf Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament*," in *The Crucified Messiah*, 90–128.

interpretation, nevertheless expressed appreciation for the review's rare combination of understanding and critical distance. The review is, in fact, more than a competent description or analysis of Bultmann's *Theology*, and has come to be known as one of the most illuminating accounts of Bultmann's work. Moving beyond mere description, Dahl reveals his own fine theological sensitivities by engaging Bultmann as he interprets him. His respect for Bultmann is evident on every page, and he is careful at points to state that he is not sure whether he understands his former teacher. Yet his passion for fairness and his obviously intimate knowledge of Bultmann's major writings resulted in an assessment of Bultmann's contribution that moved the discussion forward.

Professor Dahl himself made not insignificant contributions to that further discussion. In his estimation, a major problem arising from Bultmann's existential interpretation was the dehistoricization of the NT. Of particular concern to him were the implications of Bultmann's theological program for the Christology of the NT. Bultmann had proposed that the message of Jesus was a presupposition for the theology of the NT but not a part of that theology itself. Furthermore, he held that Jesus had not claimed to be the Messiah, and that it could not historically be established that he was the Messiah. Dahl noted that this negative result meant a positive gain for Bultmann's existential interpretation: Jesus can be apprehended as revealer and Savior only in the decision of faith. Historical criticism therefore denies any security to faith. It is as the one preached that Jesus's person signifies the demand for decision, and no confirmable data mitigate the offense of the Word. That is why Jesus's messianic self-consciousness, and indeed his whole history, is to be regarded as theologically irrelevant. To this Dahl objected that Jesus's history was not a matter of indifference to the evangelists although they also knew the offense: the hidden glory of this history is only visible to faith. He then asked of Bultmann: "Does he not avoid the offense given with the concrete history of Jesus and thereby also lose sight of the glory, visible to faith, in this history? The kerygma isolated from Jesus's history is in danger of becoming a paradox without content."[9]

Professor Dahl was not content simply to point out what he considered to be the inadequacies of Bultmann's work, but in his publications sought to provide the ground for his own views. In his review he affirmed that the works and words of Jesus do belong to the theology of the NT

[9] Dahl, "Rudolf Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament*," 104.

insofar as they were handed on by the church, interpreted and presented in the Gospels. It should be noted that Bultmann wrote before Redaction Criticism, which emphasized the theological perspectives of interest with which the evangelists used their material, came into its own. As one of the pioneers of Form Criticism, which denied theological originality to the writers of the Gospels, it was perhaps natural that Bultmann slighted the Gospels. Dahl drew attention to this neglect and claimed that the Gospels' interpretation of Jesus should also be closely analyzed in a theology of the NT.

Of course, Dahl was not the only scholar to question Bultmann's presuppositions or to insist on the theological importance of Jesus's history and teachings. In the same year (1954), Ernst Käsemann published | his famous essay of the same name, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," which has come to be viewed as marking a new stage in the post-Bultmannian debate.[10] In it, he also drew attention to the Gospels, and affirmed that primitive Christianity united its own message with certain characteristics of Jesus's preaching which stood out in sharp relief. He held that the distinctiveness of Jesus lay in his teaching, and that his other activities and his destiny should be seen in light of his teaching. This assertion raises questions about the nature of the continuity between Jesus and the exalted Lord of the church, a problem with which Käsemann wrestles throughout the essay without clearly resolving it. Dahl had written on the same subject the year before and, like Käsemann, had reassessed the role of historical criticism in the enterprise. Like Käsemann, he too warns against "Docetism," and turns to the Gospels for his starting point. But, unlike Käsemann, he begins with the crucifixion rather than with the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount. "A historically tenable description of the life of Jesus would only be possible in the form of a description of his death, its historical presuppositions, and the events preceding and following it."[11] He was also more optimistic in his assessment of what could be ascribed to Jesus, e.g., the probability that Jesus foresaw his own death, ascribed vicarious significance to it, and considered it a presupposition for the coming of the kingdom of God.[12] As to Jesus's relationship to the church, while not wishing to overstate the matter, he thought that "the Christological interpretation of the resurrection appearances and the subsequent

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[10] See Ernst Käsemann, *Essays on New Testament Themes* (trans. W.J. Montague; SBT 41; London: SCM, 1964), 15–47.

[11] Dahl, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," 72.

[12] Dahl, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," 75.

formation of the church can hardly be understood if the words of Jesus had not already paved the way for both the Christology and the ecclesiology of the primitive church."[13] Thus while he did not discuss the problem of continuity in the way Käsemann would, he was clearer on how he perceived it and on what importance he attributed to it.

These convictions were worked out further in a number of his articles which dealt with Christology, not only in the Gospels, but also in other NT writings. His occupation with Christology culminated in his presidential address in Paris in 1978 to the *Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas*, the international NT society. It is also reflected in the titles of the first two volumes of his collected essays, recently published, *The Crucified Messiah* and *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church*. The articles also reflect his interest in the interplay of historical data, interpretation of Scripture, and eschatological hopes.

The essay from which the title of the first collection was taken is regarded as programmatic by Professor Dahl, and serves well to illustrate his own views and method of approach. It was published in 1960 in a volume dealing with "the historical Jesus" and the "Kerygmatic Christ," slogans which had come to describe the theological debate stimulated by Bultmann's work. Dahl's further study has led to elaboration rather than revision of the ideas expressed in the essay. Fundamentally, he argues that the basic fact in the life of Jesus was his crucifixion as an alleged king of the Jews, and that the conviction that the crucified Messiah was vindicated by God who raised him marks the beginning of Christianity and the central theme of NT theology.

While considering it useful and necessary that the problem of the historical Jesus had been raised anew, Dahl suggested that it was time to determine, as far as possible, what really happened, and to turn to specific problems. The point at which the quest should begin, he asserted in the article, is Jesus's death, which is unconditionally established. Of the many questions that could be asked of it he selects one: "the meaning and legitimacy of saying that Jesus has been crucified as Messiah."[14] In pursuing the question he methodically examines creedal statements in the NT and concludes that in those statements that are to be theologically and soteriologically understood, the historical is not excluded but included. Similarly, the engagement of faith and the pathos of the passion narratives do

[13] Dahl, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," 84.
[14] Dahl, "The Crucified Messiah," in *The Crucified Messiah*, 14.

not exclude a historical interest. He then turns to the evangelists' description of Jesus's crucifixion as a messianic pretender, as "King of the Jews." Bultmann had claimed that Jesus died as messianic prophet, not as the Messiah, the latter being one of the dogmatic motifs of the passion story. Dahl admitted that it is dogmatic, but questioned whether therefore it is unhistorical. A preliminary examination that he then conducts of the gospel traditions shows that the designation "King of the Jews" is very old and stems neither from proof of prophecy nor from the Christology of the community. But while this shows that the crucified Messiah motif belongs to the substance of the passion story, its historicity is not thereby proved. Evidence for the latter comes from a consideration of the term Christ in Christian and Jewish usage. Dahl concludes that "the content of the predicate Messiah was determined essentially by the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus and only to a limited extent by a previous conception of the Messiah."[15] The resurrection means that God vindicated Jesus, who had been crucified as an alleged Messiah. Faith in the resurrection is faith in the crucified Messiah, which has a Christian distinctiveness from the outset. There is thus no gap between the historical Jesus and the preaching of the church; rather there exists a close and inseparable connection. Dahl rejects Käsemann's method of abstracting from historical matters of fact. On the contrary, he affirms, the question with which he is dealing is simply historical, and the continuity that he sees "is first of all a historical causal continuity."[16] The historical fact that Jesus was crucified became of central importance for the Christian formulation that Jesus is the Messiah. Jesus before his passion made no unequivocal or public claim to be the Messiah. That claim was extracted from him during the trial. Then he could not deny the charge that he was the Messiah without thereby putting in question the final, eschatological validity of his whole message and ministry.

Dahl understood that for Bultmann critical and historical research is only preliminary, and that it should be undertaken with the presupposition that the NT writings to which it is applied have something to say to the present. He shares that conviction with Bultmann, and is explicit in stating the theological significance of his argument: "The Christian faith hangs on the fact that Jesus Christ himself, and not merely a symbolic figure, encounters us in the preaching grounded in the apostolic testimony.

[15] Dahl, "The Crucified Messiah," 25.
[16] Dahl, "The Crucified Messiah," 34.

It revolves not around the general problem of the relationship between a historical and a symbolic figure, but around the personal identity of the Christ exalted to the right hand of the Father with the Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified under Pontius Pilate."[17] Alluding to the philosophical basis of Bultmann's theology, he claims, "What is necessary to faith is not a basis in scientific or philosophical interpretations of history, but simply the possibility to face all the historical facts of the case openly and without apologetic manipulations and then not to take offense. Thus a sober historical approach is required, one that can contribute to a clarification of the implications of the decision of faith without taking away from man the responsibility for his own decision."[18]

A major characteristic of Dahl's historical approach is his interest in placing the NT in its contemporary Jewish context. One notices again the | sense of continuity with which he works as he examines Jewish and Christian methods of scriptural interpretation or traces such themes as eschatology and messianism.[19] But, unlike many representatives of the History of Religions School, Dahl's *Religionsgeschichte* does not result in pictures of Judaism or Christianity in which their jagged edges are smoothed out or in which Christianity is seen as derivative and made totally intelligible by Judaism. On the contrary, the deeper Dahl digs, the more radical in his own context does Jesus become and the stranger does Christianity appear.[20] This is due to Dahl's insistence that any Jewish material used to illuminate some feature of the NT first be understood in its own right and context.[21] This means, for example, that the Qumran community's interpretation of messianic texts only becomes fruitful for NT Christology after it has been recognized that a correlation existed between the community's history and social structure on the one hand, and its eschatological interpretation of Scripture and its messianism on the other. When this is done, it is discovered that "expectation of the imminent end, realized eschatology, eschatology in the process of realization, proleptic and inaugurated eschatology—all these can be found, *mutatis mutandis*, in

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[17] Dahl, "The Crucified Messiah," 11.
[18] Dahl, "The Crucified Messiah," 12.
[19] It is seen in such articles as Dahl, "The Future of Israel," in *Studies in Paul*, 137–158, and "The One God of Jews and Gentiles," in *Studies in Paul*, 178–191, and in the way it influences his interpretation of Luke-Acts, e.g., in "The Story of Abraham in Luke-Acts," in *Jesus in the Memory of the Early Church*, 66–87.
[20] See, for example, Dahl, "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," 57, 69.
[21] Dahl, "Eschatology and History in Light of the Qumran Texts," 132–133.

Judaism as well."[22] But what altered everything for Christians was Jesus's execution as "King of the Jews," the brutal fact that led them to interpret Christologically some texts which had been applied in Judaism to the Messiah and some which had not. Whether he argues that Jewish interpretations of the binding of Isaac illuminate Rom 8:32,[23] or that Paul's argument in Gal 3 becomes clearer when it is set in the context of contemporary Jewish hermeneutics,[24] Dahl insists that what set Christianity apart from Judaism was not a new method of interpretation, but its experience of the crucified Christ.

Dahl's interest in Jewish and Christian interpretation of Scripture is not purely academic, but theological, for it is essential to dealing with the central theme of biblical eschatology, namely that God's promises are fulfilled in Christ. "In a historical description of the New Testament theology, therefore, history of interpretation must receive its due." We have to do, says Dahl, with the old scheme of prophecy and fulfillment, yet not in its classical form, for we have come "to see to what great extent fulfillment always involves a reinterpretation of the promise; only in that way can it be understood as fulfillment."[25]

Dahl's writings are never completely without theological interest, yet in the last two decades he has written important articles on a wide range of historical, textual, and literary topics. Frequently these articles were written for *Festschriften*, a form of publication to which he has contributed some two dozen times, and quite often they have dealt with the Pauline letters. He has done fascinating detective work in tracing the earliest collections of Paul's letters and determining what letters were included and when, and in studying the first "introductions" to them. Such work may appear arcane or even archaistic, but to Dahl it is not theologically irrelevant. This appears quite clear in an essay published in 1962 in a volume in honor of Oscar Cullmann. In it he studies the problem that the particularity of the Pauline letters posed for some early Christians. To them canonicity implied catholicity, and it was not clear why or how letters written to particular churches or situations should be regarded as Scripture. Dahl finds that one way in which the scandal of particularity was removed was to omit the geographical designation of the addresses from

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[22] Dahl, "Eschatology and History in Light of the Qumran Texts," 140–141.
[23] Dahl, "The Atonement—An Adequate Reward for the Akedah?"
[24] Dahl, "Contradictions in Scripture," in *Studies in Paul*, 159–177.
[25] Dahl, "Eschatology and History in Light of the Qumran Texts," 144. See, further on the subject, "Promise and Fulfillment," in *Studies in Paul*, 121–136.

certain manuscripts, thus generalizing them. But he was not content to leave the matter with that historical observation. In concluding this essay in honor of the champion of "Heilsgeschichte," he writes:

> Later on, the problem was no longer felt, but the tendency towards generalizing interpretation has remained, not only when the Epistles were used as dogmatic proof-texts, but also when they served as sources for reconstruction of a general 'biblical theology' or a system of 'paulinism.' Even 'existential interpretation' and the approach of "Heilsgeschichte" may lead to similar consequences. To the apostle himself, letters to particular churches written on special occasions were the proper literary form for making theological statements. Of this fact both exegesis and theology, not to mention preaching, have to take account. The particularity of the Pauline epistles points to the historicalness of all theology, even that of the apostle.[26]

Of special interest to Nils Dahl has been the structured forms of the Pauline Letters. Characteristically, he credited Martin Dibelius, whom he described as more of an artist but one who had a good deal of flexibility and common sense, with being the source of many insights that have proved fruitful to subsequent research. Dibelius was a pioneer in the form critical study of the Gospels, but Dahl appears to have benefited more greatly from his work on epistolographic forms, which had not been as diligently pursued. This interest he shared with Paul Schubert, his predecessor as Buckingham Professor. Schubert, who had studied with Dibelius, "rendered 'Formgeschichte' American, speaking of 'form and function' rather than of 'Gattung' and 'Sitz im Leben,' " according to Dahl.[27] In assessing the contribution that Schubert had made in his dissertation to the discipline, Dahl lamented that only a few reviewers of Schubert's book had recognized that it implied a methodological approach of high significance and wide | applicability. He noted that only in the last decade or two had a number of epistolary studies appeared, more or less directly inspired by Schubert, and he drew attention to a number of dissertations which made use "of the 'form and function' approach to the study of the Pauline letters, combining it with textual criticism, philosophical semantics, or syntactical analysis."[28] What he fails to mention is that these dissertations were written in Oslo

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[26] Nils A. Dahl, "The Particularity of the Pauline Epistles as a Problem in the Ancient Church," in *Neotestamentica et Patristica: Eine Freundesgabe, Herrn Professor Dr. Oscar Cullmann zu seinem 60. Geburtstag überreicht* (ed. Willem C. van Unnik; NovTSup 6; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), 261–271, esp. 271.

[27] Dahl, "Paul Schubert: Pioneer of the 'Form and Function' Approach to Early Christian Literature," *Reflection* 68 (1970): 13.

[28] Dahl, "Paul Schubert," 13.

and at Yale under his own direction. The dissertations, while attempting new approaches, avoided the danger of which Dahl knew Schubert to have been conscious: "fascination with speculation about the unknown (which leads) to the neglect of what is known."[29]

Schubert's "Americanization" of epistolary form criticism has been continued by Dahl in his teaching and publications, and especially in his work within the SBL, whose honorary president he was in 1979. In the Society he conceived of and for five years chaired a seminar on "The Form and Function of the Pauline Letters," which has stimulated students of Paul as well as specialists in ancient epistolography. The wide applicability of the method that had been implicit in Schubert's work was clearly being demonstrated in practice.

Professor Dahl's work continues on many fronts. Whether he wrestles with questions of the method of doing NT theology, traces the Gospel traditions in the early church, tries to solve yet another puzzle in Ephesians, attempts to grasp the early church's understanding of Paul, or learns what contemporary philosophers of language or linguists have to say, the task is pursued with zest, with respect for those who have gone before, and with gratitude for those who will continue.

[29] Dahl, "Paul Schubert," 13.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

# A REVIEW OF HANS DIETER BETZ, ED., *PLUTARCH'S ETHICAL WRITINGS AND EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE**

The volume under review witnesses to the tremendous industry of its editor and his collaborators in the *Corpus Hellenisticum*. The aim of that project, as conceived by the late W.C. van Unnik, is to examine all ancient Greek and Latin sources for what they may contribute to a proper understanding of the NT.[1] Plutarch (ca. 50–120) is a natural choice for such an investigation, for his numerous writings are major sources for any study of the religion, philosophy, ethics, history, or social life of his period. Betz and his colleagues examined Plutarch's theological writings in an earlier volume,[2] and here devote their attention to ethics, a major concern of philosophers in the early Empire.

The enormous scope of Plutarch's ethical writings, the state of Plutarchean studies, and the availability of collaborators necessitated a selection of the treatises to be studied. The fourteen included, however, do represent a sufficiently wide range of subjects to give an impression of the sorts of topics that engaged a moral philosopher in the first century and the way he handled them: "On Progress in Virtue," by William C. Grese; "Advice about Keeping Well," by Morton Smith; "The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men," by David E. Aune; "The Virtues of Women," by Kathleen O'Brien Wicker; "On Moral Virtue," by Jackson P. Hershbell; "On the Control of Anger," by Hans Dieter Betz and John M. Dillon; "On Tranquility of Mind, On Brotherly Love, On Praising Oneself Inoffensively," by Hans Dieter Betz; "On Talkativeness," by William A. Beardslee; "On Love of Wealth," by Edward N. O'Neil; "On Envy and Hate," by Dieter Lührmann; "Consolation to His Wife," by Hubert Martin and Jane E. Phillips; "The Dialogue on Love," by Hubert Martin. The authors of the articles represent

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* Originally published in *JBL* 100 (1981): 140–142. The book under review is Hans Dieter Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (SCHNT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1978).

[1] Willem C. van Unnik, "*Corpus Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti*," *JBL* 83 (1964): 17–33.

[2] Hans Dieter Betz, ed., *Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature* (SCHNT 3; Leiden: Brill, 1975); reviewed by Edward N. O'Neil in *JBL* 94 (1975): 631–633.

different fields of study: Smith and Wicker are ancient historians, Dillon, Hershbell, Martin, O'Neil, and Phillips are classicists, and Aune, Beardslee, Betz, Grese, and Lührmann are NT scholars.

Contributions to the *Corpus Hellenisticum* project have taken different forms. Some, following the example of Wettstein's work, which the project seeks to amplify, list parallels from pagan authors to the NT in canonical order, with very little comment added. While easiest to use, this procedure runs the serious risk of having "parallels" to the NT taken out of context and to having them misused. Other contributions have been topical or thematic in nature, tracing certain themes in the pagan literature to illustrate corresponding phenomena in early Christian literature. This approach has the benefit of providing a larger context, but cannot be applied to the systematic investigation of a large body of material without prejudging what themes or topics are to receive attention. The procedure followed in this volume is designed to offset the difficulties inherent in the enterprise. An introductory essay by Betz comments on ethics in general in the Greco-Roman period as well as on the ethics of Plutarch and early Christianity. All essays on the treatises are introduced by discussions which focus on understanding the treatises in their own right. While there are individual differences, these discussions generally treat the formal structure and composition of each treatise, and briefly sketch the philosophical, ethical, or literary tradition to which the treatise belongs before turning to discuss the treatment of the topic by Plutarch and early Christian literature. Then, in an attempt to protect the integrity of each tractate, Plutarch's work is summarized in expanded outline form in a manner intended to provide the reader with the context for the parallels to early Christian literature which are adduced. Extensive indexes to passages from the LXX and early Christian literature, Greek words, and subjects make it possible for the reader to find what he is looking for in the Plutarchean context. The goal of this design is admirable, but the essays demonstrate that attaining it is not easy.

141 | The treatments of the literary characteristics of the treatises, and the outlines, where they are provided, will be useful guides to readers sufficiently interested to work through the treatises, but even a more casual reader will be challenged by some provocative statements, e.g., by Aune's suggestion, on the basis of similarities he sees between the gospels and Plutarch's *The Dinner of The Seven Wise Men*, that "the commonly accepted notion that the canonical Gospels were an entirely new and unique literary form developed by early Christianity in late antiquity stands in need

of reassessment."[3] Martin's statement that 1 Thess 4:13–18 is reminiscent of Plutarch's consolation to his wife has much merit.[4]

A close reading of the volume impresses one with the riches it contains, especially on matters of detail. What is disappointing, however, is that, despite the procedure adopted, Plutarch himself does not emerge very clearly. Of course, contributors to the volume know that he was a Middle Platonist, but they are evidently more impressed by his eclecticism,[5] and in particular by his indebtedness to the Cynics and Stoics. That he, like other moral philosophers of the period, derived much from Cynic and Stoic traditions is beyond doubt, and, as O'Neil points out,[6] it is no accident that Plutarch has most in common with those Christian writings which are themselves most influenced by these two philosophical schools. But one must go beyond the identification of traditions to the way they are used and to the basis for their use. Betz is aware that Plutarch interprets and changes various types of ethical material,[7] and on occasion he and others do address the issue in discussing a particular subject,[8] but in general it is not clear from the essays what it is in Plutarch that makes his moral instruction cohere, and, consequently, how it compares with early Christian instruction.

Hershbell, no doubt partly due to the more theoretical nature of his tractate, *On Moral Virtue*, addresses the issue more directly and insistently. He demonstrates that Plutarch is in the Platonic-Aristotelian ethical tradition, with an anthropology and a notion of character education that envision "a perfecting of the self into a harmonious whole, a work of which one might be justly proud."[9] The centrality of the concept of virtue (ἀρετή) as human achievement is properly stressed, as it is by Wicker.[10] The long philosophical tradition to which Plutarch belonged, and which he used in attacking the Stoics, was unknown to or ignored by the Christian writings taken into consideration in the volume, and Christians only infrequently used the term ἀρετή. They had a different anthropology, and stressed reliance on God rather than human achievement. Thus, by doing

3 *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 63.
4 *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 413.
5 E.g., *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 202, 231, 290–291.
6 *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 305.
7 *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 9.
8 E.g., *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 203.
9 *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 136.
10 *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature*, 106–114.

greater justice to Plutarch's philosophy, Hershbell not only records that an important Plutarchean term does not occur or does so only rarely in early Christian literature, but explains why this is so and drives to the heart of the matter. It would have been most useful if similar extended discussion had been devoted in the volume to the relationship between Plutarch's religion and his ethics.

By concentrating on Plutarch, in addition to ἀρετή, other terms important to pagan moralists but not equally so to Christians are turned up. Betz's treatment of the tractate *On Brotherly Love* is a good case in point. It clearly illustrates once more that a preoccupation with "parallels" on matters of details obscures the fact that in many respects it is precisely the absence of corresponding features in one of the bodies of literature but important in the other that should be examined closely in studies of this kind. Advantage, however, has not been taken of all the opportunities to draw a clear picture of Plutarch. He has, for example, been called "the apostle of φιλανθρωπία," and it is striking that in a volume on his ethics only relatively cursory comments are made on that virtue. One could also argue that τύχη and λύπη deserved rather more space than they are granted.

The volume is a potentially useful tool if it is used properly. It is not, nor does it claim to be, a systematic presentation of Plutarch's or early Christian ethics. Nor, with very few exceptions, does it even offer full or systematic treatments of major ethical concepts or practices in the two bodies of literature. What it does is to provide points of | entry into Plutarch's thought. Ironically, the essays which are likely to be most informative to the reader who comes from the early Christian side will appear to provide more NT parallels to Plutarch than the reverse. But, since such readers presumably already know their way around the NT and the scholarship devoted to it, a redressing of the balance is in order, for Plutarch deserves to be better known by the guild.

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CHAPTER TWENTY

# A REVIEW OF HELMUT KOESTER, *INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT* *

Koester makes clear in his Preface what he proposes. He undertakes to write neither an introduction to the NT nor a history of Christian literature but a history of early Christian churches, which is the context within which the literature is to be understood. Reconstruction of this history requires the examination of all Christian writings from the first 150 years of Christian history; hence he will also treat sixty non-canonical writings. Convinced that new discoveries, particularly the Nag Hammadi writings, require a reorientation of our views, Koester wishes to advance scholarship, recognizing that hypothetical reconstruction will play a part in his attempt. He also signals his perception of that history. It was a "complex process, full of controversies and difficult decisions. Understanding this process requires critical judgment as well as the construction of trajectories through the history of early Christianity."[1]

Koester is further convinced that the investigation must take place in the context of the history of religions. Thus, his work is to be seen as in the tradition of his teacher Rudolf Bultmann, to whose memory it is dedicated. Elsewhere, he had decried the use of the history of religions to provide "backgrounds" to the NT. He noted the

> inherent tendencies in the history of religions approach which contributed to a certain disregard for questions of historical dating and distinctions in historical development. A convenient, albeit unjustified, consequence has been to describe these backgrounds as something strangely inflexible that did not change its basic contours over the centuries.[2]

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* Originally published in *RelSRev* 10 (1984): 112–116. The book under review is Helmut Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament; Vol. 1: History, Culture, and Religion of the Hellenistic Age; Vol. 2: History and Literature of Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress/Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982).

[1] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:xxii.

[2] Helmut Koester, "New Testament Introduction: Critique of a Discipline," in *Christianity, Judaism and Other Greco-Roman Cults: Studies for Morton Smith at Sixty* (ed. Jacob Neusner; 4 vols.; SJLA 12; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 1:1–20, esp. 6.

This description, which James M. Robinson has also criticized for being static and monolithic, only rarely allowed the religion of Judaism and Hellenism to be integrated into the picture of a developing and changing Christianity. Earlier, in stressing the need for more precise description of Hellenistic Judaism, Koester had indicated what he had in mind. The essential desideratum, he thought, was "the interpretation of the religious self-understanding in the particular historical setting, rather than the clever arrangement of history of religions parallels in a non-historical fashion."[3] Hence the two volumes before us.

The task of writing a history of early Christianity and its literature which does justice to Christianity's participation in the world in which it existed is a daunting one. Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult not to allow our perception of one to influence our description of the other. That the effort must nevertheless be made goes without question, but the difficulty of the undertaking is the more obvious when it is attempted in one book, even though it be as learned and brilliant as Koester's. The final test, in addition to the degree to which the integrity of one's material is safeguarded, must be the extent to which the description of Christianity is really informed by what precedes it. It is to these issues that I shall address myself.

## Volume 1: *History, Culture, and Religion of the Hellenistic Age*

The first part is as good a one-volume treatment of the history and culture of the Hellenistic and Roman periods as can be found, and will become a standard reference work for students of early Christianity. Although he of necessity at times depends heavily on the work of others, Koester nevertheless provides a viewpoint that makes for a coherent picture. In addition to the topics usually taken up in such books (history, society, economics, education, language, literature, philosophy, and religion), he devotes one-fourth of his space to Judaism in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, including consideration of its literature. There is so much here that interests the student of the NT that one wishes that more references to the second volume had been provided.

[3] Helmut Koester, "Paul and Hellenism," in *The Bible in Modern Scholarship: Papers Read at the 100th Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature, December 28–30, 1964* (ed. J. Philip Hyatt; Nashville: Abingdon, 1965), 187–195, esp. 191–192.

As much as the volume brims over with information, however, there are noteworthy omissions. There is, for example, no discrete treatment of epistolography, although those literary genres are chosen for attention which are of interest to the NT. On the other hand, that aretalogy is taken up as an important genre surprises no one familiar with Koester's work. Nor the importance that he ascribes to romance: it is

> the typical literary expression of the late-Hellenistic view of human existence. All essential elements of human experience and the conquest of its limitations, as they found expression in the various genres of Hellenistic literature, were joined together by the romance into a new literary concept . . . it places the human individual in the center of the plot, and it reconciles this human being with the powers of fate which often seem to render life meaningless, because at least the romance knows a happy ending.[4]

These comments contain two features of Koester's work which give me pause. One is the tendency toward generalization represented by "the late-Hellenistic view of human existence." Elsewhere we read of "the spirit of Hellenism,"[5] "the typical Hellenistic belief,"[6] "the Hellenistic understanding of existence,"[7] "the typical Hellenistic view of human beings and their world."[8] That a section entitled "The Spirit of the Hellenistic Age" discusses such different subjects as the Cynics, Euhemerism, Astrology and Fate, and Orphism and Concepts of the Afterlife should call into question the usefulness of such generalizations.[9] It is precisely this kind of generalization that bedeviled the history-of-religions school, and which we shall do well to avoid.

The other disturbing feature is the nature of the generalization, that is, that the individual was seen to be oppressed by fate. We meet this, not only in the discussions of Gnosticism and magic,[10] where we might expect it, but also in those of the philosophical schools. So, Epicureans and Stoics are also said to have overcome the bondage of fate.[11] It is unrealistic to expect from a work of this scope that all subjects taken up would be discussed in detail. Nevertheless, to lump together Epicureans and Stoics in this way in the interest of maintaining the generalization does not

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[4] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:136–37.
[5] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:139.
[6] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:135.
[7] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:139.
[8] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:202.
[9] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:153–63.
[10] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:380–82.
[11] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:149–50, 353.

do justice to their differences, particularly at this point. The Epicureans attributed everything to chance, thus for them there was no predestination that could interfere with one's free decision to act. To the Stoics, on the other hand, everything was predetermined, which brought to the fore the question of free will, a capacity essential to their view of individual freedom.[12] Koester thus not only fails to impress us with the diversity in perception obtained, but misses an opportunity, in the case of Stoicism, to demonstrate, as Bultmann had,[13] its usefulness to us in our attempt to understand Paul.

114 | The concern for particularity which one expects is also lacking in the section on the philosophical marketplace, taken to be the social setting in which Christians like Paul preached.[14] Instead, we meet with homogenization. We are told that there was competition in that marketplace between the preachers who offered their wares, but the nature of the competition is not realistically related to the diversity of self-understanding of the preachers, nor to their views of the human condition, nor to the methods they employed in view of the notions they held. Rather, philosophers of different sorts are grouped together with religious hucksters to form a mass of propagandists who gave greater weight to power of speech and miracles than to rational discourse. It is difficult to see how such public preachers as Stertinius, Dio Chrysostom, and the vast majority of Cynics, who were aware of their differences, could have been part of the scene thus described. I fear that it is a certain understanding of 2 Corinthians that has contributed to this reconstruction. The situation was infinitely more complex and calls for greater precision. Whether, in fact, the marketplace was the place where Christian preachers habitually performed, is not at all clear from the evidence. Recent social description has offered quite different pictures,[15] and Nock fifty years ago drew attention to the fact that later pagan works directed against Christianity do not allude to out-of-door preaching.[16]

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[12] Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Sather Classical Lectures 48; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 102–103.

[13] Rudolf Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting* (trans. R.H. Fuller; LAB 4; New York: Meridian, 1956), 142–145.

[14] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:355–58.

[15] Edwin A. Judge, "The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community," *JRH* 1 (1960–1961): 4–15, 125–137; Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980); Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 29–30.

[16] Arthur Darby Nock, *Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933; repr., Oxford Paperbacks, 1961), 192.

## Volume 2: *History and Literature of Early Christianity*

The temptation to allow one's view of early Christianity to influence one's understanding of its world is also evident in the second volume. Paul's letter writing, for example, is not preceded by a treatment of ancient epistolography, as one might expect it to be. Perhaps this is so because Koester does not consider Paul's letters "literature,"[17] and he had earlier discussed literary genres.[18] Perhaps it is because he is impressed by Paul's achievement in creating something new in his letters.[19] Neither literature nor occasional letters,[20] they are "instruments of ecclesiastical policy" for use in organizing his churches.[21] Paul's letters are, of course, distinct in character, but that distinctiveness as characterized by Koester is tempered when one remembers that Epicurus's letters, of which we largely have fragments, but which were widely known in antiquity, performed much the same function. Recent work on epistolography, particularly that by the SBL Seminar on the Form and Function of the Pauline Letters, has demonstrated the value of going beyond the material, especially papyrus letters, on which a previous generation of scholars depended. Much remains to be done. The letters of Epicurus deserve closer scrutiny from persons interested in ancient epistolography.

Koester is at his most brilliant when sketching the development of early Christianity. After twenty-five years of provocative articles from his pen, we now have a comprehensive picture of how he understands that development to have taken place. His indebtedness to Walter Bauer has never been clearer,[22] nor what he has learned from Ferdinand C. Baur about relating one's sources to the historical process. The space allotted the documents has been determined by their perceived importance for the development as Koester understands it rather than the theological value traditionally ascribed them; for example, Romans, Ephesians, Colossians, Gospel of Thomas, and the Shepherd of Hermas all receive about the same amount of space, while Revelation, Ignatius, and the Pastorals

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[17] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 2:2.

[18] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 1:121–40.

[19] Helmut Koester, "1 Thessalonians: Experiment in Christian Writing," in *Continuity and Discontinuity in Church History: Essays Presented to George Huntston Williams on His 65th Birthday* (ed. F. Forrester Church and Timothy George; SHCT 19; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), 33–34.

[20] But see Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 2:55.

[21] Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 2:3, 55, 281, 286.

[22] See Walter Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity* (ed. Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel; trans. Robert A. Kraft et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971).

are treated at much greater length. Non-canonical sources, and of special interest, the Nag Hammadi writings, are consistently made part of the process. The development is largely described in terms of controversies and confrontations, a hypothesis that calls for a vigorous response from those who would prefer a reconstruction that lays at least equal weight on continuity. One expects that the tendency to date canonical writings late and non-canonical ones early will be challenged. What is striking, in view of Koester's earlier comments, is how intramural and intellectual it all seems to have been. His intellectualistic interpretation is reminiscent of Bultmann. The historical development is largely described in terms of Christian theological interests which are rarely related to the contemporary intellectual or social worlds. There are exceptions: "the renewal of apocalypticism" and Luke-Acts, for instance, are related to social and economic conditions, as is, from time to time, the ethical teaching of one writer or another. By and large, however, the development is not dearly related to what is offered in the first volume.

## Conclusion

This is an ambitious work, written with great boldness. The forcefulness of the writing, sometimes bordering on the apodictic, should not obscure the fact that its author is engaged in hypothetical reconstruction. The hypothetical nature of the effort would have been more obvious throughout, particularly in the second volume, if contrary viewpoints had been acknowledged.[23] As it is, we have a clear presentation of one tradition of NT scholarship. That is a considerable contribution in itself, and future scholarship will have to come to terms with it. That the English edition has appeared so soon after the original German has not prevented Koester from benefiting from reviews of the first edition. He has made some corrections, added a short chapter on cities in the Roman Empire, provided fuller bibliographies, and included maps, photographs, charts, a glossary, and extensive indexes, all of which will add to the usefulness of these handsomely produced volumes.

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[23] See Meeks, "Review of Helmut Koester, *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*," *JBL* 101 (1982): 445–448.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

# ON THE WRITING OF COMMENTARIES*

We all use commentaries, certainly commentaries on the Bible. A glance at the sales catalogues of publishing houses, especially those serving evangelical constituencies, shows that commentaries are their bread and butter. Carl Holladay and I have been contributors to this industry for more than forty years, starting with our collaboration in the Living Word Commentary, published by the Sweet Publishing Company, later taken over by Abilene Christian University. Carl contributed the commentary on 1 Corinthians to the series,[1] James Thompson the ones on Hebrews and 2 Corinthians.[2] I was editor of an introductory volume to the series and an article in that volume, and Jim Roberts had an article in that volume.[3] So, we have been at this for some time.

Some months ago, Carl and I talked about commentary writing, especially in light of the fact that we are both currently writing commentaries for major series, he on Acts for the New Testament Library, and I on the Pastoral Epistles for Hermeneia. The questions arose as to what a commentary is, why it should be written, and how.[4] We thought it might be interesting | to this audience to discuss the issues we face in terms of our own experience, thus introducing an autobiographical element to our papers. 130

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* This paper was presented to the Christian Scholars Conference on June 26, 2009, at Lipscomb University in Nashville, Tennessee. The oral nature of the communication is retained, as are the personal references to the original context of the lecture. It was published in *ResQ* 53 (2011): 129–140.

[1] Carl R. Holladay, *The First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians* (LWC 8; Austin, Tex.: R.B. Sweet, 1979).

[2] James W. Thompson, *The Letter to the Hebrews* (LWC 15; Austin, Tex.: R.B. Sweet, 1972); *The Second Letter of Paul to the Corinthians* (LWC 9; Austin, Tex.: R.B. Sweet, 1992).

[3] Abraham J. Malherbe, *The World of the New Testament* (LWC 1; Austin, Tex.: R.B. Sweet, 1967).

[4] It is evidently natural that experienced commentators ask themselves those questions after having already written commentaries. See Ernest Best, "The Reading and Writing of Commentaries," *ExpTim* 107 (1996): 358–362. Already an experienced commentator, Best at the time was writing the commentary on Ephesians for the International Critical Commentary.

## Autobiography: Academic Formation

In trying to understand why I write in the way I do, I have gone back to the early years of my academic formation, for, as some of you have heard me say, I do believe, with Tennyson's Ulysses, that we're part of all that we've met. That takes me back to Harvard, where I entered the Divinity School in 1954, newly graduated from Abilene Christian College. Of course, going about my task in this way may confirm the suspicion probably fostered by a Yale man, that a succinct definition of autobiography is a Harvard man talking.

### Reading the Languages

I can't remember much of what I had learned about the study of the Bible at Abilene Christian College. We did not engage in serious, critical study of the Bible at ACC, but were primarily focused on clarifying, establishing, and defending those doctrines and practices most important to our ecclesial identity. I did receive a good grounding in the grammar of NT Greek, and through a concentration on the book of Acts, a historical perspective.

My later approach to the NT started with my experience at Harvard. This is what I did during my three-year STB program, the curricular equivalent of the MDiv. In addition to the usual courses in Bible, history, theology, world religions, ethics, etc., I read Xenophon's *Anabasis* with Sterling Dow, Plato's *Apology* with George Luck, and faithfully audited Werner Jaeger's reading of, and communion with, Euripides. With Arthur Darby Nock, who would later be the director of my doctoral dissertation, I began reading writings more contemporary with the NT, particularly Dio Chrysostom and Plutarch.

On the Christian side, I read the NT in Greek, studied Hebrew with Robert Henry Pfeiffer, and took a year of ecclesiastical Latin with Ralph Lazzaro. To get outside the NT, I read patristic Greek with Milton Anastos for two years. During the first two years in the doctoral program, Robert Kraft and I took a Greek reading course with Helmut Koester on Eusebius's *Ecclesiastical History*. You get the point: I became immersed in the world in which the NT came into existence through the literature of that world.

At the same time that the reading of these ancient sources was taking place, I was also learning to read the NT, and it should surprise no one that I read the NT as belonging to that world and that it seemed natural to read the NT as I read other ancient texts. A strong influence on me

was the young Krister Stendahl, arriving in Cambridge from Uppsala the same summer that I arrived from Abilene. I found Stendahl's perspective on the NT congenial for his historical orientation, and was infected by the excitement with which he studied the text, always drawing from that treasure, like Matthew's scribe, things old and new. Stendahl did not teach me how to relate the Graeco-Roman stuff I was reading to the NT; he was more interested in the Jewish side of things, especially in the Dead Sea Scrolls, on which he had done | original work in his dissertation and was still exploiting. What he did impress on me was that one had first to determine what the writings of the NT meant in their own time before trying to discover what they mean in our own time. 131

## Learning Exegesis

From my association with Stendahl also came what I thought to be the aim and method of exegesis. I do not remember that he gave instruction in exegetical method. When I served him as a teaching fellow, another fellow and I observed how he handled the text, noticed how other scholars of similar bent also did so, and constructed an exegetical outline that we could use in teaching students in our classes to do exegesis. I expanded that outline in an article I wrote for the special issue of the *Restoration Quarterly* in 1961 on the exegesis of the NT.[5] There is nothing esoteric about the method. Classicists go through the same motions with their texts. What is noteworthy is that up to that time, a handbook on exegesis had not yet been written. Many years later, Carl Holladay and John Hayes wrote their book on the subject,[6] a standard text that has been so successful that the royalties from it will guarantee them a secure retirement.

## A Commentary for the Church

These brief comments on exegetical method are not a digression, for they lead directly to my experience producing commentaries. At ACC,

[5] Abraham J. Malherbe, "The Task and Method of New Testament Exegesis," *ResQ* 5 (1961): 169–178. [*Light*, 1:27–39]

[6] John H. Hayes and Carl R. Holladay, *Biblical Exegesis: A Beginner's Handbook* (3d ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007; originally published Atlanta: John Knox, 1982; London: SCM, 1983).

JW Roberts started using the special issue of *Restoration Quarterly* immediately in his exegesis courses, and when I joined the faculty in 1963, I did so also. Exegesis there was never to be the same. Historical criticism, without being named, had sneaked into the camp, never to be ejected. The method was enthusiastically accepted by the most extraordinary group of students it has been my privilege to teach anywhere. The acceptance of the method and its results became widespread, prepared for by *Restoration Quarterly.* It went beyond mere acceptance to the point that the Sweet Publishing company proposed a commentary series, The Living Word Commentary, which Everett Ferguson and I would edit. That series' projected audience was members of the Church of Christ, so it represents my involvement in commentary writing for a particular ecclesial constituency.

Everett and I were clear in our own minds that the method employed would be "historical" and would be introduced by a volume that I would edit, *The World of the New Testament*.[7] That volume included articles on social, political, and historical subjects, as well as one on how to study the Bible, by Roy Bowen Ward, very much like what I had started in the special *Restoration Quarterly* issue. I wrote a short introduction to the volume, basically justifying historical criticism (but referring to it as "the historical method") by arguing | for its appropriateness to a history of salvation theology without using the term. The perceptive reader will recognize the intention of the article to relate the commentary series to its constituency by making theological and practical sense. It will also not escape notice that on the cover of volumes in the series the words πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος ("all Scripture is inspired") was printed prominently in gold. The series was directed to preachers and teachers, and the individual volumes showed no interest in the Graeco-Roman sources I was reading. The commentators were not competent to utilize those sources, and the projected readership would have been nonplused by them.

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## The Graeco-Roman Context

My doctoral dissertation, accepted in 1963, had examined the apologetic work of a second-century Christian, Athenagoras. I argued that Athenagoras, in making his case for Christianity, did so in a manner that reflected his own philosophical formation, which was Platonist, and in literary form like

[7] See n. 3 above.

that of a handbook on Platonic philosophy. I was thus interested in the interface between Christianity and its environment, here in the defense and explication of the faith. My interest in Platonism continued in the middle 1960s while Everett Ferguson and I translated and commented on a work by Gregory of Nyssa.[8] Concurrently, I continued to write on early Christian apologetic and prepared articles cannibalized from my dissertation, which started being published toward the end of the 1960s.[9]

And so we come to the commentary on Thessalonians, which was published in 2000.[10] Asked how long it took me to write it, I replied, only half facetiously, "Forty years." The beginning of the project would then take us back to the late 1950s, which is exactly when I started developing an interest in the two letters. The way in which that happened set the direction for my study of these documents.

In the fall of 1957, Phyllis and I were involved in what is now called a church planting in Lexington, Massachusetts. It was also the time when I was knee-deep in reading the ancient texts mentioned above. A number of us who were students at Harvard were working with fledgling churches, combining our academic and church lives. For example, in 1957 six of us started something grandiosely called the Boston School of Religious Instruction, conducted for two terms on Friday evenings at the Brookline Church of Christ. We taught courses on OT and NT Introduction, Jewish and Graeco-Roman Backgrounds to the NT, church history, and so on. There was a hunger for such things, demonstrated by the number of folk who attended. At the time, there were only around 450 members of the Church of Christ in all six of the New | England states, scattered from southern Connecticut to the Canadian border. Phyllis, an inveterate counter of the house, remembers that we had an average attendance of forty or so, largely, of course, from metropolitan Boston. The interest in things academic extended to local churches. For example, the women in the Lexington church prevailed on me to teach them Greek in the Ladies Bible

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[8] Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson, *Gregory of Nyssa: The Life of Moses* (CWS; Cistercian Studies 31; New York: Paulist, 1978; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2006).

[9] Abraham J. Malherbe, "Athenagoras on Christian Ethics," *JEH* 20 (1969): 1–5; [*Light*, 2:829–835] Malherbe, "The Holy Spirit in Athenagoras," *JTS* NS 20 (1969): 538–542; [*Light*, 2:837–841] Malherbe, "The Structure of Athenagoras, *Supplicatio pro Christianis*," *VC* 23 (1969): 1–20; [*Light*, 2:807–827] Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers," in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten* (ed. Patrick Granfield and Joseph Jungmann; 2 vols.; Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), 1:214–25; [*Light*, 2:849–865] Malherbe, "Athenagoras on the Location of God," *TZ* 26 (1970): 46–52. [*Light*, 2:843–848]

[10] Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians* (AB 32B; New York: Doubleday, 2000).

Class, which I did for a year on Thursday mornings, using the old Davis grammar, which was then used in Greek courses at ACC.[11]

It is in this context that I met Russ Hulbert, who affiliated with us. Russ had grown up in a fellowship devoted to study of prophecy and things millennial. I knew nothing about such matters and made the mistake of reading books by people who claimed to know apocalyptic mysteries and chopped and diced texts as they constructed systems in which variations of the terms millennial and tribulation identified apocalyptic schemes. The apocalyptic overload fried my brain, and I appealed to Russ to choose a NT text we could study so I could learn what was so dear to his heart. He chose 1 Thessalonians, and there began my fascination with this little letter and its successor.

While Russ and, as I would discover, many writers were impressed by the otherworldliness of the apocalyptic elements in the letter, I was impressed by how in so many ways it was at home in the culture in which it was written. In my dissertation I would examine the interface between Christianity and its world as reflected in the defense of an established faith; in the Thessalonian letters, I was also struck by that interface, but here the concern was to discover how the life of faith could be lived in a society newly viewed as alien. I was off and running, for decades teaching Thessalonians in churches, to undergraduates and graduate students, to faculty members and conferences internationally.

My understanding of the letters was enriched by teaching and research on subjects that might appear to certain people not directly related to Thessalonians, but which contributed to my understanding of them. For example, I wanted to know more about ancient letter writing, so I translated, for the first time into English, ancient handbooks on letter writing,[12] and directed some of my students in translating some pseudonymous ancient philosophical letters.[13] This led one of my colleagues at Yale to say, "Abe reads the junk mail of antiquity."

I discovered that one type of philosopher, the moralist, was especially important to early Christians, so I drew attention to them in a sourcebook of their writings that introduced them to a larger audience and in a series

[11] William H. Davis, *Beginner's Grammar of the Greek New Testament* (New York: Harper, 1923).

[12] Abraham J. Malherbe, "Ancient Epistolary Theorists," *Ohio Journal of Religious Studies* 5 (1977): 3–77; repr., with minor revisions to the translation, and with indices and expanded bibliography, as *Ancient Epistolary Theorists* (SBLSBS 19; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

[13] Abraham J. Malherbe, ed., *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* (SBLSBS 12; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977).

of technical articles demonstrated how they helped us to understand some features of Paul's letters, particularly 1 Thessalonians.[14] In all this, I was fortunate to | have join me the most remarkable train of students 134 any teacher could wish for, first at ACC and then at Yale. The ones I could count on to tackle material new to them with vigor and discipline were members of the Church of Christ and the Jesuits, and the lone Benedictine Luke Timothy Johnson.

## How to Write a Commentary

I come now to the actual writing of commentaries. How to go about it? In what follows, I reflect on what I do, but do not think that to be entirely idiosyncratic. I will sound apodictic, which is fine, for it will evoke sharp reaction. When I first started thinking about this paper, I thought it might be interesting to see whether classicists had done much thinking on the nature of commentary writing since Greeks and Romans had been writing commentaries for centuries. I found that there has been considerable interest in the activity and that much had been written on it during the last decade and a half. I refer to them in this paper not because I think they set the standard we are to follow, but because they have thought long and hard about writing commentaries, frequently on texts dating from the period in which I am interested, indeed, sometimes on authors in whom I have had a longtime interest.

## Bibliography?

Where and how to begin writing a commentary? Many, perhaps most, writers begin by assembling a bibliography. That is a rather curious way to go about it, if you stop to think about it. You are to comment on a text, presumably because an editor or publisher thought you had special qualifications to do so. So, why open yourself to the interpretations, even fantasies, of others before you work on your text? I cannot here discuss why this is the wrong way to approach the subject. I know commentators who make the grand claim that they approach the text in light of the scholarship on it. That is a never-ending task, for the bibliography continues to

[14] Abraham J. Malherbe, *Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook* (LEC 4; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986).

grow. More serious is that attention to all the stuff that appears in print diffuses one's attention. *Ad fontes!* Focus on the text! If something worthwhile has been written, it will bubble up as the commentator pursues more basic work.

The way to begin is to develop a close relationship to the text. Unburden yourself of the preconceptions you have of the text, acquired from your reading of interpreters and your own previous research. To spend time with them at this stage is like washing your feet with your socks on. When confronted by the phalanxes of commentators, I am reminded of J. Frank Dobie, the father of Southwestern literature. When someone asked him why he never got his Ph.D., he retorted that the dissertation held him off, for writing one was like digging up bones from one hole and putting them in another.

## Translation

Of course, a writer of a commentary does not stand in front of his text unsullied by learned opinion. Quite the contrary. But I try to sip from Lethe so that I can be encountered anew by my text. I much prefer that encounter to be | informed by immersion in ancient authors who shared a universe with my document. I have come to place great importance on beginning by preparing a careful translation of the text to be commented upon. I have in mind a rigorous engagement, not a superficial reading that depends on other translations.

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The Pastoral Epistles take up fifteen to seventeen pages in the Nestle-Aland edition and can be read easily in less than an hour. The translation I have in mind takes several months. In translating previously untranslated texts, I learned how difficult such translation is, not because the grammar is difficult and the vocabulary obscure, but because the materials with which we have to do are technical, a fact that poses special problems for the translator. Translation to a certain extent is interpretation. A constant challenge to the translator is whether to read words that sometimes have a technical meaning as if they always do so, or whether an ordinary surface meaning suffices. An example is whether εὐαγγελισαμένου in 1 Thess 3:6 carries some sense of gospel preaching, or whether it simply means that Timothy brought good news. The decision requires a little exegesis, but even then certainty is not absolute. But the very difficulty at the stage of translation alerts the commentator that close attention needs to be paid to the language used to describe communication. Such decisions

can become a bit *recherché*, and the commentator must beware of not being seduced into "maximum exegesis." My former colleague, Nils Dahl, once said of a student that he had the courage to intone the obvious. In a similar quip, George Orwell identified a different character trait: "We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men."[15] Whether we wish to ascribe restraint to courage or intelligence, we need not develop senses acute enough to hear the grass grow in order to appear scholarly.

In writing on Thessalonians, I was impressed by how inadequately scholars deal with the syntax of the text. That is partly due to the paratactic nature of NT Greek and partly to our poor knowledge of the Greek language. The commentator has a special responsibility to lay out the significance of the linguistic architecture of the text. I have tried to do that in my Thessalonians commentary, which in that respect is like the great nineteenth-century commentary on the same letters by John Eadie. My commentary could be used to good effect in intermediate Greek courses. It was written with a sensitivity to pedagogic need in reading Greek, and the full indices are an aid to that exercise.

The translation of which I speak is enhanced when one begins considering the critical apparatus for clues as to how the textual tradition understood the text. Close examination of the textual variants will sharpen one's eyes to aspects that one would miss if one's interest in the apparatus were confined to establishing the text.

## Interpreting the Text

As a commentator, I am fully aware that I am offering an interpretation of the text, which is one of the two main functions of a commentary, the other being creating a reference work. The two are not mutually exclusive, and I will return to the latter feature below. Fifty years ago, early in my graduate studies, we read a lot of Bultmann and discussed at length the possibility of presupposition-less exegesis. The upshot was that such exegesis was not possible, but that what should be of concern was whether one's presupposition was congruent with the text. So, what kind of text is 1 Thessalonians?

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[15] George Orwell, review of Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis*, *The Adelphi* (January, 1939); reprinted in John Carey, ed., *George Orwell: Essays* (London: Everyman's Library, 1996), 107.

Can we with some confidence describe its character so that we can treat the letter according to that character? I think we can.

## The Literary Character

In 1 Thess 2, Paul describes his ministry to the Thessalonians in a series of antithetic statements such as that he was not motivated by error or impurity, nor did he speak with guile, but that he spoke as being entrusted with the gospel of God. This sounds, especially to German scholars, as if Paul is denying charges that he preached out of ignoble motives, and then the first three chapters of the letter are seen as a self-defense, which is the main purpose of the letter. The last two chapters, containing practical advice, is defined as paraenesis, an ancient style of moral exhortation that is unoriginal and generally applicable without revealing anything about the circumstances to which the letter is addressed. Understood in this way, the exegesis will be slanted in a particular way.

I too comment with a particular understanding of the letter. When one reads the letter in the context of ancient moral literature, it does not appear apologetic but paraenetic throughout, including the first three autobiographical chapters. My understanding of paraenesis is not only formal, but is expanded in light of ancient practice to take note of antithesis, which is now seen to have a paraenetic function, to lend emphasis to the exhortation. My interpretation, supported by ancient texts, shows that my presupposition is congruent with my text.

## The Authority and Integrity of the Text

I have learned much at this point from classicists, who are adamant about the interpretive nature of commentary.[16] Much as we strive for objectivity, common sense, and science in the sense of German *Wissenschaft*, we do not attain it for all kinds of reasons, including our own predilections and limitations and the contexts in which we write and the audience for which

[16] Instructive to me has been the acknowledgment of the fifth-century Platonist, Simplicius, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, in which long digressions provide him opportunity to interpret. See Han Baltussen, *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius: The Methodology of a Commentator* (London: Duckworth, 2008), and on transgressions, esp. Pantelis Golitsis, *Les commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d'Aristote: tradition et innovation* (CAGBQS 3; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008). I return to digressions below.

we write. That being the case, it is all the more important to be clear about our relationship to | the text. It is unavoidable, particularly in a pedagogical 137 setting, that the commentator assumes some authority with respect to the reader. So much the more is it important for the commentator to remember that authority resides in the text that he is attempting to explain.[17] If a text has called for commentary, it assumes a position of authority *vis-à-vis* the commentator, whether it is a Platonic dialogue, a history, or a Pauline letter. While having authoritative status, it nevertheless requires interpretation, for its meaning is not patently obvious, hence the need for a commentator. But the commentator must exercise self-discipline in his craft so as not to violate the integrity, thus authority, of his text. This is more than something attitudinal; it can be practiced in a number of ways.

## The Flow of the Text

The first thing I do when I turn to comment on a book is to gain an understanding of the literary structure of my document. I assume that my author set out to achieve his purpose for writing in a logically crafted way. The text does not become for me a literary specimen on which I am to perform an autopsy; I rather view it as a dynamic attempt to inform or persuade its readers, and my task is to get inside the text to see how that is done. I begin by sketching in a preliminary manner the flow of the document, taking note of its constituent parts, going beyond the usual outlines of the structure of the document. I look for links between the different blocks of text. Such links may be minimal or non-existent. In such cases, it is even more important to ask how the content and order of the blocks reveal something about the larger sequence or structure. It is important in a commentary (as in a doctoral dissertation!) that the transition from one section to another receive explicit comment.

Moving to individual blocks of texts, I am at great pains to identify the rhetorical structure, which requires, first, a determination of the limits or overall structure of the section. I have been struck by how often NT commentators miss the presence of *inclusio*, the practice of creating an

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[17] For the authority of the text, see Christina Shuttleworth Kraus, "Introduction: Reading Commentaries/Commentaries as Reading" in *The Classical Commentary: Histories, Practices, Theory* (ed. Roy K. Gibson and Christina Shuttleworth Kraus; Mnemosyne Suppl. 232; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 4–7; Glenn W. Most, "Preface," in the volume he edited, *Commentaries=Kommentare* (Aporemata 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), viii–xi.

envelope construction that encloses a passage by repeating the same element at the beginning and end, thereby showing what the author intends to say in the section so included. An awareness of this device helps us to see that in 1 Thess 4:3–8, Paul's discussion of sexual morality, what he considers the real theme is holiness or sanctification, which is signaled in the enclosing brackets (vv. 3 and 7) and between them (v. 4). It is this motivation for and quality of the conduct inculcated that makes Christian conduct different from the pagans who do not know God, rather than the behavior itself.

138 | After identifying these units of text, the commentator segments the text into smaller units, *lemmata*, for comment. This is an extremely difficult and hazardous procedure.[18] Choosing certain words or phrases perforce means that the text is being atomized, and some *lemmata* are thought to be more important than others, a decision informed by the commentator's own preconception and judgment. Particularly worrying to me is that *lemmata* themselves become part of Frank Dobie's dead bones that are moved from one commentary hole to another, and a tradition is created that decides what is worthy of comment. In a sense, the authority of the text is violated, for now it is arrayed before the reader as a series of dissected parts which invite discussion of themselves without their linkage to their context.

This type of commentary neglects terribly the syntactical relationship of the constituent parts of a text, which makes it impossible to construct its meaning. Examples of this procedure are A.S. Pease's commentaries on Cicero[19] and Howard Marshall's on the Pastoral Epistles.[20] Such commentaries can be very learned and sometimes useful in other ways than to illuminate the text before one, but they can also be very dull. Still, they can also be entertaining, when written by a certain type of scholar we seldom have the good fortune to encounter in our professional conferences, such as the old scholar on Chaucer that C.S. Lewis describes:

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[18] See Shuttleworth Kraus, "Introduction," 10–16.

[19] E.g., Arthur S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De divinatione: Libri II* (2 vols.; UISLL 6 and 8; Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1920–1923; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963); Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum: Libri III* (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955–58; repr., Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968).

[20] I. Howard Marshall, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999).

> What a glory-hole is the commentary of an old author. One minute you are puzzling out a quotation from a French medieval romance: the next, you are being carried back to Plato: then a scrap of medieval law: then something about geomancy: and manuscripts, and the signs of the Zodiac, and a modern proverb 'reported to Mr. Snooks to be common in Derbyshire,' and the precession of the equinoxes, and an Arabian optician (born at Balk in 1030), five smoking room stories, the origins of the doctrine of immaculate conception, and why St. Cecilia is the patroness of organists. So one is swept from East to West, and from century to century, equally immersed in each oddity as it comes up.[21]

Unable to match that, I try to retain the integrity of my text.

## Excursus and Digression

Related to extended comment on a *lemma* is the excursus, which I have studiously avoided in the Thessalonians commentary, but may not be able to avoid in the one on the Pastorals. An excursus is really a type of digression, which has a long history in commentary writing. I have learned much from discussions of Simplicius's practice, by himself and others. Simplicius's main concern is to interpret Aristotle's text by imposing a cohesive perspective on a philosophic system that needs clarification. To achieve this, he writes extensive digressions from his textual exegesis of Aristotle's text, which become autonomous sections in which a particular subject is discussed, sometimes systematically.

| Simplicius is self-conscious about his digressions and justifies them. 139 They can be a means by which to present a lot of information, but also one by which to achieve other purposes, such as to interpret the text in a way to harmonize it with others (in Simplicius, with Plato and Theophrastus), or to polemicize. The pedagogic value of the commentary is thus enhanced by these excursuses, but such systematic summaries divert attention from the flow of the text commented on.[22]

In commentaries on the Bible such digressions are usually titled excursuses, as in Marshall's commentary on the Pastorals, which contains

[21] Quoted by Baltussen, *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius*, 197. The quote originally appears in Walter Hooper, *They Stand Together: The Letters of C.S. Lewis to Arthur Greeves* (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 330.

[22] Simplicius's largely admirable view of exegesis admits of efforts at harmonization. See Simplicius, *In Cat.* 7.23–32, quoted by Baltussen, *Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius*, 33. Golitsis, *Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d'Aristote,* ch. 4, deals with Simplicius's excursuses more extensively.

eleven. Mini-treatises on subjects thought important to the work commented on (e.g., for the Pastorals, godliness [εὐσέβεια], church order, household codes) are Kittel-like additions with frequently no connection to the text where they appear. I am reluctant to use excursuses primarily for this reason and also because I do not find them particularly useful. (I may change my practice in the Pastorals commentary because of the nature of those letters.) In the Thessalonians commentary, for example, I have much to say about paraenesis and psychagogy, subjects with which I am identified by the guild. I know that some readers would like me to provide excursuses on these topics for easy reference, but I won't abet their sloth. If the reader wants to learn about them, the extensive indices in the book refer to the places where I discuss them—in context. I have written long articles on subjects that others might include in the commentary as excursuses, for example, on paraenesis, godliness, and a book on psychagogy. The results of these efforts are summarized at appropriate places in the commentary.

## Literary Character and Purpose

My commentary on the Pastoral Epistles will be different from the one on Thessalonians mainly because the two sets of letters differ as to their literary character and purpose. I could get a handle on Thessalonians by identifying their paraenetic character, informed by the literary culture of the time. The Pastorals are not that easy to classify, and I find the options most frequently offered these days, that they are a kind of church order or directions to delegates, unacceptable. They appear to me closer to the *parangelmata* tradition, which collects advice or instruction under a particular rubric, such as Plutarch's *Advice to Bride and Groom* (*Conjugalia Praecepta*) and *Precepts of Statecraft* (*Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*). The Pastorals consist of blocks of instruction whose connection with each other are not always clear; in fact, the relationship of the precepts within each block cannot always consistently be determined. The syntax is rudimentary, which further atomizes the text.

## The Use of Parallels

In addition to interpreting a text, a commentator produces a reference work. Almost nobody reads through an entire commentary. We consult

commentaries for enlightenment on certain texts and expect to find enough information to meet our focused interest. It is very difficult for me to decide | how much to repeat what I said elsewhere in the commentary 140 to set a particular text in context. If unsuccessful, the commentary's character as reference work will prevail, and the commentary will become a chain of mini-treatises which adduce parallels from hither and yon in the conviction that they provide the key to understanding. Parallels must be used with discrimination and their use must be disciplined by relating them to the commented text.[23]

A good example of how not to use parallels is the article on 1 Tim 6:3–12 in a recent issue of *Novum Testamentum*.[24] The author has scoured ancient literature for certain words that are used in this section of text, and claims that a Cynic frame of mind can be detected in the argument in the text. It is nice to have the parallels collected, but it would have been even nicer if the author had done basic exegesis of 1 Tim 6:3–12, which would have called into question his choice of vv. 3–12 as a unit as well as his identification of sub-units which show how the argument progresses.

## Conclusion

Given my orientation, described in the beginning of this paper, I confront the enduring challenge to situate my text appropriately in the literary culture of its time. I write for a readership that generally is not familiar with the sources I think useful to understand my text, and I am therefore aware of my pedagogic responsibility to provide ample evidence of the relevance of that material to my interpretation. That could open me to the criticism that I make Paul a Hellenistic moral philosopher, despite my efforts to stress the differences between Paul and the philosophers.[25]

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[23] On the use of parallels, see Shuttleworth Kraus, "Introduction," 20–22; See, e.g., Roy K. Gibson, "A Typology of 'Parallels' and the Role of Commentaries in Latin Poetry" in Gibson and Shuttleworth Kraus, *The Classical Commentary*, 331–357; L. Michael White and John T. Fitzgerald, "*Quod est comparandum*: The Problem of Parallels," in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Thomas H. Olbricht, and L. Michael White; NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 12–39.

[24] Nils Neumann, "Kein Gewinn=Gewinn: Die kynisch geprägte Struktur der Argumentation in 1 Tim 6:3–12," *NovT* 51 (2009): 127–147.

[25] I am criticized by Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 9–10, passim, for drawing attention to what I consider differences.

I can only hope that my effort to situate the NT texts in their cultural context may contribute to further study of the letters on which I comment as the edge of strangeness wears off. In the meantime, I am aware of the danger of giving the reader rather more of Hellenistic moral philosophy than is necessary.[26] Nevertheless, that is what this Ulysses has met and is part of.

[26] I think that I approached the limit in my treatment of 1 Thess 4:9–12.

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